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2nd SENAC Advisory Group Meeting Report: Summary of Meeting on Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity in WFP November, 2005 © World Food Programme, Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN) This report was prepared under the umbrella of the “Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity” (SENAC) project. The SENAC project aims to reinforce WFP’s capacity to assess humanitarian needs in the food sector during emergencies and the immediate aftermath through accurate and impartial needs assessments. United Nations World Food Programme Headquarters: Via C.G. Viola 68, Parco de’ Medici, 00148, Rome, Italy ODAN Emergency Needs Assessment Branch SENAC Project Coordinator: Darlene Tymo Tel: +39 06 6513 3608 E-mail: Darlene.Tymo@wfp.org SENAC Methodology Specialist: Agnès Dhur Tel: +39 06 6513 3650 E-mail: Agnes.Dhur@wfp.org SENAC Pre-Crisis Information Specialist: Jan Delbaere Tel: +39 06 6513 3256 E-mail: Jan.Delbaere@wfp.org This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union.

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2nd SENAC Advisory Group Meeting Report ___________________________________________________________ November 2005

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Background and Purpose of Meeting.......................................................................... 8 II. Achievements of SENAC Project and Future Priorities ............................................. 9

A. The Role of Markets ............................................................................................... 9 B. The Effects of Food Aid ....................................................................................... 11 C. Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity ............................................................... 13 D. Non-Food Responses to Food Insecurity in Emergencies .................................... 15 E. Pre-crisis Information ........................................................................................... 16

III. Lessons from Field Practice................................................................................... 17 A. WFP Field Perspectives and Case Studies............................................................ 17 B. Lessons from EFSA Practice in Ethiopia and Niger ........................................... 19

IV. Panel Discussions of Outstanding Issues................................................................ 20 A. EFSA Process, Collaboration and Quality Standards .......................................... 20 B. EFSA and the Link to Response Decisions.......................................................... 20

V. Advisory Group Consultation with WFP Management............................................ 21 Acronyms.......................................................................................................................... 23 Annex 1: Annotated Agenda............................................................................................. 24 Annex 2: List of Participants ............................................................................................ 27 Annex 3: Update on Theme 1 - The Role of Markets....................................................... 29 Annex 4: Update on Theme 2 - The Effects of Food Aid................................................. 32 Annex 5: Update on Theme 3 - Chronic versus Transitory Food Insecurity.................... 36 Annex 6: Update on Theme 4 - Non-Food Responses in Emergencies............................ 41 Annex 7: Update on Theme 5 - Pre-crisis Information..................................................... 44

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Report of the 2nd Advisory Group Meeting on Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity

in WFP (SENAC) 2 – 4 November 2005, Rome and Castel Gandolfo

I. Background and Purpose of Meeting The Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC) project funded by ECHO represents a major element of WFP’s corporate effort to improve emergency needs assessments (ENAs), as outlined in two WFP Executive Board policy decisions in 2004. The SENAC activities, which effectively began in early 2005, concentrate on five themes: (1) the role of markets; (2) the effects of food aid; (3) chronic and transitory food insecurity; (4) non-food responses to food insecurity in emergencies; and (5) pre-crisis information. The overall goal is to improve methods and guidance in these areas, and build sufficient baseline information on household food security status and risks in countries where this information is lacking or outdated. Guidance is provided by a Steering Committee of donors and partners, while the five thematic areas are guided by an Advisory Group of experts. The purpose of the meeting was to review the key outputs of the SENAC activities during Phase 1, using the recent Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) and Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) in Niger and the Darfur assessment (EFSA combined with nutrition and market analysis) as case studies. It also served to review the proposed 2006 Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA) implementation plan, including Phase 2 of the SENAC project, and to re-visit the role of the Advisory Group in 2006. The meeting was organized into two sessions: a series of presentations held in WFP Headquarters (Rome) to present the initial findings of three research themes to interested WFP staff and donor representatives, and a two-day meeting in Castel Gandolfo involving all Advisory Group members, WFP staff, donors and partners, including non-governmental organizations. (See Annex 1 and Annex 2, respectively, for the agenda and list of participants.) This document provides a brief summary of the meeting’s main outputs, including the major achievements to date in implementing SENAC activities and the priorities and challenges identified for 2006. These topics are organized by thematic area (Section II), practical experience from the field (Section III), and outstanding issues regarding partnerships and WFP’s role in non-food response options as discussed by two panels (Section IV). Section V contains a summary of remarks made to WFP Operations Department management by the Advisory Group chair. Additional information for each theme is provided by brief papers prepared by the Advisory Group heads and distributed at the meeting (Annexes 3 – 7).

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II. Achievements of SENAC Project and Future Priorities A. The Role of Markets1 The work on markets remains a high priority for WFP, because overly pessimistic assumptions about the role of markets in addressing food supply shocks are viewed as the most important factor affecting potential overstatements of the level of food aid imports required. This can in turn lead to possible negative effects on markets, including displacement of commercial imports and disincentives. To date, WFP has progressed by developing extensive sections on markets in the EFSA Handbook (July 2004), and beginning to develop templates for standardized market profiles and establish pre-crisis market baselines in 16 countries. For example, field work on price analysis, market structures and commodity flows is progressing relatively well. Specific market studies have also been conducted in several countries, e.g. to inform local purchases in Mozambique and review potential market impacts of food aid in Lesotho and Swaziland. In Darfur, several methods were used to assess the potential for markets to fill food deficits, including (1) analysis of household’s purchases of cereals and (2) comparing how much cash was spent on cereal purchases to information on prices, but more guidance is needed on this topic. Although these efforts are at an early stage, including only one completed market profile in Niger, some initial challenges were identified by the Advisory Group and the Regional Assessment Officers (RAOs). The efforts to date focus on food supply issues and possible deficits, particularly for cereals markets. They also focus on current or historical market conditions, rather than projections of these conditions. While these areas represent an essential component of required baseline information, more priority should be given to:

Projecting the market response: The baselines represent a snapshot of the existing situation. The Advisory Group recommends that a standardized, simple method be developed to project the likely response of local markets to shocks, and estimate the potential for different market interventions to mitigate the shock (e.g. through transport subsidies, changes in credits and tariff policies). This model would assess how the market would respond to food aid imports and local purchases, and the commercial capacity to import additional food; it could be done on a regional level. The RAOs would also appreciate a tool to estimate at which point market functioning is sufficient to (a) fill the food supply gap and/or (b) support cash-based responses.

1 This section combines the presentations by Paul Dorosh, World Bank, and Simon Dradri, WFP Regional Market Assessment Officer.

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Monitoring and analysing price trends over time: The Advisory Group suggests that more emphasis be placed on regular monitoring and basic analysis of price trends over time; this would include comparisons of prices in local and neighbouring markets. The Niger market analysis is a very good start but should go further. Much of this data is already collected but needs to be better managed (data entry, cleaning, storage and access) and analysed.

Looking beyond national borders: To date, the market studies have tended to

focus too heavily on the national situation while overlooking the role and importance of cross-border trade. For example, the lack of analysis of the Nigerian market situation was a major factor in underestimating the need for imports in Niger.

Assessing livestock and local labour markets: Initial analysis has focused on food

markets, but more effort should be placed on assessing the livestock and local labour markets to understand livelihoods. However, this will be difficult and requires high analytical capacity, which may stretch staff resources. When time or staff capacity is limited, assessments of crop markets should take priority.

Strengthen coordination of market analysis: Market data collected by different

units in WFP—including the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) unit, the procurement unit, the economic analysis unit of the Policy and Programme Support Division, and RAO market analysts—should be better coordinated.

Key challenges in the markets area include:

Theory versus practice: The analytical work required to develop useable market models is substantial; even a simple spreadsheet model requires extensive data so background work is necessary before a crisis. The market modelling tool may therefore be more suitable for pre-crisis baselines. Tools need to be developed that translate theoretical market concepts into practice, can be used rapidly in emergencies, and are user-friendly so that non-specialists can apply them.

Operational challenges: Integrating the market work with the other EFSA work is

logistically and practically difficult, as they involve different units of analysis (households versus markets). When a crisis affects large areas, it is not possible for a single market person to conduct the analysis, particularly as much time is required to verify weak or poor quality data, e.g. on price changes.

Building expertise: WFP’s analytical capacity at the local/regional/headquarters

level needs to be strengthened to carry out in-depth analysis of markets.

Longer-term issues: In the future, work should be undertaken to identify ways to support or stimulate markets after the crisis.

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B. The Effects of Food Aid The work under this theme has focused on two desk reviews on whether food aid causes dependency or affects migration patterns at the community or household level. Both include suggestions on how to assess these issues in EFSAs. The authors of both studies identified the lack of quality and empirical rigour in most of the literature reviewed, including the failure to differentiate sufficiently between correlation (two events that share an underlying cause) and causation (one event directly causes another). The studies point out the lack of a clear definition of dependency, and that the effects can be positive or negative according to the time factor. Positive dependency is a goal of humanitarian organizations: people ought to be assisted when they cannot meet their immediate basic needs without assistance. Negative dependency is defined as when actions to assist people meet their current needs reduce their capacity to meet their future basic needs. The main potential causes of dependency were identified as:

1) ex ante: before food aid arrives, the expectation of aid can fill in (positive) or crowd out/replace (negative) private or community forms of insurance, such as safety nets or remittances, or lead to increased risk-taking (“moral hazard”) and

2) ex post: after food aid is delivered, this transfer leads to increased income and food supply, but may affect prices and trade flows.

In theory, the potential risks of food aid dependency at community level include reduced local and national production; displacement of commercial purchases; reduced incentives for saving and activities devoted to community solidarity; and lower remittances. At the household level, the risks include reduced incentives for production and increases in leisure consumption. As reported in practice, the desk studies found: A thin evidence base: Overall, the case that food aid causes negative dependency

is “not proven”. In particular, there is no evidence of impacts of food aid on the level of national production, especially in the medium/long term. Also, there is little evidence that food aid replaces remittances or encourages moral hazard. Food-for-work (FFW) activities may encourage opportunistic behaviour, but this effect can be reduced by the use of participatory techniques.

Contextual factors are important: Negative effects, including price changes

affecting producers, are most likely (a) in local markets that are weak or not well integrated, and thus more susceptible to large price decreases, and (b) when aid is poorly timed, unreliable or badly targeted.

Households actively pursue diverse livelihood strategies: Most households do not

rely on food aid, therefore there are no ex ante insurance effects, nor is there convincing evidence that FFW discourages home production. Migration is an important coping strategy

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The following priorities and challenges were identified for this thematic area: Need for more rigorous studies to test dependency “myth”: Although many

studies are based primarily on anecdotes, they have fostered a negative view of food aid which has been adopted by a number of governments and donors. WFP may face criticism if it does not actively seek to defuse the myths and reduce the risks of negative dependency. Thus, WFP should sponsor more rigorous studies on dependency, including the potential effects on traders. However, the issue of dependency was considered to be a second order issue for EFSAs, particularly because the dependency effects usually arise from programming and policy decisions rather than from inaccurate needs assessments. (As subsequently discussed in the Advisory Group meeting, WFP will need to determine whether the work on dependency should be transferred from the SENAC project to other units within WFP, e.g. the Policy and Programme Support Division or the Office of Evaluation.)

Improved tools and guidance: The studies make some suggestions on how to

improve existing ENA guidance and tools on assessing negative effects (e.g. collect data on local wage rates, credit rates and availability, and remittances). However, both desk reviews should be more specific on how to improve guidance for incorporation in the EFSA Handbook. A typology or practical checklist of when, where and why food aid might lead to negative effects, and recommendations on what effects to monitor, would be useful. However, standard tools may be difficult to develop as many of the factors leading to negative effects/dependency are highly contextual.

Assessment of effects at other levels: The risks of dependency at the market,

government and institutional level should also be considered. Examples include Ethiopia, where long-term provision of food aid may have promoted dependency of both national and local governments, and Uganda, where local purchases have supported traders whose livelihoods may suffer if food aid is replaced by cash-based programmes.

A number of additional points were made during discussion of this topic. It was noted that the role of government policies (such as trade restrictions or biases against food aid) in creating adverse incentives or effects also needs to be taken into account, as does the scale of food aid compared with the volume of imports. For example, the bias against food aid in Zambia led to negative effects on food security. Also, it was suggested that the alpha value may be used to indicate the potential for negative effects in emergency settings. Cash transfers face similar criticisms as food aid regarding potential negative effects, but little research has been conducted on this topic. Regarding the importance of contextual factors, it was noted that even late arrival of food aid can have positive effects. For example, when merchants in Bangladesh knew that food aid would eventually be provided after the floods in 2002, they lent food to the poor. Once WFP’s food aid arrived, it was used to pay back the loans. Finally, it may not be essential to prove causation, but to explore the “proximate causes” of dependency.

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C. Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity The main expected outputs of this thematic group are two desk reviews, to identify (a) EFSA methods and tools for distinguishing between chronic and transitory food insecurity and evaluate the effects of shocks on these different livelihood groups, and (b) factors that trigger emergency needs assessments in slow onset crises and operational guidance for launching and exiting from assistance programmes. Although this work is at an early stage, some preliminary findings were presented: Need to clarify terms and focus on the magnitude of food insecurity: Existing

definitions of chronic and transitory food insecurity are unclear, and tend to confuse two dimensions: timeframe (duration of food insecurity) and intensity/severity (whether the condition is moderate or acute). As a trigger for emergency programmes, the magnitude of the food gap is more important; thus groups facing acute food insecurity should be the main recipients of emergency food aid.

Using transitory food insecurity to trigger EFSAs and emergency responses is

problematic: In many cases, transitory food insecurity is treated as severe (e.g. in Bosnia in 1992, a transitory moderate situation received a disproportionate response), while chronic conditions are equated with moderate food insecurity and receive inadequate assistance (e.g. Somalia in 2002).

Important linkages between transitory and chronic food insecurity may be

captured through a “composite food insecurity” concept: The effects of even small shocks on chronically insecure people living at the edge of subsistence, and of repeated “sharp shocks” or food insecurity “ratchets” that lead to destitution of transitorily affected groups, cause overlapping and multiple vulnerability. When shocks occur, both the chronic and transitory groups are pushed lower on the food insecurity scale, but the chronically affected are likely to be more vulnerable and merit greater attention.2

Important EFSA triggers may be overlooked: The main factors leading to

inadequate assessments of crises are (1) failure to investigate anecdotes, (2) uncritical acceptance of official statistics. Best practice involves verification of statistics and anecdotes, including attention to reconciling inconsistencies in key indicators monitored (e.g. Malawi in 2001-2002).

Future priorities and challenges in this field include:

2 During the discussions, the concept of composite food security was found to require clarification before the next draft of the desk review.

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Development of a protocol for EFSAs: Several established methods to measure food insecurity, including dietary diversity, the Coping Strategy Index (CSI), the Household Economy Approach (HEA) and famine scales are being reviewed to see how well they contribute to key aspects of chronic and transitory food insecurity in an EFSA. Field testing of protocol involving various methodologies will occur in 2006.

Technical and political difficulties of differentiating chronic and transitory

groups: Pressure is being put on assessments to differentiate chronic and transitory groups (e.g. in Southern Africa) but guidance is lacking. When both groups reside in the same areas, it was questioned whether current survey instruments used by WFP permit differentiation. Also, most methods do not provide thresholds indicating when people move from one level to another or information on duration. Possibly useful methods include: (1) where baseline data exists, using a threshold-based approach (e.g. famine scale; being applied in Somalia); (2) identifying chronic households as those that can not purchase food when prices are at the long-term average (used in East Sudan); and (3) using asset thresholds. Finally, political pressures often make it difficult to apply labels or thresholds, e.g. countries that do not want to admit to chronic food insecurity problems or that a crisis constitutes a famine.

Programming challenges: Ideally, responses need to be tailored to transitory and

chronic problems, with emergency operations focused on saving lives for chronic groups (likely to be acutely food insecure after a shock) and saving livelihoods for transitory groups (likely to be moderately food insecure, at least in the immediate post-shock period). An innovative example is the Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), which seeks to provide cash or developmental programmes to a core group of chronically food-insecure communities, to be augmented with emergency responses when a crisis arises. In practice, it is difficult to target (i.e. develop simple selection criteria) and implement different programmes for these two groups. This fact led one participant to suggest that making distinctions between chronic and transitory food insecurity may be artificial, particularly in the early post-crisis stages.

Identify a minimum set of triggers/indicators to monitor: In countries without

annual assessments or data collection, a minimum set of triggers for a food security crisis would include (1) increases in food prices (admittedly a somewhat late indicator); (2) food supply data based on analysis of climate, production figures; and (3) data on incomes sources and migration. Because most accepted indicators of malnutrition are “late”, a core set of early indicators, possibly including dietary diversity, would be useful. Also, increased prevalence of malnutrition from sentinel clinics can be a fairly rapid indicator in chronic situations.

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D. Non-Food Responses to Food Insecurity in Emergencies A desk review of data from about 50 reports by NGOs, donors, UN agencies and consultants was conducted to determine whether need assessments by food aid agencies have led to non-food aid interventions, and if did not, why. The review was hampered by the relatively low quality of data and the lack of essential information (e.g. few examples were found of written assessments and the team had difficulty linking these with established programmes and any evaluations which covered both). The findings of this review are: Conducting good assessments of food and non-food responses faces numerous

challenges: These include time and political pressures to conduct rapid assessments so urgent humanitarian needs are met, diagnostic bias stemming from agencies’ mandates, and different timeframes and objectives (e.g. focus on saving lives or livelihoods).

Analyses focus on symptoms and responses are predominantly food aid:

Insufficient analysis is conducted of underlying causes of food insecurity, such as market failure, land use issues, or poverty. The “decision tree” in practice promotes food aid first and only afterward considers potential market responses.

The analysis suggested that there is no single preferred approach for assessing non-food responses, and WFP’s EFSA Handbook already contains many of the essential concepts. The following additional approaches and challenges were identified: Iterative or multi-stage assessments are essential: Rapid initial assessments need

to be complemented with more in-depth assessments and linked to monitoring systems. WFP has already adopted this approach.

A livelihoods approach to EFSA: Although a full-scale livelihoods assessment

may not be realistic for all EFSAs, it is essential to incorporate a number of livelihood elements. Best practice would involve (1) identification of livelihood groups and zones; (2) analysis of relevant processes, institutions and policies affecting households (e.g. terms of trade); (3) increased use of historical, conflict and commodity chain analysis; (4) review of which assets are most important for the livelihood strategies of different groups; and (5) greater links with health and nutrition data. This approach identifies a wide range of interventions to support households’ livelihood goals.

Use a simple decision tree for food aid: An example of a simple decision tree was

developed by Dan Maxwell: (1) if markets are functioning, food aid is not imported; (2) when food is available in regional markets, local purchases are favoured; (3) imported food aid is provided only when local and regional markets

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cannot respond adequately. However, decisions on food versus non-food responses are rarely an “either/or” option.

Implementation capacity and agency mandates are major operational challenges:

Responses are generally crafted according to agency mandates, raising the issue of who can synthesize information and establish priorities for food and non-food responses to food insecurity. Also, limited field capacity to implement non-food responses in emergencies is a major problem. Although WFP’s implementation role is currently unclear, it should advocate for non-food responses and expand its work on markets, including labour and livestock markets. Improved partnerships between food aid and other sectors, e.g. nutrition, are essential.

E. Pre-crisis Information The work on CFSVAs has progressed substantially, leading to a better understanding of food insecurity problems in countries where the existing database is weak. WFP has standardized basic primary data collection tools, adopted a livelihoods framework, used consumption/access matrices and incorporated market analysis in these baselines. Among the main implementation issues identified were: CFSVA are often too long and descriptive: Decision-makers require concise,

useable and “marketable” documents; the Niger summary document was a useful model.

More reliance on local, multidisciplinary teams: CFSVAs should rely less on

external consultants to ensure consistent analysis and technical quality and to ensure that the local context is not overlooked. Also, they should make more use of multi-disciplinary expertise on teams rather than having a single person in the lead.

Partnership: Much of the pre-crisis baseline work is heavily WFP oriented, and

could be oriented to a broader audience. Baselines should include information that can be used by everyone, and subsequently analysed as required. A common “platform” should be established for collection and storage of the data, e.g. the Vulnerability Analysis Committees.

The effort to establish food security monitoring systems (FSMS) is slower, but WFP has a comparative advantage in providing household level data for use in existing monitoring systems. The research priorities for the pre-crisis information theme include: Need for clear, unified operational model for food insecurity: Information from

EFSAs, CFSVAs, FSMS and monitoring/evaluation information needs to be standardized and integrated. This should be based on clear indicators, and on a data model that articulates the links between food insecurity, vulnerability, and

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programming decisions. The planned research activities, which include a review of CFSVA guidelines and practice and of ways of measuring dietary diversity, will help lead to greater standardization of WFP’s approach. Also, peer reviews will be conducted of the comprehensive vulnerability assessments.

Integrating market, nutrition and household food security data: An analytical tool

is required to integrate the data gathered using these diverse methods. It should also include those priority indicators identified under the other SENAC thematic groups.

Other useful activities: Each country office should have a readily available

repository of population data, established during the CFSVA. A good inventory of CFSVA datasets should be compiled and made available to practitioners. A standard template should be developed for outputs.

III. Lessons from Field Practice

A. WFP Field Perspectives and Case Studies Actual progress to date and remaining challenges were reviewed from the perspectives of the RAOs, a Regional Programme Advisor, and staff involved in the recent work in Darfur and Niger. The EFSA Handbook has been an important reference tool for developing best practice, and capacity-building activities are underway. The ongoing and planned thematic research topics are all considered relevant for field operations. Among the highlights of recent EFSAs and CFSVAs are: Sampling and population data: The importance of rigorous sampling has been

recognized. In Darfur, all areas were included in the sampling frame regardless of access, and a representative sample was drawn for each of the three states, allowing comparison between them. Availability of adequate population statistics remained a major limitation.

Combining food security, nutrition and market analysis in EFSAs: In Darfur, all

three analyses were conducted simultaneously. A single household questionnaire was used, and anthropometric measurements made in the same households, reducing duplication of efforts and permitting analysis of the correlation between food security and nutritional data. In Niger, it was not possible to partner with UNICEF during the EFSA because of late consultations between the two agencies. (It was noted that the TANGO East Sudan study also combined health, nutrition, and market information with the livelihood and food security data.)

Innovative approaches in Niger: The Niger CFSVA included joint analysis of

food access and dietary diversity indicators, which was not done in earlier

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baselines. The EFSA attempted to differentiate chronic and transitory groups by comparing household information on seven indicators. Niger is also the first country where the SENAC outputs – CFSVA, market profile, EFSA – were all conducted, so it is important to test whether these exercises are useful for comparing pre- and post-crisis conditions.

Several outstanding issues and challenges with implementing and linking these tools were highlighted by these recent field experiences: 3 Difficulty linking the CFSVA, market profile and EFSA: In Niger, it was not

possible to compare directly the food security groups identified by the EFSA with those in the CFSVA because of the different timing, sample frame and variables included in the statistical analysis of these different exercises. Although market monitoring information on prices was useful, it was not possible to link directly market data with the information on household-level effects.

Problems with use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA): As found in the

Niger EFSA, PCA is very complex and time-consuming, and the resulting clusters still include a certain amount of “subjectivity”. An attempt was made to compare the PCA food consumption groups to those obtained using a “basic ration” approach, which analysed data on reported food consumption in terms of how much it contributed to meet minimum nutritional requirements (kilocalories, protein, and lipids). Differences were observed but time did not allow pursuing the research on the reasons for some discrepancies. In the Darfur case, it was questioned whether the same clusters could be replicated as those identified by the previous year’s EFSA.

Different approaches to zoning: The use of different zoning techniques

(livelihood, agro-ecological and administrative boundaries) to isolate areas with similar food security characteristics remains an issue. In some cases, different zoning approaches are used by different partners or for different exercises. The possibility of combining agro-ecological and livelihood zones, and the need to test intra- and inter-zone variability were discussed.

Targeting difficulties: In Niger, the livelihood groups did not match neatly with

the three food security groups (severe or moderate food insecurity, or “at risk” for their livelihoods). Also, the indicators describing the food security groups could not always be feasibly applied for targeting.

Additional methods required: Field staff need a broader range of quantitative and

qualitative tools, including methods for food gap estimation, population estimates, differentiating chronic and transitory food insecurity, and integrating monitoring information and nutrition and health data into EFSAs. They would also appreciate lessons from the use of the CSI as a proxy for food insecurity. While SENAC

3 See Section II, A for additional information on market analysis challenges.

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currently appears to focus on quantitative techniques, WFP needs to start giving priority to a better balance between qualitative and quantitative methods.

B. Lessons from EFSA Practice in Ethiopia and Niger James Darcy, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), presented highlights from ODI’s recent reviews of EFSA Practice in Ethiopia and of the humanitarian situation in Niger, in particular the links between assessments and decision-making. In Ethiopia, the government-led assessment was based on sound methods in theory, but not in practice. Despite professed inclusion of access and livelihood elements in the assessment model, it was still primarily focused on food availability/supply issues. No standard approach was used, and qualitative approaches were used to develop quantitative estimates on beneficiary numbers. These numbers were subject to negotiation and were mainly based on the previous year’s needs. The lesson is that credible EFSAs are the key to avoiding politicization. In Niger, although donors were accused of not responding to funding requests, this view overlooks a number of mistakes made by the early warning and needs assessment processes. Early warning systems failed to grasp the importance of price increases, or to investigate changes in household’s coping strategies. The needs assessments disagreed on the scale and nature of the crisis, such as whether it was a famine and whether it was a generalized or local problem. Indeed, WFP’s flash appeal only requested a small amount of food aid to scale up existing development operations, in part because of strong anti-food aid sentiments and reluctance to shift from development to emergency measures. The result is that donors were given conflicting messages, and remained unconvinced of the overall level of needs. These two cases suggest that the estimation of needs is driven by expectations of donor’s resource allocations. Future assessments should provide a risk analysis of which groups will be affected by what events, and for how long, as the basis for developing appropriate interventions. This involves identification of several “spheres” of risk: immediate, medium and longer-term risks. Communicating these risks and linkages clearly to donors is the key to obtaining buy-in and support; complex analysis must be turned into marketable products. Also, better funding mechanisms are required for preventive responses in slow-onset situations. In the subsequent discussion, it was noted that the 2005 appeal in Ethiopia was not the best “snapshot” to look at EFSA practice, because of the high level of political interference by both donors and government that year. It was suggested that responses are never solely based on technical recommendations, but almost always are subject to political and operational concerns; thus negotiation is “inevitable”. Disagreement was expressed with the view that ENAs are driven by resource allocations; other factors such as the application by donors of different standards to different countries are more important.

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IV. Panel Discussions of Outstanding Issues4

A. EFSA Process, Collaboration and Quality Standards This panel discussed whether WFP should retain an independent assessment role vis-à-vis government and other partners, and whether it should establish general standards for good EFSA practice. The panel was unanimous in stating that in general, WFP should not undertake independent assessments, because as a United Nations agency its primary role is to support governments. Also, collaborating with a range of partners increases credibility and brings many resource and logistical advantages, such as pooling transport and staff. Although collaboration involves frustrations and compromises, it is implausible that it leads to less accurate or “objective” assessments. As observed in Tanzania and Sudan, fielding separate EFSAs leads to conflicting messages and divided donors. The panel agreed on the need for quality standards, without elaborating on this topic. Other participants suggested that independent EFSAs should be used in some cases. The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions (CFSAMs) retain independence over the final results, but this does not mean that no collaboration takes place. A distinction should be made between consultation and consensus; consensus is not necessary in all cases, and may not necessarily lead to a bad “compromise” position. Also, in some cases there may be no effective government or other partners, calling for independent EFSAs. Finally, independence does not just mean acting alone, but involves an element of objectivity or avoidance of bias.

B. EFSA and the Link to Response Decisions This panel discussed three main questions: Given WFP’s mandate and capacities, what is the rationale for carrying out

comprehensive assessments that encompass more than possible food aid responses? Comprehensive assessments allow WFP to move toward a food security framework, allowing it to better align its programmes to initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction strategies, and to increase its involvement in nutrition programmes. It would also reduce bias and lead to improved consolidated appeals and CFSAMs. A remaining issue is whether WFP has the right mix of people and competencies to adequately assess non-food (including market and policy) responses.

4 Two panels were asked to discuss key challenges related to assessments. Panel A was composed of Joyce Luma, WFP; Nicole Menage, WFP; Gary Eilerts, FEWS NET; and Michael O’Donnell, SCF-UK; Panel B was composed of Georgia Shaver, WFP; Kisan Gunjal, FAO; Peter Walker, Tufts University; and Wolfgang Herbinger, WFP.

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How should WFP position itself on the wider questions of food security and livelihood interventions? This decision was viewed as mainly being up to donors and WFP’s Executive Board, in light of possible concerns regarding WFP’s mandate vis-à-vis other agencies. It will also depend on establishing valid partnerships with other agencies, such as the World Bank (e.g. in the Ethiopia PSNP) or UNICEF. Beneficiaries would benefit from a wider role for WFP, which was seen as the best “leader” in terms of field presence, advocacy and operations in support of food aid. However, WFP may not have sufficient competence (actual or perceived) to take a full leadership role. WFP could undertake some pilot non-food activities to support food security.

How do EFSAs actually inform decision-making on WFP’s responses? In

addition to establishing the needs for operations, EFSAs help to inform decisions on local purchases and on non-food needs. The main reasons why EFSAs are delinked from programming decisions are that resources were not provided, programmers questioned the credibility of the EFSA, or there was insufficient analysis of implementation capacity.

V. Advisory Group Consultation with WFP Management This section contains remarks made by James Darcy, chair of the Advisory Group, to WFP Operations Department management following the workshop. The Advisory Group was impressed by the progress that has been made. Two things in particular stood out: The progress that has been made in developing assessment methods and practice

(e.g. in the Darfur EFSA), and the way in which results are being presented. The honesty and transparency with which problems encountered during

assessments, methodological and practical, are being discussed (e.g. in Niger). There are three main reasons why emergency assessment as a whole, and the SENAC process in particular, are very important. First, ENA is essential for informing programming decisions – for ensuring that interventions are appropriate, targeted, effective and efficient. Without good assessment, you cannot hope to gauge the effects of your interventions. Some of the specific thematic work under SENAC – e.g. on understanding the workings of markets at times of crisis – should be particularly helpful in this regard. Second, ENA provides a relatively objective basis with which to resist some of the political and institutional pressures and biases that may cause figures to be inflated or down-played. These pressures may be internal to WFP as well as external – senior managers at regional and headquarters level need some consistent basis on which to

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judge whether the analysis coming from the Country Office is reliable and reasonably comparable with that coming from other offices. Third, there is a growing demand from donors for more evidence-based funding requests, as well as institutional pressure for results-based management. Donors themselves are under growing pressure to demonstrate results and respond according to need to the most urgent cases. But on what basis does a donor decide the relative priority of funding, e.g. Ethiopia versus Southern Africa? The credibility of WFP’s appeals is at issue: donors do not necessarily trust WFP appeals, therefore the Programme will need to be able to substantiate its requests with robust analysis based on credible assessment. Some of the implications of this are: There is a need for a substantially greater investment in ‘diagnostics’. This is true of the humanitarian system as a whole, which invests proportionately far too little in this area. For WFP particularly, the need to invest is underscored by the increase by a factor of two or three in recent years of the size of its emergency operations. The SENAC project, including investing in RAOs, is taking things in the right direction, but WFP will need to maintain and build that investment beyond the life of SENAC. This involves both continued work on methods and, crucially, in the practical skills of assessment. However, there is a wide gulf between theory and practice. The methods have to be simple, robust and adaptable to context and staff need the requisite practical and analytical skills to make sense of them. Another implication is the use of short- to medium-term food security as the framework for emergency assessment. This is absolutely the right approach, but it raises some important challenges. Inevitably, such assessments will throw up response options that range beyond food aid. The question is then, what does WFP do with these? They might include anything from protection-related interventions (e.g. aiming to ensure safe access to markets or fields), through livelihood and market support options such as de-stocking or price subsidy, to the transfer of resources other than food – e.g. cash or vouchers. There is a vital need for leadership in this field of emergency food security. Given the scale on which it operates and the extent of its field presence, WFP is probably the only agency that can provide such leadership. Finally, the Advisory Group would like to stress the link with decision-making, and the importance of transparency and good communication. You may conduct the best needs assessments in the world, but if they cannot be translated into terms that decision-makers can use in establishing priorities for resource allocation, they are of strictly limited value. It is essential to present the results in summary form in a way that is simple, clear and compelling. That does not, of course, mean that problems and uncertainties should be glossed over. It does mean that you should be able to set out the key facts, as you understand them; a prognosis or risk analysis of predicted short and medium term outcomes based on those facts; and how it is that your responses are designed to avert the most serious of those outcomes. For both internal and external purposes, this provides the basis for informed and accountable decision-making.

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Acronyms CFSAM FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission CFSVA Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis CSI Coping Strategy Index EFSA Emergency Food Security Assessment ENA Emergency Needs Assessment FFW Food for work FSMS Food Security Monitoring System HEA Household Economy Approach (SCF-UK) PCA Principal Component Analysis PSNP Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia) RAO Regional Assessment Officer SENAC Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity in WFP VAM Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping

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Annex 1: Annotated Agenda

2nd SENAC Advisory Group Meeting

2-4 November 2005, WFP HQ/Castel Gandolfo, Italy

Wednesday 2 November 2005 Chair: Tim Frankenberger, TANGO International Morning Session, Holiday Inn, Parco de’ Medici 9:00-10:30 Non-food aid solutions to acute food insecurity: Findings and lessons for

emergency assessments – Peter Walker & Elizabeth Stites, Feinstein International Famine Centre, Tufts University

10:30-11:00 Break 11:00 – 12:30 Food aid and dependency: Implications for emergency food security

assessments – Erin Lentz, Cornell University and John Hoddinott, IFPRI

Afternoon Session, WFP HQ, Delegate’s Lounge 14:00 – 15:30 Chronic and Transitory Food Insecurity: Triggering Assessments in Slow

Onset Crises – Stephen Devereux, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex 16:30 (at WFP HQ) Advisory Group planning meeting (James Darcy - Chair, Tim Frankenberger - Facilitator, David Kaatrud, Wolfgang Herbinger, Joyce Luma, Darlene Tymo, Jan Delbaere, Agnes Dhur) 19:30 (at hotel, Castel Gandolfo) Advisory Group planning meeting for thematic group leaders (Dorosh, Hoddinott, Devereux, Mock, Walker), Chair (Darcy), Facilitator (Frankenberger) Thursday 3 November 2005 8:30 Coffee/pastries 9:00-9:30 Opening of meeting

- David Kaatrud, Director, Assessment, Analysis and Preparedness Service (ODA) - James Darcy, SENAC Advisory Group Chair

Introductions, review agenda, housekeeping issues…..

9:30-11:00 EFSA: What more do we know?

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Five Advisory Group thematic group leaders – Mock, Dorosh, Walker, Devereux, Hoddinott - to each give 10 minute presentation summarizing what we have learned and main outstanding issues in each thematic area.

Tim Frankenberger – to summarize key points from previous day’s presentations/discussions at WFP, focusing on relevance for emergency needs assessments.

11:00-11:15 Break 11:15-12:00 EFSA: What more do we know? (cont…)

WFP Field Perspective: one Regional Assessment Officer (food security), one RAO (markets), and one Regional Bureau manager to each give 10 minute presentation on what works well with EFSA practice and process, and the remaining challenges for WFP.

12:00- 13:15 Case Study: Darfur

EFSA (Wolfgang/Hiro/Andrew); market analysis (Dekha Sheikh); programming. Present the EFSA approach used for October 2004 and October 2005 assessments, what works well, what needs to be improved, and usefulness for programming.

13:15-14:45 Lunch 14:45-16:00 Case Study: Niger

CFSVA (Jan Delbaere); market profile and CFSAM (Geert Beekhuis); EFSA (Agnes Dhur); programming; ODI retrospective (James Darcy). Critical review of whether the SENAC activities are meeting their objectives, linking with other initiatives, and the remaining challenges.

16:00-17:30 Next Steps: Learning from Experience (coffee in groups)

Plenary discussion and then break into five thematic groups to summarize, based on case studies and research findings so far, the remaining challenges and next steps for improving EFSAs.

17:30 Meeting of Advisory Group Thematic Group Heads/SENAC (Darcy, Walker,

Mock, Hoddinott, Dorosh, Devereux, Herbinger, Tymo) Friday 4 November 2005 8:30 Coffee/pastries 9:00-10:00 Next Steps: Learning from Experience (Plenary)

Summarize outstanding issues and next steps, by theme and cross-cutting, based on

previous day’s discussions. 10:00- 11:15 WFP’s ENA Implementation Plan for 2006

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Wolfgang Herbinger (Chief, ODAN) to give overview of ENA workplan and priorities for

2006. Joyce Luma (Chief, ODAV) to give overview of VAM workplan and priorities (highlighting

how SENAC activities fit in). Review how above fit into WFP’s overall strategic plan. Review key recommendations from interim review of SENAC (Goyder report), and WFP’s

response. Discuss priorities for strengthening emergency needs assessment capacity in 2006.

11:15-11:30 Break 11:30-12:30 Lessons from EFSA Practice in Ethiopia

Based on an ODI review in 2005 of WFP assessments in Ethiopia, James Darcy to highlight strengths and weaknesses in current EFSA practice, and opportunities for improvement.

12:30-14:00 Lunch 14:00-16:00 EFSA Scope and Process – Panel Discussion

Two panels to discuss key issues related to assessment challenges. Topics: 1) EFSA process, standards and collaboration and 2) EFSA and the link to response decisions.

16:00 – 16:15 Break 16:15 - 17:30 Role of the SENAC Advisory Group in 2006

• Advisory Group to discuss their role for next year (limited group discussion i.e. Advisory

Group members, Steering Committee members, and SENAC project team)

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Annex 2: List of Participants

Participant Title Organisation Agnes Dhur Methodology Specialist, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome Alexis Hoskins Rapporteur Consultant (WFP, Rome) Annalisa Conte Country Director WFP, Burkina Faso Anne Callanan Senior Programme Advisor, PDPN WFP HQ, Rome Baker Mukeere Food Security Economist, PDPE WFP HQ, Rome Barbara Conte Consultant, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome Bienvenu Djossa Regional Programme Advisor WFP Regional Office, Kampala Bill Barclay Head, CMEA WFP HQ, Rome Cedric Charpentier Asst. Crisis Information Officer,

VAM WFP HQ, Rome

Darlene Tymo Senior Project Coordinator, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome David Kaatrud Director, ODA WFP HQ, Rome Dekha Sheikh Regional Assessment Officer,

Markets WFP Regional Office, Kampala

Denis Vidal Donor Relations Officer WFP, Belgium Elizabeth Stites Visiting Scholar Feinstein International Famine

Center, Tufts University, USA Eric Kenefick Regional VAM Advisor WFP Regional Office,

Johannesburg Erin Lentz Consultant for the study on

Dependency as a possible effect of Food Aid

Cornell University, USA

Francois Buratto Head, Field Procurement WFP HQ, Rome Gary Eilerts Program Manager FEWS NET, USA Giovanni La Costa Programme Advisor WFP HQ, Rome Hiro Aiga Senior Programme Advisor, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome Howard Standen Food Aid Advisor FRCT, C/o CARE Haiti, USA Iain McDonald Head, Situation Room, ODAP WFP HQ, Rome James Darcy Research Fellow Overseas Development Institute

Humanitarian Policy Group, UK Jan Delbaere Crisis Information Specialist, VAM WFP HQ, Rome Jeffrey Marzilli Evaluation Officer, OEDE WFP HQ, Rome John Hoddinott Senior Research Fellow International Food Policy Research

Institute, USA Joyce Luma Chief, ODAV WFP HQ, Rome Kisan Gunjal Food Emergency Officer, ESCG Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations, Rome Lili Mohiddin Emergency Food Security &

Livelihoods Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods, Oxfam

Mamadou Diouf Regional Assessment Officer, Food Security

WFP Regional Office, Dakar

Margarita Lovon Regional Assessment Officer, WFP Regional Office, Panama City

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Markets Participant Title Organisation

Mark Gordon Food Security Information Specialist, VAM

WFP HQ, Rome

Max Merbis Deputy Director Centre for World Food Studies, The Netherlands

Michael O'Donnell Food Security and Livelihoods Advisor

Save the Children, UK

Nancy Mock Director Interdepartmental Program in Complex Emergencies & Disaster Management, Tulane University, USA

Naouar Labidi Regional Assessment Officer, Food Security

WFP Regional Office, Kampala

Neil Briscoe First Secretary, Humanitarian Affairs

Department for International Development, Rome

Nicole Menage Chief, ODTP WFP HQ, Rome Paul Dorosh Senior Economist The World Bank, USA Peter Walker Director Feinstein International Famine

Center, Tufts University, USA Petros Akililu Chief, PDPE WFP HQ, Rome Phumzile Mdladla FEWS NET Reg. Representative

for South Africa FEWS NET, South Africa

Ron Ockwell Facilitator Consultant to WFP, Rome Samir Wanmali Programme Advisor, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome Sarah Laughton Programme Advisor, PDPT WFP HQ, Rome Sheila Grudem Programme Advisor, PDPT WFP HQ, Rome Silvia Guizzardi Assistant Tango International Simon Dradri Nyakua

Regional Assessment Officer, Markets

WFP Regional Office, Johannesburg

Stephen Devereux Fellow Institute of Development Studies, UK

Sylvie Montembault

Regional Assessment Officer (Food Security)

WFP Regional Office, Johannesburg

Thierry Negre MARS-FOOD Action Leader European Commission Joint Research Centre, Italy

Tim Frankenberger Facilitator Tango International Tim Waites Livelihoods Adviser Department for International

Development, UK Wolfgang Herbinger

Chief, ODAN WFP HQ, Rome

Yvonne Forsen Regional Assessment Officer, Food Security

WFP Regional Office, Bangkok

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Annex 3: Update on Theme 1 - The Role of Markets Paper prepared by Chris Barrett, Cornell University, and Paul Dorosh, The World Bank, October 27, 2005 Summary of Work Undertaken to Date: SENAC has completed the first edition Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook, which includes extensive sections on market. Some of these new materials have been employed in recent assessments in Indonesia, Niger, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and perhaps other locations as well. Work has apparently begun on developing templates for constructing reasonably standardized market profiles and for collecting market information during emergency food security assessments (EFSAs). Likewise, there has apparently been work on establishing pre-crisis market information baselines in 16 priority countries. The markets thematic advisory group has seen very rough (typically 1 or 2 page) outlines for the pre-crisis market profiles for Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Guatemala, Honduras, Madagascar, Tajikistan, and Timor Leste only, as well as the full report for Niger. A desk review has been commissioned from a team at Michigan State University to review the empirical evidence of effects of short-term food aid on local markets, to identify the most essential information required ex ante to anticipate the effects of food aid on local markets, including an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses associated with current assessment methods and tools, and to recommend improvements in EFSA methods for markets assessments. Only the TORs for this study were available as of mid-October. In summary, the work on markets is very incomplete to date, with no completed desk reviews and only one completed market profile (Niger). While there is quite a bit of work underway, it remains too early to provide any assessment of the pace or quality of the project’s progress in this thematic area. Remaining Challenges: SENAC leadership and the interim project review emphasize that improved market analysis in emergency and vulnerability assessments remains a high priority. We concur with this assessment. In practical terms, overly pessimistic assessment of the ability of markets to deliver sufficient food in response to local supply shocks is likely the single most important factor behind overstatements of food aid requirements that sometimes

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lead to donor skepticism and to post-delivery problems with market displacement and disincentives for domestic producers, importers, or both.5 We have only seen the outlines of the pre-crisis market profiles, thus any assessment of their quality is very premature. We do have some concern, however, that many of these do not seem oriented towards exploring the likely response of local markets either to (i) delivery of food aid, (ii) local purchase of food for distribution, (iii) stimulus of local demand (e.g., through cash transfers), or (iv) other market interventions (e.g., transport subsidies, changes to import tariffs, provision of trader credit lines). Some of the key steps in the types of analysis have already been outlined. However, there remains further work to do in developing the methodology for determination of likely market responses quickly and reliably. Developing clear methods for assessing likely market response, not just current and historical market conditions, is perhaps the biggest challenge facing SENAC and emergency needs assessment more generally. This should be a focus area of planned activity 1.2 under the markets theme of SENAC. There is also a clear, critical role for baseline price and inventories data, as well as for assembling best-available estimates of local price and income elasticities of demand and price elasticities of supply and of coefficients of price transmission within the country. Such data are commonly collected in some locations by national statistical agencies as part of national consumer price surveys to establish inflation rates and GDP deflators, and by early warning systems (e.g., FEWS) in areas subject to frequent emergencies. Yet price data collection, entry, cleaning, storage and access are commonly problematic. There remains much room for improvement in data harvesting, management and exploitation. This would seem to be an area meriting attention during periods between crises. With data in hand, country and regional offices could undertake any of a number of analyses to help firm up the pre-crisis baseline understanding of likely market response. Without getting into detailed technical questions surrounding price analysis methods, we note, however, that many standard econometric methods for price analysis (e.g., co-integration, error correction models) impose very strong assumptions that are likely unsupportable in many places where EFSAs are to be conducted. Such methods get some mention in existing outlines, raising the question of whether the best available methods are being employed. It might be fruitful to have an electronic consultation among market

5 In some cases, problems with insecurity (as in Darfur), poor infrastructure (remote areas of Ethiopia) or government policies (North Korea) make it likely that markets will not work well in the short or medium term (up to one year). These problems may persist in the long term, as well. In these cases, a pessimistic view regarding supply is most appropriate. However, markets often do work to help stabilize supplies, such as in Bangladesh for rice and wheat following a major flood in 1998, Afghanistan for wheat flour since 2001, Sri Lanka and Indonesia for rice in 2005 following the tsunami. An extremely pessimistic view of market performance over more than two months in these cases (which likely are representative of many of the most severe food security emergencies) leads to a significant overstatement of the shortfall in food availability and a major overstatement in food aid required. See the recent note by Paul Dorosh on “Markets in Emergency Needs Assessments”.

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assessment specialists to discuss technical issues and to establish feasible best practices implementable in EFSAs. Next Steps: As agreed within the thematic group at the March 2005 meeting, it would seem that there might be considerable value to developing, perhaps in collaboration between some Emergency Assessment Officers (Markets) and outside technical experts, some standardized, simple (e.g., spreadsheet-based) models for estimating market response in terms of both price response to food aid deliveries or local purchases, and commercial capacity to import additional food into the market. Modest adaptation of existing tools (e.g., multi-market or spatial equilibrium models) should be feasible. This is presently scheduled to be undertaken as activity #3 under the markets theme, per the current Project Status Report.

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Annex 4: Update on Theme 2 - The Effects of Food Aid Paper prepared by John Hoddinott, IFPRI, 26 October 2005

Summary of Work Undertaken to Date Hammond, L, J Bush, K Savage, P Harvey, “Review of the effects of food aid on household migration patterns and implications for emergency food assistance” (draft – Oct 2005) Lentz, E, C Barrett, J Hoddinott, “Food aid and dependency: Implications for emergency food security assessments” (draft - Oct 2005) These reviews share a number of common features. Both are desk reviews of purported adverse effects of emergency food aid drawing on a range of sources including published and unpublished academic papers, operational agency reports and, on some points, interviews with WFP staff and other donors. Hammond, Bush, Savage and Harvey (hereafter HBSH) focus on the impact on migration, particularly distress migration. Lentz, Barrett and Hoddinott (hereafter LBH) address impacts on labor supply and transfers. Both reviews focus primarily on communities and households. LBH also cover the literature on markets and both make some reference to the ways in which governments affect, and are affected by, crises, needs assessments and emergency food aid. Given these commonalities, these reviews are summarized together. Implicit in HBSH and LBH is a common, albeit loose, conceptual framework. Both see rural households and the individuals within them as active, not passive, actors in the environments in which they live. These households are forward looking in the sense that actions they take today are based partly on meeting current needs and partly with a view to considering the best way to respond to uncertain future events. A critical consequence of this is that rural households have a diverse source of livelihoods, not only incomes from agricultural sources, but also from wage work (both locally and outside their area of origin), non-farm own business activities and remittances. An important implication of this, as HBSH note explicitly (and LBH note implicitly) is that migration is an important component of livelihood and coping strategies. Both studies situate concerns regarding adverse emergency food aid impacts within this context, although their use of language is not as precise as one might like. A better way of phrasing these is that emergency food aid may create adverse incentives in the short run (encouraging distress migration, discouraging work, crowding out private transfers) which in the longer term create dependency (households or individuals are unable to maintain some minimal standard of living without external aid). A variant on the latter, suggested by LBH, is that an expectation of assistance causes moral hazard – individuals do not self-insure (or take greater risks) on the assumption that external assistance will be forthcoming should things go awry. And while both studies focus on these as adverse outcomes, arguably this needs some caution. If an emergency causes primary care givers to spend many hours

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away from pre-school children in order to work, an intervention which reduces this labor effort and increases time available for child care may be actually be welfare enhancing despite its apparent disincentive effects. Further, as LBH note, in cases of really severe shocks, any prospective adverse effect should be a subordinate concern to meeting immediate needs. Both studies stress the critical analytical distinction between correlation (or association) and causality. Observing, for example, that people migrate when emergency food aid is provided DOES NOT mean that the provision of emergency food aid causes this migration. HBSH provide an excellent example of this, noting that severe emergencies which destroy asset bases may cause individuals and households to migrate to distribution centers set up to ameliorate this adverse event. There is a correlation between migration and emergency food aid but no causation – the causal factor underlying both is the adverse shock. Both studies have grave concerns about the quality of much of the literature on disincentive and dependency effects. Both express concern that the critical distinction between correlation and causality is not made in the anecdotal and case study literature that appears to dominate discussions on the issue of disincentives and dependency. My reading of both papers is that there is a further, though perhaps unspoken, concern that this critical distinction is not understood by some WFP staff either. Neither study finds compelling evidence of disincentive or dependency effects. HBSH write, “We argue here that there is a lack of empirical, documented evidence to suggest that people move only or primarily to take advantage of food aid” (p. 1) LBH write, “the modest available evidence thus suggests no long-term negative dependency impact of food aid on local production” (p. 10) and “We find little evidence that food aid crowds out remittances at the household level or encourages moral hazard” (p. 25). Both studies, however, insert two caveats alongside these findings. First, they note that the evidence base is thin. The few good studies on these topics sit alongside a larger number of bad ones. Second, there are well known problems associated with delivering food aid in a timely, transparent and reliable manner. Because, from the point of view of potential beneficiaries, the likelihood, timing, form and amount of assistance is so uncertain, it is not surprising that they are not observed altering their actions in response to uncertain food aid flows. Given both caveats, the most appropriate conclusion to draw from both studies is that claims regarding disincentives and dependency are “not proven”. Both studies provide ideas as to how considerations regarding adverse effects can be integrated into emergency needs assessments, though at times these recommendations are rather general in nature.

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Groupe URD, “Real-time review of selected food aid programmes implemented in Afghanistan and implications for emergency food security assessments (final – Aug 2005) Groupe URD were asked to review of a selected number of food and non-food programmes in Afghanistan in order to identify the information which would be useful to collect and criteria to apply ex ante at the assessment stage so as to better inform the design of interventions in emergency situations. They were asked to comment on targeting of food and non-food programmes, unintended side effects, timeliness of delivery, logistic and security issues. There were also asked to comment on the relevance, appropriateness, reliability and validity of the information underlying emergency needs assessments. There were also asked to undertake a number of additional activities. The budget and time frame were inadequate to meet these ambitious terms of reference. While the report provides a very rough sketch of how existing needs assessments are conducted, there is little in the way of detailed information. It conveys a few unverifiable anecdotes regarding targeting, disincentive effects, corruption and the appropriateness of the items supplied. It provides a general list of information that could be collected for needs assessments, but this is inferior in scope and detail to that provided in the first edition of the Emergency Food Security Assessment Handbook. Remaining Challenges and Next Steps

1. The two desk reviews are reasonably comprehensive. While one could quibble about omissions and points of emphasis (e.g., there is a much larger academic literature on migration in non-emergency circumstances than is cited by HBSH; LBH could have undertaken more interviews with operational WFP staff and other donors), it is unlikely that such additional work would fundamentally alter the conclusions of both reviews.

2. Both reviews would be of greater use to WFP if they were more specific about

how the emergency needs assessments could be strengthened and more specific about where their recommendations fit in to the existing handbook. Given the work done to date, WFP should consider extending the timeline (and budgets?) so as to ensure this happens. (An example: Table 5G of the Handbook describes migration as an early distress signal when, as HBSH point out, migration is often part of regular livelihood strategies and an inability to migrate may be a cause of a crisis.)

3. Both reviews decry the absence of rigorous studies and their conclusions are made

tentative as a result. WFP needs to explore whether the existing state of knowledge is sufficient for their purposes or whether additional, high-quality, empirical work would be of value.

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4. Both desk reviews point to the importance of good baseline information as well as the ability to integrate this into emergency needs assessments. This forms part of a larger challenge for WFP staff involved in SENAC.

5. The Groupe URD report on Afghanistan is not salvageable. WFP needs to make a

management decision about the value of such “real time reviews”, but perhaps with the awareness that these need to be significantly better resourced if they are to come close to meeting their ambitious terms of reference.

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Annex 5: Update on Theme 3 - Chronic versus Transitory Food Insecurity Paper prepared by Steven Devereux, Institute of Development Studies, UK, 28 October 2005 This short paper summarises two desk reviews that are under preparation for the ‘Chronic versus Transitory Food Insecurity’ theme of the SENAC project: (1) "Identification of methods and tools for emergency assessments to distinguish

between chronic and transitory food insecurity, and to evaluate the effects of various types and combinations of shocks on these different livelihood groups"

(2) “Identification of factors that trigger emergency needs assessments in slow onset crises, and operational guidance for the launch, continuation and exit from assistance programmes”

Definitions and Concepts Chronic and transitory food insecurity refer to the time dimension of food insecurity: chronic food insecurity is a long-term or persistent inability to meet minimum food consumption requirements, while transitory food insecurity is a short-term or temporary food deficit. An intermediate category is cyclical food insecurity, such as seasonality. Despite being conceptualised in terms of duration, definitions of chronic and transitory food insecurity rarely specify time periods. Another source of ambiguity relates to the temporal and severity dimensions of food insecurity. Although ‘chronic’ and ‘transitory’ are linked together, implying different durations, ‘transitory’ is often used to imply ‘acute’, with the corollary assumption that ‘chronic’ equates to ‘mild’ or ‘moderate’ food insecurity. Accurate information on the depth or severity of food insecurity – the magnitude of the food gap – is more important and urgent in an emergency programming context than the duration of food insecurity. Because of this fact, and in an attempt to resolve the confusion between duration and severity, this paper favours a 2x2 classification of food insecurity: chronic moderate (e.g. chronic hunger); chronic acute (proxied, for instance, by high IMR and CMR); transitory moderate (e.g. the annual hungry season in tropical agricultural systems); and transitory acute (food crises). ‘Vulnerability to food insecurity’ is often defined as a distinct concept, although this is tautologous, since ‘food insecurity’ not only describes situations where current food intake is inadequate, it also incorporates the possibility that future food intake will be inadequate. Vulnerability analysis is, however, essential for understanding changes in food security, and for triggering an EFSA.

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Problems with Using Transitory Food Insecurity to Trigger EFSA Transitory food insecurity refers to changes in food security status – a sudden (‘often precipitous’) decline in the ability to meet subsistence needs. If indicators of transitory food insecurity are to be used to trigger an EFSA, this raises significant methodological challenges, including: (1) the need for baseline data as well as current data, for purposes of comparison; and (2) the need to identify cut-offs or thresholds to determine the significance of a deterioration in status. There is also a significant risk that aid allocations might be distorted, in two directions. Firstly, a relatively minor fall in food security indicators could trigger a disproportionate humanitarian response. An example is the case of Bosnia in the early 1990s, when a population with good pre-conflict food security status and strong coping capacity received more donor assistance per capita than famine-affected populations in Sudan at the same time. Secondly, a ‘chronic acute’ food insecurity situation could receive inadequate donor attention, because without a visible change in status indicators no EFSA or appeal process will be triggered. This possibility is best described by Bradbury’s phrase the ‘normalisation of crisis’ – a scenario whereby a very high but persistent baseline level of chronic food insecurity becomes ‘acceptable’, while a sharp rise from a lower baseline level (e.g. of GAM and SAM) generates a massive aid response. In 2002, for instance, a humanitarian intervention in one Southern African country was triggered by a rise in malnutrition rates from 2.5% to 5%, but routine nutritional surveillance in Somalia that reported 13% malnutrition produced no donor reaction, as this level was considered ‘normal’ for Somalia. Linkages between Transitory and Chronic Food Insecurity The notion of ‘transitory food insecurity’ as a sudden collapse from adequate to inadequate food intake ignores the reality that there are strong negative synergies between chronic and transitory food insecurity. A major risk factor for transitory food insecurity is being chronically food insecure. Chronic-to-transitory linkages: Most people who are vulnerable to food crises already

subsist in marginal environments on the edge of survival, such that a relatively minor shock can fatally compromise their ability to cope. Slow-onset processes (e.g. rising HIV-prevalence or land pressure) can push households ever closer to the edge. When the causes of food insecurity are political (e.g. conflict-related), famine conditions may be deliberately inflicted on certain groups.

Transitory-to-chronic linkages: Chronic poverty and food insecurity are often the products of a series of ‘short, sharp shocks’ – for example, a sequence of droughts with insufficient recovery periods in between. Such shocks can set up ‘food insecurity ratchets’, forcing households to dispose of their asset buffers and productive assets to survive, until they fall below a minimum ‘asset threshold’ and face destitution as well as heightened vulnerability to famine.

The concept of composite food insecurity is introduced, to address this reality of overlapping and multiple vulnerabilities. Transitory food insecurity tends to affect

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(disproportionately) people who are already chronically food insecure, so ‘composite food insecurity’ applies to households that are chronically vulnerable at the best of times, and are also susceptible to periodic food shocks. In this sense, ‘vulnerability to food insecurity’ is a misleading concept – relatively few households are food secure most of the time but vulnerable to becoming food insecure some of the time; rather, there are many chronically food insecure households that are vulnerable to a further deterioration of their status – from ‘chronic moderate’ to ‘transitory acute’ food insecurity. Programmatic Responses WFP has developed three categories of response to food insecurity: (1) Emergency Operations (EMOPs) address critical episodes of transitory food insecurity; (2) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) address rehabilitation needs; (3) Development Operations address longer-term problems of chronic food insecurity. WFP has been criticised for not setting clear criteria for (i) moving from one programme category to another, and (ii) exiting from Country Programmes. In some cases (e.g. Mozambique), all three kinds of programme have been running simultaneously with different population subgroups, with potentially confusing results. A recent evaluation of WFP’s Enabling Development Policy (EDP) in Mozambique concluded: “In chronically food deficit areas there is a clear risk that dependency is created by the project in the absence of exit strategies and an analytical basis for a vision of how food insecurity could be tackled in the long term.” An innovative attempt to separate chronic from transitory food insecurity programming is the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia. The PSNP builds on the insight that food insecurity in Ethiopia is partly transitory and short-term, and partly structural and long-term. Even in good rainfall years, 4-5 million Ethiopians depend on food aid, but this number rises to up to 12-13 million in drought years. Accordingly, the PSNP divides the food insecure population into two groups. The ‘unpredictably food insecure’ will continue to be the beneficiaries of annual appeals, and will receive emergency assistance as needed. However, the 4-5 million ‘predictably food insecure’ have been taken out of the annual emergency appeal process and are receiving social transfers, often in the form of cash, that are intended to contribute to market development and economic growth. A significant feature of the PSNP is the introduction of an exit strategy. Within five years, these chronically food insecure households are expected to ‘graduate’ out of their dependence on external assistance. While there are concerns about whether cash transfers alone will be sufficient to reverse the cycle of impoverishment and structural vulnerabilities in the highlands – especially given the evidence for deteriorating food security and rising destitution in Wollo and elsewhere – the PSNP is commendably ambitious in its objectives and design.

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Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely Methodologies for Emergency Food Security Assessments This section of the paper reviews several methodologies that have been designed to assess the food security status of a population, that can be implemented and analysed quickly to produce robust information to inform emergency food security programming. The intention is to devise a protocol for field testing that draws on relevant elements of these methodologies, which include: Dietary diversity: The number of different food items consumed is a simple but robust

indicator of the quality and quantity of a household’s diet (a 1% increase in dietary diversity is associated with a 1% increase in per capita consumption). A study in Haiti clustered households into ‘low’, ‘borderline’ and ‘high’ dietary diversity, and identified several characteristics (e.g. experiences of hunger, or coping strategies) that differentiate chronic from transitory food insecurity.

Coping Strategies Index: The CSI was designed by CARE to provide a rapid assessment of a household’s current food security situation. Four categories of coping behaviour are measured. Monitoring fluctuations in the index can give a rapid indication of shifts in ‘transitory acute’ food insecurity. Studies have shown that “the CSI accurately reflects current food security status and is also a good predictor of future food security status”.

Household Economy Approach: The HEA was developed by Save the Children UK and is now used for vulnerability assessments and food security programming by many agencies in Africa. The methodology describes the livelihood systems of wealthy, middle and poor households that live in an area and share a similar ‘food economy’. By estimating the coping capacities of each category of households, food aid requirements during a food crisis can be estimated.

Household self-assessment: A study of destitution in Ethiopia devised a simple question that asked respondents to locate their household in one of four well-being categories: ‘doing well’; ‘doing just okay’; ‘struggling’; ‘unable to meet household needs’. This question was asked for different points in time, which allowed an analysis of trends in household food security, and was found to match accurately the timing and impacts of livelihood shocks such as droughts.

Famine scales: The ‘famine intensity scale’ introduces objective, universal thresholds (for CMR, wasting, market prices and other food security descriptors or outcomes) to differentiate between various degrees of food insecurity, from ‘Level 1: Food insecurity conditions’ through to ‘Level 5: Extreme famine conditions’. A shift from one level to the next will trigger a scaling up (or down) of humanitarian interventions. Exit criteria are defined by ‘Level 0: Food security conditions’.

Each approach is considered in terms of its contribution to 4 aspects of an EFSA: (1) establishing the baseline; (2) analysing vulnerability; (3) programming needs; (4) exit criteria. The methods are also reviewed from the perspective of their ability to distinguish between chronic and transitory food insecurity, and in terms of their ‘Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely’ characteristics. To take one methodology

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as an example, the Household Economy Approach is briefly assessed here for EFSA purposes. 1. Establishing the baseline:

‘Food economy zones’ have already been defined and ‘household economy baselines’ have been conducted for many chronically food insecure and emergency-prone areas in Africa.

2. Analysing vulnerability: The HEA methodology has been applied to the analysis of food security impacts of slow-onset crises, such as HIV/AIDS and coffee price fluctuations.

3. Programming needs: Simulation software (‘RIskMapping’) has been used to model the impacts on food security of livelihood shocks, to generate food aid requirements for different household categories.

4. Exit criteria: Where baselines profiles exist, the impacts of food security interventions can be assessed in terms of returning households to their pre-crisis condition, at which point an EMOP should be replaced by a PRRO or by development programming.

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Annex 6: Update on Theme 4 - Non-Food Responses in Emergencies

Paper prepared by Peter Walker, Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University, 26 October 2005 Food aid continues to be the most prevalent and longest-running external responses to food insecurity in emergencies. This is due to a variety of factors, including political pressures from donor governments, and other endogenous and exogenous pressures on implementing organizations. Food aid does play an important role in saving lives and can be useful in preventing the sale of assets and adoption of irreversible coping strategies such as migration and early marriage of children. Providing free food aid should, however, be the last resort in a response strategy and should only be considered after other interventions to improve availability, access and utilization have been considered. These other interventions include non-food responses. The challenges to conducting good assessments in emergencies are manifold. These include the urgent need to save lives and the difficulties of operating in conditions of political instability that may be violent and are often in flux. Pressure from constituents, donors and national (host or donor) governments compounds the urgency of developing a rapid and visible response. Distinguishing between chronic and transitory food insecurity and appropriate responses thereto pose a challenge for both practitioners and policymakers. Organizations must decide when to prioritize the protection of livelihoods, even though these programs are less likely to generate public or political support. In reporting results, emergency assessments have to balance an examination of the obvious symptoms of food insecurity (poor food availability, insufficient food access or inadequate food utilization) with a discussion of the underlying factors that are likely contribute to the nature and severity of food insecurity. The assessment methodologies used to develop food and non-food responses are fundamentally similar and rely on the same types of frameworks and tools. The key difference lies in whether or not the assessment is able to take into account the breadth of factors affecting food insecurity, including destruction of livelihood strategies, loss of assets, public health crises, displacement and the use of potentially damaging coping strategies. Greater emphasis on these underlying causes is more likely to point to non-food responses. However, due to the proven difficulties in conducting multisectoral assessments, agencies seeking to collect thorough information on the causes of food insecurity must seek to strike a balance between gathering context-specific data and using a broad framework that is capable of examining the multiple dimensions of food insecurity. Differences in the assessment approaches of organizations are due to the size of an organization; the extent to which decisions within an organization are centralized or made by field offices; an organization’s mandate and the implications of the mandate on the

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conceptual framework; and the preferred methodology of an organization. In seeking to measure the severity and nature of need in emergencies, organizations will usually conduct a food security assessment, a nutrition survey or will use a livelihood approach. Policymakers can use any or all of these tools to program an emergency response to food insecurity. The choice of survey is determined based on the mandate, conceptual framework and previous field experience of the organization. The practice of conducting assessments in multiple stages is most likely to lead to a complete picture able to take into account changes over time and enable necessary adjustments in programming. Organizations using multi-stage assessments may conduct a rapid initial assessment immediately after an emergency and follow this with a more in-depth assessment as soon as circumstances allow. Practitioners use very similar tools when conducting emergency assessments with slight variations according to a focus on food security, nutrition or livelihoods. There is no specific tool or set of tools used in emergency assessments that is more or less likely to indicate the need for a non-food response. . Although multiple options for non-food responses exist, those that seek to protect, support or promote livelihood strategies are likely to have the greatest impact over time. Livelihood approaches can include a vast range of non-food responses, including livestock programs, agricultural support, health interventions, water and sanitation improvements, and cash and credit responses. Summary of Recommendations The report recommends the use of a food security assessment framework following a livelihoods perspective. Recognizing that it is nearly impossible to conduct a complete livelihood assessment under emergency conditions, the envisioned framework seeks to expand upon and improve existing models for food security assessments that adopt a livelihood approaches. This proposed framework seeks to introduce greater nuance into the current understanding of how different livelihood groups experience, adapt to and, in some cases, benefit from an emergency and how these different strategies lead to variations in food security. To this end, central components of the assessment framework include conflict analysis to understand the interests of various groups in the emergency, a greater focus on public health as an underlying factor, and more thorough examination of coping and crisis strategies and the role these strategies play in mitigating or exacerbating food insecurity. In regard to data collection and analysis, the focus is on capturing the diversity of livelihood strategies across population groups. The proposed framework emphasizes the importance of desk-based studies on past crises and historical processes. The importance of valid and rigorous qualitative data is central to the relevance of emergency assessments, and the framework includes the incorporation of good practices in data collection.

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Key steps in the proposed assessment framework include:

1. Identify the livelihood groups within a geographical/ecological zone as well as the standard livelihood zones. This expands upon approaches that assume homogeneity of livelihood groups across food economy zones.

2. Review the processes, institutions and polices that influence the current state of

food security. Relevant processes, institutions and policies are also those that have affected or been affected by the evolution of the crisis as well as the livelihood and coping strategies of the various groups. Emphasize market studies (including commodity chain analysis) and conflict analysis.

3. Review the current food security situation in relation to the pre-disaster or

baseline information if such information is available. The temporal dimension is critical in this part of the analysis, including whether the food insecurity is chronic or transitory and what, if any, are the seasonal and intra-annual variations.

4. Review relevant household livelihood assets or capital, including human, natural,

physical, financial and social assets. Focus on those assets that are the most important to the livelihood strategies of a particular group (e.g. livestock for pastoralists, land and agricultural inputs for farmers, etc), taking into account the role of kinship and social safety nets (social assets) and health and education (human assets) for all population groups. Note that certain assets can also be liabilities, particularly in situations of characterized by conflict and political instability.

5. Review the livelihood goals (or desired livelihood outcomes) of different groups

in order to understand how the current crisis has hindered or enabled these goals and what adaptations, if any, households within these groups have made in a continuing effort to meet these goals. Take into account the various coping and crisis strategies and ascertain what, if any, irreversible or damaging strategies may have been adopted.

The proposed framework is well-suited to demonstrate the potential links between food insecurity and non-food responses. This occurs through the identification of diverse livelihood groups and an examination of how crisis affects the livelihood strategies and outcomes of households within these groups. By compiling data on the policies, institutions and processes affecting food security and examining underlying factors such as public health and the vulnerability context, this framework will indicate a range of possibilities for the implementation of non-food interventions. Such responses might be in support or protection of assets (such as livestock, microcredit or emergency health interventions), to enable policies that support livelihoods (such as regulations on land access or transborder trade), or to support institutions (such as civil society and governance) or processes (such as economic processes).

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Annex 7: Update on Theme 5 - Pre-crisis Information Paper prepared by Nancy Mock, Tulane University, USA, 28 October 2005 WFP’ progress in the area of pre-crisis information (comprehensive food security vulnerability assessments (CFSVA and food security monitoring systems-FSMS) has progressed substantially since the last meeting. Four CFSVA’s have achieved draft report status, at least for the first steps of the CFSVA and all planned countries now have Terms of Refernces for planned work. FSMS work is proceeding more slowly, and this aspect of the pre-crisis information work may be still more problematic in terms of WFP’s particular role and strategy related to FSMS. WFP is moving towards an underlying data model of food insecurity and vulnerability as well as towards a standard methodology for baseline surveys. There is a clear movement towards a common definition of food insecurity around dietary groupings and household livelihood profiles. This progress should be commended. WFP has conducted quite challenging survey work in places like Angola, for example. All of the CFSVA’s make an attempt to count and characterize the food insecure and those vulnerable to food insecurity. Methodology relies heavily on statistical techniques to reduce dietary consumption proxies and sometimes other food access related information to both identify food insecure and vulnerable groups as well as to profile these groups. In all cases, substantial literature reviews preceded household surveys and, in some cases, secondary data analysis was performed to characterize food insecurity and vulnerability. Remaining challenges can be grouped in to a few levels: macro (good practice consensus within the food security/humanitarian community; World Food Program corporate level issues; SENAC project specific; and specific technical and methodological issues related to the CFSVA and FSMS work. At the global level, there are a number of parallel initiatives that will influence information requirements for humanitarian work. The DFID-lead benchmarking exercise is currently at a relatively early state. However, it may result in further movement towards standardization of specific humanitarian outcome measures. Within the food insecurity community, the SADC’s Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC) is completing a review of recent vulnerability assessment methods applied during the Southern African drought. This review found that methodology applied in the region was indeed problematic and that more effort needs to be made to combine quantitative and qualitative methods when translating VA findings to actual determination of food and non-food humanitarian needs. This review also underscored the need for vulnerability assessment to draw upon comprehensive information on risk, capacities, and structural vulnerability and to integrate nutritional data with livelihood and dietary data. The assessment concluded that NVACs, on whole, were overly reliant and grounded in formal qualitative inquiry, which while important, stopped short of

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providing6 quantitative estimates of needs and projected needs for food and other assistance. The Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) recently developed a typology for classifying food security phases, which is gaining popularity in the Horn of Africa region. This index is based upon a combination of outcome benchmarks and qualitative information that has a softer metric. At the corporate WFP level, some progress has been made to develop an integrative analytical framework for the analysis and use of food insecurity and vulnerability information by WFP7; however, much remains to be done on this score. An overarching data model for the conceptual understanding of food insecurity and vulnerability that is linked to corporate decisions related to food aid programming is not yet articulated. At the same time, although some progress has been made to bring various analytical activities such as VAM, EFNA, early warning under the same office, these activities are still run from separate units. Evaluation remains separated. Therefore, the movement towards standard metrics and operational definitions of food insecurity and vulnerability has not been fully achieved. The absence of a clear data model together with organizational compartmentalization of food insecurity and vulnerability information activities affects the effectiveness and efficiency of the SENAC project. CFSVA, FSMS, EFSA, and evaluation should be intimately integrated activities. Yet this is not the case to date. For example, the CFSVA is identified as pre-crisis, but in reality, in most cases, several of the countries identified are actually in or emerging from crisis. What is unique about the CFSVA as an analytical activity is three fold: its comprehensiveness in terms of gathering and analyzing a combination of primary, secondary, quantitative and qualitative data-i.e. the luxury of time and financing to develop good baseline information-including information on trends in environmental and social indicators; and two, the establishment of benchmarks and an understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics that link risk, capacities, food security and the welfare of populations. CFSVA should inform the nature of FSMS as well as EFSA and evaluation of WFP and other food security programming in country. The CFSVA’s are still someone uneven in this regard. Part of the problem, it seems, is that the CFSVA’s are still being organized and executed not by a multi-disciplinary team, but single consultants working in conjunction with a field office collaborator. Secondly, there is still a tendency of some staff to equate CFSVA with household survey. Food security and vulnerability household surveys (and this is developing to be almost a standardized tool at WFP) can be conducted at any time (pre, during and post crisis). In many, but not all cases, a primary data collection effort will be required to undertake CFSVA, especially in fragile state contexts. There are a number of exceptions where poverty monitoring and other survey programs might be tweaked to provide key 6 TANGO, Vulnerability Assessment Methodology Review, Draft Report, August, 2005. 7 EFSA Handbook, 2005 and analytical linkages note from WFP SENAC staff

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information for food insecurity and vulnerability. This is true particularly where natural disasters are superimposed on countries/regions that are not experiencing active conflict. The survey component of the CFSVA is moving towards a standard instrument and analytical approach. The household survey tool applies relatively heavy data collection and advanced statistical techniques to achieve classification of food insecurity and vulnerability. The accuracy and sensitivity of the surveys and data analytic techniques should be better described, especially if this is moving towards a standard analytical strategy. There also is concern that qualitative inquiry is undervalued as companion tools in the design of quantitative tools, establishment of metrics and then on the interpretation of results and their use for developing program options/contingency plans. The food insecurity and vulnerability index doesn’t include nutritional status, and indeed the lack of relationship between the food insecurity/vulnerability index and anthropometry in Angola, for example, is a cause for concern regarding the construct and face validity of the tool. Another important omission in the data model relates to conflict and governance issues and community/market capacities to respond to crisis. TAG members from across the thematic groups should review methods and results from pre-crisis activities. This would ensure that these activities benefit from state-of-the-art expertise on dietary proxies, livelihood assessment, better distinguishing chronic and transitory food insecurity, market analysis and monitoring. In fact, this group could help WFP to develop a WFP corporate data for decision model. WFP, through one of its research activities, should undertake re-analysis and comparative analysis of three or four of its CFSVA’s, investigating sensitivity analysis, construct validity and cross-sample comparability of the approach.