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Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro

Stanford, April 28th, 2014

Ignacio Cano

Laboratory for the Analysis of Violence State University of Rio de Janeiro

BRASIL


Rio de Janeiro: context •  Population (2010 Census):

–  City of RJ: 6.320.446 –  Metropolitan Area of RJ: 11.835.708 –  State of Rio de Janeiro: 15.989.929

•  One in four to one in five inhabitants, in slums: –  Lack of property of the land: Self-construction –  Irregular access to urban services –  Very cheap reproduction of labour –  Lack of Residential policies –  Large sections of the population plunged into informality


Rio de Janeiro: context •  Highest degree of inequality (Gini -> 0,5) •  Micro-segregation •  Last decade: reduction of poverty and, for

the first time, of inequality: – Economic growth and stability – Assistance programs of conditional income

transfers: ‘Bolsa Família’ (11 million beneficiaries in Brazil)

–  Increase in minimum wages


Rio de Janeiro: context •  Highest Incidence of Violence and Crime •  Lethal Violence as the main problem •  Homicide Rate increases dramatically in the 80’s

–  cocaine market –  heavy weapons –  territorial control of criminal groups


Homicide Rates: Evolution in time

Ano

20001995199119851980

120,00

100,00

80,00

60,00

40,00

20,00

0,00

Rio de Janeiro

Outros Municípios

Região Metropolitana


Homicide Rates


Robbery Rates


Theft Rates


Impact of Homicides on Population MORTALITY TABLE

Rio de Janeiro, 1998

MALES Prob. Of death up to the next age (all causes)

Prob. Of death up to the next age (all causes

except homicide)

Life expectancy (all causes)

Life expectancy (all causes

except homicide)

Years of life Lost due to

homicides

Survivors at that age (cohort=

100.000: all causes)

Survivors at that age (cohort=

100.000: all causes except

homicides)

Extra survivors in the absence of homicides

Age nqx total nqx no hom ex total ex no hom ex tot – ex no hom

lx total lx no hom lx tot - lx no hom

0 0,027083 0,026927 63,60 66,12 2,52 100.000 100.000

0,00

1 0,004267 0,004147 64,37 66,95 2,58 97.292 97.307 15,65 5 0,001933 0,001851 60,64 63,23 2,59 96.877 96.904 27,31 10 0,002983 0,002472 55,75 58,34 2,59 96.689 96.724 35,21 15 0,015797 0,005378 50,91 53,48 2,57 96.401 96.485 84,52 20 0,022279 0,008283 46,69 48,75 2,06 94.878 95.966 1088,47 25 0,023835 0,011255 42,70 44,14 1,44 92.764 95.172 2407,34 30 0,023535 0,015043 38,68 39,61 0,94 90.553 94.100 3547,25 35 0,028062 0,021551 34,55 35,18 0,63 88.422 92.685 4262,87 40 0,036259 0,030754 30,47 30,90 0,42 85.941 90.687 4746,67 45 0,047406 0,043279 26,53 26,80 0,27 82.825 87.898 5073,80 50 0,064882 0,062134 22,72 22,90 0,18 78.898 84.094 5196,10 55 0,090050 0,087643 19,13 19,25 0,13 73.779 78.869 5090,03 60 0,131414 0,129562 15,77 15,86 0,09 67.135 71.957 4821,51 65 0,177119 0,175855 12,78 12,85 0,07 58.313 62.634 4321,14 70 0,248732 0,247996 9,99 10,06 0,07 47.985 51.619 3634,95 75 0,353020 0,352439 7,47 7,55 0,08 36.049 38.818 2768,82 80 1 1 5,18 5,30 0,11 23.323 25.137 1813,95


Homicide Rate by Age and Race: Males Taxa Específica de Homicídio para Homens, por Grupo Racial

Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 1998

Faixa Etária

65+60-64

55-5950-54

45-4940-44

35-3930-34

25-2920-24

15-190-14

Hom

icíd

ios

por 1

00.0

00 h

ab.

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Brancos

Pardos

Pretos


Homicide Rate by race, age and marital status: Brazil 2001

Homens – Solteiros Homens – Não Solteiros

0

50

100

150

200

250

de 20 a 24anos

de 25 a 29anos

de 30 a 39anos

de 40 a 49anos

de 50 a 59anos

60 anosou mais

Brancos Negros

0

50

100

150

200

250

de 20 a 24anos

de 25 a 29anos

de 30 a 39anos

de 40 a 49anos

de 50 a 59anos

60 anos oumais

Brancos Negros


Micro-segregation of Violence


Micro-segregation of Violence


Central Trait: Territorial Control •  Background: slums interspersed in the city ->

very rich/poor people living together. Micro-segregation as opposed to centre-perifery

•  Domination of small territories, in order to process/sell drugs, to control markets or to establish a certain social order

•  Control of these small areas is fiercely disputed by armed groups - need of machine guns to defend it and high levels of lethal violence


Several Types of Armed Groups

•  Criminal Groups based on Drug-dealing, which establish loose network formed in jail

•  Death Squads for `social cleansing` •  `Militias`: corrupt state agents (policemen, prison

guards, firemen, etc.) who occupy the slums in their free time, extort inhabitants and control most economic activities


Armed Actors •  Control of small territories and populations •  Heavy weaponry to defend territory •  Drug-selling as the basis of business (unlike Sao

Paulo) •  Tyrannical control of population:

–  Movements –  Colour of clothing –  Slang

•  Neo-feudalism


Armed Actors •  Penalties for those who disobey:

–  Reprimand –  Beatings –  Expulsion –  Death

•  Drug Dealers: Loose networks (Comandos) formed in jail -> networks of mutual assistance but not centralised organisations

•  Constant dispute over territory among the criminal groups and with the police


Armed Actors •  Absence of State and of formal rights •  Loss of Communal Trust (Perlman: 1968-1998)

–  Social Capital •  Assistance activities towards population:

–  Parties, medicines, burials, etc.

•  Long continuum between Coercion and Support •  Provision of Order and Social Control: support •  History of Authoritarian Social Control:

internalised by victims who have been socialised in this and seen nothing else


Armed Actors •  Local leaders and Residents Associations:

–  many killed, threatened, integrated –  they have to at least be tolerated by local power –  asked by the state to mediate in order to carry out

public works –  Stigmatised by this very mediation

•  Armed Groups make it impossible to generate independent political leaderships and political change


Definition of Militias in RJ: 5 traits •  Control of small territories and their populations by

armed irregular groups •  Coercive control •  Economic Motivation •  A legitimisation discourse linked to protection/order •  Openly composed and directed by state agents •  Differences with other countries:

–  Political links but no political project, –  No particular identity upheld, –  No ‘desperation’ –  Monopoly of control over territory


Comparison of irregular armed groups

Characteristics Militias Drug-dealers

Death squads

Control of territories and population X X Not full Coercion X X X

Economic motivation X X X Legitimisation discourse X

Integrated/ directed by state agents X Partially and not publicly

Partially and not publicly

Other traits

Better organisation.

Control of many

economic activities.

Weapon used for symbolic

value

Directed by

tradesmen/ politicians


Traditional State Response: public policies •  Policies ? •  Repression rather than prevention •  Reactive rather than pro-active – events of great

repercussion – role of media •  Militarized – War on Crime, War on Drugs •  Focused on Slums


Militarisation of State Response •  Training •  Doctrine •  Tactics •  Armoured Vehicles •  Caliber as the main problem •  Army intervention •  Military Justice •  Military Disciplinary Regulations for Policemen


Police Use of Lethal Force: 1993-1996

Mortos e feridos em confrontos com a Polícia por Tipo de VítimaMunicípio do Rio de Janeiro. Janeiro 93- Julho 96

Tipo de Vítima

PolicialIgnorado (civil)

Vítima AcidentalOpositor

Núm

ero

de V

ítim

as

Mortos

Feridos

Fontes: R.Os, IPMs, Prom. Bravura (ISER))

1000

800

600

400

200

0


Opositores mortos e feridos pela Polícia por Cidade

São Paulo

Rio de Janeiro

Indianápolis

San Diego

Atlanta

Houston

Los Angeles

New York

Philadelphia

DallasChicago

Núm

ero

de V

ítim

as

MORTOS

FERIDOS

Fontes: R.Os,IPMs,Pr. Bravura(ISER)/Sec.Seg. SP (só dados da PM) Ano1995

Fonte para as cidades USA: Geller & Scott Deadly Force. Ano 1991.

500

400

300

200

100

0




São PauloRio de Janeiro

HoustonLos AngelesNew York

Philadelphia

Chicago

Proporção dos Hom. Dolosos Cometidos pela Polícia, por Cidade

Fontes: R.Os, IPMs, Pr. Bravura (ISER)/ Sec.Seg. SP.(só PM). Ano 1995.

Fontes para as cidades USA: Geller & Scott (92). Ano 1991.

PER

CEN

TAG

EM

15

10

5

0



Buenos Aires

Jamaica São Paulo

Rio de Janeiro

HoustonLos Angeles

New YorkPhiladelphiaChicago

Indice de Letalidade da ação policial por Lugar

Fontes: R.Os, IPMs, Prom. Bravura (ISER). 1995./ Secr.Seg. SP jan-ago 95

Outras fontes: Geller & Scott (92) / Chevigny (90)

Indi

ce d

e Le

talid

ade

3

2

1

0


Police Use of Lethal Force: 1993-1996 INDICE DE LETALIDADE POR ADMINISTRAÇÃO DA SEC. DE SEGURANÇA

Fontes: R.Os, IPMs, Prom. Bravura (ISER))

IND

ICE

DE

LETA

LID

ADE

Atual (mai95-jul96)Anteriores (93-abr95

4

3

2

1

0


War on Crime/Drugs •  Drug-dealing peddlers take the brunt of crime repression

–  War on crime •  High white-collar crime rarely investigated successfully •  Evidence of connections between low-level violent

networks and high-level criminality / corruption •  General evidence of link between police violence and

corruption –  Mingardi –  Killing of Judge Patricia Acioli –  Morro do Fallet –  Tropa de Elite -> Warrior policeman is the exception

•  Extreme violence of state agents fuelling violence -> policy of extermination, summary executions


Traditional State Response •  State Response -> part of the problem •  Traditionally, police interventions followed a

militarised strategy: war on crime/drugs •  Periodical invasion of slums with heavy gunfire

regardless of humanitarian impact •  Human rights violations: torture, summary

executions, •  Very low legitimacy of police among poor

communities •  Corruption


Traditional State Response •  Effectively, police force traditionally as one

more actor disputing territorial control •  Public policies designed not to protect people

who live in the slums but to fight the enemy •  Last governments -> Priority of fighting the

main criminal network (Comando Vermelho) -> increased conflict among criminal networks

•  State action feeds into the vicious circle of violence


War on Crime/Drugs •  Not a War in formal terms:

–  Clear Groups/Sides: `enemy always recruiting from population` –  Temporary: permanent/unwinnable –  Specific Objectives: profit, therefore unattainable

•  A War in its consequences: –  High victimisation –  Heavy Weaponry –  Displacement of populations, Lack of access to medical services –  Severe humanitarian effects: victims of stray bullets in slums

treated as collateral damage •  What is defined as real in a society... •  Metaphor of War used for several purposes:

–  Any means can be used: human rights violations (Geneva Conventions)


Recent Policies •  Pacifying Police Units:

–  Saturation –  Permanence –  Community Policing doctrine –  New Policemen

•  Targets/Rewards for police officers (Compstat): –  Reduction in homicides and in police killings

•  Division of Homicides (capital) –  Higher clearance rate?

•  Reduction of Homicides 2008-2012 •  Reduction of Armed Crimes


Recent Policies •  Pacifying Police Units:

•  Significant reduction in violent deaths (48%) and a smaller reduction in robberies in and around UPP areas

•  Parallel increase in non-lethal and non-armed crime, partially due to reduced under-reporting rates and partially to absence of authoritarian rule by armed groups

•  Opportunity to Reform Police/Policies and leave behind ‘war on drugs’

•  Selective Intervention in territorial/social terms: project to turn Rio into an international centre of tourism and services


NÚMERO MÉDIO DE CASOS POR MÊS E COMUNIDADE

TAXA MÉDIA POR MÊS E COMUNIDADE (por 100.000 hab.)

PRÉ UPP PÓS UPP PRÉ UPP PÓS UPP VíAmas de Morte Violenta 0,94 0,25 10,03 2,21 VíAmas de Homicídio 0,86 0,16 9,06 1,00 VíAmas de Autos de Resistência 0,50 0,01 5,70 0,12 VíAmas de Desaparecimento 0,32 0,71 3,60 6,92 VíAmas de Lesões Dolosas 3,34 11,66 41,33 127,36 VíAmas de Violência DomésAca e Familiar 2,17 8,47 27,12 84,66 VíAmas de Ameaça 2,30 7,97 29,45 99,24 VíAmas de Estupro 0,14 0,37 1,35 4,84 Ocorrências de Roubos 5,87 2,70 61,23 20,58 Ocorrências de Furtos 3,48 5,38 46,46 64,99 Ocorrências de Crimes relaAvos a Drogas 1,91 5,83 24,13 63,93

Criminalidade Registrada dentro das Comunidades Antes e Depois da Entrada das UPPs Recorded Crimes and Crime Rates in the communi9es

before and a<er UPPs City of Rio de Janeiro: Jan 2006 – July 2011


Sta9s9cal Model of the Net Effect of UPP presence inside the communi9es, controlling for the overall trend in the city

Jan 2006 – July 2011 – Cidade do RJ

Variáveis independentes: efeito da comunidade, presença da UPP e incidência no resto da cidade

Fonte: InsAtuto de Segurança Pública – ISP . Elaboração : LAV-‐UERJ

VALORES ABSOLUTOS TAXAS por 100.000 hab.

TIPO DE OCORRÊNCIA Coeficente Qui-Quadrado GL p Coeficiente Qui-

Quadrado GL p

Vítimas de Morte Violenta -0,52 16,59 1 0,000 -4,79 7,32 1 0,007 Vítimas de Homicídio Doloso -0,56 22,30 1 0,000 -5,55 11,89 1 0,001 Vítimas de Auto de Resistência -0,44 32,07 1 0,000 -5,10 25,11 1 0,000 Vítimas de Desaparecimento 0,25 15,13 1 0,000 2,21 5,02 1 0,025 Vítimas de Lesões Dolosas 6,71 227,85 1 0,000 76,39 222,23 1 0,000 Vítimas de Violência Doméstica 4,43 115,15 1 0,000 42,23 69,23 1 0,000 Vítimas de Ameaça 4,08 108,32 1 0,000 57,73 95,36 1 0,000 Vítimas de Estupro 0,18 13,60 1 0,000 3,15 14,03 1 0,000 Número de Roubos -1,92 16,21 1 0,000 -8,03 2,24 1 0,134 Número de Furtos 1,54 60,65 1 0,000 21,83 42,92 1 0,000 Número de Crimes de Drogas 3,06 70,29 1 0,000 32,34 69,27 1 0,000


0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Number of Civilian Deaths in Police Interventions in the state of Rio de Janeiro , per Year


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SEROPÉDICANOVA IGUAÇU

ITAGUAÍ

NILÓPOLIS

DUQUE DE CAXIAS

Legenda:Centro da Cidade e Zona Portuária

Subúrbios

Zona Norte

Zona Oeste

Zona Sul e Barra da Tijuca

Territórios das UPPs

Outros Municípios do Estado do RJ ®0 5 10 152,5

Kilometers

LOCATION OF UPPS


CIRCUNSCRIÇÕES DAS DELEGACIAS E UPPs

FAVELAS

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0 10 20 30 5 Kilometers

RATE OF VIOLENT DEATHS PER 100.000 inhab., BY AREA METROPOLITAN AREA OF RIO DE JANEIRO -‐ 2010

Mortes por 100.000 hab.20 ou menos

Mais de 20 a 30

Mais de 30 a 40

Mais de 40 a 50

Mais de 50


Present Crisis •  Homicides increasing in some areas (Baixada

Fluminense) since 2012 and in the state as a whole since 2013

•  Robberies also increasing over the last year (reward crimes)

•  Exhaustion of the positive impact of policies •  Polices have not been evaluated nor adjusted


TAXAS DE MORTES VIOLENTAS POR 100.000 HAB. ESTADO E REGIÕES -‐ 2008 A 2013

Fonte: Ins9tuto de Segurança Pública – ISP . Elaboração: LAV-‐UERJ


Present Crisis •  Partial Loss of legitimacy of UPPs (Amarildo case

and others) •  Lack of progress in police reform:

–  Lack of significant change in training and overall doctrine: war on crime coexists with pacification

–  Most policemen in UPPs would rather not work there (CESeC, 2011, 2103)

–  Absence of a strategy to merge UPPs with rest of policing

•  UPP remained in Stage 1: police saturation •  Advances easily reversible if police leave


Present Crisis •  Lack of progress in relationship with community

and its institucionalization •  Electoral Year: no prospects of major decisions •  Last week: crisis in Copabana (Pavão-

Pavãozinho) •  Partial return of old rethoric: ‘demonstrators

stimulated by drug dealers’

Documents

Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro - Amazon Web Services · – State of Rio de Janeiro: 15.989.929 • One in four to one in five inhabitants, in slums: – Lack of property of the