Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus … · Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus de lecture Alain Badiou Second manifeste pour la philosophie Fayard, 2009

Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus de lecture

Alain Badiou

Second manifeste pour la philosophie

Fayard,2009

Vingtansaprès sonpremierManifeste pour la philosophie, où il dénonçait le discourssur la «fin» de la discipline,AlainBadiouse rebelle, cette fois-ci, contre la proliféra-tion et «l’existence artificielle excessive » des nouveaux «philosophes» sur la scènemédiatiqueetleurmoraleconservatrice,touten poursuivant sa réflexion sur ce qu’est laphilosophie, lephilosophe, l’Idée.Qu’est-ceque la vraie vie, qu’est-ce qu’une vie dignedecenom?C’estunequestionàlaquellelaphilosophie peut donner une réponse ou aumoinslaformed’uneréponse,estimeBadioudans son Second manifeste pour la philoso-phie.Unequestionquil’amèneraàdéclarer,à l’encontre de ce qu’il considère commeidéologiedominantedenotreépoque,quelavievéritableestlavieselonl’Idée,laviesouslesignedel’Idée.Puis,deposerlanécessitéd’uncommunismede l’Idée,un«deuxièmegesteplatonicien».LaréférenceàPlatonpourBadiouestfonda-mentale.Elleestlepointcommundesesdeuxmanifestes.Lepremier(1989),oùilaffirmaitla continuité de la philosophie ainsi que sacertitude qu’il existe des vérités, pas seule-mentdescorpsetdeslangages.«Ilyabeletbiendesprincipes»,réaffirme-t-ildèslepre-mier chapitre de sonSecond manifeste. Des«choses»universelles–dansl’amour,l’art,lascienceetlapolitique–quisontdesvérités,etnondesopinions.L’opinion,elle,estpropreausophiste.Endeçàduvraietdufaux,elleestunereprésentationsansvéritédontlaseulefonctionestd’êtrecommunicable.Badiouenestconvaincu:lesophiste,ancienoumoder-ne,estceluiquiréduitlapenséeàdesrègles,desconventionsoudesjeuxdelangage,etquitente, à l’image deWittgenstein qui est sonincarnationmoderne,d’évincerl’idéedevé-

ritéauprofitdel’idéederègle.«Àbiendeségards,cequiseprésentecommelaphiloso-phieestunpuissantsophisme»,disaitBadiouen1992(Conditions).Maisdelààpenserquelesophistenedoitpasexister…voilàcequiseraitundogmatismequimèneraitaudésas-tre.Au contraire, comme il l’explique dansplusieursdesesouvrages, lesophisteestun«partenaire»nécessairepour lephilosophe,son«frèrejumeau»qu’ilconvientdemettreàsajusteplace.Ce sophiste moderne, c’est aussi le «dé-mocrate», rappelle le Second manifeste. Àtravers huit chapitres (Opinion, Apparition, Différenciation, Existence, Mutation, Incor-poration, Subjectivation et Idéation), AlainBadiou porte la «suspicion platonicienne»contre la «propagande» du capitalo-parle-mentarismeetle«dogmatisme»deladémo-cratieetdesdroitsdel’homme;demanièregénérale,contrelamoraleconservatriceom-niprésenteaujourd’huidanslasphèremédia-tiquemaisaussidansbiend’autresdomaines,sous couvert du mot «philosophie». «La‘philosophie’ est partout», se révolte-t-il.Danssalignedemire:

«(…) quelque chose comme un pauvre dogmati-smevia laphilosophieanalytique, lecognitivismeet l’idéologie de la démocratie et des droits del’homme.Àsavoirunesortedescientisme(ilfautnaturaliser l’esprit, l’étudier selon les protocolesexpérimentaux de la neurologie), doublé, commetoujours,d’unmoralismeniaisàteinturereligieuse(ensubstance:ilfautêtregentiletdémocrateplutôtqueméchantettotalitaire)».

SonSecond manifestecomporteàl’évidenceunenuancerévolutionnairelesituantàl’op-posédu«dogmatismeservile».Pourallerau-delàdetoutmoralisme,Badiouréitèresonaffirmationdel’existencedesvé-rités,des«choses»intelligiblesetutilisables«dansdescontextes individuelset symboli-ques entièrement distants et différents, dansl’espacecommedansletemps».Ces«cho-ses» sont universelles. Elles unifient lesmondesmultiples.Etc’est làquesesitueletravailduphilosophe:«(…)détectant,pré-sentantetassociantlesvéritésdesontemps,réactivantdesvéritésoubliées,fustigeantles

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA48(2/2009)pp.(369–383)

BookReviews/Buchbesprechungen/Comptesrendusdelecture370

opinionsinertes,ilestlesoudeurdesmondesséparés».En «platonicien sophistiqué», comme il sequalifielui-même,AlainBadiouironise:«Jene soutienspasque lesvéritéspréexistent àleurdevenirmondaindansun‘lieuintelligi-ble’séparé,etqueleurnaissancen’estqu’unedescente du Ciel vers laTerre». Elles n’ensont pasmoins éternelles, ajoute-t-il un peuplus loin. Leur éternité doit être compatibleavec la singularité de leur apparition : c’estpourquoi Badiou s’efforce de «rendre ra-tionnelle » l’apparition de l’éternité dans letemps.L’occasion pour l’auteur de reprendre sathéorie de l’être et de l’apparaître, exposéedans L’Être et l’événement (1988), l’un deses ouvrages fondateurs, où ses 37 médita-tions,construitessousformededéductionsetd’axiomes,posaientcomme thèseprincipalel’identitédel’ontologieetdesmathématiques.L’objet,le«ilya»,réduitàsonseulêtre,estunmultiplepur.Siontentedesoustraired’unobjetsaprésenceetsesdéterminations,cequireste, c’est la multiplicité des multiplicités,composéeencoredemultiplicitésetainsidesuite.À la fin, il n’y apasd’atome ; onnetombepassurUn,maissur levide,ouplusprécisémentsurunensemblequinecontientaucun élément. L’un n’est pas. L’être est lamultiplicité pure tirée du vide. Et la penséedel’être,cen’estpaslapoésie,c’estlama-thématiqueoul’ontologie,c’est-à-direledis-courssurl’être.Lapenséedel’apparaîtreoudel’être-là,desoncôté,seconstituecommelogique,penseBadiou.L’être-làapouressen-ce«nonuneformedel’être,maisdesformesdelarelation»,dontlalogiqueestlathéorie.Etlamétaphysique?C’est«touteorientationdelapenséequiconfondsouslamêmeIdéelamathématiqueetlalogique».LeschapitresExistence puisMutation, pastoujoursfacilesàdécrypter(toutcommelestableauxexplica-tifsendeuxièmeettroisièmedecouverture),recycleront ensuite plus particulièrement lesnotions d’existence, d’inexistant, d’atomeréel d’apparaître et de matérialisme, avantde toucher à une autre pierre angulaire desa doctrine : l’événement. De l’événement,l’ontologien’arienàdire,disaitBadioudanssesprécédentsouvrages: ilrelèvedecequin’estpasl’être-en-tant-qu’être.C’estnotam-mentdansLogiques des mondes(2006)quelephilosopheendéveloppalathéorie.DanssonSecond manifeste,ilsouligneralepointdéci-sifquereprésentel’événementpourlavérité:«unevériténepeuts’originerqued’unévé-nement».Etdeladécrire:«Unevérité,c’estunévénementdisparudontlemondefaitap-paraîtrepeuàpeu,danslesmatériauxdispa-ratesdel’apparaître,l’imprévisiblecorps».

L’événement,entantquecréationdenouvel-les possibilités, perturbe l’ordre du monde.Trois types de positions face à l’ordre dumonde existent : enthousiasme, indifférenceouhostilité.Parallèlement,Badioudistinguetrois typesde sujets : fidèle, réactif ouobs-cur.Silesujetfidèle(exemple:laRévolutiond’octobreenRussie)incorporelanouveauté,lesujetréactifviselaconservationdesformespolitiquesetéconomiquesantérieuresetdecefait nie l’événement. Badiou y range, entreautres,ledémocratebourgeois,letravaillismeenAngleterreouleNewDealaméricain.Lesujetobscur, lui,veut lamortducorpsnou-veau. Exemple : le fascisme, qui cherche àsubstituerà l’événementunesubstanceéter-nelle(uneNation,uneCultureetc.).Lemêmemodèlepeuts’appliqueràl’amour:leréactifviselaconjugalitéetlafamille;l’obscurnelaisse aucune place à l’erreur ni au hasard.Maislefidèleincorporelerisqueet«orientel’amourvers lapuissanceeffectiveduDeuxqu’il institue».Autrement dit : l’amour estlepremierdegrédupassagedel’individuau-delàdelui-même.Ilmontreque«cequis’ap-pelle vivre, n’est pas réductible aux intérêtsindividuels».Voilàoùonrevientà«laquestionultimedelaphilosophie»:qu’est-cequ’uneviedignede ce nom ? Se prononçant contre une viesans Idée, qui consiste à vivre uniquementpoursasatisfaction,Badioutranche:«(…)laphilosophiedéclarequevivre,c’estagirpourqu’iln’yaitplusdedistinctionentrelavieetl’Idée».Unevievéritable,c’estunevieselonl’Idée.L’Idéeétantcequiorienteunindividuselon leVrai. L’«idée duBien» de PlatondevientchezBadioul’idéeduVrai.«L’idéeestvraied’exposerlachoseenvérité,elleestdonctoujoursidéeduVrai,maisleVrain’estpasuneidée».Iln’yapasd’Idéedel’Idée:c’est précisément cette absence que Badiounomme«Vérité»,cettecatégoriecentraledelaphilosophieetlecœurdutravailduphilo-sophe.Opposant l’universalité et l’éternité des vé-rités au «culte du particularisme» et de la«démocratie»(carlavraiedémocratie,c’estl’égalité devant l’Idée) qui nous fait vivresansIdée,Badiouinsistesurlanécessitéd’un«deuxième geste platonicien» : celui d’uncommunisme de l’Idée. La question fonda-mentale, selon Badiou, pourrait être : «ca-pitalo-parlementarisme (…), conduisant à laguerre,ourenouvellementvictorieuxdel’hy-pothèsecommuniste?».L’Hypothèse communiste sera justement letitre de son dernier livre, publié récemment(Nouvelles Éditions Lignes).Endernièrepar-tiedecetouvrage,ontrouveraletexteprésen-téàl’occasiond’uncolloque,tenuàLondres



àl’UniversitédeBirckbeckdu13au15mars2009, intitulé «L’Idée du communisme» etdédiéaucommunismeentantquevaleurpo-sitive.Badiouyestimequel’échecdestentati-veshistoriquesnepermetpasd’écarterl’idéeducommunisme,maisquedenouvellessolu-tionsdoiventêtreenvisagéesaujourd’hui.Onauraitpeut-êtreaimél’entendredavantagesurles solutions effectives.Mais sonhypothèsecommuniste reste avant tout générique.Ellefondetouteorientationdel’humanitéverssonémancipation.LephilosophetravailleactuellementsurunenouvelletraductiondelaRépubliquedePla-tonquiporteraletitre:Du Commun(isme).AlainBadiou, né en 1937 àRabat, est pro-fesseurémériteàl’Écolenormalesupérieure.Écrivainetphilosophe,platonicienetmaoïs-te,ilapubliéunetrentained’ouvragesphilo-sophiquesetpolitiquesmaisaussidesromansetdesdrames.

Nataša Laporte

Franz Ungler

Organismus und SelbstbewusstseinUntersuchungen zur Naturbeobachtenden Vernunft bei Hegel

Hg.vonMichaelWladikaundMichaelHöflerPeterLangVerlag,Frankfurta.M.,Berlin–Bernu.a.2006

DiesenunveröffentlichteStudievonUngleristdessenDissertationsschrift,dieer1972inWieneingereichthat.Den„Kern“dieserStu-die bildet dieFrage,wie sich beiHegel dieIdeesoentzweienundvereinenkann,dasssieNaturundGeistgleichermaßenunddennochaufausdifferenzierteWeiseist.DieseAusdif-ferenzierungbesteht inderBestimmungdesVerhältnissesvonOrganismusundSelbstbe-wusstseinundkreistsomitumdieFrage,wiedie Idee gleichermaßen auf eine naturhafteundaufeinegeisthafteWeiseseinkann(vgl.S.137).DieserProblemkreisbetrifftnachUn-glereinerseitsdiePhänomenologie des Geis-tes(1807)–dortinsbesonderedie„beobacht-ende Vernunft“; hier wird gewinnbringend

auch dieGeistphilosophie derEnzyklopädieeinbezogen–undandererseitsdieBegriffslo-gik–dortgenauer:a)denÜbergangvonderObjektivität/Teleologie zur Ideenlehre/„IdeedesLebens“undb)denÜbergangbzw.denEntschlussvonderIdeeindieNatur.Einean-gemessenintensiveEinbeziehungdesdrittenTeilsderNaturphilosophieausHegelsEnzyk-lopädie,„DieOrganik“,vermisstmanjedochschmerzlich.Unglermotiviert seineStudie imerstenKa-pitel „Naturorganismus und reflektierendeUrteilskarft“ (S.17–47)miteinerausseinerSicht berechtigten Kritik Hegels an KantsKritik der reinen Vernunft und an der Kri-tik der Urteilskraft, wo das Verhältnis vonbiologischem Organismus, Teleologie undSelbstbewusstseinaufeineäußerlicheWeise„gelöst“sei,ebeninderberühmten„alsob“-Verbindung,beiderdieZweckmäßigkeitaufdieeinseitigsubjektivenAspektederVernunftverschobenwirdundnichtalsWesensprinzipimObjektselbsterkanntwerde.SoferndieUr-teilskraftindiebiologischenEntitätennurausGründeneinervonderVernunftgefordertenSinndimensionZweckehineinprojiziert,ent-wertedieseinerseitsdieObjektivitätderVer-nunftsowieandererseitsdieZweckdimensionimGegenstandselbst.KantshierfürzentraleAussagelautet:„DenndawirdieZweckeinderNaturalsabsichtlicheeigentlichnichtbe-obachten,sondernnurinderReflexionüberihreProduktediesenBegriffalseinenLeitfa-denderUrteilskrafthinzudenken,sosindsieunsnichtdurchdasObjektgegeben.“ (KdU§ 75)Hiermussman tatsächlich,wieUng-lersehrgutmitHegelkritischweiterführendherausstellt,hinterfragen,ob„Beobachtung“derNaturdurchdieVernunfteinletztes,me-thodischgesichertesunddamitwissenschaft-lich akzeptables Kriterium für die interneBestimmungderStrukturdesGegenstandes,genauer:biologischerOrganismen,seinkann.DieProblematik,BeobachtungundVernunftangemessenzubestimmen, ist tatsächlich jaauchinderPhilosophiederGegenwartnochimmer ein wesentliches Problem, das sichvonderTheoriederBeobachtungs-undPro-tokollsätze des logischen Positivismus unddesWienerKreisesüberWilfridSellarsunddessenholistischeKritikanderBeobachtungvonGegebenembishinzuDavidsonkontinu-ierlichdurchhält(„MythosdesGegebenen“).Hier könnte diese Tradition sicherlich eineMenge von Unglers differenzierter Analy-se und von Hegels Kritik der Beobachtunglernen. Ungler erzählt diesen Kontext deraufhebenden Dialektik der „beobachtendenVernunft“ imVerhältniszum(Natur-)GesetzausHegelsPhänomenologiezutreffendnach.Dieserstrecktsichüberdaszweiteunddritte



KapitelderDissertation:„VernunftundOrga-nismus“ sowie „Organismus und Vernunft“(S.49–107)undbildetdasHerzstückderAr-beit.UnglersRekonstruktion ist zwarvölligkorrektundvermagwesentlicheZusammen-hänge auf demNiveauHegels darzustellen,enthält jedoch wenigVerweise auf die For-schungoderaufKritikanHegel.Außerordentlich lehrreich sindUnglersVer-weiseaufeinemöglicheAuseinandersetzungnaturphilosophischerGedankenmitderEvo-lutionstheorie. Erst in der Hegel-Forschungder letzten Jahre wurde diese Thematik in-tensivdiskutiert.Fraglichistdort,obHegelsteleologischesGattungskonzeptmitDarwinsEvolutionstheoriemutatis mutandis kompati-belistodernicht.UnglerentscheidetsichfürdieAlternative,beides sei inkompatibelundmankönnesogarmitHegeldieFalschheitderEvolutionstheoriebegründen.DiesegewagteThesescheintdemRezensentenjedochnichthinreichend durch einzelne Nebenbemer-kungen gerechtfertigt zu sein. Entscheidendhängt der Antidarwinismus mit der Haupt-thematik dieser Studie zusammen, nämlichmit der Problematik des Verhältnisses vonOrganismus und Selbstbewusstsein. Ung-ler geht soweit, dass er generell der NaturEntwicklungabspricht,ebenweilihrSelbst-bewusstsein fehlt (vgl. S. 101 f). Hierwirdjedoch einfach gesetzt, dass a)EntwicklungSubjektivität impliziert und b) in der Naturals solcher Subjektivität nicht vorhandenist.StimmtmanbeidenPrämissenzu,istdieEvolutionstheorie allerdings nicht haltbar.Infolgedessen sind „Naturalismus“ und jede„nichtphilosophischePsychologie“–jasogardieformaleLogik–fürdengestrengenHege-lianerUnglerbloß„Pseudo-Wissenschaften“(vgl.S.103sowie104).Obmanausdiesem„Abseits“herausnocheinendienaturwissen-schaftlichen Argumentationspartner aus derBiologie der Gegenwart erreichenden Passspielenkann,scheintdemRezensentenfrag-lich.Ebensoproblematischerscheint,obdiebeidenPrämissenkorrekt sind.Diskussions-würdig istesauch,obsie–fallssiekorrektseinsollten–überhauptwirklichdenStacheldesDarwinismustreffen,dennesistfürdenDarwinismusnichtnurzentral,dasssichdieArten entwickeln, sondern ebenso, dass diebiologischen Arten sterblich sind, dass esalsokeineunsterblichenArtentelechienoderArteide gibt. Diese Sterblichkeit der Artenistjedochnichtdamitzugleicherledigt,dasseskeineArtenentwicklunginderNaturgibt.Selbstwenn sich die eineArt nicht aus deranderen entwickeln sollte, folgt daraus we-derlogischnochnotwendig,dassdieseArtendannauchunsterblichseinmüssten.DereigentlicheGedanke,denmanmitHegelhier entfalten kann, besteht eher darin, dass

mansichnichtzueinersolchenEntzweiungmitderNaturwissenschafttreibenlassensoll-te, sondern vielmehr zu beleuchten hat,wieman einen hinreichendweiten und zugleichdoch bestimmten Begriff von Subjektivitätentwickelnkann,derauforganischeLebens-formen als notwendige Bedingung bezogenund dennoch nicht einfach mit ihnen – imverfehlten Sinne des gegenwärtigenNatura-lismusoderderLeib-Seele-Identitätstheoreti-ker – identisch ist.Ungler selbst stellt ja inseinertrefflichenDeutungder„IdeedesLe-bens“ausderBegriffslehrederLogikheraus,dassinderIdeedieVereinigungvonObjektundSubjektalseinedialektischeLeib-Seele-Einheitzubegreifenist(S.122ff.).Wenninder Idee eineVereinigung von organischemLeibmitderSeelezudenken ist,kannmanaber prinzipiell die Subjektivität nichtmehrlosgelöst von ihrer biologisch-organischenVerfassung betrachten. Dann ist es eigent-lichein(fastcartesianischer)RückfallhinterHegel,derNaturSubjektivitätund(evolutio-näre)Entwicklungabzusprechen.EinzweiterArgumentationsstrangderStudie(vgl.S.17–39)bestehtdarin,dassUnglermitHegelbeiKantauchspekulativeAspekteei-nerinneren,wahrenZweckmäßigkeit, inderproduktiven Einbildungskraft (KrV, B 150ff.) sowie im anschauendenVerstand (KdU,§§75–77)sieht.DortseidieDichotomievonzweckmäßiger Vernunftidee und sinnlich-kausaler Welt des Gegebenen überwunden.HierstehtdieVernunftdemGegenstandnichtmehräußerlichbeobachtendgegenüber,son-dern bildet mit dem Organismus vermittelsderinnerenZweckmäßigkeiteinespekulativeIdentität. Beides, Schematismus der Einbil-dungskraftundintuitivenVerstand,analysiertUnglerbrillant,aufselbständigeWeise,nichtzutextnah,sondernsachnahundsouverän.InKonfliktmitKantsLehrevonderEinbil-dungskraftinderzweitenAuflagederKritik der reinen Vernunft trittnachUngler jedochKants Lehre vom Unterschied zwischenWahrnehmungs-undErfahrungsurteil (S.23ff). –NachAnsichtdesRezensentenvermi-schtUnglerhierverschiedeneTheorieebenenausKantsTheoriedesUrteils, sofernesEr-kenntniskonstituierendist.DieUrteilstheoriederzweitenAuflagederKrVkommtohnedieDifferenzierung von Wahrnehmungs- undErfahrungsurteil aus; nur in den Prolego-mena taucht jenerUnterschiedauf,unddorthat er eigentlich doch eher eine propädeu-tisch-pädagogischeFunktion.Denndassallesinnlichen Anschauungen unter der EinheitderApperzeptionstehen–wieesdiezweiteAuflagederKrVkonzipiert–bedeutet,dasssinnlicheAnschauungenfür unsnurinsofernsind, als sie sich dem kategorialen Denken



synthetisch einordnen, womit sie eben ver-mittels von Urteilen auf die Verstandesbe-griffegebrachtwerdenundalsokeinebloßenWahrnehmungsurteilemehrsind.DieserZu-sammenhang hebt die Problematik auf, wieeseigenständigeWahrnehmungsurteilegebenkann, denn sie sind dann eben nicht mehreigenständig, sondern höchstens noch un-vollkommeneVorphasen innerhalb eines sieumfassenden und ganzheitlich zu sehendenErkenntnisprozesses, in demAnschauungenaufBegriffegebrachtwerden.UnglersDeu-tung der Schwächen von Kants Konzeptiondes anschauendenVerstandes (S. 35–39) istein echterGeniestreich, der dieNotwendig-keit deutlich macht, über Kant hinauszuge-henundmitHegeleinensystematischenundsachlichenZusammenhang – eben einen imHegelschenSinndialektischenKonnex–vonbiologischer Entität und sie denkenderVer-nunftkonzipieren.Fazit:Durchgängig istbereits indieserDis-sertation vonUngler der spätereHegelianerzubemerken,derbesondersdortseinegroß-artige Genialität beweist, wo er die TexteKants und Hegels freier, nicht so textnah,deutet; das zeigt sich besonders im erstenund im letztenKapitel; diebeidenmittlerenKapitelweisen eine sehr großeTextnähe zuHegels Phänomenologie auf, die demjeni-gen,derdasPrimärwerkkennt,oftdieFrageaufdrängen:„Wozu?“AufschlussreichistdasdurchdieHerausgeberangefertigteVerzeich-nisdervonUnglerabgehaltenenLehrveran-staltungen(S.143–157);eszeigtdieprofundeBreitevonUnglersenormerGelehrtheitvonderAntike bis in dendeutschen Idealismus.DasNamensverzeichnis lässtetwaszuwün-schenübrig;z.B.tauchtdermehrfachimTextvorkommendeDarwindortnichtauf;CohennureinmalobgleicheröfterimTextpräsentist und interessanterweise wohl UnglersKant-Bildmitgeprägthat.EbensosuchtmanDriesch im Namensverzeichnis vergebens,obgleich Ungler eine außerordentlich inter-essanteArgumentationgegendessenAuffas-sungderEntelechie(vgl.S.91)entfaltet.Ins-gesamtmussmanfreilichdenHerausgeberndankbarsein,dennsiehabeneinensystema-tischwertvollenBeitragzurHegelforschungzugänglichgemacht.

Rainer Schäfer

Paul Guyer (ed.)

The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy

CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge2006

Fourteen years after the publication of The Cambridge Companion to Kant (CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, 1992), PaulGuyerisagaintheheadofthenewprojectinKant scholarship: publication of The Cam-bridge Companion to Kant and Modern Phi-losophy.Thisvolumeisnotjustquantitativelylarger,butcontainsalsoafewimportantqual-itativenovelties.First,everyincludedauthorhasbeenaskedtoaddressboththehistoricalcontextand thehistorical impactof thepar-ticular topic inKant.This shows theaim toextend investigations in Kant scholarship,but also to show importance of his thoughtforalmosteverytopicinmodernphilosophy.Second, there are many new contributors,whoarenewrisingKantscholars.Thisbringsmanynewinsightsandapproachesprovidingspecial intellectual freshness in the interpre-tationsofKant’sviews.Third,therearefewless addressed topics,whatgivesnewproofofconstantflourishingofKantscholarship.PaulGuyerhasalmostcopy-pastedthewhole“Introduction” from previous Companion,probablyfindingthatsuchformulationismostadequate.Itssubtitle“Thestarryheavensandthemorallaw”showsGuyer’smethodologi-cal(interpretative)choice:hepresentswholeKant’sopus through thedistinctionbetweenhistheoreticalandpracticalphilosophyend-ingwith intriguing thoughts about his thirdCritique, as his last greatwork, intended tosolvethetensionbetweenthetheoreticalandthepractical.Thereareeighteenessaysincludedinthisvol-ume.ThefirstninechaptersdealwithKant’stheoreticalphilosophyandthenextsixchap-tersconcernKant’spracticalphilosophy.Thelast threechapters aredevoted tomore spe-cificsubjects:Kant’stheoryofaestheticsandteleology,hisphilosophyofreligionandtheimmediate receptionofhisCritique of Pure Reason.In the first essay, entitled “A Priori” after ashortsketchofhistoricalbackground,PhilipKitcher analyses Kant’s own conception ofa priori knowledge. In the light of contem-poraryepistemologicaldistinctionshe shedssome lighton initial formulation in theCri-



tique of Pure Reason:Kantisconcernedwithjustificationist approach, strong conceptionand synthetic kind of a priori knowledge.TheanalysisofKant’sviewof“marks”ofa prioriknowledge(necessityanduniversality)givesKitcherabasisforreinterpretingKant’sinitial formulationandprovidinganaccountof a priori knowledge as tacit knowledge.He offers few possibilities of interpretativemending thoseviewsandfinds themallun-satisfactory.HeconcludeswithbriefaccountofKant’slegaciesthepostkantiandiscussionsofa prioriknowledge.GaryHatfield is theauthorofsecondessay:“KantonthePerceptionofSpace(andTime)”.Heprovides thebackgroundofKant’sworkand then he analyses the concept of spaceand spatial cognition in his earlierwritings,where Kant defends a modified Leibnizian(relational)viewofspace.Afterthepresenta-tionofhismature,criticaltheoryofspace(asa prioripureformofintuition),presentedintheCritique of Pure Reason,Hatfieldstressesthe fact thatKantmade clear that synthesisbytheunderstandingisnecessaryforcogni-tionofspatialstructures.Finally,hepresentsapartofreceptionofKant’scriticaltheoryofspacethroughfewmainlinesofobjectionsordefencesofKant.LisaShabelisoneofthenewraisingpotentialinKantscholarshipandthisisconfirmedbyher essay “Kant’s Philosophy ofMathemat-ics”.Shestartswithahistoricalbackgrounddiscussing rationalist philosophy of mathe-matics thatdominatedbeforeKantand thenarticulates his philosophy of mathematics,contained in his Critique of Pure Reason.First,sheexaminesthoroughlyhisargumentsforsyntheticityofmathematics.Second,sherehearses the same arguments but focus-ing on philosophical proofs for apriority ofmathematics.AftertheilluminationofKant’scentral thesis (allmathematical cognition issynthetica priori)Shabelgivesaninsightfulinterpretation of importance of Kant’s phi-losophyofmathematicsforhisentirecriticalproject.Finally,shediscussesbrieflythevastinfluenceofKant’sviewonpostkantianphi-losophyofmathematics.In essay “Kant on A Priori concepts: TheMetaphysical Deduction of the Categories”Béatrice Longuinesse provides systematicpresentationofKant’sprojectofmetaphysi-cal deduction of basic a priori elements ofourcognition–pureconceptsofunderstand-ing (categories). She presents the stages inKant’sphilosophicaldevelopmentbeforehismaturesolutioninthefirstCritique,examin-ingviewsinhisearlierwritingsandlectures.Then she provides a brief sketch onKant’sviewonlogicbypresentinghismaindistinc-

tions.Sheelucidatestheconceptoffunctionof judging, and the concept of capacity tojudgefromwhichKantderivesallfourlogi-cal formsof judgment (quantity,quality, re-lation, modality). She continues elaboratinghowKantderivesthetableofcategoriesfromthetableofjudgmentsstressingthescopeofthisdeduction.Finally,sheprovidesanexten-sive presentation of impact ofKant’s viewsonhissuccessors.Atthebeginningoffifthessay,“Kant’sPhi-losophy of the Cognitive Mind”, PatriciaKitchersketchesinshorttheoriesofmindofKant’s predecessors and gives brief generalcomment of rational and empirical psychol-ogybeforeKant.Then she shows that eventhough Kant criticizes Leibniz and Wolff,in his earlier writings and lectures he ad-dresses rationalist account of mind. Before(re)constructingKant’stheoryofmind,basedonhisfirstCritique,shesketchesbrieflyhistheory of cognition and, then, she providesanalysis ofKant’s vision of subject of cog-nition, identifying the concept of transcen-dentalapperceptionasacrucialconcept.Shedifferentiates four usages of this concept inbotheditionsoffirstCritique.Inthefinalsec-tionshepresentssomeissuesemergingfromKant’stheory,givingalsoashortcommentoneveryofthem.In “Kant’s Proof of Substance and Causa-tion”,ArthurMelnickfirstgivespreliminaryremarksconcerning rationalist’s andempiri-cist’s accounts of causation and substance.Then he analysesKant’s proof of causationinfirstCritique,stressingthat it isbasedonpartialcausaltheoryoftime,whichgiveshimplausible answer to many objections of hiscriticsonthispoint.Thenhetriestosolvethepossibleincoherenceofmentionedtheoryoftimewithconstructionist theoryof time.Hestresses that interrelation between causalityand substance clarifiesKant’s proof of sub-stance,whichisbasedonthevisionoftimeasaformofintuition,butinthecourseofper-manent constructive temporising procedure.In this light, he elaborates the connectionbetweencausationandsubstance,buthealsoembracesimportantrelationofbothofthemtothetranscendentaldeductionofcategories.FinallyhecomparesKant’sviewswithmod-ern developments regarding causation andsubstance.In theseventhchapter,“KantandTranscen-dentalArguments”,RalphC.S.Walker firstprovides general conception ofwhat shouldbe‘TranscendentalArgument’bothforKantand his followers, but also what is exactlyits function meant to be. Then he gives anaccount of Kant’s theory of cognition, butmerely focusing on detection and examina-



tion of what could stand for transcendentalargument:justificationofpureformsofintui-tion,categoriesofunderstandingandideasofreason. He continues with the examinationof strenghtness of transcendental argumentspresenting various objections of postkantianphilosophers,andgivingacommenttoeachofthem.Heconcludes,followingStrawson’slineofthought,thattranscendentalargumentsdonotimpelustowardsidealism,andarguesthatthereisanotherwayoflookingatthem,contrarytothosepresentinphilosophicallit-erature.KarlAmeriksistheauthoroftheeightchap-ter,which is named “TheCritiqueofMeta-physics:TheDestructionandFateofKant’sDialectic”.At thebeginningofhis essayheexplainstheneedforsystematicexaminationof all ideas of reason which resulted in solargepartofCritique of Pure Reason,called“TranscendentalDialectic”.ThenhegivesanoverviewofKant’scriticalexamination,fol-lowedby extensive commentary concerningthe scope of such critique. Ameriks eluci-dates the concept of ‘unconditioned’,whichisdeeplypresentinKant’scritiqueandleavesa kind of suspicious metaphysical residuewhich pulls many postkantian philosophersbackinthemetaphysicalspeculationswhicharepresentedattheendofthisessay.Inhisessay“PhilosophyofNaturalScience”,MichaelFriedmandealswithKant’sengage-ment with natural science which occupiedhim during his whole intellectual career.First, he sketches the background ofKant’scritical writings on the subject, presentingCartesian, Leibnizian and Newtonian viewson“naturalphilosophy”,butalsohisownpre-criticalviewsinhisearlierwritings.FriedmanpresentsKant’smature viewby consideringhiscentralworkonthesubject–Metaphysi-cal Foundations of Natural Science,especial-lyrelatingtoCritique of Pure Reasonandthesignificanceofpurenaturalscienceforwholecriticalproject.HeconcludeshisessaywithextensiveandinsightfulobservationofKant’slegaciesinphilosophicaltreatmentofnaturalsciencesafterhim.In the “Supreme Principle ofMorality”Al-lenW.Wood first examineswhat could ex-actlybesuchaprinciple,andwhatisthetruenature and grounding of it inKant’s ethicalthought.Thenheprovidesathoroughanaly-sisofGroundwork of Metaphysics of Morals,differentiatingafive(orevensix)formulationofKant’s“supremeprincipleofmorality”.Hecontinueswithshortobservationonpossibleconnection between Groundwork and Cic-ero’s On Obligation, concluding that thereis almostnothing to learn about the first onthereadingofthesecond.Finally,hepresents

Kant’scriticismofhispredecessors’attemptsto ground morality and also examines theforceofthiscritique.“KantonFreedomoftheWill”byHenryAlli-sonistheeleventhchapter.HesketchesviewsonfreedomofthewillbyKant’spredecessors,finding this necessary for understanding hisown conception. Then he articulates Kant’sconceptionofrationalagency,explainingthekey term – spontaneity – in both epistemicandpracticalway.Thisprovideshimabasisfor elaborating, further,Kant’sderivationofautonomy (as positive concept of freedom)andpracticalspontaneity(asnegativeconceptoffreedom).Kant’smatureviewoffreedomhasbeenelaboratedthroughAllison’spresen-tationofhissolutionofthethirdantinomyofreasoninCritique of Pure Reason,whichtriestoreconcile twoapparentlyconflictingprin-ciples:determinismofnaturallawsandfree-domofourwill.Heconcludeswith insight-fulpresentationofconceptionoffreewill,inrelationwithKant,insomeofhissuccessors(Fichte,Hegel,Schopenhauer).ChaptertwelveisRobertB.Pipin’sessay,en-titled“MineandThine?TheKantianState”.He first sketchesKant’s conception of rightandhisdefinitionofstate,stressingtwomainissues:thepossibilityofourexternalfreedomanditsrelationtotheprivateproperty.ThenheelaboratesKant’sdemandfortheexitfromthestateofnaturewhichresults inconstitu-tionofcivil state,buthepointsout that theproblemofwhatsortofnormativeclaimsisexactlyaclaimof right still remains, show-ing three possibleways of readingKant onthispoint.Tryingtoshedsomelighton thispoint,heanalysespartofMetaphysic of Mor-als,whereKanttriestodefendthestateastheonly condition for possibility of justice. HeconcludeswithsomesuggestionsonpossibleproblemsinKant’saccount,butalsoonpos-siblereadingKantasproto-Fichtianorproto-Hegelian.Jane Kneller provides probably the great-estnoveltyinKantiantopicsincludedinsidethisvolumewithheressay“KantonSexandMarriageRight”.Motivatedbyhighlynega-tive reactionofalmostallKant’ssuccessorsonhisviewconcerningmarriage,shetriestoexamine itcloser tosee if thosechargesarereasonable. She sketches Kant’s precriticalviewsandthensheconcentratesherattentionto Metaphysic of Morals, providing sketchofKant’stheoryofrightsnecessaryfortrulyunderstandingofhisaccountofmaritalright.Sheexaminesthemarriagerightinmorede-tail and presents metaphysical assumptionsbehindhisconceptionofmarriage(metaphy-sicsofpersonhoodandmaritalbondbetweenindividuals).Knellerconcludesthatalthough



therearesomeexaggerationsinobjectionstoKant,unfortunatelyhehasattheendlockedhimselfintraditionalism.After she gives historical context of Kant’sdiscussion, another raising Kant scholar,PaulineKleingeld, inher“Kant’sTheoryofPeace”,examinesthreenecessaryconditionsfor possibility of true (world) peace: inter-nal republican organisation of states, theirexternal organisation in voluntary league ofstatesandcosmopolitan right in internation-al relations between the states. Contrary toothercommentaries,sheprovidesasatisfac-toryinterpretationofKant’sthesisthatbefore“world state” (state of all states)we need aless forcefulboundbetween them ina formof league of states.Then she proceedswithexaminationofKant’svisionhowtheprocesstoward perpetual peace could be practicallyrealised.SheconcludeswithpresentationofsomeresponsesonKant’stheoryofperpetualpeace by his successors (Rawls, Habermas,Höffe,Fichte).Inchapterfifteen,LaraDenispresents“Kant’sconceptionofvirtue”.Shestartswiththepres-entationofKant’spredecessors’conceptionsofvirtueethics(Plato,Aristotle,Stoics,Epi-cureans,Augustine,Abelard,Aquinas, Gro-tius,Hobbes,Shaftesbury,Hutcheson,Wolff,Crusius).SheexaminesKant’stheoryofvir-tuethroughseveralsteps.First,sheanalysesKant’sconceptsofvirtue,lackofvirtue,andvice. Then she elucidates relations betweenvirtueandfewimportantconceptsofKant’sethical thought (good will, human agency,vices, highest good). She continues withKant’scriticismofhispredecessors,butshealsopresentssomeresponsestoKant’stheoryofvirtue(SchillerandSchopenhauer)anditsreceptionincontemporaryvirtueethics.Paul Guyer begins his essay “Kant’s ambi-tionsinthirdCritique”bysketchingthevasthorizon of addressed topics in this far lessappreciatedworkinKantianscholarship.Hedecides to provide a reading ofKant’sCri-tique of JudgmentasacontinuationofdebatewithHume.Thus,hedifferentiatesthreemainsubjectsof thisdebate:necessityofparticu-larlawsofnature,universalvalidityofjudg-ments of taste, and the moral significanceof teleological concept of nature. He firstpresentsHume’saccountconcerningallthreementioned subjects and then continueswithexaminationofKant’s“answers”,especiallyfocusinghisattentiononevaluatingtheirsuc-cessfulness. At the end, he provides someintriguingthoughtsaboutinfluenceofKant’saestheticandteleology.Frederick Beiser in “Moral Faith and theHighestGood”,inthemerebeginning,stres-sestheproblemsconcerningtheinterpretation

ofKant’sphilosophyofreligion.Hegivesapreliminary historical context, necessary forunderstandingKant’sview,stressingtheorig-inality of his thought: religious belief couldbejustifiedsolelybypracticalreason.BeisershowsthatthestartingpointofKant’sentiremoral theology is fundamentally Christianconcept of highest good.After he providesanaccountofmetaphysicswhichliesbehindourmorality,namelyfaithintranscendentbe-ing,heproceedswithpresentationofKant’smoral proof for the existence ofGod.Thenhe explains what Kant means by claimingthat the faith canbe rational and that it haspriority over the knowledge.Answering thetwogeneralobjectionstomoralfaith,Beiserconcludeshisessaybytryingtoplaceamoralfaith inmore vital position inKant’swholephilosophy.The last essay is Manfred Kuehn’s “Kant’sCritical Philosophy and ItsReception –TheFirst FiveYears (1781–1786)”. He presentsfourreviewsofKant’sCritique of Pure Rea-sonandhisfirstresponses,during1781–1782.Then he tries to show that Prolegomena(1783) ismotivatedbyKant’sworry togiveananswertothecritiquesinoneofthemen-tioned reviews.Kuehn shows that Schulze’sExposition of Kant’sCritiqueofPureReason,which is extensive presentation and defenceofKant’sview,wasacrucialstepinreceptionofKant’sthought.Then,heelucidatesKant’sworking on Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals(1783–1784)asrelatedtotheintentiontocriticizethebookofhismajorcritic,Chris-tian Garve.After the presentation of Kant’sessays published during 1784–1786, Kuehnshows that hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1785) was intended as ananswer to thedoubtsof somecommentators(Ulrich,Schulze).Finally,heconcludeswithKant’sengagementin“pantheismus dispute”.Thisvolumealso includesanextensivebib-liographyofprimaryand secondary sourcesforKantscholarshipanddetailedindex.Con-sideringthevarioustopicsofessaysincludedin this volume, given historical context forevery topic, organised bibliography by cus-tomary broad divisions in discussions ofKant’sphilosophy,andveryusefulindex,thisvolume presents a remarkable introductionforeveryonewhoisnotparticularlyfamiliarwithKant.Ontheotherside,consideringthefact that authors of essays are in the top oftheir fields ofwork, this volume iswithoutanydoubtindispensablematerialforanyonewhoentersintheworldofKantscholarship,butalsoitisinthesametimetheimpressiveenrichmentofthisscholarshipitself.

Igor Eterović



Jan Verplaetse, Jelle De Schrijver, Sven Vanneste, Johan Braeckman (eds.)

The Moral BrainEssays on the Evolutionary and Neuroscientific Aspects of Morality

SpringerScience,BusinessMediaB.V.,Dordrecht–Heidelberg–London–NewYork2009

Moralityisconsideredtobeoneofthemostcomplexandmosthumanqualities,definingandenablinglifeincommunity.Nowonder,therefore, that the neural underpinning ofthat “function” has been an interesting aimforscientistsalloverthetime.TheVienneseneurologist Moritz Benedikt (1835–1920)situatedmoralityintheoccipitallobes,view-ing morality as a sense organ. Oskar Vogt(1870–1959)sawmoralityasafunctionofthelamina pyramidalisofthefrontallobes,whilephrenologistsdisputedaboutthepreciseloca-tionofmorality,butdidnotdoubt about itsexistence. Since then,many scientists up tomodern times, have been either searchingfororspeculatingaboutthecorticalareathatmight explain (im)moral behaviour, but wehave somehowbeen deprived of a final an-swer.Particularlyworrisome,hereby,soundsthat(im)moralactingmightbeengineered.The book contains twelve chapters. In the“Introduction”,JanVerplaetse,JohanBraeck-man,andJelledeSchrijvergiveaveryusefulhistorical overviewof the problem, a brain-imagingprimer,andtheplanofthebook.An-dreaGlennandAdrianRainedealwith“TheImmoralBrain”,studyingspecificallypsycho-pathy(usingThePrisoner’sDilemma).JorgeMollandRicardodeOliveira-Souzapresenttheirconceptof“‘Extendedattachment’andtheHumanBrain: InternalizedCulturalVal-uesandEvolutionaryImplications”,subserv-ingcooperationbeyondkinandbeingconsid-eredtobeuniquelyhuman.“Neuro-CognitiveSystemsInvolvedinMoralReasoning”isthetopicofthepaperbyJamesBlair,advocatingamultiplemoralitysystem(withatleastfourmechanismsof learning based on emotions:care-based–harmreciprocity;disgust-based–purity; social convention–hierarchy; af-fect-free morality). Jean Decety and C.DanielBatsondealwith“EmpathyandMor-ality: Integrating Social and NeuroscienceApproach”,provingthatempathyoperatesbyway of conscious and automatic processes.KristinPrehnandHaukeR.Heekerenentitledtheircontribution“MoralJudgementandthe

Brain:AFunctionalApproachtotheQuestionof Emotion and Cognition inMoral Judge-ment Integrating Psychology, NeuroscienceandEvolutionaryBiology”,studying,amongother,theroleofemotionsandintuitivefeel-ings in moral judgement. Dirk De Ridder,BertholdLangguth,MarkPlazier,andTomasMenovskywrite about “MoralDysfunction:TheoreticalModelandPotentialNeurosurgi-calTreatments”,inparticularaboutantisocialpersonalitydisorders(APD)/psychopathyandpaedophiliaaswellas the treatmentofsuchdiseases(electricalstimulationofthenucleusaccumbens,anteriorcingulatecortex,amyg-dala, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsolateralprefrontalcortex).MatthijsvanVeelen,fromDepartment of Economics of AmsterdamUniversity, investigates “Does It Pay to BeGood?CompetingEvolutionaryExplanationsofPro-SocialBehaviour”,whileRandolphM.Nesseposes thequestion “HowCanEvolu-tion and Neuroscience Help Us UnderstandMoralCapacities?” and,inasecondcontribu-tion, writesabout “RunawaySocialSelectionforDisplaysofPartnerValueandAltruism”,insinuatingthat“ourexpectationthatthereissomesharppeakthatdefines‘normal’”(inthesenseofmorality)maybewrong.Theobjectof interest of John Teehan is “The EvolvedBrain: Understanding Religious Ethics andReligiousViolence”,analyzingtheapproachto(non)violenceinvariousreligions.Finally,Jelle De Schrijver concludes the book with“An Evolutionary and Cognitive Neuro-science Perspective on Moral Modularity”,suggesting that evolutionary biology raisesandcognitiveneurosciencetestsdifferenthy-pothesesonmoralmechanisms.Itispositivethatsomeyoungerauthorswereinvitedtocontributetothepresentbook,butit is apity thatBechara,Damasio,Eslinger,Nichelli, Schultz, and others studying thefunction of the orbitofrontal cortex, reward/punishment,andrelatedphenomena,werenotincludedamongtheauthors.Probablythemostimportantconclusionofthepresentseriesofarticlesisthatthereisnosingle“moralcenter”.Severalcorticalandsubcorti-calstructures,likethecingulatecortex,medialandventromedialprefrontalcortex,hippocam-pus,amygdala, insula,etc.,playcertain rolesin preparing and executingmoral behaviour,andeachmoral task (processingpersonalvs.impersonal moral dilemmas; empathy; etc.)seems to have its own neural network. Thepresentbookmightberegardedasanexcellentinsightintothestatus quaestionis,providinguswithapreciousevolutionaryandneuroscien-tificupdateforallthoseinterestedinthecuri-ousinterdisciplinaryfieldofmorality.

Amir Muzur



Peter Lamarque

Philosophy of Literature

Blackwell,2009

PeterLamarque hasmore than once provedto be the leading expert in the field of phi-losophyofliterature,buthisnewbookgoeseven beyond the excellence of his previousbooks(whichinclude,amongother,The Fic-tional Point of View(1996)andTruth, Fiction and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective(1994,co-authoredwithSteinHaugomOlsen).AlthoughThe Philosophy of LiteratureispartoftheFoundations of the Philosophy of Arts series(whichincludesThe Philosophy of Artby Stephen Davies, and The Philosophy of Motion PicturesbyNoëlCarroll)andassuchit ismeant toprovideakindof introductionintothesubjectof(philosophyof)literature,Lamarquemanagestodomorethanthat:bypresenting the historical contexts and view-points regardingmanydifferent topicsdeal-ingwithliterature,healsoprovideshisread-erswithmany valuable information dealingwith art and aesthetics generally, and litera-ture and literary criticism in particularly. Inthatsense,atthemostgenerallevel,hisbookis an excellent guideline to different philo-sophical theoriesabout thenatureofartandthenatureofaestheticexperience, judgmentandevaluation.However,Lamarqueisprima-rilyinterestedinthephenomenaofliterature:itsdistinctcharacter,whichmakesitcloseto,butradicallydifferentfromalltheotherarts,the special practice of dealingwith and be-ingengagedinliterature,andthesignificanceoftheinstitutionalbackgroundagainstwhichthe literature is developing. Always adopt-ing thephilosophicalperspective,Lamarquepaysspecialattentiontoshowinginwhatwayliterarycriticsandtheoreticiansdealingwithliterature “handle the issue”.His concern togivecredittothosewhoareinsomehowdif-ferentwayconcernedwithliteratureispresentthroughoutthework,anditisevidentinthefact that more than once Lamarque raisesquestionaboutthepropertaskofphilosopherof literature and the special role he has intacklingtheseissues,whichisinmanywaysparalleltotheroleofliterarycritics(andvice versa), but also distinct and incommensura-bletoit.Alwaystryingtoanswerthequestion“whatistoviewliteratureasart”,Lamarquegoesbeyondtheapproachtakenbytheliter-arycritics,andtriestogiveusaphilosophi-calpointofview,which,accordingtohim,isbasedonthefollowingidea:

“Thephilosopher looksat fundamentalprinciples,conceptual connections, unnoticed consequences

oflinesofthought,significanceandinsignificance,boundarieswherethesearepossibleanddesirable.Intheory-constructingmodel,heorshemightthenhopetodevelopanoverarchingtheoryofthephe-nomenathathelpsunify,explain,andclarifydiffuseelements.Thephilosophicalinvestigationoflitera-tureisaprobingintopracticesandproceduresbutitdoesnotofferahistoryofthosepracticesorasocio-logicalanalyzesofthem.Itlooksattheunderlyingconventionsandassumptionsthatgivethepracticeswhatdistinctiveidentitytheyhaveandseekstofindacoherentperspectivethatmakessenseofthem.”1

With that view inmind, Lamarque sees thephilosophyof literature as “foundational in-quiryintotheverynatureoftheliterary,clas-sifyingthesubjectmatter,delineatingaspects,analyzing concepts, exploring norms, andvalues,locatingthewholepracticeofwritingandreadingliteraryworksinitsproperplaceamong related but distinct practice.” Thisquote is anice illustrationof the topics thatLamarques deals with in the book. Chapterone, entitled “Art”, is dedicated to showingwhatistheplaceofliteraturewithinaesthet-ics,philosophyandart,butalsotoseeinwhatwaysarealloftheseconnectedandentwined.HerewecanalreadynoticethethoroughnesswhichcharacterizesLamarque’swritingandthe precision he uses in tackling the issues.Trying to set the stage for his philosophicalstudy,Lamarque iscareful topresentdiffer-ent approaches thatwere taken by differentresearchgroupsovertheyears.Wecanlearnalotaboutdifferentaspectsfromwhichlitera-turehasbeenexamined;differentliterarythe-ories,sociologicalandhistoricalaccountsandattemptstakenbyaestheticianstoexplainthenature of aesthetic experience.AlreadyhereLamarque starts to build his theory ofwhatliterature is.He rejects reductive accountofliterature according to which literature canbe explained in terms of one literary mode(novel,poemetc.),and the ideaof reducingor identifying literaryworkswith its textualqualities,andclaimsthat,ininvestigatingtheliterature,we should be attentive not of thenotionofliterature,butofthephenomenaofliterature.Goingbacktotheideathatwasal-readypresent inhisTruth, Fiction and Phi-losophy,heclaimsthatliteratureanditsdif-ferentaspectsarepresentineverycultureandineverysociety,andthatitincludesdifferentlinguisticpractices:tellingstores,makingpo-etryetc.Therefore,heclaims,thephilosopherof literature should explore the structuresthatenabletheinteractionofthosewhopar-ticipateinthepractice(forexample,writers,readers, publishers, critics). In that sense,philosophyofliteratureisratherdistinctfromsociologyofliterature,ethnography,psychol-ogyoranyother inquiry.Another importantideathatispresentedhereanditwillremain



importantinthewholebookistheclaimthat“tothinkofliteratureasartis,minimally,tothinkofworksasartifactsordesignsofsomekind,exhibiting‘artistry’comparableincer-tain respects with other arts and capable ofaffording distinct kinds of pleasure”.2WhatLamarquewantstoshowisthatliteraryworksarenotmeant tobe just “pleasingpiecesoflanguage”,butaredeservingofspecialkindofaestheticappreciationandattention.Inor-dertoreachthatkindofviewofliterature,heclaimsthatphilosophyofliteratureshouldac-ceptthefollowingsixideas:1. itmustencompassallliteraryformswith-

outgivingprecedencetooneofthem;2. itmustavoidattemptstoexplainliterature

intermsoflinguisticproperties;3. itmust avoid “art for art’s sake” aesthe-

ticism;4. it mustn’t explain aesthetic pleasure in

terms of purely hedonistic, sensuousterms;

5. it should not give priority to natural re-sponse, but (following Hume’s idea) tolearned,trainedresponse;

6. itshouldrecognizetheautonomyoflitera-tureashumanpractice.3

Inthesecondchapter,“Literature”,Lamarqueexaminesandanalyzesdifferenttheoriesthatwere put forward by different people in theattempt to define and explain the nature ofliterature and fiction. At the most generallevel, there are the essentialist versus theanti-essentialist notions of literature, whichargue over the question of whether or notit is possible todefine literature in termsofnecessary and sufficient conditions.Follow-ing the treadofWittgensteinandhis familyresemblance idea, people likeMorrisWeitzseektodefineliteratureintermsofsimilari-tiesandconnectedness,ratherthanintermsofsharedfeatures.Thischapterisveryinforma-tive regarding the historical development ofthe attempts to define not just literature butart generally andLamarque is very detailedin survey of literary theories. He explainscluster theories, advocated byBerysGaunt,whichcenteraroundtheideaoftendifferentfeatureswhichanobjectshoulddisjunctivelysatisfyinordertocountasart.Asimilarver-sion of disjunctivist theory is defended byRobertStecker.Lamarquerejectsbothofthis,showingthattheyareeithertooinclusiveortooexclusiveinassigningthestatus‘literary’todifferentworks.Next,heturnshisattentiontotheworkdonebythecriticM.H.Abrams,whoclaimsthathistoricaldevelopmentofartand literature shows that there are four fea-tureswhichwere at different times the cen-treof theart.Thesefour“coordinatesofartcriticism are the universe, the audience, the

artistandthework”.Whatthismeansisthattherearedifferentthingsthatcanbethefocusofanartwork,thatis,literarywork.Mimetictheoriesweremostlybasedontheattempttorepresent theworldas faithfully aspossible.Pragmatictheoriestriedtoemphasizetheroleoftheaudienceandtheeffectthatanartworkhason theaudience.Expressive theories arebased on the artist and his inner feelings,thoughts, mental states etc. Finally, autono-moustheoriesstresstheautonomyofaliter-arywork.Turninghisattentiontotheproblemoffiction,Lamarquediscussestheorieswhichtriedtoexplainfictionintermsofimaginativeliterature,speechactsorsomeotherlinguisticdevice.Theflawthattheyallsharecanbestbedescribedintheclaimthatnotallliteratureisofthatsort.Notallliteratureisinversesandnot all sentences within a literary work cande described as pretended illocutionary act.That’sthemainreasonforacceptingsomekindofinstitutionaldefinitionofliterature,accord-ingtowhichliteratureshouldbeobservedandanalyzed fromawiderperspective:wehavetolookattheexistingsocialpracticeswhichunderlie thephenomenaof literatureanden-ableit.TwoideasemergeinthischapterthatLamarquebelievesare important in explain-ingreasonsforengaginginreadingliterature.Ashesees,“literaryactcanbecharacterizedacross two dimensions, an imaginative/crea-tive dimension and a content dimension”.4Thischapterendswithontologicalquestionsregardingtheorigin,identityandexistenceofliteraryworks,theresultofwhichisveryim-portant distinction between text, understoodintermsofsentences(withalloftheirlinguis-tic, semantic, syntactical features)andwork.Workisnottobeidentifiedwithitsphysicalrealizationandalthoughatextcanhavemanyvaluableelements,suchasthesentencestruc-ture,rhythmetc.;workissomethingmoreandaesthetic appreciation should be focused ontryingtograsptheworkasawhole.Chapter number three, “Authors”, opens updifferent questions regarding the ‘author’.Someofthemostfamousproblemsconcern-ingthatroleoftheauthorareexaminedhere,like the intentionalist vs. anti-intentionalistdebate,theproblemofinterpretationandthemeaningofaliterarywork.Thischapteralsooffersagalleryofdifferent“persona”oftheauthor, from “the poet as sage” conception,whichischaracteristicofromanticism,tothedeathoftheauthorproclaimedbyauthorslikeBarthesandFoucault.Fourthchapter,“Practice”,isconcernedwiththeothersideoftheliteraryinteraction,name-ly the audience, ormore concretely, literarycritics. Raising again the question of whatit istoreadaliteraryworkasaworkofart,



Lamarquetriestounraveldifferentprocessesthat togetherconstitute thepracticeofbeingengagedinliterature.Inthatsense,thischap-terismostlyconcernedwithliterarycriticismanddifferent tasks that lieahead in thepro-cess of dealing with literature, like explor-ing formal structure, explication, exploringwork’s subject and interpretation.Lamarqueisveryeager to reject the ideaofautonomyinthepracticeofreading,claimingthatread-ingispurposiveactivitythatinvolvesareaderwhoisawareofthefactwhatheisreadingisa literarywork,anartwork,and is ready torespondtoitinsuchaway.Readerexpectsaliterarywork tobe imaginativeandcreativeandtohaveaspecialcontentandtoapproachto a literary work as a work of art means,amongotherthings,totrytofindthesevaluesin the text. In that sense, Lamarque claims,thepracticeofreadingshouldn’tbeprimarilyconcernedwithfindingthemeaning,butwiththe proper response thatwork is to elicit inthereader.5Sowhatisrelevanttoattendingtoliteratureasartisthefollowing:– aheightenedawarenessofformandstruc-tureandthe“design”ofthewhole;

– anexpectationofcoherenceandinnercon-nectedness;

– an expectation that the works presents asubject of some interest, either throughnarrative content, imagined emotion, ormetaphoricalillustration;

– an expectation that thework exhibits anddevelops organizing principles or themesthat provide unity and value in the workbeyondtheimmediacyofthesubject,invit-ingreflectiononmattersofmoreuniversalhumanconcern.6

So,thatiswhatLamarquehasinmindwhenheclaimsthatartisticappreciationisalearnedresponse, acquired through experience andtraining.Inchapterfive,“Fiction”,Lamarquesetshim-selfthegoalofexplainingfiction,asaspecialanddistinctkindofliteraryworks.Manyau-thorshavesofartriedtodothat,butmostofthemhaveusuallybeendeterminedtofindso-lutiontoonlyoneoftheproblemsoffiction;whatissospecialaboutLamarqueisthathetacklesdownallthequestionsthatareprob-lematic in thisarea.Theseincludeabovealltheverynatureoffiction.Manyphilosophers,dealingwiththesemanticsandphilosophyoflanguagehavetriedtosolvethepuzzleofthefictionallanguage.Lamarqueexaminessomeof the theories thatwere put forward in or-dertoexplainfictionandfictionalutterances,theorieswhicharebuiltupontheideaofpre-tending (to state something) or pretending(tomake an assertion), and he rejects themclaimingthatwhatisimportantforthefiction

isitsoriginanditscontent,notthesentences.Movingnexttothequestionoffictionalchar-acters,Lamarquecontrastsdifferent theorieswhichtriedtoexplainthecharacterandstatusoffictionalcharacters.Themostpressingis-sueinthisareahasbeentoexplaintheontol-ogyoffictionalcharacter:whatdoesitmeantosaythatEmmaBovaryisafictionalcharac-terandwhataretheconsequencesofthatas-sertionforthestorybeingtoldbytheauthor?And finally,Lamarque turnshisattention towhathasbecometobeknownastheparadoxof fiction. The problem, in a nutshell, is toexplainwhywereactemotionallytofictionalcharacters, given that they aremadeup andthereforenon-existent.Lamarqueconcludes:“Whatthediscussionoffictionandemotionservestoemphasizeistheimportancethathu-manbeingsattachtoengagingimaginativelywithfictionalcharactersandsituations.”7

Chaptersixopensup,inmyopinion,themostprovocative issues concerning literature andfiction. Entitled “Truth”, it tries to exploresomeepistemologicaltreadsthatareentwinedintheliteraryandfictionalworks.Hopingtoshowthatliteraturecanhavesomeepistemo-logicalvaluesthatmakeitevenmoreworthyofappreciation,Lamarqueaddstothecentu-rieslongdebateaboutthecognitivevalueoffiction, which dates back to at least Plato’sideaofthedeceptivepoetryandobliviouspo-etsandAristotle’sclaimthatpoetknowsnotjusthowthingsarebutalsohowtheyshouldbe.If,ashehasshowninthepreviouschap-ter, fiction actually is “similar” enough tothereallife,thanitcertainlymakessensetoclaimthatwecanlearnfromfiction.Infact,Lamarquetakesitasobviousthat:

“…noonecoulddisputethatreaderscanlearnabouttherealworldfromfiction:theypickupfactsabouthistory,geography,pointsofetiquette,clothingandfashion,idiomaticusage,aswellashowtoperformpracticaltasks,howpeoplebehaveincertainsitua-tions,whatisitliketobeinanearthquake,astormat thesea,orablazinghouse.(…)thequestionisnotwhetherwecanlearntruthsfromfiction–thatisaninescapablefact–butwhatvaluetoattachtothislearning”.8

So,therealtaskofaphilosopherofliteratureis to seewhether truth is a criterion for lit-eraryvalue,whetherliteratureistobeeseenasgreatduetoitstruth.Asbefore,Lamarqueshowsusdifferentconceptionsregardingthisconnection,liketheideaofaspecialkindofliterary truth, sui generic conception, advo-catedforbyI.A.Richards,J.HospersandI.Murdoch.Lamarquealsotriestosolvesomeoftheobjectionsthatwereputforwardtotheideathatthetruthaddsupsomespecialvalueto the fiction, usually called “the trivialityproblem”,9claiming that“Thenovel’svalueresidesintheworkingofthetheme,notinthe



theme’s bare propositional content”.10 Thathoweverdoesnotcompletehisthoughtontheissue.Infact,Lamarquegoesontoclaim:“Noonewhogivesprimaryfocustothediscoveryof propositional truths in literature, or whomines famousworks for stirring quotations,wouldqualifyasasubtlereader”11andgoeson to seewhatother epistemological valuesthereareinthefiction,apartfromtheconvey-ance of true descriptions of things found intherealworld.Whatfictioncandoforusistomakeusseethingsfromsomedifferentangle,tomakeuscometoamoralunderstandingofcomplex real life situations, to come to seewhat is like to be such-and-such. Differentphilosophers use different labels to explainthisideathatfictioncanteachussomething,Gordon Graham describes it as “enrichinghuman understanding”, John Gibson callsit “acknowledgement”, Lamarque mentions“eyeopeningeffect”.12However,intheend,Lamarqueclaimsthatnoneofthesevaluesiswhatmakes literature intrinsically valuable,these are but by-product.He concludes thisdebateclaiming:

“Themistakeistosupposethattobeseriousorre-flectiveaworkmustineffectteachsomething.Yetthere is no such implication.Awork is serious ifittreatsaserioussubjectmatter.Butitcandothatwithout being true andwithout presenting a viewthatoughttobeendorsed.”13

Finally,inthelastchapter,“Value”,Lamarquetriestoseewhatisthereal,orashecallsit,corevalue that is tobe found in the literarywork.14Firstly,heexplores theories thatarebased on the distinction between intrinsicliterary value, which are connected to theformal features, and externalist (more com-monlyusedexpressionisinstrumentalvalue)whichhavetodowiththeeffectsofliterature.However,Lamarqueclaims,itishardtodrivethelinebetweenthetwoandthebestwecando is to try todetermine the intrinsicvaluesin the context of the relevant conception ofliterature and the practices governing theinteraction.This is going back to the socialconception of literature, according towhicheveryliteraryworkisnotjustatext,but“aninstitutionalobject,atextlocatedinanetworkofconventionsandactions”.15

This chapter raises another important andhighly debated question in the philosophyof literature, and that is the question of therelationbetweenethics,orethicalvalueandliterary value. This question is often basedontheclaimthatliteratureisandshouldbeasourceofmoraledification.Lamarquehow-everdoesn’twanttoaccepttheclaimthatthisiswhatmakes literatureespeciallyvaluable.Similarlyaswiththeissueofepistemologicalvalues,heclaimsthatweshouldnotbeprima-rilyconcernedwithethicalelucidationwithinthework,becauseitwouldmaketheprocess

ofengaginginliteraturetooinstrumentalandwouldtakeawayofthevalueofreadingandappreciatingaliterarywork.ThisisinshortwhatLamarque’sbookisallabout.Itisfascinatingforthetopicsitopensup, as well as for the meticulousness andthoroughness of Lamarque’s writing. Onecan definitely learn so many things aboutliterature, literarycriticism,different literarytheories anddifferent theories about art andaesthetics.Itishardtodojusticetotheauthorand topresentallofhisarguments,but it isworthnotingtheirbrilliance.Alwaystryingtoshowtheimportanceandvalueof literature,Lamarquemanagestostayalways,inallthecontextsof inquiry, faithful to thesix initialpointswhich,accordingtohimshouldbetheframeworkofaphilosophyofliterature.Onecanofcoursequestionthem,ormaybetheirconsequences.For example, by claiming that response tofiction should be trained and experienced,Lamarque sets the slippery slope inmotion:howmuchtrainingandhowmuchexperience?Ifnotallanswersshouldmatter,itseemsthatthe road to relativism is opened (althoughLamarqueresolutelyrejectsrelativism)anditremainshardforLamarquetoexplainwhoseresponses should be acceptable and onwhatgrounds.Theissueoftrainedandexperienced“judges” opens up one more epistemologi-calproblem,namely thequestionof experts.Experts candisagree among themselves, canreachdifferentjudgmentsandcanresponddif-ferently to the samework. In that sense, thenotionofinstitutionbecomesratherillformedandunfounded;andthisjeopardizestheprac-ticesthataretoguideourappreciationoflit-eraryworks.Andofcourse, itremainsunan-sweredwhatstatusshouldbegiventothe“un-trained”readers,thatis,whathappenswiththeeverydayreader?Onthecompletelydifferentside,itisplausibletoclaimthatthesearchforthatcoreliteraryvalueisalsoleftmurky.But,Ibelievetheseworriescannotreallyreducethebrillianceandimportanceofthisbook.Inthatsense,Lamarque is a fascinatingauthorwithclear and coherent vision of what literatureis,andhisstyleofwritingisaboveallworthofpraise.Oneotherthing,sofarleftunmen-tioned, is the abundance of examples takenfromtheliterature.Lamarqueshowsenviablefamiliaritywiththeliteraryworks,aswellaswithworksfallingindomainofliterarycriti-cism.Inthatsense,thisbookisextremelyval-uablesourceofknowledgeforall thosewhoareinanywayconcernedwithliterature.

1Lamarque,2009,“Preface”.2Ibid.,p.16.



3Ipresenttheseideashereinaratherbareform.Formoredetails,seeibid.,p.26. 4Ibid.,p.62.This idea isalso takenover fromLa-marque&Olsen,1994,chapter10. 5“Ifliteraryworksaremerelyundifferentiatedtexts,orstringsofsentences,meaningallthatwordsinthemcouldmean,itisimpossibletoseewhytheyshouldhaveanyspecialvalue. Onlybylocatingworksinawider ‘institutional’ framework, canwe seewhyliteraryworksshouldengagereadersandbesoughtafter.Soratherthanstressingautonomyoftheindi-vidualwork,itseemsmorefruitfultoemphasizetheautonomyofthepracticewithinwhichtheworksareread.Whatmakesliteraryworkdistinctiveiscloselyconnectedtowhatmakesreadingpracticedistincti-vewhentheworksarereadasliterature.Exploringsuchpracticeisthekeytounderstandingwhatgivesliteraryworksthevalueandinteresttheyhave”(La-marque,2009,p.132).Lateron,hewrites:“...thosewhostressthepursuitofmeaning,givetheimpressi-onthatliteraryworksarepuzzlestobesolved,morethanexperiencestobeundergone.Thefocusischan-gedifwethinkofsuchworkasworksofart tobeappreciated.Partofwhatisinvolvedinappreciatingaworkofartasaworkofartistoappreciateitasanartifactdesignedforapurpose.”(Ibid.,p.136.) 6Ibid.,p.137. 7Ibid.,p.218. 8Ibid.,pp.221–222. 9SeeforexampleJeromeStolnitzwhohasclaimedthattruthsimpliedintheliteratureareoftentrivial(“OntheCognitiveTrivialityofArt”).10Lamarque,2009,p.239.11Ibid.12For a more detailed analysis of these, see ibid.,chapter5.13Ibid.,p.253.14“…sui generisliteraryvaluesassociatedwithcon-stitutive aims of literature shared by all works”(ibid.,p.255).

15Ibid.,p.267.

Iris Vidmar

Lars Svendsen

Fashion: A Philosophy

ReaktionBooks,London2006

Dealingwiththetopicoffashionbyusingadiscourseofphilosophyisanadventureworthnoticing.What are the questionswhich canbe posed by a philosopher on such a trivialand superficial phenomenon as fashion is?An insight into motivation for philosophiz-ingonfashionispartlygivenbytheauthorofFashion: A Philosophy Lars Svendsen him-self–writingabookonfashionwasanidearaisedafterwritinganotherbookA Philoso-phy of Boredom.Not that fashionandbore-domareinanydirectrelationnecessarily,butcertainlyrepresentnon-fashionabletopicsforaphilosopher.LarsSvendsen,aphilosopher fromNorway,withalighttouchandaplayfulattitudewritesa study on fashion. Critical examination isdoneinalight-philosophicalstylewithmostmaterials drawn from sociologists. Classicsoffashiontheoryarecompiledwiththoughtson fashion by some of the most prominentphilosophers fromEnlightenment tomoderntimes.Productisanarticulatestudyonfash-ion which will appeal to anyone curious toknowwhat liesbeneathwhat seems tobe aglobal fascination with fashion.Fashion: A PhilosophywasfirstpublishedinNorwegian2004,followedbyEnglishtranslationbyJohnIrons, and published in 2006 by ReaktionBooks,London.Svendsenstatesonewell-knownfact:fashionaffectsattitudeofmostpeople towardsboththemselves an others, though many woulddeny it.At the same time, fashion seems tobeoneoftheleastimportantthingsonecouldimagine(p.10).InthisrelativelysmallbookLarsSvendsenisofferingapanoramicover-view of fashion theories and provides ananalysisof fashionasahistoricalphenome-non.Inacriticalmanner,Svendsendivesintoa fashion and considers it as a “mechanismor an ideology that applies to almost everyconceivable area of the modern world” (p.11), which also has an important relevancefortheformationofidentity.Svendsenpointsout that identity is no longer provided by atradition,butitisjustasmuchsomethingwehave tochoosebyvirtueof the fact thatweareconsumers(p.19).Drawingfromnumer-ousauthorshediscussesfashionascentraltoanideaofmodernity,asavividproductofamodernageandthereforeanimportantmag-nifierforanalysisofmodernity.



The ‘new’ as a principle of fashion, originsandspreadoffashion,interrelationsbetweenfashion and language, body, art, and con-sumption are topics discussed in this book.Author also deals with the ongoing disputeonfashionasanart-formusingsomeof thewell-known examples from the fashion-artcollision.Inaninterestingtwistofusualargu-ments, it isconcludedthat, ironically,artistshave become increasingly preoccupiedwithfashion(p.110).Finalpartsofthebookana-lyzefashionandconsumption,andfashionasanidealof life.Consumerismisapproachedthrough symbol consumption – every prod-uctissaturatedwithmeaning,signvaluehasbecome central and has gradually come toovershadow all other value. Therefore, au-thorpointstoafactthatisdifficultnottobebrand-conscious in today’s society (p. 125).Theconsumersocietypresupposesirrationalindividuals,andthatisaperfectplaceforir-rationality of fashion consumption to do itsbest.Searchingfortheidealitemcanbeseenasadrivingforceinthemodernfashioncycle–aneverendingquestdestinedtofail.Challengingthe“mantraofthenew”bothinmodernityandfashionasoneofitsmanifes-tations,Svendsennoticesachangeinatem-porality of fashion – creation of new formshas been replaced with recycling the oldones,e.g.fashionacquiredacyclictemporal-ity.Fashionusedtofollowamodernistnormby new fashion replacing all previous onesand subsequentlymaking them superfluous.But, as Svendsen claims, logic of fashionhas changed– logicof supplementation hasreplacedtraditionallogicofreplacement.Re-cycled change is also a change, and changeisanessentialcharacteristicofeveryfashion.Change for the sakeofchange, inordernotto“improve” theobject,or tomake itmorefunctional,ispointingtothefashionashighlyirrational.Maybethatisthereasonforthelackofinter-estamongphilosopherstodealwithfashion.Ingeneral,philosophershavenotbeenhighlyfashion-conscious anyway. With an excep-tionofKant,“theelegantMasterofArt”(p.17/18), philosophers did not bother them-selveswith practical aspects of fashion.Ontheotherhand,theoriesonandaboutfashionhavebeensubjectsofinterestinaquitealotofdistinguishthinkers.SvendsenisdrawingbackfromawiderangeofthinkersasfarasPlato,orThomasMorusandAdamSmith,tothemorerecentoneslikeBarthes,Bourdieu,orBaudrillard,andusingthemforanalysisofwell-known fashion theories. Most popularone,“trickle-down”theory,providesuswithargumentationthatfashionishighlyintercon-nectedwith a society, and that it represents

a way social classes are dealing with theirsocialstatus.Svendsentracksoriginsofthattheory in a work ofAdam Smith, followedbyKant,HerbertSpencer,ThorsteinVeblen,GeorgSimmel, and evenBourdieu,with fi-nallyacceptingsomeargumentation,butalsofindingitsshortcomings.Fashion has become more democratic, duetothedevelopmentoftheindustry,butitcer-tainlyhasnotbecomeegalitarian.Ashavingmoneytobuyanexclusivepieceofclothing,orhavingprivilegedaccesstoacertainfash-ionobjectareloosingimportanceincreatingastylebecauseofagreatamountofdesign-ers,stylesoffered,andmoreaccessiblecop-ies,someotherillusionmusthadbeenfound.‘Youth’isceasingtobeatermforparticularagegroupandtendingtobeatermforan“at-titude” towards life (p. 61). Consumers arefronting thechallengeofdecidingnotabout“fashionable” clothes, but rather about styletheywishtofollow.Underliningcharacteris-tictodayseemstobeapursuitforyouth.Thatcontext of everyday experience is pointingto the questionof humanbody and its rela-tions to fashion in forming of self-identity.QuotingworkofAnneHollander,Svendsenarguesthatourperceptionofhumanbodyisalways dependent on the prevailing fashionof the time (p. 77/78) and continueswith aquestion:arethere“natural”reasonsformenand women dressing differently? Is there a“truenature”which isdisguisedorpromotebyclotheswewear?Doclotheswechoosetowearhavesomecharacteristicofalanguage,ordoesithaveafunctionofa“message”totheoutsideworld?Svendsenanswersno,thusopeningquestionsofadifferentkind.Narrowlylinkedwithsocialcurrents,insepa-rable from social context, in close relationwith the technologicand industrial changes,fashion representsmore than an intellectualhobbyforindividualestheticiansandarthis-torians. Svendsens’ book provides a goodstarting point for further and possiblymorephilosophically oriented examination of aslipperymeaningoffashion.

Ivana Zagorac

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Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus … · Book Reviews / Buchbesprechungen / Comptes rendus de lecture Alain Badiou Second manifeste pour la philosophie Fayard, 2009