Coup d'Etat by Edward LuttwakReview by: Thomas R. IrelandPublic Choice, Vol. 8 (Spring, 1970), pp. 111-112Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30023144 .

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REVIEWS 111

Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat, Greenwick, Connecticut: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969. Pp. xv, 209. $0.75.

Coup d'Etat by Edward Luttwak is a remarkably good book for what it is and advertizes itself to be - a practical handbook for taking over a nation. It begins with a cataloging and careful analysis of different types of non-democratic

techniques for seizing control of a political entity. Most importantly, Luttwak draws the distinction between a revolution and a coup d'etat. Unlike a revolution, a

coup d'etat involves a very small number of people and, if successful, little or no violence. The question which then concerns Luttwak is how a small number of individuals, with careful planning, can seize control of a state with virtually no

fighting resistence on the part of the establishment government.

Surprisingly, Luttwak's analysis takes on no normative overtones. He is intent on explaning how a coup d'etat could be accomplished, not when or whether it should. In this sense, it is reminiscent of Machiavelli's The Prince. This objectivity is

surprising in that the book is not an academic piece of work. There are virtually no references to the standard sources of any of the social sciences and no attempt to draw parallels between the book's analysis and other inquiries into similar social

phenomena. Luttwak creates his own theory as he goes along and he does a good job. The book is filled with excellent examples of each type of situation he discusses and these are worthwhile on their own part.

The central thesis of the book is that, by careful planning under certain types of conditions, the power of a large government bureaucracy can be turned

effectively against itself to seize control of the government. This can be done, according to Luttwak, if:

1) Social and economic conditions confine political participation to a small fraction of the population.

2) The influence of foreign powers in the internal affairs of a state are small.

3) The state has an obvious political center through which central control is administered.

Given these conditions, Luttwak considers the information and timing problems coup planners face in each part of a state bureaucracy, both before and after the coup. The point is constantly made that at no point does the coup require massive amounts of force. The coup is a political process which requires neutralization of potential opposition and proper timing of a number of limited tractical objectives. Any outbreak of fighting will generally mean the failure of the

coup attempt.

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112 PUBLIC CHOICE

In a sense, it would be difficult to fault or accept Luttwak's handbook without having attempted to apply his suggested techniques, but on the surface, at least, he seems to have answered the perplexing question of how a small number of

persons can seize a government with virtually no violence.

Thomas R. Ireland

Alain Wolfelsperger. Les Biens Collectifs Fondements theorique de l'economie publique. Paris, France: Presse Universitaires de France, 1969. Pp. 206.

For Alain Wolfelsperger voluntary-exchange theory and the theory of

compulsion are normative and imperfect explanations of respectively a direct

democracy and a completely absolute dictatorship. His purpose is to synthesize these traditional views of the public economy by reviewing the literature on public goods. The resulting theory (he calls it "institutionalism") is supposedly positive and sufficiently general to explain the size and nature of the public sector in a

variety of different societies.

Wolfelsperger's book is structured around five questions: the objective of the

State, the definition of a public good, the concepts of disequilibrium and

equilibrium in the public sector, efficiency of political institutions and the

efficiency of financial institutions.

The State exists only to satisfy the wants of individuals. But the weights attached to the wants of citizens of the community, those outside the community and the anticipated wants of those as yet unborn depend on the nature of the insititutions that were previously adopted. (p. 30)

Public goods are all goods or services that the State decides to produce or cause to be produced. (p. 64) The fact that a good is characterized by indivisibilities

(voluntary-exchange) or must be produced by the State in order to agree with the

"general well-being" of the community (theory of compulsion) does not make it

public. This depends only on the institutions that have been adopted and the

preferences of those that participate in making decisions through the State.

Disequilibrium in the public sector results in political action, e.g., a change in the party platform of the governing party, the election of a different party, logrolling by elected representatives, the migration of citizens to other communities. Individuals engage in these actions in order to change the nature and the quantity of public goods produced. Equilibrium is defined as the ideal situation in which no political action is undertaken. Everyone is satisfied given his ability to cause the community to act politically. (p. 80)

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