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    Melancholy, Irony, and KierkegaardAuthor(s): Abrahim KhanReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 17, No. 1/2 (1985), pp. 67-85Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40036365.

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    International Journal

    for

    Philosophy

    of

    Religion

    1

    7:67-85

    (1985).

    1985 Martinus

    Nif

    ho

    ff

    Publishers,

    Dordrecht.

    Printed

    in the

    Netherlands.

    MELANCHOLY,

    IRONY,

    AND

    KIERKEGAARD

    ABRAHIM KHAN

    Trinity

    College,

    University

    of

    Toronto,

    Toronto,

    Ont.

    Almost

    everyone

    who knows

    anything

    about

    Kierkegaard

    nows

    that

    his

    writings

    tend

    to

    be

    melancholy.

    Some

    know

    rightly

    of

    the

    irony

    with which

    he

    writes. Still

    some others

    know that both

    melancholy

    and

    irony

    are

    thematic

    features

    primarily

    of

    his

    early writings.

    But

    probably

    very

    few

    know that

    he

    perceives

    melancholy

    and

    irony

    as two

    closely

    related

    concepts.

    The

    conceptual

    nexus between

    the

    two,

    taken

    almost for

    granted,

    remains

    argely unexplored

    and somewhat

    surprisingly

    disquieting.A footnote in his doctoral dissertation,providingsome evidence of

    Xenophon's

    failure

    to

    understand Socrates

    correctly,

    arouses

    the

    disquietude.

    Drawn

    from

    Memorabilia

    II,

    14, 2ff.,

    the evidence is

    Xenophon's

    depiction

    of a

    young

    dinner

    guest

    who

    is

    presumed

    to

    understandSocrates'

    remarkson

    greed.

    Kierkegaard

    contends

    that

    instead of

    representing

    the

    youth

    as

    taking

    a little

    bread

    with his

    meat

    in

    order

    to

    indicatehis moral

    mprovement,

    Xenophon

    should

    have

    shown

    him as

    becoming

    so

    melancholy

    (Melancholf)

    hat he

    gave

    up eating

    meat

    altogether. 1

    This

    disquietude

    stirs

    as we

    try

    to find an

    answerfor

    why

    the

    young

    man

    should be

    cast

    as

    being melancholy

    Melancholi).

    The

    reply

    that melan-

    choly

    is

    a

    fitting

    expression

    for

    Socratic

    irony

    is

    neither lucid

    nor

    perceptive.

    Al-

    though an 1849 passagefrom his journal2in which Kierkegaardtates that the

    melancholy

    person

    tends,

    like the

    ironist,

    to become

    the

    henpecked partner

    n a

    marriage

    s

    a

    vague

    hint

    at

    an

    answer,

    he

    passage,

    nevertheless,

    makes the

    question

    more

    vexing,

    and

    the

    demand for an

    adequate

    account

    of

    their

    conceptual

    nexus

    more

    pressing.

    Hence,

    this

    paper

    aims to

    put

    the

    disquietude

    o

    rest

    by

    clarifying

    the

    relationship

    between

    melancholy

    and

    irony.

    More

    specifically,

    he clarification

    is

    beneficial

    on two

    counts.

    One,

    it sheds

    more

    light

    on

    the

    way

    in

    which Kierke-

    gaard

    exploits

    scepticism;

    he other

    is

    that

    is

    permits

    he

    drawing

    of

    a

    tighter

    com-

    pass

    around

    the

    meanings

    of

    Melancholi and

    Tungsind ,

    each

    purportedly

    representing

    ifferent

    degrees

    of

    melancholy

    n

    his

    writings.3

    Kierkegaard's arly pseudonymouswritingshave been used as the basis for

    drawing

    the

    purported

    distinction

    between

    Melancholi and

    Tungsind .

    How-

    ever,

    the nature

    and

    intention

    of the

    works,

    the

    first

    of

    which is

    Either/Or

    ssued

    in

    two

    volumes,

    are such

    that the

    distinction

    between

    these

    two terms is

    not a

    priority.

    Artfully

    constructed to be

    dramatically

    provocative,

    they

    make use

    of

    67

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    68

    thought experiments,speeches, diaries, letters, etc., to attracttheir reader'saess-

    thetic

    interests while

    unobtrusivelyaiming

    to make the

    reader take

    note

    of his

    own

    mode of

    existence

    and

    to become the

    agent

    of

    his own selfhood.

    They

    present

    aesthetic

    life in

    its manifold as

    being

    constituted

    by

    accidents,

    by idiosyncracies,

    by

    'raw

    material',

    by

    chance,

    and

    by

    the fortituous

    contatenationof

    circumstances

    that a

    family

    or an

    environment

    provides. 4

    n this connection

    melancholy

    s

    both

    a

    constituent of

    the aesthetic life

    and a

    definite thematic features

    especially

    in

    Either/Or.

    The

    treatment

    of

    the

    theme

    shows

    melancholy

    not as a

    problem

    to be

    resolved,

    but

    as a

    means and

    motive

    for

    becoming

    a

    genuine

    or

    complete

    person.

    The

    literature,

    having

    been rendered more connotative than

    denotative

    by

    the

    literary freedom exercised and artistry employed in its composition, does not

    support

    unambiguously

    distinctionbetween

    two

    types

    of

    melancholy.

    For it

    lends

    to

    an

    equally

    plausible hypothesis

    that

    Tungsind

    s

    a

    stylistically

    elegant

    varia-

    tion

    of

    Melancholi. 5A defense of that

    hypothesis

    is

    not the

    intention

    of

    this

    study.

    On

    the

    contrary,

    its intention

    is to see whether

    the

    purported

    distinction

    can

    be

    further

    clarifiedand

    strengthened

    on

    the

    basis

    of

    a

    text that

    is

    more

    formal

    and

    denotative n

    comparison

    o the

    early

    pseudonymous

    iterature.

    Already

    alluded

    to,

    the

    text

    for our

    study

    is

    Kierkegaard's

    issertation,

    pub-

    lished

    underthe

    title The

    Concept

    of

    Irony,6

    submitted o the

    University

    of

    Copen-

    hagen

    in

    1841,

    and

    precedes

    the

    composition

    of

    Either

    Or.

    Its use

    of

    either term

    is

    admittedlysparsebut no way a handicapin accomplishingour stated objective.

    More

    specifically,

    the

    text

    shows

    one

    occurrence

    of

    Melancholi and contains

    none

    of

    its

    six

    variant orms

    occurring

    n the

    Kierkegaard

    orpus.

    As

    for

    the term

    Tungsind

    t does

    not occur in the

    text,

    but

    its

    variants

    tungsindig

    nd

    tung-

    sindigt

    do,

    occurring

    wice

    and once

    respectively.

    As

    we

    shall

    see,

    the contexts

    in

    which

    they

    occur are

    substantial

    enough

    to

    establish the

    meaning

    of

    Melan-

    choli

    and

    to

    extrapolate

    it in the case of

    Tungsind.

    The context

    for the

    one

    Melancholi

    ccurrence,

    already

    cited,

    is

    that

    engendering

    he

    unsettling

    question

    as

    to

    why

    the

    young

    dinner

    guest

    should

    be

    depicted

    as

    becoming

    so

    melancholy

    as

    to

    refuse

    food

    altogether,

    a

    question

    occasioning

    he clarification

    of

    the

    conceptual

    tie between

    melancholy

    and

    irony.

    Kierkegaard's

    nderstanding

    of

    irony

    is an

    appropriate

    tarting

    point

    for that

    clarification.His

    development

    of

    the

    concept

    is such that the

    expression

    irony

    as

    a

    mastered

    moment is

    crucial

    in his

    interpretation

    of

    an

    authentic

    human

    exis-

    tence.

    He

    singles

    out for his

    purpose

    a

    particular pecies

    of

    irony

    and calls

    it

    irony

    in

    its

    essential

    greatness,

    as its

    zenith. When

    mastered,

    his

    particular

    orm of

    irony

    has,

    in

    brief,

    a

    chastening

    effect

    on the

    personal

    ife. In

    a

    profound

    sense,

    Kierke-

    gaardian

    rony

    is a

    possible way

    of

    being

    in

    the

    world,

    a

    condition

    for

    acquiring

    wholeness

    of

    personality,

    or

    human

    plenitude.

    Valuable in

    the

    shaping

    of

    his

    understanding

    f

    irony

    are

    two

    figures,

    Socrates

    and

    the

    German

    Romanticist,

    Solger.

    It

    is the

    latter

    who

    provides

    him

    with

    a cue

    for

    making

    rony

    a

    condition for

    authentic

    human

    existence.

    For

    Solger

    ectures

    on

    aesthetics

    take

    irony

    as a

    condition

    for

    very

    artistic

    production.7

    This

    means that

    irony

    is

    a form of

    consciousness,

    a

    standpoint,

    or

    a

    moment of

    an

    infinitely

    abso-

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    69

    lute negationof everyaspectof finitude. At thatmoment,ironyis at its zenithand

    is

    truly

    the

    negation

    of

    negation. Solger'sunderstanding

    f

    irony,

    however,

    has

    a

    defect.

    Kierkegaard

    aults him

    for not

    going

    further.

    Instead

    of

    following

    through

    to

    master

    irony

    and

    thereby

    to

    become

    reconciled

    with

    the

    finite,

    Solger

    himself

    is

    trapped

    in a state

    of

    vacuous

    infinity.

    Although

    he

    grasps

    rony

    as

    engendering

    a

    mood

    in

    which

    all

    contradictions

    are

    cancelled,

    his

    irony

    remains,

    n Kierke-

    gaard's stimate,

    speculative

    or

    contemplative

    at

    best.8

    Irony

    at its zenith

    is never

    mastered,

    and therefore

    cannot teach the

    ironic

    subject

    that his

    personal

    life

    must become an actualized

    infinity every

    moment.

    Consequently, Solger's

    view

    breaks

    no

    new

    ground

    with

    respect

    to

    Socrates'

    understanding

    f

    irony.

    The paradigmatic igure in the shapingof Kierkegaard'sonception of irony

    is

    Socrates. For in

    Kierkegaard's yes

    he is the

    accouncher

    for the

    principle

    of

    actualizing

    he infinite

    through

    one's

    personal

    ife.9

    Although

    the

    principle

    has its

    inception

    in

    Socrates,

    we are reminded that it is

    only

    cryptically

    and not

    fully

    present

    in

    him.

    To the

    extent

    that the

    principle

    s

    present

    in him

    and that

    irony

    for him

    is

    an

    orientation

    of

    personality,

    Socrates

    is a

    world historical

    personage

    marking

    the

    beginning

    of the

    period

    of

    reflective

    individuality

    n

    world

    history.10

    The

    implication

    s

    that

    through rony

    Socrates

    negates

    the form

    of life

    encouraged

    and

    defined

    by

    the Greek

    state

    of

    his time. Put another

    way,

    he

    becomes

    through

    irony

    negatively

    related

    to

    the

    objective

    ethical

    reality,

    to its

    demands

    and

    obliga-

    tions constituting the substantiallife of Hellas.11And,

    having

    assumedsuch a

    standpoint,

    he

    divorces

    himself

    not

    only

    from

    the

    past

    but from

    any

    subsequent

    future

    development

    of

    it. A further outcome

    is

    that his

    earthly

    life

    culminates n

    an

    infinite

    negativity

    nstead of

    affirming

    he

    actuality

    of

    infinity.

    As with

    Solger,

    Socrates

    too

    is

    trapped

    by

    the

    seductive and

    enchanting

    moment

    of

    irony,

    or as

    Kierkegaard

    ells

    it,

    is

    swept

    out

    upon

    that

    infinite Oceanus where

    the

    good,

    the

    true,

    the

    beautiful,

    etc. confine

    [delimit]

    themselves n

    infinite

    negativity. 12

    Although

    he never

    masters

    irony,

    he

    represents,

    nonetheless,

    the

    instantiation

    of

    irony

    as an

    infinite absolute

    negativity,

    that

    is,

    one

    whose life is

    oriented so as

    to

    begin

    with

    the concrete and to

    endeavour

    onstantly

    to

    arrive

    at the

    abstract.

    Any

    account

    of

    Socrateswhich fails

    to

    depict

    him as an

    essential

    ronist

    is,

    for

    Kierkegaard,

    mpoverished.

    One such

    account

    is that of

    Xenophon.

    In

    Kierke-

    gaard's

    estimate of

    that

    account,

    the

    misunderstanding

    f the

    Socratic

    utterances

    is

    occasioned

    by

    Xenophon

    s lack of an

    eye

    for a

    situation and of

    an ear for

    repar-

    tee,

    shortcomings

    reflected

    by

    his

    failure

    to

    depict

    the

    young

    dinner

    guest

    as be-

    coming

    so

    melancholy

    (Melancholi)

    hat

    he refuses

    food

    altogether.

    Kierkegaard's

    insight

    that

    melancholy

    is

    associated with

    sitophobia,

    the

    obstinate

    refusal

    of

    food,

    anticipates

    the

    psychoanalytic

    enquiries

    and estimate of

    Abraham

    nd

    Freud

    on

    severe

    forms

    of

    melancholy.13

    That

    aside,

    Kierkegaard,

    believe,

    does not

    quite

    accuratelyexplain

    the

    deficiency

    in

    the

    Xenophonticaccount. He takes it that

    Xenophon

    does

    not

    know how to

    depict

    melancholy

    on

    the

    basis

    that

    the

    account

    fails

    to show

    any

    trace

    of

    irony.

    He

    rightly

    perceives

    the

    account

    as

    missing

    the

    thrust

    of the

    Socratic utterances

    which he

    takes as

    being

    in

    the

    direction of

    per-

    sonality

    and

    its

    inward

    transformation.But

    by

    charging

    hat

    it

    contains

    no

    trace of

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    70

    irony, he is implyingthat Xenophon fails to understand hat the Socraticutter-

    ances are

    essentially

    intended as a

    catalyst

    in the

    development

    of

    genuine per-

    sonality.

    The

    implication

    is buttressed

    by

    his remark hat

    Xenophon

    lacks

    an ear

    for

    detecting

    in

    the

    Socratic

    rejoinders

    the infinite

    reverberating

    ackward

    echo

    of the

    reply

    in

    personality. 14

    To

    lay

    out the

    charge

    further,

    and

    consequently

    to

    pinpoint

    more

    accurately

    wherein

    lies

    Kierkegaard's

    mistake,

    the

    charge

    againstXenophon

    amounts

    to

    this:

    he

    fails to

    understand hat the

    Socratic

    utterances,

    n the final

    analysis,

    require

    of

    the hearer

    an

    inward

    response through

    which

    the

    hearer

    realigns

    himself

    with the

    ideal

    infinity.

    The

    response

    s

    not,

    as

    Xenophon

    assumes,

    an external

    one

    having

    o

    do with bringingone's outwardbehaviour nto conformity with the established

    norms,

    that

    is,

    with

    what

    is

    considered

    useful,

    expedient,

    and

    finite. That

    which

    Xenophon

    takes to be

    the

    fitting

    human

    response

    s determined

    by

    his

    philosophi-

    cal

    anthropology,

    or,

    his

    view of human

    personality

    and

    the

    way

    in

    which

    it

    is con-

    solidated.

    In

    his

    estimate,

    human

    plenitude

    is

    independent

    of

    any

    reference

    to

    an

    ideal

    infinity.

    Indeed,

    personality

    is consolidated

    by

    means

    of

    the

    good,

    but

    the

    good

    taken

    as whatever is

    immediately

    useful,

    serviceable, ucrative,

    moderate

    and

    accords

    with the

    existing

    and

    objectively

    ethical

    order.15

    Completeness

    n

    personality

    is

    taken to be

    in

    correlation with

    becoming

    properly

    related

    to the

    finite

    order of

    reality.

    Human ife

    is

    shaped

    by accidentality,

    by

    empirical

    ealities,

    in Xenophon'sview.

    For

    Kierkegaard

    uch

    a

    view,

    in which

    personality

    s

    shaped

    by

    the

    parodying

    shadows

    of

    the

    good,

    is worthless.

    The

    useful and

    serviceablewith

    respect

    to the

    good

    is

    only

    the

    external

    dialectic

    of

    the

    good

    and

    even

    though

    that

    dialectic

    is

    infinite,

    it

    is,

    as he

    puts

    it,

    an

    infinitely

    bad

    one.16 His

    objection

    to

    Xenophon's

    view

    of

    personality

    and his

    own

    view

    of it

    have as their

    scaffolding

    at

    least

    two

    presuppositions

    o

    which

    Xenophon

    does not

    subscribe.

    One is that the

    good

    must

    be

    conceived

    n

    such a

    way

    that

    in

    itself it

    has both an internaland infinite dialec-

    tic,

    as

    well as an

    external

    one.

    The other is that

    personality

    s such that

    it has

    an

    inner

    infinity

    and cannot

    become

    complete

    unless its

    infinity

    becomes

    correlated

    with the internal and infinite dialectic of the good. Kierkegaard'smistake is in

    assuming

    that

    the two

    presuppositions

    are

    unquestionable,

    hat

    they

    are

    shared

    by

    Xenophon

    and

    by

    others.

    And,

    as

    we

    have

    shown,

    for

    Xenophon

    that

    is

    cer-

    tainly

    not the

    case. His

    anthropology

    s

    conceived

    differently

    from

    that of

    Kier-

    kegaard.

    The

    scheme

    and

    thrust

    of

    Kierkegaard'srgument

    n

    the

    text remains ntact and

    undiminished

    nspite

    of

    his

    wrongly

    mputing

    o

    Xenophon

    certain

    presuppositions.

    In

    pointing

    out

    Kierkegaard's

    pparent

    oversight,

    we

    have uncovered

    presupposi-

    tions

    which are

    implicit

    for

    the

    conception

    of

    personality

    which

    has

    for

    its

    proper

    task

    the

    actualization

    of

    ideality

    through

    the infinite

    exercise

    of the

    will,

    and

    which has

    irony

    as a condition for

    the

    inception

    of that task.

    Further,

    without

    the

    two,

    neither can the

    proper

    weighing

    be

    given

    nor the

    proper

    sense be

    made

    of

    Kierkegaard's

    emark

    that the

    situation and

    reply

    for

    which

    Xenophon

    lacks

    respectively

    an

    eye

    and ear are

    essentially

    the

    complex

    forming

    the

    ganglia

    and

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    71

    cerebral ystemsof personality. 17Theyalso make ntelligiblehis pithilystated and

    familiar thesis that

    irony

    is a

    determination

    of

    subjectivity.

    And,

    finally,

    they

    are

    the

    background

    rom which

    emerges

    his

    assertionthat

    whoever does

    not

    under-

    stand

    inrony

    and

    has no

    ear

    for its

    whisperings

    acks

    eo

    ipso

    what

    might

    be

    called

    the

    absolute

    beginning

    of the

    personal

    ife. 18

    The

    species

    of

    irony

    which

    the

    presuppositions

    avour

    and which

    is

    ascribed o

    Socrates

    does

    not

    issue from

    Kierkegaard'smagination.

    Plato

    identifies

    it

    as the

    more

    significant

    of

    a

    double

    species,

    and,

    more

    specifically,

    as that

    which

    simply

    has no

    purpose

    or has

    itself

    as

    its

    purpose.

    This

    irony

    is both the

    agent

    and

    ter-

    minus

    towards which it

    strives. 19

    Its

    corresponding

    dialecticalmovement is not

    that which keeps a problemhovering n order to arriveat a solution. Instead,the

    movement

    is one in

    which

    the

    abstract Idea can become

    actualizedor

    concretely

    manifested

    in

    human life.

    As

    the

    movement

    infinitely

    expands

    itself

    and flows

    out in

    extremities,

    rony

    brings

    t to a

    check and

    turns

    t

    back

    into the

    personali-

    ty

    to

    round off

    itself

    there.20A

    consequence

    of

    this

    movement

    being

    rounded

    off

    in

    personality

    s

    that

    all

    empirical

    experiences

    are

    invalidated or

    the

    subject.

    Or,

    as

    Kierkegaard

    uts

    it,

    irony

    works itself

    free from

    sheer

    empirical

    sandbanks

    and

    from

    the

    restraintsof

    speculation.21

    Irony,

    a

    negating

    force

    setting

    free the

    subject

    from

    the

    restraintsof

    his

    given

    historical

    actuality,

    is in

    Hegelian

    framework

    an

    integral

    moment in

    the

    dialectic

    of the Idea. Accordingto Hegel,whom Kierkegaard ivescredit to on this score,

    irony

    is

    essentially

    a

    self-destructionwith an

    apriority

    within

    itself.22

    Its

    apriority

    implies

    that

    irony

    directs itself

    against

    the

    totality

    of

    existence,

    the

    given

    actuality

    of a

    certain

    time and

    place,

    and

    not

    just

    against

    a

    particular

    henomenon.

    That

    is,

    the

    person

    who

    is bounded

    by

    the restraints

    of

    the

    objective

    ethical

    reality

    of

    his

    day

    is

    set

    free from

    them,

    from

    the

    civic

    commitments and

    obligations

    marking

    normal

    daily

    existence. The

    validity

    of

    the

    established

    orm of

    existence,

    that de-

    fined

    by

    his

    society,

    having

    been

    destroyed

    n

    a

    Hegelianway

    with

    respect

    to

    him,

    the

    person

    is

    free

    only

    in

    a

    negative

    way,

    since

    irony

    negates

    by

    virtue

    of

    a

    higher

    which

    is not. 23

    Its

    negating

    power

    s

    depicted

    more

    forcefully

    and

    vividly

    through

    Kierkegaard's

    wn words:

    Irony

    establishes

    nothing,

    for thatwhich is to be estab-

    lished

    lies behind

    it. It is a

    divine

    madnesswhich

    rages

    ike a

    Tamerlane

    nd

    leaves

    not

    one

    stone

    standingupon

    another in

    its

    wake. 24

    That

    raging

    or

    divine

    madness

    is

    precisely

    what

    Kierkegaard

    as

    in

    mind

    also when

    he

    refers

    to

    irony

    as

    an

    in-

    finite

    absolute

    negativity.

    When he

    speaks

    of it

    as an

    instant

    of

    critical

    satisfac-

    tion

    in

    theoretical

    concerns, 25

    he

    has

    in

    mind also

    the

    characteristic

    f

    the

    per-

    sonal

    freedom it

    occasions. The

    person

    whose

    standpoint

    is

    irony

    as a

    negating

    force,

    experiences

    a

    subjective

    freedom which at

    every

    moment

    has

    within

    its

    power

    the

    possibility

    of

    a

    beginning

    and is

    not

    generated

    from

    previous

    condi-

    tions. 26

    Consequently,

    he

    person,havingadopted irony personally,

    becomes

    not

    only

    free

    but is

    also

    intoxicated

    by

    the

    infinity

    of

    possibles

    confronting

    him.27

    And

    insofar as

    it

    occasions the

    freedom

    described

    above,

    irony

    is

    considered

    o be

    a

    determination f

    subjectivity.

    The

    point

    about

    irony

    and

    its

    corresponding

    eflex

    movement

    in

    personality

    s,

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    72

    in regard o our concern,that it leavesthe persontaking rony asa standpointcon-

    fronted with

    nothingness.

    The

    objectless

    confrontation

    s

    implied

    by

    the

    very

    fact

    that

    irony

    has within it an

    apriority

    for

    self-destruction,

    and

    by

    the

    very

    nature

    of

    the

    personal

    freedom it

    occasions.

    According

    o

    the

    former,

    t

    does

    not allow

    any-

    thing

    to

    endure,

    nor

    posits anything

    for that

    matter.

    In accordance

    with the

    latter,

    its

    freedom

    is

    a

    negative

    one,

    again

    meaning

    that

    nothing

    is ever affirmed.

    The

    im-

    pact

    of

    its

    infinitely

    delicate

    play

    with

    nothingness 28

    n the

    personality

    s that

    the

    latter

    is faced with

    having

    either

    always

    to

    posit

    something

    or

    simply

    to

    despair.

    Kierkegaard

    s

    quick

    to

    point

    out, however,

    that

    if

    a

    person

    does not

    feel that

    im-

    pact,

    if

    he

    is

    not

    faced

    with

    either,

    then he is not

    really takingnothingness

    erious-

    ly. The nothingnessin that case is only speculative,andhe is not truly an ironic

    person.

    This

    infinitely

    delicate

    play

    with

    nothingness

    marking

    an

    ironic consciousness

    and

    Kierkegaard's

    se of the term Melancholi

    re,

    I

    forward,

    a mutual

    fit. The

    term

    has

    reference

    to the

    temporary

    experiencing

    of

    nothingness

    specifically

    oc-

    casioned

    by irony

    taken as one's

    personal

    standpoint. Kierkegaard's

    emark hat

    Xenophon

    should have

    depicted

    the

    young

    dinner

    guest

    as

    becoming

    melancholy

    (Melancholi)

    to the

    point

    that

    he

    refuses

    food,29

    implies

    that

    the

    irony,

    which

    Xenophon

    misses

    in

    Socrates'

    utterances,

    taken

    as a

    personal

    standpoint,

    is cor-

    related with

    the

    encountering

    of

    a

    serious

    nothingness.

    When

    carefully

    considered,

    the refusal to take food is construableas an expressionfor the temporaryen-

    counter

    with

    nothingness.

    Freud

    notes

    in his

    enquiry

    that refusalof nourishment

    is

    met with in severe

    forms of melancholia. 30

    But

    one

    need not

    appeal

    to

    Freud

    to

    appreciate

    hat

    the refusal marks

    the

    person's

    break

    away

    from the

    temporal

    or

    finite

    reality.

    There is

    no

    doubt that the abandonment

    does

    bring

    to mind

    the li-

    bido's

    drawing-in,

    or

    regression

    rom

    the external world

    to the

    ego.

    A form of

    narcissism,

    his

    regression

    s taken

    by

    Freud as a

    necessary

    precondition

    of melan-

    cholia.31

    Although

    quite

    decisive

    about

    the

    fact

    that the

    disposition

    to

    fall

    ill

    from

    melancholia

    predominates

    n

    narcissistic

    types,

    Freud

    in the

    very

    enquiry

    cautions

    that

    his conclusion is based

    on

    insufficient

    empirical

    data.

    To

    cite

    Freud

    in connection with this

    study

    is to

    acknowledge

    he stark resemblanceof his me-

    lancholia

    to

    Kierkegaard's

    Melancholi,

    and most

    important

    to caution

    against

    the

    temptation

    to

    conclude

    that both men are

    speaking

    about

    the

    same

    condition,

    namely

    an

    illness.

    Indeed,

    Freud's

    enquiry

    is about

    an

    illness,

    a

    condition

    not

    necessarily

    and

    deliberately

    willed.

    Up

    to this

    point Kierkegaard's

    Melancholi

    cannot

    be

    considered

    an

    illness.

    We

    have

    no

    indication

    that it is

    a

    protracted

    en-

    counter with

    nothingness.

    It is

    decisively

    different

    from Freud's

    concern

    in

    that

    the

    experience

    of

    nothingness

    ssues

    from

    having

    adopted rony

    as a

    personal

    tand-

    point

    or

    orientation

    in

    life.

    To

    underscore

    Melancholi,

    t

    is

    a

    condition

    always

    in

    alignment

    with

    irony,

    one

    in

    which

    the

    personby

    virtue of his

    irony

    is

    indifferent,

    hovering,

    or detached from the finite world

    as

    defined

    by

    the observance

    f

    ethical

    obligations

    or commitments n accordance

    with

    daily

    life in a

    society.

    The

    notion of

    detachment or indifference

    is the

    conceptual

    nexus between

    Melancholiand

    irony.

    Kierkegaard

    enders

    t

    by

    his use

    of the Greek erm

    epoche ,

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    73

    ordinarily aken as meaning openness asin beingreservedwith respectto passing

    judgment.

    He sees

    in the

    term,

    however,

    its

    deeper meaning,

    one in

    which the no-

    tion

    of

    personality

    is resonant. More

    specifically,

    its

    meaning

    is the reflex of

    personality

    nto

    itself

    which

    at

    that

    point

    is abstract

    or void of

    content.32

    The

    reflex

    of

    personality

    nto

    itself is akin

    to

    a reserved tate

    of

    mind.

    Notwithstanding

    their

    close

    affinity,

    the

    two are

    not

    identical.

    Their

    difference is

    predicated

    on

    Kierkegaard's

    hoice of

    the

    Danish

    term

    Paaholdenhed,

    o

    translate he Greek

    epoche .

    The

    significance

    of

    that choice

    must

    be made

    to

    prevail

    f

    the texture

    of

    the

    conceptual

    nexus is to

    become

    manifest. The Greek term is

    ordinarily

    rans-

    lated into Danish

    by

    Tilbagenholdenhed

    whose

    etymology suggests

    the

    idea of

    holdingback or closedness.33But in optingto translate t by Paaholdenhed

    whose

    etymology suggests

    the

    idea

    of

    holding

    on

    to,

    Kierkegaard

    as in mind

    the

    perseverance

    f

    abstract

    personality,

    that

    is,

    the frameof

    mind correlated

    with

    such

    a

    personality.34Consequently,

    epoche

    with

    respect

    to

    abstract

    personality

    implies

    not a refusal to

    give

    assent,

    but

    the

    clinging

    on to the

    imperturabibility

    f

    mind

    attained

    by

    suspendingjudgment

    about what men consider

    good,

    useful,

    etc.

    in

    daily

    life.

    The comments on

    epoche

    and Greek

    scepticism

    by

    Kierkegaard's seudonym

    Climacus s beneficial.

    For

    according

    to

    him

    epoche

    is

    associated with doubt

    begot by

    an act

    of

    the will.35

    Its intractablerelation to the

    act

    of

    willing

    warrants

    further the caution againstthe equatingof Melancholiwith Freud'smelancholia.

    To continue

    with

    Climacus'

    omments,

    Greek

    scepticism

    s

    essentially

    the

    retiring

    kind,

    one in

    which

    the

    sceptic

    remains

    aloof

    by

    drawing

    no

    conclusion from im-

    mediate

    cognition.36

    The

    implication

    of that form of

    scepticism

    s not that

    cogni-

    tion

    is

    unreliable,

    but that

    error

    might

    arise in the

    drawing

    of a

    conclusion. The

    Greek

    sceptic,

    therefore,

    kept

    his

    mind

    in

    suspense

    and

    held on to that

    repose

    of

    mind

    by

    willing

    it.

    He

    did not

    even

    express

    the

    negative

    and

    cognitive

    results

    of

    his

    indifference o

    existing

    states of affairs

    est

    it

    disturb

    his mental

    equipose.37

    What is

    central to

    Pyrrhonic

    scepticism

    s

    evidently

    also

    central

    to the connec-

    tion

    between

    melancholy

    and

    irony

    as

    conceived

    by

    Kierkegaard.

    As

    represented

    by

    Pyrrho,

    scepticism

    took

    repose

    of

    mind,

    achieved

    by

    being

    indifferent to all

    that

    appears

    good

    to

    man,

    as the

    happiness

    which

    Stoics and

    Epicureans

    ought.

    The

    central

    notion,

    repose

    of

    mind,

    does

    not

    imply empty-headedness.

    For

    the

    Pyr-

    rhonic

    phrase

    on

    mallon

    (no

    more

    this

    than

    that) suggests

    instead the

    idea

    of

    giving

    equal weight

    to

    arguments

    or

    and

    against

    the

    claim

    that some

    appear-

    ances

    can be

    apprehended

    as

    being

    true. That claim

    is the

    backbone of the

    Stoics'

    theory

    of

    apprehension

    katalepsis).

    The

    avoidance

    of

    distinction,

    the

    refusal

    to

    favour the

    inclining

    of

    one

    way

    over

    another,

    is

    the

    essence of the

    catch

    phrase

    on

    mallon which

    characterizes

    he

    sceptic's

    mental

    equipose

    reported

    by

    Dio-

    genes

    Laertius38and

    reiterated

    by

    Climacus.39To the

    word

    epoche

    Laertius

    couples

    the

    word

    akatalepsis

    (non-apprehension)

    when

    describing

    Pyrrho's

    scepticism.40

    Kierkegaard's

    ognizance

    of a

    Pyrrhonic

    repose

    of

    mind,

    which

    he

    does

    not

    confuse with

    the

    harmonious

    repose

    in

    nature,

    is

    registeredby

    his refer-

    ence

    to

    the

    rise of

    ironic

    ataraxy

    which

    elevates itself

    higher

    and

    higher.41

    The

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    74

    referenceis clear evidence that he has in mind the self-consciousnessof Greek

    scepticism

    for

    which ataraxia

    calmness

    of

    mind)

    is

    another

    catchword

    for a

    certain self-

    consciousness,

    taken

    by

    Kierkegaard

    as

    marking

    the

    incipience

    of

    reflective

    ndividuality.

    The

    conceptual

    link identified

    as

    the

    notion

    of

    holding

    on to

    a

    frame of mind

    marked

    by

    mental

    equipose

    needs no

    further

    exposition

    to

    appreciate

    why

    the

    melancholy

    person

    and the

    ironist

    in

    Kierkegaard's

    iew tend to become the

    hen-

    pecked

    partner

    n a

    marriage

    relationship.

    Each tend

    to be indifferent

    to the de-

    mands of

    daily

    living,

    to its

    responsibilities

    nd

    obligations.

    Each is

    unruffled

    by

    the

    variety

    of

    human

    passions

    and desires

    experienced

    ordinarily

    n

    the course

    of

    daily living. Each consequently tend to appearaloof, complacent,and morally

    malleable. But

    more

    important,

    by

    tracing

    the

    conceptual

    link,

    the

    meaning

    of

    the term

    Melancholi

    s

    more

    clearly

    and

    readily

    perceived.

    The

    term,

    included

    in

    Kierkegaard's

    roader

    concept

    of

    melancholy,

    is

    apparently

    neither

    easy

    to

    grasp

    nor on

    quick

    glanceevidently

    and

    sufficiently

    rich

    in

    content,

    except

    through

    a

    tracing

    of

    its

    conceptual

    ie

    to

    irony.42

    A

    tighter

    grasp

    of its

    meaning

    s

    acquired

    by

    examining

    also

    Kierkegaard's

    sti-

    mate

    of

    Socrates. In his

    view,

    Socrates,

    his

    paradigmatic

    igure representing

    he

    historical

    turning

    point

    at which

    subjectivity

    or reflective

    individuality

    appears,

    instantiates

    Melancholi.

    For he

    describes

    the

    master

    of

    irony,

    the

    Socrates

    who

    throughhaving adopted irony as a standpoint negates the substantialreality of

    his time

    as it

    is

    embodied

    by

    Hellas,

    as

    being

    mastered

    by irony

    in the

    end.42

    Al-

    though

    Socrates

    was

    concerned

    to

    begin

    with the concrete

    in

    order to arrive

    at

    the

    abstract

    Idea,

    the

    good,

    and

    constantly

    to arriveat

    it,

    he falls

    short of

    exempli-

    fying

    in

    his own life that

    which

    he

    himself

    espouses.

    In the final

    analysis,

    he re-

    mains

    always

    more

    negatively

    free,

    holding

    on to a frame of

    mind

    described

    as

    ironic

    ataraxy

    and

    suggested

    by

    his

    professed

    ignorance,

    his claim that he

    knew

    nothing,

    and

    his

    constantly

    seeking

    of

    enlightenment

    rom

    others.43

    By

    main-

    taining

    an

    ironic

    standpoint

    to

    the

    last,

    he

    becomes consumed

    by

    his own

    en-

    thusiasm

    for

    irony.

    Kierkegaard, ommending

    o

    his readers his view of

    Socrates

    and

    irony,

    sums t

    up

    vividly

    n these words:

    His zeal in

    its service consumed

    him,

    and at last

    he,

    too,

    was seized with

    irony:

    everything spins

    around

    him,

    he becomes

    giddy,

    and all

    things

    lose

    their

    reality.

    This view of

    Socrates

    and the

    significance

    of his

    standpoint

    n

    world

    history

    seems

    to

    me

    to

    culminate so

    naturally

    n

    itself that

    it

    will,

    I

    hope,

    find

    acceptance

    with one

    or

    another

    of

    my

    readers.44

    According

    o these

    lines,

    Socrates

    does

    not

    have a

    saturnine,

    ethargic,

    or maudlin

    personality.

    They

    suggest

    then a

    consciousness,

    to which is correlated a state of

    Melancholi, seeming to be marked clearly by a lighthearted,soft, buoyant, or

    ethereal

    temperament,

    to

    the extent

    that

    consciousness

    becomes

    fluttering,

    vacu-

    ous,

    and

    evanescent.

    That

    being

    the

    case,

    Melancholi does not

    imply

    dullness,

    dejection

    or

    sluggishness,

    hat

    is,

    moods which do not

    show the

    slightest

    trace

    of

    the

    shared

    meaning

    which

    Kierkegaard

    bservesbetween

    irony

    and

    jest.

    He

    points

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    75

    out that in his native language irony is occasionallytranslatedby the word

    Skalkagtigheid, eaning irresponsible

    layfullness

    r

    archness.45

    That

    Socrates

    has a

    sprightly

    and

    waggish

    side

    to his

    personality

    needs

    no

    belabouring

    here.

    In-

    stead,

    what needs

    underscoring

    s

    that

    Socrates'

    melancholy

    condition

    (Melancholi)

    is

    essentially

    that

    of

    an

    abstractly

    determined

    personality.

    That

    s,

    his

    melancholy,

    to

    which

    our term Melancholi

    efers,

    is

    indicative

    of

    what

    Kierkegaard

    onsiders

    to

    be

    a

    self which

    is in abstracto

    and not

    as

    yet

    in concrete.

    Socrates

    s

    not the

    only

    example

    of

    an

    abstractly

    determined

    personality

    or self.

    Nor,

    for

    that

    matter,

    s the

    sprightly,

    buoyant

    mood ascribed

    o

    him,

    the

    sole

    dispo-

    sition

    characterizing

    n

    abstractly

    determined

    personality.

    A self which

    fails

    to

    be-

    come concretelydetermined s markedalso by despondency,gloom,wearinessand

    feelings

    of heaviness.These

    are the kinds of

    dispositions

    primarily

    n the

    chiaroscu-

    ro

    of

    Tungsind.

    They

    are

    certainly

    the

    kinds of

    dispositions

    or affects

    suggested

    from the context

    in

    which

    Kierkegaard

    ses

    the terms

    tungdindig

    and

    tung-

    sindigt .

    The two terms ean

    on

    the

    main from

    Tungsind

    whose

    etymology

    shows

    that it is

    derived

    from the two Danish stems

    tung

    and

    Sind,

    meaning

    heavy

    and

    mind/spirit respectively.

    Its

    etymological meaning

    certainly

    accords

    with

    the

    description

    of

    personalities

    hat are

    to

    be found

    associated

    with the

    context

    in

    which

    its two

    variants

    occur.

    Of the two

    variants,

    the first

    one which

    Kierkegaard

    ses is

    tungsindigt

    n

    his denouncementof the attemptto idealizeSocratesas an Indianmystic and to

    construe the Phaedo

    as

    being

    Oriental

    n its

    spirit. Insisting

    that

    the

    dialogue

    of

    the

    Phaedo

    is

    authentically

    Greek n

    spirit

    and

    that

    Socrates

    s

    essentially

    an

    ironist,

    he

    acknowledges

    hat there is

    a

    point

    of

    coincidence

    between

    irony

    and

    a

    subjective

    mysticism.

    They

    both terminate

    with utter

    abstraction or

    nothingness,

    which

    is

    essentially

    the

    instant

    of

    isolation

    occurring

    as a result

    of

    the

    reflex

    of

    personality

    into

    itself. Their

    point

    of

    coincidence

    notwithstanding,

    he mood

    of

    each in

    Kierke-

    gaard's

    view is

    distinctly

    different. One is the exact

    opposite

    of the

    other,

    the

    mood

    associatedwith

    mysticism

    being

    heavierand

    conveyed by

    his use of a

    Tungsind

    form. In

    his

    depiction

    of

    the

    latter

    he

    states that

    it

    consists

    of a

    dissolution

    and

    a

    melancholy (tungsindigt)

    absorbing

    anguour,

    in a

    soaking whereby

    one becomes

    not

    softer but

    heavier..so as to move

    unsteadily

    in

    a

    fog. 46

    Of

    course,

    tung-

    sindigt

    s

    stylistically

    better

    suited than

    melancholske o

    convey

    the

    feeling

    of

    heaviness

    presumed

    o

    characterize

    mysticism.

    But there

    is

    more to the

    use of

    a

    Tungsind

    orm than

    just

    stylistic

    preference.

    Kierkegaard

    ees

    the

    subjective

    condition

    associatedwith

    mysticism

    as

    being

    phe-

    nomenologically

    different

    from

    the

    subjective

    condition

    expressed

    by

    the

    use

    of

    Melancholi .

    The

    mystic,

    in

    choosing

    to

    remain

    outside

    his

    finite

    self

    and

    de-

    tached from the

    external

    world

    with

    it civic

    obligations,

    has

    chosen an

    isolated

    self,

    one with no

    history

    of

    continuity.

    Through

    hat

    choice he has

    cancelled

    the

    instant of

    isolation

    engenderedby

    the

    reflex of

    personality

    nto

    itself.

    The

    crucial

    point

    for

    the

    distinction

    between

    the

    two

    subjective

    conditions

    is

    that

    in the

    mys-

    tic's

    case,

    the

    cancellation s effected

    by

    prolonging,

    to the extent

    possible,

    the

    instant

    of

    isolation,

    and

    yearning

    to dwell in it

    indefinitely.

    Hence

    that

    which

    as a

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    76

    transientfactor is wholesomeby being a condition for becominga genuineper-

    sonality

    becomes a

    sickness when

    it

    is

    protracted

    ndefinitely

    or when one

    longs

    to

    embrace

    it

    eternally.

    As

    a

    sickness,

    it

    inculcates

    a

    disposition

    characterized

    by

    weightiness,

    urbidity,

    weariness, ndolence,

    and

    depression.

    Together

    hese moods

    are

    part

    of the

    syndrome

    or a

    personality

    whose

    development

    s

    deformed.

    Neither

    episodic

    nor

    superficial,

    this

    subjective

    condition,

    exemplified

    by

    the

    mystic,

    is a

    possible

    way

    of

    being

    in

    the

    world,

    but

    not a

    meaningful

    way

    of

    acquiring

    human

    plenitude.

    Although

    the

    personality

    remains

    n abstracto and

    will never

    become

    in

    concreto unless the

    mystic

    chooses himself

    absolutely

    in

    his

    eternal

    validity,47

    his

    subjective

    condition is

    markedly

    different from

    that

    of Socrates.

    Again, the two occurrencesof the remaining Tungsind variantsuggestan

    arrest

    n

    the

    development

    of

    an

    authentic

    personality

    ncurred

    by

    putting

    the whole

    of

    life in

    the

    service of

    maintaining

    ternally

    the reflex

    of

    personality

    nto itself.

    The

    wider

    context

    for

    Kierkegaard's

    se

    of

    the variant

    tungsindig

    s with

    respect

    to

    his estimate of

    Schlegel's

    novel Lucinde and the

    depiction

    of one

    of its charac-

    ters.

    Insofar as the

    novel is

    representative

    of

    irony,

    Kierkegaard

    aults it

    for not

    representing

    rony

    in

    its essential

    greatness,

    as a

    mastered

    moment.

    Its

    primary

    concern s

    to

    abrogate

    all

    ethics

    and

    to

    sponsor

    a view

    of life in which the individual

    is

    left with all

    actuality

    cancelled,

    and

    is

    consequently

    aced

    with sheer

    nothingness.

    In

    brief,

    the

    personality

    t

    promotes

    s

    essentially

    one that is in abstracto.

    Kierkegaardmakes use of tungsindig n his descriptionof the seriousness

    underlying

    the

    novel. In

    stating

    that

    it

    has

    a

    certain

    melancholy

    {tungsindig)

    seriousness, 48

    e no

    doubt has in

    mind

    at least

    one

    of

    its characterswhose

    per-

    sonality

    is in

    abstracto,

    namely

    its hero

    Julian. The fact that

    much

    of

    Julian's

    ife

    has

    gone

    unutilized before

    meeting

    his

    true

    love

    Lucinde,

    the fact that he

    yearns

    for

    death

    which he

    sees as the

    eternal

    night

    that

    would

    render

    perfect

    the

    lovers'

    embrace

    and

    protect

    it

    from

    the

    ravages

    of time and from the

    demands

    of the

    finite

    world,

    the

    fact that he

    fails

    to fill the

    gap

    between the

    luminous

    moments

    through

    the

    longing

    for an eternal

    embrace,

    and the fact

    that

    he

    realizes

    how dis-

    consolate

    his life

    would be

    without his lover attest to the

    novel's dominant

    motif:

    the

    yearning

    for love. Fashionable

    among

    Romantics,

    the motif

    suggests

    also the

    lapsing

    into an

    aesthetic

    stupor

    which

    Kierkegaard

    ees as

    lulling

    the

    deeper

    ego

    into a

    somnabulant

    tate. 49

    The whole of life

    according

    o

    that motif is

    given

    over

    to

    imagination.

    Life's

    highest

    perfection,

    its ideal

    infinity,

    is the

    longing

    for a

    pure

    and

    unadulterated

    passivity

    as in a

    vegetative

    existence.

    That

    is,

    the

    longing

    for that

    existence

    is

    itself

    a

    part

    of

    the

    existence

    which

    Kierkegaard

    inds

    expressed

    by

    the

    following

    sentence

    in

    the

    novel:

    The

    supreme

    nsight

    of

    the

    understanding

    s to

    choose

    the role of

    silence,

    to restore

    the

    soul

    to

    imagination

    and not

    to

    disturb

    he

    sweet

    cooings

    of

    the

    young

    mother

    with

    her child. 50

    The

    source

    of

    the novel's

    melancholy{tungsindig)

    eriousness

    s the ideal which

    it

    proposes

    for the

    consolidation

    of

    personality.

    Its

    ideal,

    in

    Kierkegaard's

    stima-

    tion,

    produces

    at

    best

    a

    slugglish,

    dull, forlorn,

    morbid

    personality

    whose

    develop-

    ment

    in

    concreto

    is

    arrested.

    According

    to the novel's

    ideal for

    human

    life,

    the

    imagination

    s

    given

    complete sovereignly

    over the whole

    of life.

    This

    is not the

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    77

    same as delighting n the free play of the imagination.The latter is indeed a mark

    of

    our

    common

    humanity.

    But

    the

    former,

    Kierkegaard

    ontends,

    makes life into

    a dream and

    robs

    the soul of its moral

    tension.

    Expresseddifferently,

    the

    novel's

    ideality

    is

    essentially

    a

    product

    of

    nature,

    namely

    the harmonious

    unity

    of a

    beauti-

    ful

    individuality.

    Unlike a

    reflective

    ndividuality

    which

    is

    necessarily

    aligned

    with

    irony

    in

    the

    case of

    Melancholi,

    t

    is formless and

    void of

    content.51

    To

    make the

    point

    more

    forcefully,

    and

    tersely

    from

    another

    angle,

    the

    longing

    for a

    divine

    peace

    in

    which the mind is never

    disturbed

    s

    only

    the

    negative

    and not the sub-

    stantial

    aspect

    of

    love.

    Longing

    can never be

    a

    determinationof

    subjectivity;

    or

    in

    Kierkegaard's

    iew it

    is a relationto

    something

    not

    given, 52

    and

    consequently

    to nothing.It does not require he exercisingof the samecomplexof humancapa-

    cities

    as is

    required

    or the

    eternal

    self-positing

    of self

    consciousness 53

    whereby

    personality

    s

    in

    the

    process

    of

    becoming

    more

    fully

    or

    concretely

    developed.

    The

    range

    of

    moods

    or

    feeling

    tones

    associated

    with

    the

    longing

    or the desire

    for

    a

    plant-like

    existence is

    againsuggested

    by

    the

    use of

    tungsindig

    n

    describing

    Lisette,

    another character n

    the

    novel.

    Lisette,

    we are

    told,

    is a

    slave to inward

    caprice,

    to aesthetic

    pleasure, succumbing

    to

    ennui,

    to an

    ''excessive indolence

    which

    bothers

    about

    nothing. 54

    In

    the

    end she

    succeeds

    in

    doing

    what

    many

    times

    has

    crossed Julian's

    mind,

    namely

    committing

    suicide.

    That she

    is

    the kind

    of

    personality

    which

    lapses

    into an

    aesthetic

    stupor

    is

    indicative from

    Schlegel,

    accordingto Kierkegaard, ot stoppingshort of anythingto portray her with a

    poetic

    glow.

    That

    stupor

    not

    only

    lulls her

    deeper ego

    into

    a

    somnabulant

    tate,

    but

    permits

    her

    arbitrary

    go

    free latitude

    in

    ironic

    self-satisfaction. 55

    he

    not

    only

    longs

    for an

    existence

    vegetative

    in

    its

    passivity,

    but

    at

    times

    her existence

    approximates

    hat

    longing

    quite

    closely.

    She

    represents

    one of

    the

    different sen-

    sual

    ways

    of

    being

    in

    the world.

    And

    Kierkegaard

    otes this

    by

    citing

    from

    the

    novel

    a

    line

    which

    states

    that as

    a

    child

    she was more

    melancholy

    {tungsindig)

    than

    lightminded

    (letsindig)

    and that

    even

    then she had

    been

    daemonically

    ex-

    cited

    by

    sensuality. 56

    n

    citing

    from

    the

    novel,

    Kierkegaard

    ranslates he German

    schwermutig by

    the

    Danish

    tungsindig

    which

    Kierkegaard

    ranslators ender

    by

    the

    English

    melancholy .

    The choice of Danish

    equivalent

    for

    the

    German

    term

    schwermutig

    with

    respect

    to

    its

    meaning

    s

    faultless.

    Furthermore,

    tung-

    sindig

    s

    rythmically

    and

    etymologically

    balanced

    by

    letsinding .

    Hence

    Kierke-

    gaard's

    choice of

    tungsindig

    s

    commendable.But that

    aside,

    there is

    no

    question

    of

    tungsindig

    having

    as its

    reference a

    person

    whose life is

    constantly

    outside

    herself,

    is

    determined

    by

    transitory

    and

    finite realities

    and is

    marked

    by

    insensitivi-

    ty

    to

    the

    moral

    obligations

    and

    responsibilities

    oncomitant

    with

    everyday iving.

    Her

    deeper

    ego

    being

    in

    a

    somnabulant

    tate

    is

    an

    indication

    of a

    prolonged

    dura-

    tion

    of

    the reflex

    movement

    of

    personality

    nto

    itself,

    of

    her

    isolation

    from

    every

    actuality, including

    the

    actuality

    of the

    personalitybecoming

    reconciled

    with

    the

    surrounding

    world in

    which

    it

    finds

    itself.

    A

    plant-like

    existence,

    her

    ideal

    infinity

    is

    formlessand

    void

    of

    content.

    To

    extrapolate

    from

    the contexts in which

    its variants

    occur,

    Tungsind

    as a

    distinctly

    different

    meaning

    from

    Melancholi .

    That

    difference

    is

    not

    obvious

  • 8/11/2019 Khan - Kierkegaard

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    78

    from the Englishtranslationof TheConceptof Irony since both wordsare trans-

    lated

    by

    the same

    English

    word

    'melancholy'

    .

    Such a translation

    s not without

    justification

    f

    at the

    outset

    one assumes

    hat

    Tungsind

    nd Melancholi

    elong

    to

    the

    concept

    of

    melancholy,

    that

    either marks

    a self

    or

    personality

    n

    abstracto,

    and

    that

    each

    is

    indeed correlatedwith

    an

    experience

    of

    nothingness

    and

    with

    a

    personality

    detached from

    the

    obligations

    and

    responsibilities

    that

    accord

    with

    the

    objective

    ethical world in which one lives. In

    brief,

    as forms of

    melancholy

    Tungsind

    and

    Melancholi

    separately

    have reference

    to a self

    that

    has no

    history

    of

    continuity,

    or that

    has not taken as

    yet

    the

    step

    that

    would

    allow the birth

    of a

    personality

    n

    its

    full

    measure.

    Howeverstrikinglysimilar n resemblance,he two termsaredecisivelydifferent

    when

    the

    phenomenon

    each

    represents

    s

    carefully

    considered.

    There

    s

    no

    question

    that

    Melancholi

    s

    aligned

    with

    irony

    taken as a

    personal

    standpoint,

    and

    is there-

    fore

    indicative of

    a reflective

    ndividuality.

    ts

    correlation

    with

    irony implies

    that

    it

    is

    to be

    taken as

    a

    necessary

    condition

    for,

    the first

    phase

    n,

    the

    development

    of

    a

    complete

    personality.

    That

    is,

    subjectivity

    is determined

    only negatively

    and

    lightly.

    In

    the

    case of

    Tungsind,

    however,

    it

    is

    a

    condition

    not

    in

    alignment

    with

    irony.

    None of

    Schlegel's

    characters

    n

    the

    novel has

    irony

    as a

    standpoint.

    In

    fact

    Kierkegaard

    ensures

    Schlegel

    for

    confusing

    an

    ironic

    self-satisfaction,

    which

    is

    a

    Romantic

    theme,

    with

    irony

    in

    its

    essential

    greatness.57

    The fact that

    the con-

    dition of Tungsindoccurs as a

    part

    of the

    experience

    which Romanticismdepicts

    and

    mysticism

    relishes

    ndicates that

    Tungsind

    has to be

    understood

    as

    being

    cor-

    related with an

    attempt

    to

    eternalize

    a

    sensual

    moment

    in

    temporality

    and

    the

    failure

    to

    accomplish

    t. The

    moods

    in

    the

    range

    of

    ennui and

    depression

    engen-

    dered

    by

    that

    failure

    is

    the

    syndrome

    of

    Tungsind,

    and of a

    personality

    hat

    has

    not

    yet

    become in

    concreto. To underscore heir

    decisive

    difference,

    Tungsind

    s

    aligned

    with

    the

    constant

    onging

    to

    eternalize,

    or

    freeze,

    a

    peak

    sensual

    experience,

    whereas

    Melancholi is in

    conformity

    with

    irony

    as

    a

    personal

    standpoint.

    They

    are

    essentially

    wo

    different

    conditions

    of

    melancholy.

    The

    difference

    between

    the two

    is more

    evident and

    pronounced

    by juxta-

    posing

    the conditions of

    Tungsind

    and melancholia.The formerdoes not

    approxi-

    mate

    the

    latter in

    its

    syndrome.

    According

    o

    Freud,

    the

    syndrome

    or

    melancholia

    includes

    the

    effect of

    dejection,

    preference

    for

    being

    alone,

    loss of

    interest,

    re-

    morse,

    and

    suicidal

    tendencies.

    Although

    he

    lists

    ambivalence

    as a factor

    in

    melan-

    cholia,

    he

    does not

    consider

    t

    a

    decisive

    one

    since

    it

    is

    present

    also

    in

    mourning.58

    As

    mentioned

    earlier,

    narcissism

    s

    the crucial actor

    in Freud's

    melancholia,

    and its

    tendency

    prevails

    n

    each

    of

    the three

    personalities:

    he

    mystic,

    Julianand Lisette.

    As

    personalities

    ndicative of

    Tungsind,

    each

    of them

    is

    marked

    by

    a

    drawing-in

    of

    the

    libido

    from

    the

    external

    world

    to the

    ego

    by

    a

    regression

    oncomitantwith

    loss

    of

    interest and

    with

    being

    alone. Julianand Lisette are

    ambivalent

    with

    respect

    to

    their

    love

    objects.

    Both are

    suicidal,

    and the

    mystic,

    insofar as

    Kierkegaard

    n-

    derstands

    him

    as

    going

    back behind

    consciousness or as

    bursting

    free

    from

    his

    mortal

    frame,

    is

    equally

    suicidal.

    Finally,

    all

    three

    personalities

    how

    signs

    of the

    effects of

    dejection

    and

    low-spiritedness.

    Since none

    of

    these

    symptoms

    is

    found

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    79

    in the case of Melancholi,it may very well be that Kierkegaard'sTungsindand

    Freud'smelancholia

    efer

    to a

    personality

    with the same defect.

    Our

    juxtaposing

    of

    Tungsind

    and melancholia

    is

    intended

    not

    to establish

    synonymity,

    but to

    accentuate

    that

    Tungsind

    s

    construed more

    in

    terms

    of a

    liability

    to

    the

    development

    of

    a

    genuine personality,

    whereas

    Melancholi

    s

    not.

    Although

    both

    beget

    a

    personality

    void

    of

    content,

    Melancholi

    s

    definitely

    a con-

    dition

    resulting

    from

    a

    dialectical

    movement

    flowing

    outwards

    and

    brought

    to a

    halt

    by irony

    which leads

    the movement back

    into

    personality

    to round off itself

    there. This means

    that

    the

    movement cannot

    be considered

    as

    happening

    acciden-

    tally,

    that

    irony

    must

    be accorded

    a

    specific

    role

    for the

    reflex

    in

    personality

    o

    be effected. More importantthan the reflex movement,however, is the ensuing

    freedom which

    the

    person

    acquires

    and

    without which he

    cannot

    choose

    himself

    absolutely

    n his

    eternal

    validity.

    In

    Kierkegaard's

    iew

    of

    personality,

    not

    sensual

    feelings

    but

    the

    personal

    self that

    is to be

    inflnitized

    absolutely.

    As his

    pseudonym

    Judge

    Williams

    n

    Either

    Or

    puts

    it:

    I

    myself

    am the

    absolute,

    for

    only myself

    can I

    choose

    absolutely

    and

    this absolute choice

    of

    myself

    is

    my

    freedom. 59

    Concomitant with Melancholi

    is

    the

    freedom to choose oneself

    absolutely.

    It

    fol-

    lows,

    then,

    that Melancholi

    must therefore be

    a

    transientcondition

    abrogatedby

    being

    subsumed

    in

    the

    positing

    of an absolute choice

    whereby

    personality

    con-

    tinues

    to become

    fully developed.

    Of

    course,

    if

    that

    choice is

    not

    exercised, then,

    as in the case of Tungsind, he developmentof authenticpersonality s arrested.

    Whatever

    reflex movement

    in

    personality

    accompanies

    Tungsind,

    he movement

    is

    certainly

    not

    led

    by

    irony,

    but

    by

    the

    longing

    to infinitize

    absolutely

    that

    which

    is

    by

    definition

    episodic

    and

    labile,

    namely, sensuality.

    There

    is no

    shred

    of

    evidence

    available o

    suggest

    that whatever

    onging might

    be

    concomitant

    with

    the condition

    of

    Melancholi

    that the

    longing

    is

    essentially

    that

    associated with

    Romantics,

    young

    men,

    poets,

    and artists.60To be

    clear,

    the

    longing

    which

    Romantic

    literature

    treats,

    is

    essentially

    one in

    which the

    impulse

    of

    the libidio

    fluctuates without restraints. The

    person

    is

    capriously

    pulled

    hither and thither

    under the

    sway

    of

    feeling

    tones

    and cerebral

    activity.

    Whatever

    remoteness

    exists between the

    person

    and the

    objectively

    ethical world is

    intended

    to

    facilitate

    and

    heighten

    the

    spiritualizing

    of the

    sensual and the

    sensualizing

    of

    the

    spiritual.

    Such is the

    nature of the

    longing

    not

    only

    depicted

    by

    Romanticism,

    but

    marking

    the romantic

    love

    idealized

    by

    Schlegel

    in

    his novel

    Lucinde and

    sought

    in

    his

    personal

    relation with

    Dorothea.61The same also

    might

    be said of

    the

    longing

    characterizing

    mysticism

    to

    whatever

    extent

    Kierkegaard

    nderstands

    the

    phenomenon.

    The

    unavailability

    of evidence

    raises

    serious

    questions

    as

    to

    whether the

    claim that Melancholi

    is

    essentially

    melancholy

    of

    the

    Romantics

    and

    poets

    is

    coherent and

    valid. On

    the

    basis

    of

    Kierkegaard's

    issertation,

    t is a

    weak if

    not

    specious

    claim.

    Equally

    indefensible is

    the

    claim that

    Tungsind

    s

    Melancholi at

    a

    deeper

    or

    higher

    evel.

    The

    temptation

    to make

    and

    accept

    the

    claim arises from

    giving

    more

    weight

    to

    seeing

    the two conditions as

    yielding

    an

    abstract self

    instead

    of

    seeing

    each as a

    modally

    determinate unction.

    To

    put

    the

    alleged

    claim

    different-

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    80

    ly, I cite it verbatim: The essential difference...ies in the meaningof Tungsind

    and

    the

    intensification it

    represents

    of Melancholi *2 Words

    such as intensi-

    fication and

    higher

    evel

    obscure

    the

    real difference between

    the two forms

    of

    melancholy.

    The two

    are not

    anymore

    the same

    as

    are the emotions love

    and

    hate

    the same.

    The

    implication

    s not that the

    two

    forms of

    melancholy

    are

    oppo-

    sites.

    Perhaps

    hey

    are.

    Instead,

    it

    is

    that there is

    an

    unmistakably

    lear

    difference

    which is

    predicated

    on

    the

    definite

    role

    accorded

    to

    Pyrrhonic

    scepticism

    with

    respect

    to

    irony,

    and,

    consequently,

    to Melancholi.

    Whatever

    cepticism

    accompa-

    nies

    Tungsind

    s

    by

    accident and

    plays

    no essential

    role

    in

    the

    latter,

    even

    though

    there

    is a

    reflex

    movement

    in

    personality.

    And,

    as

    explained

    earlier,

    the

    crucial

    difference betweenMelancholi and Tungsind s with the motive force by which

    the

    reflex

    movement

    in

    personality

    is

    determined

    n each

    case.

    Irony

    as a

    force

    not

    only

    begets

    scepticism

    a la

    Pyrrho,

    but when masteredhas

    a

    chastening

    effect

    on

    the

    personal

    life.

    Hence,

    Melancholi

    is

    a

    modally

    determinate function

    of

    irony

    taken

    as a

    personal

    standpoint

    without which the choice of the self

    in

    its

    eternal

    validity

    cannot

    be made.

    The absence of a radical

    scepticism

    n

    Tungsind

    results

    from

    the

    very

    fact that

    yearning

    is

    the

    motive

    force and has

    also

    in

    this

    case

    an

    epistemological

    apriority.

    Taken

    as

    cognitively

    real and

    absolute,

    yearning

    for

    the

    sensual

    blocks

    the

    final

    step

    to

    total

    scepticism.

    Whatever

    cepticism

    might

    accompany

    Tungsind

    eads

    to

    suicide,

    as

    is the case with

    Lisette.

    And so

    long

    as

    imaginations givencomplete sovereigntyover the wholeof life, radical cepticism

    is

    averted.

    The role

    accorded to Greek

    scepticism

    makes a

    difference;

    marks

    off

    Melancholias

    tending

    to be

    more

    cerebral,

    and

    Tungsind,

    isceral;

    and casts

    serious

    doubt

    on

    the

    claim

    that

    they

    are

    essentially

    the

    same condition

    with

    a

    difference

    in

    degree.

    Indeed,

    there is a

    definite

    difference,

    but it seems to be more of

    a

    differ-

    ence in

    kind

    rather

    han in

    degree.

    Two

    observations

    ollow

    from

    our

    explanation

    of

    the connection between me-

    lancholy

    and

    irony

    and

    from

    drawing

    a

    tighter

    compass

    around the

    meanings

    of

    Melancholi

    nd

    Tungsind .

    The first is

    with

    respect

    to

    Kierkegaard's

    iew of

    Socrates. He

    would

    have us

    see

    Socrates

    as a

    person

    subject

    to

    Melancholia.

    His

    activitieshave

    suggested

    representations

    of him as a

    gadfly,

    as a

    midwife,

    and as

    an

    ironist. But

    all

    these

    activities,

    Kierkegaard

    would

    have

    us

    think,

    inculcate

    melancholy

    in

    Socrates.

    Consequently,

    one

    implication

    s that

    Socrates'

    personali-

    ty

    is

    such

    that

    it is

    in

    abstracto.

    His

    subjectivity

    or

    authentic

    personality

    s mini-

    mally

    determined. A

    further

    implication

    is

    that he fails

    to

    exemplify

    his

    own

    precept

    enshrined

    in

    the

    expression

    know

    thyself.

    For

    he

    never became

    his

    true

    self

    as

    a

    result

    of

    his

    failure

    o choose himself

    absolutely

    n his

    eternal

    validity.

    Unlike

    the

    personalities

    exemplifying

    a

    condition

    of

    Tungsind,

    he

    is

    depicted

    as

    being

    trapped

    between

    the

    finite

    and

    infinite,

    never

    becoming

    reconciled

    with

    temporality.

    Such

    is

    the

    view of

    Socrates

    hat

    Kierkegaard's

    issertation

    ommends.

    The

    second

    observation

    and

    concluding

    remarkcenters

    on

    Kierkegaard's

    nter-

    pretation

    of

    oriental

    mysticism

    in

    the

    Brahmanicor

    Indian

    tradition. The

    Vedic

    texts

    do

    not

    indicate

    evidence to

    suggest

    a

    mysticism

    that is characterized

    by

    a

    condition

    of

    Tungsind,

    hat

    is,

    by

    a

    longing

    that is

    hazy,

    low

    pitched, oppressive,

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    81

    and evaporatingn a feeble lethargy.In fact, the TaittiriyaUpanishad63hows that

    the

    case

    is

    the

    contrary.

    In

    setting

    out the

    mystic

    doctrineof the Veda in

    the form

    of

    a

    discourse between teacher

    and

    pupils,

    that

    Upanishad

    puts

    the

    emphasis

    on

    the

    practicing

    of

    virtue,

    the

    heeding

    of

    duties,

    and on

    being

    truthful. Its

    ethical

    emphasis mplies

    a

    recognition

    of the seriousnessof

    responsibility

    and the

    feeling

    of

    respect

    for natural

    consequences

    n

    striving

    o

    attain

    the

    ultimate bliss of

    Brah-

    man,

    man's

    highest

    end

    according

    o

    that tradition.

    Notwithstanding

    he

    fact that

    he

    mistakenly

    mputes

    to

    oriental

    mysticism

    the

    longing

    for

    an existence

    depicted

    as

    being

    essentially

    that of the

    vegetative

    still

    life

    of

    a

    plant, 64

    his view

    of the

    relation

    between

    melancholy

    and

    irony

    remainsunaffected. The intent in

    making

    the observations to point out that ourunderstandingf Tungsinds not deepened

    by

    taking

    into consideration

    mysticism

    in

    the Brahmanic

    radition.For it

    is

    clearly

    not a

    mysticism65

    endorsing

    the

    pursuit

    of evanescent

    wordly

    or sensual

    desires,

    nor

    subjecting

    the whole of

    one's

    life

    entirely

    to

    the rule of

    fanciful

    imagination.

    Its

    emphasis

    s

    very

    much akin

    to

    Kierkegaard's

    wn

    emphasis

    on

    choosing

    abso-

    lutely

    to inflnitize oneself in its

    eternal

    validity

    and

    thereby

    to become

    reconciled

    with

    temporality

    and

    its

    obligations.

    Whetheror

    not

    the Brahmanic

    raditioncon-

    ceives

    melancholy

    as

    a means

    of

    becoming

    one's true self and

    the extent

    to

    which

    its view of

    the self is in

    opposition

    to

    Kierkegaard's

    iew

    are

    without

    doubt

    impor-

    tant

    matters.But

    they

    do

    not

    shed

    light

    for

    our

    purpose

    n

    this

    study.

    In short, that purposeis to understand he nature of the connectionbetween

    melancholy

    and

    irony,

    and to

    apprehend

    and state

    accurately

    the

    meaning

    of

    Me-

    lancholi

    and of

    Tungsind.

    I have

    explained

    that

    the

    inter-locking

    notion between

    the

    two

    concepts

    is one found

    at the heart

    of

    Greek

    scepticism,

    corresponding

    o

    the

    state of mind in

    which no

    conclusion about the

    empirical

    world and

    its de-

    mands

    is

    drawn,

    and that

    both

    Melancholi

    and

    Tungsind

    are

    modally

    determinate

    functions.

    With

    respect

    to

    the role

    each

    asigns

    to

    scepticism,

    Melancholi

    must

    certainly

    be accorded a

    preponderantweight

    over

    Tungsind.

    For the former is

    constituted

    necessarilyby

    means of

    Pyrrhonic

    scepticism,

    whereas

    for

    the

    latter,

    whatever

    scepticism

    it

    might

    be

    associated

    with

    is

    accidental

    to

    its

    constitution

    and

    hardly

    worthy

    to be reckonedas

    being Pyrrhonic.

    Furthermore,

    he

    two are

    best

    understoodwhen

    seen

    in

    terms

    of

    modally

    determinate

    unctions.

    Melancholi

    is

    most

    certainly

    a

    function of

    a

    species

    of

    irony;

    while

    Tungsind

    s

    clearly

    a func-

    tion

    of

    imagination

    and

    desire.

    NOTES

    1.

    S^ren

    Kierkegaard,

    The

    Concept

    of Irony,

    trans.

    (Bloomington:

    Indiana

    University

    Press,

    1965),

    p.

    51. The

    original

    Danish

    text

    Om

    Begrebt

    Ironi

    is

    included in

    Kierkegaard's

    Samlede Vaerker, 3rd edition (Gyldendal, 1962), Vol. 1, and the corresponding page

    reference is

    p.

    73.

    Hereafter,

    English

    translation

    is cited

    as

    CI and

    Danish

    text

    as

    BI.

    2.

    Papirer,

    X

    A

    400

    translated

    by

    Howard

    Hong

    and Edna

    Hong

    in

    Sfaen

    Kierkegaard's

    Journal

    and

    Papers,

    Vol.

    3

    (Bloomington:

    Indiana

    University

    Press, 1975),

    No.

    2691.

    The

    entry

    is made

    nine

    years

    later

    from the

    writing

    of

    his

    dissertation,

    and

    its

    frag-

    ment

    appropriate

    for

    this

    study

    reads,

    how

    close

    irony

    and

    melancholy

    are

    to

    one an-

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    82

    other. Insteadof Melancholi he originalDanish, rom which the Hongstranslate he

    English melancholy ,

    as

    Tungsind .

    A

    concern

    of this

    paper

    s

    whether he

    supposed

    differencebetween