Matteo Falomi_A Moral Conf

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    A MORAL CONFLICT WITH MORALITY

    Perfectionism and Moral Theories

    Matteo Falomi Sapienza Universit di Roma

    1. I want to consider, in what follows, the relation between ethics and conceptions of the self.

    The idea that our conceptions of the self, or self conceptions, might be important for ethics has

    been initially met with resistance in the analytic tradition. To mention just two sources of

    distrust: first, appeals to the naturalistic fallacy have made it hard to see how a description of

    who we aremight be relevant for an understanding of what we must do1; second, the idea

    (which dates back at least to Sidgwick) that character is exclusively expressed in action has

    promoted a picture of moral theory which makes action, and not character, the primary focus of

    moral evaluation.2 These assumptions has been, as is well known, increasingly contested in

    more recent developments of the tradition. In metaethics, for instance, metaphysical discussions

    on the nature of self has been deemed relevant to the explanation of moral motivation and

    moral responsibility; in normative ethics, instead, virtue theorists have revaluated the

    significance of character for our understanding of moral assessment and practical reasoning.

    What I want to consider, however, is a further way in which our conceptions of the self might

    be important for ethical thought a way which cannot be readily accommodated, I believe,

    within metaethical or normative debates. The problem I have in mind has been famously stated

    1 A version of this argument can be found already in Moores Principia Ethica; see Moore 1959: 113-114.2 See for instance Sidgwick 1981: 391-394.

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    by Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals, where, in speaking of our judgements of ethical

    value, he invites us to ask what value do they themselves possess.3 Nietzsche is asking, in

    other words, why do we find morality on the whole valuable, or what are the sources of the

    interest we take in it. An answer to such questions might involve, in various ways, an appeal to

    our conceptions of ourselves, and in what follows I want to explore some of these ways. I will

    consider, in particular, Cavells account of moral perfectionism: my claim will be that Cavells

    use of this notion provides a peculiar way of understanding the relation between our self

    conceptions and our commitment to morality in general. I will then compare Cavells ideas

    with two other important accounts that are relevant in this connection: the neo-Aristotelian

    position that Alasdair MacIntyre puts forward in After Virtue, and the neo-Kantian conception

    articulated by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity. These authors link, like

    Cavell, a certain description of what we are with our exposure to morality as such: still, as I will

    argue, the connection they envisage seems to exclude (in different ways) the very dimension of

    moral experience that Cavells notion of perfectionism emphasizes. The aim of the comparison

    is then twofold: I want, on the one hand, to indicate a possible framework in which Cavells

    work on perfectionism may be understood; and on the other, to spell out what Cavells specific

    contribution to such a framework could be.

    2. In Cavells understanding of perfectionism, questions about our conceptions of the self are

    not simply seen as relevant for ethics, but as ethicalquestions themselves. This point is easy to

    overlook, but as I will try to show it has a crucial significance for Cavells moral philosophy.

    Cavell doesnt start, in other words, with some philosophical account of what we are, and then

    3 Nietzsche 1967: 17.

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    moves to see how this philosophical anthropology might be important for ethics. Problems

    about our conception of ourselves, rather, belong to a specific register of moral life namely,

    the perfectionist register. This register exists alongside the dimension of ethics that is usually

    articulated by moral theories, and in which more canonical questions about the right action are

    asked. Both registers are associated with specific moral difficulties and peculiar modes of moral

    reasoning.4 In what follows, I wont give a full description of these two registers of moral life: I

    will provide, instead, an introductory sketch of their difference by focusing on the kind of

    moral difficultythat, according to Cavell, characterizes each of them. Having outlined the

    difference between perfectionism and the area of moral life articulated by moral theories, it will

    be possible to raise the question of their relation: this will, in turn, enable us to see the

    connection that Cavell envisages between our self conceptions and our engagement in morality.

    Lets begin from the following passage, from Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:

    A call for change will not be expressed as a particular imperative when what is problematic in your life

    (as of now) is not the fact that between alternative courses of action the right has become hard to find,

    but that in the course of your life you have lost your way. 5

    Cavell here contrasts two kinds of moral difficulty: one has to do with choosing the right action

    between alternative possibilities, while the other is expressed by Cavell as a matter of losing

    ones way.The first kind of difficulty is encountered when we dont know what to do: we are

    faced with two possible courses of action, and we wonder which one is recommended by

    morality. When we envisage such a dilemma, we may want to recur to moral theories: by

    4 See Cavell 2004: 24.5 Cavell 1990: xxx.

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    We may come to feel, in this sense, that our current mode of life is not really ours, that it

    doesnt express or represent who we are. This sort of perplexity, that Cavell names crisis, is

    the peculiar moral problematic that calls for a perfectionist assessment of our condition: the

    image of losing ones way is another description of this kind of experience.6

    Having sketched the difference between these two register of moral life, we might now

    consider their relation: how the perfectionist questioning of ones identity is related to the

    sphere of moral theory? In this respect, I want to stress two points: first, the perfectionist

    questioning is, in Cavells perspective, essentialto moral theory; second, this mode of

    questioning may nonetheless enter in conflictwith the requirements of moral theory.

    Lets begin from the idea that a perfectionist register is essential to moral theory. We may

    introduce the issue by bringing out a point that was implicit in what has been said so far. Our

    present mode of life may involve a commitment to morality, a conception of ourselves as moral

    agents. A perfectionist investigation of our present mode of life, therefore, may induce us to

    question whether our current commitment to morality is really ours. What Cavell indicates

    here is a particular way of raising the question of our interest in morality, of the value morality

    has for us: for if my present commitment to morality doesnt really represent me, then my

    consent to morality is a matter of mere conformity; in this case, morality is valued as a way of

    gaining social acceptance, or of avoiding responsibilities towards ones life, etc. If a moral theory

    doesnt have a space for such perfectionist investigations of our relation with morality, then it

    might leave the nature of our interest in morality in the dark: we might never know whether

    our adoption of morality is merely moralistic, whether we are enforcing morality on ourselves

    6 On the idea of crisis see for instance Cavell 2004: 11; Cavell 2004: 446.

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    by immoral means.7 In this sense, Cavell claims that a perfectionist questioning of ones

    identity is essentialto moral theory:8 without this mode of self examination, we would never

    understand the value morality has for us.

    This brings us the possibility of a conflictbetween the perfectionist register and the sphere of

    moral theories. What happens, indeed, if we discover that our present commitment to morality

    is notreally ours? We might be brought, in such a predicament, to withdraw our consent to

    morality as such, because such consent, as it stands, is a sign of our dispossession of ourselves.

    As Cavell puts the point in The Claim of Reason, we would find ourselves in the position of

    seeking the salvation of the self through the repudiation of morality.9 This is a peculiar case of

    moral conflict: it is not a conflict of obligations within a moral code (for what is on trial is

    morality itself), nor is it the usual challenge to morality from the point of view of egoism. We

    may think of it as combining certain features of these two kinds of conflict. As in the case of a

    conflict between morality and egoism, what is challenged is morality on the whole, and not a

    specific obligation. As in the case of conflicts of obligations within a moral code, the conflict is

    motivated morally. What brings me here to question morality in general is not an egoistic desire

    to affirm my present interests as they stand: the kind of questioning that interests Cavell is

    rather driven by ones sense that ones present interests should be different from what they

    currently are. Cavell wishes to understand the force of this should as moral, although not in

    the sense in which one should or must perform a particular action out of duty.

    To sum up, in Cavells perspective, the question whether my present conception of myself is

    really minebelongs to a specific register of morality. This register, which Cavell calls

    7 See Cavell 1990: 13.8 See for instance Cavell 1990: xxxi. See also Cavell 2004: 316.9 Cavell 1979: 269.

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    perfectionism, is essentialto understand our adherence to morality as a whole: we couldnt

    clarify the nature of our interest in morality independently of it. Perfectionism can, on the

    other hand, conflictwith our commitment to morality: such a commitment might in fact be

    part of a mode of life that I cannot recognize as mine anymore. Since perfectionism is itself a

    dimension of our moral life, this kind of conflict may be seen as a moral conflict with morality.

    3. Having completed this admittedly crude sketch of Cavells position, I will now proceed to

    compare Cavells ideas with those of MacIntyre and Korsgaard. Lets take MacIntyre first. There

    is a sense in which we can say that, in MacIntyres account, the relation between self and

    morality has a central place: according to his conception, indeed, the practice of morality allows

    us to realize our true selves. Even if MacIntyre wishes to depart from certain features of the

    Aristotelian framework, this much at least is retained: obedience to morality is the device

    through which we get from our present state, our nature as it stands, to the full realization of

    ourtelos, of what we really are10 (a departure from Aristotle lies surely in the way in which

    MacIntyre conceives of the human telos). The idea of a device shouldnt be understood in

    instrumental terms: in the Aristotelian account MacIntyre endorses, in fact, while virtues are

    seen as [] means to an end, the relation of means to end is internal and not external.11 It

    wouldnt make sense, in this perspective, to say that I might realize my telosby means other

    than the virtues: the exercise of virtue belongs indeed to the very description of human

    flourishing.

    10 See MacIntyre 2007: 52-55.11 MacIntyre 2007: 184.

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    MacIntyre shares then with Cavell the idea of a distance between my present mode of life and a

    mode of life that realizes what I am. A crucial difference, however, lies in the role that

    MacIntyre assigns to morality in such a framework. In Cavell, as we saw, morality is an

    dimension of moral life alongsidethe perfectionist register, in which questions about our true

    self are raised. These two registers may generate a specific kind of moral conflict: we can

    question our commitment to morality from the point of view of the realization of our essence.

    In MacIntyre, instead, morality is the means (the only one, indeed) to realize ones self:

    morality, therefore, cannot by definitionbe in conflict with the realization of the self. It seems,

    then, that MacIntyres way of connecting self and ethics excludes the very possibility of

    understanding our relation to morality as a whole that Cavell wishes to emphasize.

    The exclusion is not accidental. The possibility of a conflict between morality and realization of

    the self presupposes that these notions can be separated, as Cavell is indeed inviting us to do.

    But in MacIntyres perspective, such a separation could only mean that weve lost the only

    possible rational understanding of morality: if morality is not connected to the realization of our

    telos, then we wont be able anymore to make sense of our commitment to morality in general.

    Our conceiving ourselves as moral, in such a predicament, is only a cover for the affirmation of

    our arbitrary desires. From this point of view, then, the difference between MacIntyre and

    Cavell is striking: while in MacIntyre the possibility of questioning the value of morality from

    the point of view of the self is a symptom of the fact that morality is over, in Cavell this very

    possibility opens up a specific dimension of moral experience a dimension that is, in fact,

    essentialto every account of moral conduct.

    I want now to turn briefly to Korsgaards position in The Sources of Normativity. Korsgaard

    doesnt share MacIntyres pessimism about modern moral philosophy: for her, the burden of

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    questioning our engagement in morality as such is not a sign of the degeneration of our moral

    culture, but is precisely what distinguishes the modern outlook from ancient ethics of

    excellence.12

    She accordingly believes, like Cavell, that questions about the value of morality are

    an essential feature of our ethical thinking: still, her treatment of such questions seems to

    exclude, analogously to MacIntyres account, the very possibilities of criticism that Cavell

    wishes to preserve.

    Korsgaard as well gives pride of place to the connection between our conceptions of the self and

    our obligations. Elaborating on the Kantian insight that our will must be determined by a law,

    she argues that the laws that govern our actions must be expressive of what she defines our

    practical identity. By this she means a certain description under which we value ourselves,

    and that gives sense to our conduct; examples of practical identities are for instance mother,

    soldier, citizen, etc.13 In this perspective, it is because we conceive of ourselvesin certain ways

    that we have reasons to act or not to act, hence certain obligations. Now, the obligations

    deriving from our practical identities are not ispo factomoral, but Korsgaard thinks that

    reflection on our practical identities can lead us to recognize moral obligations. We need to

    acknowledge that, while our particular practical identities are contingent, the fact that we must

    have somepractical identity to make sense of our conduct it is not: this gives us a reason for

    adopting a practical identity that doesnt spring from any practical identity in particular, but

    from our conceiving ourselves as human. In conceiving ourselves as human beings, according to

    12 See Korsgaard 1996: 4-5.13 See Korsgaard 1996: 100-101.

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    Korsgaard, we recognize the obligations we have towards humanity as such, namely ourmoral

    obligations.14

    The upshot of this transcendental argument is that, if we have a conception of ourselves at all,

    then we must be conceiving ourselves as moral agents. Now this conclusion, if correct, would

    spoil the possibility of raising the sort of questions about morality as a whole that Cavell

    indicates. Korsgaard, not differently from MacIntyre, is indeed obliterating the space in which I

    can ask whether my present way of conceiving myself including my present commitment to

    morality is really mine. The point of her argument is to show that, if I have a conception of

    myselfat all, then I am by default conceiving myself as a moral agent. Moral identity, in this

    perspective, mustbe mine, whatever the relation I may happen to have with my present mode

    of life in general: I am committed to morality, therefore, even if my current ways of conceiving

    myself dont represent what I really am.

    Korsgaard, for this reason, doesnt have a space for the kind of moral conflict with morality that

    Cavell stresses. She is in general careful to preserve the possibility of conflict: she endorses

    Bernard Williams view that we cannot conceive ourselves only as moral agents, if we are to

    make sense of the point morality has for us.15 But the conflicts Korsgaard recognizes are

    typically conflicts of obligations generated by a clash between our moral identities and those

    more local practical identities that are in general compatible with morality. There is no space,

    here, for the sort of conflict that Cavell describes, in which a question about my identity draws

    me to criticize my commitment to morality as a whole. In order to question morality as a

    14 See Korsgaard 1996: 120-12315 Korsgaard 1996: 125.

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    whole, in Korsgaards perspective, I should be a complete normative sceptic16: I should, that is,

    not value anything at all, and not have any reason to act in one way rather than another.

    Korsgaard doesnt see that I might havesome values and commitments that dont represent me,

    and that also thisacknowledgement may lead me to criticize my adherence to morality.

    In spite of all their apparent differences, Korsgaard shares with MacIntyre a certain way of

    connecting morality and conceptions of the self. What Korsgaards reasoning shows, in fact, is

    that we alreadyare the kind of animals that are exposed to morality. As she writes, the fact that

    we are human beings, and that we must value something if we are to act at all, is simply the

    truth:17 we must, therefore, value morality as well. Korsgaards transcendental arguments are

    then reaching by a different route the same conclusion that MacIntyre achieves through

    teleological arguments: for MacIntyre as well, indeed, our exposure to morality can be read off

    from the very description of the kind of beings we are. This suggests a further way of

    articulating their difference from Cavell. In Cavells perspective, in order to be exposed to

    morality we must have a self that we can call our own: Cavell writes in this sense that moral

    perfectionism is the precondition of morality.18 In this perspective, were not simply are, but

    we must becomehuman beings, beings that are exposed to morality. The task of becoming

    human, moreover, is seen by Cavell as a specifically moraltask: constructing ones self, or caring

    for it, is a particular dimension of our moral life, associated with peculiar difficulties and

    specific modes of reasoning. It is only through an engagement in these modes of reasoning that

    we can hope make ourselves committed to morality. Our commitment to morality, in other

    16 Korsgaard 1996: 160-164.17 Korsgaard 1996: 123.18 Cavell 1990: 62.

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    words, is itself a moralproblem: we cannot prove, by philosophical arguments, that our

    exposure to morality is already built in our conception of ourselves.

    References

    Cavell, S. 1979 The Claim of Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York

    Cavell, S. 1990 Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Chicago University Press, Chicago

    Cavell, S. 2004 Cities of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.

    Korsgaard, C. 1996 The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    MacIntyre, A. 2007 After Virtue, Third Edition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame

    Moore, G.E. 1959 Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, London and New York

    Nietzsche, F. 1967 On the Genealogy of Morals andEcce Homo, Vintage Books, New York

    Sidgwick, H. 1981 The Methods of Ethics, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis