PROGRAMME COLLABORATIF DE DOCTORAT (CPP) EN …

CONSORTIUM POUR LA RECHERCHE ÉCONOMIQUE EN

AFRIQUE (CRÉA)

PROGRAMME COLLABORATIF DE DOCTORAT

(CPP)

EN ÉCONOMIE POUR L’AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE

MICROÉCONOMIE

PLAN DU COURS

(Révisé en : février 2014)

Programme collaboratif de doctorat

Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 2

ECON 601 : MICROÉCONOMIE I

I. Théorie du consommateur (18 heures)

II. Théorie de la production et de l’offre (6 heures)

III. Théorie de la structure du marché (4 heures)

IV. Théorie de l’équilibre général (9 heures)

V. Choix économique dans un contexte d’incertitude (5 heures)

VI. Théorie des jeux (18 heures)

ECON 602 : MICROÉCONOMIE II

I. Économie de l’information (18 heures)

II. Économie du bien-être et choix social (11 heures)

III. Défaillance du marché (9 heures)

IV. La structure du marché revisitée (12 heures)

V. Autres sujets de microéconomie (10 heures)



ECON 601 : MICROÉCONOMIE I

A. INTRODUCTION

L’objectif principal du cours est de fournir aux étudiants de troisième cycle qui y participent

une compréhension complète de la théorie microéconomique avancée afin qu’à la fin du

cours, ils soient familiarisés avec une analyse très pointue de la microéconomie. Les étudiants

seront bien armés pour appliquer les concepts et les outils microéconomiques dans le contexte

africain. Le cours est conçu pour un semestre et traitera des questions microéconomiques à un

niveau supérieur. Les sujets abordés comprendront : la théorie du consommateur ; la théorie

de la production et de l’offre ; la théorie de la structure du marché ; la théorie de l’équilibre

général ; le choix dans un contexte d’incertitude et la théorie des jeux.

Textes principaux :

Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, New York,

Oxford University Press. (Désormais appelé MWG)

Jehle, G.A. and P. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall

Inc. (Désormais appelé J & R)

Textes complémentaires :

Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton: NJ.

Princeton University Press.

Eatwell, J., Milgrom, M. and P. Newman (1987), A Dictionary of Economics, MacMillan.

Cowell F. (2006), Microeconomics: Principles and Analysis, Oxford University Press, New

York.

Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall.

Kreps, David, M. (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New

York.

Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, W.W. Norton and Company New

York.

Les ouvrages suivants couvrent les mathématiques figurant dan les conditions préalables



pour suivre ce cours.

Beavis B. and I. M. Dobb (1990), Optimization and Stability Theory for Economic Analysis,

Ch. 1-4. Cambridge University Press.

Chiang, A.C. and K. Wainright (2005), Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics,

4th Edition, McGraw-Hill.

Dixit A.K (1990), Optimization in Economic Theory 2nd Edition, Oxford, Oxford University

Press.

Efe A.O. (2007), Real Analysis with Economics Applications, Princeton.

Rudin (1967), Real Analysis, McGraw-Hill.

Silberberg, E. and W. Suen (2002), The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis,

3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York.

Simon, C. and L. Blume (1994), Mathematics for Economists, New York, Norton.

Sydsaeter Knut, Peter Hammond J. & Arne Strom (2014), Further Mathematics for Economic

Analysis, Pearson Education/Prentice Hall

Takayama, A. (1993), Analytical Methods in Economics, Part 1-3, Ann Arbor: The University

of Michigan Press.

(+) ci-dessous indique les lectures obligatoires alors que les autres références sont

facultatives.



B. PLAN DÉTAILLÉ DU COURS

1. THÉORIE DU COMPORTEMENT DES CONSOMMATEURS

1.1. Préférences, utilité et demande (4 heures)

+J & R Ch.1

+MWG Chapitres 1 et 3

Barten. A. and V. Bohm (1982), “Consumer Theory” in Arrow K. and Intrilligator M.D. eds.

Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. II, pp. 381- 429. Amsterdam: North

Holland.

Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapitres 1-2.

Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall. Chapitres 2 - 3.

Liebenstein, H., (1970) “Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’

Demand,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64 (May): 183-207.

Phlips L. (1983), Applied Consumption Analysis 2nd Edition, Amsterdam; North Holland

Press. Chapitres 1-5

Simon, H. (1959), “Theories of Economic Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural

Science,” American Economic Review, XLIV, 3, June.

Simon, H., (1973), “Rationality as Process and Product of Thought,” American Economic

Review, Papers and Proceedings, (May), p. 1-14.

Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, New York: W.W. Norton and

Company. Chapitre 7

1.2 Utilité indirecte, fonctions des dépenses et théorie de la dualité (4 heures)

+ J & R Chapitres 1 et 2

+MWG Chapitre 3



+Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapitres 1-2.


Company. Chapitre 7.

Strauss, J. (1986) “Estimating the Determinants of Food Consumption and Caloric

Availability in Sierra Leone,” Ch. 4 in Singh, I. L. Squire and J. Strauss eds.

Agricultural Household Models. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall Chapitre 4.

Barten. A. and V. Bohm (1982), “Consumer Theory” Ch. 9 in Arrow K. and Intrilligator M.D.

(ed.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics vol. II, pp. 381- 429. North Holland

Amsterdam.

Diamond, Peter and Dan McFadden (1974), “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in

Public Finance,” Journal of Public Economics, 3, 3-21.

Diewert, W.E. (1993), “Duality Approaches to Consumer Theory,” Ch.12 in Arrow, K.J. and

M.D. Intriligator (eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 1, Amsterdam, North-

Holland.

Gorman, W.M. (1976), “Tricks with Utility Functions,” in Artis, M. and A.R. Nobay (eds.),

Essays in Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-243.

1.3 Préférence révélée (2 heures)

+ J & R Chapitre 2: 86-92

+MWG Chapitre 2

+Koo, A.Y.C. and Georg Haverkamp, “Structure of Revealed Preference: Some Preliminary

Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, July/August 1972, 724-744.

Kreps, David, M., (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New York.

Richter, M. (1966), “Revealed Preference Theory,” Econometrica 34, pp.635-45.

Samuelson, P. A., (1983), Foundations of Economics Analysis (enlarged edition). Cambridge,

Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.



Samuelson, P. A. (1948), Consumption theory in terms of revealed preference, Economica 15,

pp. 243-53.

Samuelson, P. A. (1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard Economic Studies

Springer Science and Business Media, Inc., 2005. Vol. LXXX, Cambridge: Harvard

University Press.


Company. Chapitre 8

1.4 Évaluation de l’évolution du bien-être (4 heures)

Surplus du consommateur, variation compensatoire et équivalente, indices de prix et de

quantité

+MWG Chapitre 3 (3.I)

+J&R Chapitre 4: 166-175

+ Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall Chapitre 4.

+Willig, R. D. 1976 “Consumer Surplus without Apology.” American Economic Review 66,

pp. 587-97.

+ Diewert W.E. (1987), “Index Numbers,” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,

edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman. New York: Macmillan 2 pp. 767-

780.

Bacon R. (1995), “Measurement of Welfare Changes Caused by Large Price Shifts.” World

Bank Discussion Papers No. 273. The World Bank Washington D.C.

Braithwait, S.D. (1980), “The Substitution Bias of the Laspeyres Price Index: An Analysis

Using Estimated Cost of Living Indices,” American Economic Review (March): 64-77.

Caves, D.W., L.R.Christensen and W.E. Diewert (1982), The Economic Theory of Index

Numbers and the Measurement of input, output and Productivity,” Econometrica 50,

1393-1414.

Chipman J.S. and J.C. Moore (1980), “Compensating Variation, Consumer Surplus, and

Welfare,” American Economic Review, 70, 933-49.



Deaton, A. (1997), The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach.

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapitres 7 et 8.

Freeman, A.M. (1993), The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and

Methods. Washington: DC. Resources for the future. (Chapitre 3)


Company, chapitre 10.

1.5. Comportement des consommateurs en situation de rationnement

(2 heures)

+ Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapitre 4 (section 4.3)

+Deaton, A. (1981) “Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Consumer Behaviour under

Rationing” Ch. 3 in Deaton. A. (Ed) Essays in the theory and measurement of

consumer behaviour. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

+Neary J. P. and K.W. Roberts. (1980) “The Theory of Consumer Behaviour under

Rationing,” European Economic Review, 13 pp. 25-42.

Bevan, D.L., A. Bigsten, P. Collier and J.W. Gunning (1987), “Peasant Supply Response in

Rationed Economies” World Development, 15(4), pp. 431-39.

Neary J. (1987), “Rationing,” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by J.

Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman. New York: Macmillan. 4 pp. 92-96.

Saah Raaj K. (1987), Queues, Rations, and markets: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor

and the Rich,” American Economic Review, March. pp 69-77.

Tobin, J., and H.S. Houthakker (1950-51), “The Effects of Rationing on Demand Elasticities.”

Review of Economic Studies, 18, pp. 140-53.

1.6 Offre de travail et choix inter-temporel (2 heures)

+Becker, G. S.(1993), A Treatise on the Family, Chicago: IL. University of Chicago Press,

chapitres 2-4.



+Bardhan, P and Udry, C (1999), “Interlinked transactions and rural development,” Ch 9 in

Development Microeconomics, Oxford University Press.

+Berndt, E (1993), “Whether and how much women work for pay? Applications of Limited

dependent Variable Procedures,” Ch 11 in The Practice of Econometrics, Addison-

Wesley Publishing Company Inc.

+Gravelle and Rees, chapitre 15.

Deaton, A. and C. Paxson (1994), “Intertemporal Choice and Inequality,” Journal of Political

Economy, 102.

Imai S. And Keane M. P. (2004), “Intertemporal Labour Supply and Human Capital

Accumulation,” International Economic Review, 45, pp 601 – 641.

Lovo S. (2012), “Market Imperfections, Liquidity, and Farm Household Labour Allocation:

The Case of Rural South Africa,” Agricultural Economics, vol 43, pp471 – 428.

II. THÉORIE DE LA PRODUCTION ET DE L’OFFRE

2. Ensembles de production, maximisation du profit et minimisation des coûts,

dualité, agrégation, efficacité (6 heures)

+ J &R, chapitre 3.

+MWG, chapitre 5

+Nadiri, M.I. (1982) “Producers theory,” Ch. 10 in Arrow and Intrilligator op. cit, pp. 431-

490

+Diewert, W.E. (1982) “Duality Approaches to Microeconomic Theory” Ch. 12 in Arrow K.

J. and M. Intriligator. Handbook of Mathematical Economics Vol 2 Amsterdam North-

Holland.

+Udry, Christopher (1999) Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit Maximization

in African Agriculture,” in Ranis and Raut eds. Trade, Growth and Development:

Essays in Honor of T.N Srinivasan, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Varian, chapitres 1-6



Blackorby, C., Primont, D. and R. Russell (1979), Duality, Separability and Functional

Structure: Theory and Economic Applications, Amsterdam, North-Holland.

Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P., O'Donnell, C.J., Battese, G.E. (2005), An Introduction to Efficiency

and Productivity Analysis 2nd Edition. Springer Science and Business Media, Inc. 350

pp.

Fuss, M. and D. McFadden (eds)(1978), Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory

and Applications, Volumes 1 et 2, Amsterdam, North-Holland.

McFadden, D. 1978, “Cost, revenue, and profit functions,” In: Production Economics: a Dual

Approach to Theory and Applications, vol. 1, Fuss, M. and D. McFadden (eds).

Amsterdam: North Holland. pp. 3-109.

III. STRUCTURE DU MARCHÉ

3.1. Concurrence parfaite (1 heure)

+J&R, chapitre 4

+MWG, chapitre 10

Varian, chapitre 13

Mankowski Louis and Joseph Ostroy (2001), “Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the

Market,” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX (June) 479-535.

3.2 Monopole et concurrence monopolistique (3 heures)

Équilibre des monopoles, discrimination par les prix, bien-être ; concurrence

monopolistique

+J&R, chapitre 4: 158-165

+MWG, chapitre 12: 384-387

+Tirole, chapitre 1-3

Varian, chapitre 14



Chamberlain, E. (1933), Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

University Press.

Tirole ,J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

Cambridge University Press, chapitres 1-3.

Varian, H. R. (1989) “Price Discrimination,” chapitre 12 in Schmanlese, R. and R. Willig

(ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland.

IV. THÉORIE DE L’ÉQUILIBRE GÉNÉRAL

4.1 Économie d’échange pure, économie de production et bien-être (3 heures)

+J&R, chapitre 5

+MWG, chapitres 15-17.

Varian, chapitres. 17-18

Gravelle and Rees.

Eatwell, J., M. Milgate and P. Newman (ed.) (1987), General Equilibrium, Macmillan.

4.2 Existence, unicité et stabilité des équilibres (3 heures)

+J&R, chapitre 5

+MWG, chapitre 17.

+Debreu G. (1982), “Existence of competitive equilibrium,” in Arrow, K.J. and M.D.

lntrilligator (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. II, New York: North

Holland.

Varian Ch 17 and 18.

Gravelle and Rees Ch. 16.

Aliprantis, C.D., et al (1989), Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria, New York



and Berlin, Springer Verlag.

Arrow, K.J. and F.H. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco: Holden

Day.

Debreu, G (1959), Theory of Value. New York: John Wiley & Sons

Grandmont, J.M. (1992), “Transformations of the commodity space, behavioural

heterogeneity, and the aggregation problem,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57, pp.1-35.

Hildenbrand W. and A. Kirman (1988), Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam, North Holland,

chs. 1, 2, 3*, 6 and Appendices.

Mackinnon, John (1998), “Food Storage, Multiple Equilibria and Stability: Why Stable

Markets May Become Unstable During Food Crises,” Centre for the Study of African

Economies WPS/99-1. Oxford University.

4.3 Noyau et équilibres (2 heures)

+J&R Ch 5

+MWG Ch. 18

+Hildenbrand, W. and A. Kirman (1988), Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam, North Holland,

chs. 4 and 5

Varian Ch. 21.

Anderson, R.M. (1978), An elementary core equivalence theorem,” Econometrica, 46, pp. 83-

87.

Hildenbrand, W. (1982), “Core of an Economy” in Arrow, K.J. and M.D. Intrilligator (eds.),

Handbook of Mathematical Economics, II, New York, North Holland.

Mas-Colell, A. (1989), “An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set,” Journal of

Mathematical Economics, 18, pp. 129-139.

4.4 Modèles d’équilibre général appliqués (1 heure)

+Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley (1984), “Applied General Equilibrium Models of Taxation and

International Trade: An Introduction and Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature,

Vol. XXII pp. 1007-1051.



Bédia, F. Aka (2006), “Poverty, Inequality and Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization in

Côte D’ Ivoire: A Computable General Equilibrium Model,” AERC Publications, RP

160, October.

Chia N-C, S. Wahba and J. Whalley (1992), “A General Equilibrium-Based Social Policy

Model for Cote d’Ivoire.” Poverty and Social Policy Series, Washington D.C.: World

Bank.

Dervis, K.J., J. de Melo and S. Robinson (1982), General Equilibrium Models for

Development Policy, Cambridge.

Scarf, H. and J.B. Shoven (ed.) (1984), Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge.

Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley (1992), Applying General Equilibrium, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

V. CHOIX ÉCONOMIQUE DANS UN CONTEXTE D’INCERTITUDE

5. Utilité attendue, aversion au risque, théorie des perspectives, domination stochastique

et utilité dépendant de l’État (5 heures)

+J&R Ch 2

+MWG Ch 6

+Barberis, Nicholas C. (2013), Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review

and Assessment, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter, pp.

173-196.

+Dercon, Stephan and Pramila Krishnan (2000), “In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing

within Households. Journal of Political Economy. 108, pp 688-727.

+Fafchamps, M., C. Udry and K. Czukas (1998), “Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are

Livestock a Buffer Stock?” Journal of Development Economics.55 (2), pp. 273-306.

+Fafchamps, Marcel (1993), “Sequential Labour decisions under Uncertainty: An Estimable

Household Model of West African Farmers.” Econometrica. 61 pp. 1173-98.



+Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under

Risk,” Econometrica,XLVII pp. 263-291.

+Machina M. (1987), “Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved,” Journal

of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), pp.121-54.

Varian Ch 11:5-11:7.

Gravelle and Rees Ch 19-21.

Diamond P. and M. Rothschild (1989) (eds). Uncertainty in Economics: Readings and

Exercises (Revised edition), Academic Press, San Diego.

Hirshleifer, J. and J. Riley (1992), The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge

University Press, Chapitre 5.

Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva, Jean-Marc Tallon (2012), Decision Theory Under

Ambiguity, Journal of Economic Surveys, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 234–270, April.

Rosenzweig, M. and H.P. Binswanger (1993), “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption

Smoothing and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low Income

Countries: Investment in Bullocks in India, Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), pp.

223-44

Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, (1970), “Increasing Risk I: A Definition,” Journal of Economic

Theory, 2, pp.225-43.

Schoemaker Paul J.H (1982), “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence

and Limitations. “Journal of Economic Literature. Vol XX (June) pp. 529-563.

Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1992), Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative

representation of uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, October, Volume 5,

Issue 4, pp 297-323.

VI. THÉORIE DES JEUX

Abreu, D, D. Pearce, and E Stachetti (1990), “Towards a theory of discounted repeated games

with imperfect monitoring,” Econometrica 58, pp. 1041-64.

Bernheim, B. D. (1984), “Rationalizable Strategic Behaviour,” Econometrica 52, pp. 1007-

28.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joes.2012.26.issue-2/issuetoc

http://link.springer.com/journal/11166/5/4/page/1



Binmore, K. (2007), Playing for Real - A Text on Game Theory. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Binmore, K. (2008), Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

Fudenberg, D and E. Maskin (1986), “The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting

or with incomplete information,” Econometrica 54, pp 533-56.

Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press. Cambridge Mass.Ch 1.1-1.2,

Ch. 6.1-6.5

Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press. Ch. 1-

3

Gintis, H (2000), Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press; Chs 1-5.

Harsanyi, J. (1967-68), “Games with Incomplete Information played by Bayesian Players,”

Management Science, 14: 159-82; 320-34; 486-502.

Kreps, David (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Clarendon lectures in

Economics. Oxford: Calrendon Press.

Kreps, David, M., (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New

York.

Osborne Martin J. (2000), Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.

Pearce, D. (1984), “Rationalizable Strategic Behaviour and the Problem of Perfection,”

Econometrica, 52, pp. 1029-50.

Rasmussen, E (2007), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 4th Edition,

Blackwell Publishers

Schultz, T. W. (1975), “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria,” Journal of

Economic Literature, 13 pp. 827-847.

Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour

60th Edition (2012) Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

6.1. Jeux statiques à information complète (4 heures)



Indépendance stratégique et concept de jeu ; joueurs ; règles du jeu ; gains ; résultats et

stratégies ; représentation de la forme stratégique (normale) ; dominance, choix aléatoires,

stratégie pure, stratégie mixte.

+Gibbons Ch. 1

+J&R Ch. 7

+MWG Ch. 7-8.

Gintis Ch. 1-4

Kreps Ch. 11

6.2 Jeux dynamiques à information complète (4 heures)

Représentation de la forme étendue ; induction à rebours, perfection du sous-jeu

+Gibbons Ch. 2

+J&R Ch 7

+MWG Ch. 9.

Gintis, H Ch. 6

Kreps Ch. 11-15

6.3 Jeux statiques à information incomplète (4 heures)

Règle de Bayes ; équilibre de Nash bayésien ; perfection de la main tremblante, mise à jour

bayésienne, perfection du sous-jeu.

+Gibbons Ch. 3

+J&R Ch 7

+MWG Ch. 8

Kreps Ch. 14



6.4 Jeux dynamiques à information incomplète (4 heures)

Rationalité séquentielle, croyances raisonnables et induction vers l’avant, négociations,

enchères et jeux répétés.

+Gibbons 4

+J&R Ch. 7

+MWG Ch. 9

Kreps Ch. 15

6.5 Théorie évolutive des jeux (2 heures)

+Camerer, C. (2002), Behavioural Game Theory: Experimental Studies of Strategic

Interaction: Princeton: Princeton University Press.

+Carpenter, J. P. (2007), “The Demand for Punishment,” Journal of Economic Behaviour and

Organization. 62, pp. 522-542.

+Bowles, Samuel (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution.

Princeton: NJ. Princeton University Press.



ECON 602 : MICROÉCONOMIE II

A. INTRODUCTION

L’objectif principal du cours est de fournir aux étudiants de troisième cycle qui y participent

une compréhension complète de la théorie microéconomique avancée afin qu’à la fin du

cours, ils soient familiarisés avec une analyse très pointue de la microéconomie. Les étudiants

seront bien armés pour appliquer les concepts et les outils microéconomiques dans le contexte

africain. Le cours est conçu pour un semestre et traitera des questions microéconomiques à un

niveau supérieur. Les sujets abordés comprendront : l’économie de l’information ; l’économie

du bien-être et le choix social ; les défaillances du marché ; la structure du marché et d’autres

sujets de la microéconomie.

Textes principaux :

Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory Oxford

University Press. New York. (Désormais appelé MWG)

Jehle, G.A. and P. Reny (2011) Advanced Microeconomic Theory 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall

Inc. (Désormais appelé J & R)

Textes complémentaires :

Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999), Development Microeconomics. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton

University Press.

Campbell Donald E. (2006), Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of information 2nd

edition. Cambridge University Press.

Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall Inc

Kreps, D. M., (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf New York.

Tirole, J. (1991), The Theory of Industrial Organization. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Varian, Hal. R. (1992) Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, W.W. Norton and Company

New York.



B. PLAN DÉTAILLÉ DU COURS

I. ÉCONOMIE DE L’INFORMATION

1.1 Asymétrie de l’information et marchés incomplets (2 heures)

+J&R, Ch 8

+MWG Ch. 13, 14

+Kreps Ch. 16-18

+Akerlof, G. (1970) “The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market

Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84.

+Grossman, S and O. Hart, (1983) “An analysis of the principal-agent problem,”

Econometrica 51, pp. 7-45.

Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Massachusets.

Mankowski L. and J. Ostroy. (2001), “Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market.”

Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX (June) 479-535.

Mookherjee, Dilip (1998), “Market Failure and Information,” Ch.2 of Dutta, B.(ed.). Welfare

Economics, Oxford India Paperback. Delhi. pp 28-100.

Stiglitz, J.E. (1998) “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government; The Private Uses

of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,

12, pp. 3-22.

1.2 Sélection adverse ; signal (2 heures)

+J&R, Ch 8

+MWG, Ch 13 A-C

+Kreps, Ch 25.9-11

+Bardhan and Udry, Ch 7



+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis, (2000) “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and

Economic Performance,” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook in

Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.

+Riley, John H. (2001), “Silver Signals: Twenty Five years of Screening and Signalling,”

Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 432-478.

+Spence, A.M. (1973), Job Market Signalling, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, pps 355-

74


Milde, H and J.G. Riley (1988), “Signaling in Credit Markets” Quarterly Journal of

Economics 72, pp. 101-29.

1.3 Sélection adverse ; filtre (2 heures)

+J&R Ch 8.

+MWG, Ch 13 D.

+Kreps, Ch 17.2

+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis (2000) “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and

Economic Performance,” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook in

Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.

+Riley, John H. (2001) “Silver Signals: Twenty Five years of Screening and Signaling,”

Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 432-478.

Bardhan and Udry (relevant chapitres)


Rothschild M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An

Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,

90 (4), pp. 629-649

1.4 Aléa moral (4 heures)

+J&R, Ch 8



+MWG, Ch 14

+Kreps, Ch.16

+Alderman, Harold and Christen Paxton (1992), “Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the

Literature on Risk Sharing Institutions in Developing Countries.” Policy Research

Working Paper No. 1008, World Bank Policy Research Department, Poverty and

Human Resources Division. Washington, D.C.

+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis (2000), “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and

Economic Performance,” in Handbook in Income Distribution. Anthony Atkinson and

Francois Bourguignon eds. Dortrecht: North Holland.

+Besley, T. (1994), “Savings, Credit and Insurance,” in Behrman, J. and T.N. Srinivasan,

(eds.), Hand Book of Development Economics North Holland.

+Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton

University Press Ch. 8 and 9

+Coate, S and M. Ravallion (1993), “Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization and

Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements,” Journal of Development

Economics 40 (1), pp. 1-24.

+Laffont, J-J. and M. Matoussi (1995), “Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and

Sharecropping in El Oulja.” Review of Economic Studies. 62, pp. 281-99.

+Udry, C. (1994), “Risk Insurance in a rural credit market: An Empirical Investigation in

Northern Nigeria,” Review of Economic Studies 61 (3), pp. 495-526.

Bardhan and Udry. Ch. 7.

Binswanger, H.P. (1980), “Attitudes towards Risk: experimental measures in rural India,”

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62 (August). pp. 395-407.


Cheung, S. (1969), “Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual

Arrangements,” Journal of Law and Economics, 12, pp. 23-42.

Deaton, A. (1992), “Saving and Income Smoothing in Cote d’Ivoire,” Journal of African

Economies, 1(1), pp. 1 - 24.

Doherty, N.A. and H. Schlesinger (1983), “Optimal Insurance in incomplete Markets,”



Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 1045-54.

Fafchamps, M., J.W. Gunning and R. Oostendorp (2000), “Inventories and Risk in African

Manufacturing,” Economic Journal, 110 (2000), pp. 861-893.

Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom (1987), “The Theory of Contracts,” in T. Bewley (ed), Advances

in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press.

Hoff, K. (1996), “Market Failures and the Distribution of Wealth: A Perspective from the

Economics of Information,” Politics and Society, 24(4), pp. 411-32.

Newbery, D. (1989) “Missing Markets: consequences and Remedies,” in F. Hahn, (ed.) The

Economics of Missing Markets, Games and Information. Clarendon Press.

Pattillo, C. (2000) “Risk, Financial Constraints and Equipment Investment in Ghana: a Firm-

Level Analysis,” in P. Collier and C. Pattillo (eds.), Investment and Risk in Africa,

London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 96-119.

Pauly, M. (1968), “The Economics of Moral Hazard,” American Economic Review, 58 (3),

pp. 531-537.

Rosenzweig, M. (1988), “Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low

Income Families” Economic Journal, 98.

Shavell, S. (1979) “On Moral Hazard and Insurance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93,

pp. 541-62.

Stiglitz, J.E. (1990), “Peer Monitoring and the Credit Markets,” World Bank Economic

Review 4, No 3. pp.251-69.

Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”

American Economic Review, 71 (3), pp. 393-410.

Udry, C. (1995), “Risk and Saving in Northern Nigeria,” The American Economic Review, 85

(5), 1287-1300.

1.5 Enchères et conception du mécanisme (4 heures)

+J&R, Ch 9

+Kreps, Ch 18



+ MWG, Ch 23

+Bulow, J. and J. Roberts (1989), “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions,” Journal of

Political Economy. 97 (5), pp. 1060-1090.

+Klemperer, Paul (1999), Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, Journal of Economic

Surveys, 13 (3) pp. 227-86.

+Laffont, J-J and J. Tirole (1987), “Auctioning incentive contracts.” Journal of Political

Economy 95, pp. 921-37

+McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan (1987), “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic

Literature 25, pp. 699-754.

+Milgrom, P., and M. Weber (1982), “A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.”

Econometrica 50, pp. 1089-1122.

Aron, Janine (1998) “Policy Rules and Bidding Behaviour in the Ethiopian Foreign Exchange

Auction,” Centre for the Study of African Economies WPS/98-11. (April) Oxford

University.

Bikhchandani, Sushil, (1988), “Reputation in repeated Second-Price Auctions,” Journal of

Economic Theory, 46, pp.97-119.

Bolton Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Mass.

Dordunoo, C. K. (1994), “The Foreign Exchange Market and the Dutch Auction System.”

AERC Research Paper Series, RP 24, October

Krishna, Vijay (2002), Auction Theory. New York: Academic Press

Milgrom, P. (1989), “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3,

pp. 3-22.

Myerson, R. (1979), “Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica.

47 (January) pp.61-73.

Myerson, R., and M. Satterthwaite (1983), “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,”

Journal of Economic Theory, 28, pp. 265-281.

Riley, J. and W. Samuelson (1981), “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic Review,

71:381-39.



Tenorio, Rafael (1993), “Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behaviour in a Multi-Unit

Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics 75(2),

pp. 302-14.

1.6 Sujets liés à la théorie des contrats (2 heures)

Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Mass.

Salanie B. (1997), Contract Theory: A Primer, MIT Press Mass.

Schmitz Patric W (2001), The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of

Recent Topics in Contract Theory http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/MPRA

Paper No. 1562.

Chiappori P.A. and B. Salanie (2003), “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent

Work” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Vol 1 M, Dewatripont, L.

Hansen and S. Turnovsky eds., Cambridge University Press.

II. ÉCONOMIE DU BIEN-ÊTRE ET CHOIX SOCIAL

2.1 Choix social (5 heures)

+J & R Ch. 6

+MWG Ch. 21

+Arrow, K.J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd Edition New York: Wiley.

+Sen, A.K. (1995) “Rationality and Social Choice,” American Economic Review, 85, 1995,

pp. 1-24.

+Sen A. (1987), “Social Choice,” in Eatwell et al. A Dictionary of Economics. pp. 382-93.

+Yew-Kwang Ng (1990), Welfare Economics, London: Macmillan, Ch. 5.

Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press

Sen, A.K. (1970), Collective Choice and Social Welfare: North Holland.

Sen, A.K. (2000), “Distributive Justice” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.) Handbook

in Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.

http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/MPRA%20Paper%20No.%201562

http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/MPRA%20Paper%20No.%201562



2.2 Préférences revisitées (4 heures)

+J & R Ch. 6

+MWG Ch. 21

+Bowles, S. (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton

University Press Ch 3

+Camerer, C & Fehr, E “Measuring social preferences” http://www.unizh.ch/iew/wp

+Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: the economics of reciprocity,”

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp. 159-81.

+Heinrich, J., S. Bowles, R. Boyd, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath (2001), “In

Search of Homo-Economicus: behavioural experiments in 15 small scale societies”

American Economic Review, 91, pp. 73-78.

+Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory,” American Economic Review,

83:5, pp.1281-302.

+Thaler, R. (2001), “Anomalies.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp. 219.

Becker, G. (1962), “Irrational Behaviour in Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy,

70(1), pp.1-13.

Becker, G. (1996), Accounting for Tastes. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1977) “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.” American Economic

Review, 67(2), pp. 76-90.

Bowles, S. (1998), Endogenous Preferences: the Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other

Economic Institutions, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 pp. 75 -111.

Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2000), “Walrasian Economics in Retrospect,” Quarterly Journal of

Economics, 115(4), pp.1411-39.

Camerer, C. (2002), Behavioural Game Theory: Experimental Studies of Strategic

Interaction: Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Crawford, V. (2002), “Introduction to Experimental Game Theory,” Journal of Economic

Theory, 104, pp.1-15.

http://www.unizh.ch/iew/wp



Eckel, C.C. and P.J. Grossman (1998), “Are Women Less Selfish than Men?: Evidence from

Dictatorship Experiments,” Economic Journal, 108, pp. 726-735.

Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2002), “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature, 415, pp.137-40.

Hirschleifer, J. (1994), “The Dark Side of the Force,” Economic Inquiry, 32, pp.1-10

Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (2000), “Choice, Values and Fairness,” Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Lowenstein, G. (1999), “Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural

Economics.” Economic Journal. 109(453), pp. F23-F34.

Rabin, M. (1998), “Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature. 36(1) pp.

11-46.

2.3 Mesure du bien-être (2 heures)

+Jha, R. (1998), Modern Public Economics. Routledge

+Slesnick, D. T. (1998), “Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare,” Journal of

Economic Literature. Vol. XXXVI, (December) pp.2108-65.

+Yew-Kwang Ng (1990), Welfare Economics, Macmillan, London Ch. 5.

Deaton A. (1986), “On measuring Child Costs: With Application to Poor Countries,” Journal

of Political Economy, 94, pp. 720-744.

Deaton, A (1997), The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach, World

Bank, Washington, D.C.

Lambert, P. J. (2001), The Distribution and the Redistribution of Income: Mathematical

Analysis. Manchester University Press.

III. DÉFAILLANCES DU MARCHÉ

3.1 Biens publics et externalités (7 heures)

+Bowles, S (2003), Chs 1&4



+MWG Ch. 11.

Varian, Ch. 23-24

Bardhan and Udry, Ch 10

+Arrow, K.J. (1971), “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities,”

in Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. M.D. Intriligator ed. Amsterdam: North

Holland, pp.3-23

+Besley, Timothy (1994), “Do Market failures justify interventions in Rural Markets?” World

Bank Research Observer 9 (1), pp. 27-47.

+Jha, R. (1998) Modern Public Economics. Routledge.

Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), 67–

73

Cullis, J. and P. Jones (1998), Public Finance and Public Choice. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Lipsey, R.G. and K. Lancaster (1956), “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of

Economic Studies, 24 (63), pp. 11-33.

Mookherjee, D (1998), “Market Failure and Information Dutta (ed.), Welfare Economics:

Themes in Economics, Oxford India Paperback pp. 28-100.

Pigou, A.C. (1932) Economics of Welfare, MacMillan, London.

3.2 Rendements croissants généralisés (2 heures)

+ Arthur W. B. (1989) “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by

Historical Events.” Economic Journal 99: 116-131.

+Arthur, B. W. (1990), “Positive feedback in the economy,” Scientific American. 262, pp. 92-

99.

+David, P. (1989) “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” American Economic Review 75

pp. 332-337

+Young, H.P (1995), “The Economics of Convention,” Journal of Economic Perspectives.

10 (2) Spring, pp. 105-122.



Durlauf, S and Young, P (2001), Social Dynamics, Brookings Institution

Sokoloff, K. and S. Engerman (2000), “Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of

Development in the New World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp.217-

32.

Arthur, B. (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependency in the Economy. Annarbor:

University of Michigan Press.

IV. STRUCTURE DU MARCHÉ REVISITÉE

4.1 Les entreprises en tant qu’institutions (2 heures)

+Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz (1972), “Production, Information Costs and Economic

Organization.” American Economic Review, 62(5), pp.777-95.

+Williamson, Oliver (1989), “Transaction Costs Economics,” in Schmanlense, R. and

R.Willig (ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland

+ Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press; pp. 15-60.

+Gravelle and Rees Ch 6 and 13.

+Holstrom B. and J. Tirole (1989), “The theory of the firm,” Ch. 2, in Schmanlense, R. and

R.Willig (ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland.

+Coase, R (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica. 4, pp.386-405

+Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1988) “Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and

Future.” Canadian Journal of Economics, August. Vol XXI No 3. pp. 444-458.

+Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organizations, and Management. Prentice

Hall: Chapitre 1.

Bigsten, A., P. Collier, S. Dercon, B. Gauthier, J.W. Gunning, A. Isaksson, A. Oduro, R.

Oostendorp, C. Pattillo, M. Soderbom, M. Sylvain, F. Teal and A. Zeufack (2000),

`Contract Flexibility and Conflict Resolution: Evidence from African Manufacturing’,

Journal of Development Studies, 36, pp. 1-37.

Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.



Hart, O. (1985), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pindyck, R., (1988) “Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice and the Value of the Firm,”

American Economic Review, 78, 1988, pp. 969-985.

Williamson, Oliver (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press: New York.

Ch 1-3.

4.2 Concurrence imparfaite (Oligopole) (5 heures)

+J&R Ch.3

+MWG Ch. 12

+Kreps Ch. 10-12

Varian Ch. 15 and 16

+Basu, Kaushik and Clive Bell (1991), “Fragmented Duopoly: Theory and Applications to

Backward Agriculture,” Journal of Developing Economies. 36, pp. 145-65

+ Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press. Ch. 5, 6, 7

Baumol, W, Binzar, J., and R. Willig (1982), Contestable Markets and a Theory of Industrial

Structure, San Diego: Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich.

Chamberlain, E. (1933), Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

University Press.

Friedman, J. (1982), “Oligopoly Theory,” Ch.11 in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator (eds)

Handbook of Mathematical Economics vol. II, North Holland.

Jacquemin, A. and M. Slade (1989), “Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Mergers,” Ch.7, in

Schmanlense, R. and R. Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization,

Amsterdam; North Holland.

Shapiro C. (1989), “The Theory of Oligopoly Behaviour,” Ch. 6 in Handbook of Industrial

Organization Amsterdam; North Holland.

Sheperd, W.G. (1995) “Contestability vs. Competition - once more,” Land Economics, 71(3),

pp. 299-309.



Stigler, G. (1960) “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy, 72, pp.44-61.

4.3 L’économie de la régulation et de la dérégulation (3 heures)

+Laffont, J-J and M. Meleu (1999), “A Positive Theory of Privatisation for Sub-Saharan

Africa.” Journal of African Economies, 8 (AERC supp.) pp.30-67

+Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision

Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (4).

+Stigler, G.J (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics. 2(1)

Spring pp. 3-21.

Beesley, Michael E. (1997), Privatisation, Regulation and Deregulation 2nd Edition,

Routledge.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1990), “The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After.”

Econometrica. May, 62(3) pp. 507-37.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and

Regulation. MIT Press.

Newbery, David M. (2000), Privatisation, restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities.

Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Peltzman S. (1976), “Towards a General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and

Economics. 19 (2) August, 211-48.

Rees (1993), The Economics of Regulation and Public Enterprises, Harvester Wheatsheaf,

Oxford.

Vickers, John and George Yarrow (1989), Privatisation: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge:

MIT:Mass. Ch. 2-4.

Winston, Clifford (1993), “Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for

Microeconomics,” Journal of Economic Literature. September.

4.4 L’économie des technologies de l’information (2 heures)

+Varian, H. (2001), Economics of Information Technology, Raffaele Mattioli lecture, Bocconi



University. Mimeo

+Economides, N. (1996), “The Economics of Networks” International Journal of Industrial

Organisation. 16(4), pp.673-99.

+David, P. (2002) “Economic Forces in the Co-Evolution of Information Technology and

Intellectual Property Institutions,” Technical Report, Stanford University.

Armstrong, M. (1998), “Network Interconnection in Telecommunications” Economic

Journal. 108, pp.545-64.

Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1988), “Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs,” Rand

Journal of Economics. 19, pp.123-137.

Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1988), “Optimal Contracts with Lock-in,” American Economic

Review, 79(1), pp.51-68

Newbery, David M. (2000), “Privatisation, restructuring and Regulation of Network

Utilities.” MIT Press.



V. AUTRES SUJETS DE MICROÉCONOMIE

5.1. Allocation des ressources au sein des ménages (4 heures)

+Alderman, H et al (1995), “Unitary versus Collective models of the Household: Is Time to

shift the Burden of Proof,” The World Bank Research Observer, 10(1), pp.1-19.

+Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999), Development Microeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999, chs. 2.

+Dasgupta, P. (1993), An Inquiry into Well being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

+Lundberg, S and R. Pollak (1993), “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage market,”

Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), pp. 988-1010.

+McElroy, M. and Horny, M. (1981), “Nash Bargained Household Decisions: towards a

generalization of the theory of demand,” International Economic Review, 22 pp. 333-

349.

+Strauss, J. and D. Thomas (1995), “Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of Household

and Family Decisions” in J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasen (eds.) Handbook of

Development Economics: Volume 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Basu, K. and P.H. Van (1998) “The Economics of Child Labor,” .American Economic

Review, 88.

Bergstrom, T. (1997) “A Survey of Theories of the Family” in M.R Rosenzweig and O. Stark

(eds), Handbook of Population Economics, 1A, Amsterdam: Elsevier

Browning, M. and P.A. Chiappori (1998), “Efficient Intra-household Allocation: a General

Characterization and Empirical Test,” Econometrica, 66, pp. 1241-1278.

Chiappori, Pierre Andre (1992), Collective labour supply and welfare,” Journal of Political

Economy, 100(3), 437-67.

Fortin, B. and G. Lacroix (1997), A test of the unitary and collective models of household

labour supply. Economic Journal, 107(July), 933-55.

Haddad, Lawrence and Thomas Reardon (1993), “Gender Bias in the Allocation of Resources

within the Household in Burkina Faso: A Disaggregated Outlay Equivalent Analysis.”

Journal of Development Studies. 29 (20), pp. 260 – 276.



Haddad, Lawrence, John Hoddinott, and Harold Alderman, (1997), Intra-household Resource

Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods and Policy, Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press.

Hodinnot, John and Lawrence Haddad (1995), “Does Female Income Share Influence

Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote D’Ivoire.” Oxford Bulletin of

Economics and Statistics.

Juster Thomas F and Frank P. Stafford (1991), The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings,

Behavioural Models and Problems of measurement,” Journal of Economic Literature.

Vol. XXIX June pp. 471-522.

Mueller, Eva. (1984), “The Value and Allocation of Time in Rural Botswana,” Journal of

Development Economics, May/June15 (123) pp.329-60.

Rosenzweig, Mark (1986) “Program Interventions, Intra-household Distribution and the

Welfare of Individuals: Modelling Household Behaviour,” World Development 14(2),

February, special issue); 233-43.

Thomas, D. (1991), “Intra-household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach,” Journal

of Human Resources, 25.

Udry, C. (1996), “Gender, Agricultural Productivity and the Theory of the Household,”

Journal of Political Economy, 104, pp. 1010- 1046.

5.2 Risques, incertitudes et réseaux sociaux (3 heures)

+Besley, T. and S. Coate (1995), “Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social

Collateral.” Journal of Development Economics. 46(1), pp. 1-18.

+Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan (2000), `In Sickness and in Health: Risk-Sharing within

Households in Rural Ethiopia’, Journal of Political Economy, 108, pp. 688-727.

+Durlauf, S. and H.P. Young (2001), Social Dynamics. Cambridge: MIT Press.

+Fafchamps, M. (1992), “Solidarity Networks in Pre-Industrial Societies: Rational Peasants

with a Moral Economy,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41(1),

pp.147-74.

+Platteau, J.P. (1995), “A Framework for the Analysis of Patron-Client Ties in Agrarian



Economies,” World Development, 23(5), pp.767-86.

Azam, J.-P., P. Collier and A. Cravinho (1994), ‘Crop Sales, Crop Shortages and Peasant

Portfolio Behaviour: an Analysis of Angola’, Journal of Development Studies, 30, pp.

36-79.

Bardhan, P. (1993), “Analytics of the Institutions of Informal Cooperation in Rural

Development” World Development, 21(4): 633-9.

Ben-Porath, Y. (1980), “The F-Connection: Families, Friends and Firms and the Organization

of Exchange.” Population and Development Review, 6(1), 1-30.

Binswanger, H.P. and J. McIntire (1987), `Behavioural and material determinants of

production relations in land abundant tropical agriculture’, Economic Development

and Cultural Change, 36, pp. 73-99.

Coate, S. and M. Ravallion (1993), “Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization and

Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements,” Journal of Development

Economics, 40, pp. 1-24.

de Janvry A., M. Fafchamps and E. Sadoulet (1991), `Peasant Household Behaviour with

Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained’, Economic Journal, 101, pp. 1400-

1417.

Dercon, S. (1998), ‘Wealth, Risk and Activity Choice: Cattle in Western Tanzania’ Journal of

Development Economics, 55 (1), pp. 1-42.

Eswaran, M. and A. Kotwal (1989), “Implications of credit constraints for risk behaviour in

developing economies,” Oxford Economic Papers, 42, pp. 473-82.

Fafchamps, M. (1993), “Sequential Labor Decisions under Uncertainty: an Estimable

Household Model of West-African Farmers,” Econometrica, 61, pp. 1173-1197.

Fafchamps, M., C. Udry and K. Czukas (1998), ‘Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are

Livestock a Bufferstock?’, Journal of Development Economics, 55, pp. 273-305

Grimard, F. (1997) “Household Consumption Smoothing Through Ethnic Ties: evidence from

Cote d’Ivoire,” Journal of Development Economics, 53 (2), pp. 391-422.

Hoff, K., Braverman, A. and J.E. Stiglitz (eds.) (1993) The Economics of Rural Organization:

Theory, Practice and Policy. New York: Oxford University Press; chs. 2, 5, 12, 14,

24-27.



Paxson, C., (1982) “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to

Transitory Income in Thailand,” American Economic Review, 72, pp. 15-33.

Rosenzweig, M. (1988) “Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low

Income Families” Economic Journal, 98, pp. 1148 – 1170.

Stiglitz, J.E. (1974) “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Share Cropping,” Review of Economic

Studies, 41, pp. 219-255.

5.3 Économie comportementale (3 heures)

+Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity,”

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159-81.

+Heinrich, J., S. Bowles, R. Boyd, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath (2001), “In

Search of Homo-Economicus: behavioural experiments in 15 small scale societies”

American Economic Review, 91, pp. 73-78.

+Rabin, Matthew, and Richard H. Thaler. 2001. "Anomalies: Risk Aversion." Journal of

Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp. 219-232.

Banarjee A. V. and E. Dulfo (2009), “The Experimental Approach to Development

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