~B RIE -F 1" N G P A -P E R - . . . NOV EM BER 1 9 9 a

ashin ton Office on frica ducational Fund, nc.

••

helps split the

rank and file in

the unions.

The Con­

gress ofSouth

African Trade

Unions

(COSATU),

churches and

other anti­

apartheid

organizations are

deman~gan

end to the

violence and~

] freedomof~

~ organization for

{ unions and

~ community

groups. African

National Congress (ANC)

leaders are trying to restrain

their followers. But peace will

be elusive unless the

government's security forces

take a more even-handed role.

This briefing paper presents

an overview ofthe background

to this violence which threatens

to derail the transition to a post­

apartheid South Africa.

and any other independent po­

litica! forces in its territory. In

Natal and at the nationallevel

right-wingers in the police are

working with Buthelezi's

Inkatha rnovernent to provoke

violence and sidetrack peaceful

negotiations. And sorne em­

ployers are encouraging Inkatha

because the ethnie strife be­

tween Zulu and Xhosa workers

ightingin

South

Africa's

Natal province

since 1987 has

killed more than

3,000 people,

more than the

strife in Beimt or

in Northern Ire­

land. In August

of1990, the

battle spread to

the Johan­

nesburg area,

leaving more

than 800 dead

by mid-Septem­

ber. But the me-Demonstra,tors protestfighting tha,t ha,s cJa,imed thousa,nds oflives in the Na,ta,l province.

dia catchphrase

"black-on-black violence" does

nothing to explain what's be­

hind the killing. And references

to "tribal violence" or "rival

anti-apartheid groups" seriously

distort the reality.

ChiefGatsha Buthelezi's

one-party KwaZulu state, set up

by the apartheid regime to rule

Zulu South Africans, is attempt­

ing to forcibily suppress unions

Printed on Recycled Paper

What's Behind the Violence?

it fàiled to attraet more than a few.As the 1980s began, Buthelezi's

support rested on severa! pillars. RuralZulus in particular responded to hisappea1s to ethnic and traditional val­ues and in any case were accustomedto taking direction from their chiefs.üthers less convinced on thesegrounds saw him as an anti-apartheidspokesperson. In a 1977 survey byGerman researchers, 78 percent ofur­ban Blacks in Natal said they sup­ported Buthelezi, as did 28 percent inthe Johannesburg area. WithinKwaZulu, however, this support de­pended as much on patronage as onconviction. Access to land, govem­ment jobs, housing and recruitmentfor labor in the mines depended ongood ties with the Inkatha politica1machine.

In the last decade, as organizingby students, unions and anti-apart­heid groups took root among BlackSouth Afiicans in Natal as elsewhere,Buthelezi's support dropped precipi­tously. In response, Inkatha tumed

Black Consciousness movement thatbecarne prominent in the mid-1970sstrongly criticized Buthelezi andother homeland leaders for collabora­tion with the apartheid regime. But aslate as 1979, the exiled leadership ofthe ANC maintained regular contactwith Buthelezi, hoping that his am­bivalence would be resolved in favorofthe anti-apartheid cause.

In 1975 Buthelezi revived an ear­lier Zulu cultural organization ca1ledInkatha. The new organization wasdesigned to reinforce traditional Zuluidentity and to serve as a political ma­chine tying all Zulus to the KwaZulupower structure. Inkatha leadershipand the KwaZulu legislative assemblyare tightly intertwined. Butheleziclaimed in 975 that "aIl members ofthe Zulu nation are automaticallymembers ofInkatha if they areZulus." Inkatha also adopted theANC colors and sought to portray it­selfas the heir ofANC founding fa-thers like ChiefLu i. In theoryInkatha was open to non-Zulus, but

iA policem/l,nforces Il, township resident to remwe Il, street bIJrrf,&lUi.e. Residents ereaed bIJmclUles to preventpolice IJccess becIJuse they believed police were supporting In/ut,thIJ IJttIJclts.

Bu elczi, KwaZuluand Inkatha

ChiefGatsha Buthelezi is oftendescribed simplyas the leader ofmorethan six million Zulus. But his rise topower and the shifts in bis politicalfortunes are in flet a complex story.

A minor chiefin the 1950s and1960s, Buthelezi was part oftheSouth Afiican system for administra­tion ofthe rural areas reserved for Af­ricans. Unlike his fellow Zulu chiefAlbert Luthuli, who W3S dismissed byPretoria for his leadership in ANCprotests, Buthelezi kept a low politica1profile. When South Afiica createdthe Zululand territorial authority in1970, the other chiefs choseButhelezi as chiefexecutive officer.The KwaZulu constitution in 1972,drawn up by the South Afiican gov­emment, strengthened Buthelezi'spowers and relegated the traditionalZulu king, Goodwill Zwelethini, to apurely ceremonial role.

In line with the apartheid policy,the KwaZulu administration wasgiven direct authority over ruralZulus, as weIl as sorne living close tourban areas in Natal province,. Zulusliving in 'white' areas were also eli­gible for KwaZulu citizenship. Themajority ofthe KwaZulu legislativeassembly is composed ofappointedchiefs; the minority ofeleeted mem­bers also consists entirely ofsupport­ers ofButhelezi.

In the 1970s, Buthelezi por­trayed bis participation in the home­land government as a strategy forworking against apartheid fromwithin the system. He occasionallyclashed v:erbally with the centralSouth Afiican government. At timeshe appealed to traditional symbols ofZulu greamess; on other oc~ons heevoked the heritage ofthe ANC,hinting that he symbolically repre­sented the banned organization insidethe country.

Black resistance inside South M­rica was only gradually reemerging af­ter the repression of the early 1960s,and Buthelezi's stand had sorne cred­ibility at the rime. Steve Biko and the

. 2.

What's Behind the Violence?

repeaiedly to violence, often with thetacit cooperation ofthe South Africansecurity forces.

Anti-Apartheid sistance inNatal: Stud ts, Workers andCommuni -es

As portrayed by the media over­seas, Buthelezi often appears as amoderate advocate ofnon-violent op­position to apartheid, distinguishinghimselffrom the ANC by his opposi­tion to the anned struggle. In prac­tiec, Buthelezi bas also opposed thenon-violent resistance that grew in­side South Africa, because it posed achallenge to his political monopolyand to bis role as administrator ofapartheid institutions. l.lntil recently,the conflict was almost entirely in Na­tal. Far from being conflict betweendiffer-ent ethnic groups, it wasButhelezi's effort to suppress any rivalorganization among Zulus.

The first prominent confronta­tion was with student activists, who in1980 organized successful boycotts ofapartheid education in KwaMashuand Umlazi, two Durban townshipsunder KwaZulu administration.Buthelezi denounced the studentsand organized anned Inkatha mem­bers to force the students to retum toclasses. They attacked ManY students

. in the townships and at the UniversityofZululand. In 1983 protest at theuniversity against a planned Inkatharally on campus resulted in an Inkathaattack on student dormitories, killingfive students.

Even larger confrontations camein the second halfof the decade, afterthe fonnation ofthe United Demo­cratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and theCongess ofSouth African TradeUnions (COSATU) in 1985. TheUDF's community organizations di­rectly threatened Buthelezi, becauseInkatha was involved in government­sponsored community councils evenin townships not directly underKwaZulu administration. Rent strikesand other campaigns in black town­ships targeted these govemment bod-

ies, and were suppressed by the apart­heid regime. Inkatha was allowed tooperate freely, and became even moreidentified with the govemment struc­tures.

Of200 violent

incidents in Natal

from January­

April 1990,

195 were attributed

tolnkatha.

The KwaZulu administration,moreover, had deve10ped close linkswith white business in Natal, who in­vested in cheap labor in"the home­land, and had promoted a smallgroup ofblack businessmen with pa­tronage. In early strikes in Natal in1973, KwaZulu official Barney Dladlahad helped Mediate and won respectfrom workers and unions. But he wassoon dismissed by Buthelezi.

In the 1980s Buthelezi opposedindependent union organizing, andpromoted an Inkatha-linked tradeunion federation, with a slate ofoffic­ers primarily ofbusinessmen andInkatha officiais.

In addition to criticizing theA1~C's armed struggle, Buthelezi op­posed strlkes and stay-aways as weIl aseconomic sanctions because, he said,they damaged the South Africaneconomy. He also denounced theUDF and COSATU as surrogates forthe ANC. He especially attackedprominent Indians and Xhosa-speak­ing blacks among the leaders ofthethree organizations.

A 'moderate' vis-a-vis the apart­heid regime, Buthelezi quickly turnedto the rhetoric ofviolence whenspeaking ofaction against his oppo­nents, reca1ling the martial virtues ofZulu conqueror 5haka. More andmore Black South Africans concluded

.3.

that his ambivalence was tilting to theside ofthe regime. By mid-1985, asurvey among urban Blacks by the In­stitute for Black Research showedthat ChiefButhelezi's support in Na­tal had dropped to 33 percent, 45percentage points less than in 1977.In the Johannesburg area it was downto only five percent. A Sunday Timespoli the same year showed onlyslightly higher percentages forButhelezi.

The Escalation ofViolenceand the Role of the Police

In 1984 and 1985, with initialoutbreaks in Durban, and sustainedconflict around Pietennaritzburgsince 1987, Inkatha repeatedlylaunched violent attacks on anti­apartheid unions, community organi­zations and communities perceived tobe supporters ofthe ANC. ANC'comrades' in the townships foughtback in self-defense and sometimesinitiated retaliatory raids. There havebeen incidents ofindiscriminate vio­lence on both sides.

Evidence from independent ob­servers as well as legal affidavits col­leeted by C05ATU and UDFattorneys show, however, that:

• Almost alllarge-sca1e attacks havebeen initiated by organizedgroups ofarmed InkatQa warriorsagainst individuals and communi­ties who declined to join Inkatha.

• Prominent Inkatha members, aswell as members of the KwaZulupolice, which is recruited and di­reeted by Buthelezi's administra­tion, have been involved in theattacks.

• With onlya few exceptions, nei­ther the KwaZulu police nor theSouth African police have takenaction against Inkatha gangs, norhave perPetrators been chargeddespite affidavits naming specificindividuals and killings,.

• Retaliatory actions by township'comrades' have been largely

What's Behind the Violence?

spontaneous, not organized byleaders ofthe ANC, COSATU orUDF. Nevertheless, police actionafter clashes bas included raids todisann township residents andrepeated detentions ofanti-apart­heid leaders.

Detailed chronologies and sup­port for these conclusions can hefound in the sources listed below.The following is a briefoutline oftheevolution ofthe violence.

Du" ,,1984-1985In 1984 tension rose in the

Durb town$ips ofLamontville andHambanathi, whefi residents op­posed plans for incotpOration intoKwaZulu. In one incident in AugustInkatha vigilantes, accompanied bySouth African police, bumed tenhouses and killed Alfred Sithole, a

In some incidents

aroundJohannesbut;g,

special squads of

provocateursstarted

the violence, then lefttownship residents and

Zulu migrantworkers

tofight each other.

schoolteacher and community leader.UDF supporters were driven out ofHambanathi in fear oftheir lives.

On August 1, 1985, UDF activ­ist and civil rights lawyer VictoriaMxenge was assassinated, reportedlybya South African govemment deathsquad. Student protests in Blacktownships were followed by sornelooting. Buthelezi threatened that the"anger of the peo le" would he un­leashed against what he tenned "mis­guided children and thugs." Inkatha

accused the UDF, the South AfricanCouncil ofChurches (SACC) and lo­cal pastors ofstirring up trouble. OnAugust 7 a memorial service forMxenge in Umlazi township was at­tacked by 300 Inkatha warriors. Atleast four moumers were killed. But aSouth African police spokesman saidhe was unaware ofthe incident.

Over the next weeks Inkathawarriors roamed through Umlazi andKwaMashu townships, purportedlyrestoring lawand order. Newspaperreports and affidavits catalogued at­tacks on funerals, burnings ofhomesofanti-apartheid leaders and killingsofyouth who refused to join Inkatha.The police teargassed and dispersedanti-apartheid gatherings, but with­drew their pattois during Inkatha at­tacks. Among the victims of theunrest were Indians in Inanda town­ship' whose houses and shops wereburned by unknown Africans sus­pected to be linked with Inkatha.

As a result of the violence, sup­port for Inkatha among urban Afri­cans in Natal dropped even lower. Arandom survey by the Institute forBlack Research in the Durban metro­politan area in September found thatsupport for Inkatha fell from 20 per­cent to five percent, while support forthe UDF jumped from 26 percent to51 percent.

Pietermaritzburg 1987-1990Inkatha attacks in this area ofNa­

tal grew initially out ofa protractedstrike at BTR Sanncol by the Metaland Allied Workers Union. Inkathaopposed sympathy strikes for theBTR Sarmcol workers and in Decern­ber 1986 three strikers were killed bya group oflnkatha mernbers. Al­though police arrested severa! sus­pects, they were never brought tocourt and later released.

In May 1987 COSATU and theUDF called a national stayaway toprotest the whites-only elections.ChiefButhelezi opposed thestayaway, but sorne 90% ofworkers inthe Pietermaritzburg area stayedhome. Buthelezi blamed union busdrivers, and as manyas 12 were killed

&by te/l1'IJ/lssed in township 1'iolmee.

as Inkatha tried to force the drivers toleave COSATU and join the Inkatha­backed United Workers Union. Thiswas accompanied by massive Inkathaforced recruiting drives in townshipsaround Pietennaritzburg. Communi­ries which refused were bumed out;opponents oflnkatha sometimes re­taliated against communities seen asInkatha strongholds. According to aUniversity ofNaral compilation, therewere 403 political killings in the areain 1987, 690 in 1988, and a total ofover 3,000 by mid-1990.

Following the release ofNelsonMandela in February 1990, the vio­lence escalated, as it became clear thata one-person-one-vote system wouldIeave Butheiezi a marginal figure.Short1y after his release Mandela drewa crowd of120,000 supporters inDurban; Buthelezi, who claimed torepresent Durban's Zulu-speaking M­ricans, only drew 10,000. Inkatha'sresponse was to rely on its advantagein force: of200 violent incidents inNatal from January-ApriI1990, 195were attributed to Inkatha.

Inkatha warriors, allowed by po­lice to carry "traditional" weapons, at­racked townships repeatedly. In somecases, according to eyewitnesses,thousands ofwarriors were bussed infor the attacks. Charges ofinvolve­ment ofKwaZulu police were con­finned when the Natal SupremeCourt in June 1990 issued an injunc-

What's Behind the Violence?

tion "interdieting members ofthe po­lice from assaulting, harassing or en­gaging in any unlawful attlcks" in thetownship ofKwaMakhuta.

In 1989 and again in 1990, at­torneys for COSATU compiled de­tailed dossiers ofbias and occasionaldirect involVl m nt in the violence byboth KwaZulu and South African po­lice. But despite legal âctions, and thepresence at times ofmilitary unitsseen as less partial than the police, thegovemment refused to arrest warlordsand other named individuals respon­sible for killings.

TrllnspIUIl1990Beginning in late July 1990, the

violence spread to the Transvaal. Thefirst inàdent came only a week afterButhelezi announced Inkatha's trans­formation into a politica1 party thatwould recruit whites as well as Blacksaround the country. By mid-Septem­ber the death toll exceeded 800. As inNatal, observers reported that Inkathasupporters initiated most attacks, andthat police action was rarely impartial.But in the multiethnic Transvaal con­text, the violence often took on anethnic charaeter. It aIso pitted mi­grant residents ofthe single-sex hos­tels against longer-tenn urbanresidents in townships and squattercamps.

Inkatha organized first amongZulu-speaking hostel residents withties to fàmilies in KwaZulu. Sornewere already Inkatha supporters, buteyewimess reports said others wereforced to join in the violence. Hosteldwellers who refused to join Inkatha,especially Xhosas and other non­Zulus, were killed or expelled fromthe hostels. Then Inkatha attackedsquatter camps near the hostels; resi­dents retaliated with attacks on thehostels.

As in Natal, observers reportedthat police were slow to disarmInkatha, but concentrated their raidsagainst Inkatha's opponents. Butthere were also persistent eyewitnessreports that whites were involved in anumber ofanacks. Themba Khoza,leader ofthe Inkatha Youth Brigade,

who was among the few Inkathamembers arrested, was seen leadingan attack in Sebokeng in September,anned and accompanied by fourwhites. In this and other incidents,the ANC charged, special squads ofprovocateurs moved ioto an area tostart the violence, then left hosteldwellers and township residents tofight each other.

A Zulu hostel resident inter­viewed anonymously by the WeeklyMail reported that he was forced tojoin in the fighting and wear the redheadband identifying Inkatha sup­porters. His only alternative would beto flee the hostels, he said, and eventhen Inkatha might retaliate againsthis family at home.

Although senior police officiaIsprofessed the desire to maintain im­partiallawand order, and Inkathawarriors were disarmed in sorne inà­dents, the general perception in thetownships was that rank-and-file po­lice tended to side with Inkatha.

Additionally, new accusationssurfaced, so· far without specific con­finnation, that sorne of the killersmight not be Inkatha at aIl, but pro-

(cm must take

responsibilityfor

restraining ourforces ...

but when the other

side is constantly

attacking and irs

not being restrained,

then there can be

no success. ))

- Willies Mchunu,National Union of

Mineworkers ofSouth Africa

.5.

fessionals linked with South Africa'sdeath squads and surrogate anniessuch as Renamo from neighboringMozambique. In one attack on acommuter train in early September,gunmen killed at least 26, withoutsaying a word, leading to speculationthat they might be concealing foreignaccents.

In mid-September, the South M­rican police announced Operation"Iron Fist" to crackdown on the vio­lence, but the ANC charged that thecrackdown was aimed at the commu­nity rather than the violence. Presi­dent de Klerk admitted the possibilityofinvolvement ofa 'third force' inthe Violence, but refused to allow anindependent inquiry.

Prospects for Peace

Negotiations between Inkathaand representatives ofCOSATU, theUDF and recently the ANC as wellhave repeatedly failed to end the vio­lence. Before this year, key negotia­tors on the anti- apartheid side havesometimes been detained by police.At times the violence has taken on amomentum which the leadership can­not control. Recently, negotiatorshave met on severa! occasions. ButButhelezi has claimed that the vio­lence can ooly be resolved throughthe ANC's recognition of Inkatha'sequaI status, and bilateral talks be­tween himselfand Nelson Mandela.

In September and October, localnegotiations appeared to stem theviolence in sorne areas. In sorne casespolice officiais were credited for rnak­ing an effort to keep the peace and ar­rest offenders. And a high-levelmeeting including Mandela andButhelezi was planned. But the pros­pects for a durable peace were stillprecarious given the differences.

The ANC and COSATU agreethat Buthèlezi and Inkatha shouldparticipate in the fonnulation ofanew constitution for South Africa,but say that competition for politicalsupport should be peaceful and thatelections to a constituent assembly

What's Behind the Violence?

must he democratic. In the interimthey demand that policing he impar­tial and that anyone responsible forviolence he arrested and charged inthe courts.

In conttast, Buthelezi, like theSouth African govemment, is fearfulto give up the option offorce whendemocracy would leave mm with only

a minority ofvotes. The more theANC mns public support, the greaterthe temptation for Inkatha to useviolence.

Since the South Mrican govern­ment is still responsible for law andorder, the demand for impartial po­licing is direcred to President deKlerk. It is still unclear, however,

whether de Klerk is most interestedin stopping the violence or in usingit to weaken the ANC. As long asthe government is seen as promot­ing Inkatha, and as failing to controlthe right-wing within its own secu­rity forces, any talks to stop the vio­lence are unlikely to produce lastingpeace.

Wa hln ton Office on AfrlcaEdu tional Fund, Inc. Hw U this Briefing Pa

Staff

Aubrey McCutcheon, IIIExecutive Director

Dr. William MinterAssoc. Dir. for Communications and Education

Imani CountessAssoc. Dir. for Publications and Public Maies

Jim TvarianVolunteer

Church of the Brethren

Tonya BrooksIntem

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