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8/9/2019 Ryan Devine Russell WPA
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A Discussion on Russell, Wittgenstein and Austin
Bertrand Russell is considered one of the originators of analytic
philosophy. His controversial view outlined in The Philosophy of
Logical Atomism came into heavy criticism from both Ludwig
Wittgenstein, and later by J.L. Austin, who criticized Russell as well as
other Russellian philosophers, in Sense and Sensibilia.
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell had a tumultuous
unique relationship. It can be argued that their effect on each other
profoundly changed both of their philosophical ideologies. Russells
views on how language organizes the world are deeply rooted in the
traditional 17th century metaphysics mixed astutely with a keen sense
of analytic philosophy. Both Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin have shown
that we cannot put too much weight in Russells views, however it is
not certain if they have successfully shown that Russells work is
entirely void of any explanatory ability.
In what follows, I will discuss Russell's views on sense-data and
language, views that stem from his logical atomism. I also discuss
these views in light of the criticism they received from Wittgenstein
and J.L. Austin, and argue that these criticisms are only partly feasible.
Russells view centers on the concept that the world consists of
facts that he defines as the kind of thing that makes a proposition
true or false. His point is that facts exist independently of the
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language describing them. The sentence Russell is dead is neither
true nor false in and of itself. Its truthness is dependent on some part
or occurrence of the world. The opposite statement Russell is alive
represents the same fact as the previous statement and that
occurrence is what makes the statement false. He makes the claim:
When we speak falsely it is an objective fact that makes what we
say false, and it is an objective fact which makes what we say
true when we speak truly. (Russell 42)
His point centers around the distinction between types of facts:
particular facts, those that describe specific things about certain
objects, and general facts, which make claims about an objects class.
Specifically, his point is that these facts are independent of the
language that is being used. Russell states this to make sure that his
point is understood:
[A] proposition is not a name for a fact, from the mere
circumstance that there are two propositions corresponding to
each fact. (Russell 46)
These facts are objective by nature and form what he calls atomic facts
or facts about the relationships in the external world. Any atomic fact
has a relation to particulars or terms of relations in atomic facts.
(Russell 60) He uses the example of This is white to describe this
exact relationship. The statement refers to a relationship between an
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object and its properties.
Now that he has his groundwork laid he begins to talk about how
we interact with these atomic facts and particulars. He doesnt think
that we can be directly connected with this external world because we
can only be acquainted with the world by our sense, or as he calls it,
sense-data. This view means he thought that language describes the
world in a sort of one-to-one correspondence, the idea that
prepositions specifically pick out something intelligible about the
external world.. He thought that to believe in logical atomism was to
believe that one does believe the world can be analyzed into a
number of separate things with relations and so forth. (Russell 49)
There are two points that we can infer from Russells Logical
Atomism: First, language mirrors the nature of the world or states of
affairs. Second, that we perceive the world through sense-data, and
these sensations are the only thing we can be directly acquainted with.
These views were interestingly developed with a pupil of his,
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgensteins first, and only published work,
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, closely parallels Russells view of
what language does, and how we use language to describe this
external world we can only know through our sense-data. Although
later in Wittgensteins investigations of language he no longer agrees
with Russell over what language represents, he seems still sympathetic
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to the theory of sense-data.
Wittgensteins rejection of logical atomism can be described
astutely from a thought experiment he suggests we consider.
[F]or example the proceedings that we call games What
is common to them all? Dont say: There must be something
common, or they would not be called games but look and
see whether there is anything common to all. (Kenny 44)
His point doesnt seem obvious at first, but it is an important
distinction about the way we use language. According to Russell one
should be able to come up with a precise formal system that mirrored
the actual world, or some description of what games are through a
series of statements. But ultimately Wittgensteins point is just this:
We cant! There are words are in a way self-evident, because
language isnt the precise setup we perceive it as.
We know what a game is independently of its lexical definition. If
we define game as something that has rules, do we call the man who
is tossing a ball against a wall, or throwing it up into the air and
catching it a game? Do we not call these things games? This
distinction is one that creates problems for Russells view, as it shows
that there are instances when we cannot define words in a meaningful
way, but that doesnt mean that we consider them meaningless. When
I say the word game, you know what I mean, or what I am talking
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about regardless of what our definition of the word is. Specifically
even though we cannot come up with an acceptable definition for the
word game we could never find anyone who would say the word is
meaningless.
This is a valid point against Russell. It shows that our concept of
language and words definitions cannot be defined in these clear,
decisive ways. Words are naturally disconnected from the external
world, because they arent doing exactly what Russell thinks they are
doing (describing how the world actually is). The difference is that we
cannot find out anything more about the world from defining these
words, and some words are impossible to define without creating a
contradiction of a definition that clearly leaves out something it should
include. For Wittgenstein the meaning of any word in language is its
use in that instance.
His point stems from a realization he had about what language
can actually tell us about the external world: his previous view was
flawed. He now thinks that things cannot be hidden in objects anymore
than a math problem like 753/7 is hidden until the division has been
carried out. (Kenny 36). His previous view, more in line with Russells
Logical Atomism, was wrong:
I wasnt clear about the sense of the words a logical
product is hidden in a sentence (and suchlike) The proposition
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this place is now red (or this circle is now red) can be called an
elementary proposition if this means that it is neither a truth-
function of other propositions nor defined as such But from a
is now red there follows a is now not green and so elementary
propositions in this sense arent independent of each other like
the elementary propositions in the calculus I once described I
[previously] thought that the whole use of propositions must be
reducible. (Kenny 36)
It means that it is not the case that there is a neat, pretty
packaged language correlated to the actual world. When we use the
words like cat, game, etc. these words are not amenable to
Russellian analysis. Specifically we cannot provide a series of
descriptions that truly defines its use that does not in some way
contradict itself.
Another example of this same scenario is when we consider
when someone misuses a word. Do we say that we truly did not
understand his or her point? No, we would never say that. There are
plenty of examples that you can tell the meaning of the misused word
through the tone, or the emphasis on the phrase. Suppose I was to say
The government has usurped my car! The lexical definition says that
this sentence is meaningless for the definition is to seize and hold by
force without legal authority. The point here is that words and their
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definitions seem to hinge on more than just what weve previously
described them to be. It seems to be the case, however, where a word
is completely misused, where no facet of the words use is in its lexical
definition is spoken, but somehow the sentence is still completely
understood. Furthermore we would never say that the sentence is
completely meaningless.
So does it seem to be the case that we do actually know what
they are saying, even though their use of the words seem counter-
intuitive to the way that we usually infer that words meaning?
Wittgenstein also considers situations he thinks that Russells
(and earlier Wittgenstein) ideas cant describe:
Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports
the number of slabs in a pile Such a report might run: Five
slabs. Now what is the difference between the report or
statement Five slabs and the order Five slabs!? (Wittgenstein
10e)
He considers that maybe the difference is inherent in the tone, or in
the fact that we consider one version a statement and the other a
command. But these distinctions cannot be attributed to the language
itself, but merely how we are using it. He thinks that Russells views
cannot distinguish the difference between the two utterances for two
reasons: First, There is something more to language than just the
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words themselves. Second, we cant even seem to talk about language
intelligently in Russellian terms because we are still in the same
language framework that were trying to analyze.
An implication of Wittgensteins view is that it impossible to talk
about language in a meta sense because any time we try to do that,
we are still stuck using a language. This issue stems from the fact that
we cannot escape language in any circumstance because of the fact
that we rely on it solely to communicate. We cannot ever talk
intelligently about language for we already rely on it to talk about
everything. So any flaw that is inherent in our language is also
apparent in any discussion we have about it.
This doesnt necessarily mean that Russell has to throw in the
metaphysical towel. Wittgensteins views rely heavily on examples
of when we arent using language in a way that Russell might call its
true sense. The statements we are uttering could be considered
unclear. The difference is that if we flesh out exactly what we mean
when we say Five slabs is ambiguous by nature and that were using
the situation to take it out of ambiguity. There is a clear difference
between the two utterances of Five slabs, one of them is an answer
to a question, while the other one is unprecedented by any previous
statement. Just because we can assume the use of the statement by
the situation that encompasses it doesnt mean that the language is
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ambiguous.
Wittgenstein, however, doesnt seem to be as critical of Russells
view of sense perception and his ideology of sense-data. This sets the
stage for another philosopher by the name of J.L. Austin to attack
another facet of Russells work: sense-data.
J.L. Austin did not think you could even make sense of Russells
view that our interaction of the world was only through sense-data. He
thought that there were some fundamental issues that Russell
overlooked.
Austin couldnt understand how we were coming to doubt our
senses in the first place. He wants to look at what the ordinary man
believes versus the philosophers beliefs or what they are prepared to
admit because [w]e must look at both sides of this contrast, and with
particular care at what is assumed in, and implied by, what is actually
said. (Austin 7)
Austin thinks the ordinary man will say that he perceives
material things. The mere idea of saying that we arent seeing these
material things seems strange. Basically, the fact is that all the phrase
material thing is doing is acting as a foil to the phrase sense-data.
He does the same thing for the other philosophers definitions such as
directly, perception, etc. Austins first point was just that he
thought using the words sense-data begged the question that they
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already existed. Furthermore, he thought these words were
unintelligible. But even if that isnt the case, he thinks the idea is still
flawed. He wonders specifically why we have any reason to doubt our
senses at all:
[I]t is also implied, even taken for granted, that there is
room for doubt and suspicion, whether or not the plain man feels
any [i]t suggests that when, for instance, I look at a chair a few
yards in front of me in broad daylight, my view is that I have
(only) as much certainty as I need and can get that there is a
chair and that I see it. But in fact the plain man would regard
doubt in such a case as plain nonsense (Austin 10).
He then goes on to consider what it actually means to be deceived by
our senses, specifically what the philosopher means by deceiving our
sense. He thinks that talking about deception is strange because we
are usually not being deceived. His point being that if we can describe
away all of our deceptions, using reason, then how are they ultimately
the types of deceptions that should cause us to doubt our senses.
Austin also makes the distinction between seeing a bright green
after-image against a white wall [being] exactly like a bright green
patch on the wall (Austin 49). His point seems to hinge on this: if
Russell is allowed to use reason to show how our sense-data is able to
understand things such as chairs and tables, as opposed to things like
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brown blobs among white backgrounds, then why cant he say that the
reason a stick seems like it is bent when it is placed in water, is
because it is in water!? He is saying why should we doubt our senses in
the first place? As soon as one lets reason into the picture at all, it
explains away the illusion our senses perceive as merely being a
misunderstanding of our reasoning when we decide what they are.
Once we can explain away the illusion, or how our minds are
misinterpreting what we are seeing, is it really a delusion of the kind
that Descartes and Russell rely on to show that we cannot trust our
senses? The answer hinges on what evidence are we really using to
doubt our senses, but more importantly it seems that Austin is really
making the claim that the ordinary man wouldnt even consider these
illusions reason to doubt our senses in the first place:
As Ayer observes, probably truly, a child who had not
learned that refraction was a means of distortion would naturally
believe that the stick really was crooked as he saw it; but how is
the fact that an uninstructed child probably would not
discriminate between being refractedand being crooked
supposed to establish the allegation that there is no qualitative
difference between the two cases? (Austin 51)
But then in the next sentence he seems ultimately to contradict
himself. He is trying to come up with an example that he thinks can
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turn Ayers view into one that supports his vision of how much reason
we can use in conjunction with situations where we doubt our senses.
But instead it seems he is giving a thought experiment that invalidates
the core of his argument:
What sort of reception would I be likely to get from a professional
tea-tester, if I were to say to him, But there cant be any
difference between the flavours of these two brands of tea, for I
regularly fail to distinguish between them? (Austin 51-52)
Lets take his same example and plug these into his positions: the
ordinary man and the philosopher. His point is supposed to show that
there is some difference between Russells view (the child thinks the
stick is crooked in the same way that what our sense are really seeing
is a crooked stick) and his own (that the professional tea-taster should
be able to use his knowledge to be a part of his senses). But he seems
to go wrong, as it seems his sides are actually reversed. Why
shouldnt the philosopher be the tea-taster in his example? Isnt he
the one who actually has some expertise with language? Hasnt he
spent time dissecting and discussing what we actually mean when
we use certain terms? These questions make it seem obvious that
Austin is misrepresenting his own argument. The ordinary man is just
that: the person who cannot distinguish between the two different
types of teas. The person who hasnt dissected language in a way that
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tells us about how we can uses words in different ways and has to
sometimes create language, in use, to describe these new phenomena.
Austin seems to think that the language that the ordinary man is
good enough to talk intelligently about whatever we need to talk
about, but the tea-taster, wine-taster, or beer connoisseur ultimately
has their own language to talk about those things in the same way that
a philosopher has its own terms for talking about the way we perceive
the world. The philosopher is able to notice distinctions in the world
that the ordinary man just cannot see, as he is untrained to do so.
Therefore the words that Austin thinks are being misappropriated by
the philosopher, specifically because the ordinary language is already
full of great distinctions, seem to be false by his own accord. The tea-
taster does need its own language with its own distinctions to talk
intelligently about the different types of teas, just as the philosopher
does. By saying that the ordinary man has some insight into the way
that we use language seems to be the equivalent of trusting your
gardener for advice on how to fix your car. He just doesnt have the
applicable knowledge to talk intelligently on the subject in the first
place.
Austins objection to a philosopher who is using terms such as
sense-data is unintelligible. He wants us to believe that using such
terms seems unintelligible however his theory on why the philosopher
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cant use those terms seem ultimately invalid.
But what does this mean for Russell? Are his views still valid?
Wittgenstein has raised some strong counter-examples to show how
Russells philosophy cannot explain certain ways that we actually use
language. Wittgenstein also has a valid point that we cannot truly be
talking about language outside of the language itself. These points
seem to hinder the explanatory power of what exactly language can
actually be referring to, specifically that this idea of a one-to-one
correspondence to the external world. But what about Russells view
on how we perceive the world, and if we are directly connected to it?
Even with Austins objections it seems safe to say that this view is still
quite defendable, even if it means we have to admit that perhaps
being directly connected with an external world is impossible, though
we are merely acquainted with it through our sense-data.