Soliman 2012

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TILTING AT PYRAMIDS: INFORMALITY OF LAND CONVERSION

IN CAIRO

Professor Ahmed SolimanArchitecture Department, Faculty of Engineering,

Alexandria University, Alexandria, [email protected]

Summary: This paper assesses the conversion of agricultural land in Egypt during itssocioeconomic and political transformations. The focus is on the diverse mechanism behind thecomplexity of urban housing informality on agricultural land as well as the legal political processthat recently flourished all over the Egyptian cities by which housing informality has come toaccount for 35-40% of the total housing production. The real economics of land conversion in ElMatarya area on the periphery of Cairo is investigated to show that a remedial approach andpublic policies cannot be dissociated from planning directives, and city management strategies.The paper predicts that economic and governance reforms as well as the contribution of thegrassroots would create a common ground for facilitating or enabling the legitimization of land

conversion in a sustainable way that also yields potential economic efficiency.

Key Words: Housing informality, security of tenure, land conversion, land reform, agriculturalland

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Sixth Urban Research and Knowledge Symposium 2012

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TILTING AT PYRAMIDS: INFORMALITY OF LAND CONVERSION

IN CAIRO

I. INTRODUCTIONThe land question is central to economic analysis. Its use in an urban context is crucial in shapinghow effectively cities function and who gets the principal benefits from urban economic growth(Stilwell & Jordan, 2004). This paper assesses the conversion of agricultural land in Egyptduring its socioeconomic and political transformations. The focus is on the diverse mechanismbehind the complexity of urban housing informality on agricultural land as well as the legalpolitical process that recently flourished all over the Egyptian cities by which housinginformality has come to account for 35-40% of the total housing production.

Most Egyptian cities are surrounded with belts of informal housing built on agricultural land.Between 1982 and 2004, an estimated 1.2 million faddans1 of agricultural land has beendecimated through such development (World Bank, 2007). Agricultural land is being lost at anestimated annual, daily, and hourly rate of 54545, 149.4, and 6.22 faddans respectively. Fuelledin part by remittances from Egyptians working in Gulf countries in the 1980s, a tremendousamount of new construction has been built illegally on agricultural land. Urbanization, rapidpopulation growth, and increasing housing demand for the urban poor are among the causes ofmany houses being built, renovated, or enlarged throughout the cities without recourse to zoningand construction regulations. About 88 percent of housing in Egypt has been built in violation ofthe building code.

It is estimated that at least 17 million Egyptians reside in informal areas in Egyptian cities (EgyptHuman Development Report, 2010), and the value of informal housing construction in Egypt isaround US$ 241.4 billion (De Soto, 2000). The vast majority of recent urban informalization hasoccurred on agricultural areas surrounding Egyptian cities. The result is a growing divergence inEgyptian cities: between the oldand the new areas of urban agglomeration, a Great Dividebetween "establishing", strugglingand emerging urban spaces. The former space is the newgated communities of the elites of the society, the middle, is the formal city and symbolizes thecommunity that follows the prevailing laws, while the latter is the peri-urban informalsettlements which mirrors the marginal groups. Cairo and the other Cairos within the city, theformal city, informal city and desert city in The Egyptian landscape" (Silver, 2010; Sims, 2010;

AlSayyad, 2009).

Today, the total population of Egypt is approaching the figure of 90 million, the largestpopulation in North Africa (CAPMAS, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2010). About half of the population isconcentrated in two major urban centers: Cairo and Alexandria, while the remaining half isscattered in 221 small and intermediate urban settlements along the Nile river valley and delta.

11 One faddan = 0.42 ha, each faddan constitutes 24 Qirat, each Qirat constitutes 175 square meters.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0197397511000592#ref_bib87#ref_bib87http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0197397511000592#ref_bib87#ref_bib87

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Most of the General Strategic Plan for 221 cities and 4600 villages indicates expansion onadjacent agricultural areas. It is expected that Egypt will lose formally around 66,300 and13,8000 faddan of the best fertile areas surrounding Egyptian cities and villages respectively bythe year 2027 (Soliman, 2010). During one and a half years after the 25 January revolt of 2011,Egypt has been lost between 10,0000 -120,000 faddan.

The total population of Egypt will reach around 145 million by 2050 (CAPMAS, 2011) where62.4 percent will be urbanized (UN-Habitat, 2008). During the inter-census period (19962006),the annual urban housing production is conservatively thought to have grown to reach 263,838units. Of these, 55.6 percent were formal and 45.4 percent informal. Many studies on Egyptianinformal housing enumerated as many as 8.5 million informal housing units, of which; 4.7million units on agricultural land within or outside municipal boundaries; 0.6 million ongovernment-owned desert land within municipal boundaries; and 3.2 million outsideadministrative village boundaries. In Cairo, 81 percent of informal units sit on privately ownedagricultural land, with 10 percent on government owned desert land and the remainder on state-owned agricultural land (World Bank, 2007; Cities Alliance, 2008; Habitat, 2010). It is not the

intention to deal much with the mechanisms of how informal settlements get started as discussedelsewhere (Soliman, 2004).

The study adopts ethnographic method, in which ethnographic observation is used in conductingthe field survey, while ethnographic interviewing relied on personal and official documents andinformal interviews with stakeholders (local municipality, local residents, planners, NGO's, realestate agents, and land developers).

The paper predicts that economic and governance reforms as well as the contribution of thegrassroots would create a common ground for facilitating or enabling the legitimization of landconversion in a sustainable way that also yields potential economic efficiency. The differencesbetween costs, value, and benefits of agricultural land conversion within Egyptian cities arehighlighted.

The paper examines the above hypothesis through three main arguments. First, for so many yearsthe international donors and local governments failed to upgrade or at lest to eliminate theperpetuation of informal settlements in developing countries (Hasan, Patel, and Satterthwaite,2005). As cities have expanded, so have the informality developed residential areas, especiallyon agricultural land. Second, the need for illegal occupation of land and informal dwellingarrangements stems from a deep marginalization and exclusion from formal access to land anddevelopment (Al Sayyad, N. and Roy, A., 2004, Soliman, 2004; Sims, D., 2012, Huchzermeyer,M. and Karam, A., 2006). Third, informality has made it possible for the survival of a largepercentage of the urban population, enabling a range of precarious livelihoods, and at the sametime, it changed land uses, and urban spaces in the major urban centers. The way informalitydoes this is not compatible with formal urban process. Therefore, this paper sheds lights on themechanism of housing informality on agricultural land that recently flourished all over theEgyptian cities, with emphases on a case study ofEl Matariya area in Cairo city.

The paper is structured as follows: the second section explores the perpetuation of urban housingon agricultural land, and its effect on land uses, urban pattern, and urban spaces and it tracks

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mapping cities' growth and land reforms, and the reason behind conquering agricultural land.Section three examines a case study to present a critical review of housing informality onagricultural land inEl Matariya area in Cairo city. A concluding section offers directions for theapplicability of an adapted model to housing informality that it is hoped to assist in enhancingthe environment, supporting national and local economic development, and making a common

ground by setting priorities for urban informality, and sustainable development needs.

II. PERPETUAL CHALLENGE OF SPACE: LAND, REAL ESTATE AND HOUSINGINFORMALITY

The following section addresses the perpetuation of informal settlements in Egypt throughmapping cities' growth on agricultural land and land reforms by which urban informalization onEgyptian landscape has occurred. Also, the main causes that led the urban poor to conqueragricultural land are examined. There are interesting parallels in the evolution of the literature oninformal housing and on the informal economy and, over time, their scale, importance andcomplex linkages with the "formal" economy and housing production were recognized (De Soto,

2000; Bromley, R., 2004). It is estimated that around 40 percent of Egyptian economy isinformal, by which it contributed largely in the spreading of housing informality.

1. Mapping cities' growth and land reformHistorically, most Egyptian agglomerations were not predominantly urban areas and it has neverbeen classified as distinct by the state. The historic city (medina), such as Cairo and Alexandria,typically consists of a dense agglomeration of dwellings, with commercial uses on the groundfloor. As illustrated in figure (1) the urban form of these cities consists of a series of historiclayers, epitomized by relatively homogeneous land markets, each with their own rules. Small andintermediate Egyptian cities are originally characterized by a compact rural agglomeration,

which formulated the first layer of the urban fabric, and by the time, more district layers wereadded on. Over time, many properties have deteriorated for lack of maintenance by absenteeowners, or of the conflict of the fragmented ownership patterns.

On the eve of the 1952 Revolution, ownership of agricultural land was heavily concentrated in afew hands. About 0.1 percent of owners possessed one-fifth of the land and 0.4 percentcontrolled one-third, in contrast to the 95 percent of small owners with only 35 percent of theland, and 44 percent of all rural inhabitants were landless (Osman, T., 2010). The land reformLaw No. 178 of 1952, and the subsequent laws No. 127 and No. 15 of 1961, and 1963respectively limited individual ownerships to 50 faddan per an individual and a total landholderfor a family of 100 faddan. It targeted the property of the upper class of landowners, dubbed

"feudalists" by the government, for distribution to the poorest villagers and landless. Accordingto these laws, the agricultural land ownership is right kind original on the land and gives itsowner the power to use, abuse, and dispose of the fact that the land is for an agricultural use thatleads to a definition of property of this description. During this era, urban growth on adjacentagricultural land was prohibited, and planning control was in force.

At the beginning of the sixties significant improvements to public spaces, streets, markets,historic buildings, and new districts has been made in the majority of the Egyptian cities, which

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formulated the second layer as planned cities. The awqafand Agrarian Land Reform foundationsown significant proportions of new added district properties. Planned extensions on agriculturalland were added on with distinct neighborhoods reflecting the socioeconomic mix of thepopulation, such as El Mohandseen district in Cairo, through a combination of publicimprovements and private investment. By June 1966, the pyramid of landownership truncated at

the top part and widened at the base part while large holdings were not entirely eliminated, theshare of those owning fifty faddan or more dropped to 15 percent. The 95 percent of ownerscame to the control of 52 percent of the land instead of the 35 percent they have owned beforethe reforms (Hopkins, H., 1969).

The third layer is the scattered-urban informal urbanization that started in the mid 1970s and hasaccommodated most of Egypt's sustained annual urban demographic growth rates of 2 to 3percent since the 1980s. Most of this expansion occurred on privately owned land that weredistributed according to Agrarian land reform. From 1975 to 1985, urban land values doubledevery three to four years while prices on agricultural fringes rose up but by less than the prices ofurban land. The number of small owners, those with fewer than five faddan, increased to nearly

3.29 million in 1984 from 2.92 million in 1961, while the area they owned dropped from 3.17millionfaddan to 2.9 millionfaddan (Osman, T., 2010). Because of low revenue of agriculturalproduction, many of small landowners sold their properties for private developers who convertedthese areas into informal residential development. This suggested that land fragmentationworsened, because of the continual division of land among heirs in accordance with Islamicinheritance laws. The number of landless families also rose up due to the population growth.

Figure 1: Various layers of urban growth for selected small cites in EgyptSource: GOPP, 2012

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Fig. 2 Urban development of Cairo city in various phases Fig 3. Informal areas in Cairo citySource: GOPP, 2012

Between the 1970's and 1980's, the Open-Door Policy of Sadat and the privatization policy ofMubarak was diminished as the government relaxed its controls over agricultural land. However,land reforms resulted only in the redistribution of about 15 percent of Egypt's land undercultivation, and by the early 1980s, the effects of land reforms in Egypt drew to a halt as thepopulation of Egypt moved away from agriculture. The issuance of law 96 in 1992 revoked theformer Agrarian Land Reform of 1952 that had given tenants security of tenure and legalized theright to inherit tenancy agreements. The new law fully enacted in October 1997 after a five-yeartransition period, but the rent after 1992 was increased from 7 to at least 22 times the fees of theland tax. After the enactment of the new law, all landowners could take back their land andcharge tenants market-based rent, which in some cases increased to 300400 percent. Despitecontract renewal, the tenants remain vulnerable and insecure because of threats of eviction fromproprietors. During this era, the fourth layer appeared by which the peri-urban informalurbanization was dominating the new fabric of urban areas. This trend was facilitated bytraditional tenure systems where the privately owned land was subdivided into three types.Privately registered owned land is an area guaranteed full land registration and has a permanentsecurity of tenure. Privately no registered owned land, with Hiyazah (land holding) is an areawith de Jure tenure recognition but has not full security of tenure. Privately in doubt, ownershipis an area with de facto recognition but has not tenure title. With this type of urbaninformalization, un-serviced parcels cannot be legally subdivided, and buildings in theseinformal settlements are therefore encumbered with three instances of non-compliance: (a)illegal agricultural land subdivision; (b) change in use; and (c) unauthorized construction.The fifth layer, occurred in parallel to the fourth layer, is the planned urban extensions whichexisted in new towns, gated communities, and development corridors, but it is located only inCairo and Alexandria, and other scattered cities that have back desert areas (Singerman, D.,

2009).

Several factors have historically been associated with urban informalization on agricultural landin Egypt. Firstly, the government, either directly or indirectly, had played a major role in allcases. Due to the land-reform measures of the early 1960s, and changes in official economicpolicy have taken economic power away from the traditional landholders and spread ownershipacross a wider section of the society. The original owners of the allocated land, who receivedland parcels according to law No. 178, after so many years died and left his/her land to his/her

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heirs, who were always in a conflict and were forced to put in sale their land shares to otherpeople, but this often results in parcels being abandoned when multiple progeny cannot agreeover subdivision or sale. Alternatively, if a proprietor dies without children, his property istransferred to Nasser Bank (Bait-Elmaal). Most of these lands have converted to housinginformality, and fragmentation of ownership became inevitable. Secondly, the enactment of land

policy in the early 1990's has stimulated greater inequality in land holdings, and it has been seenas a far safer investment in uncertain times than industrial production. Finally, further instabilitywas created by the Agrarian Land Reform which resulted in the change of large ownership areasfrom a private freehold to a public title, then to a private ownership, and vice-versa. This had amajor impact on the agricultural land patterns, and led to the insecurity of land tenure.In sum up, the various land reform laws, socioeconomic and political transformations associatedwith a lack of land delivery system have contributed directly or indirectly in changingagricultural land pattern by which opened the door for land speculators and private developers toconquer agricultural land and changed its use into illegal residential areas. Also, the dynamicprocess of urban informalization has reflected in various ways on urban spaces in which housinginformality became the dominant features of these spaces.

2. Why do people conquer agricultural land?Scattered researches examined informal housing typologies (Sims, D., 2010; Soliman, 2004;2007) that have provided a basis for analysis of the mechanisms of demand and supply by whichhousing on agricultural land (housing informality), as a main type of housing delivery system,became inevitable to accommodate the urban poor.In Egypt, there are three mechanisms for carrying out a housing project for low-income groups;formal, organized, and housing informality (see figure 2). The latter two involved self-helptechnique, while the former is a complete product. Formal housing constructed by governmentbodies have to pass through several governmental agencies, and complicated procedures, startingfrom the Ministry of housing and ending at various local governmental departments. To

implement an organized housing project several effects on housing production are occurred;scarcity of fund to carry out the project; long and complicated procedures for the approval of theproject; and long time span of the implementation process.

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Figure 4: Methods for carrying out housing projects for low-income groupsSource: Authors elaboration

On the other hand, the mechanisms of housing informality to be developed off the ground areremarkably fast, taking no more than a few weeks, and less costly than the official methods. Theproduction of housing informality is influenced by those who produce them (usually the privatedevelopers, either formally or informally), the organizer or regulator (the government), theintermediaries (who are regulating the process of exchange of goods and services among thebeneficiaries), the consumers (the residents of informal housing areas) and the market forces allmanaged the housing production.

However, the urban poor conquer agricultural land taking into account the following factors.Firstly, housing informality is developed on agricultural land for which the owner has some sort

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of legal tenure, a formal occupation permit (Hiyazah), and the possibility for improving servicesand economic status and promoting the development of smaller enterprises through acombination of housing and a place for work. Secondly, housing informality often is developedin advance of the principal lines of urban growth and roads, and in close proximity to jobopportunities, social community networks, and amenities. Thirdly, the residents have adopted

their own methods and their own procedures on incremental process without restrictedregulations and procedures in providing suitable shelter for themselves. The variation of landplots size, housing types, their quality, and level of investment and improvements on housingconstruction are tailored solely according to the degree of security of tenure, as well as, to matchthe varied needs and resources of the residents. Fourthly, the informal credit system (Gamaiyyat)exist through a co-operation between the stakeholders -whatever the range - and the households,the intermediary, the landowner, and an informal contractor (Soliman, 2010). Financialcollective action is operated in a way that coincide the stakeholders' preferences in agriculturalland development process, where the cost of the construction of a housing unit is paid onincremental basis, with a down payment between 25-30 percent of the total current cost, and therest to be reimbursed on monthly basis over 3-5 years.

Therefore, these settlements offered the possibility of changing their status from illegal sub-division into a legal situation and have the possibility of becoming an owner-occupier in the nearfuture, and the future prospect of the locality to be a part of, or within, the city boundary. Thefuture prospect of using land plots as an asset to secure the residents from the inflation, tofacilitate the development of home based enterprises, and to give them attractive financialreturns. The designs and standards of the houses within housing informality were customizedaccording to the resident's requirements and needs. It is therefore, housing informality provides awide range of plots' size with the conservation of local planning conventions for its residents(Soliman, 2010) which provide considerable flexibility in designing layouts and enable anyimbalance in demand and supply to be corrected.

In sum up, the perpetuation of housing informality is a response to a shortage of affordablehousing, scarcity of land supply for low-income groups, the relaxation of law, and the weaknessof planning management. Therefore, housing informality is not developed through established orstate-regulated procedures, and it does not utilize the recognized institutions of housing andhousing finance. However, the government is unable to compete with the preferences of housinginformality neither in the implementation process nor in the local credit system.

III.INFORMALITY OF LAND CONVERSION INEL MATARIYA AREAThe following part examines the developmentofEl Matariya area and how informality of land

conversion operated during the last six decades.3. Historical background

In Egypt, urban informalization is as old as modern urbanization and urban development, whichhave existed in Cairo for more than nine decades ago. Janet Abu-Lughod (1971), whose mainresearch covered the 1957-61 periods, did not mention the phenomenon at all; neither did DavidSims (2010). Evidences are indicated that the appearance of urban informalization in Cairo datesback to the 1900's when squatters' areas (Ezbet El Saiaada,Ezbet El Lemon,EzbetAbu Toyalhia

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and Tall El Hosen) were found inEl Matariya area north west of the city of Cairo (GOPP, 2012).These squatters areas were accommodated the workers who came from Upper Egypt for theconstruction work ofHeliopolis Oasis which was built between 1906 and 1929 by a Belgian,Baron Edouard Empain (Ilbert, R., 1984). The agglomeration of housing informality onagricultural land inEl Matariya began to appear in the 1930s and expand in the 1950s as small

rural agglomeration calledEzbs such asAbu Toyalhia, where little interest in what was at first avery marginal and not very visible phenomenon, neither from government nor academics. At thebeginning of 1950's, the government was increasingly preoccupied with creating new socialistsociety through the modernisation of all sectors in Cairo, and it could afford to ignore a fewinformal developments on the periphery. El Matariya area is a part ofAin Shams area(zone 3)and its urban fabric is consisted of several unplanned development layers and has little non built-up areas left. The total area ofEl Matariya is about 1626 faddan with a population of 0.831million people with a very high residential density of 511 persons/faddan (GOPP, 2012).

As illustrated in figure (3), in the early 1930s, there were six main edges limited El Matariyaarea; railway track in the eastern side; Ismailia Canal form western edge; El Tawfekyia canal on

the north; a public sewage pipe was crossing the site diagonally from north towards the south;andEl Hawary road extended from Obelisk site in the north perpendicular on the public sewagepipe headed towards the southern part of the area. Scattered Ezbs were spread across the area.Now, three edges are existed; Port Said Street (adjacent to Ismailia Canal) connects the area withdowntown and it extends and intersects to the Cairo Ring Road in the north. Railway trackbecame a metro line, and El Tawfekyia canal became the area's ring road. Three historical sitesare located in the area; Obelisk site and Tall El Housen (hill fort) in the northwest and Tree ofMary in the southeast, all of which are separated by farmland adjacent to them.

Figure 5: The process of illegal agricultural land subdivision and conversion in El Matariya

area in the city of Cairo. Left: Agricultural fields before urban development, Middle:

Consolidated illegal urban development, Right: Built-up area according to agricultural land

subdivisionSource: GOPP, 2012

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El Matariya community was often forged based on prior family ties and shared backgrounds.Most ofEl Matariya's population originates from Upper Egypt, the poorer provinces `up' theNile in the southern part of Egypt. Much of the population claims to be Sa`idi (Upper Egyptian)but had been living previously in other squatter settlements in the periphery ofEl Matariya,mainlyEzbet El Lemon. They have settled in unregistered, unofficial, but lawful activities, such

as wood retail sales, building and construction, and providing security for people or things. Theprocesses of agricultural land subdivision and land conversion in El Matariya are examinedbelow.

4. Agricultural land subdivision and institutionVirtually all agricultural land in El Matariya, as applied on the fringes of Egyptian cities, wascomposed of irrigated, intensely cultivated, mostly under family freehold tenure. Some lands areawqaf lands (under the Ministry of Religious Endowments trusts), but farmed by smallholdertenants. In addition, 70 percent of the site were allocated to people according to Agrarian LandReform of 1952 (Islah El Zirhaa, under the Ministry of Agriculture), again farmed bysmallholder tenants, by which the rights of tenants are strong, approaching those of freehold

tenure.

InEl Matariya, as in any agricultural area in Egypt, there are a number of main and secondaryirrigation canals (Turaa and Missqa) and drains (Mussaref) whose rights-of-way represent theonly lands in the public domain, by which are considered the key drivers for land subdivision.These are normally between 10 and 30 meters wide (including associated embankment roads),with a length varied between 2000-2500 meters. In El Matariya, as in other urbanized informalareas, it is these rights-of-way, which has been converted to main streets (see figure 3). On thestages of the different periods, the farmland, as underlying agricultural field patterns were rigidlyrectangular, and it could be that this order itself is translated into subdivisions that appearedplanned. Any attempts at legal conversion of these agricultural lands for urban use confront three

main problems; lack of legal, up-to-date registration; extremely fragmented land holdings in longnarrow strips; and finally, fringe informal subdivision of agricultural land into building plots.According to Islamic law, all heirs obtain a share of the heritage, but a son inherits a sharedouble that of a daughter. Such a process of subdivision is dynamic and occurs piecemeal over alocality, increasing disparities in parcel size. However, since each new plot must have access toan irrigation canal and a communal path, the result is generally one of linear parcels (Ahwad) upto 500 meters long and 150 meters wide. Generation after generation, such plots have beenfurther subdivided into narrower strips separated by small irrigation channels (Missqa). Sometoday are as narrow as 15 meters.

As localities become increasingly urbanized, some canals dried up and added to the width of

contiguous roads, such asEl Tawfekyia canal. Furthermore, as disputes arise among heirs, courtshave often transferred judgment to engineers with expertise in subdividing land according toIslamic law. Such subdivisions usually occur according to a measurement of faddan, whichconstitutes 24 Qirat (175 square meters). Since each Qirat contains 24 Saahim (7.29 squaremeters), the characteristic width of many plots is 7.29 meters or some multiple thereof. Largeagricultural parcels (Ahwad) were usually subdivided within the pattern of large irrigation canalsand drains, and each Hoaad (large parcel) must have side reservations for paths and canal

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cleaning. The pattern of the old irrigation system thus usually defines the main and secondarystreets.

According to the above outline of agricultural land subdivision, three types of streets within ElMatariya area are existed. First, the major inter-settlement arteries; second narrow streets which

form the boundaries of the residential blocks and third, passages within the blocks, which aresemi-public, (known as hara- darb- atfah), by which formulated the interior paths within theblocks, and allowed access to private land plots. After the subdivision of the agricultural landinto small plots (varied in size between 175 - 350 square meters, or one-two Qirat), then thelandowners are proclaimed the sale of these small pieces of land for people who are looking forland plots cheaper than the prices in the official land market.

5. How agricultural land conversion markets operatesThe conversion process in El Matariya area was characterized by three stages of growth:scattered expansion, collective expansion, and consolidated expansion. Scattered expansionstarted with government intervention in the early 1950s when some buildings were erected, as

popular residential blocks close toMary's Tree, and a central hospital on the southern edge of thesite. These buildings have been spread along the main road adjacent to Kablat Street. Othereducational and social buildings have been built in the northeast of the site, and the Obelisk siteon the northern edge was left without development. Some rooms were built close to the railwaytracks to house railway inspectors.

In the early of the 1960's, urbanization occurred in the country and a growing shortage ofhousing within Cairo encouraged speculators to buy large tracts of agricultural land in ElMatariya area. Agricultural land sub-divisions and conversion were organized by the landlordsand often carried out with the help of university students. Typically, allocating a plot of land to aprivate buyer would take between two and three days with a contract between the parties

agreeing on terms for down payments and credit. Over a period of ten years, the whole site wassold and the area was consolidated. Collective expansion began with the erection of the mainroad (Tourelly Street) in the late 1960's that replaced the public sewage pipe by a road thatcrossed the area from southwest to northeast (figure 3). This provided a diagonal shortcut acrossthe fields from the railway track to KablatStreet and it was soon looked upon as a main publicservice road that became a major "spine" for residential development. People were encouraged tobuild on both sides and Tourelly Street soon became a suitable path to and from their dwellings.The residents considered this street as the first step towards permanent settlement, and morebuildings were erected on vacant plots close to accessible paths.

Two forms of consolidated expansion took place. First, as the settlement's potential was

recognized by speculators, more illegal land sub-divisions took place and more buildings wereerected. The demand for apartments rose and small developers and contractors started to buildmore houses. The site became valued as a new residential area for low-income groups offeringan alternative to crowded inner-city rented flats. The low land prices (compared to land closer tothe city centre), the availability of vacant land with access to various facilities, and increased jobopportunities within the site have all encouraged a growing number of people and speculators toinvest in housing construction. This has helped a substantial number of low-income groupschanged their status from tenant to owner - occupier. The second form of consolidated expansion

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was vertical expansion. With increasing land prices and building materials costs, new storeyshave been added to existing buildings according to the resources of each household and theneeds of the owners.

Private developers often took the first steps in conversion of agricultural land within El Matariya

and they could often obtain a good return for their investment in a very short time. The level ofdevelopment within El Matariya increased considerably as soon as the area was incorporatedinto the city's boundary or as soon as local authority or central government changed its statusfrom illegal sub-division into a legal and regulated area. The state has played an indirect role inthe initial development in most of housing informality in Egyptian cities, and its role haschanged over time according to the socioeconomic and political transformations of the country(Soliman, A., 2012). The residents took the initiative of adopting the site and building theirhouses according to their needs and requirements by which they were dominated with, andinfluenced by the market forces and development within the country.

IV. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTAs has been described housing informality does not operate in isolation as a commodity, rather itdepends on the domination of capital, labor, collective resources and a cooperation among thestakeholders, by which the governmental institutions are included. The first lesson to be learnedis to recognize people as potential: to invest money, to manage and maintain the physicalenvironment, to control the local resources, and to participate in national economy. The secondlesson is the need for the government to adopt an approach that supports what people do, and toregulate to the benefit of the collective resources. One priority should be the development ofhousing sites by which enabling affordable housing standards, rather than standards so unfeasiblethat they leave most of the housing stock unregulated. The third lesson to be learned from urbaninformality is the importance of local planning convention: where street layout and distribution

of commercial activities promote sustainability, where value-for-cost is maximized, therebyallowing residents the opportunity to control the built environment, and where people areencouraged to invest in the shared amenities and maintenance of their neighborhood. The fourthlesson is local financial convention which is introduced among the beneficiaries in a way thatsuite their financial needs, requirements and responsibilities through issuing unofficialdocuments between them to guarantee the rights of each of them. Also, social networks andcultural norms are the organizational bases that dictate those rules and the means through whichthey are enforced.

The constraints within housing informality grow; their location on agricultural land, theentrepreneurial initial subdivision, and the ex-post to introduction of infrastructure have all led to

several major shortcomings in the quality of life for those living there. Also important in thisregard are the poor quality of roads and of means of transportation, the poorly ventilateddwellings, and the unregulated construction, which may vary in terms of safety depending on theknow-how of local contractors. As well as the great loss of vast area of agricultural land.

Housing informality markets and land conversion procedures need to be formulated in line withsocioeconomic reforms and poverty alleviation strategies, as well as, with the context ofsocioeconomic needs of the bottom strata of the society. This requires indirect/direct intervention

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and public investment to produce democratize access to land and promote overall urban reform.Such processes should aim not only at recognizing individual land ownership, but mainly atpromoting the communal-spatial integration of informal settlements. Social networks in informalareas, which extend beyond kinship, remain overwhelmingly casual, unstructured, andnonpolitical. The Gamaiyyat, the informal credit system, is perhaps the most important form of

neighborhood networking in Egypt. The weakness of civic or non-kinship cooperation at thecommunity level only reinforces traditional hierarchical, paternalistic relations with peopledepending more on local elders and problem solvers than on broad-based social activism.

The question of agricultural land conversion and real estate today concerns the majority of theinhabitants of regional metropolises, as well as those of secondary cities. Furthermore, from theperspective of an over all control desired by the local powers, the passage from a policy ofcontainment to a policy of integration has become vital and it represents an inescapable reversal.The housing informality is finally being considered as integral part of the urban matrix. As wellas, the absence of both planning control and urban management over the built environmentwithin Egyptian cities has led into urban informality.

However, throughout the various potentialities, constraints, and the facts that Egypt has beenmagnified by the political goal of saving and rescuing agricultural land, it is possible to explore amodel in order to increase land delivery system for the urban poor, as well as to eliminatehousing informality. This model implies the three magnets forces; the state, community; andmarket, all of which are operated in some way together or on individuality bases or both, bywhich the final output is urban development. The view of urban informality as a cooperation oran arrangement or relationship (whatever the level and the type of urban informality), is theresult and the functions of capital - whatever the amount and sort- state involvement and thenature of community concerned. Therefore, public/private cooperation in urban informality isconsidered as the outcome of capital which is generated by a number of different interest groups(public and private, whatever their legal form and economic status) utilizing the main collectivesresources within the market (land, labor, material etc., as well as, the legislative process whichcontrols the operation of these resources) in facilitating and controlling land provision forhousing, interacting within the development strategy of the government.

Within this conceptualization, the in between the three magnets, is the final product, and the lineparallel to the triangle is the output of the integration between the three magnets and the productas it is reflected in the triangle in figure (4 ). The model suggests that each line in the triangle is aresponse of the interaction between the various forces in the triangle. The importance of thismodel is that how to reduce the tension between the state, market and community in favor offacilitating land delivery system for the urban poor, and in eliminating housing informality. Insummary, housing informality can be viewed from an institutional perspective and from abehavioral perspective. From an institutional point of view, it is concluded that housinginformality can take different formal, legal shapes, but have in common that they are (to differentdegrees) hybrid institutions that deal with competing drivers stemming from public, market andcommunity forces and values. These drivers occur in varying combinations, sometimes reflectingthe origins of these organizations and affecting the motivations of the key stakeholders involved.From a behavioral perspective, housing informality have in common that they (again to differentextents) adopt entrepreneurial strategies to fulfill their objectives (versus traditional

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bureaucratic or management-oriented behavior); conflicts between principles are played outin organizational strategies and day-to-day decisions.

This model can be used as a basis for comparing similarities and differences between housinginformality within and between countries at a much deeper level than the traditional

comparisons based on tenure or other formal organizational characteristics. Thereby it can alsogenerate interesting information for policy makers to see to what extent different political, social,economical, and institutional contexts lead to different behavior by housing informalityproviders. Furthermore, the model may also be useful for professionals, to assess to what extenttheir housing informality organization is being consistent concerning what they say they (wantto) do and what they actually do. However, for all purposes, more measurable information(indicators) has to be obtained by applying the model to individual housing informality sites,which will be a main task for further research.

Figure 6: Position of housing informality between State, market, and communitySource: Authors elaboration

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Soliman 2012