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CMD 18-H6.62A File / dossier: 6.01.07 Date: 2018-06-12 Edocs: 5559643 Supplementary Information Oral Presentation Submission from Greenpeace In the Matter of Ontario Power Generation Inc., Pickering Nuclear Generating Station Renseignements supplémentaires Exposé oral Mémoire de Greenpeace À l’égard de Ontario Power Generation Inc., centrale nucléaire de Pickering Request for a ten-year renewal of its Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station Demande de renouvellement, pour une période de dix ans, de son permis d’exploitation d’un réacteur nucléaire de puissance à la centrale nucléaire de Pickering Commission Public Hearing – Part 2 June 2018 Audience publique de la Commission – Partie 2 Juin 2018

Supplementary Information Renseignements …nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/hearings/cmd/pdf/cmd18-h6/... · Exposé oral : Mémoire de . Greenpeace . À l’égard de ; Ontario

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CMD 18-H6.62A

File / dossier: 6.01.07 Date: 2018-06-12

Edocs: 5559643

Supplementary Information Oral Presentation Submission from Greenpeace In the Matter of Ontario Power Generation Inc., Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

Renseignements supplémentaires Exposé oral Mémoire de Greenpeace À l’égard de Ontario Power Generation Inc., centrale nucléaire de Pickering

Request for a ten-year renewal of its Nuclear Power Reactor Operating Licence for the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

Demande de renouvellement, pour une période de dix ans, de son permis d’exploitation d’un réacteur nucléaire de puissance à la centrale nucléaire de Pickering

Commission Public Hearing – Part 2 June 2018

Audience publique de la Commission – Partie 2 Juin 2018

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Supplementary Comments to18-H6.62 To:TheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionDate:June12,2018From:Shawn-PatrickStensil,SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceRe:SupplementarysubmissionsandadditionstoGreenpeacesubmission18-H6.62ThisdocumentprovidesadditionalbackgroundandevidencetosupportGreenpeace’ssubmission18-H6.62.Attachment1isGreenpeace’sreviewoftherecentlyreleasedImplementingPlanforthePickering

NuclearGeneratingStation.IthighlightswheretheprovincialgovernmenthasmadeinadequateprovisiontoprotectthesafetyofOntariansintheeventofanaccident.Itprovidesrecommendationsforimprovingpublicsafety,transparencyandverifyingtheadequacyofoffsitenuclearemergencyplanning.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontointegratetheserecommendationsintosection10.1oftheLicenceControlHandbook(LCH).Attachment2isacopyofaletterGreenpeacehassenttotheDeputyMinisterofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices.Itprovidesadditionalinformationrelatedtosection2.3ofGreenpeace’ssubmission.ItdetailsGreenpeace’sconcernsrelatedtotheapparentlackofseparationbetweentheMinistryandOPG.Thisraisesquestionsrelatedtotheintegrityofgovernmentoversightofnuclearemergencyplanning.InGreenpeace’sview,theprovincialgovernment’sineffectualoversightofnuclearemergencypreparednessshowsithasnotmadeadequateprovisionfortheprotectionofpublicsafetyandtheenvironment.Greenpeacefeelstheprovince’smishandlingofemergencymanagementisgroundsforrejectingOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingPickering.Attachment3isacopyofGreenpeace’srecentsubmissiontotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandClimateChangedetailingwhyreactordecommissioningshouldbeincludedontheprojectlistundertheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.Itprovidesadditionalinformationrelatedtosections1.2to1.2.3ofGreenpeace’soriginalsubmission.Notably,theRegionalMunicipalityofDurhamin18-H6.67hasalsorequestedanenvironmentalassessmentofOPG’splanstodecommissionthePickeringnuclearstation.Thetimelineforcarryingoutanenvironmentalreviewbeforethestationclosesistightconsideringthatthestationcouldcloseasearlyas2020.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoinstructstaffinitsrulingtocontacttheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandClimateChangetorequestdecommissioningbeincludedontheprojectlistundertheImpactAssessmentAct.Greenpeacealsorecommendsappropriatewordingbeincludedinsection11.2ofLCHtosetouttheexpectationthatanenvironmentalassessmentofdecommissioningwillbecarriedoutbeforethestationcloses.AdditionalAmendmentstotheLCHNeededInlinewithcommentsprovidedinsections2.1(OPG’sPeriodicSafetyReview–Insufficienttransparency)and1.1.1(TheNeedforcontingencyplanningandaclosureplan)Greenpeacerequestschangestosections15.1(PeriodicSafetyReviewIntegratedImplementationPlan)and15.4(EndofCommercialOperations)oftheLCH.ChangesareneededtomaintainCommissionauthorityoverthe

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regulatoryscopeofPickering’scontinuedoperationandimprovethetransparency.Forexample,ascurrentlywordedsection15.4wouldallowstafftoallowOPGtocontinueoperatingbeyond2024withoutCommissionapproval.InGreenpeace’sview,onlytheCommissionshouldhavetheauthoritytoapproveorrejectarequestfromOPGtooperatebeyond2024.IfOPGweretoapplytooperatePickeringlonger,itshouldtriggerapubliclicensingreviewingaswasrecentlycarriedoutforBrucePower(BrucePowerhadafive-yearlicencebutwasobligatedtoreturntotheCommissiontochangetheregulatoryscopeofitsoperationstoenablereactorrefurbishmentandlife-extension).AsnotedbyCNSCstaffduringPickering’s2014licencerenewal,proposalstofurtherextendPickering’slifespanwillimpactregulatoryrequirements.AsnotedintheCommission’s2014ruling“CNSCstafffurthernotedthat,incaseofsignificantlylongerlifeextension,beyond247000EFPH,someadditionalrequirementswouldlikelybeimposed,suchasan

independentandseparatefilteredventingsystemforbeyonddesign-basisaccidentsatthePickering

station.”1InGreenpeace’sview,aproposaltooperatePickeringbeyondwhatisproposedinthe

currentapplicationshouldtriggerareviewoftheregulatoryscopeofthestation’scontinuedoperations.GreenpeacerequeststhisbestatedexplicitlyintheLCH. ItshouldalsobenotedthatOPG’scurrentapplicationforeseesclosingthefirstunitin2022not2024.ThisisnotreflectedintheLCH.AdditionalamendmentsshouldbemadetotheLCHtoensureitisproperlyalignedwiththeplanconsideredduringthesehearings.ForfurtherInformation:

Shawn-PatrickStensil,SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceCanada416-884-7053,[email protected]

1RecordofDecision,includingReasonsforDecisioninthematterofOntarioPowerGenerationInc’sapplicationtorequesttoremovalofHoldPointforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,May7,2014,pg6.

Attachment1

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CommentsontheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation

PreparedbyShawn-PatrickStensilSeniorEnergyAnalystGreenpeaceCanada

June12,2018

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1.Introduction&RecommendationsThisdocumentprovidesGreenpeace’shigh-levelreviewoftheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,whichwaspublishedthelastweekofApril2018.Recommendationsareoutlinedbelowforimprovingpublicsafety,transparencyandverifyingtheadequacyofoffsitenuclearemergencyplanning.GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontocontinueusingitslicensingauthoritytoprovokeimprovementstooffsiteemergencyplanningandpublicsafety.GreenpeacecontinuestobeconcernedbythegovernmentofOntario’sineffectualoversightofnuclearemergencyresponse.ThegovernmentofOntarioisOntarioPowerGeneration’s(OPG)soleshareholderandapprovesitsbusinessplans.Giventheprovince’scombinedresponsibilityforoffsitesafetyandOPG’sbusinessplans,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontoconsidernotonlyOPGasthelicenceeinitsdeliberations,butalsothegovernmentofOntario.Greenpeacemakesthefollowingrecommendations:

• TheCommissionshouldincludeaconditioninOPG’slicencerequiringanyfuturechangestotheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationtoundergopublicconsultationpriortopublication.

• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringthegovernmentofOntario

topublishthefindingsofthestudyithascommissionedtoconsidertheadequacyofcurrentemergencyplanningdistances.TheresultsofthisstudyshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.

• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGortheprovinceto

commissionandpublishindependentmodellingofamajoraccidentatPickering.ThismodellingshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.

• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwiththe

provincetoensurethatpreparednessandplanningmeasuresareinplacetoidentifyandmonitor“hotspots”acrosstheentire50kmIngestionControlZone.

• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoencouragetheprovincetoadoptanExtended

PlanningDistancealignedwiththelargerareasrecommendedbytheIAEA,real-worldexperienceandavailableaccidentmodelling.

• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoprovide

informationonhowtoprepareforanuclearemergencytoallresidentsoftheContingencyPlanningZonebytheendof2019.

• TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithprovince

andmunicipalauthoritiestoidentifyallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIngestionControlZone(IPZ)aswellasreceptionfacilitiesforspecialized-careevacueesoutsideoftheIPZ.

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• ToberesponsivetotheexpectationsofTorontoandDurhamRegionalcouncils,theCommissionshouldexpandrequirementsforKIdeliverytothe20kmareacurrentlyproposedfortheContingencyPlanningZone.

• TheCommissionshouldimposeanewlicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwith

schoolboardstoensurethestockpilingofKIinallschoolswithinthecurrent50kmIngestionPlanningZonebeforetheendof2019.

• TheCommissionshouldincludeanadditionallicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoinform

residentsoftheIngestionPlanningZoneoftheirrighttoorderKItabletsfortheirfamilyorbusiness.

• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoupdateREGDOC-2.10.1torequirelicencees

facilitatethestockpilingofKIinschoolsanddaycareswithintheIngestionPlanningZoneandtoinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheirabilitytoorderKIfreeofcharge.

• TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoincludeanewrequirementinthenextiteration

ofREGDOC-2.10.1obligatinglicenceestocarryoutKIDistributionTimeEstimatestudiestoverifythefeasibilityofpromptlydistributingKIintheIngestionPlanningZoneintheeventofasevereaccident.

2.Transparency&PublicConsultationDespiteongoingpublicinterestinnuclearemergencyresponse,therewasunfortunatelynopublicconsultationontheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.ThisshowstheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices(henceforthreferredtoasthe“MinistryofCommunitySafety”)stillhasworktodoinordertoinstilacultureofopennessandtransparencyinitsoperations.SincetheFukushimadisasterbeganin2011,theMinistryofCommunitySafetyandOPGhaveexhibitedasecretivepatternofbehaviourandhavebeenresistanttopublicscrutiny.TheMinistryofCommunitySafetyhaseffectivelyrefusedtorespondtoFreedomofInformationrequestssince2013.1Ithasalsorefusedtorespondtoinformalinformationrequests.2Notably,thepublicconsultationthattookplacein2017onlyoccurredbecauseofa2013politicalcommitmentmadebytheMinisterofCommunitySafetytoGreenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclearAwareness(DNA).3DocumentssubsequentlyobtainedbyGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformationlegislationindicatethatfouryearsafterthispoliticalcommitment,whatfinallyinitiatedthepublicconsultationwaslikelyOPG’sfearsthatadditionaldelayscouldputatriskthelicenceapplicationnowbeing

1Greenpeacefiledapproximately30requestsover2yearsthatOFMEMonlyrespondedtoonceacomplaintwasfiledwiththeOfficeoftheInformationCommissioner.WhenGreenpeacefiledsubsequentrequests,OFMEMfiledacomplaintwiththeOICallegingGreenpeacewasaveraciousrequestor.2DaveNodwell(MinistryofCommunitySafety)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“RE:PresentationandsubmissiontotheDurhamCommittee,”email,October21,20153MadeleineMeillieur(MinisterofCommunitySafetyandCorrectionalServices)toTheresaMcClenaghanetal.,letter,October21,2013.

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consideredbytheCommission.4Tomitigatetheserisks,OPGwentsofarastosecondstafftotheMinistryofCommunitySafetyexpeditethePNERPupdate.5ThishighlightsthelackofintegrityandindependenceintheoversightofOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplans.InGreenpeace’sview,thisputsinquestiontheobjectivity,impartialityandcredibilityofthepublicconsultationcarriedoutbytheprovinceanditsconclusions.ThelackofeffectiveseparationbetweenOPGanditsshareholderalsosupportsconsideringtheOntariogovernmentasthede-factolicenseeinthisapplication.Commendably,theMinistryhasattemptedtoincludetheprincipleoftransparencyintherevisedPNERP,withtheadditionofclause1.2.12whichstates:

Apolicyoftruthandtransparencyshouldbefollowedinprovidinginformationtothepublicandmediapriortoandduringanuclearorradiologicalemergency.

Althoughthisisalaudablemodification,thebehaviouroftheMinistrysincethePNERP’spublicationshowsthatthispolicyhasyettobeintegratedintotheMinistry’splansortoinformdecisionmaking.Forinstance,theMinistry’spositiononthepublicreleaseoftheaccidentstudyithascommissionedtoverifytheadequacyofcurrentplanningdistancesshowsitsattemptstointegratetransparencyintoday-to-dayoperationshasbeenineffectual.WhenaskedbyAjaxRegionalCouncillorColleenJordanwhetherthisstudywouldbepubliclyreleased,DaveNodwell,theDeputyChiefforPlanningandProgramDevelopmentattheMinistry,statedithadnotbeenconsidered.6Thisresistancetochangeisunsurprising.In2015,DurhamRegion,whichhoststhePickeringandDarlingtonnuclearstations,askedthegovernmentofOntarioto“…provideallnon-confidentialdataandstudiesusedinconsideringchangestoOntario’soff-sitenuclearemergencyplans.”7Thismotionwaspassedinresponsetotheprovince’songoingreluctancetoreleaseinformation.Inspiteofthis,thegovernmentacknowledgedin2017thatnothinghasoccurredtostrengthenitsdisclosurepoliciesinresponsetoDurhamRegion’srequest.8ConsideringthatmuchofthecontroversyrelatedtotheadequacyofoffsiteemergencyresponsesinceFukushimahasfocusedonthelackofcredibleaccidentmodelling,itisdifficulttofathomthataMinistrytaskedwithapublicsafetyhasnotconsideredtheneedanddesirabilityofreleasingthisstudy.Indeed,informationshouldbepubliclyavailablebydefaultandonlyexemptifauthoritiescanprovidesufficientevidencedemonstratingthatdoingsowouldinfactbeasecurityrisk.

4OPG,RiskRegistry–PickeringRelicensing2018,May31,2017,FOI#17-048,pg.393.5JimColes,OPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementis“onloan”totheMinistryofCommunitySafety“tosupportdevelopmentofthenewProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan”.See:https://www.linkedin.com/in/jim-coles-97a35442/6DurhamRegionalCouncil,March21,2018.7DurhamRegionalCouncil–Minutes,November4,2015,pg.29.8MinisterMarie-FranceLalonde(MinisterofCommunitySafety),ResponsetoWrittenQuestionNo.248,2ndSession41stParliament,Tabled:May4,2017.

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Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludeaconditioninOPG’slicencerequiringanyfuturechangestotheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationtoundergopublicconsultationpriortopublication.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringthegovernmentofOntariotopublishthefindingsofthestudyithascommissionedtoconsidertheadequacyofcurrentemergencyplanningdistances.TheresultsofthisstudyshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.3.ThePlanningBasis&DetailedPlanningGreenpeaceisconcernedthattheprovincehasweakenedthecriteriausedforselectingreactoraccidentsconsideredindetailedemergencyresponseplans.Section2.2oftheImplementingPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationstatesthataDesignBasisAccident(DBA)“…releaseprovidesthemainplatformfordetailedplanning.”DesignBasisAccidentreleasesarecomprisedofprincipallyshort-livednoblegaseswitheffectivelynoradioiodinesorlong-livedradioisotopes.ADBAwouldtypicallybealevel5accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).DBAsarealsolimitedtoeventswithanestimatedprobabilityof1E-5oronein100,000yearsofreactoroperation.However,thelasttimeOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplanswerereviewedinthe1990s,theRoyalSocietyofCanada(RSC)recommended“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”9TheRSCmadethisrecommendationafterreviewingthe1995probabilisticriskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstation.Notably,the1995PickeringAriskassessmentfoundaccidentsleadingtosignificantreleaseshadextremelylowestimatedprobabilities,rangingfrom5E-9to4E-10.10TheRSCrecommendationinformedplanningbasisinthe2009PNERP.Sincethe2011Fukushimadisaster,GreenpeacehashighlightedthatmorerecentriskassessmentsforthePickering,DarlingtonandBrucenuclearstationshavefoundmajoraccidentstobemorelikelythanpreviouslythought.RisksassessmentspublishedsinceFukushimahaveidentifiedaccidentsequencesleadingtolargeoffsitereleasesmeetingtheRoyalSocietyofCanada’srecommendedcriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.Greenpeace’ssubmissiontotheCommission’s2013hearingsonOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclearstationobservedthatthemostrecentPickeringBriskassessmentfoundlargereleaseaccidentsatthestationtobecredible.11The2014PickeringAriskassessmentfoundlargereleaseaccidentstohaveanestimatedprobabilityof4.7E-612,showingtheestimatedlikelihood

9W.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersintheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,pg.33.10Ibid,pg.11.11Shawn-PatrickStensil(Greenpeace),IntolerableRisk:TheContinuedOperationofthePickeringNuclearStation,May2013,CMD13-H2.11912Greenpeacesubmission,CMD14-H2.47

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ofmajoraccidentsincreasedbyfourlevelsofmagnitudesincethe1995PickeringAriskassessment.Greenpeacehasfoundnoevidencethattheprovincehasindependentlyevaluatedthesignificanceoftheseriskassessments.Instead,itappearsthattheprovincehasreliedonOPG’sassurancesthatemergencypreparednessmeasuresremainadequate.Evidenceoftheprovince’soverrelianceonOPGforpolicyanalysisisapparentintheprovince’scommentsprovidedonthedraftenvironmentalassessmentreportofOPG’sproposaltorebuildthePickeringBreactors.ThisenvironmentalreviewrequiredOPGtoreviewtheimpactsofanaccidentwithaprobabilityof1E-6.EmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)-thepredecessortoOfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyMamanage-wasalsosurprisedbythelandcontaminationcausedbytheaccident.EMOsubmittedthefollowingcommentonthedraftenvironmentalassessmentreport:

TherecognitionthatsignificantgroundcontaminationispossibleisalsoinconsistentwithpreviousstatementsmadebyOPGanditspredecessor,OntarioHydro(OH).Over20yearsago,whenthefirstversionsofthePNEPandthedoseprojectionprogramERPwereunderdevelopment,EMO(thenEPO)wasassuredbyOHthatanygroundcontaminationwouldbeminimalorimpossible,duetothepresenceofEFADShigh-efficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters.Forthisreason,OPGdeemeditunnecessarytoincludeaGroundDepositionModule(GDM)withinERP.ERPwouldonlymodelthedosesanddoseratesresultingfromtheemissionofnoblegasesandradionuclides,andthisremainsthecasetothepresentday,evenafterseveralrevisionsandimprovementstotheERPcodes.EMOhas,fromtimetotime,expresseditsdisquietatthisstateofaffairs,butintheabsenceofanyevidencetothecontrary,hasrefrainedfrominsistingthataGDMbeincorporatedintoERP.13

Inshort,thegovernmentwassurprisedbythepotentialforgroundcontaminationbecauseOPGhadassureditrepeatedlyovertwentyyearsthatitneedonlyprepareforaccidentalreleasesinvolvingnoblegasesorDesignBasisAccidents.Notably,theaccidentscenarioassessedinthe2008PickeringBlife-extensionenvironmentalassessmentreportmetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanningrecommendedbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada.ThisshowsthatEMOwasnotindependentlyreviewingOPG’sprobabilisticriskassessments,butsimplyrelyingonassurancesfromthecompany.ItappearsthatOPG’sbeliefthatonlyDesignBasisAccidentsshouldbeconsideredindetailedemergencyplanninghadbecomedogmawithinthecompany.Forexample,whenOPGreviewedthebasisforstaffingrequirementsfornuclearaccidentsitcouldfindnostandardorrationaletosupporttheplanningassumptionsforon-siteemergencyplans.OPGcalledthetypeofaccidentusedtodetermineitsresourceandstaffingcapacityrequirements“anartefact.”14

13APPENDIX2,CommentsandResponseTable–PubliccommentsonDraftEAScreeningReportforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationBRefurbishmentandContinuedOperationsProject,CEAR#06-01-21226,pgs.48–4914“EmergencyResponseOrganizationStaffingBasisforRespondingtoDesignBasisAccidents:AnalysisSummaryReport,”May30,2012,PN208/RP/001R02.

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Unfortunately,thisdogmahasnowbeennowformalizedinthe2017PNERP.InGreenpeace’sview,thedecisiontoreducethecut-offprobabilityusedfordeterminingdetailedplanningfrom1E-7and1E-5showstheprovincehasbeenmotivatedmorebymaintainingthestatusquothanstrengtheningpublicsafety.ToprovidebackgroundonthehistoricdevelopmentofthePNERPplanningbasis,AnnexAprovidesatimelineofreportsanddecisionsthathaveinformedtheplanningbasisoverthepastfourdecades.15Italsodocumentsthefindingsofindustryprobabilisticriskassessmentsovertime.SincetheFukushimadisaster,GreenpeacehasurgedtheCNSCandthegovernmentofOntariotoverifytheadequacyofpublicsafetybyopenlymodellingaccidentsequencesleadingtolargeradioactivereleases.AsdocumentedinpastsubmissionstotheCommission,thereareknownaccidentsequencesleadingtoFukushima-scaleradiationreleasesatallofOntario’snuclearstations.AlthoughtheCNSCandHealthCanadahavecarriedoutaccidentmodellingtoestimatetheimpactsofanaccidentattheDarlingtonnuclearstationsinceFukushima,nosimilarmodellinghasbeenundertakenforPickering.Unlikethefour-unitDarlingtonnuclearstation,Pickeringisanolderdesignandhassixoperatingreactorsthatsharecommonsafetysystems.Amillionpeoplelivewithin20kmofPickering.Pickering’solderdesignmeansradioactivereleasescouldbelargerthanthosemodelledfortheDarlingtonnuclearstation.Pickering’slocationalsoincreasesthepotentialconsequencesofanaccidentcomparedtotheDarlingtonnuclearstation.InconsideringOPG’slicenceapplication,theCommissionshouldacknowledgethatthereisnopubliclyavailableaccidentanalysistoverifytheadequacyofoffsiteemergencymeasuresatPickering.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGortheprovincetocommissionandpublishindependentmodellingofamajoraccidentatPickering.ThismodellingshouldbepresentedtoameetingoftheCommissionin2019.4.AHalfMeasure-ContingencyZoneTheprovince’sproposedContingencyPlanningZone(CPZ)isasymbolichalfmeasurethatprovidesnoadditionalpublicsafetybenefitsandisunalignedwithinternationalguidance.AttheApril4thCommissionmeeting,theMinistryofCommunitySafetystatedthatthe20kmCPZdealswiththepotentialfor“severe,lowprobabilityaccidents“andthepossibilityof“hotspots”16beyondtheDetailedPlanningZone(DPZ).However,InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)standards,real-worldaccidentsaswellasCanadianandinternationalaccidentmodellingshowsthatthelimited20kmCPZisinsufficientforaddressingsuchevents.

15AnnexAisanextractfromGreenpeace’s2017commentsonthePNERPdiscussionpaper.16MeetingoftheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission,Transcripts,April4,2018.pgs.29and55.Availableat:http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/Transcript-CommissionMeeting-April4,2018.pdf

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TojustifytheCPZ,theMinistryofCommunitySafetyreliesuponCSAstandardN1600-14Generalrequirementsfornuclearemergencymanagementprograms.Greenpeacequestionstherelianceonstandard.CSAstandardsaredevelopedusingconsensus-basedprocessesamongindustrystakeholders.ThismeansthatOPGorBrucePowercanblocktheadoptionofanyproposedstandardsthatmayconflictwiththeirfinancialcosts.OPG’sthen-directorofemergencymanagementJimColes,chairedthecommitteethatdevelopedCSA-1600.Inshort,N1600isalowestcommondenominatorstandard.N1600reflectsneitherbestpracticesnorpublicexpectationsforsafety.Moreover,aclosereviewofN1600’ssupportingcitationsshowsthattheindustry-producedstandardisunalignedwiththeIAEA’spostFukushimaemergencyplanningguidance.TherationalefortheCPZinN1600isbasedontheguidancecontainedintheIAEA’s2013guideActionstoProtectthePublicinanEmergencyduetoSevereConditionsatLightWaterReactor.17Thisguiderecommendsaseriesofemergencyresponsezonessizesbasedonaradioactivereleasesequivalenttoalevel6accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).18Theprovince’sproposedCPZisbasedontheIAEA’s2013recommendationthatmemberstatesestablishanExtendedPlanningDistance(EPD).Thisguidedescribestheobjectiveofthiszoneasfollows:

Inthisareaarrangementsshouldbeinplacetoprovideinstructionstoreduceingestionofcontaminatedmaterialandcarryoutdosemonitoringtolocatehotspotsthatmayrequireevacuationwithinadayandrelocationwithinaweektoamonth.ItisalsorecommendedthatevacuationofthoserequiringspecializedcarebetoareasbeyondtheEPDtoavoidadditionalevacuations.19

Asnoted,apurposeoftheEPDistoidentifyandmonitorlocalizedcontamination–referredtoashotspots-beyondevacuationzones.TheneedforsuchplanningmeasureswasunderlinedbythecontaminationcausedbyChernobylandFukushima.Inbothcases,localizedcontaminationextendedwellbeyondtraditionalplanningzones–evenhundredsofkilometersfromthestations.Suchcontaminationmayevenrequirelocalizedevacuations.TheCNSChasobservedthatthelimited20kmCPZwouldbe“…inadequateforhotspotmonitoring.”20Notably,thesameIAEAguideusedtojustifytheContingencyPlanningZoneinCSAStandardN1600makesrecommendationsonthesizeofthosezones.ThisinformationwascuriouslyomittedfromCSAstandardN1600.Table1belowcontraststheIAEA’ssuggestedplanningdistanceswithzonesproposedintheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.

17Page18ofN1600citesthe2013IAEAguideasthebasisforitsExtendedplanningdistancerequirement.18V.A.Kutkovetal.,Basicstrategiesofpublicprotectioninanuclearpowerplantbeyond-DesignBasisAccident,NuclearEnergyandTechnology,2(2016),pg.17.19InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,ActionstoProtectthePublicinanEmergencyduetoSevereConditionsatLightWaterReactor,May2013,pg.21.20KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),Ibid.pg.9.

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Table1.Suggestedplanningdistances(IAEAvs.PNERP2017)

Emergencyzonesanddistances

Suggestedmaximumradius(km)ProvincialNuclearEmergency

ResponsePlan2017>1000MW(th) 100to1000MW(th)

Precautionaryactionzone(PAZ) 3to5 3

(AutomaticActionZone)Urgentprotective

actionplanningzone(UPZ)

15to30 10(DetailedPlanningZone)

Extendedplanningdistance(EPD) 100 50 20

(ContingencyPlanningZone)Ingestionand

commoditiesplanningdistance(ICPD)

300 100 50(IngestionPlanningZone)

ThiscomparisonshowsthatOntario’sCPZissignificantlysmallerthanthatproposedbytheIAEA.TheCPZforPickeringis80%smallerthantheIAEA’srecommendedplanningzonesizeforstationsabove1000MWandeven40%thesizerecommendedforplantssmallerthan1000MW.Pickering’scapacityisover3000MW.Greenpeacedoesnotconsiderthe20kmCPZtobecredibleorsufficienttopreventradiationexposureintheeventofasevereaccident.TheprovincehasprovidednoevidentiarybasisforlimitingtheCPZto20km.IthasonlystatedthattheCPZsizewas“….determinedbydoublingthePrimaryZonedistanceinordertoprovideaconservativebufferfornuclearemergencyplanningandresponse.”21Incontrast,theIAEA’srecommendeddistanceswerebasedonmodellingofradioactivereleasesfromalevel6accidentontheINESscale.Notably,aftermodellingaFukushima-scaleradioactivereleasetheGermanCommissiononRadiologicalProtectionrecommendedarrangementsbeinplacetoassesstheradiologicalsituationwithin100kmofanuclearstationtodetermineifemergencymeasuresareneededbeyondthe20kmevacuationzone.22Alsoaftercarryingoutaccidentmodelling,Switzerland’saligneditsemergencyplanningrequirementswiththeIAEA’srecommendedEPDof100km.However,thereisCanadianaccidentmodellingshowingthattheIAEA’ssuggested100kmEPDismoreappropriatethantheprovince’s20kmCPZ.InMarch2017,HealthCanadaandEnvironmentCanadapublishedthereport,ARGOSModelingofAccidentAandAccidentB

21OfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyManagement,DiscussionPaper:PlanningBasisReview&Recommendations,May2017,pg.5. 22GermanCommissiononRadiologicalProtection(SSK),Planningareasforemergencyresponsenearnuclearpowerplants,2014,pg.21.

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Scenarios,whichmodeledasevereaccident23attheDarlingtonnuclearstationbasedontheweatherconditionsof7daysinJuneandJuly2016.24Althoughthestudywaslimitedbythenumberofdaysassessed,theresultssuggestthatcurrentproposedContingencyandIngestionPlanningZonesaretoosmall.Basedonitsanalysis,HealthCanadamadethefollowingobservationontheprovince’sproposedzonesizes:

ThecontingencyplanningzoneshouldconsiderpotentialscenariosforprotectiveactionsthatwouldavertbothaTotalEffectiveDoseandtheThyroidDose.MakingtheseconsiderationswouldindicatethatdistancesshouldbesomewhereintherangeoftheIAEArecommended50-100km.TheSecondaryZoneof50kmissignificantlylessthanthatrecommendedbytheIAEAandUScounterparts.HCmodelingofsevereaccidentsyieldsdistancessimilartothePNERPingestioncontrolzonefortheFermifacility.Acommoditiescontrolzone(SecondaryZone)distancebetween80-100kmmaybemoreappropriate.25

ItisworthnotingthatCNSCstaffrecommendedthat“…OFMEMusetheplanningdistance(EPD)usedbytheIAEA.TheCPZisaCSAN1600conceptandhasadifferentmeaning.ThespiritofCSAN1600CPZistoaccountforthoserelativelylessprobableaccidentsthatwouldnotwarrantextensivepreparednessandplanning.Theintentofthezonewillaffectitssize:theproposed20kmcouldbeareasonablesizeforcontingencyplanning,butitwouldlikelybeinadequateforhotspotmonitoring.”26Inconclusion,theproposedCPZisnotalignedwithIAEArecommendations,theimpactofrealworldaccidentsnorinformedbycredibleevidence.TheCPZissymbolicandprovidesnoclearadditionalsafetybenefitstoOntariansintheeventofasevereaccident.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwiththeprovincetoensurethatpreparednessandplanningmeasuresareinplacetoidentifyandmonitor“hotspots”acrosstheentire50kmIngestionControlZone.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoencouragetheprovincetoadoptanExtendedPlanningDistancealignedwiththelargerareasrecommendedbytheIAEA,real-worldexperienceandavailableaccidentmodelling.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoprovideinformationonhowtoprepareforanuclearemergencytoallresidentsoftheContingencyPlanningZonebytheendof2019.5.IncompleteOperationalObjectivesoftheContingencyZone

23Itshouldbenotedthesourceterm–theinventoryofradionuclidesreleasedtotheenvironment-usedforthisstudywassignificantlysmallerthanFukushimaorChernobyl.24L.Bergman,etal.,ARGOSModellingofAccidentAandAccidentBScenarios,HealthCanada&EnvironmentandClimateChangeCanada,May152017,ReportVersion525HealthCanada–RadiationProtectionBureau,EBRRegistry013-0560,CommentID210075,July11,2017.26KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),Ibid.pg.9.

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The2017ProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)andthe2018ImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationindicatetherearefewadditionalactionsrequiredbyprovincialandmunicipalauthoritiestoimplementtheCPZ.TheonlyuniquerequirementsfortheCPZarelistedinSection2.2.5(e)(iii)ofthePNERP.Thoseprovisionsarelimitedto:

• divisionintosub-zones• populationestimatesforeachsub-zone• developmentofmechanisms,processesandprocedurestoprovidefor

environmentalradiationmonitoringanddataanalysisbythePEOCScientificSection• familiarizationsessionswithimpactedmunicipalities,asrequired• identificationofexistingresponsecentresthatfallwithintheCPZanddevelopmentofa

listofpossiblealternateslocatedoutsidetheCPZThus,asidefromaclearerunderstandingofpopulationestimateswithin20kmofthePickeringnuclearstationtheCPZprovidesnoadditionalsafetybenefitcomparedtothe2009PNERP.However,asdiscussedIAEAstandardsrecommendresponsemeasuresbeputinplaceintheEPDtofacilitatethe“….evacuationofthoserequiringspecializedcarebetoareasbeyondtheEPDtoavoidadditionalevacuations.”GreenpeacehasbeenunabletoidentifywhetherpreparednessmeasureshavebeenincludedintheupdatedPNERPtoimplementthisobjectiveoftheEPD.ThelackofdetailedplanningintheCPZisalsoofparticularconcerntovulnerablecommunities,includinghospitalpatientsandtheelderly.In2015,GreenpeaceCanadasurveyedthenumberofhospitalswithin30kmofthePickering,finding22hospitalswith7,399beds.Thesameareaalsohad82retirementhomeswith9,368beds27(ideally,amoreappropriatesurveywouldincludeallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIPZ).Incontrast,therewere7hospitalswith800patientswithin20kmoftheFukushimanuclearstation.28Itshouldalsobenotedthatin2017CNSCstaffrecommendedOFMEM“…identifymorepreparednessactivitiesfortheCPZ.”AdditionalmeasuresrecommendedbytheCNSCincluded“suchaspectsasevacuationplans,theavailabilityofKIbeforeorattimeofemergency,locationofcentresoutsidethiszone.”29Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludealicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithprovinceandmunicipalauthoritiestoidentifyallhospitalsandretirementhomeswithinthe50kmIngestionControlZone(IPZ)aswellasreceptionfacilitiesforspecialized-careevacueesoutsideoftheIPZ.6.KIDistribution

27ResearchcommissionedbyGreenpeacein2015.28TheNationalDietofJapan,TheofficialreportofTheFukushimaNuclearAccidentIndependentInvestigationCommission,2012.29KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),pg.9.

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TherearebothpublicexpectationsandtechnicalevidencethatsupportexpandingthedistributionandaccessibilityofKIbeyondwhatisproposedintheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation.TheMinistryofCommunitySafety’supdatedImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationsimplyadoptstherequirementsetbytheCNSCin2014.TheCommissionestablishedthesenewrequirementsduetopublicexpectationsforpublicsafety,internationalbestpractices,concernsrelatedtotheprovince’sslowresponsetoFukushima,andresultsfromthesevereaccidentstudyindicatinganincreasedoccurrenceofchildhoodthyroidcancerwouldoccurfollowinganuclearaccident.The2014requirements,whicharedetailedinREGDOC-2.10.1NuclearEmergencyPreparednessandResponse,obligateOPGtodeliverKItoallhomesandbusinesswithinthe10kmDPZandmakeKIreadilyavailablewithinthe50kmICZ.However,theCommissionrelieduponthesewithoutanyspecificanalysistojustifytheiruseforKIdistribution.FormerCNSCCommissionerSandyMcKeownreferredtothe10kmPrimaryZoneasa“minimum”30forKIpre-distribution.Notably,theprovincecontinuedtoresisttheCommission’sstrengthenedKIdistributionrequirements31whilemunicipalitiescalledforthemtobeexpanded.Forexample,evenaftertheCNSC’snewrequirementshadbeenimplemented,theprovince’s2017DiscussionPaperonproposedchangestothePNERPstatedthat“…nopolicyrecommendationsregardingstockinganddistributionofIodineThyroidBlocking(ITB)havebeenproposedgiventhatitdoesnotformacomponentofthePlanningBasis.”32Incontrast,bothDurhamRegion33andtheCityofToronto34haverequestedthedeliveryofKIbeyondthecurrent10kmdistributionarea.ThisshowsstrongpublicsupportforstrengtheningtheCNSC’s2014KIdistributionrequirements.AvailabletechnicalanalysisalsosupportsexpandedKIdistribution,inparticulartovulnerablecommunities.IntheCNSC’scommentsontheprovince’s2017DiscussionPaper,CNSCstaffacknowledgethatbothCNSCandHealthCanadamodellingindicatesthatchildrenbeyondthe10kmDPZmayneedreadyaccesstoKIintheeventofamajoraccident.CNSCstaffrecommendedthat:

…thePNERPaddresshowtoensurethatKIcanbepromptlydistributedasrequiredintheCPZorIngestion/SecondaryZoneatthetimeofemergency.FromtheHealthCanada(HC)data,itappearsKIcouldbepromptlyneededforchildrenbeyondcurrent10kmPZ/DPZ.ThisisconsistentwithCNSCStudyofConsequenceofaHypotheticalSevere

30CNSC,TranscriptsofPublicMeeting,August21st,2014,pg.82.31JohnSpears,“Therealquestionaboutnucleardisaster:Federalorprovincialissue?”,theTorontoStar,August23,2014.32OfficeoftheFireMarshalandEmergencyManagement,DiscussionPaper:PlanningBasisReview&Recommendations,May201733TheRegionalMunicipalityofDurham,“RegionalresponsetoProvincialDiscussionPaperentitled“ProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendations”.EBRRegistryNumber013-0560,”#2017-COW-137[asamended,perCouncilJune14,2017]34TorontoCityCouncil,EX28.13-Toronto'sEmergencyManagementProgramandRevisionstotheTorontoMunicipalCodeNovember7,2017

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NuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasures,(SARP)studyandisalreadyaddressedinREGDOC2.10.1.CNSCstaffencourageOFMEMtoconsiderhowtheywillassurethatKIwouldbeprovidedtovulnerablepopulationsinatimelymanner(eitherpre-obtained,orpromptlyprovidedattimeofemergency).35

TheCommission’srecommendationisreasonableandtechnicalanalysisshowsthatKIwouldbeneededoutsideoftheDPZintheeventofasevereaccident.Meanwhilethereareseveralmillionpeople,overfivehundredschoolsandanunknownnumberofdaycareswithintheIPZthatdonothavereadyaccesstoKI.Inshort,thelargepopulationaroundthePickeringnuclearstationnecessitatesthattheMinistryofCommunitySafetyhaveplansandcapacityinplacetocarryoutamassKIdistributionprogramintheeventofanemergency.AlthoughlicenceesmustdemonstratethefeasibilityofevacuationplansthroughregularEvacuationTimeEstimate(ETE)studies,thereisnoequivalentinformationinthepublicdomaintoverifywhetherOFMEMcouldpromptlydistributeKIacrossthePickeringIPZintheeventofanemergency.Inlightoftheseuncertainties,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontouseitslicensingauthoritytoincreasetheaccessibilityofKIthroughouttheIPZ.TherearethreesimpleoptionsavailabletomakeKImoreeasilyaccessibletocommunitiesnearthePickeringnuclearstation.ThefirstistosimplyexpandtheareainwhichKIisdeliveredtohomesandbusiness.ThisentailsexpandingKIpre-distributionbeyondthecurrent10DPZ.ThesecondoptioninvolvesmakingKImorereadilyaccessibleintheareabeyondthepre-distributionzonethroughstrategicstockpiling.Theplacementofsuchstockpilesshouldenablerapiddistributionintheeventofanemergency.AsrequiredinREGDOC-2.10.1,suchstockpilesshouldpayparticularattentiontovulnerablecommunities.IntheGTA,themostobviouschoiceforsuchstockpileswouldbeschoolsanddaycares.IncomplyingwithREGDOC-2.10.1,BrucePowerhascreatedKIstockpilesinallschoolswithinthe50kmIPZ.36OPGhasnotfacilitatedthestockpilingofKIinGTA-areaschools.Finally,KIcanbemademorereadilyaccessibleoutsideofthepre-distributionareabyencouraginghouseholdsandbusinessestorequestKIsupplies.AlthoughREGDOC-2.10.1requiresOPGtomakeKIavailabletoanyonewithintheIPZ,itdoesnotobligateOPGinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheavailabilityofKI.Notably,BrucePowersentaninformationpackagetoallresidentsintheIPZsurroundingtheBrucenuclearstationinformingthemoftheavailabilityofKI.37TherehasbeennoequivalentefforttoinformresidentswithinPickering’sIPZoftheavailabilityofKI.Insummary,theKIdistributionrequirementscontainedinthe2017PNERPandtheImplementationPlanforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStationareinsufficienttoadequatelyprotectthepublicintheevenofasevereaccident.InlightoftheMinistryofCommunitySafety’songoingresistancetoenhancingKIdistributionrequirements,GreenpeaceencouragestheCommissiontouseitslicensingauthoritytodrivecontinuousimprovementthroughadditionallicenceconditionsandupdatestoREGDOC-2.10.1.

35KathleenHeppell-Masys,(DirectorGeneral,CNSC),pg.5.36BrucePower,ApplicationforRenewalofProl.18/2020:SupplementalSubmission,February28,pg.27.37Ibid.

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Recommendation:ToberesponsivetotheexpectationsofTorontoandDurhamRegionalcouncils,theCommissionshouldexpandrequirementsforKIdeliverytothe20kmareacurrentlyproposedfortheContingencyPlanningZone. Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldimposeanewlicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoworkwithschoolboardstoensurethestockpilingofKIinallschoolswithinthecurrent50kmIngestionPlanningZonebeforetheendof2019.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldincludeanadditionallicenceconditionrequiringOPGtoinformresidentsoftheIngestionPlanningZoneoftheirrighttoorderKItabletsfortheirfamilyorbusiness.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoupdateREGDOC-2.10.1torequirelicenceesfacilitatethestockpilingofKIinschoolsanddaycareswithintheIngestionPlanningZone(IPZ)andtoinformresidentsoftheIPZoftheirabilitytoorderKIfreeofcharge.Recommendation:TheCommissionshouldinstructstafftoincludeanewrequirementinthenextiterationofREGDOC-2.10.1obligatinglicenceestocarryoutKIDistributionTimeEstimatestudiestoverifythefeasibilityofpromptlydistributingKIintheIPZintheeventofasevereaccident.

AnnexAThisisanextractfromthedocument“GreenpeaceCanada’sComments

ontheDiscussionPaper–PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendations”,July28,2017.Itsummarizesthehistoryoftheplanningbasisusedfornuclearemergencyplanningin

Ontario.Italsosummarizesthefindingsofpubliclyavailableindustry-producedprobabilisticriskstudiesfortheDarlington,PickeringandBrucenuclearstations.

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Section2ThissectionreviewsthehistoricdevelopmentofOntario’scurrentplanningbasisaswellasthe

reviewofoffsiteemergencyresponseinCanadasincetheFukushimadisaster.Itidentifiesanumberofpatterns:updatedriskstudiesindicatinganincreaseinthelikelihoodof

majoraccidentssincethe1990s,thefailureofgovernmentauthoritiestoconsidertheserisk

studies,thetendencyofOPGtomodifyriskassessmentsiffindingsareinconvenient,andthefailure

ofgovernmentauthoritiestoconsidertheimpactsofaFukushima-scaleaccident.

2.1TheEvolutionofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyPreparednessMay1980–Solicitor-GeneralRoyMcMurtrysetsupOntario’semergencyplanningofficein

responsetotheThreeMileIslandAccident.129

April1984–TheReportofWorkingGroup#3:TheprovincialgovernmentestablishedWorking

Group#3tomakerecommendationsonthe“technicalbasis”fornuclearemergencyplans,

includingreferenceaccidents,planningzonesandplanningtimes.Simplyput,thegroupwasasked

whataccidentstheprovinceshouldplanandpreparefor.Theyrecommendeddetailedplanningfor

allaccidentswithanestimatedlikelihoodbelow1E-6perreactoryearor1E-5forastationwithten

reactors.Theworkinggroupcharacterizedthehazardofsuchaccidentsashavinganeffectivedose

of250mSv(25rem)attheboundaryofanuclearstation.ThisremainsanassumptionofOntario’s

nuclearemergencyresponseplantothisday.

ThisdoseestimatewasbasedonthelicensinglimitrequirementsoftheAECB.Theaccidental

radiationreleasesusedforemergencyplanningaresimilarinscaletothoseresultingfromtheThree

MileIslandaccident.Releaseswouldbeprincipallynoblegaseswitheffectivelynoradioiodinesor

long-livedradioisotopes.ThiswouldprobablybecategorizedasanINES5accident.TheworkinggrouparrivedatthedistancesfortheContiguous,PrimaryandSecondaryZonesby

applyingtheinversesquarelawfromradiationprotectiontoa250mSvdoseatthefencelineofthe

nuclearstation.Thatis,doublingthedistancefromasourceofradiationwilldecreaseexposureby

aquarteroftheoriginaldose.Thus,250mSvatthesiteboundarywouldleadto100mSvwithin3

km.Thiswouldrequiremandatoryevacuation.TheWorkingGroupdesignatedthistheContiguous

Zonewhereenhancedemergencypreparednessisnecessary.Similarly,a250mSvdoseatthesite

boundarywouldresultinapproximately10mSv,whichistheminimumactionlevelforevacuation,

9kmfromtheplant.ThisbecamethePrimaryZone.

TodeterminethesizeoftheSecondaryZonewherearrangementsaremadeingestioncontrol

measures,WorkingGroup#3assumeda2.5Sv(250rem)thyroiddoseatthesiteboundary.This

wouldbecausedbyareleaseof37terra-Becquerels(3.7E+13)ofIodine-131.Thiswouldleadtoa

thyroiddoseof1.5mSv(0.15rem)between20and40kmfromtheplantdependingonrelease

duration.TheworkinggroupthusrecommendedaSecondaryZoneof50km.130Inretrospect,itis

129

TheGlobeandMail,“Ontariosetsupemergencyplanningoffice,”27May1980.130

ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#3,April1984,pg.24.

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noteworthythatOntario’sSecondaryZoneisbasedoniodinereleases1,000timessmallerthanFukushimaand10,000smallerthanChernobyl.Asdiscussedinsection1.11,aspartoftheCNSC’seffortstomodernizedesignstandardsitestablishedaSmallReleaseFrequency(SRF)in2008.TheSRFwasestablishedtoacknowledgeadesignvulnerabilityofCANDUreactors.Itlimitsreleasesofmorethan1E+15ofI-131tolessthan1E-5perreactoryear.Thisissignificantbecauseitmeetstheprobabilitycut-offfordetailedemergencyplanningrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3.BasedontheunderstandingofCANDUaccidentpathwayin1984,however,WorkingGroup#3assumedsignificantlysmallerreleasesofradioiodine.April26,1986–TheChernobylaccidentbegins:Theaccidentpermanentlydisplacesover300,000peoplelivingwithin30kmareaaroundthestation.Otherareashundredsofkilometresfromthestationarecontaminatedandrequireevacuation.Theaccidenteventuallyleadstothousandsofthyroidcancers,particularlyinchildren.Ithighlightsthepotentialforreactoraccidentstocausedamageatgreatdistances.Humanerroralsocontributedtotriggeringtheaccident.June1986–ProvincialcabinetfinallyapprovesnuclearemergencypreparednessplansfollowingChernobyl.February1987–CabinetCommitteeonEmergencyPlanningdiscussionofChernobylAccidentReport:AyearaftertheChernobyldisasterbegan,cabinetdiscussedtheimplicationsforemergencyplanning.ThereportprovidedtocabinetstatedthatChernobylraisedthequestionof“…whethertheupperlimitpresentlyfixedfordetailedplanningandpreparationprovidesarealisticandadequatemarginofpublicsafety?”131ThereportobservedthatChernobyl“…highlightsanotherdangerinattachingundueimportancetothemathematicalprobabilitiesofvariousaccidentsequencescommonlycomputedinriskanalysisstudies:theimportanceofthehumanfactorintheequation,andthedifficultyofquantifyingit.”132Italsoacknowledgedthatforsevereaccidents,Ontario’semergencyplansenvisage“…theimprovisationofprotectiveactionforthepublicoutsidethe10kmPrimaryZone.”InlightofChernobyl,thereportquestionedwhetherthis10kmzoneprovidedanadequatemarginofsafetyand“…towhatextendimprovisationcanbedependedon”.133CabinetsupportedareviewoftheupperlimitfordetailedplanningandpreparationsinOntario,andthe10kmprimaryzonederivedfromit.134February1988–OntarioNuclearSafetyReview(ONSR)Recommendations:TheexpertpanelappointedbygovernmenttoreviewthesafetyofOntario’sreactorsfollowingtheChernobyldisasterrecommendedthat“…theProvinceofOntariobaseitsnuclearemergencyplanningonthemaximumcrediblereleasesofradioactivematerials.”135Thereviewalsoobservestheprovinceonlyhadtwostaffdedicatedtonuclearemergencyplanningandhadfailedtoallocatesufficientfundstoimplementingexistingnuclearemergencyresponseplans.136

131MinistryoftheSolicitorGeneral,CabinetSubmissiononEmergencyPlanning:ChernobylAccidentReport,February19,1987,Pg.12132Ibid,pg.13.133Ibid,pg.13.134Ibid,pg.1.135OntarioNuclearSafetyReview,TheSafetyofOntario’sNuclearPowerReactors:AScientificandTechnicalReview,Vol.1.February1988,pg.xv.136Ibid.

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AnexpertreviewbytheformerpresidentoftheAtomicEnergyControlBoard(AECB)commissionedbytheONSRpanelalsoobservedthat“…thequestionoftheimpactonwatersuppliesfromtheGreatLakesformanymillionsofpeoplehasbeenlargelyoverlooked.”137ThisreviewsuggestedtheOntariogovernmentmaywishtoinvestigatethepossiblecontaminationoftheGreatLakesandconsideralternativesourcesofdrinkingwater.138Suchananalysishasnotoccurred.June1988–ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8onTheUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning–WorkingGroup#8recommendedexpandingtherangeofaccidentsconsideredinprovincialplanningandpreparednessfromwhatwasoriginallyproposedbyWorkingGroup#3.Itproposedatwo-tierapproachtoplanning:detailedplansandpreparednessforaMaximumPlanningAccident(MPA)andmoreconceptualplansforaWorstCredibleRadiationEmission(WCRE).TheMPAwasdefinedasall“accidentswhichcanbequantitativelydeterminedtobeaslowasoncein105station-years”139orapproximately10E-6perreactoryearforan8unitstationlikePickeringorBruce.ThisaccidentiseffectivelythesameasthedetailedplanningaccidentrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3.Releasesoccuraftertwenty-fourhours,areprincipallynoblegases,withonly0.1%ofareactor’sradioiodineinventoryreleased.(SeeTable14inAppendixAforafulldescription).TheWCREreferstoaccidentsestimatedbyindustryestimatestobelow1E-6,ortobeunquantifiable,suchasthosecausedbyterroristattacksorhumanerror.Forplanningpurposes,theWorkingGroupsettheparametersofWCREaccidentsasareleaseoccurringwithinthefirsttwenty-fourhoursandwith1%ofiodinecoreinventoryreleasedwithinanhour.(SeeTable15inAppendixAforafulldescription).ForWCREaccidents,WorkingGroup#8recommendedemergencymeasuresbeinplacetoprotectagainstearlysicknessordeath.140Notably,thisaccidentisstillsmallerthanreleasesfromFukushimaorChernobyl.TheworkinggroupalsorecommendedthattheprimaryzonesatPickering,BruceandDarlingtonbeexpandedfrom10to13km,andthattheprovinceconsiderexpandingcertainemergencymeasures,includingdistributingpotassiumiodidepills,installingearlywarningsystemsforthepublicandrestrictingnewhousingconstructionnearnuclearfacilities.141Notably,OntarioHydro’srepresentativeonWorkingGroup#8filedadissentingopinion,statinghewasagainstexpandingprimaryzonesto13km.142AsdiscussedinSection1.1,WorkingGroup#8wasmandatedtoconsiderhostileaction,publicperceptionsofaccidentrisk,publicexpectationsforsafetyandsafetymarginstoaddressuncertainties.TheseissueswerenotconsideredintheDiscussionPaper.September1993–CabinetCommitteeonproposedchangestonuclearemergencyplanningandpreparedness:FiveyearsafterthepublicationoftheWorkingGroup#8report,acabinetcommitteediscussedcivilservicerecommendationsforstrengtheningnuclearemergencyresponse.The

137A.T.Prince,“ReviewofNuclearEmergencyMeasuresAffectingOntario,andOtherRelatedMatters,“foundinVol.2.AppendixVIofTheSafetyofOntario’sNuclearPowerReactors:AScientificandTechnicalReview,February1988.138Ibid,pg.51.139ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–TheUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988,pg.84.140Ibid.pg.85.141Ibid.,pg.iv.142G.Armitage,(OntarioHydro),DissentingMinute,June30,1988.

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proposalrecommendedthegovernment“…expandthetechnicalbasisoftheProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlantocoveraccidentsbeyondthecurrentdesignbasisandimplementconsequentialmeasuresforincreasingpublicsafety.”Itnotedtheprovince’scurrentplanningbasis“…assumesadelayintheemissionofradioactivityfromthestationtotheenvironment,andprecludesanyearlyhealtheffectsamongthepubliclivingaroundthestation.”143ItrecommendeddeliveringpotassiumiodidepillstoresidentsintheContiguousZone,expandingthePrimaryZonesaroundBruceandDarlingtonto13km,andimplementingearlywarningsystemsandpriorityevacuationzonesfortheContiguousZone.144Thesubmissionnotedthatthe“vastmajority”ofstakeholderssupportedtherecommendationsofWorkingGroup#8.145However,thecabinetsubmissionrejectedincludingtheworstcredibleemissionrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#8intheplanningbasisbecause,inpart,“OntarioHydrowouldincurtheseadditionalintendedcosts.”146ThecommitteevotedfortheMinisteroftheSolicitorGeneraltoreportbacktothethemwithintwelvemonthswithafullexaminationofimplementationcostssocabinetapprovalforanamendednuclearemergencyplancouldbesoughtwithintwenty-fourmonths.147TheNDPgovernment,however,losttotheProgressiveConservativesintheJune1995provincialelectionandcabinetneverapprovedtheproposedchanges.1995–MinistryofEnergyinitiatesreviewofrecommendationstoexpandOntario’splanningbasis:InresponsetoOntarioHydro’sconcerns,theMinistryofEnergycommissionedtheRoyalSocietyofCanadaandtheCanadianEnergyAcademy(heretoforereferredtoasRSC/CAE)toreviewWorkingGroup#8’srecommendationtoexpandplanningtoincludemoresevereaccidentsaswellasitsrecommendationstopre-distributepotassiumiodideandexpandthePrimaryZoneto13km.Notably,themanagementteamseekingadvicefromtheRSA/CAEincludedOntarioHydro,whichhadopposedWorkingGroup#8’srecommendations.148March1996–OntarioHydro’sSubmissiontoRSC/CAEReview–OntarioHydro,whichhadopposedWorkingGroup#8’srecommendationstoexpandtheprimaryzone,providedcommentstotheRSC/CAEinearly1996.Asdiscussed,OntarioHydrowasalsorepresentedonthemanagementteamthathadcommissiontheRSA/CAE.OntarioHydroarguedchemicalandphysicalrealitiesaswellaschangesinunderstandingrelatedtoradioiodinemeantthatreleaseswouldbesignificantlylessthantheWCREbyWorkingGroup#8.OntarioHydroalsoarguedthateveniflargereleasesdidoccur,theywoulddosoafter30hoursduetorecentupgradestocontainmentsystemsatPickering.149Thecompanyassertedthataccidents

143TheMinistryoftheSolicitorGeneralandCorrectionalServices,CabinetSubmission:NuclearEmergencyPlanningandPreparedness,September301993,pg.1144Ibid.,pg.3.145Ibid,pg.4.146Ibid.pg.9.147CabinetCommitteeonEnvironmentPolicy,ThursdayNovember18,1993,pg.4.148DeborahE.Farr,(ManagerElectricityOperationsandPlanningSection,MinistryofEnvironmentandEnergy)toLindaLiik(OntarioHydro)etal.,Letterwith“TermsofReferencefortheReviewbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianEngineeringAcademyofOutstandingQuestionsrelatedtotheProposedProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,”1995.149OntarioHydro,OntarioHydro’sSubmissionoftheReviewbytheRoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineeringofOutstandingQuestionsRelatedtotheProposedProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,January1996.

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causingearlyradiationeffectsclosetothesiteboundarywouldhavefrequenciesbelow1E-8andwouldthereforebewellbelowthethresholdof“credibility.”150OntarioHydroalsodismissedseveralinitiatingeventsthathavesincebecomeanacceptedconcern.Forexample,thecompanyarguedthat,despite50yearsofreactoroperationsworldwide,“noaccidentormajorupset”haseverarisendueto“external”causessuchasearthquakes.151InlightofFukushima,suchclaimswouldnolongerbeacceptedbythepublicorregulatoryauthorities.Notably,theDiscussionPaperdoesnotexplicitlyconsiderthecontributionofexternaleventstoaccidentrisk.OntarioHydroalsodismissedWorkingGroup#8’sconsiderationofhostileactionorterrorismeventhoughitwasmandatedtobythegovernment.Thecompanyarguedthatit“…ishardtoimaginehowanoperationofrequiredmagnitudeandexpertisecouldbecarriedoutwithoutmanyhoursofawarenessbycivilauthoritiespriortoanyrelease.”SinceSeptember11th,thisdismissalofterrorismriskswouldalsonotbeaccepted.AsdiscussedinSection1.6,OPGhasconsistentlyinvokedsecurityconcernstowithholdreactorrisk-relatedinformationsinceSeptember11th.TheDiscussionPaperdoesnotaddresstheriskfrommalevolentevents.OntarioHydroopposedrequiringthepre-distributionofKIwithinthe3kmContiguousZonebecause“RadioiodineisnotconsideredasignificantthreatinCANDUreactors.”ItalsoarguedKIdistributioncouldbe“dangerous”becauseKIdistributioncouldbeineffective.152AfterFukushima,ofcourse,theCNSCrequiredreactoroperatorstoensureKIispre-distributedinthe10kmprimaryzoneandavailabletoeveryonewithinthe50kmsecondaryzone.DurhamRegion,whichhostsOPG’sreactors,hassupportedandaskedforKIdistributiontobeexpandedbeyondthe10kmprimaryzone.TheDiscussionPaper,however,doesnotmakerecommendationsonKIdistribution.November1996–RSA/CAERecommendations:TheReporttotheMinistryofEnergyandEnvironmentconcerningtwoTechnicalMattersintheProvinceofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyResponsePlaneffectivelyadoptedOntarioHydro’srecommendations.Itrejectedthepre-distributionofKIinthe3kmContingencyZoneandtheexpansionofthePrimaryZoneto13km.Itrecommendedthat“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”153ThisisalevelofmagnitudebelowwhatwasrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3and#8.AssessingaccidentscenariosfromOntarioHydro’s1995riskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstationagainstthe10E-7cutoffcriteria,theRSA/CAEfoundthatcurrentemergencymeasureswereadequate.The1995PickeringAriskassessmentfoundaccidentsleadingtosignificantreleaseshadextremelylowestimatedprobabilities,rangingfrom5E-9to4E-10.154(SeeTable4inAppendixA.)TheRSA/CAEidentifiedonescenariofromthe1995PickeringAriskassessmentthathadasimilarseveritytotheWCREaccidentproposedbyWorkingGroup#8.Thisscenario,referredtoasExPlantReleaseCategory-3(EPRC-3),hadanestimatedprobabilityof9.4E-8,whichisjustbelowthecut-off

150Ibid,pg15.151Ibid,pg15.152Ibid,pg25.153Ibid,pg33.154Ibid,pg.11.

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criteriarecommendedbyRSA/CAE.155EPRC-3wouldreleaseapproximately3.8E+15Becquerelsofradioiodine.156Itwouldmostlikelybecharacterizedasalevel6INESaccident.AsdiscussedinSection1.6,PRAspublishedsince1996havefoundaccidentsleadingtomajorreleasestobemuchmorelikelythanthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.ToGreenpeace’sknowledge,thesignificanceofthesePRAresultshaveneverbeenconsideredbyOFMEM.May2002–Ministry’schoiceofsevereaccident“blueprint”–EmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)concludedthat“EPRC-3isavalid‘blueprint’or‘template’scenarioforthemoresevereaccidentforwhichplanningandpreparednessistobecarriedout.”Becausethemost“severeimpactstothepublicfromEPRC-3istothe1-3kmContiguousZone”EMOconcluded“enhancedpreparedness,includingearlywarningsystemsandpriorityevacuations,isappropriatefortheContiguousZone.”157Notably,EMOdismissedmore“severe”accidents(EPRC-1andEPRC-2)foundinthe1995PickeringAriskassessmentfromconsiderationduetotheirextremelylowprobabilities,comparingsuchevents“…tothatofacometorasteroidstrikeonEarthresultinginamajorextinctionofspecies.”158ThechoiceofEPRC-3asablueprintforthesevereaccidentinthePNERPhighlightsaweaknessincurrentemergencyplanning.SevereaccidentsinthePNERParenotaddressedthroughdetailedplans,butthroughthebeliefthatexistingemergencymeasurescouldbeexpandedintheeventofsuchevents.EPRC-3’sreleasesaremuchsmallerthanFukushimaandChernobyl,whichmeansprovincialauthoritieshaveneverconsideredthefeasibilityofextendingemergencymeasureintheeventofsuchevents.Meanwhile,FukushimaandChernobylhavebeenidentifiedatallofOntario’snuclearstation.2.2Implications:TheEvolutionofOntario’sNuclearEmergencyPreparednessAfterThreeMileIsland,OntarioputinplacedetailedemergencyplanstoaddressaccidentssimilarinscaletoThreeMileIsland.Thatis,Ontario’sdetailedplanningwasdesignedtoprotectOntariansintheeventofalevel5accidentontheInternationalNuclearEventScale(INES).Althoughittookapproximatelyfifteenyears,Ontarioeventuallyincreaseddetailedplanning,albeitlimitedtotheContiguousZone,toaccountforlevel6accidentsontheInternationalNuclearEventScale.Notably,thesevereaccidentchosenbytheOntariogovernmentasa“blueprint”isapproximatelytwenty-fivetimessmallerthantheaccidentalreleasesthatoccurredatFukushima.AlthoughOntario’semergencyplansweremodifiedafterChernobyltoacknowledgemoresevereaccidentscouldoccur,thegovernmenthasdonenothingtoassessitsabilitytoaddressaccidentsonparwithFukushimaorChernobyl.155Ibid,pg.11.156ThecorefractionofIodinereleasebyEPRC-3wasestimatedtobe2E-3.The1-131coreinventoryforaPickeringAreactoris1.93E+18.AsimpleestimateofEPRC-3’siodinereleaseis3.86E+15Bq.157Dr.AaduPilt,ATechnicalAssessmentoftheEnhancedPlanningandPreparednessArrangementsintheContagiousZoneSurroundingOntarioPowerGenerationInc.NuclearGeneratingstations,May2002,pg.6.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.158Ibid.,pgs.2-3.

56

2.3ThechangingunderstandingofCANDUreactorrisksAsdiscussed,theRSC/CAErecommendedin1996that“…detailedemergencyplanningshouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwithaprobabilityofapproximately10-7/Reactoryear”(Onceintenmillionyearsperreactor)159.Usingthiscut-offprobability,theRSC/CAEconcludedthattherewasnoneedtoexpandthedetailedemergencyplansrecommendedbyWorkingGroup#3afterThreeMileIsland.ThiswasbasedontheconclusionsofOntarioHydro’s1995riskassessmentforthePickeringAnuclearstation,whichfoundthatallaccidentsbelowwithanestimatedlikelihoodabove10E-7resultedinminorreleasesonlyoccurringaftertwenty-fourhours.Toaddressmoresevereaccidents,belowthe10E-7cut-off,theprovincialgovernmentselectedanaccidentfromthePickeringAriskassessment,whichfellbelowtoserveasa“blueprint”160forsevereaccidentplanning.Asnoted,thisscenario,EPRC-3,hadanestimatedlikelihoodof9.4E-8–justbelowtheRoyalSocietyofCanada’scut-offfordetailedplanning.EPRC-3wouldreleaseapproximately3.8E+15ofiodineequivalentandwouldlikelyberatedasanINES6accident.Ontarioeffectivelyhasdetailedplansandpreparednessforaccidentswithreleasesuptoalevel5INESaccidentwithsome“enhanced”measuresintheContiguousZonetodealwithalevel6INESaccident.ForaccidentswithseveritysimilartoEPRC-3,thegovernmentonlyhasconceptualplansandstrategies.ForaccidentswithreleasesaboveINES7orChernobylofFukushima,theprovincedoesnotevenhaveconceptualplansandstrategies.Whilebasingitsrecommendationsontheaccidentscenariosfoundinthe1995PickeringAriskassessment,theRSC/CAEalsonotedthat“…tothiscollectionofaccidentscanbeaddedanynewanalysesofotherscenariosifofcomparableprobability.”161AsdiscussedinSection1.6,sincetheRSC/CAErecommendationswerepublished,newindustryriskassessmentshaveidentifiedaccidentscenariosthatmeetthedetailedplanningcriteriaandaresignificantlymoreseverethanthoseidentifiedinthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.Greenpeacehasfoundnoevidencethatprovincialauthoritieshaveassessedthesescenariosortheirimplicationsforemergencyplanning.InGreenpeace’sview,thisisevidenceofapatternwherePRAresultshavebeenselectivelyusedbygovernmentauthorities.PubliclyAvailableReactorRiskAssessmentssince19971999BruceBRiskAssessment:ThreeyearsaftertheRSC/CAEmadeitsrecommendations,anewriskassessmentfortheBruceBreactorsidentifiedanumberofmoresevereaccidentsthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningandpreparedness.

159W.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersintheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,p.33.160Ibid.161Ibid.

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Itfoundlargereleaseaccidentshadanestimatedlikelihoodof3.7E-7.Italsoevaluatedthelikelihoodof“severereleases.”Aseverereleasewasdefinedasareleasegreaterthan10percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.Accordingtotheseriskassessments,severereleasescouldleadtoearlyfatalities.Itfoundseverereleaseshadalikelihoodof1.2E-7.162ThismeetstheplanningcriteriarecommendedbytheRSC/CAE.SeeTable16inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.2003and2005BruceARiskAssessment:TosupporttherestartoftwooftheBruceAreactors,BrucePowerpublishedriskassessmentsshowingcrediblecatastrophicscenariosthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanning.AsummaryofBruceAriskassessmentresultswasprovidedaspartoftheenvironmentalassessmentoftherestartandlifeextensionoftheBruceAreactors.AlthoughBrucePowerdidnotexplicitlyidentifythelargereleasecategories,thesociallydisruptiveaccidentscenarioscanbededucedfromthedoseestimates.Ex-PlantReleaseCategories1,2,3and4produceearlyfatalitieswith“…animmediateindividualdoseof>3000mSv.”EPRCs1and2haveprobabilitiesabove1E-7andmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbyRSA/CAE.SeeTable17inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.The2005BruceAriskassessmentupdatefoundlargereleaseaccidentshadanestimatedlikelihoodof1.3-6.Italsofoundseverereleaseshadalikelihoodof4.1E-7.Notably,twoscenarioswouldreleaseover50%of1-131andCs-137.(SeeTable18inAppendixA).Approximatelyathirdoflargereleaseaccidentswereinfactseverereleasescenariosofmorethan10percentofthecoreinventor.2008PickeringBRiskAssessment:In2008,OPGreleasedasummaryofitsmostrecentPRAforthePickeringBnuclearstationtosupporttheenvironmentalreviewofitsproposaltorebuildthefourPickeringBreactors.Itidentifiedfouraccidentsequences(EPRC1,EPRC4,EPRC5AandEPRC7)thatleadtolargereleases.InthisassessmentOPGdefinedlargereleaseasanaccidentthatisexpectedtoreleasemorethan1%ofCs-137intotheenvironment.ItfoundtheLargeReleaseFrequencyforthestationtobe7.1E-7,whichisthesameasthelikelihoodestimateforEPRC5A.Theotherlargeaccidentsequenceshadextremelylowprobabilitiesbetween1E-10and1E-11.163SeeTable19inAppendixAformoredetails.Notably,CNSCstaffdirectedOPGtoassesstheconsequencesofEPRC5Aeventhough7.1E-7fallsbelowthecut-offof1E-6thattheCNSCusestoselectaccidentsforenvironmentalreviews.CNSCstaffgaveseveralreasonsforthis.First,theoriginalriskassessmentOPGsubmittedtotheCommissionfoundthatEPRC5hadaprobabilityof6.3E-6.OPG,however,reassessedthisaccidentscenarioandlowereditsprobabilityto7.1E-7,whichisbelowthecut-offprobabilityforenvironmentalreviews.CNSCstaffnotedthatthiswasonly“marginallybelow”thecut-offprobabilityandarguedthatifexternalevents–flooding,fire,seismic-wereconsidereditbeevencloserorexceedtheassessmentcriteria.164InGreenpeace’sview,OPG’sreassessmentofEPRC5highlightsarisktopublicsafetyrelatedtoanunquestionedrelianceonindustryriskstudies.Suchstudiescanbeeasilymanipulated.Reactoroperatorshaveafinancialandreputationalinterestinexcludingsevereaccidentsfrom

162OntarioPowerGeneration,BruceNGSBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,November1999,NK29-REP-03611-00001,pg.38.163OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,November14,2008,pg.33.164T.E.Schaubel,(Director,PickeringRegulatoryProgramDivision,CNSC)toD.PatrickMcNeil(SeniorVicePresident,OPG)“PickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment(EA)–CNSCPositiononFinalMalfunctionsandAccidentstobeusedintheEA,”August7,2007,E-DOCS#3068013.

58

environmentalreviewsandfromemergencyresponse.TheDiscussionPaperdoesnotconsiderthebiasofindustryriskstudies. AsdiscussedinSection1.11,EPRC5Awouldreleaseapproximately3.64E+15BqsofI-131and7.1E+13BqsofCs-137.165SeeTable20inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.TheenvironmentalreviewfoundthatthereleaseofCs-137causedlocalizedgroundcontaminationaroundthestation.ThissurprisedEmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)becausethecurrentplanningaccidentonlycontemplatesthereleaseofnoblecases.OPGrespondedtoEMO’sconcernsbystatingthatonlydesignbasisaccidents,whichhaveaprobabilityabove1E-5,areusedforemergencyplanning.Thus,EPRC5didnotmeetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.166Table21inAppendixAshowsthatOPGconsideredonlyFuelDamageCategories(FDC)3–8DesignBasisaccidents.ItisunclearhowEMOrespondedtoOPG’sposition.The2008PickeringBenvironmentalhighlightstwoongoingandworryingpatterns:First,OPGhashistoricallyarguedagainstplanningforlargeraccidents.Inlate1990s,itsupportedtheRSC/CAE’suseofthePickeringAriskassessmentwhenthefindingsoflargerreleaseswerehighlyimprobable.Adecadelater,OPGcuriouslyomittedmentionoftheRSC-CAErecommendationtoplanforaccidentsabove1E-7whenitsownPRAfoundanaccidentsequencemoreseverethanthecurrentplanningbasis.Instead,OPGassertedplanningoccursfordesign-basisaccidents.Aswillbediscussed,thesecondpatternisOPGreassessmentandmodificationofPRAresultswhentheyareinconvenient.Inlightofthesepatterns,GreenpeacefeelstheDiscussionPaper’sportrayalofindustryriskassessmentsasobjectiveandfactualisimprudent.2011DarlingtonRiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentidentifiedtwoscenariosthatwouldmeetthecriteriafordetailedemergencyplanning.OnescenarioleadstoreleasesonparwithFukushimaandtheotherleadstolargebutearlyreleases.TheassessmentcharacterizedReleaseCategory1asa“[v]erylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination.”Ithadanestimatedlikelihoodof4.90E-6,butOPGapplied“analyticalenhancements”toreducethelikelihoodto7.8E-07.DuringtheenvironmentalassessmentreviewofDarlington’sproposaltoextendtheoperationallivesoftheDarlingtonreactors,Greenpeaceallegedthese“analyticalenhancements”werecarriedouttoavoidhavingtheconsequencesofthisaccidentassessedintheenvironmentalreview.167Asnoted,OPGalsoreassessedthePickeringBPRAwhenitfoundalargereleaseaccidentshouldbeconsideredinanenvironmentalreview.Unliketheenvironmentalreviewofthelife-extensionofthePickeringBriskassessment,CNSCstaffdidquestionOPG’suseofanalyticalenhancementsorthefailuretoconsiderexternalevents.Notably,theseismicriskassessmentfoundalargereleasefrequencyover1E-6.SeeTable22in

165K.S.Dinnie(Director,NuclearSafetySolutions)toE.Marczak(OPG),“PickeringLifeExtensionProject:AccidentalAirandWaterborneReleaseforPickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment–EPRC5,letter,January19,2007,AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.166PatrickMcNeil(SeniorVicePresident,OPG)toT.Schaubel(Director,CNSC),“OPG’sResponsetoEmergencyManagementOntarioCommentsonthePickeringBfinalEnvironmentalAssessmentStudyReport,”letter,NK30-00531,April29,2008.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.167SeeCommissionMemberDocument12-H13.181,SubmissionfromGreenpeaceCanada;AlsoseeCNSCCommissionHearingTranscripts,December5,2012,pgs.367–419.

59

AppendixA.ThishighlightshowtheCNSChasalsobeeninconsistentinitsoversightofindustry

PRAs.

Asnoted,98%oftheaccidentsequenceswithinReleaseCategory1isamulti-unitaccident.168This

explainsthelargecatastrophicradiationreleasesassociatedwiththisscenario.Theassessmentalso

foundonescenario,referredtoasReleaseCategory2,tobealargeandearlyofmorethan1E+14

BecquerelofCesium-137.Eventhoughthisscenariomeetsthecriteriafordetailedplanning,early

releasesarenotcontemplatedinOntario’sdetailedemergencyplans.SeeTable23ininAppendix

Aformoredetails.

Asdiscussed,thesourcetermforthisaccidentwasusedfortheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy,

whichisakeyreferencetotheDiscussionPaper.However,neithertheDiscussionPapernorthe

CNSC’sSevereAccidentStudyacknowledgesthatthisaccidentscenarioisanearlyrelease.169This

underminesthecredibilityofboththeDiscussionPaperandtheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.

2013PickeringBRiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentfoundtheestimatedlikelihoodof

catastrophicaccidentshadrisenbyfourlevelsofmagnitudesincethepreviousassessmentfor

PickeringBwasreleasedin2008.TheseChernobylscaleaccidentsmetthecriteriafordetailed

emergencyplanningrecommendedbytheRCA/CAE.

ReleaseCategory1hadanestimatedprobabilityof2.9E-06andisdescribedasfollows:“Largeearly

releasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greater

than3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)”.170Thiswouldbeconsideredalevel7INESaccident.See

Table24inAppendixAforadditiondetails.

Thesignificantchangeinthefindingsbetweenthe2008and2013PickeringBriskassessments

highlightsthesignificantuncertaintyinherentinindustryriskassessment.Thisuncertaintyisnot

acknowledgedintheDiscussionPaper.Indeed,theDiscussionPaperonlyusedtheword

uncertaintyoncewhencitingaHealthCanadastudy.171

DuringCNSChearingsin2013onOPG’sapplicationtocontinueoperatingthePickeringnuclear

station,Greenpeacehighlightedthattheriskposedbythestationwasmuchhigherthanpreviously

thought.GreenpeacealsonotedthatthefindingsoftheOPG’smostrecentriskstudiesrequired

OPGtoinvestinriskreductionmeasuresaccordingtoitsownpolicies.172NeithertheCNSCnorOPG

hadacknowledgedthisintheirsubmissions.

CNSCstaffrespondedtoGreenpeace’sconcernsbysimplyassertingthatrecentenhancementsin

responsetotheFukushimadisasterwouldreducethelikelihoodofanaccidentby10to100times.

Staffprovidednoevidenceforthisduringthehearings.CNSCstaffdidnotacknowledgeorexplain

168

YolandeAkletal.,DiscussionPaperonSafetyGoals–Stage1:AnalyzeIssue,ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandReliabilityDivision,March2013.169

Seepage34ofDiscussionPaperwhereitacknowledgesthatthesourcetermoftheaccidentassessedintheCNSC’s

SevereAccidentStudy“…ofasimilarmagnitudetoapostulatedaccidentwithafrequencyof3.74x10-7”.Thisisthe

probabilityofReleaseCategory2,whichisalsoanearlyrelease.170

OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,NK30-REP-03611-00021-R000,February2014.171

DiscussionPaper,pg.37.172

See:CommissionMemberDocument13-H2.119,SubmissionfromGreenpeaceCanada.

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whythelikelihoodoflargereleasehadincreasedbyafactorofathousand.173InGreenpeace’sview,

thisisanexampleoftheCanadianregulator“disowning”riskassessmentinformationwhen

challengesorthodoxy.

InresponsetoGreenpeace’ssubmissiontheCommissiondirectedOPGto“…provideanactionplan

toaddressanyidentifiedissuesshouldOPGexceeditstargetedsafetygoals.”Greenpeacealso

highlightedthatthecurrentapproachtoriskassessmentdoesnotconsidertheaggregateriskof

multi-unitnuclearstationslikePickering.Asaresult,theCommissiondirectedOPGtodevelop“…a

whole-sitePSAoramethodologyforawhole-sitePSA,specifictothePickeringNGSsite.”Notably,

theCNSC’sformalreviewoftheFukushimaaccidentfailedtoidentifythesinglereactorapproachto

riskassessmentasproblematicoranunderestimateofrisk.Despitethis,anewapproachtoassess

site-wideriskhasyettobedeveloped.TheDiscussionPaperfailstoacknowledgethisweaknessin

currentPRAmethodology.ThisissignificantgivenallofOntario’sreactorsaremulti-unitstations.174

2014PickeringARiskAssessment:Thisriskassessmentfoundascenariothatleadstocatastrophic

releaseswithinthefirsttwentyhoursthatmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanning.ThisriskassessmentwasonlyreleasedduetoaformalproceduralrequestmadebyGreenpeaceduring

aforementioned2013licencerenewalhearings.175Itshowsasignificantincreaseinthelikelihoodof

majoraccidencesinceRSC/CAEreviewedthe1995PickeringAriskassessment.

ReleaseCategory1hasanestimatedlikelihoodof4.69E-6andisdescribedasa“Largeearlyrelease

withpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination”.Release

Category1alsoleadstothereleaseof3%ofthecoreinventoryofiodineandcaesium.176Thiswould

bealevel7INESaccident.SeeTable25inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.AsshowninTable6in

Section1.6oflarge–andearly–radioactivereleaseshasincreasedbyfourlevelsofmagnitude

sincethe1995PickeringriskassessmentusedbytheRSC/CAEduringthelastreviewofnuclear

emergencyplanning.ThisisnotacknowledgedintheDiscussionPaper.

2013BruceARiskAssessment:The2013BruceAriskassessmentalsoshowedasignificantincrease

inthelikelihoodofmajoraccidentscomparedtothepreviousPRA.ReleaseCategory0andRelease

Category2releaseapproximately8.5E-16BqofI-131.Theirrespectiveestimatedfrequenciesare

2.90E-6and6.72-06.177TheBruceAriskassessmentdescribesReleaseCategory0sequenceasa

“…severecoredamageatallfourreactorsmoreorlesssimultaneously.Thesesequencesare

predictedtoresultincontainmentfailureswithin24hoursoftheinitiationoftheaccidentsequences.”

178

Similartothefindingsofthe2013PickeringBriskassessment,therevisedBruceAprobability

estimatedwouldtypicallyrequireBrucePowertoinvestinsystemupgrades.BrucePower

respondedtothisbyassertingthatthepost-Fukushimaenhancements–referredtoasEmergency

MitigatingEquipment(EMEs)-wouldreducethelikelihoodofsuchaccidentsbyuptoafactorof10.

173

CNSCPublicHearingTranscripts,May30,2013,Pickering,Ontario,Pgs.284–336.174

CNSC,RecordofDecision,includingReasonsforDecision,intheMatterofOPG’sApplicationtorenewthePower

OperatingLicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation,August2013,pg.23.175

Ibid,pg.23.176

OPG,PickeringARiskAssessmentSummaryReport,NA44-REP-03611-00036-R000,April2014.177

BrucePower,BruceALevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,NK21-03611.5,December2013,pg.319178

BrucePower,BruceLevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,December2013,NK21-03611.5PNSAS,pg.319.

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Notably,evenwithEMEsmanyofthesevereaccidentsequenceswouldstillmeetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbytheRSA/CAEinthe1990s.SeeTable26inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.2015BruceBRiskAssessment:The2015BruceBriskassessmentalsofoundthelikelihoodoflargereleaseshadincreasedsignificantly.ReleaseCategories1and2wouldreleasemorethan3%ofareactor’sinventoryofI-131orapproximately8.88E+16Bqofradioiodine.Thesecategorieshavefrequencies4.71E-06and4.97E-07respectively.SeeTable27inAppendixAforadditionaldetails.Again,BrucePowerassertedthefrequencieswereinfactlowerduetotheuseofEMEs.Thesefrequencies,however,stilldonotconsiderthecontributionofexternaleventstoaccidentrisk.Italsodoesnotexplainwhythemorerecentrisksassessmentsfoundmajoraccidentstobemorelikelythanpreviouslythought.2015DarlingtonRiskAssessment:In2015OPGreleasedanupdatedriskassessmentfortheDarlingtonnuclearstationtosupportitsapplicationtorebuildandextendtheoperationoftheplant.Notably,thebaselinereleaseestimatesinthisriskassessmentallassumedEMEcredit.Table28intheAppendixAcomparestheresultsofthe2012and2015Darlingtonriskassessments.GreenpeacerequestedOPGprovidereleasecategoryestimateswithandwithoutEMEcreditasBrucePowerhaddoneinits2014risksummaryreport.179OPGrespondedthatinitslevel2internaleventsriskassessment“…thecasewithnoEMEorSIOsisonlyasensitivitycase.Assuch,theresultsorthissensitivitycasewerenotderivedonanindividualreleasecategorybasis.TheLRFwithoutEMEorSIOsis1.5*10-6occurrencesperreactoryear.”180ItappearsthatthepushtohaveEMEcreditsreducereleasefrequenciessincehassignificantlychangedthemethodologiesandverifiabilityofCanadianprobabilisticriskassessments.Aswillbediscussedinthenextsection,CNSCstaffinternallyreferredtoReleaseCategory1ashavinganestimatedlikelihoodof4.7E-6in2015inbriefingspreparedfortheCNSC’sExecutiveCommittee.181ThisisdifferentthantheprobabilityestimatesOPGhaspubliclyusedforthisscenario.2015InternalCNSCAssessmentofStationBlackoutScenarios:AttherequestoftheCNSC’sExecutiveCommittee,CNSCstaffassessedstationblackoutscenariosattheBruceandDarlingtonstationsin2015.Itconcluded“…alargereleaseoffissionproducts,inparticularradioactivecaesium,canoccurwithinthefirst24hoursforBruce.”ItconcludedasimilarscenarioatDarlington“…wouldhavethelargestofreleasesataround60hours.”182Table27belowfromtheCNSCExecutiveBriefingshowtheseknownaccidentscenarios,whichmeettheRCA/CAEcriteriafordetailedplanning,tohavereleasesonparwithChernobylandFukushima.

179S-PStensiltoR.Manely,“InformationrequestforadditionalProbabilisticRiskAssessmentestimates”,letter,August13,2015.180MemorandumtoGreenpeace,“ResponsetoRequestfromGreenpeaceforInformationfromDarlingtonNGSProbabilisticSafetyAssessment”September10,2015,N-CORR-03611-0562767LOF181BriefingforthePresident,SevereAccidentProgressionWithoutOperatorAction,August24,2015,EDoc#:4811602,pg.6.182Ibid.

62

Table29–ComparisonofStationBlackoutScenariosatBruceBandDarlington

SignificantEvents BruceBTiming

DarlingtonTiming

Cs-137andI-131Release(%ofCoreInventory)

Cs-137Release(Bq)

I-131Release(Bq)

CorecollapsesFirststageofreleasetothe

atmosphere5.9 10.7

BruceB:2.1%DNGS:0.2%

BruceB:5.3E+15DNGS:5.2E+14

BruceB:2.4E+17DNGS:2.3E+16

Shieldtanksidewallmeltsthrough.

CoriumrelocatestotheFuellingMachineDuct.Limitedcoreconcrete

interactionoccursbeforethecoriumisquenched.

Secondstageofreleasetotheatmosphere

18.9 25.0

BruceB:9.2%DNGS:0.7%

BruceB:2.3E+16DNGS:1.8E+15

BruceB:1.1E+18DNGS:8.2E+16

CoriumbecomesuncoveredintheFuellingMachineDuct.

Moltencoreconcreteinteractionresumes.

Thirdstageofreleasetotheatmosphere.

33.3 58.3

BruceB:11%DNGS:8%

BruceB:2.8E+16DNGS:2.1E+16

BruceB:

1.3E+18DNGS:9.3E+17

2.3Implications:ThechangingunderstandingofCANDUreactorrisksAlthoughtheDiscussionPaperrepeatedlyappealstorecentreactorenhancementstojustifymaintainingcurrentemergencyresponseplans,itdoesnotmentionhowrecentPRAshavefoundmajoraccidentstobemuchmorelikelythanpreviouslythought.InGreenpeace’sview,thisindicatesabiasedandselectiveuseofriskassessmentinformation.Indeed,whilereactoroperatorsandtheCNSChaveassertedthatpostFukushimaenhancementswillreducethelikelihoodofanaccidentbyafactorof10or100,industryriskestimateshaveshownthelikelihoodofsucheventstohaveincreasedbyafactorof1000.AlthoughaccidentsonparwithbothFukushimaandChernobylhavemetthecriteriafordetailedplanningrecommendedbytheRSC/CAEinthe1990s,GreenpeacehasfoundnoevidencetoshowthatOFEMEMhasseriouslyconsideredthesescenarios.ThishighlightsbothhoweasyitistomodifyPRAresultsifinconvenientandthesignificantuncertaintiesinherentinsuchriskassessments.What’smore,thispatternofselectivelyusingriskassessmentinformationisinlinewithDr.JohnDowner’sobservationthatreactoroperatorsandnuclearregulatorsfindjustificationsto“disown”inconvenientriskassessmentinformation.InGreenpeace’sview,thiscallsforamoreprecautionaryapproachtonuclearemergencyresponse.2.4Canada’sReviewofEmergencyPreparednesssinceFukushimaSimilartoChernobyl,theFukushimaaccidentshouldhaveinitiatedatransparentassessmentofwhetherthecurrentlimitsondetailedemergencypreparednessmeasuresarestillappropriate.However,sinceFukushimafederal,provincialsafetyauthoritiesandreactoroperatorshaveshowna

63

patternofavoidinganopenandrigorousassessmentoftheadequacyofoffsiteemergency

measuresagainstaFukushima-scaleradiationrelease.

DespitemisleadingassertionsfromtheCNSC,therehasbeennopublicassessmentofthe

consequencesofaFukushima-scaleaccident.Thishasdeprivedthepublicanddecision-makersof

keyinformationontheriskofcontinuingtooperateeighteenreactorsinOntario.

March11,2011–Anearthquakeandtsunamitriggeranaccidentleadstoradiationreleasesfrom

threereactorsattheFukushimaDaiichinuclearstation.Theaccidentreleasesapproximately

1.6E+17ofIodine-131.TheFukushimareleasesareovertwentytimeslargerthantheaccident

previouslychosenasa“blueprint”forOntario’ssevereaccidentplanning.

March20,2011–HearingsonOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonnuclearstationbegindespiterequestsfromcivilsocietyorganizationstodelaythehearingstoprovidetime

tolearnlessonsfromtheFukushimadisaster.InlinewithCNSCpolicy,theenvironmental

assessmentdoesnotassesstheconsequencesofaFukushima-scaleaccidentbecauseindustry

expertssucheventstobetoo“improbable.”TheabilityofOntario’semergencyresponseplansto

copewithsuchalargeaccidentwasnotassessed.Theaccidentconsideredwithinthe

environmentalassessment,whichwasreferredtoasa“SafetyGoalRelease”(SGB)assumes1E+15

BqofI-131isreleasedintotheenvironment.Asdiscussed,thisreleasealsoendedupservingasthe

basisfortheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.

However,initsfinalreportinAugust2011theJointReviewPanelrecommendsOPGberequired

“…toevaluatethecumulativeeffectofacommon-causesevereaccidentinvolvingallofthenuclear

reactorsinthesitestudyareatodetermineiffurtheremergencymeasuresarerequired.”183This

hasnotoccurred.October2011-TheCNSC’sFukushimaTaskForce’sobserved“…itmaybeusefulforthe

environmentalassessmentprocesstoincludeconsiderationofsevereaccidents,shouldthisbe

regardedasresponsivetopublicconcerns”.184TheCNSC’sexclusionofmajoraccidentsfrom

environmentalassessmentshasbeenalong-standingcomplaintofcivilsocietyorganizations.

May2012–InresponsetotheCNSC’sFukushimaTaskForcereport,Greenpeaceaskedforthe

CNSCtochangeitspolicyofwithholdinginformationontheconsequencesofmajoraccidentsfrom

thepublic.185Thisincludedexpandingthescopeoftheenvironmentalassessmentontheproposed

life-extensionoftheDarlingtonnuclearstationtoincludesevereaccidents.Greenpeacealso

requestedtheCommissionexpandthescopeofitsreviewoftheFukushimadisastertoinclude

regulatorcapture.TheCommissionrefused.

November2012-DuringhearingsontheenvironmentalreviewofOPG’sproposaltoextendthe

operationallivesoftheDarlingtonreactors,hundredsofcitizensaskforanassessmentofthe

impactsofaFukushima-scaleaccidentatDarlington.GreenpeacespecificallyhighlightedRelease

183

JointReviewPanel–DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,EnvironmentalAssessmentReport,August2011,Reportpg.vi.184

CNSC,FukushimaTaskForceReportDraft,(October2011)pg.56.185

Shawn-PatrickStensil,GreenpeaceCommentsontheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission’sResponsetoFukushima,April2,2012,CMD12-M23.8.

64

Category1intheDarlington2012riskassessmentasaknownandrealisticaccidentscenariothatcouldcausesignificantoffsiteimpacts.Duringthehearings,CNSCstaffadmittedtheycouldhaveassessedsuchaccidents,buthadsimplydecidednottodoso.Onthelastdayofthe2012hearings,CNSCstaffcommittedtopublishananalysisofalargereleasebeforethecurrenthearings.ThiscommitmentwouldbecometheSevereAccidentStudydiscussedintheDiscussionPaper.April2013–FollowingaprivatemeetingwithOPG,CNSCstaffacceptedthecompany’srecommendationfortheaccidenttobeassessedinCNSC’stheSevereAccidentStudy.Asdiscussed,thisrecommendedsourcetermhasalsobeenusedinHealthCanada’s2017ARGOsstudy.(SeeTable13inSection1.20foracomparisonofsourceterms.)OPGrecommendedCommissionstaffusea“Goldilocks”approachtoselectinganaccidentforitssevereaccidentstudy.Thatis,“nottoobig,nottoosmall,justright.”186Specifically,OPGrecommendedthestudyusethesameaccidentalreleasescenariothatOPGusedfortheenvironmentalreviewfornewreactorsatDarlington.OPGmayhaveconsideredthisreleasescenarioas“justright”becauseitwaseffectivelythesameasthe“blueprint”(EPRC-3)accidenttheprovinceselectedforsevereaccidentplanning.Thisscenariowouldthusnotputinquestionanycurrentemergencymeasures.ItwasalsoeffectivelythesameastheaccidentreviewedintheenvironmentalassessmentofOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsattheDarlingtonsite.However,OPGdidrecommendanadditional“sensitivity”casewithreleasestentimeslargerthancurrentblueprintforemergencyresponse.ThiswasareasonablepropositionbecausetheestimatedemissionswithinaReleaseCategorycanvarybyafactoroften.187Nevertheless,thissensitivitycasewasstilltentimessmallerthantheFukushimaaccident.CNSCstaffacceptedOPG’srecommendations. October2013–OPG,theCNSCandEmergencyManagementOntario(EMO)meettodiscusstheSevereAccidentStudy.Atthemeeting,OPGstatedthestudy’sobjectivewas“todetermineiftheexistingemergencyplansandcountermeasuresinplacetodayprotectthepublicfromtheconsequencesofpotentialoff-siteBeyondDesignbasis(BDB)/Severeaccidents.”OPGsaysthestudyfindstheprovince’semergencyplansprovide“appropriatecountermeasuresandaregenerallyprotective.”188January2014–CNSCmanagementreviewadraftoftheSevereAccidentStudyandaskforthesensitivitycasetoberemovedfromthepublicreleaseofthestudy.FrancoisRinfret,DirectoroftheDarlingtonRegulatoryProgramDivision,toldcolleagues“…thisdocumentwouldbeusedmalevolent-lyinapublichearing.”Herequestedthe“sensitivitycase”,whichwastentimesthesizeofthebaselinerelease,butstillsmallerthanFukushima,toberemovedfromthestudy.CNSC

186JohnPeterstoFredDermarkaretal.,“MinutesofSARPmeetingwithCNSC–April2013”,email,April9,2013,9:26pm.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.187BrucePower,BruceALevel2At-PowerInternalEventsRiskAssessment,NK21-03611.5,December2013,pg.77.188OPG,OverviewofOPG’sapproachtoOff-SiteConsequenceAssessmentarisingfroma“SevereAccident–OPG–EMO–CNSCmeetingOctober16,2016”,presentation.AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.

65

directorGregRzentkowskitheearlyreleasescenarioswereremovedfromthestudyreleasedtothepublic.189AswillbediscussedinSection2.4,thesuppressedsensitivitycaseshowedapotentialneedtoexpandemergencymeasures.Forexample,radiationlevelswouldbehighenoughtorequireKIconsumption20kmfromthereactorandshelteringcouldberequiredasfaras40kmfromthestation.ThereleaseofthestudywasdelayedfromFebruarytoJune2014.February2014–EMOstaffaskedstafffromtheMinistryofEnergytoundertakeastudyrelatedto“thescientificbasisofthePNERP”.TheMinistryofEnergyhasrefusedtoreleasethisdocumenttoGreenpeacethroughFreedomofInformation,citingcabinetconfidence.AvailableinformationindicatestheMinistryofEnergyadoptedOPGrecommendedaccidentscenariosforassessment.190AlthoughthegovernmenthastoldtheOfficeoftheInformationCommissionerthatthisanalysiswillinformeventualcabinetrecommendationsforarevisedPNERP,itisnotcitedintheDiscussionPaper.ThisindicatesthatthepublichasbeendeprivedofriskrelatedinformationthathasalreadyinformedtheDiscussionPaper’srecommendations.June2014–TheCNSCreleaseditsdraftreportStudyofConsequencesofaHypotheticalSevereNuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasures.Theoriginalsensitivitycasewasreplacedbyareleaseonly4timeslargerthanthebaselinerelease.Inthepublicstudy,CNSCstaffassertedthatincreasingthesourcetermwastoaddressthepossibilityofanaccidentatallfourDarlingtonreactors.Duetothesmallsourceterm,thisstudydidnotrespondtotheconcernsGreenpeaceraisedduringthe2012Darlingtonhearings.November2015–OFMEMrequestedcommentonadraftdiscussionpapertoindustrystakeholderssuchasOPGandBrucePowerentitled“PNERPPlanningBasisReview&Recommendations”.Althoughnotpubliclyavailable,CNSCdocumentsobtainedthroughAccesstoInformationindicatethatthestudyreliesontheCNSC’ssevereaccidentstudytoassesstheadequacyofoffsiteemergencypreparedness.191TheDiscussionPaperconcludesthereisnoneedtoexpandoffsiteemergencymeasures.November2015–Athearingstoapprovethelife-extensionoftheDarlingtonnuclearstation,hundredsofcitizenscomplainaboutthelackofinformationonaFukushima-scaleaccident.CNSCstaffassertthestudyfulfilspublicexpectationsbecausethedoseprojectionsinthestudyaresimilarinmagnitudetothedosesobservedfollowingFukushimaaccident.CivilsocietygroupsandconcernedcitizensoverwhelminglyrejectthisCNSCmisleadingportrayalofpublicexpectations.December2015–Followingthe2015Darlingtonhearings,OFMEM’sDirectorofPreventionandRiskmanagementwritestotheCNSCtoaskforassistancewiththeemergencyreview.Mr.SulemannotedthattheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy“validated”thecurrentplanningbasis.However,hesaidit“…hasnowbeenbroughttohisattentionthatamoreappropriatebasisforsevereaccidentdoseconsequenceswould,infact,betheProbabilisticSafetyAssessment(PSA)studiespreparedby189GregRzentkowskitoAndrewMcAllisteretal.,“RE:UpdateonStudyofConsequencesofaSevereNuclearAccident,”email,January7,2014,3:02.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.190GreenpeacehasfiledsupportingevidencewiththeOfficeoftheInformationCommissioneraspartofappealNo.PA14-543191InternalcorrespondenceinwhichCNSCstaffdiscussedthereferencetotheMinistryofEnergy’ssevereaccidentmodellinginthe2015draftDiscussionPaperwasobtainedthroughCNSCAccesstoInformationrequestA-2015-0148.

66

thenucleargeneratingstudies.Giventhatweneitherhaveaccesstothesestudies,nordowehavethein-houseresourcestoscientificallyassesstheminatimelymanner,wekindlyrequestCNSCresourcesbemadeavailabletoprovideOFMEMwiththedistanceversusdoseconsequencesandprobabilityoftheapplicablePSAsforPickering,DarlingtonandBruce.”192Thisisasignificantadmissioninlightoftheforegoingdiscussiononthefindingsofindustryriskassessmentssincethe1990s.ItappearsOFMEMwasnotawarethatitshouldreviewPRAfindingstoassesstheadequacyofnuclearemergencyresponse.ItisunclearwhethertheCNSCdidprovidemodellingonDarlington,BruceandPickeringtoOFMEM.May2017–OFMEMreleasedaDiscussionPaperonProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP):PlanningBasisReviewandRecommendationsforpubliccomment.TheDiscussionPaperreliesheavilyontheCNSC’ssevereaccidentstudytosupportitsrecommendations.Italsocitesanew2017studyproducedHealthCanada.TheHealthCanadastudy,whichusesmoresophisticatedclimatemodelling,useseffectivelythesamesourcetermastheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy.TheHealthCanadastudyalsonotesthattheCNSChasprovidedanewsourcetermtoOFMEMforsuggesteduseinemergencyplanning.193ThissourcetermisnotmodelledintheHealthCanadastudyordiscussionintheDiscussionPaper.TheDiscussionPaperrecommendsagainststrengtheningnuclearemergencypreparedness.2.5Implications:Canada’sReviewofEmergencyPreparednesssinceFukushimaDespitereal-worldexperienceandthefindingsofindustryriskassessmentssincethe1990s,federalandprovincialauthoritieshaveavoidedevaluatingtheoffsiteimpactsofaccidentsofanyaccidentscenarioswithaseveritysignificantlygreaterthanEPRC-3,whichwaschosenbytheOntariogovernmentin2002asa“blueprint”forasevereaccident.Table28belowcomparestheIodidne-131fromreleasesfrompubliclyavailableassessmentandassessmentsthathaveeitherbeensuppressedbytheCNSCorneverundertaken.Table30:Comparison1-131ReleaseScenarios

PubliclyAvailableAssessments AssessmentsnotAvailabletothePublicOntario’s“Blueprint”

SevereAccidentEPRC-3

CNSC’sSevereAccidentRelease

CNSC’sPublicSevereAccident

SensitivityRelease

CNSC’sSupressed

SevereAccidentRelease

FukushimaRelease

ReleasefromRelease

Category1atBruceA

3.86E+15 4.4E+15 1.7E+16 4.4E+16 1.6E+17 1E+18

192Al.Suleman(OFMEM)toT.Jamieson,letter,December18,2015.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.193L.Bergman,etal.,ARGOSModellingofAccidentAandAccidentBScenarios,HealthCanadaandEnvironmentandClimateChangeCanada,May15,2017.

67

AsdiscussedinSection1.8,Germany194andSwitzerland195havecarriedoutopenevaluationsofFukushima-scaleaccidentsattheirnuclearstationssince2011.Thesereviewshaverecommendedexpandingoffsiteemergencymeasures.InCanada,however,theCNSCandOPGhaveactedinunisontoavoidanypublicassessmentofsuchaccidentscenarios.Meanwhile,OFMEMhastakendirectionfromboththeCNSCandOPG.ForGreenpeace,thecoordinatedactionsoftheCNSC,OPGandOFMEMraisequestionsabouttheindependenceofpublicsafetyauthoritiesinCanada.ItalsoshowsaneedfornewmechanismsftoenablethepublictoscrutinizeandchallengethepotentiallyfaultybeliefsandrationalesofOFMEMandtheCNSC.InGreenpeace’sview,thereisaneedtobothplanforlargeraccidentsandempowercitizenstoensurepublicauthoritiesconsiderpublicexpectationsforsafety.2.6TheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy:WhatwashiddenfromCanadians?Sinceitsrelease,theprovincehascitedtheCNSC’sStudyofConsequencesofaHypotheticalSevereNuclearAccidentandEffectivenessofMitigationMeasurestoconcludethatcurrentoffsitemeasuresareadequate.Asnoted,however,thereferenceaccidentusedinthestudyiseffectivelythesameaccidenttheprovinceusedasa“blueprint”(EPRC-3)forcurrentsevereaccidentplanning.Itis,then,notsurprisingthatthestudyconcludescurrentoffsitemeasuresareadequateandrobust.Inshort,thestudydidnotrespondtopublicrequestsforoffsiteemergencymeasurestobestresstestedagainstaFukushima-scaleaccident.Asdiscussed,CNSCmanagementbelievedthatthesensitivitycase,whichwasstilltentimessmallerthanFukushima,wouldbeused“malevolently”bythepublic.196WhatterrordidCNSCmanagementfear?ItappearsthatCNSCmanagementfearedpubliccallstoexpandoffsitenuclearemergencymeasures.AlthoughtheCNSCwithheldtheoriginalsensitivitycasefromthepublicreport,theydidincludeasmallersensitivitycasefourtimeslargerthanthebaselinerelease.Thebaselineandsensitivitycaseshowpublicdoseestimatesincreaselinearlyinproportiontothescaleofreleases.ItisthuspossibletoextrapolatefromtheresultsofthepublicstudytodeterminewhatCNSCstafffearedwouldbeused“malevolently”.TheTable31belowcomparestheresultsoftheCNSC’spublicreport,whichconfirmtheadequacyofcurrentoffsitemeasures,tothesupressedsensitivitycaseandtoanevenlargerFukushimascalerelease,whichiswhatthepublicintervenorshavecalledforsince2011.Table31–ComparisonofPublicandSupressedSARPScenarios

194TheFederalOfficeforRadiationProtection,RODOS-basedsimulationofpotentialaccidentscenariosforemergencyresponsemanagementinthevicinityofnuclearpowerplants,June2015195InspectionfédéraledelasécuriténucléaireIFSN,Examendesscénariosderéférencepourlaplanificationd’urgenceauvoisinagedescentralesnucléaires,2013.196AndrewMcAllister,toJulieBurttetal.,“FORREVIEW:DraftStudyoftheConsequencesofaSevereNuclearAccidentandassociatedCMD14-M5,”email,December9,2013,4:56PM.AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.

68

DosemSv

24-24(1) 24-24*4(2) 24-24*10 Fukushima*23

Distance

from

Plant

Whole

BodyThyroid

Whole

BodyThyroid

Whole

BodyThyroid

Whole

BodyThyroid

1 25.4 431 101.6 1724 250 4310 575 99133 4.5 70.7 18 282.8 45 407 103.5 1626.16 1.75 26.7 7 106.8 17.5 276 40.25 614.112 0.67 9.82 2.68 39.28 6.7 98.2 15.41 225.8620 0.31 4.4 1.24 17.6 3.1 44 7.13 101.228 0.18 2.49 0.72 9.96 1.8 24.9 4.14 57.2736 0.13 1.75 0.52 7 1.3 17.5 2.99 40.25

50 0.07 0.95 0.28 3.8 0.7 9.5 1.61 21.85

70 0.04 0.52 0.16 2.08 0.4 5.2 0.92 11.96

90 0.03 0.39 0.12 1.56 0.3 3.9 0.69 8.97

Bold=greaterthanthePNERP’slowerProtectiveActionLevel(PAL)forevacuationof10mSv;italicsgreater

thanthePNERP’slowerPALforShelteringof1mSv;50mSvPALforthyroidblocking.

1)TakenfromTable6.1oftheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy(pg.46).

2)TakenfromTable6.2oftheCNSC’sSevereAccidentStudy(pg.47).

TheaccidentscenarioremovedfrombyCNSCmanagementshowsanexpansionofemergency

measureswouldbeadvisedtoaddressaccidentstentimessmallerthanFukushima.Insucha

scenario:

• EvacuationwouldberequiredfortheentirePrimaryZone.Detailedplanningforsucha

scenarioisalreadyinplace.

• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredoutto20km.KIiscurrentlyonlypre-distributedto

residentswithinthe10kmprimaryzone.

• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredforvulnerablecommunities,childrenandpregnant

women,outto40km.Itisunclearwhatplanningtheprovincehasputinplaceto

rapidlydistributeKIwithin50kmofOntarionuclearstations.

• Shelteringcouldberequiredoutto40km.

BasedontheCNSC’smethodology,aFukushima-sizedaccidentwouldrequireasignificant

expansioninpre-preparedemergencymeasures.Insuchascenario:

• Evacuationwouldlikelyrequiredoutto20km.Thereiscurrentlynodetailed

preparationforsuchanevacuation.

• KIconsumptionrequiredto30km.KIiscurrentlyonlypre-distributedtoresidents

withinthe10kmprimaryzone.

• KIconsumptioncouldberequiredforvulnerablecommunitiesoutto50km.Itis

unclearwhatplanningtheprovincehasputinplacetorapidlydistributeKIwithin50km

ofOntarionuclearstations.

• Shelteringrequiredoutto60km.Thisexceedsthecurrent50kmSecondaryZone.

69

3.ConclusionInthissubmission,Greenpeacesetouttoanswerthefollowingquestion:

DoestheDiscussionPaper’srecommendedupperlimitfordetailedplanningandpreparednessprovideadequatesafetymarginsconsideringreal-wordexperience,thepublic’sexpectationsforsafetyaswellastheuniquehazardsassociatedwiththelocationofOntario’snuclearstationsonboththeGreatLakesandinthedenselypopulatedGreaterTorontoArea?

Theansweris‘no.’Safetymarginsareameansofcompensatingforuncertainty.Inspiteofrealworldoccurrenceofnuclearaccidents,theDiscussionPaperreliesexclusivelyonindustryriskstudiestojustifyitsrecommendations.InGreenpeace’sview,Ontariomustabandonitsprobabilisticapproachtonuclearemergencyplanningandreplaceitwithaprecautionaryanddeterministicapproach.Thatis,theOntariogovernmentshouldselectanupdatedplanningbasisaccidentbyconsideringbestpractices,publicexpectations,real-worldexperienceaswellasinsightsfromindustrytechnicalassessments.TheDiscussionPaperfailstoconsiderrealworldexperienceorpublicexpectationsforsafety.Thegovernmentshouldthereforerejectitsrecommendationtomaintainthehistoricplanningbasisaccident.InsteaditshouldataminimummatchtheprecedentsetbySwitzerlandandputinplacemeasurestoprotectOntariansintheeventofalevel7INESaccidentatanyofthetwenty-fivereactorsthatlinetheGreatLakes.

70

AppendixA

Table1–InternationalNuclearEventScale(INES)

INESScale Description

EquivalentinIodine

131

Lower

Limit

Upper

Limit

7

MajorAccident

Widespreadhealthand

environmentaleffects.External

releaseofasignificantfractionof

reactorcoreinventory.Long-term

environmentalconsequences.

5*1016

-

6

SeriousAccident

Likelythatprotectiveactionsuchas

shelteringandevacuationwillbe

judgednecessarytopreventorlimit

healtheffectsonmembersofthe

public.

5*1015

5*1016

5

Accidentwith

Wider

Consequences

Someprotectiveactionwill

probablyberequired(e.g.localized

shelteringand/orevacuationto

preventorminimizethelikelihood

ofhealtheffects).

5*1014

5*1015

4

Accidentwith

Local

Consequences

Protectiveactionwillprobablynot

berequired,otherthanlocalfood

controls.

5*1013

5*1014

1-3 Nolimits

(1)InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,TheInternationalNuclearandRadiologicalEventScale:User’sManual,2008Edition.Availableat:http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/INES2009_web.pdf

Table2–MultiunitLargeReleaseScenarios

PRA

ReleaseCategory# Description

ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal

events2011

Darlington

PRA

ReleaseCategory1

Verylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination. 4.90E-006

2013

PickeringB

PRA

Release

Category1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsite

radiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination

(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)

2.9E-6

2014

PickeringA

PRA

Release

Category1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsite

radiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination

(greaterthan3%coreinventoryofI-131/Cs-137)

4.69E-6

2013BruceA

PRA

Release

Category0

Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131

occurringmainlyafter24hours.2.9E-6

71

2013BruceAPRA

ReleaseCategory1

Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

2.45E-7

2015BruceBPRA

ReleaseCategory0

Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

4.71E-06

2015BruceBPRA

ReleaseCategory1

Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

4.96E-07

Table3–RecentEarlyReleasesScenarios

PRA

ReleaseCategory# Description

ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal

events2011

DarlingtonPRA

ReleaseCategory2

Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.

3.70E-007

2013PickeringB

PRA

ReleaseCategory1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof(I-131/Cs-137)

2.9E-6

2014PickeringA

PRA

ReleaseCategory1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryofI-131/Cs-137)

4.69E-6

2013BruceAPRA

ReleaseCategory0

Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

2.9E-6

2015BrueBPRA

ReleaseCategory0

Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

4.71E-06

Table4-PickeringAEx-PlantReleaseCategories1995

Ex-PlantReleaseCategory

ReleaseFrequency

(RY)Description(2)

EPRC1 4E-10Alargeunfilteredreleasefromcontainmentintheperiod0-24hoursafteraccidentinitiation.Thereleaseoccursthroughapre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.

EPRC2 5.9E-9Alarge,unfilteredreleasefromcontainmentintheperiod6-24hoursafteraccidentsinitiation.ScenariosareverysimilartoEPRC1exceptthatthereisnopre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.

EPRC3 9.4E-8Anunfilteredreleasefromcontainmentinaperiod1dayto1monthafteraccidentinitiation.ManyoftheeventsequencesinEPRC3involvealatecontainmentfailureduetoahydrogenexplosion.

EPRC4 2.2E-8

Areleasefromcontainmentintheperiod0-6hoursafteraccidentinitiation.Thereleaseoccursthroughapre-existingopeninginthecontainmentenvelope.ManyoftheeventsequencesinEPRC4aresimilartothoseinEPRC1,butthereleaseissmallerbecausesomeofthecontainmentsubsystemsareoperational,mitigatingthedrivingforcesandfilteringtherelease.

EPRC5 1.8E-8Areleasethroughtheheattransportsystemtotheexternalenvironment,bypassingcontainment.Typicalreleasepathwaysinvolvefailureofsteamgeneratortubes,orblowbackthroughtheemergencycoolantinjectionsystem.

72

EPRC6 2.6E-7

Earlyreleasewithinafewsecondoftheaccident,butshortinduration.SequencecouldinvolveaLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)withsubsequencefailuretoshutdownthereactor,resultinginalargepowerexcursion,butwithallcontainmentsubsystemsavailable.

EPRC7 1.3E-4Severecoredamageoccurswiththecontainmentintactandallsubsystemsavailable.

1)TheEx-PlantReleaseCategoryandReleaseFrequencyaretakenfromTable12.2-1ofOPG’s1995PickeringARiskAssessment,MainReport.2)DescriptionsareadaptedfromthesummariesprovidedbyDr.GordonThompsoninhisreporttotheCanadianSenate:AReviewoftheAccidentRiskPosedbythePickering‘A’NuclearGeneratingStation:AReporttotheStandingCommitteeonEnergy,EnvironmentandNaturalResourcesoftheCanadianSenate,2000,pgs.43-44.3)InthePickeringARiskAssessment,OPGdecidednottocalculatethesourcetermandpotentialconsequencesofEPRCs1and2.OPGgavethefollowingreason:“Atsomelevel,thelikelihoodofoccurrenceofaparticularEPRCbecomessufficientlylowthatitcannolongerbemeaningfultoevaluaterisk,irrespectiveoftheconsequences.Belowthislevelthereisnoneedtoevaluatetheconsequencesindetailalthough,thefrequenciesoftheomittedcategoriesshouldstillbeincorporatedintothecomparisonwithsafetygoalsandfinalconclusionsofthestudy.AprecedentexistsforsuchafrequencycutoffintheCanadianlicensingprocess,whereconsequencesanalysisisnotrequiredfortheindividualeventsequenceswhosecalculatefrequencyfallsbelow10-7/year.InthePARA,acutoffof10-8/yearwaschosentoensurethatnoeventofpossiblesignificancejustbelowthe10-7/yearthresholdhadbeenmissed.”PickeringAProbabilisticRiskAssessmentMainReport,Chapter13,p.13-1.4)ThereleaseforEPRCs3–6werecalculatedbymultiplyingthereleasefactionsprovidedinTable13.3-1(p.13-3)ofthePickeringARiskAssessmentforIodineandCesiumagainstthecoreinventoryforeachisotope.TheReleasefractionsforIodineandtheCesiumforeachEPRCareasfollows:EPRC3-2E-3,EPRC4–7E-3,EPRC5–1E-3,EPRC6–3E-4.Table13.4-2statesthataPickeringreactorcorecontains1.93E+18ofIodine-131and5.03E+16ofCesium-137.TheCesiumreleasesweremultipliedby40toexpressthereleasesinradiologicalequivalenceofIodine-131asrequiredbytheInternationalNuclearEventScaleUser’sManual.

Table14-MaximumPlanningAccident(MPA)ReactorStatus EquilibriumHold-upTimeinContainment

24hours**

PowerLevel 1750MW(th)PlumeReleaseHeight 20mReleasestotheEnvironment NobleGases 100%ofcoreinventory***Iodines 0.1%ofcoreinventory***RemovalTime 1dayWeather(fromendofhold-upperiod)

PasquillFweatherforfirst6hours(windspeedof1m/s).PasquillDweatherfornext18hours(windspeedof5m/s)

WindDirection Steadyfor24hoursWindMeander 22.5®*ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–theUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988p.47.**WhenWorkingGroup8madeitsrecommendationsitthoughtthiswasaconservativeassumptionbecause“Changestobemadeintheup-comingyearstothePickeringsitewillresultinalongerhold-uptime.”***Duringhold-up,muchofthenoblegases(andiodine)inventorywilldecaybyradioactivity.Theactualreleaseisthenlessthan100%(or0.1%).

73

Table15-WorstCredibleRadiationEmission(WCRE)*ReactorStatus EquilibriumHold-upTimeinContainment ZeroPowerLevel 1570MW(th)PlumeReleaseHeight 20mReleasestotheEnvironment NobleGases 100%ofCoreinventoryIodines 1%ofCoreinventory**RatesofRelease NobleGases 10%perhourIodines 1%infirsthourWeather(fromendofhold-upperiod)

PasquillFweatherforfirst6hours(windspeedof1m/s).PasquillDweatherfornext18hours(windspeedof5m/s)

WindDirection Steadyfor24hoursWindMeander 22.5®*ReportofProvincialWorkingGroup#8–theUpperLimitforDetailedNuclearEmergencyPlanning,June30,1988,p.65.Table16–1999BruceBEx-PlantReleaseCategoriesReleaseCategory

(1)Characteristics Frequency

(occ/yr)

PopulationDose(P-Sv)

(2)

EPRC1Largeearlyradioactivityreleaseintocontainment(0-24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.

2.8*10-9 32,900

EPRC2

Largedelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment,Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabilitytomitigate.

9.1*10-8 35.400

EPRC3

Significantearlyreleaseintocontainment(0-24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.

2.7*10-8 10,400

EPRC4

Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafteriniatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairement;Explantreleasedrivenbysteamingmitigatedbyvaultcoolers.Or,significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(atleast6hoursafterinitiatingevent);Latecontainmentfailureduetosteam-pressurization;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.

6.9*10-8 8,730

EPRC5

Largedelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingwithvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.

2.0*10-10 22,300

EPRC6Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Pre-existingcontainmentenvelopimpairment;Ex-plantreleasedrivenbysteamingmitigatedbyvaultcoolers.Or,

1.8*10-7 2,800

74

Significantdelayedreleaseintocontainment(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent);Latecontainmentfailureduetosteam-pressurization;Explantreleasedrivenbysteamingvaultcoolersunavailabletomitigate.

EPRC7

Smallreleasefromcontainmentbypass,suchasHTpumpglandsealfailure,boilertuberupture,ECIblowback,pipebreakinD20feed/bleedsystemofLOCA2Asizeoutsidecontainment;Ex-plantreleaseviadirectpathwayoutsidecontainment.

3.5*10-6 760

EPRC8

Significantearlyreleaseintocontainmentduetofailureofreactorshutdown;Pre-existingorearlyconsequentialcontainmentenvelopeimpairment(containmentenvelopecrackduetoover-pressurebysteamsurge);Earlyshort-termex-plantpuff-release.

4.7*10-10 40

EPRC9

Designbasisfuelfailureevents(largeLOCA,singlechanneleventswithcontainmentpressurization,LOCA*ECIandLOCA*ECR,moderatorheatsinkavailable;Earlyex-plantreleaseduetocontainmentbypasswithfailureofboilerSRVcooldown,ordepletedcontainmentvacuumandpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment.

5.9*10-6 240

EPRC10Designbasisfuelfailureevents(seeEPRC9);Intactcontainmentandallcontainmentsystemsavailable;DelayednoblegasreleaseviaEFADS(>24hoursafterinitiatingevent).

5.8*10-5 7

LargeOff-SiteRelease(perunit)EPRC1–6(3) 3.7*10-7 SevereOff-SiteRelease(perunit)EPRC1-3,5 1.2*10-7 (1)ThefirstthreecolumnsaretakenfromTable2-7oftheBBRA,p.29.(2)ThepopulationdoseestimatesaretakenfromTable2-11oftheBBRA,p.36.(3)LargeandSevereReleasesestimatesaretakenfromTables2-2and2-3oftheBBRA.ALargereleaseisdefinedasareleasegreaterthan1percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.ASeverereleaseisdefinedasareleasegreaterthan10percentofthecoreinventoryofcesium-137.

Table17–2003BruceARiskAssessment

ReleaseCategory

MeanFrequency(occurrencesperreactoryear)

MeanIndividualDose(mSv)

MeanIndividualRisks(Sv.y-1)

PopulationRisks(Person-Syy-1)

EPRC1 1.5*10-7 >3000* * 4.9*10-3

EPRC2 3.6*10-7 >3000* * 1.3*10-2

EPRC3 6.4*10-8 >3000* * 6.7*10-4

EPRC4 8.6*10-8 >3000* * 7.5*10-4

EPRC5 2.2*10-9 260 5.7*10-10 5.0*10-5

EPRC6 9.1*10-7 3000 2.7*10-6 2.5*10-3

EPRC7 2.6*10-5 590 1.5*10-5 2.0*10-2

EPRC8 7.0*10-10 220 1.5*10-10 2.8*10-8

EPRC9 2.8*10-5 270 7.6*10-6 6.7*10-3

EPRC10 3.0*10-5 37 1.1*10-6 2.1*10-4

Totalrisk(perunit) 3.5*10-5 4.6*10-2

Totalrisk(per4unitstation) 1.4*10-4 1.8*10-1

*SinceEPRC1,2,3and4arepredictedtoresultinanimmediateindividualdoseof>3000mSv,theyareconsideredintheanalysistocontributetoanearlyfatalityrisk.ThetotalcontributionofEPRC1toEPRC4toearlyfatalityiscalculatedasthesumoftheindividualmeanfrequencies,or6.6*10-7perunit,or2.7*10-6forfourunits.(1in1,520000reactoryears)

75

Table3.5.11-5,3-110,BruceARefurbishmentforLifeExtensionandContinuedOperationsProject,EAStudyReport

Table18–2005BruceARiskAssessmentUpdate

SafetyGoal

Consequencecategories

contributingtoSafetyGoal

SafetyLimit(perreactoryearunlessotherwisestated)

Calculatedfrequency(Notes1)

Integratedfrequencyofcontributors

(PRY)Note2

ComparisonofIntegrated

Frequencywithlimit

SevereCoreDamage(SCD)

FDC1-ICFDC1-OCFDC2-ICFDC2-OC

1E-4 6.55E-81.16E-127.72E-53.64E-5

5.7E-5* MeetsLimit

EarlyFatality(EF)

EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC4

1E-5persiteyear

2.61E-88.60E-71.02E-84.97E-8

4.5E-7* MeetsGoal

DelayedFatality(DF)

EPRC5EPRC6EPRC7EPRC8EPRC9EPRC10

1E-4persiteyear

1.42E-9/1.85E-119.36E-7*/1.4E-7*3.88E-5/1.15E-60.02.06E-5/2.7E-74E-5/7.4E-8

1.3E-6* MeetsLimit

LargeRelease(LR)

EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC4EPRC5EPRC6

1E-5 2.61E-88.6E-71.02E-84.97E-81.42E-99.36E-7*

1.3E-6* MeetsLimit

SevereRelease(SR)

EPRC1**EPRC2**EPRC3EPRC5

1E-6 2.61E-88.6E-71.02E-81.42E-9

4.1E-7* MeetsLimit

TheseresultsarefromtheBruceANuclearGeneratingStationProbabilisticRiskAssessment,BAPRAUpdatePart1SummaryReport,P.A.Robinson,NSSReport11575/TR/001Issue01,February2005.CitedinReviewofBruceNGSAAgainstModernSafetyStandards:SummaryReport,March2006,preparedbyR.A.Brown&AssociatesLtd.,AcquiredthroughAccesstoInformation.*indicatesthatthefrequencyhasremoveddouble-accountingbothwithinanindividualconsequencecategoryandwhererelevantbetweenthecontributorsfromdifferentconsequencescategories.FortheDelayedFatalitygoal,asaconservativesimplification,theoverallfrequencypresentedissimplythesumoftherisksfromindividualEPRCcontributors.**ItisnoteworthythatthereleasefractionforI-131forEPRC1and2isover50%.ForCs-137thereleasefractionis50%inthecaseofEPRC-1is52%and76%forEPRC-2.Source:CNSC–ProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentandReliabilityDivision,BruceAProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PAPRA)DetailedReview:MainReport,DocumentFileNumber:26-1-7-4-3,pg.161.

Table19–2008PickeringBRiskAssessment

EPRC Characteristics Frequency(Occ/yr)

76

1Fastaccidentprogression(<6hours),coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentorearlyconsequentialcontainmentenvelopefailureandunavailabilityofcontainmentheatremovalsystems

1.1*10-10

2 Delayedaccidentprogression(>6hours),coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentandunavailabilityofcontainmentheatremovalsystems. 1*10-11

3 Fastaccidentprogression,coupledwithpre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairmentbutcontainmentheatremovalsystemsavailable 1*10-11

4 Fastaccidentprogressioninwhichpartialimpairmentof,containmentsystemsleadstopotentialforenhancedrelease 2.4*10-10

5aSlowaccidentprogressionthatresultsinlate(>24hours)releasesfromcontainment.EPRC5Aisconsideredtohavethepotentialforseverecoredamageinmorethanasingleunit.

7.1*10-7

5b Slowaccidentprogressionthatresultsinlate(>24hours)releasesfromcontainment.EPRC5Baffectsasingleunitonly. 2.1*10-8

6 Slowaccidentprogressionbutinvolvingadirectpathwayforradioactivereleasethatinitiallybypassescontainment 1*10-11

7 Delayedaccidentprogressioninwhichpartialimpairmentofcontainmentsystemsleadstopotentialforenhancedrelease. 1*10-11

8 Non-severeaccidentsinconjunctionwithapre-existingcontainmentenvelopeimpairment.Releaseispredominantlythroughacontrolled,filteredpathway. 1.3*10-6

9 Severeaccidentsequencesinwhichthecontainmentenvelopeisintactanallcontainmentsystemsareavailable.Releaseisthroughacontrolledfilteredpathway.

1.0x10-6

LargeReleaseFrequency(perunit)EPRC1-5,5A,7(2) 7.1*10-7

(1)ThistableistakenfromTable3inthe2008PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.45(2)TheLargeReleaseFrequencyistakenfromTable4ofthe2008PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.46.

Table20–PickeringBEPRC5SourceTerm

SingleUnit Multi-unitAccidentRadionuclide Release(Bq) Release(Bq)

Kr-85 1.43E+15 5.72E+15Kr-85m 1.47E+17 5.88E+17Kr-87 2.90E+17 1.16E+18Kr-88 4.10E+17 1.64E+18Xe-133 1.20E+17 4.80E+17Xe-135 1.20E+17 4.80E+17I-131 6.13E+14 2.45E+15I-132 9.09E+14 3.64E+151-133 1.29E+15 5.16E+15I-134 1.40E+15 5.60E+15I-135 1.20E+15 4.80E+15Cs-134 7.59E+12 3.04E+13Cs-136 1.12E+13 4.48E+13Cs-137 1.77E+13 7.08E+13Rb-86 2.11E+11 8.44E+11Sb-127 4.46E+13 1.78E+14Sb-129 1.54E+14 6.16E+14

77

Source:K.S.Dinnie(Director,NuclearSafetySolutions)toE.Marczak(OPG),“PickeringLifeExtensionProject:AccidentalAirandWaterborneReleaseforPickeringBEnvironmentalAssessment–EPRC5,letter,January19,2007,AcquiredthroughFreedomofInformation.

Table21–2008PickeringBAssessmentwithAccidentCategories

ReleaseSource ReleaseEventMean

Frequency(/Yr)

IndividualRisk(2) SocietalRisk(1)

IndividualDose IndividualRisk(8)

NormalOperation Routine 1.0 6.8E-6 3.4E-7 N/A

DesignBasis FDC3-5(8) 1.13E-3(3) 1.13E-3(3) 7.6E-8 6.6E-4

Te-127 4.20E+13 1.68E+14Te-127m 3.58E+12 1.43E+13Te-129 1.50E+14 6.00E+14Te-129m 2.04E+13 8.16E+13Te-131m 7.28E+13 2.91E+14Te-132 6.97E+14 2.79E+15Sr-89 3.90E+12 1.56E+13Sr-90 9.34E+10 3.74E+11Sr-91 5.64E+12 2.26E+13Sr-92 6.07E+12 2.43E+13Mo-99 1.29E+13 5.16E+13Rh-105 5.98E+12 2.39E+13Ru-103 9.15E+12 3.66E+13Ru-105 6.86E+12 2.74E+13Ru-106 1.30E+12 5.20E+12Tc-99m 1.14E+13 4.56E+13La-140 9.65E+11 3.86E+12La-141 9.11E+11 3.64E+12La-142 8.77E+11 3.51E+12Nb-95 6.17E+11 2.47E+12Nd-147 3.40E+11 1.36E+12Pr-143 8.18E+11 3.27E+12Y-90 1.12E+10 4.48E+10Y-91 5.90E+11 2.36E+12Y-92 7.24E+11 2.90E+12Y-93 8.26E+11 3.30E+12Zr-95 7.19E+11 2.88E+12Zr-97 9.25E+11 3.70E+12Ce-141 4.86E+12 1.94E+13Ce-143 4.91E+12 1.96E+13Ce-144 1.74E+12 6.96E+12Ba-139 6.65E+14 2.66E+15Ba-140 6.49E+14 2.60E+15

78

Accidents FDC6-8 3.81E-3(4) 4.53E-5(4) 8.6E-9 7.5E-5

SevereAccidents

EPRC1EPRC2EPRC3EPRC4EPRC5AEPRC5BEPRC6EPRC7EPRC8EPRC9

1.1E-101E-111E-112.4E-107.1E-72.1E-81E-111E-111.3E-61E-6

1.4(5)

0.42(5)

0.55(5)

0.23(5)

0.51(9)

0.013(5)

0.14(5)

0.69(5)

1.2E-3(10)

4.5E-3(5)

7.6E-122.08E-132.76E-132.8E-121.8E-9(10)1.3E-117E-143.5E-137.9E-112.3E-10

2.1E-78E-99.9E-99.5E-83.2E-52.4E-71.8E-91.1E-87.1E-72E-6

TotalQuantifiedAccidentRisk(1Unit)

8.7E-8(11) 7.7E-4(11)

TotalQuantifiedAccidentRisk(4Units) 3.4E-7(11) 3E-3(11)

Totalrisk(NormalOperation+ReactorAccidents) 6.8E-7 6E-31.Within100kmradiusofstation2.Atsiteboundaryassumedtobeabout1km.3.FDC3-5Cumulativedoseassumedtobe25%ofEPRC9dose.4.FDC6-8Cumulativedoseassumedtobe1%ofEPRC9dose.5.IndividualDose–(a)EmergencyphaseandLongtermdirectexposuredoseat1km,plus(b)anadditional1%foringestion.6.IndividualRisk=Annualprobabilityoffatalitytocriticalindividual;SocietalRisk=Fatalitiesperyearwithin100kmofPickeringNGS.7.Contributionfornormaloperationassumedtobesameasforindividualriskonarelative-percentagebasis.8.NoteFDC=FuelDamageCategory.Includesat-powerandshutdowncontribution,andinsideandoutsidecontainment.9.EPRC5Aconsequenceisestimatedtobe4*EPRC5B.10.IndividualDose=(a)EmergencyphaseandLongtermdirectexposuredoseat1km,plus(b)anadditional1%ingestion,plus(c)individualdoseforFDC3-5.11.SingleunittotaldoesnotincludeEPRC5A;4unittotal=1*EPRC5Aplus4*(1unittotal).Source:OPG,PickeringBRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,ReleaseNovember14,2008.

Table22–2011DarlingtonAssessmentSummaryforExternalEvents

ExternalEventSevereCoreDamageFrequency

LargeRelease

FrequencyFireAt-Power 1.9E-6 9.7E-8

SeismicAt-Power(1) 3.7E-6 3.7E-6FloodingAt-Power 4.8E-7 4.8E-7(2)

1)Seismicresultsreportedforeventswithafrequencyofoccurrenceupto1E-4(recurrenceintervalof10,000years)2)LRFforat-powerinternalfloodingwasnotassessedduetothelowfrequencyofseverecoredamage.LRFisboundedbySCDfrequency.Source:OPG,DarlingtonNGSRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,REP-03611-10072,May29,2012,pg.96.

Table23–2011DarlingtonRiskAssessment

ReleaseCategory# Description

BaselinePredictedFrequencyPerReactorYear(1)

PopulationDose(person-SV)(2)

LatentCancerFatalities

79

(1)ThesearethebaselinepredictedfrequenciestakenfromTable16oftheDarlingtonNGSRiskAssessment

SummaryReport.ThesearebeforeOPGchangedmodelingassumptionstoreducetheprobabilityofthe

severeaccidentRC1.

(2)BasedonOPG'sprojected2013populationtoaradiusof100kmfromDarlingtonsite.Notably,the

ScreeningReportindicatesthatthepopulationdoseforRC7willdoubleby2055becauseofpopulationgrowthwithintheGTA.

(3)LatentCancerfatalitiesiscalculatedbyusingariskcoefficientof0.05deathsperPerson-Sv.Thismethod

hasalsobeenusedbyOPG.

Table24-PickeringBReleaseCategories2013(1)

ReleaseCategory# Description

ReleaseFrequencywithoutexternal

events

Release

Category1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffects

and/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof

(I-131/Cs-137)

2.9E-6

Release

Category2

Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”definition

(greaterthan1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurringmainly

within24hours)

N/A

Release

Category3

Delayedlargereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”

definition(greaterthan1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring

mainlywithin24hours)

9.7E-07

Release

Category4

Earlysmallreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease”definition

(greaterthan1015BqofI-131butlessthanRC2occurringmainly

within24hours)

N/A

(3)

RC1Verylargereleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffectsand/orwidespreadcontamination.

4.90E-006 6.00E+004 3000

RC2Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.

3.70E-007 1.20E+003 60

RC3Latereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“LargeRelease”ofmorethan1014BecquerelofCesium-137.

0 Notavailable.

RC4 Earlyreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease” 2.00E-009 1.10E+003 55

RC5 Latereleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease” Notavailable. Notavailable.

RC6 GreaterthannormalcontainmentleakagebelowSmallReleaselimit. Notavailable. Notavailable.

RC7Normalcontainmentleakage.Leakageacrossanintactcontainmentenvelopeorlong-termfilteredrelease.

1.50E-006 5.40E+001 2.70

RC8 BasematMelt-through.Noreleasetoatmosphere. 4.90E-006

80

Release

Category5

Delayedsmallreleaseinexcessofsafetygoal“SmallRelease”

definition(greaterthan1015BqofI-131butlessthanRC3occurring

mainlyafter24hours)

2.0E-7

Release

Category6

Mitigatedbutgreaterthannormalcontainmentleakageandbelow

SmallReleaselimit(greaterthan1014BqofI-131butlessthanRC5

occurringmainlyafter24hours).

N/A

Release

Category7

Normalleakagethroughanintactcontainmentandfilteredrelease

occurringmainlyafter24hours.N/A

Release

Category8

Undergroundreleaseviabasematmelt-through.Noreleaseto

atmosphere.N/A

1)ThefirsttwocolumnsofthistableweretakenfromTable9ofthePickeringBRiskAssessmentSummary

Report(p.101).ColumnthreeistakenTable15ofthesamereport(p.107).

2)TheIodineReleasecolumnwascalculatedbymultiplyingthereleasefractionsmentionedinthesecond

columnwiththecoreinventoryofIodine-131.Iodinewaschosenbecauseitisusedtodetermineratingson

theInternationalNuclearEventScale.BecausethecoreinventoryforthePickeringBreactorswasnotreadily

available,thePickeringAinventorywasusedasanequivalent.See:Table13.4-1,“RadioactiveInventoryof

ReactorCore”,PickeringARiskAssessmentMainReport,1995,p.13-8.

Table25–PickeringAReleaseCategories2014

Release

CategoryDescription(1)

Frequency

(2)

INES

Level

Release

Category1

Largeearlyreleasewithpotentialforacuteoffsiteradiationeffects

and/orwidespreadcontamination(greaterthan3%coreinventoryof

I-131/Cs-137)

4.69E-6 7

Release

Category2

Releaseinexcessof1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring

within24hours.N/A 6?

Release

Category3

Releaseinexcessof1014BqofCs-137butlessthanRC1occurring

after24hours.3.45-8 6

1)ThefirstandsecondcolumnsaretakenfromTable7ofthePickeringARiskAssessment.Thesummed

LargeReleaseFrequencyis4.72E-6.

2)ThethirdcolumnistakenfromTable12ofthe2014PickeringARiskAssessment.Thesefrequency

estimatesexcludeexternalevents.

Table26–2013BruceAat-PowerInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults

ReleaseCategory(RC) FrequencyFrequencywith

EMECreditDescription

RC0 2.9E-6 6.32E-7

Earlyverylargerelease->~3%core

inventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24

hours.

RC1 2.45E-7 4.25E-8

Lateverylargerelease->~3%core

inventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24

hours.

RC2 6.72E-6 7.91E-7

EarlyRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureof

fissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-

137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131

occurringmainlywithin24hours

RC3 1.21E-12 1.05E-13 LateRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureof

81

fissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131

occurringmainlyafter24hours.

RC4 7.68E-8 7.65E-9

EarlyRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015Bqof1-

131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlywithin24hours.

RC5 2.03E-12 4.97E-14

LateRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015BqofI-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurring

mainlyafter24hours.

RC6 1.47E-6 2.97E-7

Mitigatedrelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofI-131but<1015BqofI-131occurringmainlyafter24

hours.

RC7 6.52E-6 1.93E-6 CETSuccessPath–Slowreleasecontaining<1014BqofI-131.

RC8 2.19E-6 3.67E-7 BasematMelt-through–PenetrationofFMDconcretebasematduetoCCI

LargeReleaseFrequencyTotal 9.87E-6 3.67E-7 SumofRC0toRC3

SmallReleaseFrequencyTotal 9.95E-6 1.47E-6 SumofRC0toRC5.

Source:AttachmentA–BruceAandBruceBInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults,F.Saunders(BrucePower)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“GreenpeaceInformationRequest,”letter,February13,2015.

Table27-BruceBat-PowerInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults

ReleaseCategory Frequency FrequencywithEMECredit Description

ReleaseCategory0 4.71E-06 5.9E-7 Earlyverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryof1-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

ReleaseCategory1 4.96E-07 6.2E-8 Lateverylargerelease->~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

ReleaseCategory2 2.70E-07 3.61E-8

EarlyRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainly

within24hours

ReleaseCategory3 1.43E-08 1.99-9

LateRD-152LargeRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofCs-137but<~3%coreinventoryofI-131occurringmainly

after24hours.

ReleaseCategory4 1.74E-7 2.05E-8

EarlyRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015Bqof1-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlywithin24

hours.

ReleaseCategory5 0 0LateRD-152SmallRelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1015BqofI-131but<1014BqofCs-137occurringmainlyafter24hours.

ReleaseCategory6 5.74E-6 1.38E-6Mitigatedrelease–Mixtureoffissionproductscontaining>1014BqofI-131but<1015BqofI-

131occurringmainlyafter24hours.

82

ReleaseCategory7 4.08E-6 1.33E-6CETSuccessPath–Slowreleasecontaining<

1014BqofI-131.

ReleaseCategory8 4.94E-6 6.2E-7BasematMelt-through–PenetrationofFMD

concretebasematduetoCCI

LargeReleaseFrequencyTotal

5.49E-6 6.93E-7 SumofRC0toRC3

SmallReleaseFrequencyTotal

5.67E-6 7.14E-7 SumofRC0toRC5.

Source:AttachmentA–BruceAandBruceBInternalEventsLevel2ReleaseCategoryResults,F.Saunders(BrucePower)toS-PStensil(Greenpeace),“GreenpeaceInformationRequest,”letter,February13,2015.

Table28–VariationsinDarlingtonLargeReleaseFrequency

DARA2012(1) DARA2015(2)

ReleaseCategoryBaselinePredictedFrequency

EnhancedModel

withSIOs

EnhancedModelwithoutSIOs

BaselinePredictedFrequencywithEMEs

WithEMEandSIOs(3)

D-RC1(Alevel7INESaccidentwithmorethe3%ofI-131tothe

environment)

4.9E-06 5.1E-08 7.8E-07 5.0E-07OPGwouldnot

provide.GreenpeaceEstimate:2E-7

D-RC2(Alevel6INESaccidentwithreleasesequivalenttothe

CNSC’ssevereaccidentstudy)

3.7E-07 3.6E-07 5.2E-07 5.2E-07OPGwouldnot

provide.GreenpeaceEstimate:2E-7

D-RC3 0 0 0 0 0

SummedFrequencyofLargeReleasesCategories 5.27E-06 4.11E-07 1.3.6 1E-6 4E-7(4)

(1)TheDARA2012numbersweretakenfromTable16DarlingtonRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.104.(2)TheDARA2015numbersweretakenfromTable17ofthe2015DarlingtonRiskAssessmentSummaryReport,p.110.ItshouldbenotedthatGreenpeacerequestedDARAfrequencyestimateswithoutcreditforEmergencyMitigatingEquipment,butOPGrefused.(3)GreenpeacerequestedOPGprovideReleaseCategoryestimateswithoutcreditforbothEMEsandSIOs.OPGrespondedthat:“IntheLevel2InternalEventsforAt-PowerPSAthecasewithnoEMEorSIOsisonlyasensitivitycase.Assuch,theresultsofthissensitivitycasewerenotderivedonanindividualreleasecategorybasis.TheLRFwithoutEMEorSIOsis1.5E-6occurrencesperreactoryear.”(MemorandumtoGreenpeace,“ResponsetoRequestfromGreenpeaceforInformationfromDarlingtonNGSProbabilisticSafetyAssessment”September10,2015,N-CORR-03611-0562767LOF)ThisimpliesthatEMEsimpactonlargereleasefrequencyisapproximately0.5E-6(1.5E-6withoutEMEscomparedto1E-6).(4)Table13ofthe2015indicatesthatthesummedLRFwithEMEsandSIOsis4E-7.BasedonthisGreenpeaceestimatestheRC1andRC2wouldbeequalto2E-7each.

Attachment2

1

June12,2018

MatthewTorigian

DeputyMinisterofCommunitySafety

MinistryofCommunitySafetyand

CorrectionalServices

25GrosvenorStreet11thFloor

Toronto,Ontario

M7A1Y6

Re:Ensuringtheimpartialityofthepublicserviceinregardtonuclearemergencyplanning

DearDeputyMinisterTorigian,

IwritetoseekclarificationonthestepstheMinistryhastakentoensurethepublicserviceis

competentandfreefromconflictofinterestincarryingoutitsresponsibilitytoprotectpublic

safetyintheeventofanuclearemergency.

OverthepastseveralyearsGreenpeacehasbecomeincreasinglyconcernedthattheOntario

publicservice’sresponsibilitytoupholdthepublicinterest–andpublicsafety–mayhavebeen

compromisedbyitsrelianceonreactoroperatorsforpolicyadvice.TheAuditorGeneralof

OntarioechoedGreenpeace’sconcerninher2017report,whichnotedthatin2015astaff

memberwaspaiddirectlybyanuclearpowercompanywhilebeingworkingattheMinistry.The

AuditorobservedthatthistypeofarrangementcouldposearisktotheMinistry’sobjectivity.

Greenpeaceagrees.

I’mcontactingyounowbecauseithascometoGreenpeace’sattentionthattheMinistryhas

continuedtorelyonstafffromnuclearcompaniestocarryoutitsfunctions.

InthedocumentattachedtothisletterIhighlightseveralexamplesofhowtheMinistry’s

relianceonOntarioPowerGeneration(OPG)staffmayhavecompromisedethicaland

professionalbehaviourofthepublicservice.Iamconcernedthatthisongoingrelianceon

nuclearindustrystaffmayhavecompromisedtheneutralityofthepublicservice.

Asyouknow,thepurposeofPublicServiceofOntarioAct(hereinPublicServicesAct)isto

ensurethepublicserviceiseffective,non-partisan,professional,ethicalandcompetent.

UpholdingthesevaluesisneededsothatbothOntariansandMinisterscantrustandhave

confidenceinthepolicies,proposalsandprogramsoverseenbythepublicservice.

ThePublicServiceActrequirespublicservantstotakestepstoavoidanyconflictofinterest

betweentheirprofessionaldutiesandtheirprivateaffairs.Staffsecondedfromnuclear

companiesareinaclearconflictofinterest.Whilethepublicserviceismandatedtoadvancethe

publicinterest,nuclearcompaniesaremotivatedbyprofit.Giventhatnuclearcompaniespay

2

foremergencyresponsemeasures,industrystaffmaynotsupportstrengtheningpublicsafetyif

itleadstoincreasedcostsforreactoroperators.IhaveseennoevidencethattheMinistryhas

reflectedontheimpactitsrelianceonnuclearoperatorsmayhaveonpublicsafetyandpublic

trust.

Forthisreason,Iaskyoutoprovideclarityonwhatstepshavebeentakentoensuretheethical

andneutraloperationofthepublicserviceinregardtoitsresponsibilitytooverseethe

adequacyofnuclearemergencyresponse.ThiswillalsohelpclarifywhethertheMinistryhas

soughttorespecttheobjectivesofthePublicServicesAct.

Ithusrespectfullyrequestresponsestothefollowingquestions:

• PleaseprovidealistofallstaffloanedorsecondedtotheMinistryofCommunitySafety

toassistwiththeoversightofnuclearemergencyresponsesincethe2011Fukushima

disaster.Pleaseincludetheirresponsibilitiesandtheperiodduringwhichtheyassisted

theMinistry.

• Foreachstaffmembersecondedorloanedfromanuclearcompany,suchasOPG,

pleasestatewhethertheMinistrysoughtadvicefromtheConflictofInterest

Commissionerregardingtheethicalacceptabilityandpotentialconflictsofinterest.If

advicewasnotrequestedfromtheConflictofInterestCommissioner,werethereother

formalprocessesusedtoevaluatetheethicalacceptabilityofthesesecondments?

• HastheMinistryestablishedanypoliciesorprocedurestoensurearrangementswith

nuclearcompaniesdonotimpedetheMinistry’sabilitytoobjectivelyassessnuclear

risksandprovideunbiasedanalysistotheMinisterandthepublic?Pleaseindicate

whetherthesedocumentspubliclyavailable.

• TheMinistryappearstohaveanongoingandinformalrelianceonOPG,whichisa

Crowncorporation,fortechnicalandstaffingsupport.HastheMinistryestablishedany

guidelinesorprocedurestoensureOPG’sbusinessinterestsdonotundulyinfluence

governmentoperations,advicetotheMinisterorrelationshipswithpublic

stakeholders?

• HastheMinistryassessedthestaffingneedsandfinancialsupportrequiredto

implementthelatestProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP)aswellas

anyCanadianNuclearSafetyCommissionrequirementsthatmayimpactMinistry

operations?

Thankyouforyourattention.Greenpeacemakestheserequestsinthehopethattheywillhelp

clarifywhatactionstheMinistryhastakentoensuretheintegrityofitsoversightofnuclear

emergencyresponse.

Intheeventthattherehasbeeninsufficientconsiderationoftheseissues,Greenpeacewill

supportandencouragepoliciesandactionstostrengthentheindependenceandcompetencyof

thepublicservice.

3

Truly,

Shawn-PatrickStensil

SeniorEnergyAnalyst

GreenpeaceCanada

33CecilSt.,

Toronto,Ontario

M5T1N1

CC:

SidneyB.Linden,ConflictofInterestCommission

BonnieLysyk,AuditorGeneralofOntario

BrianBeamish,InformationandPrivacyCommissioner

J.DavidWake,TheOfficeoftheIntegrityCommissioner

Marie-FranceLalonde,MPP,Ottawa-Orléans

TheHonourableAndreaHorvath,LeaderoftheOpposition

MikeSchreiner,MPPGuelph,LeaderoftheGreenPartyofOntario

4

SummaryofConcerns

Sincethe2011theFukushimaaccidentbegan,Greenpeacehasbeenraisingconcernsrelatedto

theadequacyofOntario’sProvincialNuclearEmergencyResponsePlan(PNERP).Wehave

attemptedtoencouragethemodernizationofthePNERPandhaveputasignificantamountof

effortintodevelopingandproposingconstructiveproposalsforimprovingpublicsafety.

Greenpeaceisveryconcernedthatthevalueofoureffortsmayhavebeencompromisedby

whatwebelievetobeaneffectivelackofseparationbetweennuclearcompanies,inparticular

OntarioPowerGeneration(OPG),andtheMinistryofCommunitySafetyandCorrectional

Services(henceforthreferredtoas“theMinistry”).

TheMinistryhasasignificantresponsibility:protectingpublicsafety.Thegovernmentneedsan

impartialpublicservicetoensureitreceivesadvicethatisinformedbythepublicinterest,

objectiveandindependent.Impartialityalsoencouragespublicconfidenceandtrustin

governmentoversightandensuresthatpublicconcernsreceivefairandobjectivetreatmentno

mattertheirpoliticalviews.

TheOntariogovernmentisalsoOPG’ssoleshareholder.OPG’soperationsatthePickeringand

DarlingtonnuclearstationsareapublicsafetyriskandrequiretheMinistrytoprepare

emergencyresponseplans.AsOPGpaysforoffsitenuclearemergencymeasuresaroundits

stations,ithasafinancialinterestinlimitingtheirexpansion.

Notably,unlikeBrucePower,OPGdoesnotappearontheOfficeoftheIntegrityCommissioner’s

LobbyistRegistry.GreenpeaceisconcernedthatOPG’sstatusasaCrownCorporationmayhave

ledgovernmentauthoritiestotreatOPGasanextensionofthepublicserviceinsteadoflike

privatecompany.ThisraisesquestionswhethertheviewsofGreenpeaceandothercivilsociety

intervenershavebeentreatedfairlybythepublicservice.GivenOPG’sbusinessinterests,itmay

alsoraisequestionsregardingtheobjectivityandindependenceofadviceprovidedto

government.

Itisastatedpurposepersection1(1)ofthePublicServiceAct“Toensurethatthepublicservice

ofOntarioisnon-partisan,professional,ethicalandcompetent.”Thisdocumentaimstoprovide

severalexamplesofgovernmentactivitiesthatmayhavecontravenedatleastthespiritofthe

PublicServiceAct.ThemajorityoftheexamplesrelatetotheMinistry’sdirectorinformal

relianceonOPGindevelopingoradvisingonpolicyrelatedtonuclearemergencyplanningin

theProvinceofOntario.

Thatsaid,ethicalbehaviourwithinthepublicservicerequiresreflectingupontheimpactof

decisions,especiallywherethepublicinterestobjectivesofthegovernmentmaybeinfluenced

byprivateinterests.Greenpeacewishestobetterunderstandwhat,ifany,processesarein

placetosafeguardormitigatethepotentialforOPG’sprivatebusinessintereststoimpact

governmentdecision-makingandtherelationshipbetweentheMinistryandnon-industryactors

suchasGreenpeace.

5

DirectRelianceonOPGstaff

TheAuditorGeneralofOntario’s2017reportobservedthattheMinistry’sresponsibilityfor

nuclearemergencyresponserequiresittohaveexpertstaffabletoprovidethegovernment

“…withindependentandobjectiveadvice.”However,theAuditorconverselynotedthatthe

Ministryhadfailedtofillkeypositionsandreliedinsteadona“…networkofretirednuclear

powercompanystaffandanuclearconsultinggroup.”In2015,theMinistryevenreliedonstaff

paiddirectlybyanuclearcompany.1

TheAuditorconcludedthat:“ThistypeofarrangementcouldposearisktoEMO’s[Emergency

ManagementOntario]objectivity”andrecommendedtheMinistry“useindependentnuclear

expertiseatalltimestoassessnuclearrisks,plansandresponsestrategies.”Inresponse,the

MinistryagreedwiththeAuditor’sconcernsandrecognized“…theneedforindependenceand

clarityinitsarrangementswiththenuclearpowercompanies.”2

Despitethis,ithascometoGreenpeace’sattentionthattheMinistryhascontinuedtorelyon

nuclearcompanystafftocarryoutitsresponsibilitiesfornuclearemergencyresponse.

AccordingtohisLinkedInprofile,OPGemployeeJimColeshasapparentlybeen“Onloanfrom

OPGtosupport[the]developmentoftheProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan”sinceJuly2017.

Mr.ColeswasOPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementandFireProtectionfrom2012to

2015.

AsOPG’sDirectorofEmergencyManagementandFireProtection,Mr.Coleschairedthe

committeein2013thatdevelopedCanadianStandardsAssociationGroupstandardN1600,

Generalrequirementsfornuclearemergencymanagementprograms.Notably,CSAstandards

aredevelopedusingaconsensus-basedprocessamongindustrystakeholdersandgovernment

agencies.ThismeansthatOPGorBrucePowercanblocktheadoptionofanyproposed

standardsthatmayconflictwiththeirfinancialinterests.Thestandardwasalsodeveloped

withoutpublicconsultation.Notably,thestandardsubsequentlybecameastandardagainstthe

PNERPwasre-assessedandupdated.

Thus,OPGhashadprivilegedaccesstoinfluencethescopeofrevisionstoPNERPthroughMr.

Coles.OutsideofgovernmentOPGhasbeenabletoinfluenceCSAStandardN1600in2013and

nowinsidetheMinistrythroughMr.Coles’apparentsecondmenttoassistwiththe

developmentofthe2017PNERP.GreenpeaceencouragestheMinistrytoclarifyMr.Coles

presentroleandresponsibilitiesingovernmentaswellaswhatprocedureshavebeenputin

placetomitigatethepotentialinfluenceofhisemployer.

InformalRelianceonOPGstaff ThroughdocumentationobtainedthroughFreedomofInformationlegislation,Greenpeacehas

notedthatMinistrystaffhaveshownatendencytoinformallyrelyonOPGstaffforadviceon

technicalmatters.ThisisanindicationthattheMinistrylackssufficientstaffwithtechnical

expertisetomaketechnicalassessmentsindependently.

1AuditorGeneralofOntario,AnnualReport,Chapter3,Section3.04–EmergencyManagementinOntario,December

2017,pg.253.2Ibid.,pg.254,

6

TheglaringexamplewhichbestillustratesthisinformalrelianceonOPGstaffoccurredafter

Greenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclear

Awareness(DNA)metwithMadeleineMeilleur,theMinisterofPublicSafetyandCorrectional

Services,inAugust2013.Themeetingwasinitiatedduetoconcernstheorganizationsraised

duringCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC)hearingsonOPG’sapplicationtocontinue

operatingthePickeringnuclearstationinMay2013.TheMinistry’sinadequateoversightof

nuclearemergencypreparednesswasafocusofdiscussionduringthesehearings.

Alsoraisedatthehearing,werefindingsfromOPG’smostrecentriskassessmentforthe

Pickeringnuclearstation.Thisassessmentfoundthatanaccidentleadingtoalargeradiation

releasewasmuchmorelikelythanpreviouslythought.Indeed,inthe1990stheRoyalSocietyof

Canada(RSC)recommendedthatthegovernmentputinplace“…detailedemergencyplanning

shouldbedoneforaccidentsresultingfromacredibleseriesofeventswhichcouldoccurwitha

probabilityofapproximately10-7/reactoryear.”

3Risksassessmentsatthetimeshowed

accidentsmeetingthiscriteriadidnotleadtolargeradioactivereleases.However,therisk

assessmentpublishedbyOPGin2013foundmajoraccidentswouldmeetthecriteriaproposed

bytheRoyalSocietyofCanadafordetailedplanning.

Unfortunately,GreenpeacehasfoundnoevidenceshowingthatMinistryhasindependently

reviewedthesignificanceoftheaforementionedriskstudiesbeforeorafterourmeetingwith

theMinister.Onthecontrary,correspondenceobtainedthroughFreedomofInformationshows

that,inresponsetoarequestfromtheMinister,MinistrystaffaskedOPGtoprovidetheir

analysisoftheissue(seeAttachment2).Basedthis,Greenpeaceisdeeplyconcernedthatthe

issuesithasraisedwiththeMinisterhaveineffectbeendealtwithbyOPG.InGreenpeace’s

view,thisexemplifieshowthelackofindependentexpertisewithintheMinistryhasleadto

possibleunfairtreatmentofstakeholdersbythepublicservice.

Notably,MinisterMeilleurcommittedtoholdapublicconsultationonnuclearemergency

responseduringtheAugust2013meeting.However,thispublicconsultationdidnotoccuruntil

May2017.AccordingtootherdocumentsacquiredthroughFreedomofInformation,the

MinistrycontinuedtoconsultbehindcloseddoorswithOPGandotherindustrystakeholderson

possiblechangestothePNERPthroughoutthisperiod.

OPG’sOrganizationalInterestsinthePNERPConsultationGreenpeaceisconcernedthatOPG’sprivateinterestsmayhaveinfluencedthetimingandscope

ofMinistry’s2017publicconsultationonnuclearemergencypreparedness.

Asnoted,MinisterMeilleurcommittedtoholdapublicreviewonnuclearemergencyresponse

in2013,buttheconsultationdidnotoccuruntil2017.Theadequacyoftheprovince’s

emergencypreparednesswasalsoafocusoftheCNSC’sreviewofOPG’sapplicationforfive-

yearoperationallicenseforthePickeringnuclearstation.ThislicenceexpiresinJuly2018and

willbereviewedthissummer.

3IW.R.Bruceetal,ReporttotheMinistryoftheEnvironmentandEnergyconcerningtwotechnicalmattersinthe

ProvincialNuclearEmergencyPlan,RoyalSocietyofCanada&CanadianAcademyofEngineering,November1996,pg.

33.

7

AccordingtodocumentsobtainedthroughFreedomofInformation,OPGwasconcernedany

furtherdelayinupdatingOntario’snuclearemergencyresponseplansbeforetheCNSC’s

relicensinghearingscouldleadtoregulatorysanctionbytheCommission.Inaninternal

documentdetailingriskstoitslicenceapplication,OPGobserved:

ThereisatightschedulefortheProvincetohavetheupdatedPNERPapprovedby

Cabinetbytheendof2017,beforetheSpring2018electionandPart1Hearing.Thereis

ariskthat,ifthePNERPisnotupdatedandapprovedintimebythecurrentCabinet,it

willbesignificantlydelayedbeyondthe2018PNGSlicenceexpirydateandwillraise

questionsabouttherobustnessofoff-siteemergencypreparednessaroundPickering.

TheseissuescouldthreatenPickeringrelicensingandresultinholdpointsand/ora

shorterlicenceterm<10years.4

Tomitigatetheserisks,thedocumentstatesthatOPGwas“…engagedatseniorlevelsto

provideappropriatesupportandconsultation.”5Asearliernoted,OPG’sformerDirectorof

EmergencyManagementandFireProtectioniscurrently“onloan”totheMinistrytoassistwith

revisionstothePNERP.Mr.Colessecondmentmaybeoneoftheactionstakentoreducethe

riskofregulatorysanctionbytheCommission.

AlsoofsignificanceisthattheCityofTorontorequestedthegovernmentextendthepublic

consultationperiod“toSeptember30,2017inordertoallowmunicipalitiesandcitizensto

providemeaningfulinput.”6Althoughtheprovinceprovidedatwoweekextensiontothe

consultation,itmeantthatTorontoCouncilwasunabletoconsideremergencyplanningissues

duetocouncilholidaysoverthesummerbreak.

OPG’sinternalenterpriseriskassessmentsalsoindicateitwasconcernedbythecost

implicationsoftheprovincedecidingtoputinplaceemergencyplanstoaddressmoresevere

accidents.SinceFukushima,Greenpeaceandotherorganizationshavearguedfromapublic

safetyperspectivethatitwouldbeprudenttoprepareaccidentsleadingtolargeradioactive

releases.

InadocumententitledFailuretoObtainaLongerTermLicenceRenewalforPickering,OPG

describethecostimpactsonthecompanyifthegovernmentdecidedtostrengthenpublic

safety:

In2016,theCNSCadvisedtheOFMEMtoconsidermoresevereaccidentsintheupdate

tothePNERP,whichmayresultinpotentialchangestotheplanningbasis.These

changesmayincludenewprotectiverequirementsandexpansionoftheemergency

planrequirementsforPickering.Newprotectiverequirementsmayresultintheneed

formodificationstoPickeringthatcouldhavecostimplicationsforoperatingthestation

to2024.Changestotheemergencyplanrequirementsmayentailexpandingthe

evacuationzoneandpotassiumiodidepilldistribution.Thismayimpactthepublic’s

4OPG,RiskRegistry–PickeringRelicensing2018,May31,2017,FOI#17-048,pg.393.5Ibid.6MM31.31,RequestforExtensionoftheGovernmentofOntario’sdeadlineforcommentsonitsDiscussionPaperon

nuclearemergencypreparedness-byCouncillorNeethanShan,secondedbyCouncillorPaulAinslie,July4,2017.

8

perceptionofnuclearandcouldaffectPickering’slongertermlicenseapplication.7

InGreenpeace’sview,theaforementionedextractsfromOPG’splanningandenterpriserisk

documentsshowthecompanyhadclearmotivationstobothlimitpublicconsultationandto

preventthegovernmentfrompreparingformoreseverenuclearaccidents.InGreenpeace’s

view,OPGhasaclearprivateinterestinminimizingpublicsafety.

ConsideringthatOPG’sprivateinterestsconflictwithMinistry’spublicsafetymandate,

GreenpeacerequestsclarificationonwhatstepsweretakentosafeguardMinistryobjectivityof

governmentoperationsbeforeandduringthe2017PNERPpublicconsultations.

EnsuringtheCompetenceoftheCivilService:AdequateFunding

Overthepastdecade,ithasbecomeapparenttoGreenpeacethattheMinistryisunderstaffed

andneitherabletofulfillnewplanningrequirementsputinplacesinceFukushimanorthe

public’sexpectationfortransparencyandopengovernment.

GreenpeaceisconcernedthattheMinistrymaybemademorevulnerabletotheinfluenceof

OPGandotherprivateinterestsduetoafailuretobothmaintainsufficientindependent

expertiseandanticipatefuturestaffingneeds.ThisspeakstowhethertheMinistryhasmade

adequateefforttoensurethepublicserviceis“competent”asstatutorilyrequiredunder

Section1(1)ofthePublicServicesAct.

AstheAuditorGeneralobservedinher2017report,thegovernmentexpectsnuclearpower

companiestocoverthefullcostofmanagingitsnuclearemergencymanagementprogram.In

2015,theMinistryreceived$750,000fromreactoroperators.TheAuditorobservedthatthe

Ministrycouldprovidenobasisdemonstratinghowthisamountwasdetermined.8

Notably,CabinetDocumentsfrom1987showthatthegovernmentofthedayestimatedthe

costofnuclearemergencyresponsetobeapproximately$396,600annually.9Whenadjustedfor

inflation,thisequalsapproximately$730,000in2015dollars–effectivelythesameamount

citedbytheAuditor.

ThisindicatesthattheMinistrymayhavesimplylosttracksincetheChernobyldisasterofthe

basisforitsresourcerequirements.ItalsosuggeststhattheMinistryhasnotbeenregularly

forecastingitsstaffingneedsandadjustingitsfundingrequestsfromreactoroperators.

Requirementsfornuclearemergencyresponsehavechangedsignificantlysincethe1986

Chernobyldisaster.Forexample,theprovinceisnowexpectedtoparticipateregularlyin

emergencyexercisesateachofOntario’snuclearstations.Publicexpectationsregarding

transparency,publicconsultationandopengovernmenthavealsoevolved.Forexample,the

7FreedomofInformationRequest17-048,pg.4038AuditorGeneralofOntario,AnnualReport,Chapter3,Section3.04–EmergencyManagementinOntario,December

2017,pg.253.9SolicitorGeneral,CabinetSubmission–ChernobylAccidentReport,AnnexC–ResourcesforNuclearEmergency

Planning,February19,1987,pg.8.

9

2017PNERPhasnewcallsforregularpublicconsultationandgovernmenttransparency.These

allhaveimpactsonstaffingrequirements.

InGreenpeace’sview,theMinistryincreasesthelikelihoodthatOPG’sprivateinterestsmay

inappropriatelytaintgovernmentdecision-makingbyfailingtoanticipateandresourceits

staffingneeds.DoingsoresultsintheMinistry’soverrelianceondirectsupportfromnuclear

companies.ThisnotonlyunderminestheMinistry’sindependence,butthecompetencyofthe

publicservice.

10

Attachment1BelowisascreenshotofJimColesLinkedInProfile.LastAccessedJune12,2018.

11

Attachment2ThescreenshotbelowshowscorrespondencebetweenMinistrystaffandOPG.InAugust2013,

Greenpeace,theCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA)andDurhamNuclear

Awareness(DNA)metwiththeMadeleineMeilleur,theMinisterofPublicSafetyand

CorrectionalServices.FollowingthemeetingMinistrystaffaskedOPGtoclarifytheconcernswe

raisedwiththeMinisterinsteadofcarryingoutitsownindependentassessment.

Attachment3

June1,2018

MinisteroftheEnvironmentandClimateChange

200Scacre-CoeurBoulevard,2ndFloor

Gatineau,Quebec

K1A0H3

Re:CommentsontheConsultationPaperonApproachtoRevisingtheProjectList

Towhomitmayconcern,

Thankyoufortheopportunitytocommentonthegovernment’sConsultationPaperonApproachtoRevisingtheProjectList:ANewImpactAssessmentSystem.

ThegovernmenthasproposedtheImpactAssessmentAct(“IAA”)toreplacethe2012versionoftheCanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAct(CEAA2012).InGreenpeace’sview,CEAA2012wasastepbackwardinenvironmentalprotection.Theprojects

designatedforenvironmentalassessmentsunderCEAA2012areinsufficient.Significantprojectswereexcludedthatcouldharmourprogresstowardssustainability.Itshould

notbeconsideredanappropriatebaselinefortheIAA

TheConsultationPaperproposesanapproachfordeterminingwhatprojectswillbe

consideredunderIAA.Greenpeaceisconcernedbythattheproposedapproachisinsufficientlyclearandtoonarrowtoencouragegovernmentauthoritiestotakeactions

thatencourageCanada’stransitiontowardsustainabledevelopment.Inshort,the

proposedapproachisinadequatetocompensatefortheerosionofenvironmental

protectioncausedbyCEAA2012.

Inthissubmission,wefocusonnuclearprojectsthatshouldbeincludedinanupdated

projectlist.Specifically,anyapproachtodesignatingprojectsshouldensurethatthe

followingprojectsareassessed:

• Allnewreactorconstructionprojects,includingproposalstobuildexperimental

SmallModularReactors(SMR);

• Reactorlife-extensionproposals,whichwereexcludedfromreviewsunderCEAA2012;and,

• Reactordecommissioningplansandwastemanagementstrategies.

ForbroadercommentsontheConsultationPaper,pleasenotethatGreenpeaceCanadasupportsthecommentsfiledbytheCanadianEnvironmentalLawAssociation(CELA).

Factorsforassessingaproject’scontributiontosustainability

TheConsultationPaperstatesthatundertheIAAwillfocusonwhetheraproject’sadverseeffectsareinthepublicinterest.Thispublicinterestdeterminationwillbe

guidedbya“project’scontributiontosustainability”.

Ifproperlyimplemented,thiscouldbeasignificantadvancementfromhow

environmentalassessmentsofnuclearprojectswerecarriedoutunderCEAA2012and1992.Unlikeotherindustries,nuclearprojectshavenotundergonesustainability

assessmentsunderCEAA2012and1992.Asdiscussedinprevioussubmissionsonthe

proposeIAA,environmentalreviewsofnuclearprojectshavealwaysfocusedstrictly

ontheeffectsofprojectsinsteadoftheircontributiontosustainability.TheConsultationPaperstatesitwishestomoveawayfromthisapproach.

However,thegovernmentshouldconsiderthatthestrictfocusoneffectsinreviewsof

nuclearprojectswasoccurringevenbeforeCEAA2012.Thiswasduetotheinfluenceof

theCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC),whichhasadmitteditlacksthe

knowledgeandunderstandingofsustainability.1

Forexample,eventheJointReviewPanelthatassessedOntarioPowerGeneration’s

(OPG)proposaltobuilduptofournewnuclearreactorsattheDarlingtonnuclear

stationdidnotundertakeasustainabilityassessment.Thepanelacknowledgedthat

suchanassessmentwouldput“…greateremphasisonthelegacyintermsofwaste

legacyandnuclearliability.Toachievethis,anenvironmentalassessmentwouldneeda

frameworkthatlooksatthesustainabilityofaprojectstartingwiththepreparationof

theEISGuidelines,atminimum.”2

Itgoeswithoutsayingthatamoremeaningfulconsiderationoflong-livedradioactive

wasteandthetransferofaccidentliabilitytoCanadianswouldhaveimpactedthe

conclusionsandrecommendationsoftheDarlingtonenvironmentalassessment.This

failureofgovernmentauthoritiestoapplysustainabilityassessmentstonuclearprojects

evenunderCEAA1992showswhythegovernment’supdatedprojectlistmustprovide

cleardirectionstogovernmentauthoritiesrelatedtonuclearprojects.

TheConsultationPaperlistsfivefactorsforqualifyingprojectswithinfederaljurisdictionforimpactassessments.Thesefactorsare:magnitude,geographicextent,timing,

frequency,durationandreversibility.

Nuclearprojectscausesignificantadverseeffectsintermsoftheirdurationand

reversibility.Thetwomostobviousexamplesareradioactivewasteandreactor

accidents.Radioactivewasteislong-livedandeffectivelyirreversible.Theenvironmental

andsocialimpactsofanuclearaccidentsimilartoChernobylorFukushimaarealsolong-

livedandirreversible.

1CanadianEnvironmentalAssessmentAgency,DeepGeologicalRepositoryforlowandintermediatelevelradioactive

wasteproject,JointReviewPanel,Transcripts,Thursday,October3,2013,Volume15,pgs.182-185.2JointReviewPanelEnvironmentalAssessmentReport:DarlingtonNewNuclearPowerPlantProject,

June2011,Pg.140.

AsseenwiththeJointReviewPanelreviewofOPG’sproposaltobuildnewreactorsat

Darlington,theimpactnuclearwasteorreactoraccidentsonCanada’sshiftto

sustainabilityhavenotbeenassessedinCanadianenvironmentalreviews.Thisrequires

thegovernmenttostateclearlythatsuchimpactsbeassessedundertheIAAandits

supportingregulations.

Governmentauthorities–specificallytheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission-have

usedtwoinappropriatereasonstoexcludeaccidentsandradioactivewastefrom

environmentalreviews:theassertedlowprobabilityofnuclearaccidentsandthe

existenceofpoliciesforthemanagementofradioactivewaste.

InarulingonwhetherCEAAwascorrectlyappliedtotheproposaltobuildnewreactors

atDarlington,JusticeRussellfoundthatexcludingmajoraccidentsfromenvironmental

reviewsdeprivesthepublicanddecision-makersofinformationneededtoassessthe

desirabilityofaproject.Heobserved:

“Onpolicygrounds,itislogicalthatsuchscenarios[suchasFukushimaor

Chernobyl]shouldbeconsideredbypoliticaldecision-makers,becauseonce

againtheyseemtoengagemainlyquestionof“society’schosenlevelof

protectionagainstrisk”thatwillbedifficultforaspecializedregulatorytoassess

withlegitimacy.”3

Frequencyisincludedasafactortobeconsideredindeterminingprojectsunderthe

IAA.Greenpeacerequeststhegovernmentclarifythataprecautionaryapproachbe

usedtotheapplicationoffrequencyifforeseeableconsequencesmaybeirreversibleor

oflongduration.

TheexistenceoftheNuclearLiabilityandCompensationAct,whichtransfersthefinancialrisksofnuclearaccidentsfromreactoroperatorsandsupplierstoCanadians,

showsthattheimpactsofnuclearaccidentsarewithinfederaljurisdiction.Considering

thatCanadiansshouldertheriskofnuclearaccidents,thefederalgovernmentshould

ensurethepublicisprovidedfullinformationonthepotentialimpactofsuchaccidents

beforeprojectsareallowedtoproceed.

Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsunder

theIAAshouldstatethatanyreactorprojectcoveredbytheNuclearLiabilityandCompensationActwillundergoanassessmentundertheIAA.

Asnoted,governmentauthoritieshavealsocitedtheexistenceofpoliciestojustify

ignoringthepotentialenvironmentalandsocialimpactsofradioactivewasteproduction

fromenvironmentalreviews.

DurhamRegion,whichhoststenreactorsattheDarlingtonandPickeringnuclear

stations,hasstatedthatthecurrentenvironmentalassessmentprocesshasnotproperly

assessedtheimpactsofradioactivewastes.DurhamRegioncontendsthattheexclusion

3GreenpeaceCanadav.Canada(AttorneyGeneral),2014FC463(CanLII),Paragraph331

orradioactivewasteassessmentfromenvironmentalreviewshasleadtoan

unacceptablesituationwherereactoroperatorsandthefederalgovernmenthavebeen

allowedtopostponedecisionsonthelong-termmanagementofradioactivewaste.

Asnoted,reactoroperationcreatesradioactivewaste.Nuclearwasteisanadverse

effectinthatisbothlonginduration–arguablypermanentforsometypesofwaste–

andirreversible.Thus,thegovernmentshouldmakeclearinitsregulationsthatany

projectproposalthatmaycreatelong-livedradioactivewasteswillundergoareview

undertheIAA.

Inlinewiththis,DurhamRegionhasaskedthegovernmenttoensurethat:“Approvalof

anuclearprojectshouldrequireaproponenttohaveanuclearwastedisposalsolution

availablebeforethenew/refurbishednuclearreactorsarepermittedtooperate.”4

DurhamRegion’srecommendationisalignedwithakeyobjectiveofsustainability

assessment;thatis,todiscouragedecisionsthatwillresultinthetransferofadverse

effectsorriskstofuturegenerations.5

Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsshould

statethatanyreactorprojectthatcreateslong-livedradioactivewasteswillundergoan

assessmentundertheIAA.Thisincludesbothproposalstoextendtheoperationallives

ofexistingstationsandtheconstructionofnewreactors,includingprototypeSmall

ModularReactors(SMR).

DecommissioningandWasteManagement

ThegovernmentshouldensuretheIAA’ssupportingregulationsappropriatelycompensateforthehistoricfailureofgovernmentpoliciestoopenlyconsiderthe

adverseeffectsofradioactivewasteproduction.Thisincludesnewstrategicimpact

assessmentsofdecommissioningandradioactivemanagementplans.

NuclearstationswerebuiltinCanadawithoutenvironmentalreviews.Theywerebuilt

andallowedtooperatebasedonthepromisethattheradioactivewastesproducedby

thestationwouldbesenttootheroff-sitewastemanagementfacilities.Thestation’s

communityacceptance–whatwenowcall“sociallicence”-hasbeenbasedonthis

promise.

Afterseveraldecades,ithasbecomeevidenttosomereactorhostcommunitiesthat

radioactivewastemayremainon-siteforextendedperiodoftimeifnotpermanently.

Forexample,thePickeringnuclearissettoclose,butthereisstillnoapprovedoff-site

planforthelong-termmanagementthelong-livedradioactivewastesproducedbythe

station.

4GarryCubitt(ChiefAdministrativeOfficer,DurhamRegion)toKevinBlair(MajorProjectsManagementOffice,

NaturalResourcesCanada),“EnvironmentalandRegulatoryReviewsDiscussionPaper,”August28,2017.5Gibson,R.B.(2006).Sustainabilityassessment:Basiccomponentsofapracticalapproach.ImpactAssessmentand

ProjectAppraisal24(3):170-182.

Inlightofthis,DurhamRegionhasrequestedtobefinanciallycompensatedforthe

long-termstorageofradioactivewastesatthePickeringandDarlingtonnuclear

stations.6Fromtheperspectiveofenvironmentalprotection,theforeseeablepossibility

thatreactorsitesmayunintentionallyevolveintolong-termradioactivewastestorage

facilitiesraisesquestionsofwhethersuchplansshouldbeproactivelyassessedunder

theIAA.

CitingthelackofclarityrelatedtoreactordecommissioningundertheupdatedIAA,DurhamRegionhasaskedtheCanadianNuclearSafetyCommission(CNSC)“….to

committhattheRegionofDurhamwillbeformallynotifiedofandengagedinthe

decision-makingprocesswithrespecttoconductinganEAforPNGSdecommissioning

sinceourcommunitywillbedirectlyaffectedfordecadesbythedecommissioning

process.”7Greenpeacesupportstheinclusionofreactordecommissioningonthe

projectlist.

Insummary,Greenpeaceurgesthegovernmenttoensurethatitsapproachto

determiningprojectsundertheIAAconsidersthehistoricweaknessesinthe

government’soversightofradioactivewasteproduction.Withoutcleardirectionfrom

thefederalgovernment,decommissionednuclearstationsmayinadvertentlybecome

long-termradioactivewastestoragefacilitieswithoutappropriatereviewsofhowto

mitigatepotentialadverseeffects.Itisthusimperativethatstrategicimpact

assessmentsofdecommissioningbeincludedontheIAA’sprojectlist.

Recommendation:Thefederalgovernment’sapproachtodeterminingprojectsunder

theIAAshouldincludethedecommissioningplansofexistingnuclearstations,including

contingencyplansforlong-termwastemanagementatthesite.

Conclusion

Thankyouforthisopportunitytocommentonthegovernment’sConsultationPaperonthegovernment’sapproachtorevisingtheprojectlistundertheproposedImpactAssessmentAct.Pleasedon’thesitatetocontactmeifyourequireanyclarifications.

Truly,

Shawn-PatrickStensil

SeniorEnergyAnalyst,GreenpeaceCanada

6DurhamRegion,SubmissionfromtheRegionalMunicipalityofDurhamregardingtheapplicationofOntarioPowerGeneration(OPG)torenewthePowerReactorOperatingLicenceforthePickeringNuclearGeneratingStation(PNGS)fromSeptember1,2018toAugust31,2028,May7,2018,pg.14.7Ibid,pg.16.