Urban land rent theory: a regulationist perspective

Urban Land Rent Theory: A RegulationistPerspective*

JOHANNES JAÈGER

S'il est vrai que la rente est un rapport social dominant la reÂpartition de l'espace et sonutilisation, l'analyse de la formation du prix du sol urbaine et de l'eÂvolution des valeursfoncieÁres devrait permettre d'eÂclairer la dynamique de la constitution de l'espace urbain dansune formation sociale domineÂe par le mode de production capitaliste (Miguel Dechervois andBruno TheÂret, 1979).

More than a decade ago, in an article entitled `The Theory of Land Rent at theCrossroads', Anne Haila (1990) posed the question of which direction land rent theorywould further develop along. Two of the central lines of development analysed byHaila, namely the nomothetic and ideographic traditions, have made only very limitedprogress since then. What are the reasons for this? Firstly, theorizing in a political-economic tradition has diminished considerably since the 1970s and 1980s. Secondly,and more importantly, both traditions show severe theoretical shortcomings. This holdsparticularly true for the weak conceptualization of the role of political agency and itsrelation to the structural `logic' of land rent, as well as for the political-economicprocess of development in general. Hence, what is offered here is an innovative way outof this relative stagnation through attempting to systematically develop an integratedview on structure and agency in the context of urban land. The aim of the article is toreassess the results of the debate and to show how land rent theory may still providefruitful insights into central aspects of urban processes and developments. Besides acoherent treatment of land rent and its interrelation with urban space, a mid-rangecontextualization within a modified regulationist conceptualization1 is undertaken. Thisenables us to systematically connect phenomena around urban space to processes ofbroader political-economic development and should bring a systematic treatment ofpolitics back into land rent theory. In so doing, land rent theory proves to be a veryuseful tool for providing an integrated political-economic perspective for analysis ofurban phenomena. This is illustrated briefly in the cases of Vienna, Austria, andMontevideo.

Volume 27.2 June 2003 233±49 International Journal of Urban and Regional Research

ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing.9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA

* This article was supported by a research grant of the Austrian Science Fund (P 14883). I gratefullyacknowledge the valuable support of Joachim Becker, Elisabeth Hammer, Andreas Novy and WernerRaza, as well as the highly useful suggestions of two anonymous referees. The usual caveat applies.

1 Concerning regulation theory, Storper (2001: 159) recently argued: Èven certain valiant attempts atlarge-scale theorization, the most prominent among them being the French Regulationist School, arethemselves large-scale assemblages of facts, and have made no breakthroughs at the level of basictheory'. I would hold that there are promising developments (particularly Esser et al., 1994; Becker andRaza, 2000; Becker, 2002) which make the regulationist tradition (for an overview of central works, seeJessop, 2001) an important base for stringent theoretical reasoning in the tradition of radical politicaleconomy.

Explaining urban phenomena

Michael Storper's (2001) article, `The Poverty of Radical Theory Today: From theFalse Promises of Marxism to the Mirage of the Cultural Turn', pleads for an updatedradical political economy. He points out the shortcomings of dogmatic traditionalMarxist thinking and provides a critique of the postmodernist version of Marxistthinking, i.e. the cultural turn and its social consequences:

When these culturalist perspectives trickle down to practice-oriented intellectuals, they ofteneschew wider questions of urban political economy. Questions of how the urban systemfunctions to generate or deepen urban poverty, or questions about how pluri-ethnic urbansocieties might be governed, are rarely posed . . . Yet one hears little from postmodernist andcultural-turn radicals about the organization and properties of this world. Such an analysis canonly be had through an updated radical political economy (ibid.: 170).

Notwithstanding the fact that there still remain a variety of efforts to theorize urbanphenomena which could not be accused of being postmodernist, e.g. the global city debate(Sassen, 1991) or studies on urban segregation and polarization (Musterd and Ostendorf,1998) etc., although focusing on the urban context and its internal structures,contemporary literature explaining the material or socio-political bases of phenomenasuch as urban exclusion and segregation based on profound political-economic analysishave become scarce (cf. Dangschat, 1999). Nevertheless, within studies deriving from thepolitical-economic tradition, the housing/land market or the split nature of the housingmarket is a key variable to explain, for example, urban segregation (Heinelt and Mayer,1992; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Dangschat, 1999). But the functioning of the housing/land market is more widely treated as a `black box'. Urban land rent theory which dealswith social relations around urban space taking into account the quantitative/monetarylogic of those relations is generally not applied to analyses of these phenomena. This lackmay be explained by the widely `provisional' character of land rent theory.

Land rent theory does not have one coherent and widely accepted theoretical corpus,but consists of a variety of different conceptualizations, even of its central categories.Furthermore, the theory is usually developed at a relatively high level of abstraction,which makes empirical or more concrete applications more difficult. Even DavidHarvey (1985) does not provide a convincing connection between political-economicdevelopment, urban land rent and residential differentiation. Although he treats the roleof urban land rent extensively and provides an interesting (although very abstract)further conceptualization of rent,2 and devotes a whole chapter (ibid.: Chapter 5) to theproblem of residential differentiation and segregation, he does not link the latter to landrent. At first glance this seems surprising because he explicitly criticizes conventionaltheory on residential differentiation: `[it] consists of an incoherent mass of autonomousbits and pieces of information . . . I shall therefore attempt an outline of the relationbetween residential differentiation and social structure' (ibid.: 110). A closer look at thespecific concept of land rent theory as outlined by Harvey explains the missing linkagebetween segregation and land rent theory. Within his conceptualization of rent it is quitedifficult to consider the differing ability of upper and lower income groups to pay forresidential areas, if we assume that richer sectors exclude the poorer sectors fromsocially more privileged, and therefore more expensive, places. Nevertheless, incomedifferentiation represents an important factor for residential segregation3 which couldbe explained through an adequately specified rent theory. The main aim of this article,therefore, is to demonstrate how (a reconceptualized) land rent theory sheds some lighton the `black box' land/landed property. It is argued that an adequately conceptualizedland rent theory may be a very useful tool to analyse and understand urban phenomenalike residential segregation and the political-economic processes connected to them.

2 Differentiating land rent due to the circulation of capital on the one hand and to the circulation ofrevenues on the other, based on Harvey (1982).

3 This basic idea was reassumed recently by Edwards (2000).

234 Johannes JaÈger

International Journal of Urban and Regional Research ß Joint Editors and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003

The rise and fall of land rent theory

For a produced commodity, prices, in a Classical but also in a Marxist view, depend on thecosts of production. As there is no capitalist process of production of urban land by asingle firm, the factors which determine the price of land are different from those of acommon capitalist commodity. Thus, a distinctive treatment of land and the socialrelations connected to it is required. Therefore, a special theory Ð land rent theory Ð wasdeveloped. As already mentioned, no integrated and coherent corpus of theory exists, but avariety of different conceptualizations which are due not least to the fact that differentquestions are being used to test the validity of varying conceptualizations (Haila, 1990).This may explain the relatively complex and broad range of phenomena that are treated bytheoretical works on land rent. Under the heading of urban rent, phenomena like periodicalpayments, transfers of a fictitious4 commodity (amount of money paid for a plot'sexpected future rental payments) or the existence of fictitious capital (supposed/capitalized price of a plot) may be considered. Furthermore, within the urban context thereis the problem that urban space is used for productive (by capitalists) as well asreproductive (by households) purposes, with different socio-economic logics. Moreover,urban space and material patterns of urban structure (buildings, infrastructure) areproduced in a long-lasting process. Therefore, we have to differentiate between the use ofthe existing built urban structure (circulation of buildings) and construction (production ofbuildings); furthermore, we have to consider the interrelations between these areas. All inall, land rent theory is a quite complex undertaking (cf. Ball et al., 1985: 11).

In the political-economic theoretical tradition, land rent theory is considered a crucialfactor in explaining socio-economic phenomena due to the spatiality of socialprocesses. Nowadays, however, the use of land rent theory to analyse urban political-economic processes referring to urban phenomena seems widely out of (postmodernist)favour. Since the end of the 1980s only a few theoretical contributions to land renttheory in a political-economic tradition have been made (Haila, 1988; KraÈtke, 1992;Emsley, 1998; Evans, 1999a; 1999b) and the theory has rarely been applied to empiricalanalysis. Contrary to this development (or rather, lack of development) of the pastdecade, there was a vivid theoretical debate from the 1970s to the mid-1980s.

The writings that constitute the economic Classics on rent (Marx, 1989; 1953;Ricardo, 1994) were mainly centred on the question of agricultural rent (with a fewexceptions, such as Engels, 1981; Marx, 1989: 782) and had already determined theprincipal types of rent (intensive and extensive differential rent, monopoly rent andabsolute rent).5 The Classics conceived of rent as a (regular) payment for the use ofland, as well as a specific historical social institution (the latter was particularlyemphasized by Marx), which regulates the relation between landowner and capitalist/producer. By capitalizing future expected land rent at a specific rate of interest6 fallingto a certain site, the price of a plot may be calculated. Thereby, it is assumed that theeconomic configurations which are the basis for land rent remain stable over a certainperiod. It is the moment of crisis which upsets these suppositions (Marx, 1953).Obviously, due to speculative movements, the effective prices are usually above orbelow the calculated price and we can observe strong cyclical fluctuations in prices ofthe fictitious commodity `land'.

During the upswing of Marxist thinking in the 1970s and 1980s, several works werecarried out adapting and advancing the concepts of the Classics to the urban case.7 This

4 The term `fictitious' refers to the fact that this commodity is not produced within a capitalist processof production, a price is attached to it. Fictitious capital means that, contrary to productive capital,this type of capital may not be used to produce surplus value but represents a claim to a part of thesurplus value (through rents and interest).

5 Whereby Ricardo restricted himself to the use of the concept of differential rent (cf. Marx, 1989).6 The higher the rate of interest used for the calculation, the lower the price of the land.7 For a brief overview of the theoretical development, see Haila (1990). Note, though, that this

overview is restricted to the discussions in the Anglo-Saxon and German-speaking area, and does

Urban Land Rent Theory: A Regulationist Perspective 235


took place against the background of rising housing and land prices in the 1970s andwas inspired by the zeitgeist of the 1970s. Thus, there was consensus that urban landrent was a social relation (Haila, 1990). Nevertheless, the close linkage with thetheoretical work of the Classics (centred on the question of agricultural rent) and theorthodox interpretation of their writings, particularly in France (Lipietz, 1974), as wellas the predominant use of the concept of absolute rent at the beginning of the debate,contributed to a very particular way of answering contemporary urban questions. But asmost of the work lingered at a high level of abstraction, considerable advancementscould be made. Above all, these advancements consisted in the development of a landrent theory in the political-economic tradition which allowed a deeper understanding ofclass conflicts around urban land. Although in some writings (e.g. Harvey andChatterjee, 1974; and also in the work of Massey and Catalano, 1978) the role of theinstitutional context of land rent was taken into account (Haila, 1990), these authors didnot give a sufficiently systematic treatment of the relation between land rent, theinstitutional context and the process of accumulation in general. The further discussionin the 1970s and in the early 1980s particularly contributed to a better understanding ofthe role of landlords by focusing on intensive differential rent and emphasizing theactive role of the landlords (Ball, 1977; 1980; Fine, 1979 Ð for a brief overview of thedebate see Haila, 1990; Edel, 1992). In the following, highlights of the theoreticaldiscussion in the 1980s, which may be split according to Haila (1990) into anideographic and a nomothetic tradition, will be discussed. Since the beginning of the1990s, however, the theoretical development8 has virtually stagnated.

The ideographic tradition is characterized by its opposition to general laws and by itsemphasis on the singularity of historical situations and social relations.9 Ball's (1985)article may be considered a point of culmination in this tradition, which explicitly statesthat rent may be interpreted as an aspect of social relations which may only be seen in aconcrete historical context. Furthermore, he gives a rather restricted definition of rentwhere the term is limited to the act of payment/flow of money: `Where no suchpayments take place, rent does not exist' (ibid.: 512, emphasis in original). The conceptof rent is reduced to the circulation of revenues and the role of rent in production isneglected and narrowed to distribution. Consequently, it is argued that no universaltheory of rent exists.10 The denial of a theoretical corpus does not seem veryconvincing. Making analysis dependent on the context and rejecting the application ofabstract concepts prevents insights which could go beyond a particular case. Althoughconcrete contextual analysis is crucial for any understanding of the role and functioningof land rent, theoretical concepts which allow one to systematically analyse the relationto structural forces are necessary to provide a deeper understanding (for a detailedcritique: see Haila, 1990).

The nomothetic tradition, on the other hand, was marked by the search for universallaws. David Harvey (1982) is the central author of this tradition.11 He argued that landwas increasingly becoming a financial asset. A merger between landlords and capital(as previously analysed by Massey and Catalano, 1978) was supposed to abandon thespecific (rentist) behaviour of the landed class. Therefore, land and rent were notconsidered obstacles to the accumulation of capital, but were supposed to fulfil acoordinating function. Contrary to the traditional thinking on urban rent, rent was no

not include the broad debate which took place in France (i.e. Lipietz, 1974; Topalov, 1974; 1984;Dechervois and TheÂret, 1979).

8 With the exception of KraÈtke (1992); and more recently Emsley (1998) and Evans (1999a; 1999b)whose contributions were limited to a reformulation of the concept of absolute rent.

9 The ideographic tradition may therefore be characterized as postmodernist.10 The problems of this postmodernist tradition are illustrated in Ball's own further theoretical work.

For example, Ball et al. (1998) adopt neoclassical models of explanation which (tautologically)interpret land rent as resulting from demand and supply.

11 Further work in the nomothetic tradition includes Harvey (1985), Haila (1988), KraÈtke (1992) and soon.



longer supposed to be determined exclusively by the productive sector (e.g. the conceptof extensive differential rent), but was dependent on the investment flows in the builtenvironment. Haila (1990: 290) summarizes the nomothetic paradigm:

Rent is no longer residual determined in the productive sector. The level of rent is influencedby rents in the neighbourhood and the global real estate markets . . . If, in the modern city,land rent has started to play a crucial role in determining the user and the use of space (notvice versa, as before) the question concerning the relation of the general rate of profit to rentis not crucial for the construction of a general theory of urban land rent.

This can be doubted at least in two aspects. Firstly, whilst the `traditional' land renttheory holds that the level of rent is determined by production (or the ability to pay inthe case of monopoly rent paid by households), which is supposed to lead to a specificpattern of structuring of urban space, this statement by Haila suggests that the directionof influence would be reversed. But how could land prices (which are the capitalizedexpression of future rental payments) determine the use without a base (the expectedamount of rent accruing to a certain plot)? Neither the traditional nor the nomotheticinterpretation seem to be exclusively correct interpretations. Both use mechanisticmetaphors which put the view on one or the other side of the process of structuration ofurban space by land rent. Furthermore, within both the nomothetic and ideographicmechanistic conceptualizations of land rent it is not possible to account for changes inthe structure of demand/patterns of consumption induced by land rent. For example, itmight be supposed that an increase in land rent may lead to a general shift ofconsumption patterns and thus contribute to a greater willingness to pay monopoly rent,resulting finally in a decrease in real wages. Secondly, it cannot be argued that therelation of the general rate of profit to rent should not be crucial for theorizing urbanland rent, as supposed by the second part of Haila's statement. Even from a nomotheticpoint of view, which focuses on the property investment circuit, this seemsunconvincing: the speculation-driven investment in real estate may, for example, bean expression of declining possibilities for productive investment (KraÈtke, 1992)12 or belinked to changes in profitability in the financial sector (Harvey, 1985).13

In short, both the ideographic and nomothetic theoretical tradition offer importantinsights, but at the same time have severe shortcomings. What is needed is a fruitfulsynthesis of both lines of argument and their extension to a broader integrative land renttheory which is able to coherently treat the connection between urban space and theprocess of accumulation. Furthermore, the consensus at the beginning of the debate onrent being above all a social relation should be taken seriously. Nevertheless, one severedeficiency of land rent theory still is its restricted perspective on space. It appears ratherdifficult to deal with urban space as something which goes beyond interpreting space asdistance.14 Within traditional views of urban space it was difficult to deal with the factthat land rent is structured by urban space and at the same time structures urban space.This, I suppose, might be overcome by a dialectical conceptualization of rent and byconsidering urban space as `produced' (Lefebvre, 1991). Furthermore, what is proposedhere is to follow a line of enquiry hinted at by Lipietz (1985) in distinguishing betweeneconomic and social division of space.

12 KraÈtke (1992) has developed his fruitful contribution within a (traditional) regulationist perspective.13 Therefore, the (proper) logic of land rent and the real estate sector is closely related to the general

development of the primary circuit of capital accumulation. The term primary circuit of capitalaccumulation refers to the productive sector (excluding the construction sector), whilst the conceptof secondary circuit of capital accumulation (originally supposed to be derived from the former)refers to real estate and the construction sector (Harvey, 1985). At the same time, (relatively)autonomous speculative developments in the real estate sector in the search for high rents maylead to real estate crisis and cause or deepen crises in the productive sector (KraÈtke, 1992).

14 An important exception is David Harvey (1973), who differentiates absolute and relative space andattributes different types of rent to them.



Towards a reconstruction of land rent theory

Theoretical development is always bound to the prevailing patterns of thinking andinterpretation. This also holds true for land rent theory. Picking up the theme todayallows new insights from a different point of view. This is due to achievements whichhave already been made (and diffused) Ð for example by (partially) overcoming theseparation of structure and agency (as proposed by Giddens, 1984), which enables anintegrated treatment of structural forces and social action. Building upon theseconceptualizations, further developments, particularly by the German-speaking branchof the Regulationist School (i.e. GoÈrg, 1994; 1995; Scherrer 1995; Becker, 2002), havebeen achieved. Furthermore, rethinking and reintroducing the dialectical method inMarxist thinking and breaking with mechanistic metaphors (cf. Harvey, 1996: 77±95;Merrifield, 2000; Lueger, 2001) have provided important intellectual stimuli. In whatfollows, possibilities for overcoming the theoretical shortcomings are proposed. Thereconstruction of land rent theory is developed in two stages: (1) by developing acoherent institutional embedding of land rent; and (2) by proposing a consistenttypology of rent.

Institutional embedding of land rent theory in French regulation theory

Recently, Edwards (2000) argued that property markets play an important role in thestructuring of urban processes and phenomena like segregation. But what is even moreimportant is his reminder that:

markets don't just arise `naturally' but are actively constituted by those involved, and oftenwith the state and the law actively involved in defining what is to be traded . . . The task, then,is primarily a task of analysis and clarification in which the research community should beunraveling the mechanisms in order to show just what the forces are behind the propertymarkets (ibid.: 600).

Those struggles and institutions behind the market, which constitute and structure it, aretherefore of central interest. What follows from this is that land rent theory should beconceptualized within a wider institutional context. Land rent itself has to be treated asan institution or social relation (cf. Dechervois and TheÂret, 1979: 5), which is an objectof social conflicts and struggles contextualized within a wider set of institutions. As willbe shown below, the institutional context plays a crucial role in structuring theallocation and distribution effects of rent. Among the most important regulations whichhave to be considered as constituting the institutional context there may be foundproperty laws, rent regulations, urban planning, real estate taxes etc. Changes in theinstitutional context become particularly apparent by analysing long-run transforma-tions of the role of rent and its functioning. The èmbedding' of land rent should bemade in a systematic way through linking the social context of land rent to structuralanalysis. This is achieved by linking land rent theory to the theoretical corpus of theFrench regulationist approach. An adequately specified regulation theory offers aproper framework for dealing with the specific forms of land-related institutions againstthe background of their relation to other institutions which stabilize capitalism and tothe process of accumulation.

Regulation theory as a medium-range theory has proved to be one of the most fruitfuldevelopments in the tradition of political economy during the past two decades.15 Theregime of accumulation and the mode of regulation (which is conceptualized as`dispositive' of regulation) (Becker, 2002) are the central categories of this school oftheoretical thought. It builds on the assumption that the capitalist mode of production iscontradictory in multiple ways and a specific form of regulation of those contradictionsis necessary to permit a stable path of accumulation. If the stabilization of important

15 Particularly interesting and applicable to urban land rent theory in the political-economic traditionare lines of argument closely related to a Marxist tradition of analysis (HuÈbner, 1989; Jessop, 2001).



contradictory fields is successful and coherent, we speak of a regime of accumulation.Traditionally, five structural forms Ð wage relations, mode of competition, monetaryconstraints, the state and the international regime Ð are identified as requiringstabilization (cf. Boyer, 1987). A modification of the structural forms was proposed byBecker and Raza (2000). They introduced the concept of ecological constraint, whichrefers to regulation of the (necessary) use of nature within the process of capitalistproduction.

Whilst the structural forms are interpreted as sedated patterns of agency, the termmode of accumulation represents the structural side of a capitalist society. Regimes ofaccumulation and modes of regulation are dialectically interwoven. Regulationistsempirically observed phases of stable accumulation and crisis. The post-war phase ofdevelopment up until the 1970s, for example, is identified as a long and stable phaselabelled `Fordism'. Stable phases of accumulation are characterized by a coherentrelationship between the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation. In timesof structural crisis, prevailing institutional forms become contradictory to the process ofaccumulation and no longer assure a stable path of accumulation of capital. Then achange in the specification of the institutional forms is usually observable.Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the social conflicts surrounding the emergenceof modified structural forms will be coherent, thus enabling a new path of capitalistaccumulation (cf. Lipietz, 1992).

The regulation of land or urban space, and thus land rent, may be considered animportant component of ecological constraint, as the use of land is a necessarycondition for any capitalist activity (Harvey, 1985). An analysis of the embedding ofland rent proves to be crucial for understanding struggles over the regulation of urbanland and consequent patterns of urban development. Changes in the regulation of landrent may be seen in the context of general transformations in the mode of regulationwhich is dialectically related to the process of accumulation. Thus, such aconceptualization allows for a coherent treatment of land rent within a medium-rangetheory of capitalist development.

Developing a consistent typology of land rent

The construction of types is an important form of abstraction. It is a form of theorizingwhich should not be abandoned in land rent theory. Within land rent theory traditionaltypes of land rent already developed by the Classics and by Marx were applied and`filled' with different meanings. In the theoretical discussion, therefore, it was unclearand disputed which type of rent had which `nature' or quality. Furthermore, it was evenless clear and/or contradictory among different works which type of rent played whichrole within the urban context:

To my mind, the quality of this discussion has not been very high. The controversy has easilygot entangled, and the unfortunate effect of this has been a loss of confidence in the theory ofland rent. Unravelling these tangles will, I trust, reveal the usefulness of the theory of rent(Haila, 1990: 276).16

The confusion may have contributed to the fact that authors of both the nomothetic andthe ideographic tradition widely abandoned any typology of rent and applied just onesingular concept. What is argued here is that it still makes sense to differentiate betweendistinctive types of rent as they refer to different phenomena and `logics' of land rent.Political economy offers a differentiated typology of land rent, traditionallydistinguishing between (1) absolute rent, (2) monopoly rent, (3) extensive differentialrent and (4) intensive differential rent. These different types of rent are not necessarilyto be interpreted as mathematically differentiable categories (Emsely, 1998), but as

16 The unclear and often contradictory conceptualizations and sometimes complex economicarguments may be an important explanation for the limited use of land rent theory in analyses ofurban phenomena.



ideal types helping to distinguish various forms of functional logics of rent and, thus, tounderstand the interests and behaviour of diverse social actors related to urban space.On the basis of Edel (1992), a conceptualization17 of the different types of rent ispresented in the following. This should make land rent theory a more useful andapplicable tool in urban analysis. The typology should help to improve ourunderstanding of the role of politics and social struggles in the context of shiftingdominant structures of capital accumulation. The presented typology, furthermore, isnot restricted to an abstract definition of different types of rent, but tries to brieflydevelop the spatial relevance of each type of rent within the urban context.18

Absolute rent (AR)

Absolute rent is a concept put forward by Marx (1953; 1989) and refers originally to aland tribute which was paid by agriculture (in the historical case) due to a lower organiccomposition of capital. This form of interpretation of absolute rent is also used byLipietz (1974), Topalov (1974; 1984) and others. As regards the urban context, theysupposed a lower organic composition of capital in the construction industry and thusthe existence and relevance of absolute rent. Although Lipietz (1985: 147) argues thatdistinguishing between absolute rent (tribute aÁ la Marx) and monopoly rent (tribute aÁ laEngels) may serve to analyse different types of antagonism or alliance betweendistinctive fractions of the industrial or the financial bourgeoisie, he also holds that `thedistinction between àbsolute rent' in Marx's sense and `monopoly rent' is ratherirrelevant' (ibid.: 141). Both categories differ in just one point. In the first case the value(in the urban case) is created in the construction industry whilst in the second case itcould have been produced in any branch (ibid.: 140).19 In my consideration thisconcept, which is applicable only in the context of the Marxist value theory of labour, isnot very useful in the urban context. The urban phenomena as well as the differinginterests of class fractions may just as easily be explained and analysed with the othercategories of rent mentioned.

Besides explaining absolute rent by a lower organic composition of capital, the termabsolute rent is also interpreted in a second manner, namely as a reservation price(Harvey 1973 refers to it as `class monopoly rent'; see also Dechervois and TheÂret,1979; Evans, 1999a; 1999b) and thereby due to a restriction of the supply and not due todemand. This second type of conceptualization might be useful, for instance, whentheorizing the urbanization of rural land and therefore at the urban frontier.Nevertheless, I would argue that the urban frontier is of low relevance as it is quitefar away: 50 km away from a city centre land prices might be quite low and stillcontinuing to fall with distance, and therefore may be classed as monopoly rent.Proximity (within 50 km of a city centre) to a certain place may be interpreted associally privileged space and households' tribute may thus also be considered asmonopoly rent (or capitalists' tribute as differential rent). Notwithstanding this, theminimum amount paid for urban use of place at the urban frontier has to be at least ashigh as the (in these days empirically relatively low) tribute paid for agricultural use(Dechervois and TheÂret, 1979: 204). However, the concept of a reservation price makessense considering the practice of speculative land holding (not putting it to the market/to use in the hope of higher future prices) and to describe a behaviour of landownerscontributing to a restriction of actually disposable land.20 This might lead to a higherlevel of land prices by influencing the willingness to pay monopoly rent. AR interpretedin this way, therefore, may be seen as dynamically and dialectically influencing

17 And, in my eyes, a largely complete and broadly acceptable view.18 The question of spatial relevance or concrete application of the different types of rent is (1) not

considered by many authors and (2) far from being answered in a coherent way.19 This argument is closely linked to the `New Solution' of the transformation problem (Lipietz, 1982).20 This might have a material impact on the structure of the city, but does not influence the social

structure (segregation) which depends primarily on monopoly rent.



monopoly and differential rent. Similar to Balls' (1977; 1980) and others'considerations on intensive differential rent, this conceptualization of absolute rentsupposes an active role of landowners. Nevertheless, I would argue that a reservationprice is not a rent in a strict sense. This concept just refers to the fact that the landowneris waiting until, for example, the monopoly rent offered for his plot is sufficiently high.Therefore, absolute rent is not considered any further in this text.

Monopoly rent (MR) and the social division of urban space

The concept of monopoly rent (MR) may be used as a key to deal with residentialdifferentiation, as proposed by Topalov (1984).21 Different social strata differ in theircapacity to pay for socially privileged urban space. The high rent is due to the monopolyof private land and the scarcity of socially privileged social space. Hence, social sectorswhich are economically relatively better off exclude other sectors of the population fromtheir residential areas. Thus, in structuring the social division of urban space monopolyrent plays a crucial role. By applying a wide definition of socially privileged space (seenotes on absolute rent above) we may assume that within the whole urban area monopolyrent plays an important role and affects potentially all households.

The traditional conceptualization of (monopoly) rent usually restricts its distribu-tional effects to landlords and capitalists since rent is seen as part of (unchangeable)surplus value. Lipietz (1974: 224) represents a paradigmatic example: `Le tributfoncier, est-il un rapport d'exploitation? Je dois reÂpondre: non'. Katz (1986: 71)criticizes this position, also held by Harvey (1982), and poses the crucial question:`How is it possible to have a `class struggle' notion of spatial mobility, without acorresponding `class struggle' notion of rent?'.22 The reason for neglecting theinfluence of class struggle between workers and capitalists/landowners on rent seems tolie in an orthodox interpretation of value theory (particularly by French authors on landrent) which holds that land rent may only stem from surplus value. Emsely (1998)stresses that land rent is a concept at a lower level of abstraction than surplus value andit is for this reason that the factors influencing rent are more complex. Since surplusvalue depends on the `social wage' which is the outcome of social processes, rent maybe considered as influenced by class struggles. Nevertheless, the concept introduced byHarvey (1985)23 seems not particularly appropriate, as it remains unclear whether therent paid by workers reduces real wages or not. This is, however, an important questionfor analysis of class struggles. Therefore, a conceptualization of rent as a social relationwhich may be an object of conflict between workers and landlords also seemsimportant. Hence, we should differentiate between MR1 and MR2. Whilst the firstconcept implies that monopoly rent is paid out of surplus value (and therefore does notchange real wages), MR2 holds that an increase in land rent reduces real wages (Edel,1992). Hence, institutional embedding of monopoly rent, like rent control acts and thespecific formation of the wage relation, have a decisive influence on whether monopolyrent turns out to be MR1 or MR2. By introducing this distinction, rent is conceptualizedin a form which allows us to consider distributional conflicts not only betweenlandlords and capitalists (or landed fractions of capital), but also between landed classesand the working class.24 When applied empirically, this conceptualization within a

21 Initially this idea was not raised within the context of Marxist theorizing, but proposed by Friedrichvon Wieser (1909), a scholar of the Austrian School of Economics.

22 Nevertheless, in Harvey (1985: chapters 3 and 4; not quoted by Katz, 1986) class struggle overurban land rent (and its appropriation) is conceptualized in a more general manner and is notrestricted to the mere possibility of workers' spatial mobility.

23 He argues that land rent may descend from the circulation of revenues as well as from thecirculation of capital.

24 The nomothetic line argues that there is a merger between landed classes and capitalists as landincreasingly becomes a pure financial asset. I would argue that the distinction between landedclasses and other fractions of capital is still analytically valuable. There are still antagonistic



regulationist perspective gives important insights into distribution conflicts and theirrelation to residential differentiation. In order to provide a better understanding of MRwithin different institutional contexts, its role is illustrated for the cities of Montevideoand Vienna. Both cases are highly valuable examples, as drastic changes in theinstitutional context have occurred there. Those changes make clear the importance ofthe distinctive institutional embedding and facilitate an analysis of current institutionalcontexts (and struggles over them).

What we observe in Montevideo is a substantial decline of the share of housing costsin general household spending since the 1930s, and particularly since 1943 (BeÂrtola,2000). These changes can be understood by considering the context of the formationand distribution of land rent. In 1931 not very restrictive measures of housing rentallevel regulation were introduced and the housing rental market has been heavilyregulated since 1943 (Terra, 1969). This contributed (in combination with theintroduction of a collective bargaining system and a corresponding monetary policy) toa decrease in rental levels in real terms. The decrease in rental levels led to a substantialtransfer from rentiers to the working class, who occupied around 80±90% of rentalhousing. What would explain this specific change of land regulation which led to a clearshift of rent from landlords to workers (case of MR2)? Montevideo entered a crisis inthe 1930s. This resulted in a considerable weakening of landed (urban and rural) classesand as a consequence a new social coalition arose. This new social coalition betweenproductive industry and the working class implemented new forms of regulation (wagerelations, etc., and also regulation of urban space) which led to the emergence of a newmode of regulation and a regime of accumulation, as a regulationist analysisdemonstrates (Becker et al., 2001). This new regime clearly favoured the interests ofproductive economic sectors to the detriment of rental-oriented sectors (urban as well asrural). At the same time, the spatial patterns of urban development were clearlydifferentiated from the former model. Within the context of a housing policy orientedtowards owner-occupied middle-class housing, suburbanization became a central newform of urban development, whilst the circulation of existing rental housing was lessconnected to income differentials and therefore to MR. Whilst the regulations since the1930s contributed to a considerable decrease in expenditure on housing, thederegulation of housing rents in 1974 and in the mid-1980s led to a strong increasein the proportion of money spent on housing (Propiedades, 1997: 64). Deregulationoccurred in the context of a deep accumulation crisis and was executed by a militarygovernment which came to power in 1973. The consequence of the transformation inthe ecological constraint on urban land was a massive internal migration of lowerincome households towards the periphery of the urban area (precarious squattersettlements, in many cases on illegally occupied land) and therefore increased socialpolarization (JaÈger, 1999; Becker et al., 2001). Despite this liberal transformation of theregulation of urban land, substantial measures by means of a progressive land andproperty tax to reduce/transfer land rent from landowners to the public were introducedby the local government during the 1990s. The overall earnings of the property tax morethan doubled and now represent around 0.13% of the value of real estate assets (JaÈger,2002: 153). As this example demonstrates, deviant forms of politics are possible evenwithin a consolidated liberal regulation of urban land.

A similar evolution may be observed in Vienna. Deregulation in the 1980s and 1990scontributed to a pronounced increase in rental levels and housing costs considerablyabove the level of consumer price index (CPI) increases (WIFO database). Again,modifications in the institutional context of land rent seem to be the key variable in

interests between landed fractions of capital and, for example, industrial capital (the former isinterested in maximizing rent, whilst the latter's interests lie in a `well functioning' city serving theirproductive activities). At the same time, we may observe different patterns of local politics whichcorrespond more to the interests of one or other fraction of capital (e.g. high or low real estatetaxes, urban planning oriented towards productive development or the promotion of real estatedevelopment).



explaining these developments: a process of partial deregulation of housing rental levelswas introduced at the beginning of the 1980s, which was continued into the 1990s(Novy et al., 2001). This process led to a successive recommodification of housing andurban land, and rental levels were substantially increased. Whilst in previous decades,residential segregation was to an important extent due to the differing accessibility ofdistinctive social groups to segments of the housing market (Giffinger, 1998), we mightsuppose that the logic of land rent will again gain in importance and income will be acentral resource for urban residential patterns (which empirically is hardly observableso far). What are the reasons for this transformation? The deregulation andrecommodification in the housing sector evolved in the context of a transformationin the regime of accumulation, whereby important changes in structural forms hadalready started to take place during the 1980s (Becker and Novy, 1999). Since the endof the first world war, housing rents have been heavily regulated and housingconstruction has been basically carried out by the local and central government via awell-developed sector of housing cooperatives which acted as developers and providers(due to the absence of economic interests and specific land regulations, land rent playeda negligible role). The important housing cooperative sector was closely linked to thepolitical system (clientelism) as well as to banks (until the beginning of the 1990s,mainly owned by the state) and showed a considerable ability to oppose changes in theinstitutional arrangements that had thus far proved profitable for it (Matznettner, 1991).During the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s, banks started to buy rental housing andengaged in non-subsidized housing production (and in speculative office development)where high future profits were expected. The traditional form of subsidized housingproduction became less important and was increasingly seen as a competitive factorwhich reduced the profitability of the banks' real estate projects. Finally, in 2001governmental resources designated for the production of subsidized housing decreasedconsiderably (Novy et al., 2001). The institutional embedding of MR is thereforeundergoing a significant change. A further rise in MR (as MR1 or MR2) is expected totake place, thus increasing its relevance for urban residential differentiation.

By comparing both cases we observe that whilst changes in the ecological constraint inMontevideo have already occurred and correspond to the situation of crisis, in Viennaimportant adaptations to a post-Fordist mode of development are currently underway. Asthis brief example illustrates, at a more concrete level of analysis changes may not beinterpreted as resulting from the deterministic logic of capital and a tendency towardsmaking land a financial asset, but are closely linked to political processes and decisions.Nevertheless, these political processes were related to a transformation in the structure ofaccumulation. The conceptualization proposed here, distinguishing between MR1 andMR2, may help to focus on the institutional changes and thus help to orient class strugglearound urban space. Obviously, this short description of the role of monopoly rent mainlyrefers (in both cases) to the very important sector of rental housing and vastly abstractsfrom the different effects of rent regulations on building ownership and landownership,and between the new buildings' market and the older buildings' market, or specific formsof housing production including policies on housing production. However, the aboveconceptualization may be extended or integrated with disaggregated conceptualizations ofurban land rent theory previously developed.25 Nevertheless, summarizing at the relativelyhigh level of the description above, it may be assumed that the Fordist-type landregulation, contrary to the post-Fordist type, disfavoured owners of buildings andlandowners in general.

25 For example, by the use of the different concepts of real estate rent developed by Dechervois andTheÂret (1979) and by the use of Topalov's (1974) work on the role of developers. Some possibilitiesfor enriching the above conceptualization of monopoly rent with these more concreteconceptualizations are developed in JaÈger (2002).



Extensive differential rent (DR1) and the structuration

of the economic division of space

In structuring the economic division of urban space, extensive differential rent is supposedto play a crucial role. Surplus profits (over the price of production) which accrue to aprivileged place (compared with other firms in the same economic sector) may bepotentially captured by the landowner and thus result in extensive differential rent.Thereby, extensive differential rent contributes to an equalization of the rate of profit.Hence, the role of landed property in the case of DR1 is only a passive one. In the case ofDR1, the institutional context, such as rent regulations, also has an important influence onits concrete effects and on its levels, as empirical analysis shows. Rent regulations playedan important role, for example, for the petty bourgeoisie during the Fordist mode ofdevelopment in Vienna as well as in Montevideo by offering cheap space for theirlocations (Becker et al., 2001; Novy et al., 2001) and thereby giving special advantage tothose small-scale establishments which could afford the spaces offered.

Within the Fordist mode of development the structure of the economy and itsconcrete locational necessities may be described as follows. For purposes of industrialproduction the location of the firm within the city was of relatively low importance. Onlocations at the periphery the industrial sector had to pay a small amount of differentialrent (due to relatively lower transport costs) and a (low) social minimum for the use ofurban space substituting for the loss of agricultural rent at a specific plot. Industrialestablishments in many cases were located in buildings owned by them (as there wasalmost no speculative production of space for economic uses). For services (e.g. banks)the picture was quite different. This sector was forced to locate in places where it couldsell its services. In many cases this was a central location where monopoly rent had tobe paid in competition for a relatively restricted urban space. Nevertheless, economicsectors are located in central as well as peripheral areas, i.e. parts of the commercial andthe service sector. At certain locations (i.e. in the centre) the turnover compared to thespace occupied may be considerably higher than at other locations. Whilst the price fora commodity (e.g. shoes, hamburgers) may be the same at any location, the costs perunit may be different and a surplus profit may arise which potentially will be transferredinto extensive differential rent and goes into the pocket of the landowner(Bandyopadhyay, 1984). Besides this differential surplus, surplus profits due tomonopoly prices (luxury shoes, luxury restaurants) may also be considered important incentral areas. These monopoly prices may end up as monopoly land rent.

During Fordism, due to substantial regulations of rental contracts for economicpurposes, the logic of land rent was partially offset. Nevertheless, the economic divisionof space was considerably structured by land rent. The economic division of urbanspace has changed with the transformation from Fordism to post-Fordism. This ispartially due to substantial changes in the economic structure, particularly the growth ofthe service sector (which often depends on central locations). Therefore, what we mayobserve is an increasing role of monopoly rents in the city centre. Monopoly rents arehigher in cities which have many headquarters of international (or at least multi-locational) firms, because these establishments have a higher capacity to pay for centralareas and, due to the increased competition for these areas, are forced to pay them(KraÈtke, 1992). Nevertheless, besides the process of economic restructuring, thetransformation of the institutional embedding of land rent relevant to the economicdivision of space also played an important role for urban structure as well as for theprocess of economic restructuring itself. Deregulation of rental contracts, e.g. forcommercial purposes, speeded up the process of economic restructuring by increasingthe costs of the sector which in the past had been protected by rental regulation inVienna as well as in Montevideo. In both cases political processes which led to achange in the institutional embedding of DR1 significantly influenced the developmentof the urban spatial fabric as well as the urban economy (Becker et al., 2001; Novy etal., 2001).



Intensive (differential) rent DR2

Another important concept is intensive (differential) rent. This type of rent flows out ofa more intensive use of land compared to the prevailing norm.26 In the urban case thisapplies, for example, to multi-storey buildings which have an intensive (higher soil)occupation rate. Its base is usually supposed to be DR1 (Ball, 1977; Fine, 1979), but Ipropose to also consider MR as a potential base. Hence, the `mechanism' ofintensification (e.g. the construction of buildings with a higher number of floors) mayoccur for productive as well as reproductive uses and leads to a higher rent per unit ofland, independently of whether the source is MR or DR. This may be further justified bythe argument that with the above conceptualization MR and DR1 differ mainly in termsof the source (respectively, the type of use of urban space: productive or reproductive)of rent Ð where the money that pays the rent comes from. Hence, I propose to call DR2intensive rent.

Intensive rent, and its concrete regulation, has an important influence on the spatialstructure of the city. Institutional regulations limiting the type of use of urban land, likezoning or building restrictions, are of decisive importance in preventing or enabling theformation of intensive rent. Within a liberal regulation of urban land, i.e. in the contextof widely absent or unrestrictive zoning, the processes of temporary valorization anddevalorization of different areas within a town may develop quite unhindered. Theseprocesses are due to the developers' aim to find cheap land and improve its (intensive)rent by investing more than the `normal' quantity of capital into the spot. Theinnovating developer, and not the original landowner, may thus gather a large part (orall) of the intensive differential rent. This type of rent, due to the activity of thelandowner (or developer) proper, was also called èndogenous differential tribute' byLipietz (1974). Gentrification, as well as the establishment of new commercial or officecomplexes in relatively run-down areas, may be interpreted as resulting from the realestate developers' search for cheap urban space in order to capture DR2. In the last fewdecades in German cities (KraÈtke, 1992), as well as in Vienna and Montevideo, we mayobserve the construction of this new type of prestigious island, and connected with thisan increased fragmentation of the urban space. This may be explained primarily by thechanged institutional èmbedding' of land rent. Instead of extensive urban expansion(suburbanization), which was heavily subsidized by the state, now capitalist developersare the central protagonists and therefore DR2 has gained an important role.Furthermore, the institutional context, observed in Vienna as well as in Montevideo,changed insofar as planning and building restrictions for the construction of skyscrapersand multi-storey buildings were considerably liberalized and corresponding infra-structure was established. Again, political processes changed the regulations andenabled this new form of production of urban space. Particularly within the field ofurban planning, we may observe that this was modified in such a way as to increase theaccessibility of real estate interests to the decision process. This shift may be interpretedwithin the context of a change in the dominant strategies of accumulation. Capitalistfractions linked to productive development lost in importance compared to fractions ofcapital oriented towards fictitious accumulation under post-Fordism (Becker et al.,2001; Novy et al., 2001).

Political-economic development, land rent and urban structure

The central argument of the article is that in order for land rent to be a useful tool, itshould be theorized in the context of its institutional embedding. As shownempirically, the change in the institutional embedding was responsible for thedifferent relevance of certain types of rent. At the same time, it was crucial for the

26 The nature of DR2 has been the subject of vast and contradictory as well as very abstract debates(also between Marxist and Neo-Ricardian authors). See, for example, Ball (1977), Fine (1979), Lipietz(1979), Harvey (1982) and Barnes (1988).



concrete effects on spatial patterns of development and on the economic and socialprocess as a whole. The analysis of (class) struggles therefore has to take theseinstitutional contexts into account. The application of a differentiated typology of rentseems to be useful. But how are the different types of rent connected? Whilst DR1 andMR imply a perspective of a given material structure of buildings and refer primarilyto the circulation of these (filling them up with different uses), DR2 shows how theproper logic of rent structures urban structure. MR and DR1 may be explained ascoming from the primary circuit of capital accumulation. DR2 results from the properlogic of the secondary circuit of capital accumulation. Lipietz (1985), drawing onempirical observations, stated that we might find a ranking according to a decreasingability to pay for urban ground rent. At the most privileged places (i.e. the centre) wetherefore find the highest prices (rents) which are paid by the financial sector, theluxury goods sector and by high-income groups etc. Concluding (and abstracting fromthe institutional èmbedding' of rent) we can hold that those types of activity areundertaken at locations which demand the highest rental payments. Economic andsocial division of space hence is interwoven. A certain place may be used either by areproductive or by a productive activity and therefore MR or DR1 may be realized.Furthermore, we may consider the relation between MR and DR1 on the one hand, andDR2 on the other, as a dialectical one.

In the Fordist mode of development we find that land and housing wasdecommodified to an important extent. This was achieved by a specific institutionalembedding of land rent and had important consequences for the process ofaccumulation as well as for the spatial patterns of urban development, including arelatively low level of income-based socio-spatial segregation. Restricting MR to theimportant sector of rental housing contributed to decreased segregation based onincome. With the crisis of Fordism, political measures were introduced which modifiedland rent in a specific form. This can be characterized as a recommodification of landand urban property. This change in the institutional embedding of land rent correspondsto a shift within strategies of accumulation. The accumulation crisis in the primarycircuit of capital accumulation (also a process of high inflation) caused strong pressuresfor capital to open up the secondary circuit for the accumulation of fictitious capital.Nevertheless, the institutional changes occurred within contingent, although structured,political processes. Building booms like the one in Montevideo at the end of the 1970sand beginning of the 1980s may be considered as a process of fictitious accumulation.Furthermore, a difference between Montevideo and Vienna may be noted. Whilst in theformer case a clear dependency of the construction cycle on the movement of (real-)interest rates/inflation and therefore profitability may be observed (Grau et al., 1987), inVienna the construction of housing follows a stable pattern which until recently wasstructured by non-market (or, rather, non-profit) driven production (Felderer, 1999).The recommodification leads to increased levels of income-based social exclusion andsegregation, as well as to a different pattern of city development. This may becharacterized by an increased small-scale fragmentation of the urban structure and canbe explained by the higher importance of real estate capital guided development in thesearch for intensive rent. This was enabled by a corresponding shift in the institutionalcontext (allowing exceptions to building restrictions, abolishment of zoning restrictions,provision of public infrastructure and urban embellishment).

By way of summarizing, the use of types of rent and the institutionalcontextualization help to distinguish between important, different land-relatedprocesses which occur in the urban sphere (productive and reproductive), as well asto understand a proper logic stemming from the secondary circuit of capitalaccumulation. The struggles between classes (whereby differentiating between MR1and MR2 proved to be essential) can be differentiated from struggles within fractions ofcapital. This contributes to orient the view towards specifically relevant institutions(and therefore fields of struggle) and helps to link concrete political conflictssurrounding urban space to changes in the capitalist process of accumulation.



Conclusion

The reformulation of land rent theory in a regulationist perspective presented hereunderlines the importance of the (changing) institutional context for an understandingof rent and its urban effects. Advances in critical theory, thinking about space anddialectic reasoning have contributed to the development of a new perspective on landrent. Moreover, the above conceptualization may help to arrive at a better understandingof urban processes against the background of capital accumulation. By treating land rentas a structural form within a regulationist framework, the political context (andtherefore the role of social agency) in producing urban patterns can be analysedsystematically. This helps to go beyond ideographic thinking and to overcome the `logicof capital' approach of the nomothetic tradition in land rent theory where no systematicspace for the treatment of politics is left. The conceptualization outlined here is still of apreliminary and precarious nature. Nevertheless, it may help to guide future theoreticalas well as empirical research on land rent and urban processes.

Johannes JaÈger ([email protected]), Institute for Urban and RegionalResearch, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Postgasse 7-4-2, A-1010 Vienna, Austria.

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Urban land rent theory: a regulationist perspective