Virtue Ethics in Positive Organizational Scholarship: An Integrative Perspective

Canadian Journal of Administrative SciencesRevue canadienne des sciences de l’administration28: 231–243 (2011)Published online 11 June 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/CJAS.199

Virtue Ethics in Positive OrganizationalScholarship: An Integrative Perspective

David S. Bright*Wright State University

Jason StansburyCalvin College

*Please address correspondence to: David S. Bright, Department ofManagement and International Business, Wright State University, 3640Colonel Glenn Hwy, 270 Rike Hall, Dayton, OH 45435, USA. Email:[email protected].

Copyright © 2011 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 231

Miguel AlzolaFordham University

Jacqueline M. StavrosLawrence Technological University

AbstractThe movement of Positive Organizational Scholarship(POS) aims to understand the factors that contribute to aflourishing human condition. Theorists from this groupregularly invoke virtue as a foundational concept, using it toanchor the meaning of “positive.” Yet virtue ethicists haveraised concerns that this grounding is based in a superficialunderstanding of virtue. This paper proposes an integrativeframework to bridge the two perspectives, connecting thenotion of “positive deviance”—popularized in POS—to theidea of virtue as a mean between extremes as understood inthe philosophy of virtue ethics. Copyright © 2011 ASAC.Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

JEL Classification: Z19

Keywords: virtue, virtue ethics, positive organizationalscholarship, positive psychology, positive scholarship,forgiveness, prudence

RésuméLe mouvement Positive Organizational Scholarship (POS)se propose de cerner les facteurs qui contribuent à unecondition humaine épanouie. Les théoriciens de ce groupeinvoquent régulièrement la vertu comme concept fonda-mental, l’utilisant pour ancrer le sens de « Positive ».Cependant, les éthiciens de la vertu s’indignent de ce quecet ancrage repose sur une compréhension superficielle dela vertu. Le présent article propose un cadre cohérent pourjeter un pont entre les deux perspectives, et lie la notion de«déviance positive», vulgarisée dans la POS, à l’idée devertu en tant que moyen terme entre des extrêmes dans laphilosophie de l’éthique de la vertu. Copyright © 2011ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Mots-clés : vertu, éthique, positive organizational scholar-ship, psychologie positive, savoir positif, pardon, prudence

During the past decade, a number of organizationscholars have become increasingly interested in understand-ing the positive aspects of the human condition. In doing so,they have drawn on certain conceptions of virtue. Forinstance, Positive Psychology has utilized virtue as ananchoring concept in the study of the “good life”—the highfunctioning of human individuals—culminating in worksuch as the catalog of “strengths and virtues” (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). Similarly, Positive Organizational Schol-arship (POS) is a newer movement that emphasizes positivedeviance from expected patterns (Cameron, Dutton, &Quinn, 2003). POS scholars have also drawn on virtue as a

way to understand extraordinary human functioning in andthrough organizations (Cameron, 2003; Park & Peterson,2003). Bright, Cameron, and Caza (2006, p. 251), forinstance, wrote that a virtue in an organization representsthat which is good, that which is human, and that whichproduces social betterment. Throughout this body of work isan intention to understand “human flourishing” (Spreitzer,Sutcliffe, Dutton, Sonenshein, & Grant, 2005) and “positivedeviance” in human behaviours and performance (Spreitzer& Sonenshein, 2004, 2003). The potential promise in thesemovements is a perspective on the virtues that incorporatesboth a philosophical and a behavioural understanding ofvirtue as practiced by real people in applied situations.

Yet, it is fair to say that some scholars have receivedthis movement with caution. For instance, Fowers (2008)has noted that from a virtue ethics perspective, thebehavioural understanding of virtue in the “positive

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VIRTUE ETHICS IN POS BRIGHT ET AL.

movement” has ignored a more substantive understandingof virtue as explicated through a long history of thought.

Positive psychologists have not developed a substantial

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concept of what is good, which is essential becausevirtues are defined as being enduring personal qualitiesnecessary for pursuing particular goods. (p. 629)

Fowers (2008, p. 629) attributed this lack of conceptualdevelopment of “the good” in studies of the positive todependence on a superficial, “colloquial” understanding ofvirtue, noting that virtue is “too easy” as a reference point indefining what constitutes positive deviance.

Similarly, Fineman (2006) questioned the use of“positive” in this work. From a critical theory perspective,he has suggested that “the positive turn offers a seductivediscourse, with much promise. It presents a broad vision ofthe sunnier side of life, or positive in that this can beharnessed for noble individual and organizational ends”(p. 270). However, in the same study he opines that“positive deviance is a normative, morally anchoredposition characterized by a cluster of predefined virtues[emphasis added]” (p. 271). His concern is that by relyingon such a strict view of virtues there is a danger ininappropriately excluding any discussion of “negatives.” Ahumanistic scholarship that focuses on the extraordinary inthe human condition or human performance risks deem-phasizing that people and organizations are imperfect andcapable of high dysfunction. Fineman’s (2006) cautionarynote observes that a positive perspective may willfullyignore phenomena or aspects of phenomena that do not fitits predetermined yet unarticulated vision of the good, andthereby produce dangerously underspecified theories.

The foregoing critiques have prompted an engageddiscussion between the authors of this paper, each of whomis trained in either a POS empirical school of thought or avirtue ethics, character‐focused perspective. This paperhighlights important areas of conceptual distinction to bemade from each perspective, and points out importantlimitations in the current conception of POS that may beaddressed by adopting the rich conceptual language ofphilosophical virtue theory. The paper is based on two keyobservations about points of difference.

First, for the virtue ethicist, virtue is rooted in humancharacter, generating a way of being that is good in itself.Whether that good‐in‐itself is defined pragmatically as well‐functioning in community (Solomon, 1992) or withreference to metaphysical foundations (Aquinas, 1984;MacIntyre, 1981), it can be defined, justified, and critiqued.This view is in contrast to the empirical perspective, whichfocuses on the description of virtue as expressed through thebehaviours of people, groups, or organizations.

Second, by invoking the classical view of virtue as amean between extremes (Aristotle, 1999), any givenbehaviour can be understood in its excessive and deficient

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forms as well as those forms discussed relative to theappropriate mean between them—that is, the virtue that thebehaviour best expresses (Solomon, 1992). Such a concep-tion captures the slightly oxymoronic possibility that theterm “positive deviance” may denote an excessive expres-sion of an otherwise excellent behaviour (Heckert &Heckert, 2004). Moreover, such a conception is useful forexploring the social situatedness of virtue, and therebycharacterizing both the ways in which a social collectivity(be it a group, an organization, an industry, or some largerinstitution) hinders or facilitates individual virtuousness, andthe ways in which an individual expression of virtue may beinappropriate within a collectivity. From this perspective,certain actions may only be qualified as “virtuous” undercertain conditions and thus, cannot be characterized as suchmerely in behavioural terms.

These premises provide the foundation for an integrativeview of virtue as follows. First, we discuss the motifs of POSas a mode of theorizing, and the terms of its use of thelanguage of virtue. Second, we briefly review some elementsof the virtue ethics literature that are particularly salient fordeveloping a more robust conception of virtue in POS. Third,we illustrate both this interrelationship and the normativegrounding of claims to the good with respect to the virtues offorgiveness and prudence, each of which have been of interestin the POS and the virtue ethics community. Our keyargument is that both POS and virtue ethics would benefit bymore robustly exploring how these tensions are reflected in thelay meaning of virtues in practice. Finally, we discuss someimplications of our integration for POS and for virtue ethics.

Positive Organizational Scholarship

The POS lens is distinct from traditional organizationalstudies in that it seeks to understand what represents andapproaches the best of the human condition (Cameron et al.,2003). The term positive in this framework refers to threeelements. First, it is positive deviance, meaning that thismovement is interested in explaining extraordinary positiveoutcomes, processes, and attributes of organizations thatproduce them. Second, it has an affirmative orientation,meaning that the focus is on understanding strengths,flourishing relationships, positive human potential, andother desirable outcomes. Third, it is concerned withvirtuousness and elevating processes such as doing goodin addition to doing well.

In line with these intentions, some POS scholars haveused the continuum of human states shown in Figure 1 toillustrate what is meant by the study of positive dynamics inorganizations (Cameron, 2003, 2008). In this view, peopleand organizations can be considered in terms of threebehavioural states: a negatively deviant state, the ordinarystate, and a positively deviant state. At one extreme isnegative deviance, or the dysfunctional state. Typical

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Figure 1.A framework for understanding positive organizational scholarship

DeficitGaps

AbundanceGaps

IllnessIneffectiveInefficientError-proneUnethicalDivisive Conflict

HealthEffectiveEfficientReliableEthical

Compromise

Wellness or FlowExcellent

ExtraordinaryFlawlessVirtuous

Collaboration

NegativelyDeviant State

OrdinaryState

PositivelyDeviant State

Source: Cameron (2003)


outcomes in this state would be that people experienceillness and that organizations are unprofitable, ineffective,and inefficient. Quality is problematic and errors inproduction are customary. Unethical behaviours may beevident. Interpersonal relationships between people areoften toxic. Metaphorically, this condition might becharacterized by individuals in need of hospitalization, ororganizations in need of a turnaround.

At the other extreme is positive deviance, an extraor-dinarily functional state. People in this condition are filledwith vitality and experience of flow in their work(Csíkszentmihályi, 1990). This state of flow describes thedesire and ability to go beyond a normal mode of functioningto a transcendent mode that exceeds the expectations of theordinary mode. This is consistent with the original theory putforth by Csikszentmihalyi (1975) that the optimal experienceof flow is a desired state of human functioning. For example,extraordinary organizations are considered to be thrivingwhen they achieve extraordinary value and go beyondordinary levels of performance. They are not merelyeffective but excellent. In this view, virtuous is what“individuals and organizations aspire to be when they areat their very best” (Cameron et al., 2003, p. 2). The notion ofvirtue is used to characterize practices because they are seenas the manifestation of behavioural excellence. In anorganization, for example, quality is error‐free, peoplehonour one another, and flourishing occurs at every level.Metaphorically, this condition might be characterized byindividuals functioning like Olympic athletes, or organiza-tions exceeding their stakeholders’ expectations. Such“positive deviance” is typically referred to as “excellence”in the common vernacular (e.g., Peters & Waterman, 1982).


The spaces between the extreme and ordinary illustratedifferential forces in organizing. The deficiency gaprepresents the struggle to fix problems and return to theordinary state. The abundance gap is the struggle to movebeyond the ordinary state to reach the extraordinary state(Cameron & Lavine, 2006).

Importantly, the POS continuum positions extraordi-nary organizing as an outlier. Indeed, it can be consideredunusual for people or organizations to function at eitherextreme of deviance. For instance, the social forces inorganizing usually exert substantial pressure that actsagainst any form of deviance. The power of norms ingroups is well documented (Feldman, 1984). Research onthreat‐rigidity shows that adherence to normative pressuresis isomorphic (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).Generally speaking, organizations seem to crave stability,steadiness, and predictability (March & Simon, 1958;Parsons, 1947). Most leaders and organizations, by natureand by default, focus on maintaining performance at thenorm or center of the continuum. Success is tied topredictability and reliability because these conditionsprovide sustainable profitability. In light of these over-whelming tendencies to reinforce norms, POS places valueon the outlier instances when norms are clearly exceeded ina remarkable fashion (Bright & Cameron, 2009).

The overarching intention in this effort is to producescholarship that emphasizes empiricism as a means to groundall findings and prescriptions in rigorous, theoretically‐basedresearch (Cameron et al., 2003). It is expected that this focuswill disclose the positive dynamics and organizationalbreakthroughs that make possible high human functioningin many domains. By understanding better how these

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dynamics work and are stimulated, sustained, and nourished,it is assumed that new theories and models will promoteflourishing, exceptional organizations.

In keeping with these intentions, POS scholars havemade contributions through research that develops anunderstanding of factors in organizations that nurturevarious manifestations of human strengths and virtues(Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In the organizationalliterature, examples include research on such virtues ascourage (Quinn & Worline, 2008), forgiveness (Bright,2005), compassion (Dutton,Worline, Frost, & Lilius, 2006),among many others, and a broad focus on organizationalvirtue (Bright et al., 2006; Cameron, 2003). The empiricalaim of these studies is to demonstrate the validity of virtuebecause of its ability to generate positive outcomes forpeople and organizations, including flourishing (Fredrickson& Joiner, 2002), thriving (Spreitzer et al., 2005), optimalfunctioning (Keyes & Haidt, 2003), capacity‐building(Dutton & Glynn, 2007; Stavros, Seiling, & Castelli,2008), and general excellence in the human condition(Cameron, 2003). POS scholars focus on understandingenablers and motivators, as well as “the outcomes or effectsassociated with positive phenomena” (Cameron et al., 2003,p. 3–4). Research on positive leadership seeks to explicatespecific processes, practices, and behaviours that result inextraordinary results (Avolio & Gardner, 2005; Cameron &Lavine, 2006). Research on strategy focuses on processes thatdeviate from industry norms and create desirable organiza-tional outcomes (Stavros & Wooten, 2011). The distinctivefeature of POS is that it focuses on behavioural excellencethat enables performance on the positive end of thecontinuum of organizing states (Wooten & Cameron, 2009).

While POS proponents tend to assume that flourishingoccurs at the positively deviant end of the POS continuum,they are also quick to point out that excellence does not implythe absence of negativity. For example, both positive andnegative emotions have a role to play in human flourishing(Cameron, 2008; Roberts, 2006). However, as criticalscholars persist in asking (Fineman, 2006), the question stillremains: is it not possible that positive deviance may bedysfunctional at some point and in some circumstance? If so,how do we account for this in a model of human flourishing?A recovery of virtue’s more specific meanings can enrichcurrent scholarship and lend helpful insight in this regard.

Virtue Ethics

In light of the historical importance of virtue ethics, it isunsurprising that the term “virtue” is part of the popularlexicon, and that the term has since been appropriated byscholars in other fields. From the perspective of virtueethics, virtue rests in the character excellence of a person. Itentails habits that dispose a person to think, feel, and act in acertain way (Aquinas, 1984; Aristotle, 1999). A virtue is, in


and of itself, a good attribute of a person, because to theextent that it is perfected, it realizes some aspect of what theperson ought to be (Aquinas, 1984; Aristotle, 1999). It is notan instrumental capability to perform good actions; instead,an action is good to the extent that it reflects a virtue,because an action’s purpose is merely a reflection of theactor, who in turn is a greater or lesser reflection of his orher ultimate purpose or place in the order of being. Thelanguage of virtue provides teleological grounding for thenarratives of action in organizations; it endows people witha sense of purpose and meaning in what they do.

Virtue ethicists may disagree on the purposes of humanlife: Aristotle addressed his ethics to Athenian male citizensbased on his hierarchical understanding of the natural orderof all things (Aristotle, 1999), Roman Catholic virtuetheorists base their sense of telos on the will of God revealedin the natural order of creation and in the Bible (Aquinas,1984; MacIntyre, 1981), and some contemporary virtuetheorists identify those character traits that are good in andof themselves based on their contribution to sustainablewell‐functioning of the individual within the collective(Solomon, 1992). However, the epistemic limitations of themodernist project of secularization have left room for ateleological understanding of virtue ethics (MacIntyre,1981). In this regard, virtue ethics has enjoyed somethingof a renaissance in recent decades as its ability to specify arich language and compelling vision of the good hascommended it to applied ethics (Solomon, 1992).

From the perspective of virtue ethics, one notablecharacteristic of a given character trait is that it may fail torealize its purpose if it is deficient on the one hand orexcessive on the other. For instance, a person who shunsnecessary conflict is deficient in courage, but one whorelishes and seeks out confrontation is excessive; thesestates might be described as cowardly and reckless,respectively (Aristotle, 1999). Virtue ethicists contend thatthis logic of deficiency and excess applies to all moralvirtues. Virtue, properly understood, can be defined as thevirtuous mean of a given character trait (Aquinas, 1984;Aristotle, 1999): Virtue is the golden mean betweenextremes, as shown in Figure 2.

An Integrative Perspective

Figure 2 illustrates two key differences in approach tothe question of virtue in organizations. The POS perspectiveemphasizes a focus on empirically verifiable behaviours thatmay be characterized as positively deviant. The virtue ethicsperspective focuses on character, seeing behaviours aspotential evidence of a character of virtue. The twoapproaches can be reconciled by remembering that theideas of “abundance” (Cameron & Lavine, 2006) or“positive deviance” (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004) illus-trated in Figure 1 represent organization excellence, which

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Figure 2.A classical representation of virtuous character


tends to be extraordinary in its occurrence. The “goldenmean” at the center of Figure 2 is not the modal character,but instead is the most excellent form of character accordingto some conception of virtuous purpose. Similarly, positivedeviance is not simply an extreme or excessive behaviouralexpression of “more is always better.” Rather, it is anexpression that surpasses the standards of adequacy toexceed expectations.

Combining these continua in Figure 3, the graphed lineillustrates the most likely correspondence of behaviouralexcellence (relative to other actors) and the virtuous

Figure 3.The relationship between virtuous behaviour and character: Aconception of excellence


character of the people who generate those behaviours. Onthe rising end of the curve, behavioural excellence willincrease to the extent that people are virtuous. At the top ofthe curve, where excessiveness begins to creep in, a highlevel of excellence may be present. Yet, at the far right endof the curve where excesses are more extreme, behaviouralexcellence should decline. Grant and Schwartz (in press),writing from a POS behaviouralist perspective, reached asimilar conclusion about the potential for excess, arguingthat there is an inverse, u‐shaped relationship between virtuebehaviours and high organizational function.

classical conception of virtue juxtaposed with a positive

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For instance, a lazy salesperson might give up tooeasily on a set of leads, fail to follow up on missed contacts,or not suggest alternative products to a customer whodecides against the initial offering. An obsessive salesper-son, however, also fails to meet expectations: steadfastlyrefusing to take “no” for an answer or calling so frequentlyas to become a nuisance, which not only drives away actualand potential customers, but wastes time, postage, and otherresources that might have been spent on more promisingleads. A diligent salesperson, who reads a customer wellenough to discern the difference between considerateinterest and polite dismissal, and follows up enough to beclose at hand without hovering, is both excellent and rare.

With virtue thus defined for individuals, it is importantto address the objection “but isn’t virtuousness dependenton the context?” An obsessive mortgage loan officer istedious to work with, but an investment advisor who puts inlong hours scouring the details of potential investments mayattract repeat business. We argue here that virtuousness doesnot depend solely on the context; instead, virtue is anchoredby some universal purpose (Aquinas, 1984; Hauerwas &Pinches, 1997), and a context can itself be evaluatedaccording to the degree to which it supports the develop-ment of individual character that accords with that purpose.We label organizations whose culture, climate, or othercontextual influences support expressions of character thatare deficient relative to the golden mean anomic. Similarly,we label organizations whose culture, climate, or othercontextual influences support expressions of character thatare excessive relative to the golden mean hypernomic.

A given environment may sanction departures from itslocal norms, regardless of whether those departures arevirtuous. For instance, expending diligent efforts may bepunished as “rate busting” in some anomic workplaces (atleast with respect to diligence), while declining to uphold anunreasonable pace may be punished as “chiseling” in otherhypernomic workplaces (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).However positive it may be, positive deviance can benegatively sanctioned like any other norm‐breaking behav-iour (Best, 2004); an organization may make it very difficultto sustain virtuous but positively deviant behaviour.Conversely, the same social sanctions may also be appliedto punish workers who qualify as lazy in anomic work-places, or as obsessive in hypernomic ones, therebyencouraging virtue, or at least behaviour consistent with it.

Accordingly, an individual may respond to his or herlocal context in one of two ways. A pragmatic mode(Bright, 2005) of adaptation would entail adhering to thenorms being enforced in the local context. Such adherencemay or may not bring an individual closer to the virtuousgolden mean, depending on whether their character isdeficient or excessive relative to the local norms, andwhether the local norms are anomic or hypernomic. Alocally lazy person pragmatically adapting to diligencenorms in an anomic context will become more virtuous; a


locally lazy person pragmatically adapting to diligencenorms in a hypernomic context will become more obsessive.

A transcendent mode (Bright, 2005) of response,however, is oriented not toward local norms, but towardthe telos or narrative that defines a virtue; an individualresponding in that way transcends local norms to expressmore virtuous behaviours as a matter of personal character.Moreover, because that expression may be viewed aspositively or negatively deviant within a given context, andgarner approbation or opprobrium accordingly, transcendentadaptation often requires changes to the context to besustainable, thereby contributing to the collective well‐beingof the organization. For instance, out of deep feministconvictions, a tempered radical (Meyerson & Scully, 1995)might violate an investment bank’s or consulting firm’sexcessive norms on hours and travel for the sake of work/life balance; her deviance might be considered positive bysome and negative by others, depending on whether they seethe behaviour as honourable or not, according to the valuesthey hold dear. Moreover, the tempered radical mightnetwork with others, lobby for new policies, and otherwisechange the context to legitimate the new behaviour(rendering it consistently positive, if still deviant), andeventually normalize it (rendering it no longer deviant, andin the process dragging the context closer to the universalgolden mean). Job crafting (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001)might similarly be a smaller‐scale individual tactic tosupport transcendent adaptation.

In the next section, we illustrate the anomic versushypernomic states and the interaction between person andcontext through an examination of the virtues of forgivenessand prudence.

Example #1: The Virtue of Forgiveness in Organizations

Forgiveness describes a family of actions intended tobreak or prevent destructive cycles of human interaction(Bright & Exline, 2011). The human experience is rife withmoments in which people generate consequences that havenegative or detrimental impacts on others. Most victims ofoffense instinctively experience some inclination to protectthemselves, retaliate, or gain vengeance.When these instinctsare harboured or acted upon, many harmful effects mayoccur; for example, rumination over past wrongs is correlatedto significant declines in health (McCullough, Bono, & Root,2007), and vengeful behaviours can generate escalatingcycles of offense and retaliation. All forgiveness practicesaim to prevent or disrupt these harmful cycles (Arendt, 1958).Forgiveness has been designated by some writers as afundamental human virtue, representing a form of moral andspiritual “goodness” (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).

The potential significance of forgiveness in theworkplace is considerable. For example, forgiveness hasbeen studied as a conflict resolution strategy (Butler &Mullis, 2001), a human resource strategy (Kurzynski, 1998),

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a means to rebuild cooperation (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, &Murnighan, 2002), a phenomenon connected to restorativejustice (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999), and as part of the errorrecovery process in organizations (Bosk, 2003). Forgivenessis a means to repair workplace relationships (Aquino,Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003), and when organizationsrequire that people work interdependently, it can mitigatethe occurrence of damaged connections. It can also helpleaders to develop an appropriate level of failure‐tolerantleadership (Farson & Keyes, 2002). Though there are manyforms of forgiveness (Bright & Exline, 2011), thisdiscussion focuses specifically on three: intrapersonal,relational, and organizational.

Intrapersonal forgiveness. First, intrapersonal orintrapsychic forgiveness occurs within the offended personas an internal process through which negative emotions,thoughts, and behavioural tendencies are displaced ordissolved (Bright, Fry, & Cooperrider, 2008) Throughintrapersonal forgiveness, people reduce chronic feelings ofanger, and often replace negative emotion with positiveemotion (Worthington & Scherer, 2004). Intrapersonalforgiveness can be understood as a choice point thatdetermines how a person reacts during those moments whenhe or she is naturally tempted to act on negative feelings orthoughts against others who are seen as offensive (Bright,2005; Yamhure‐Thompson & Shahen, 2003).

Two camps exist with respect to the question about howmuch this negativity must be transformed in order to claimthat forgiveness has actually occurred (Yamhure‐Thompson& Shahen, 2003). First, in the neutrality perspective, whichaligns well with the pragmatic mode (Bright, 2005; Brightet al., 2008), forgiveness is seen as the removal of oneselffrom the role of victim. Similarly, Aquino et al. (2003, p. 212)suggested that the forgiver must both “overcome negativeemotions” and abstain from acting out toward the perceivedoffender in retaliation.

Most research on forgiveness favours the neutralityposition. With a few exceptions, most researchers haveresolved that forgiveness at least requires the intrapsychicneutralization of negativity (McCullough, Hoyt, & Rachal,2000; Yamhure‐Thompson & Shahen, 2003). As a result,most work has focused on the pragmatic potential offorgiveness as a healing and restorative mechanism.

In contrast, in the positivity perspective, the intention ofthe transcendent mode, “Forgiveness happens as pastresentments are owned, not disowned; are recognized, notrepressed; are released, not retained; and are woven into newbonding relationships with others” (Augsburger, as cited inMeek & McMinn, 1997, p. 95). Through forgiveness, thenegativity the forgiver once felt toward the offender istransformed through beneficent intention into positivity(Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; North, 1998). This does notnecessarily mean that the victim must feel or behavepositively toward the offender. Rather, the offending eventbecomes a transformative catalyst, an opportunity for


transcendent growth and learning. The elevating potentialof forgiveness, as implied by its consideration as atranscendent human strength (Peterson & Seligman, 2004),remains largely unexplored.

The deficient extreme of intrapsychic forgiveness in theworkplace, or state of nonforgiveness makes intuitive senseand is well documented. The individual experience of beingharmed is characterized by emotional elements (e.g., fear andanger), cognitive elements (e.g., desire for vengeance), andbehavioural elements (e.g., acting out based on theseemotions and thoughts). Other costs of the deficient,nonforgiving state include seeking revenge, bullying, andinterpersonal conflict (Andersson, 1999; Bies & Tripp, 1997;Mikkelsen & Einarsen, 2002). If left unaddressed, theseintrapsychic tendencies can lead to dysfunctional workplacerelationships that have a negative impact on organizationalperformance. Moreover, at the personal level, a prolongedstate of nonforgiveness produces biological degradation,psychological rumination, and prolonged negative emotion-ality (Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001). Indeed, mostmodels of forgiveness are activated by the manifestation ofthe dysfunctional potential of deficiency, and forgiveness isseen as a primary mechanism for overcoming this possibility.

Relational forgiveness. A second form of forgivenessis relational or interpersonal and refers to the behavioursthrough which people visibly demonstrate forgiveness (Bright& Exline, 2011). The person who engages in relationalforgiveness (the forgiver) demonstrates three objectives orbehaviours: (a) ensures that the offender ceases to engage inharmful behaviour, (b) recognizes that the cessation hasoccurred, and (c) forgoes retributive actions. In contrast tointrapersonal forgiveness, which focuses on intrapsychiccognitions and emotions, relational forgiveness centers onthe behavioural practices associated with forgiveness.

Research on relational forgiveness has consideredseveral hypotheses. For instance, the context of a relation-ship appears to play an important role in the degree ofrelational forgiveness. People who are more committed toone another are more forgiving than those who areuncommitted (Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002). Practicessuch as apology, expressions of remorse, or offers ofrestitution all have a positive relationship with bothrelational and intrapersonal forgiveness (McCulloughet al., 1998). In addition, the communication of forgivenesshas “illocutionary force” (Pettigrove, 2008, p. 371) in that ithas the potential to change the nature of a relationship.Relational forgiveness can be communicated through bothdirect (e.g., “I forgive you”) and indirect means (e.g., “don’tworry about it” or “no problem”; Bright & Exline, 2011).

The potential interaction between relational and intra-personal forgiveness has given rise to some concerns aboutexcesses in the behaviours of forgiveness. Of particularconcern are behaviours that communicate relational for-giveness while the forgiver continues to suffer intrapsychi-cally. Some scholars are especially concerned by the

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possibility that relational forgiveness behaviours in vulner-able populations might be perceived as submissiveness thatthen exposes them to abuse or bullying. Lamb andMurphy’s (2002) edited work, Before Forgiving, is anoteworthy example of this critical perspective because itsummarizes critiques from the fields of philosophy andpsychological counselling. Among the observed potentialdangers of hypernomic forgiveness is the possibility thatwrongs may not be thoroughly addressed in a legitimate waythat benefits both victims and society (Puka, 2002). On thisnote, at least some writers emphasize that forgiveness does notpreclude the punishment of offenders to satisfy the demands ofjustice at the societal level (Bright & Exline, 2011); however,the manner in which these concerns are satisfied in practicalterms remains unexplored in research. Other questions havearisen about the relationship between forgiveness andpotentially legitimate purposes of anger (Neu, 2002). Yetother authors have expressed concern that some therapists mayactually deny the virtue in forgiveness (e.g., pushing peopletoward inauthentic expressions of forgiveness) by turning itinto a therapeutic technique (Richards, 2002). There are anumber of legitimate questions to be raised that can beaccounted for and shaped through a framework that placesforgiveness as a mean between extremes.

Organizational forgiveness. At the organizationallevel, forgiveness is a specialized form of relational forgive-ness in which an organizational system reacts to offensive orharmful human activity. At first blush it might seemcounterintuitive to consider that an organization may beforgiving, but from a behavioural perspective, it makes sense.For example, Bosk (2003) conducted a thorough study oforganizational forgiveness through an ethnography thatfocused on organizational reactions to physician surgical errorin a university hospital. Surgical residents were submitted tosevere examination by the organization and its representativeswhen they committed medical errors. In essence, the hospitalas an institution legitimized the three functions of relationalforgiveness articulated earlier to (a) ensure that the offendingphysician learned from mistakes, (b) recognize when aphysician had made corrections, and (c) forego additionalretributive action, thus providing offenders with an opportu-nity for a continued relationship with the hospital.

From the perspective of virtue offered in this paper,such an example helps illustrate why forgiveness must be amean between extreme reactions in the aftermath of sucherrors. We can imagine, for instance, a medical institutionwith a “zero tolerance” policy in which any commission oferror would result in immediate suspension of training. Sucha policy could have a detrimental long‐term impact, not onlyon the offender, but also on future patients who are deniedthe potentially helpful services of this future professional.On the other hand, an institution that is too forgiving mightperpetuate severe dysfunctions: the number of errors mightescalate, quality of care decline, and so forth. Organizationalforgiveness, then, can be thought of as a balance between


institutional intolerance on the one hand and overindulgenceon the other. It is in this context that some authors havecalled for more organizational practices that incorporate aforgiveness perspective (Nussbaum 2007), thereby creatinga “capacity to foster collective abandonment of justifiedresentment, bitterness, and blame, and, instead, … [foster]positive, forward‐looking approaches in response to harm ordamage” (Cameron & Caza, 2002, p. 39).

In this respect, some work suggests that certaininterventions can improve organizational forgiveness. Bright(2005) found that, in the context of union‐managementconflict in a trucking company, an organization‐wide culture‐change intervention was systematically deployed across 29semiautonomous sites. The five‐year program was based onan “appreciative inquiry” design in which employees wereencouraged to engage in frequent conversations about factorsthat “give life” to their organization when it was functioningat its best (Whitney & Trosten‐Bloom, 2003, p. 1). Suchconversations typically evoke dialogue that allows foremployees to develop mutual understanding and commonground. In the absence of intervention, all workers werelikely to see the organization as encouraging behaviours thatwould be associated with the anomic end of the forgivenesscontinuum. After intervention, however, most respondentsdescribed the relational context in terms that were consistentwith a more forgiving organizational environment. In sum,role and social pressures in organizations may create a pulltoward either end of the virtue continuum, and individualswithin an organization may be influenced to behaveaccordingly.

Example #2: The Virtue of Prudence in Organizations

“Prudence,” translated the Latin prudentia, which wasin turn a translation of Aristotle’s phronesis. In its traditionalsense, the word is also translated as practical wisdom in thephilosophical literature (Aquinas, 1948; Aristotle, 1999;Zagzebski, 1996). It has been translated as intelligence aswell (Aristotle, 1999). A discussion of prudence is highlyappropriate because it has long been considered by virtueethicists to be indispensible for the good life, and even forthe exercise of other virtues (Aquinas, 1948; Aristotle,1999). Moreover, it is highly regarded as a virtue to besought after in a capitalist society (McCloskey, 2004).

The term is used in at least three distinctive ways andthree different contexts in the literature. Specifically,prudence has been conceptualized as (a) the master virtue—that is, a precondition for the exercise of all the other virtues,(b) a habit of cautiousness in the practical dimension of one’slife, and (c) practical rationality especially in pursuing one’sself‐interests.

The first and third conceptualizations may be seen as anonmoral sense of prudence. As a cardinal virtue, prudence isan intellectual virtue—as opposed to a moral virtue—because

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it does not comprise any disposition to do what is morallyrequired (Aquinas, 1948; Aristotle, 1999). Justice, temper-ance, courage, and prudence constitute the four cardinalvirtues, defined as such because the possession of morespecific virtues such as loyalty, honesty, compassion, and soforth can be reduced to the possession of the cardinal virtues.Under this characterization, prudence is a virtue of thepractical intellect, which entails an understanding of whathuman flourishing is and the intellectual skills in practicalrather than theoretical matters, especially the ability toperceive the actions that contribute to human flourishing. Theprudent person understands what is morally required in eachsituation. Whether or not prudence only involves a form ofknowledge—that is, the intellectual skills to reason frommoral principles to particular circumstances—is a matter ofwhether or not prudence as a cardinal virtue is interpreted inrationalistic terms or rather as the faculties of perception andmoral imagination.

In the third sense, prudential considerations areprimarily concerned with the agent’s self‐interest as a sortof practical rationality, which is not necessarily connected toanything morally significant insofar as the agent’s choicefurthers his own ends. This is the modern usage of the termthat was completely foreign to the Ancient conceptualizationof prudence (Annas, 1993). The realm of prudence or self‐interest is different from the realm of morality according tothis view. For that reason, some scholars argue, theunderstanding of prudence as an amoral term entails thedenial of prudence as a virtue (McCloskey, 2004).

Here we are primarily interested in the second sense ofprudence, not as a cardinal virtue that underlies all othermoral virtues, but rather as a particular virtue. According toHursthouse (1999:154), practical wisdom is “the ability toreason correctly about practical matters” (p.12). It involvesknowledge of the means as well as knowledge of the ends.In Aristotle’s words:

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It seems proper to a prudent person to be able todeliberate finely about things that are good and beneficialfor himself, not about some restricted area – about whatsorts of things promote health or strength, for instance –but about what sorts of things promote living well ingeneral. (Aristotle, 1999, p. 25–29)

As a particular virtue, prudence involves governingone’s appetites. But prudence in this second sense cannot bereduced to self‐control because it does not restrain badimpulses, but rather is concerned with the development offoresight and long‐term plans for an integrated life.

Prudence is concerned not only with universal truths,but also with the singular and variable things of life. Aperson can be wise in the sense of being able to formulategood reasons about the meaning of life and still be unable tomake good decisions in real‐life situations because he or sheis inexperienced. A phronimos—a person who possesses thevirtue of prudence in the sense discussed here—cannot easily


teach others his art or explain his own processes of thought.Yet, after long practice the phronimos has a feeling for whathe should do, which cannot be merely reduced to theapplication of universal principles or rules to practicalsituations. As Rorty (2000) put it, “The Aristotelianphronimos does the right thing for the right reasons; andthat means that he lies when it is appropriate to lie,manipulates when it is appropriate to manipulate” (p. 205).In an anomic context, what would otherwise be prudentbehaviour is indeed a vice of defect (e.g., the phronimos liesto the Gestapo when they come to ask for the whereabouts ofthe Jews he is hiding in his basement), and in a hypernomiccontext, what would otherwise be prudent behaviour is a viceof excess (e.g., a stubborn and opinionated member of aradical/‐fundamentalist organization).

Prudence is to some extent an ideal—the ideal of thesort of person who rightly deliberates about the targets of thevirtues and (reliably) hits them in his actions (Foot, 1978).Then, if prudence is a matter of degree, the phronimos tellsus what these degrees mean (Russell, 2009, p. 111). Second,prudence plays a crucial role in both deliberation anddecision making. It guides one’s decision towards the meanof a virtue, and it balances that decision among the demandsof various virtues (Foot, 1978).

With Aristotle, we can treat prudence and right reasonsinterchangeably: right reason is an intellectual capacity aphronimos has rather than a set of principles the phronimosknows (Hursthouse, 2006). It is precisely those right reasonsthat enable the agent to hit the mean between excess anddeficiency in action. A person can cultivate and havedisposition to act in accordance with certain right moralprinciples. Yet, without prudence, those dispositions are justrobotic, mindless, and lacking the reasons for actingappropriately given the circumstances.

In terms of our model, a fundamental feature ofprudence is that it strives for the mean between twoextremes, namely, rashness and stubbornness. The deficientstate—defined as rashness or impulsiveness here—entailsamong other things ill constituted desires, wrong choices,and impetuous behaviour that is self‐defeating in the longterm (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 480). The excessivestate may involve rigidity, brittleness, and inflexibility ofdesires, beliefs, and behaviour that also fails to promotehuman flourishing and the agent’s self‐interests. This viewis surely controversial: Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2003)have suggested that virtues, like prudence, “are clearly notapplicable to positive deviance and may even stand incontrast to positive deviance” (p. 209).

It is precisely the hypernomic state that has become thecontemporary usage of prudence in the language of businessand economics, in the narrow sense of financial decisionmaking. In that sense, while the prudent agent appropriatelyconsiders and weighs his long‐term interests and the risksassociated with those decisions, the imprudent agent takesexcessive risks and fails to consider his own long‐term

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interests (not to mention those of others). This narrowunderstanding of prudence has been severely criticized:

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But prudence is a virtue. We have been inclined for somecenturies now in the West to relegate prudence to anamoral world of “mere” self‐interest. This has been acatastrophe for our dear economics. Only a disposition totake care of others is construed as “virtue,” and then forits intentions rather than for its practical effect.(McCloskey, 2004, p. 551)

As a virtuous expression of character, prudencecoordinates and harmonizes the other virtues and theirappropriateness both in framing situations and in makingsound moral decisions. And prudence also entails thedevelopment of goals and virtuous states that are consistentwith each other rather than recurrently in conflict. Thephronimos promotes the appropriate means to the ends andpromotes the right ends in light of the other ends (Alzola,2008). From this perspective, prudence is an essential virtuethat promotes the well‐being of both people and society.

Discussion

Summary

This paper has highlighted an important point ofcontinuity between contemporary theorizing on organiza-tional virtue in positive organizational scholarship, andtraditional theories of virtue in philosophy. By juxtaposingthe POS continuum of positive deviance with a continuumof character traits centered on the virtuous golden mean, wehave shown that positive deviance does not necessarilyimply that “more is better.” Rather, an individual dispositionthat not only avoids both deficiency and excess but alsosurpasses expectations of adequacy to achieve excellence isvirtuous. Moreover, such individual character can befacilitated or hindered by the social context in which itfinds expression: the context itself may be anomic,encouraging deficient expressions of character, or hyper-nomic, encouraging excessive expressions. This logic ofdeficiency, virtue, and excess, at both the individual and thesocial levels, can be applied to the range of character traitsthat are often studied under the banner of “virtue;” by wayof illustration, we have examined forgiveness and prudence.Moreover, individuals may react to the norms enforced intheir contexts pragmatically by adhering to those norms, ortranscendently by enacting a character that is consistent withthe golden mean of virtue regardless of contextual support.Future research may study the correlation of particularvirtues to determine whether clusters of them co‐occur,together balancing one another. Future research may alsoexamine the individuals who enact transcendent virtue, andthe insights, motivations, and techniques that set thoseindividuals apart.


Contributions to Scholarship

We have proposed a framework for resolving theincongruence between positive scholarship and a virtuesethics perspective. The framework suggests that theintentions to practice singular virtues can be situated on acontinuum in which deviance in either extreme is undesir-able and potentially dysfunctional. In addition, we havecontributed to the literatures on forgiveness and prudence byclarifying how specific virtue behaviours need to beunderstood as a mean between extremes.

At an anomic extreme, people in organizations exist ina nonvirtuous state because of a lack of virtue intent. Ofmore interest, at the hypernomic extreme, nonvirtueemerges due to the imbalances that emerge from anoverzealous emphasis on particular virtue intentions overothers. We have demonstrated the importance of acknowl-edging this hypernomic potential. Importantly, the proposedintegration of virtue into POS illustrates an importantimplication for the POS approach to organizational virtue:the abundance approach may embed the individual in asystem that pulls their habits hypernomically out of jointfrom the virtuous mean. Thus, the POS approach toorganizational virtue, as currently understood, may comple-ment normatively grounded conceptions of virtue ethics, butit may also risk realizing a hypernomic state of “too much ofone good thing” that pulls individuals away from thevirtuous mean, and therefore out of the virtuous state. Whereorganizations pull people in a virtuous direction, organiza-tions can help people become more virtuous individuals bymaking such a habit desirable, if only by ceasing tooveremphasize the aspiration toward one particular mani-festation of virtue. Though forgiveness and prudence havebeen noted as the examples of focus in this paper, the samelogic may apply to other forms of virtue such as courage,compassion, justice, and so forth.

In addition, this paper highlights the role of character inthe understanding of virtue. For instance, in an impressivedepiction of the potential mechanisms and pitfalls ofexcessive virtue behaviours, Grant and Schwartz (in press)epitomize a behaviouralist approach. They describe a “non‐monotonic” effect in virtue behaviours arguing that theirbenefits are limited. These arguments are made without anyreference to character, suggesting an assumption thatvirtuous behaviour and a character of virtue are synony-mous. By highlighting both aspects, our article implies thatvirtue is a latent construct and that behaviours alone may ormay not indicate virtuous character.

Moreover, our model illustrates how the meaning ofvirtue is distorted when focusing solely on behaviour. Forexample, we can’t really call it “forgiveness” whenforgiving behaviours are practiced in the extreme; rather,extreme forgiving behaviours might be described as“condoning” or “foolhardy acquiescence.” In this respect,there can be no such thing as “too much virtue,” because

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virtue always represents that ideal mean between extremes.Indeed, any behaviour in deficiency or excess can becharacterized as dysfunctional.

Thus, we suggest an alternate interpretation of findingson the nonmonotonic effects of virtues reported by Grantand Schwartz (in press). Rather than arguing that it ispossible to be too virtuous by doing too much of a goodthing, we argue instead that virtue is the underlyingcharacter that drives behaviour, and that a character isvirtuous only if it avoids both deficiency and excess. Webelieve that this account is consistent with the existingphilosophical literature on the virtues (see Alzola, 2008,2010; Swanton, 2003). Some POS scholars have begun toincorporate such a perspective in their theorizing on virtuein organizations (e.g., Cameron & Winn, in press).

Applied Implications

From a practical standpoint, this paper suggests that thepractice of virtue within organizations should be soughtfrom a holistic perspective. Many organizations, forinstance, have incorporated virtue through a focus on“excellence” in their organizational endeavours. Evidence ofthis emphasis is found in many best‐selling books such as InSearch of Excellence (Peters & Waterman, 1982) or FromGood to Great (Collins, 2001). The integrated perspectiveof this paper points to the need for balance in how thisaspiration is translated into action. Organizational policiesand actions that place too much emphasis on certainseemingly virtuous behaviours over others may inadver-tently create a hypernomic state of dysfunction.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

This paper underscores the limitations of empiricalfragmentation that may arise from the study of particularvirtues in behavioral research, and thus, we argue for aconsideration of context when studying virtue. Hypernomicinstances of any particular virtue may be associated with theabsence of other virtues, while a balanced expression ofdiverse virtue behaviours may help to avert hypernomicextremes.

Hearkening back to some of the examples of forgive-ness—for instance, in the medical training environment—how are the demands of justice balanced against the need forforgiveness? To what extent do the considerations offorgiveness at different levels of analysis help or hinderforgiveness at other levels? We can imagine, for instance,that when a patient is harmed, the potential for forgivenessmay be simultaneously relevant at multiple levels ofanalysis. In addition to organizational considerations, theharmed patient or family members may have an opportunityto work toward forgiveness at the intrapsychic level. Insome instances, they may seek out the offending physicianto express relational forgiveness. The actions of patients


may influence organizational decision makers and viceversa. In other words, simultaneous forgiveness at multiplelevels might help all parties to find the mean betweenextremes that constitutes a positively deviant, virtuous state.

A similar argument can be made for the examination ofother clusters of virtues. Quinn (1988) among others hasadvocated that effective leaders and organizations have anexceptional capacity to balance and integrate competingvalues. Future research on virtues can contribute to thedevelopment of this perspective in both practical andtheoretical terms.

For virtue ethicists, this article may highlight ways inwhich the virtues can be operationalized, measured, andempirically tested in an organizational context. It can alsohelp to refine the conceptualization and boundary conditionsof the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. Moreover, theframework provides a more robust framework for the use ofvirtue concepts in organizational scholarship.

In addition, it may be valuable to further examine theinteraction between people and context when considering anintegration of virtuous character and virtuous behaviours.How do individuals who enact virtue identify the goldenmean of virtue, if not with reference to the norms that areenforced around them? What motivates individuals totranscend or transform the expectations of their immediatecontext? What techniques do virtuous individuals use tosustain their transcendence? Do some organizations oftenframe virtue in positive ways, thereby facilitating itsnormalization? The answers to these and other questionscan contribute to the literatures on tempered radicalism(Meyerson & Scully, 1995), moral imagination (Werhane,1999), and virtue ethics in organizations (Solomon, 1992;Weaver, 2006).

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Virtue Ethics in Positive Organizational Scholarship: An Integrative Perspective