8/12/2019 ! Resea - Les grands sophistes dans l'Athenes de
Pericles
2/3
NOTICE OF BOOKSOTICE OF BOOKSOTICE OF BOOKS
medieval Latin cosmological and astronomicalthinking does not
bear repeating, although itsinfluence on thinking beyond strict
planetary astro-nomy is less clear. Amongst the Humanist
collec-tors of ancient texts of mathematical arts and
sciences, Ptolemy's enormous work rankedamongst the most prized:
it cannot be presumed,however, that it was only read by court
astro-nomers for the purposes of calculation. TheRenaissance
reassessment f the mathematical artsand sciences ensured that even
so apparently atechnical text was seen to have natural
philosophi-cal content and implications. Modern studentsbeginning
the required deconstruction anddemystification of Copernicus might
even read theAlmagest-and wonder at just how much Coperni-cus
relied on Ptolemaic thinking and style, and notjust in the
mathematical model.
It isonly
to beregretted
that somany
ofPtolemy's other works remain without moderneditions of the
standard f mathematical larity andreadability of this one... and,
inevitably, that thehigh price of this edition will limit its
circulationamongst casual purchasers f classical exts.
Pedersen's I974] study of the Almagest-whichwas more of a
Proemium-should have sparked offfruitful controversy and formed the
basis of furtherbroad scholarly study of the Almagest; trangelythis
did not happen. Perhaps T.'s fine translationand sensitive
mathematical notation will finally getthis wonderful text the
wider, detailed appreciationthat its importance deserves. It is
probable thatprofessional historians of ancient sciences do notneed
a new English edition of the Almagest odeepen their appreciation of
its contents and sig-nificance, but the wider audience that
thiseminently readable and sound translation shouldreach might well
find there is enough beside thegeometry to keep them up reading n
bed for a fewnights.
PIERS BURSILL-HALLDepartment f Pure Mathematics, ambridge
COLPI (B.) Die TaLS6eLa es Themistios: EinBeitrag zur Geschichte
der Bildung imvierten Jahrhundert nach Christus.(Europaische
Hochschulschriften, Reihe I5,36.) Berne: Lang, 1987. Pp. 217.
$25.05.
Themistius is a much understudied figure. A self-proclaimed
philosopher, he was a Neo-Platoniststeeped in Greek cultural
traditions who servedChristian Roman Emperors as publicist and
politi-cian. He gave key-note addresses on numerousimportant
occasions such as Imperial accessions,and headed a commission which
expanded theSenate of Constantinople in the 35os. His ultimate
political reward was the Urban Prefecture of Con-stantinople in
384. His orations attempt to justifythis combination of philosophy
and politics, forwhich he was criticized by contemporaries (cf.
G.Dagron, Travaux et memoires ii [I968], 36 ff. & A.Cameron, CQ
[1965], 221-3). Colpi's concern isnot to reassess T's life and
career-a brief introduc-tion ( 3 if.) echoes Dagron (op. cit.
passim)-but to
medieval Latin cosmological and astronomicalthinking does not
bear repeating, although itsinfluence on thinking beyond strict
planetary astro-nomy is less clear. Amongst the Humanist
collec-tors of ancient texts of mathematical arts and
sciences, Ptolemy's enormous work rankedamongst the most prized:
it cannot be presumed,however, that it was only read by court
astro-nomers for the purposes of calculation. TheRenaissance
reassessment f the mathematical artsand sciences ensured that even
so apparently atechnical text was seen to have natural
philosophi-cal content and implications. Modern studentsbeginning
the required deconstruction anddemystification of Copernicus might
even read theAlmagest-and wonder at just how much Coperni-cus
relied on Ptolemaic thinking and style, and notjust in the
mathematical model.
It isonly
to beregretted
that somany
ofPtolemy's other works remain without moderneditions of the
standard f mathematical larity andreadability of this one... and,
inevitably, that thehigh price of this edition will limit its
circulationamongst casual purchasers f classical exts.
Pedersen's I974] study of the Almagest-whichwas more of a
Proemium-should have sparked offfruitful controversy and formed the
basis of furtherbroad scholarly study of the Almagest; trangelythis
did not happen. Perhaps T.'s fine translationand sensitive
mathematical notation will finally getthis wonderful text the
wider, detailed appreciationthat its importance deserves. It is
probable thatprofessional historians of ancient sciences do notneed
a new English edition of the Almagest odeepen their appreciation of
its contents and sig-nificance, but the wider audience that
thiseminently readable and sound translation shouldreach might well
find there is enough beside thegeometry to keep them up reading n
bed for a fewnights.
PIERS BURSILL-HALLDepartment f Pure Mathematics, ambridge
COLPI (B.) Die TaLS6eLa es Themistios: EinBeitrag zur Geschichte
der Bildung imvierten Jahrhundert nach Christus.(Europaische
Hochschulschriften, Reihe I5,36.) Berne: Lang, 1987. Pp. 217.
$25.05.
Themistius is a much understudied figure. A self-proclaimed
philosopher, he was a Neo-Platoniststeeped in Greek cultural
traditions who servedChristian Roman Emperors as publicist and
politi-cian. He gave key-note addresses on numerousimportant
occasions such as Imperial accessions,and headed a commission which
expanded theSenate of Constantinople in the 35os. His ultimate
political reward was the Urban Prefecture of Con-stantinople in
384. His orations attempt to justifythis combination of philosophy
and politics, forwhich he was criticized by contemporaries (cf.
G.Dagron, Travaux et memoires ii [I968], 36 ff. & A.Cameron, CQ
[1965], 221-3). Colpi's concern isnot to reassess T's life and
career-a brief introduc-tion ( 3 if.) echoes Dagron (op. cit.
passim)-but to
medieval Latin cosmological and astronomicalthinking does not
bear repeating, although itsinfluence on thinking beyond strict
planetary astro-nomy is less clear. Amongst the Humanist
collec-tors of ancient texts of mathematical arts and
sciences, Ptolemy's enormous work rankedamongst the most prized:
it cannot be presumed,however, that it was only read by court
astro-nomers for the purposes of calculation. TheRenaissance
reassessment f the mathematical artsand sciences ensured that even
so apparently atechnical text was seen to have natural
philosophi-cal content and implications. Modern studentsbeginning
the required deconstruction anddemystification of Copernicus might
even read theAlmagest-and wonder at just how much Coperni-cus
relied on Ptolemaic thinking and style, and notjust in the
mathematical model.
It isonly
to beregretted
that somany
ofPtolemy's other works remain without moderneditions of the
standard f mathematical larity andreadability of this one... and,
inevitably, that thehigh price of this edition will limit its
circulationamongst casual purchasers f classical exts.
Pedersen's I974] study of the Almagest-whichwas more of a
Proemium-should have sparked offfruitful controversy and formed the
basis of furtherbroad scholarly study of the Almagest; trangelythis
did not happen. Perhaps T.'s fine translationand sensitive
mathematical notation will finally getthis wonderful text the
wider, detailed appreciationthat its importance deserves. It is
probable thatprofessional historians of ancient sciences do notneed
a new English edition of the Almagest odeepen their appreciation of
its contents and sig-nificance, but the wider audience that
thiseminently readable and sound translation shouldreach might well
find there is enough beside thegeometry to keep them up reading n
bed for a fewnights.
PIERS BURSILL-HALLDepartment f Pure Mathematics, ambridge
COLPI (B.) Die TaLS6eLa es Themistios: EinBeitrag zur Geschichte
der Bildung imvierten Jahrhundert nach Christus.(Europaische
Hochschulschriften, Reihe I5,36.) Berne: Lang, 1987. Pp. 217.
$25.05.
Themistius is a much understudied figure. A self-proclaimed
philosopher, he was a Neo-Platoniststeeped in Greek cultural
traditions who servedChristian Roman Emperors as publicist and
politi-cian. He gave key-note addresses on numerousimportant
occasions such as Imperial accessions,and headed a commission which
expanded theSenate of Constantinople in the 35os. His ultimate
political reward was the Urban Prefecture of Con-stantinople in
384. His orations attempt to justifythis combination of philosophy
and politics, forwhich he was criticized by contemporaries (cf.
G.Dagron, Travaux et memoires ii [I968], 36 ff. & A.Cameron, CQ
[1965], 221-3). Colpi's concern isnot to reassess T's life and
career-a brief introduc-tion ( 3 if.) echoes Dagron (op. cit.
passim)-but to
reconstruct T's reading and education from theevidence of the
surviving orations. This is a tradi-tional line of enquiry, but
well worthwhile. Thestandard edition (ed. in 3 vols by G. Downey
&A. F. Norman, Teubner, 1965-74) identifies quo-
tations, and there have been studies of T's use ofindividual
authors (e:g. J. Scharold, DioChrysostomus und Themistius, 1912),
but no attemptat a general appreciation (cf. Colpi, I8 f.).
C.'sstudy fills this gap successfully. Rather than presen-ting
sterile cross-reference, C. is concerned todifferentiate first-hand
reading from materialknown through intermediaries. Two criteria
areposited (19). The context of the allusion in T'soration must
echo that of the original, and theremust be some consistency in T's
use of an author orwork before C. is convinced that a
parallelrepresents first-hand knowledge. These seem to me
entirely sensible, and, byattention to
detail,C.
gains considerable insight into T's rraiSEla, provid-ing at the
end a convenient summary of his find-ings (193 ff.). C. is
particularly successful in dif-ferentiating formative influences
from writers whoare simply ornaments to T's style. The former
turnout to be Aristotle (95 ff.-not surprising given T'sstill
extant commentaries), Homer (23 if.), Plato(85ff.-whose Socrates is
for T the font of allwisdom), and Dio of Prusa (I49 ff.). This
study isjust as interesting for what we learn of the materialT did
not use at first hand. Throughout, andespecially from sections on
Roman history inGreek (I7I f.), philosophers (III ff.), and
vocabu-lary and figures of speech (183 ff.), C. illustratesmuch
about the handbooks of excerpts whichcontained biographic,
instructional, and apoph-thegmatic information and were the
foundation ofcontemporary schooling. C. is surely right toexplain
the many parallels and resemblancesbetween T, Julian, and Libanius
through a com-mon grounding in such material. C.'s book is
notrevolutionary, but is a well-executed addition bothto our
knowledge of an important figure of theLate Empire, and to our
understanding of fourth-century culture.
reconstruct T's reading and education from theevidence of the
surviving orations. This is a tradi-tional line of enquiry, but
well worthwhile. Thestandard edition (ed. in 3 vols by G. Downey
&A. F. Norman, Teubner, 1965-74) identifies quo-
tations, and there have been studies of T's use ofindividual
authors (e:g. J. Scharold, DioChrysostomus und Themistius, 1912),
but no attemptat a general appreciation (cf. Colpi, I8 f.).
C.'sstudy fills this gap successfully. Rather than presen-ting
sterile cross-reference, C. is concerned todifferentiate first-hand
reading from materialknown through intermediaries. Two criteria
areposited (19). The context of the allusion in T'soration must
echo that of the original, and theremust be some consistency in T's
use of an author orwork before C. is convinced that a
parallelrepresents first-hand knowledge. These seem to me
entirely sensible, and, byattention to
detail,C.
gains considerable insight into T's rraiSEla, provid-ing at the
end a convenient summary of his find-ings (193 ff.). C. is
particularly successful in dif-ferentiating formative influences
from writers whoare simply ornaments to T's style. The former
turnout to be Aristotle (95 ff.-not surprising given T'sstill
extant commentaries), Homer (23 if.), Plato(85ff.-whose Socrates is
for T the font of allwisdom), and Dio of Prusa (I49 ff.). This
study isjust as interesting for what we learn of the materialT did
not use at first hand. Throughout, andespecially from sections on
Roman history inGreek (I7I f.), philosophers (III ff.), and
vocabu-lary and figures of speech (183 ff.), C. illustratesmuch
about the handbooks of excerpts whichcontained biographic,
instructional, and apoph-thegmatic information and were the
foundation ofcontemporary schooling. C. is surely right toexplain
the many parallels and resemblancesbetween T, Julian, and Libanius
through a com-mon grounding in such material. C.'s book is
notrevolutionary, but is a well-executed addition bothto our
knowledge of an important figure of theLate Empire, and to our
understanding of fourth-century culture.
reconstruct T's reading and education from theevidence of the
surviving orations. This is a tradi-tional line of enquiry, but
well worthwhile. Thestandard edition (ed. in 3 vols by G. Downey
&A. F. Norman, Teubner, 1965-74) identifies quo-
tations, and there have been studies of T's use ofindividual
authors (e:g. J. Scharold, DioChrysostomus und Themistius, 1912),
but no attemptat a general appreciation (cf. Colpi, I8 f.).
C.'sstudy fills this gap successfully. Rather than presen-ting
sterile cross-reference, C. is concerned todifferentiate first-hand
reading from materialknown through intermediaries. Two criteria
areposited (19). The context of the allusion in T'soration must
echo that of the original, and theremust be some consistency in T's
use of an author orwork before C. is convinced that a
parallelrepresents first-hand knowledge. These seem to me
entirely sensible, and, byattention to
detail,C.
gains considerable insight into T's rraiSEla, provid-ing at the
end a convenient summary of his find-ings (193 ff.). C. is
particularly successful in dif-ferentiating formative influences
from writers whoare simply ornaments to T's style. The former
turnout to be Aristotle (95 ff.-not surprising given T'sstill
extant commentaries), Homer (23 if.), Plato(85ff.-whose Socrates is
for T the font of allwisdom), and Dio of Prusa (I49 ff.). This
study isjust as interesting for what we learn of the materialT did
not use at first hand. Throughout, andespecially from sections on
Roman history inGreek (I7I f.), philosophers (III ff.), and
vocabu-lary and figures of speech (183 ff.), C. illustratesmuch
about the handbooks of excerpts whichcontained biographic,
instructional, and apoph-thegmatic information and were the
foundation ofcontemporary schooling. C. is surely right toexplain
the many parallels and resemblancesbetween T, Julian, and Libanius
through a com-mon grounding in such material. C.'s book is
notrevolutionary, but is a well-executed addition bothto our
knowledge of an important figure of theLate Empire, and to our
understanding of fourth-century culture.
Worcester College, Oxford.orcester College, Oxford.orcester
College, Oxford.P. J. HEATHER. J. HEATHER. J. HEATHER
ROMILLY (J. DE) Les grands sophistes dansl'Athenes de Pericles.
Paris: de Fallois, I988.Pp. 335. Fr. IOO.
This is a book which needed to be written. It setsout to put
right an injustice-to correct whatMoses Finley had called 'a
historical untruth'(Politics in the ancient world [1983] 123)-by
arguingconvincingly that the widely acknowledged list ofthe
triumphs of the Periclean age is incomplete if it
fails to include the sophistic movement. The riseand success of
the sophists meant that they came tofunction as the professors of
the age of Pericles. Asintellectuals they were responsible for a
new kindof secondary education based on reasoned discus-sion which
came to replace the traditional emphasison sport and athleticism.
The main theme of thebook is developed in Chapters IV to VI, where
it is
ROMILLY (J. DE) Les grands sophistes dansl'Athenes de Pericles.
Paris: de Fallois, I988.Pp. 335. Fr. IOO.
This is a book which needed to be written. It setsout to put
right an injustice-to correct whatMoses Finley had called 'a
historical untruth'(Politics in the ancient world [1983] 123)-by
arguingconvincingly that the widely acknowledged list ofthe
triumphs of the Periclean age is incomplete if it
fails to include the sophistic movement. The riseand success of
the sophists meant that they came tofunction as the professors of
the age of Pericles. Asintellectuals they were responsible for a
new kindof secondary education based on reasoned discus-sion which
came to replace the traditional emphasison sport and athleticism.
The main theme of thebook is developed in Chapters IV to VI, where
it is
ROMILLY (J. DE) Les grands sophistes dansl'Athenes de Pericles.
Paris: de Fallois, I988.Pp. 335. Fr. IOO.
This is a book which needed to be written. It setsout to put
right an injustice-to correct whatMoses Finley had called 'a
historical untruth'(Politics in the ancient world [1983] 123)-by
arguingconvincingly that the widely acknowledged list ofthe
triumphs of the Periclean age is incomplete if it
fails to include the sophistic movement. The riseand success of
the sophists meant that they came tofunction as the professors of
the age of Pericles. Asintellectuals they were responsible for a
new kindof secondary education based on reasoned discus-sion which
came to replace the traditional emphasison sport and athleticism.
The main theme of thebook is developed in Chapters IV to VI, where
it is
2383838
8/12/2019 ! Resea - Les grands sophistes dans l'Athenes de
Pericles
3/3
NOTICE OF BOOKSOTICE OF BOOKS
argued first that the radical criticism of all previousbeliefs
by the sophists had the effect of clearing theboard and sweeping
away all previous preconcep-tions, thus establishing la table rase.
The dangersthat resulted from this however constituted one
element in a grave crisis for Athens in the lastquarter of the
fifth century BC, in that it opened theway for immoralism-the
rejection of all morality.This in turn created a need for
reconstruction, andthe working out of a new morality-all
wasdestroyed to make way for a reconstruction ondifferent bases.
This schematized analysis is pres-ented in three successive stages,
and it might beobjected that there was surely no period in the
fifthcentury when there was actually a tabula rasa inmatters of
morality, only confusion anduncertainty. This objection is met
rather late in theanalysis however, when we are told (p. 248)
that
the analysisis
onlyan artifice of
presentation-there were not two inverse movements in
differentdirections-it was the same authors who at one andthe same
time were re-creating with one handwhat they were overthrowing with
the other.
A valuable feature of the present book is itsemphasis on the
positive doctrines of the sophists-these are outlined in detail.
Inevitably some of thepoints made are controversial. The figure of
Cal-licles is excluded from the main analysis of themovement on the
grounds that whether or not hewas an invention of Plato he was not
a sophist as hedid not teach. Yet surely in some sense Plato
did
regardhim as
typifyingthe movement. Also it is
argued that the sophists, while attacking traditionalreligious
beliefs, in fact were re-introducing reli-gion on a new basis,
which meant proceedingfrommen in the direction of the gods, rather
thanfrom gods in the direction of men. This seems tome certainly
well-intentioned as an argument indefence of the sophists, but
probably mistaken-the attacks on religion were more profound
thanthis would suggest. Again the attitude of thegroup, that is the
attitude and esteem of one'sneighbours, it is suggested, was for
the sophists thefinal justification of moral behaviour. This
prob-ably underrates the importance of the doctrine ofarete as the
fulfilment of the function of theindividual. Finally I believe that
Protagoras' doc-trine is in some danger of misrepresentation on
thebasis of a not uncommon mistranslation ofTheaetet. I67d given on
p. 257. For Protagoras thewise man does not replace bad views by
otherswhich seem beneficial; he replaces bad views byviews which
are beneficial.
But these are details. What is to be welcomedwithout reserve is
the beautifully written and clearhistorical perspective which sees
the sophists asoffering a radical criticism of all beliefs in the
nameof reason, relating all to an understanding of the
function of man, and the resounding final words-without the
sophists the other Greeks of the fifthand fourth centuries could
not have been what theywere. And no more could we be what we
are
G. B. KERFERDManchester
argued first that the radical criticism of all previousbeliefs
by the sophists had the effect of clearing theboard and sweeping
away all previous preconcep-tions, thus establishing la table rase.
The dangersthat resulted from this however constituted one
element in a grave crisis for Athens in the lastquarter of the
fifth century BC, in that it opened theway for immoralism-the
rejection of all morality.This in turn created a need for
reconstruction, andthe working out of a new morality-all
wasdestroyed to make way for a reconstruction ondifferent bases.
This schematized analysis is pres-ented in three successive stages,
and it might beobjected that there was surely no period in the
fifthcentury when there was actually a tabula rasa inmatters of
morality, only confusion anduncertainty. This objection is met
rather late in theanalysis however, when we are told (p. 248)
that
the analysisis
onlyan artifice of
presentation-there were not two inverse movements in
differentdirections-it was the same authors who at one andthe same
time were re-creating with one handwhat they were overthrowing with
the other.
A valuable feature of the present book is itsemphasis on the
positive doctrines of the sophists-these are outlined in detail.
Inevitably some of thepoints made are controversial. The figure of
Cal-licles is excluded from the main analysis of themovement on the
grounds that whether or not hewas an invention of Plato he was not
a sophist as hedid not teach. Yet surely in some sense Plato
did
regardhim as
typifyingthe movement. Also it is
argued that the sophists, while attacking traditionalreligious
beliefs, in fact were re-introducing reli-gion on a new basis,
which meant proceedingfrommen in the direction of the gods, rather
thanfrom gods in the direction of men. This seems tome certainly
well-intentioned as an argument indefence of the sophists, but
probably mistaken-the attacks on religion were more profound
thanthis would suggest. Again the attitude of thegroup, that is the
attitude and esteem of one'sneighbours, it is suggested, was for
the sophists thefinal justification of moral behaviour. This
prob-ably underrates the importance of the doctrine ofarete as the
fulfilment of the function of theindividual. Finally I believe that
Protagoras' doc-trine is in some danger of misrepresentation on
thebasis of a not uncommon mistranslation ofTheaetet. I67d given on
p. 257. For Protagoras thewise man does not replace bad views by
otherswhich seem beneficial; he replaces bad views byviews which
are beneficial.
But these are details. What is to be welcomedwithout reserve is
the beautifully written and clearhistorical perspective which sees
the sophists asoffering a radical criticism of all beliefs in the
nameof reason, relating all to an understanding of the
function of man, and the resounding final words-without the
sophists the other Greeks of the fifthand fourth centuries could
not have been what theywere. And no more could we be what we
are
G. B. KERFERDManchester
STONE (I. F.) The trial of Socrates. London:Jonathan Cape, 1988.
Pp. xi+282. ?I2.95.
I. F. Stone, a splendid journalist and politicalcommentator,
turned back in his old age to Greek,
in which he had taken a one-semester course as ayoung student,
and The trial of Socrates has thevirtues one expects to find in a
book by a level-headed amateur. The impression made by theSocrates
of Plato and Xenophon on a mature mindvirtually innocent of
philosophical training butworldly-wise and deeply loyal to
democratic prac-tice deserves o be taken seriously, not least
becauseStone has a sharp eye for what is
absent-notably,compassion-as well as what is present. Inevitablythe
book has some of the faults of amateurism oo:excessive respect for
LSJ ('the court of final judg-ment') and the OCD; ignorance of one
or two
highlyrelevant data
(e.g. Lysiasr.
1.2);some wild
mistakes on peripheral matters (e.g. [p. 236] theeclipse of the
moon at Syracuse) and even on somelessperipheral e.g. [pp. 99 f.]
confusion of aXpEioswith iSlcoTTis); nd a persistent endency to
find itsurprising or sinister f ancient authors do not goout of
their way to bring in a mention of peopleand events (e.g. the fate
of Melos) which haveassumed mportance n our eyes.
The problem Stone tackles s this: Socrates wascondemned in spite
of the fact that the Athens ofhis time attached the highest
importance tofreedom of speech and easily tolerated a relaxedand
sceptical attitude to theological propositions.Why did the
Athenians betray a fundamentalprinciple of their own society?
Stone's answer istwofold: that Socrates incurred enmity by
hislifelong contempt for democratic government andincurred the
death penalty because, determined onmartyrdom (X. Ap. 5-8), he
showed his contemptflamboyantly at his trial. To invoke the
Atheniantradition of rrapprlalia would have been to accordit a
respect which he had never felt for a mob oflittle people
uninterested in the metaphysicalknowledge which alone could
generate goodgovernment.
I do not think this answer is necessarily wrong asfar as it
goes, but it is only a partial answer. Therewere other ingredients
in the situation. The reli-gious ingredient deserves pride of
place, because itwas after all the substance of the charge, and
itwould be unwise to say flatly either that theAthenians were
consistently tolerant or that theywere not. Tolerance comes and
goes with goodtimes and bad, and the predicament of Athens atthe
end of the Peloponnesian War must haveprovoked questions which
strike fear into easy-going sceptics and give heart to fanatics:
'What hasgone wrong? Suppose that there really are godswho take
offence? Who is to blame?'
The second ingredient is political; Socrates wasdamned by his
association with the wrong people,and fifty years later (Aeschines
i 173, rightlyemphasized by Stone [p. 178]) his condemnationcould
be treated as political. The oath of amnestysworn in 403 could not
eradicate from the minds ofthe jurors what they had suffered at the
hands ofKritias, nor could it change their assessment of the
STONE (I. F.) The trial of Socrates. London:Jonathan Cape, 1988.
Pp. xi+282. ?I2.95.
I. F. Stone, a splendid journalist and politicalcommentator,
turned back in his old age to Greek,
in which he had taken a one-semester course as ayoung student,
and The trial of Socrates has thevirtues one expects to find in a
book by a level-headed amateur. The impression made by theSocrates
of Plato and Xenophon on a mature mindvirtually innocent of
philosophical training butworldly-wise and deeply loyal to
democratic prac-tice deserves o be taken seriously, not least
becauseStone has a sharp eye for what is
absent-notably,compassion-as well as what is present. Inevitablythe
book has some of the faults of amateurism oo:excessive respect for
LSJ ('the court of final judg-ment') and the OCD; ignorance of one
or two
highlyrelevant data
(e.g. Lysiasr.
1.2);some wild
mistakes on peripheral matters (e.g. [p. 236] theeclipse of the
moon at Syracuse) and even on somelessperipheral e.g. [pp. 99 f.]
confusion of aXpEioswith iSlcoTTis); nd a persistent endency to
find itsurprising or sinister f ancient authors do not goout of
their way to bring in a mention of peopleand events (e.g. the fate
of Melos) which haveassumed mportance n our eyes.
The problem Stone tackles s this: Socrates wascondemned in spite
of the fact that the Athens ofhis time attached the highest
importance tofreedom of speech and easily tolerated a relaxedand
sceptical attitude to theological propositions.Why did the
Athenians betray a fundamentalprinciple of their own society?
Stone's answer istwofold: that Socrates incurred enmity by
hislifelong contempt for democratic government andincurred the
death penalty because, determined onmartyrdom (X. Ap. 5-8), he
showed his contemptflamboyantly at his trial. To invoke the
Atheniantradition of rrapprlalia would have been to accordit a
respect which he had never felt for a mob oflittle people
uninterested in the metaphysicalknowledge which alone could
generate goodgovernment.
I do not think this answer is necessarily wrong asfar as it
goes, but it is only a partial answer. Therewere other ingredients
in the situation. The reli-gious ingredient deserves pride of
place, because itwas after all the substance of the charge, and
itwould be unwise to say flatly either that theAthenians were
consistently tolerant or that theywere not. Tolerance comes and
goes with goodtimes and bad, and the predicament of Athens atthe
end of the Peloponnesian War must haveprovoked questions which
strike fear into easy-going sceptics and give heart to fanatics:
'What hasgone wrong? Suppose that there really are godswho take
offence? Who is to blame?'
The second ingredient is political; Socrates wasdamned by his
association with the wrong people,and fifty years later (Aeschines
i 173, rightlyemphasized by Stone [p. 178]) his condemnationcould
be treated as political. The oath of amnestysworn in 403 could not
eradicate from the minds ofthe jurors what they had suffered at the
hands ofKritias, nor could it change their assessment of the
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