001. Husserl e Weber

8/11/2019 001. Husserl e Weber

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Sociological Inquiry

51 (2) 99-104

Edmund HusserFs Impact on Max Weber*

Kenneth R. M U S E

Earlham College

In correcting Rickcrt, Weber was influenced by Dillhey when he accepted th e central place

of interpretive understanding in the Geisteswissenschaften. But it was partly th e influence

of Husserl

that

led

Weber

to

correct Dilthey's psychological reductionism

in two respects,

both

of

which

are

imporuint

in

Weber's concept

of

ideal

types: (I) categorial

understanding,

such as H'f have no t only in mathematical analysis bu t also in the anaiysi.'io f rational action,

does no t depend on psychological peculiarities, and (2) perceptual understanding, such as

th e

investigator

may

have

of

irrational

an d

nonrational

action, is not

given

by

immediate

intuition alone but is partly constructed, and the validity of the construction must be tested

by causal

analysis.

The author

argues,

further, that there is a phenomenological aspect to

Weber's well-known types

of

authority,

for

example. (Editor)

In this brief inquiry, I propose to raise the

question of whether there is any discernible

impact of the work of Edmund Husserl. the

"founder" of phenomenology, upon that of Max

Weber, or to phrase the question the other way

around, whether Weber appropriated anything

from Husserl's endeavors. Num erous scholars

have claimed that there are "phenomenological"

types of notion in Weber's methodological for-

mulations,' such as his doctrine of Verstehen, or

interpretive understanding, or his notion of in-

tended meaning {gemeinter Sinn), but no one, to

my knowledge, has ever claimed that Weber

himself understood these notions to be phenom-

enological, much less that they were directly bor-

rowed from phenomenological writers in his day.

All that these scholars usually wish to claim is

that these notions are similar in basic meaning to

a number of ideas that since Weber's time have

become associated with the phenomenological

mo vem ent. N o one, as far as I know, has yet

attempted to discover whether there exist direct

links between Weber and the phenomenological

movement of his day, or to explore the nature of

those con nect ions, if they exist. I propose to

open this area of inquiry by claiming that there is

strong evidence, if somewhat intricate, of a direct

impact of Husserl on Weber. However, as we

shall see, this impact had reverberations in an area

Presented at Max Weber Colloquium, University

of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, April 21, 1977.

'See, for example, George Psathas, Phenomeno-

logical Sociology: Issues and Applications

(New

ork: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 2-3. See also

tome remarks by Helmut R. Wagner in the same

work, e.g. p. 63. James Heap and Philip Roth ("On

of Weber's methodological work where it has sel-

dom been looked for, indeed where it might

- from certain perspectives be least expecte d: in

his doctrine of ideal types.

I will endeavor to show that Weber was well

acquainted with Husserl's early work, at least,

and that Weber's major appropriation from that

work was, eventually, to conceive of ideal type

construction asat least in parta "phenom-

enolog ical" procedure. If this can be show n

with at least a degree of plausibility, then the

inquiry, tentative as it is, can be expected to

have two possible pay-offs. First, a new eleme nt

will perhaps have to be added to the ongoing

debate over ideal-type construction, namely, the

possibility that the procedure involves at least

in part a phenom enological m ethod. A nd sec-

ondly, there may be implications for the whole

arena of recent attempts to devise a phenom-

enological socio logy . I have long been suspiciou s

of attempts to make a wholesale application of

Husserlian notions directly to socio logy . Th e

question as to how a philosophical approach such

as phenomenology is to be related to a scientific

approach such as sociology is far from simple,

I believe. Perhaps we can take some clues from

Weber in this regard, and learn from his selective

appropriation from Husserl's work.

Let us now turn to the issue of Husseri's direct

impact upon Weber. A s nearly as I can deter-

mine, there are no fewer that seven references

to Husserl in Weber's Wissenschaftslehre, his col-

lected me thodo logical writings. This may appear

to some as too small a number to support a

contention that Husserl had an impact upon

Weber's me thodo logicai stance. Ho we ver, it is


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100

SOCIOLOGICAL INQU

fore, at least on the face of it, the number of

references to Husserl, though relatively small,

does not argue against his having had a signifi-

cant methodological effect.

By far the majority of those references are

contained within Weber's early essay on Roscher

and Knies, published in three parts in 1903, 1905,

and 1906. Th e work of HusserKs that is men -

tioned is the Logical Investigations, published in

tw o volum es in 1900 and 1901. Weber's refer-

ences are all to Volume II of that work, particu-

larly to Investigation V, Investigation VI, and the

Appendix, since these sections are the most rele-

vant ones for the social sciences. Weber's

references to these sections range from the

very beginning right through to the Appendix,

indicating, I think it is fair to say, a thorough

reading of the work.

Weber's treating Husserl's work in this context

stems from his concerti in the essay to correct

a deficiency in the scheme of the sciences set forth

by Heinrich Ricker t. Weber has told us early in

the essay that "it is one of the purposes of this

study to test [erproben] the usefulness of his ideas

for the metho dology of our discipline."' Ho w-

ever, Rickert's framework is lacking in that it

does not have an adequate theory of interpreta-

tion [Deiitt4ng] or of interpretive understanding

[deutend Verstehen]. "Even granting the fun-

damentals of Rickert's position, the following

p o i n t . .. is indisputable: the methodological con-

trast between the sciences, with which Rickert

was concerned in his work, is not the only

contrast The following fact re m ai ns . . . :

both the course of human action and human

expressions of every sort are susceptible to a

meaningful interpretation

[sinnvollen Deutung]. '

Weber is at this point revising Rickert's frame-

work by adopting insights from the figure whom

Rickert consistently viewed as his primary antag-

onist: Wilhelm Dilthey.* This beco m es clearer

a few sentences later when Weber asserts that

"contrary to what Rickert thinks, [this sort of

interpretation] is the definitive criterion that jus-

tifies us in classifying together into a special

group of human sciences [Ceisteswissenschaften]

all those disciplines that employ such interpreta-

tions for methodological purposes.""

Weber has here adopted one of Dilthey's cen-

tral concernsthe notion of interpretationand

'Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of

Historical Economics, trans. Guy Oakes (New York:

The Free Press, 1975), p. 213, n. 9 (I will occasionally

rework Oakes's translation in minor respects).

'Ibid.,

pp. 217-218, n. 22.

has chosen to designate the social sciences

Dilthey's term [Geisteswissenschaften] and

Rickert's term [Kultttrwissenschafteti], conce

by Rickert in opposition to Dilthey's terminol

I have argued elsewhere that this pas

initiates Weber's preoccupation with the prob

of interpretive understanding, a preoccupa

that grew to such proportions as to explode

Rickertian framework altogether and led W

to adopt a revised form of Dilthey's stance

the time of Weber's late methodological work

But it would lead us astray to treat such is

in greater detail. It is sufficient to simply no

that this passage initiates Weber's life-long

cern with the problem of Verstehen, and th

is in this context that Weber finds Husserl us

Husserl's Logical Investigations became usefu

Weber by providing a view of interpretive un

standing that avoided two of Dilthey's error

his formulation of the same notion.

The first error in Dilthey's notion of in

pretive understanding is that, for Dilthey,

interpretive understanding of the expression

mental

[geistige]

life is best grounded upon

science of psychology, not a positivistic psyc

ogy but a descriptive [beschreibe nde] psychol

"Psycho logy, s


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ED M U ND HUSSERL'S IMPACT ON MAX WEBER

101

When I interpretively understand another person's

life expressions, according to Dilthey, I "project"

myself into his inner life and relive his experi-

enc es. "On the basis of this projection [Hinein-

versetzens], this transp osition, arises the highest

form in which the totality of mental life is actu-

alized in understandingthat of reproducing or

reliving [das Nachbilden oder Nacherlehen]. '"

Weber wished to dissociate his theory of inter-

pretation from this sort of naive realism, from

this epistemological optimism. He acknow ledges

that the interpretive understanding of others does

have a kind of intuitive self-evidence. "There is

certainly a sense in which the play of human

'passions' can be 'intuited' [anschauUch] and re-

produced in inner experience [nacherlebbar], in

a qualitatively different sense from 'natural' pro-

cesses." " And in a discussion of the philosopher

Theodor Lipps, Weber acknowledges that the

empathic understanding [Einfiihlung] of other

persons has a unique kind of self-evidence [vj-

denzV But it is precisely because my inter-

pretive understanding of others often seems self-

evident that the method is epistemologically

suspect. Th e intuitive obviousness of interpretive

understanding masks its subjective character: in

the domain of empathy, says Weber, "everyone

sees what he bears in his heart." " Therefore,

he conclud es, this self-evidence [Evidenz] of the

object of interpretive understanding must be care-

fully distinguished from every relation germane

to 'validity' [Geltung]

Weber's solution to the problematic status of

interpretive understanding is well kno wn : it was

to check interpretive understanding against other

methods, in particular, causal explanatory meth-

o d s . "

But our concern here is with the way in

wh ich Husserl fits into all of this. Weber's prob-

lem is this: he wishes to m ove beyond R ickert

in the direction of Dilthey by acknowledging a

'"Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften,Vol. VIT, p. 214.

Roscher and Knies. p. 174.

Ibid.,

pp. 163-166. Any full understanding of

Weber's indebtedness to the phenomenological move-

ment of his day would have to sort out Weber's

relationship toLipps,as well as to Husserl. We must

recall that Lipps and his students had already begun

to move in similar directions as Husserl during the

early years of the century, and that the early phenom-

enological movement grew out of bothfiguresand the

students they shared (see Herbert Spiegelberg.

The

Phenom enological Movem ent: A Hiitorical Intro-

duction, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (The Hague: M artinus

Nijhoff, 1965], Vol I, pp . 21-22). What is significant

is that Weber, at least at the time of the R oscher and

Kniet essay, seems to associate the term "phenomeno-

logicat" more with Lipps than with Husserl (see

legitimate role within sociology for interpretive

understanding; yet he wish es to avoid two con -

comitants of Dilthey's view of interpretive under-

standing, namely, the overemphasis upon psy-

chology and the overemphasis upon immediate

self-eviden ce. It is Husserl. I maintain, to whom

Weber turned for a solution to both of these

problems.

Why Husserl? Weber uses Husserl, I suspect,

because Dilthey had, in 1905, immediately prior

to Weber's writing of the Roscher and Knies

essay, praised Husserl's Logical Investigations as

providing the necessary epistemological frame-

work for Dilthey's view of the human sciences.

As Herbert Spiegelberg documents, "In 1905, in

presenting his 'Studies for the Foundations of the

Geisteswissenschaften' to the Berlin Aca dem y,

[Dilthey] took occasion to refer to the 'excellent

studies of Husserl,' who 'from a related standpoint

had prepared a strictly descriptive foundation of

an epistemology as a phenomenology of knowl-

edge and thus a new philosophic discipline.'

A little later he went out of his way to acknowl-

edge 'once and for all how much, by way of the

use of description in epistemology, I owe to

Husserl's epochal Logical Investigations'. T o

be sure, Dilthey's relationship with Husserl later

became strained, but at the time of Weber's writ-

ing of the Roscher and Knies article the con-

nection was being very much affirmed by Dilthey,

and Weber was surely aware of this since he

makes reference in the article to Dilthey's 1905

Berlin Academy address."

Since Dilthey had placed his stamp of approval

upon Husserl's Logical Investigations, there is

a touch of irony in Weber's use of that work

to correct the deficiencies of Dilthey's stance.

Weber is in a sense using Htisserl against Dilthey.

The key notion that Weber found helpful in the

Logical Investigations is Husserl's distinction be-

tween categorial intuition [kategoriaie Anschau-

ung]

an d

sensuous

or

perceptual intuition [sinn-

liche Anschauung]. TTiey key passag e in this

respect goes as follows:

The intuitive self-evidence

[anschauliche

Evidenz]

of mathematical propositions is quite different from

the "intuitabllity" [Anschatilichkeit]of the m ulti-

plicities of "experience," immediately given "In" us

and "external to" us, experienced [erUbte] and

accessible to experience [erlebhare]. To use Htis-

serl's terminology, the distinction is between

"categorial" intuition and "perc^tual" intuition.

. . . When empirical science treats a given manifold

as a "thing" ... then it is

invariably

the case that

this object is only "relatively determined." I.e., it

is a conceptual construct that always includes

aspe ct that are empirically "intuited." But at the


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102

SOCIOLOGICAL INQU

There

is no

need here

to

unpack this very

intricate passage. The way in which Husserl's

work is significant for Weber can be explained

in very simple language . Husserl's notion of

categorial intuition, one of the paradigms of

whichis theintuition ofmathematical statements,

provided Weber with

a

model

of

interpretive

understandingand intuitive self-evidence thatwas

not,as Husserl repeatedly emphasized, subject to

psychological reductionism, and that was not

as subject to the distorting biases that Weber

detected in much of our empathic understanding

of others. Weber's way of appropriating this

insight for the interpretation of action was to

place a great emphasis upon

rational

action,

which he felt shared thekind of categorial intui-

tion which was characteristic of mathematical

statements.

Weber goes

on to

elaborate this notion

in the

Roscher and Knies

essay, but I should like to

examine this notion in itslaterand more familiar

contex t, Weber's last methodological work, Basic

Concepts. My purpose in treating the notion

in that contextis to showthe essential similarity

of the discussion there to the earlier one,since

Husserl's name is not mentioned in the later

context. In this way, I hope to indicate that

Husserl's influence was felt throughout Weber's

work, even where Husserl's name is not cited.

Further, I wish to trace Weber's handling of

Husse rlian themes through

the

'Basic

Con-

cepts essayinsucha way as tosuggestapossible

link between Husserl and Weber's notion of

meaning-adequacy.

The continuation of these earlier themes into

Weber's later work is found in the opening

passage of Basic Con cepts. Husserl is not

mentioned here by name(heismentionedat the

beginning of the methodologically similar essay

Cber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Sozio-

logie as an important, if indirect, methodo-

logical influence'), but the thematic indebtedness

to Husserl

is

evident

in

four sections,

nos. 3, 6,

10,and 11under theheading I.Methodological

Foundations. It is interesting to notice that

the term ideal type isexplicitly mentioned only

four times in Basic Conc epts and those four

mentions occur in sections 3, 6, 10, and 11,

indicating a coincidence between Husserl-related

themesandideal types.

In section 3, Weber discussesthekindsof self-

evidence (Evidenz) there are, and he continues

touse the Husserlian distinction between mathe-

matical

and

logical self-evidence

on the one

hand,

an d empathic (einfiihlend) self-evidence on the

other, although he no longer uses the explicitly

Husserlian terms, categorial and sensible. R

er, Weber now uses solely the terms ratio

and irrational to characterize the two sor

self-evidence and the two sorts of action

responding to them. These terms have

plantedtheHusserlian ones.

It

is in

this passage that Weber makes

famous statement about rational ideal type

For the purposes of scientific analysisit isco

ient to treat all irrational, afTectually determ

meaning complexes

of

behavior

as

factors

of

d

tion from

a

conceptually pure type

of

rat

ac t ion . . .. The construction of a strictly ra

courseof action in such cases serves the socio

asa type ( ideal type ) thathas the merit of

evident understandability

(evidenten Verstand

keit)

and

u nequivocality (Eindeutigkeit).

By

parison with this

it is

possible

to

understand

ways

in

which actual action

is

influenced

by

tional factors of all sorts, such as affects

errors,in that they account for the deviation

the line of conduct that would be expected o

hypothesis that

the

action were purely rational

Therefore, at the time of Basic Conc

Weber continues to feel that a preference

ideal types of.r tion l action puts his rel

upon interpretive understanding on a fi

epistemological ground: the interpretive u

standingof

rational

action seemsto him to

the same kind

of

self-evidence

as

that

of

m

matical and logical propositions, as he tel

explicitly in section 3, comparing the evid

status of the interpretation of rational a

with that of the proposition 2 x2 = 4.

was precisely to this kind of self-evidence

Husserl gave the name categorial {katego

And it was categorial self-evidence that

Husserl escapes any redtKibility to psycholo

origins. The interpretive understanding of

rational and irrational action has a charact

self-evidence,but the interpretive understan

of

r tion l

action

has an

additional feature:

deutigkeit, which could be translated as e

unequivocality or unambiguity.

Weber reaffirms this point again

in

sectio

once again comparing rational action to m

matical reasoning.

The

meaning

of a

tra

mathematical reasoning thata person carrie

is not in the relevant sense 'psych ic.' Sim

the rational deliberationof anactoras towh

the results of a given proposed course of a

willor willnot promote certain specific inte

and the corresponding decision, do not be

on e

bit

more understandable

by

taking 'ps

logical* considerations into ac co u nt .., . H


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ED M U ND HUSSERLS IMPACT ON M AX WEBER

103

ociology has no closer relationship on a general

nalytical level t o . . . psychology than to any

ther science."

''

That this reliance upon rational action traces

back to the epistemological difficulties of inter-

retive understanding discussed earlier and to

eber's use of Husserl's notion of categorial

ntuition to place interpretive understanding upon

irmer epistemolog ical ground , should by now

airly clear. How ever, I should like to con-

sider a further link to Husserl present in "Basic

Co ncepts." I wish to maintain that Weber's

erm "meaning adequacy" {sinnhafte Addqitanz)

eserves to be understood as part of this set

f themes that go back to Weber's reading of

Husserl. How ever, this claim must be somew hat

ore tentative than the previous one, since the

term

sinnhafte Addquanz

is far from a central

usserlian term. There is considerable emphasis

n the

Logical Investigations

upon the "ideal

f adequation (Addquation) between meaning-

ntention and meaning fulfillment," but it is diffi-

ult to know whether Weber's terms relate to

his discussion or not. In the absence of a clear

erminological link to Husserl, I shall have to

argue that the meaning of the term and the

ontext in which it occurs suggest strongly that

t belongs to this "Husserlian" complex of themes

understanding.

The term "meaning adequacy" is first intro-

uced in section 6 of "Basic Concepts," where

it is discussed as a counterpoint to causal ade-

That discussion is well know n, and we

ave already discussed Weber's claim that inter-

retive understanding, no matter how self-evident,

lways requires corroboration by causal explana-

{Geltung). W e are here more concerned with

eaning adequacy itself and with the possibility

hat it should be understood as "phenomenologi-

character; therefore we can turn imm e-

iately to section 11, where the term is expanded

upon.

Weber informs us there that a generalizing

science such as sociology can compensate for the

rather abstract character of its concepts by offer-

a greater precision of concepts." "This pre-

ision," he tells us, "is obtained by striving for

he highest degree of meaning adequacy (5(>irt-

dUquanz). But how does this relate to the

sectio n, section 3? Th e

relation of this passage to section 3 can be seen

y examining the word that "precision" translates:

he word is Eindeutigkeit. It wa s discovered in

section 3 as the kind of self-evidence the inter-

pretive understanding of

rational

action possesses.

We can also see by Weber's very next sentence

that he is here continuing the themes of section 3.

"It has already been repeatedly stressed that this

aim can be realized in a particularly high degree

in the case of concepts and generalizations that

formulate rational processes."

But in this treatment, Weber begins to moderate

and soften the preference for rational ideal types

exhibited in section 3. "But sociologica l investi-

gation attempts to include in its scope various

irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic,

and afTectual modes of action, which, to be sure,

are likewise formulated in terms of theoretical

concepts that are meaning adequate." Later in

the same paragraph, both rational and irrational

ideal types are again classified under meaning

adequacy: "But when reference is made to 'typi-

cal' cases, the term should always be understood,

unless otherwise stated, as meaning ideal types,

which may in turn be rational or irrational as

the case may be, but in any case are always

constructed with a view to adequacy on the level

of meaning. '

Here we begin to see that meaning adequacy

is but a substitute term for the earlier term self-

evidence {Evidenz). It cov ers precisely the sam e

territory, occurs in the same thematic context,

and appears to be a preferable term because it is

more specific to interpretive sociology, whereas

Evidenz applied to all the sciences. W hen we

recall that this whole discussion is indebted to

Husserl, we begin to see that what Weber means

by the criterion of meaning adequacy is that

ideal types must strike us as self-evident, as

intuitively correct, whether that self-evidence be

of a rational or an emp athic sort. They must

make intuitive sense.

If it is true that Weber's criterion for ideal type

construction has, at least in part, a phenom-

enological character, that meaning adequacy

means something like "intuitive consistency" or

"faithfulness to lived experience as it gives itself

or some such phrase, then it is perhaps not so

far-fetched to claim that Weber's meaning-ade-

quate ideal types represent a "phenomenology of

social reality."

To buttress this tentative argument, I should

like to illustrate how it is that Weber's ideal types

could be seen to have a phenomenological char-

acter by examining one set of ideal types from

Economy and Society.

As my example, I have chosen the well-known

types of legitimate authority: bureaucracy, tradi-


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104

SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIR

history as he could, and has found three sorts

of legitimate authority to have kept recurring;

he then described them as consistently as

possible in "pure" terms. Th is sounds like an

ordinary enou gh scientific procedure. Why call it

"phenomenological"?

In the first place, the three "sorts" of authority

that kept recurring are not identified by means

of numerical averages or some such quantitative

procedure. Web er is, dare I use the hated word,

"intuiting" the basic qualitative types of authority

that emerge from the flux of historical data.

Secondly, a healthy dose of intuition is generally

acknowledged as a respectable, even necessary,

procedure in even the "hardest" of natural sci-

ences for the purposes of generating hypotheses

and theories. It is only that those sciences do not

remain satisfied with the intuitive self-evidence of

their hypotheses but go on to test them by other

m ethods before accepting them . But so does

Weber, as we have seen: mea ning adequacy needs

cattsal adequacy as a check.

Finally, when we look at the result of Weber's

intuitive work in this area, we see that it has some

"phenomenological" features, most notably an

attempt at a sort of "eidetic completion," a

description of the "pure possibles" that can be

imagined within the sphere of authority.

Try as one may, it is difficult to even conceive

of ways of exercizing political leadership that

can lay claim to legitimacy other than appeals

to formal rules and regulations (bureaucracy),

to traditional roles (patriarchalism and patri-

monialism), or to extraordinary personal qualities

(charisma). Tak e, for example, a father wh o

wishes to lead his family out of its current lack

of togetherness in the direction of greater com-

munal cohesiveness. Assum e that he wishes to

not simply force such togetherness through physi-

cal violence (naked power, M achi), but rather

wishes genuinely to lead with the "consent of the

govern ed" (legitimate authority). What option s

are available to him? He can encourage the

family to "legislate" rules or regulations (every-

one shall do one family-oriented deed per day,

there shall be a weekly family gathering, etc.) that

apply across-the-board to all family members

(legal-rational or bureaucratic authority). H e

might appeal to his traditional role as The Father

("I am your father, and I say.,,") and attempt

to gain consent for his scheme in that fashion

(traditional authority). Or finally he might en-

deavor to draw the family together through

generating a sense of infectious excitement

("Tennis, anyon e?" "Let's all take in a movie "

"Come, follow me; I have an exciting new vision

I of course do not wish to pass judgement

the ethical status or the pragmatic chances

success of any of these scheme s; I wish mer

to point out that it is difficult to imagine a

scheme by means of which a single individ

might successfully lead a group of people w

their consent, in some form, that would not f

into one or the other of these "pure possibl

or that would not be merely a combination

one or more of these.

I do not think that Weber would ever h

wanted to claim that his ideal types were tota

exhaustive: he had more respect for the vari

of empirical reality than that. But I do w

to suggest that there is at least a press in

direction of some basic structures of social l

some "pure possibilities" that "give themselve

"present themselves" to human action in cert

spheres. Ideal-type constr uction, thus conce iv

is far from any pure operationalism in which o

simply throws together a set of factors and s

"This will be my working ideal type for t

study." The method appears to be far m

rigorous than that. Ideal-type constructi

according to this line of thinking, would be

merely an ad hoc procedure, but a methodolo

cal procedure with its own sorts of requiremen

involving, it appears, an attempt to descr

phenomenologically the given structures wit

each action sphere, and aiming at a rather f

if not exhaustive, listing of some of the "p

possibles" that present themselves to social m

Before closing, I should like to notice in pass

one feature that this way of looking at id

types opens up. Viewed in this way , ideal ty

appear to relate to both the micro- and mac

levels of social life. In my exam ple, I noted h

an individual actor finds a limited set of ways

which to exercise authority. Th e example w

handled purely at the micro-level of analy

Yet, we are all aware that Weber's three p

types of authority allowed him to describe

number of macro-level institutiotial forms, e

elaborating at the level of leader and st

not to speak of educational, cultural, and ot

institutions, the 'log ic" of each action type. P

haps,

then, this view of ideal types allows us

see how Weber links the two levels of focus

I do not wish to develop at this point a

further implications of this analysis for eit

ideal-type construction or phenomenological so

ology. M y point has been simply to suggest i

tentative way that there exist connections betw

Weber and Husserl, the "founder" of phenom

nology, and that those connections may well

fairly significant for an understanding of Webe


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Documents

001. Husserl e Weber