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Geneva Centre or the

Democratic Control o

Armed Forces (DCAF)

3.5 Toolkit Legislating for the Security Sector

DCAF

Intelligence Legislation Model

ArgentinaThe Argentinean National Intelligence Law,

2001 and the Regulation of the National

Intelligence Act, 2002


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Geneva Centre or the

Democratic Control o

Armed Forces (DCAF)DCAF

Intelligence Legislation Model

Argentina

The Argentinean National Intelligence Law,2001 and the Regulation o the National

Intelligence Act, 2002


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About DCAF

The Geneva Centre or the Democratic Control o

Armed Forces (DCAF) promotes good governance

and reorm o the security sector. The Centre

conducts research on good practices, encourages

the development o appropriate norms at the

national and international levels, makes policyrecommendations and provides in-country advice

and assistance programmes. DCAFs partners

include governments, parliaments, civil society,

international organisations and security services

such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies,

border security services and the military.

Further inormation on DCAF is available at:

www.dca.ch

Acknowledgements

DCAF would like to thank the members o the

Editorial Board or their dedication and the time

they devoted to review this series.

Publisher

Geneva Centre or the Democratic Control o

Armed Forces (DCAF).

Cover picture: Argentinean fag

ISBN: 978-92-9222-164-5

DCAF 2011. All rights reserved.

Editorial Board

The Editorial Board or the series o booklets on

intelligence oversight comprises:

Hans Born, Geneva

Arnold Luethold, Geneva

Series Editor

Aidan Wills, Geneva


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Introduction to the toolkit 4

How to use this tool? 6

The Argentinean Intelligence Legislation 8

The Legislation, presented in the analytical grid 10

General provisions 10

Organisation and structure 12

Mandate and unctions 13

Inormation collection powers 13

Management and use o personal data 15

Cooperation and inormation sharing with domestic and oreign bodies 16

Internal management and control 16

Executive control 16

Parliamentary and expert oversight 17

Complaints handling 21

Personnel 21

Other 25

National Intelligence Law, presented in its original orm 28

Title I: General Principles

Title II: Protection o the Rights and Guarantees o the Nations Inhabitants 28

Title III: Intelligence Bodies

Title IV: National Intelligence Policy 30

Title V: Classication o Inormation 31

Title VI: Interception and Capture o Communications 31

Title VII: Sta and Capacity-building 32

Title VIII: Parliamentary Control Title IX: Penal Provisions

Title X: Transitional and Complementary Provisions 36

The Regulation o the National Intelligence Law, presented in its original orm 38

TABLE OF CONTENTS


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Introduction to the Toolkit

Legislating or the security sector is a complex

and dicult task. Many lawmakers thus nd it

tempting to copy legislation rom other countries. This expedites the drating process, especially

when the texts are available in the language o

the lawmaker, but more oten than not, the result

is poor legislation.

Even ater being amended, the copied laws are

oten out o date beore coming into eect.

They may no longer be in line with international

standards or they may not ully respond to the

requirements o the local political and societal

context. Copied laws are sometimes inconsistent

with the national legislation in place.

In some cases, there is simply no model law

available in the region or the type o legislation

that is needed. This has been the case in the Arab

region, where the security sector has only slowly

begun to be publicly debated. It is thus dicult

to nd good model laws or democratic policing

or or parliamentary oversight o intelligence

services.

It is thereore not surprising that many Arab

lawmakers have elt rustrated, conused, and

overwhelmed by the task o drating legislation

or the security sector. They ound it dicultto access international norms and standards

because little or no resources were available

in Arabic. Many o them did not know where to

search or model laws and several were about

to give up. Some eventually turned to DCAF or

assistance.

The idea o a practical toolkit or legislators in

the Arab region came when practitioners began

looking or a selection o standards, norms and

model laws in Arabic that would help them drat

new legislation. Experts rom the Arab region and

DCAF thus decided to work together and developsome practical tools.

Who is this toolkit for?

This toolkit is primarily addressed to all those

who intend to create new or develop existing

security sector legislation. This includes

parliamentarians, civil servants, legal experts

and non-governmental organisations. The

toolkit may also be helpul to security ocialsand, as a reerence tool, to researchers

and students interested in security sector

legislation.

What is in the toolkit?

The bilingual toolkit contains a number o

booklets in English and Arabic that provide norms

and standards, guidebooks as well as practical

examples o model laws in various areas o security

sector legislation.

The ollowing series have been published or arebeing processed:

Police legislation

Intelligence legislation

Military Justice legislation

Status o Forces Agreements

Additional series will be added as the needs

arise. The existing series can easily be expanded

through the addition o new booklets, based on

demand rom the Arab region.

For the latest status o publications please visit:

www.dca.ch/publications

What is the purpose of this toolkit?

The toolkit seeks to assist lawmakers in the Arab

region in responding to citizens expectations.

Arab citizens demand proessional service rom

police and security orces, which should be

eective, ecient and responsive to their needs.

They want police and security organisations

and their members to abide by the law andhuman rights norms and to be accountable or

their perormance and conduct. The toolkit thus

promotes international standards in security

sector legislation, such as democratic oversight,

good governance and transparency.

The toolkit oers easy access in Arabic and

English to international norms as well as

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Toolkit Legislating for the Security Sector

examples o legislation outside the Arab region.

This allows to compare between dierent

experiences and practices.

The scarcity o Arab literature on security sector

legislation has been a big problem or Arab

lawmakers. The toolkit seeks to address this

deciency. One o its aims is to reduce timelawmakers spend on searching or inormation,

thus allowing them to concentrate on their main

task. With more inormation becoming available

in Arabic, many citizens and civil society groups

may nd it easier to articulate their vision o the

type o police and security service they want and

to contribute to the development o a modern

and strong legal ramework or the security

sector.

Why is it important to have a strong legal

framework for the security sector?

A sound legal ramework is a precondition or

eective, eicient and accountable security

sector governance because it:

Denes the role and mission o the

dierent security organisations;

Denes the prerogatives and limits the

power o security organisations and their

members;

Denes the role and powers o institutions,

which control and oversee security

organisations;

Provides a basis or accountability, as it

draws a clear line between legal and illegal

behaviour;

Enhances public trust and strengthens

legitimacy o government and its security

orces.

For all these reasons, security sector reorm oten

starts with a complete review and overhaul o the

national security sector legislation. The point is toidentiy and address contradictions and the lack

o clarity regarding roles and mandates o the

dierent institutions.

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The Argentinean Intelligence Legislation

How to use this tool?

Subject Content

General

provisions

% Denition o key terms used in the law

% Description o institutions covered by the

law

Organisation

and structure

% Explanation o how the intelligence

community is structured and which

institutions are involved

% Description o who is responsible or the

intelligence services

Mandate andunctions

% Description o the role o the intelligenceservices and the tasks that they are and

are not permitted to perorm

Inormation

collection

powers

% Description o what inormation

intelligence services can and cannot

collect

% Explanation o the special powers

available to the intelligence services

to collect inormation, and when such

measures may be used

% Details o how and by whom special

powers are authorised, implemented and

reviewed

Management

and use o

personal data

% Rules on how personal data can be

collected, retained, accessed, transerred,

and deleted

% Explanation o how individuals can apply

to access their personal data held by the


Cooperation

and

inormation

sharing

with domestic

and oreign

bodies

% Rules on which domestic and oreign

entities the intelligence services may

cooperate with

% Details on controls that apply to

inormation sharing with domestic and

oreign entities

% Details o how and by whom intelligence

cooperation is authorised and reviewed

Internal

management

and control

% Explanation o the internal management

system

% Description o the roles and

responsibilities o managers o the


Table 1 : The analytical grid for comparing intelligence

legislation

Every state has specic needs

and expectations regarding

its intelligence services. These

demands are infuenced by actorssuch as history, legal tradition, and

a states security environment.

Legislation on intelligence

services will invariably refect

these actors. Notwithstanding

these dierences between states,

lawmakers can benet rom

studying other states legislation

and practice. Additionally,

lawmakers should reer to

international standards and best

practice in the area o intelligencegovernance. It is important to note

that international law imposes

restrictions on what states can

permit their intelligence services

to do; lawmakers should take

account o these standards when

developing the legal ramework or

intelligence services.

The intelligence series o the

Legislating or the Security Sector

toolkit acilitates the drating

process and development olegislation or intelligence services

by providing good examples o

intelligence legislation, as well

as an explanation o the relevant

international standards in this area.

Although each states legislation

on intelligence services is unique,

a number o common elements o

a comprehensive legal ramework

or intelligence services can be

identied. The Editorial Board othe toolkit Legislating or the

Security Sector developed a grid

that highlights these elements (see

Table 1). This booklet contains The

Argentinean National Intelligence

Law, 2001 and the Regulation

o the National Intelligence Act,

2002 in its original orm, as well as

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Executive

control

% Explanation o the role and

responsibilities o the executive

in controlling and overseeing the


Parliamentary

and expert

oversight

% Description o parliamentary and expert

oversight bodies outside the intelligence

services and the executive

% Description o the mandate and

unctions o external oversight bodies

% Details o the powers available to

external oversight bodies, including their

access to inormation and ocials

Complaints

handling

% Details o how individuals may complain

about the intelligence services

% Explanation o which institution is

competent to handle complaints about

the intelligence services

%Description o the powers available to thecomplaints-handling institution

Personnel

% Details o the rights and duties o

members o the intelligence services

% Inormation on possible sanctions or

unlawul actions

Other% Sections which do not all into the other

categories

% Sections that have been removed

the provisions o this legislation

reorganised by topic, as shown in

the grid. This allows lawmakers

to easily identiy the specic

topics that should be covered by

legislation on intelligence services,

as well as to compare dierent laws

according to particular topics.

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The Argentinean Intelligence

Legislation

Overview

This booklet contains the National Intelligence

Law o Argentina as well as Presidential Decree

950 o 2002 which was required by the law and

contains supplementary regulations.

The National Intelligence Law was adopted in

2001 ater almost twenty years o debate on

reorming Argentinas intelligence services

and the accompanying oversight and control

institutions. The intelligence services were

used as an instrument o oppression duringthe period o military dictatorship (1976-1983),

and were involved in large-scale human rights

abuses. Following the return o a democratically

elected government in 1983, major reorms were

needed to the intelligence services in order to

create proessional, democratically controlled

institutions, which respect the rule o law and

human rights. Reorm o the Argentinean

intelligence services took place within the

context o a broader security sector reorm

process which also overhauled the armed orces

and the police. This process ocussed on placingthe security sector under democratic, civilian

control and ending the armed orces role in

internal security.

Argentinas National Intelligence system includes

three agencies. The Intelligence Secretariat

(SIDE), a civilian body, is the lead agency in the

intelligence system. The Intelligence Secretariat

is responsible or collecting and producing

intelligence and counter-intelligence on oreign

and domestic threats to the state. The National

Directorate or Criminal Intelligence is a civilian

body which is responsible or the collectionand production o criminal intelligence. Finally,

the National Directorate or Strategic Military

Intelligence is responsible or collecting military

intelligence; the intelligence unit o each branch

o the armed orces all under the purview o this

agency.

Control and oversight of the Argentinean


The main institutions responsible or the control

and oversight o Argentinas intelligence services

are parliament, the executive and the judiciary.

1. Parliamentary oversight o the intelligence

services is conducted by the Bicameral

Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence

Bodies and Activities. The Committee

comprises seven members o the lower

house and seven members o the upperhouse o parliament; the chairmanship o

the Committee rotates between the two

houses. The Committee has a broad mandate

to oversee the ollowing dimensions o the

intelligence services: the legality o their

activities, their policies, management and

administration, eectiveness, and nances.

It can urthermore receive and investigate

complaints rom members o the public. The

Committee has extensive powers to access

the classied inormation necessary to ull its

mandate.

2. The president is responsible or establishing

overall policies and objectives or the

intelligence system. The president appoints a

Secretary or Intelligence who is the minister

that assists him/her in this task. The Secretary

or Intelligence is also the minister in charge

o the Intelligence Secretariat. The Minister

or Security, Justice and Human Rights is

responsible or the National Directorate or

Criminal Intelligence, and the Minister o

Deence heads the National Directorate or

Strategic Military Intelligence. There is nospecialised executive body or scrutinising the

intelligence services.

3. The judiciarys main oversight unction is to

review and, i appropriate, grant applications

made by the Intelligence Secretariat to use

special powers to collect inormation, such as

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intercepting communications. The Intelligence

Secretariat cannot use such powers without

prior judicial authorisation.

Other relevant laws

Beyond the National Intelligence Law, there

are several other laws which are particularly

relevant to the intelligence services in Argentina.

The Internal Security Law o 1992 contains a

number o important provisions regarding the

intelligence services. Notably, it establishes a

clear distinction between external and internal

security. The absence o such a distinction had

presented major problems in the past when the

military violated human rights while conducting

internal operations.

The National Deence Law regulates the work

o the armed orces, including each branchsintelligence service and intelligence coordination

body. This law prohibits the armed orces rom

being involved in internal security matters, and

explicitly disallows the armed orces intelligence

services rom collecting inormation on domestic

political aairs.

Finally, the Personal Data Protection Law o 2000

is relevant because it regulates the processing o

personal data by the intelligence services.

9

Sources

Priscila Carlos Brando Antunes, Establishing

Democratic Control o Intelligence in Argentina, in

PSI Handbook o Global Security and Intelligence,

Volume 1. Eds. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark

Phythian, Sholmo Shpiro, (Wesport CT: Praeger,

2008).

Eduardo Estevez, Executive and Legislative

Oversight o the Intelligence System in Argentina,

in Whos Watching the Spies? Eds. Hans Born, Loch

Johnson and Ian Leigh (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books,

2005).

Eduardo Estevez, Argentinas Intelligence in the

Twenty-First Century, paper presented at the 51st

International Studies Association Conerence, New

Orleans, February 2010.


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The Argentinean National Intelligence Law, 2001

Article 1

The purpose o the present Law is to establish the legal, organisational and

unctional bases o the Nations Intelligence System.

Article 2

For the purposes o the present Law and the activities it regulates, the ollowingterms shall mean:

1. National Intelligence: the activity that consists o obtaining, gathering,

systematising and analysing the specic inormation concerning the acts,

threats, risks and conficts that aect the Nations external and internal

security.

2. Counterintelligence: the specic activity pertaining to the intelligence

eld that is undertaken with the aim o avoiding or preventing intelligence

activities by actors that represent threats or risks to the security o the

National State.

3. Criminal Intelligence: the part o Intelligence that concerns the specic

criminal activities which, by their nature, magnitude, oreseeableconsequences, danger or ormats, aect reedom, lie, inhabitants assets,

their rights and guarantees and the institutions o the representative,

republican and ederal system established by the National Constitution.

4. Strategic Military Intelligence: the part o Intelligence that concerns

knowledge o the capacities and weaknesses o the military potential o

the countries that are o interest rom the point o view o national deence,

together with the geographical environment o the strategic operational

areas determined by strategic military planning.

5. National Intelligence System: the set o unctional relationships linking the

National States intelligence bodies, which is directed by the Intelligence

Secretariat in such a way as to contribute to decision-making with regard to

matters involving the Nations external and internal security.

Article 3

The National Intelligence Systems modus operandi must adapt itsel exactly to the

provisions set out in Part 1, Chapters I and II o the National Constitution and in the

current legal and regulatory norms.

The Legislation, presented in the analytical grid

(Extracts o Sections o the Argentinean National Intelligence Law, 2001and the Regulation o the National

Intelligence Act, 2002. For the complete version o the law, please see pages 20-33.)

General

provisions

SubjectArticles of the Argentinean National Intelligence Law, 2001and the Regulation of the National Intelligence Act, 2002

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Article 4

No intelligence body may:

1. Engage in repressive tasks, possess compulsory powers, or, in its own right,

perorm police or criminal investigation unctions, save at the specic order

o a competent judicial authority issued within the ramework o a concrete

case that is subject to its jurisdiction, or which is authorised to that end bylaw.

2. Obtain inormation, produce intelligence or store data about persons, due

solely to the act o their race, religious belie, private actions or political

opinion, or to the act that they have joined or belong to party, social, trade

union, community, cooperative, charitable, cultural or labour organisations,

or because o the lawul activities they pursue in any sphere o action.

3. In any way infuence the countrys institutional, political, military, police-

related, social and economic situation, its oreign policy, the internal lie o

legally constituted political parties, public opinion, persons, media, or legal

associations or groups o any kind.

4. Reveal or disclose any type o inormation with regard to any inhabitant or

legal person, be they public or private, that it has acquired in the exercise oits unctions, save by judicial order or dispensation.

Article 11

The creation, structuring and unctioning o associations, institutions, networks

and groups o natural or legal persons that plan and/or execute any o the stages

o the intelligence unctions and activities which the present Law attributes to the

bodies that belong to the National Intelligence System is prohibited.

The Regulation o the National Intelligence Act, 2002

Article 1

The requirements or judicial cooperation reerred to in Article 4 subsection

1) o the Act must be met under the ramework o the objectives and unctions

assigned to the required intelligence agency.

Article 2

The intelligence agencies shall outline the activities indicated in Article 4

subsection 2 o the Act, pursuant to the general prescriptions o Personal Data

Act 25,326 and specically what is stated in Article 23 o the aorementioned

legal guidelines. Fullment o these provisions shall be the result o policies and

controls established by the head o each agency in the National Intelligence

System, within the scope o their respective Jurisdictions.

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12

Organisation

and structure


Article 6

The ollowing are National Intelligence System bodies:

1. The Intelligence Secretariat.2. The National Directorate o Criminal Intelligence.

3. The National Directorate o Strategic Military Intelligence.

Article 7

The Intelligence Secretariat, which shall be under the authority o the Presidency o the

Nation, shall be the senior National Intelligence System body and its general mission shall

be to direct the System.

Article 14

The President o the Nation may convene an inter-ministerial council to assist and advise

him with regard to the strategic outlines and general objectives o the National Intelligence

policy, and in each such case shall determine the members who are to participate therein.

Similarly, when he sees ft to do so, the President o the Nation may require the consultative

participation in the said Council o representatives o the Armed Forces, the Security

Forces or the Argentine Federal Police.

Article 15

The Intelligence Secretariat shall be the responsibility o the Secretary or Intelligence, whoshall possess the rank o Minister and shall be appointed by the President o the Nation

ollowing non-binding consultation o the National Congresss Bicameral Committee or

the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities.

The Regulation of the National Intelligence Act, 2002

Article 9

The agencies that make up the National Intelligence System shall be permanent members

o the inter-ministerial council reerred to in Article 14 o the Act.


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Article 8

The unction o the Intelligence Secretariat shall be the production o National

Intelligence.

Article 9

The National Directorate o Criminal Intelligence is hereby created, and shall be

under the authority o the Secretariat o Internal Security.

Its unction shall be the production o Criminal Intelligence.

Article 10

The National Directorate o Strategic Military Intelligence is hereby created, to be

under the authority o the Minister o Deence, in conormity with the provisions oArticle 15 o Law 23,554.

Its unction shall be the production o Strategic Military Intelligence.

The Armed Forces intelligence bodies shall be responsible or the production o

the operational strategic intelligence and the tactical intelligence needed to plan

and conduct military operations, and o specic technical intelligence.

Article 5

Telephone, postal, telegraphic or ax communications or any other system or

sending objects or transmitting images, voices or packets o data, as well as any

type o inormation, les, records and/or documents which are private or access

to or the reading o which is unauthorised or inaccessible to the public shall be

inviolable throughout the Argentine Republic, except by means o a judicial order

or dispensation to the contrary.

Article 18

When, in pursuit o intelligence or counterintelligence activities, it is necessary

to intercept or capture private communications o any kind, the Intelligence

Secretariat must request the applicable judicial authorisation.

Such authorisations must be ormulated in writing and set out the grounds on

which they are issued, and shall give precise indications as to the telephone

number or numbers or the electronic address or addresses or whatever other

medium may be involved, whose communications are to be intercepted or

captured.

13

Inormation

collection

powers

Mandate and

unctions


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Article 19

In the case provided or in the previous Article, the judicial authorisation

shall be requested by the Secretary or Intelligence or the ocial to whom he

expressly delegates the power to do so, beore the ederal penal judge with the

appropriate jurisdictional competence. For the purpose o determining that

competence, regard shall be had to the domicile o the natural or legal personswhose communications are to be intercepted or, in the case o mobile or satellite

communications, the registered oce rom which they are made.

The proceedings shall be classied at every instance.

The procedural time limits at rst instance shall be twenty-our hours or both the

parties and the intervening courts.

Decisions to deny such requests shall be subject to appeal to the applicable

Federal Chamber, when the Bench that is hearing the appeal must decide within a

mandatory time limit o SEVENTY-TWO (72) hours, with authorisation to sit outside

the normal times, when appropriate.

Authorisation shall be granted or a time limit o no more than SIXTY (60) days,

which shall lapse automatically, save i the Secretary or Intelligence or the ocial

to whom this power has been delegated makes a ormal request and authorisation

is again granted by the Judge who is hearing it, or by the respective Chamber in

the event that the request is denied at rst instance. In such cases the time limit

may be extended or another SIXTY (60) days at most, when this is indispensable to

completion o the ongoing investigation.

Article 20

Once the time limits established in the previous Article have ended, the judge shall

order that the corresponding legal proceedings commence, or else that whoever is

obliged to do so destroy or erase the mediums on which the recordings have beenmade, the copies o the postal, cable or ax interventions or any other element that

would enable their results to serve as proo.

Article 21

The Directorate o Judicial Surveillance (DOJ) is hereby created as part o the

Intelligence Secretariat. The DOJ shall be the only State organ charged with

executing any type o interception authorised or ordered by the competent

judicial authority.

Article 22

Judicial orders to intercept telephone communications shall be sent to the

Directorate o Judicial Surveillance (DOJ) in the orm o an ocial letter signed by

the judge, to include precise and detailed instructions or the guidance o the said

task.

The judge must send another, summary, ocial letter that solely lists the numbers

that are to be the object o intervention, so that the DOJ can attach it to the request

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it is to send to the telephone service company with responsibility or tapping the

communications.

The ocial letters which the DOJ and its branch oces in the interior send to

telephone service companies must be signed by the head o the Directorate or o

the branch oce that is making the request.

Article 34

The Bicameral Committee shall be empowered to require the Directorate o

Judicial Surveillance (DOJ), the latters branch oces in the interior o the country,

and the companies which, now or in the uture, provide any type o telephone or

telecommunications services in the Argentine Republic, to supply it with security-

classied reports containing the list o the intercepts and taps that have been

perormed in a given period.

The Bicameral Committee shall be responsible or collating and analysing the

inormation and controlling whether the measures in question were taken in

response to judicial orders.


Article 14

During the perormance o intelligence or counterintelligence activities, in the

event that judicial authorisation is required or the interception or capture o any

type o private communications between several subjects simultaneously, the

National Intelligence Secretary will request this authorisation rom a ederal judge

with jurisdiction over any o the domiciles, in accordance with what is stated in the

rst paragraph o Article 19 o the Act.

Likewise, subsequent requests that are the product o the same intelligence

activities must be addressed to the ederal judge who was part o the original

request regarding the interception or capture o communications.

Article 15

For the purposes o Article 22 (nal paragraph) o the Act, written communications

issued by the Judicial Observations Oce to the telephone service companies shall

be signed by the Director o the area or by the duly authorised ocial, in the event

o vacancy or absence.

15

Management

and use o

personal data


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Article 12

The President o the Nation shall set the strategic outlines and the general

objectives o the National Intelligence policy.

Article 13

In conormity with the outlines and objectives established by the President o the

Nation, the Intelligence Secretariat shall possess the ollowing specic unctions:

1. Formulate the National Intelligence Plan.

2. Design and execute the intelligence programmes and budgets set out in the

National Intelligence Plan.

3. Plan and execute the activities involved in obtaining and analysing

the inormation or use in the production o National Intelligence and

Counterintelligence.

4. Direct and articulate the National Intelligence Systems activities and modus

operandi, as well as the relations with the intelligence bodies o other states.

5. Coordinate the activities included within the ramework o Law 23,554 on

National Deence and Law 24,059 on Internal Security with the ocialsappointed by the Ministers with responsibility or the respective areas,

whose rank may not be less than that o Undersecretary o State.

6. Require all the organs o the National Public Administration to provide the

inormation needed or the ullment o its unctions.

7. Require the provincial governments to provide their cooperation when it is

necessary to the perormance o its activities.

8. Coordinate the drawing up o the National Strategic Intelligence Assessment

and o the ensuing inormation-gathering plan.

9. Draw up the annual report on intelligence activities, with a view to its

presentation beore the National Congresss Bicameral Committee or

the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities. To this end the bodies

in the National Intelligence System must provide it with all the applicableinormation.

10. Make itsel amiliar with the training, capacity-building, practical training

and updating o the sta who belong to the Intelligence Secretariat, and

participate in the advanced capacity-building o intelligence sta, via the

National Intelligence School.

11. Provide the Ministry o Deence with the inormation and intelligence that is

16

Executive

control

Cooperation

and

inormation

sharing with

domestic and

oreign bodies

Internalmanagement

and control


18/45


needed to contribute to the production o Strategic Military Intelligence, in

conormity with the provisions on this matter laid down in Article 15 o Law

23,554.

12. Provide the Internal Security Council with the inormation and intelligence

that is needed to contribute to the production o criminal intelligence, in

conormity with the provisions on this matter laid down in Article 10(e) oLaw 24,059.

13. Enter into such agreements with natural or legal persons o a public or private

nature as are useul to the ullment o its unctions.

Article 14

The President o the Nation may convene an inter-ministerial council to assist

and advise him with regard to the strategic outlines and general objectives o the

National Intelligence policy, and in each such case shall determine the members

who are to participate therein.

Similarly, when he sees t to do so, the President o the Nation may require the

consultative participation in the said Council o representatives o the ArmedForces, the Security Forces or the Argentine Federal Police.

Article 15

The Intelligence Secretariat shall be the responsibility o the Secretary or

Intelligence, who shall possess the rank o Minister and shall be appointed by

the President o the Nation ollowing non-binding consultation o the National

Congresss Bicameral Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and

Activities.


Article 4

The National Intelligence Secretary shall issue the guidelines necessary or the

operations o the National Intelligence System, pursuant to the mandate granted

by Article 7 o the Act.


Article 17

The members o the intelligence bodies, the legislators who belong to the

Bicameral Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities and

the sta allocated thereto, together with the judicial authorities, ocials and

persons who, as a result o their unctions or by chance, gain access to knowledge

about the inormation mentioned in the previous Article (16) must maintain the

strictest secrecy and condentiality.

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Breach o this duty shall render the culprits subject to the sanctions provided or

in Book II Title IX, Chapter II, Articles 222 and/or 223 o the National Penal Code, as

appropriate.

Article 31

The Bicameral Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities is

hereby created as part o the National Congress.

Article 32

The bodies that belong to the National Intelligence System shall be supervised

by the Bicameral Committee, or the purpose o overseeing whether their modus

operandi is strictly in accordance with the current constitutional, legal and

regulatory norms, to include verication o strict ullment o and respect or the

individual guarantees enshrined in the National Constitution, as well as with the

strategic outlines and general objectives o the National Intelligence policy.

The Bicameral Committee shall possess broad powers to control and

investigate on its own initiative. When it requires them to do so, and subject

to the precautionary requirements laid down in Article 16, the bodies in the

National Intelligence System must supply such inormation or documentation as

the Committee requests.

Article 33

Where intelligence activities are concerned, parliamentary control shall include:

1. Considering, analysing and evaluating the execution o the National

Intelligence Plan.2. Considering the Annual Report on Intelligence Activities, which shall be

secret and shall be drawn up by the Intelligence Secretariat and sent to

the Bicameral Committee within ten days o the beginning o the period o

ordinary sittings.

3. Receiving such explications and reports as are deemed appropriate in

accordance with the provisions o Article 71 o the National Constitution.

4. Drawing up a secret annual report on the ollowing topics, and sending it to

the National Executive Authorities and the National Congress:

a. An analysis and evaluation o the National Intelligence Systems

activities, modus operandi and organisation, in the light o the way in

which the National Intelligence Plan has been executed.

b. A description o the conduct o the inspection and control activitiesundertaken by the Bicameral Committee in the perormance o its

missions, together with the grounds on which it is based.

c. Recommendations or improvements in the modus operandi o the

National Intelligence System.

5. Issuing an opinion on all drat legislation concerning intelligence activities.

6. Receiving denunciations made by natural and legal persons with regard to

abuses and unlawul acts committed during the work o the intelligence

bodies, and investigating those denunciations.

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7. Auditing the study plans which the National Intelligence School has used or

sta training and capacity-building.

Article 34

The Bicameral Committee shall be empowered to require the Directorate oJudicial Surveillance (DOJ), the latters branch oces in the interior o the country,

and the companies which, now or in the uture, provide any type o telephone or

telecommunications services in the Argentine Republic, to supply it with security-

classied reports containing the list o the intercepts and taps that have been

perormed in a given period.

The Bicameral Committee shall be responsible or collating and analysing the

inormation and controlling whether the measures in question were taken in

response to judicial orders.

Article 35

When asked to do so, the bodies that belong to the National Intelligence System

shall send the Bicameral Committee all their internal norms, principles, regulations

and organisational/operational structural charts.

Article 36

No public document issued by the Bicameral Committee may reveal data that

might prejudice the intelligence bodies activities or aect internal security or

national deence.

Article 37

The Bicameral Committee shall have the competence to supervise and control

the Classied Expenses allocated to the component elements o the National

Intelligence System. To this end it may undertake any act related to its competence.

It may especially:

1. Make itsel amiliar with and intervene in the process applicable to drat

national budget bills which the Executive Authorities send to the National

Congress. To this end the Executive Authorities shall send it all the necessary

documentation, especially:

a. An annex containing the amounts which are allocated or executed per

administrative area and whose nature is that o classied, condential,

secret or limited or restricted-access expenses.b. A security-classied annex containing the purpose, programme or

object o each expense item.

2. Require the collaboration o all the intelligence bodies addressed in

the present Law, which shall be obliged to supply the data, background

inormation and reports related to the exercise o their unctions. In cases

o strict necessity, which it must justiy, it may also require that it be sent the

documentation reerred to in Article 39 o the present Law.

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3. Control whether classied unds have been used or the purpose provided

or in the budget allocation.

4. Each year, draw up a classied report, which shall be sent to the National

Congress and the President o the Nation and shall contain:

a. An analysis and evaluation o the execution o the classied expenses

allocated to the intelligence bodies.b. A description o the way in which the Bicameral Committee has

perormed its supervisory and control activities, together with such

recommendations as the Committee sees t to make.

Article 39

The expenditures incurred during each nancial year shall be documented by

means o a monthly record signed by the responsible ocials rom the body or

dependent entity in question, which shall serve as an acquittance or the National

Comptroller-Generals Oce.

Article 40

Members o the Bicameral Committee and the permanent or temporary sta

assigned to it who make improper use o the inormation to which they have access

in the exercise o their unctions shall be deemed to have committed a serious

breach o their duties and shall be subject to the current penalty regime, without

prejudice to the liabilities which they may incur as a result o the application o the

Penal Code.

Article 41

Restrictions or classications that were established in any other norm or provisiono a general or particular nature issued by the National Executive Authorities and/

or by ocials acting under the latters authority beore the present Law comes into

orce shall not be opposable to the Bicameral Committee or its members.


Article 20

The requests or documentation reerred to in Article 35 and the supply o data and

documentation reerred to in Article 37 sub-section 2 o the Act will be processed by

the intelligence agencies pursuant to what is established in the second paragrapho Article 16 o the Act and in the other related guidelines o this regulation.

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Article 33

Where intelligence activities are concerned, parliamentary control shall include:

6. Receiving denunciations made by natural and legal persons with regard to

abuses and unlawul acts committed during the work o the intelligence

bodies, and investigating those denunciations.

Article 23

The ocials or members o intelligence bodies shall be citizens who are native-

born, naturalised or have opted or Argentine citizenship, are o age, ull the

conditions laid down in the present Law and its regulations, and whose conduct

and public lie provide adequate guarantees that they respect the National

Constitution and the current legal and regulatory norms.

The ollowing persons may not serve as ocials or members o any intelligence

body:

1. Those in relation to whom there is a record o war crimes, crimes against

humanity or crimes involving human rights violations in the les o the

Undersecretariat or Human Rights, which is a dependent entity o the

Ministry o Justice and Human Rights, or o any other body or dependent

entity that may replace them in the uture.

2. Those who are subject to any o the disqualifcations laid down in

the statutes that provide the ramework or the sta o the respective

intelligence bodies.

Article 24

The Intelligence Secretariats personnel roster shall include:

1. Permanent employees, who shall occupy the levels or categories laid down in

the regulatory norms.

2. Sta who are engaged under xed-term contracts to provide services o a

provisional or temporary nature, who shall occupy the levels or categories

laid down in the regulatory norms.

3. Oce Sta, whose appointments shall be temporary and shall be made by

the head o the Intelligence Secretariat, whose number may not exceed 2% o

the total number o permanent employees in the said Secretariats personnel

roster, and who may only remain in their positions during the tenure o the

person who appointed them. For the purposes o the present paragraph,

Oce Sta means all those persons whom the head o the IntelligenceSecretariat contracts to perorm assistance and advisory tasks.

Article 25

The duties, rights, remuneration system, categories, disciplinary regime, social

security regime and other normative provisions inherent in the labour regime

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governing the sta covered by the present Law shall be established in the Special

Statutes that are to be issued by decree o the National Executive Authorities.

The Special Statutes shall be public and shall be issued in accordance with the

directions established in the present Law.

The sta who belong to the bodies in the National Intelligence System shall all

within the scope o the provisions o Article 4(4) o the present Law.

With regard to the social security regime, any changes which may occur shall only

be valid or the intelligence sta who join ater the new statutes come into orce.

Article 26

The training and capacity-building o the sta o the bodies in the National

Intelligence System must:

1. Develop the attitudes and values required by the training o responsible

persons and ocials, with an ethical, solidary, thoughtul and critical

awareness and rame o mind.2. Help ensure that ull advantage is taken o the existing and assigned human

and material resources.

3. Increase and diversiy the opportunities or updating, improvement and

reconversion available to the persons who belong to the bodies in the

National Intelligence System.

4. Favour specic training and capacity-building in intelligence tasks and tasks

related to the law, general scientic and technical training and capacity-

building, and training and capacity-building with a humanistic, sociological

and ethical content.

Article 27

The training and capacity-building o the Intelligence Secretariats sta and

also that o the ocials with responsibility or the ormulation, management,

implementation and control o the National Intelligence policy shall be in the

hands o the National Intelligence School, which shall be under the authority o

the Intelligence Secretariat.

The National Intelligence School shall be the higher-education institute with

responsibility or capacity-building and improvement in intelligence-related

matters, and the sta o the other bodies in the National Intelligence System may

have access to its courses.

Similarly, under the conditions laid down in the regulations, it may give courses or

persons who do not belong to the National Intelligence System.A Permanent Advisory Council shall be ormed within it, to include delegates

rom all the bodies that are members o the National Intelligence System.

The Council must be consulted about the curricular programmes or both the

intelligence courses and the sta-improvement activities.

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Article 28

The National Intelligence School shall promote and arrange sta training in

accordance with the principles o objectivity, equal opportunities, merit and

capacity.

Article 29

The studies undertaken at the National Intelligence School may be the object o

validation by the Ministry o Education, in accordance with the current laws and

regulations.

Article 30

In order to give the instruction and courses concerning the studies reerred to

in the previous Article, arrangements shall be made to promote the institutional

collaboration o the National Universities, the Judicial Authorities, the Public

Prosecutors Oce, non-governmental organisations and other higher-education

institutions, centres and establishments that are specically o interest to the

aorementioned teaching purposes.

Similarly, ormal agreements may be entered into with non-governmental

organisations and other public or private institutions whose activities match

the matter regulated by the present Law, with a view to undertaking academic

activities, scientic research, and similar activities.

Article 42

Anyone who, while permanently or temporarily taking part in the tasks that are

regulated in the present Law, improperly intercepts, captures or taps telephone,postal, telegraphic or ax communications or any other system or sending objects

or transmitting images, voices or packets o data, as well as any type o inormation,

les, records and/or documents which are private or access to or the reading o

which is unauthorised or inaccessible to the public and which are not addressed

to him, shall be punished by imprisonment or between one month and two

years and by special disqualication or double the time, i no other, more severely

punished, oence results thererom.

Article 43

Anyone who, with a judicial order and while he is under an obligation to do so,ails to destroy or erase the mediums on which the recordings have been made,

the copies o the postal, cable or ax interventions or any other element that

would enable the results o intercepts, captures or taps to serve as proo shall be

punished by imprisonment or between three months and one year and by special

disqualication or double the time, i no other, more severely punished, oence

results thererom.

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Article 16

The National Intelligence Secretary will design plans or sta training that address

the various training, education and updating needs o the dierent sta categories,

as well as those related to higher level National Intelligence training or the otherNational Intelligence System agencies.

The National Intelligence School will propose plans or training, updating,

enhancement and retraining, thereby meeting the needs o the National

Intelligence System. Likewise, it will determine the vacancies to ll in virtue o the

training and instruction needs o each agency in the National Intelligence System,

as based on the annual requirements calculated by each agency.

The guidelines issued by the National Intelligence Secretary will establish the

conditions or admission and continuance, as well as other requirements or the

specic training o members o the National or Provincial Agencies that are not a

part o the National Intelligence System, yet require knowledge o the intelligence

activity or the job they perorm.

The National Oce o Criminal Intelligence, a sub-agency o the National Internal

Security Oce, and the National Oce o Strategic Military Intelligence, a sub-

agency o the Ministry o Deence, will be in charge o the specic guidelines or

the training and education o their particular personnel to be developed by the

respective security, police and Armed Forces institutions.

Article 17

The Permanent Advisory Council shall be made up o one (1) representative

designated by the National Intelligence Secretary, one (1) representative o the

National Criminal Intelligence Oce, a sub-agency o the National Internal Security

Oce, and one (1) representative o the National Military Strategic Intelligence

Oce, a sub-agency o the Ministry o Deence.

Article 18

The National Intelligence Secretary will determine the courses that will be

validated by the Ministry o Education, Science and Technology, pursuant to the

laws and regulations in eect.

The courses taken by permanent sta must be recognised in the ramework o

the National System o the Administrative Proession, pursuant to the guidelines in

eect, and at the request o any o the National Intelligence System agencies.

Article 19

The National Intelligence School, ollowing consultation with the Permanent

Advisory Council and with the approval o the National Intelligence Secretary, will

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ormulate exchanges and agreements with governmental and non-governmental

Centres o Investigation, both domestic and oreign.

Likewise, it will also promote and coordinate the tasks o investigation and

development with the relevant sectors, as based on the objectives established by

the National Intelligence System. It will also maintain permanent academic and

proessional contacts with the institutions indicated in Article 30 o the Act, andwill promote the development o similar investigations.


Article 16

Intelligence activities, the sta allocated to them, and the documentation and

databases o the intelligence bodies shall possess the security classication that is

appropriate to the interests o internal security, national deence and the Nations

oreign relations.

Access to the aoresaid inormation shall be authorised on a case-by-case basisby the President o the Nation or the ocial to whom he expressly delegates this

power, with the exceptions provided or in the present Law.

The classication o the activities, sta, documentation and databases reerred to in

the rst paragraph o the present Article shall be maintained even when knowledge

thereo must be submitted to the justice system within the ramework o a given

case or is required by the Bicameral Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence

Bodies and Activities.

Article 17

The members o the intelligence bodies, the legislators who belong to theBicameral Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities and

the sta allocated thereto, together with the judicial authorities, ocials and

persons who, as a result o their unctions or by chance, gain access to knowledge

about the inormation mentioned in the previous Article must maintain the

strictest secrecy and condentiality.

Breach o this duty shall render the culprits subject to the sanctions provided or

in Book II Title IX, Chapter II, Articles 222 and/or 223 o the National Penal Code, as

appropriate.


Article 3

The revelation or disclosure o inormation concerning inhabitants or public or

private legal persons that is acquired by intelligence agencies in the perormance

o their unctions shall necessarily require a judicial order or waiver and the

corresponding authorisation established in the second paragraph o Article 16 o

the Act, except when intervention by the agency is oreseen in a legal provision.

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Article 5

The National Criminal Intelligence Oce, a sub-agency o the National Internal

Security Oce, whose responsibilities are established in Act No. 24,059 and its

regulations, shall submit the sectors budgetary requirements each year pursuant

to the reporting hierarchy, and shall be responsible or executing the specic

Intelligence budget assigned or each scal period.

Article 6

The National Oce o Strategic Military Intelligence, a sub-agency o the Ministry

o Deence, will coordinate the operations o the intelligence agencies o the

Armed Forces. Likewise, each year it will submit the budgetary requirements o

the sector to the aorementioned Ministry o Deence and will be responsible or

managing the budget assigned to its department.

Article 7The National Public Administration agencies will provide all inormation required

by the National Intelligence Secretary in accordance with that set orth in Article

13, subsection 6 o the Act, doing so within the timerames established in the

corresponding requirements.

Article 8

In the ramework o the collaboration anticipated in Article 13, subsection 7 o the

Act, the provincial governments shall provide the National Intelligence Secretary

with all o the inormation they obtain that could lead to the discovery o threats

and conficts that may pose risks to the security o the Nation.Likewise, through the National Oce o Criminal Intelligence, a sub-agency o

the National Internal Security Oce, and within the ramework o what is stated

in Article 16 o Act No. 24,059, the inormation and intelligence agencies at the

provincial level will provide the National Intelligence Secretary with all o the

inormation they obtain that could lead to the discovery o threats and conficts

that may pose risks to the internal security o the Nation.

Article 10

The ollowing security classications will be observed by the agencies in the

National Intelligence System, pursuant to what is stated in the rst paragraph oArticle 16 o the Act:

a. TOP SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL: Applicable to any inormation, document

or material that pertains solely to the organisation and the specic activities

o the National Intelligence System agencies.

b. SECRET: Applicable to any inormation, document or material whose

access by unauthorised individuals could be detrimental to the undamental

interests or objectives o the Nation.

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c. CONFIDENTIAL: Applicable to any inormation, document or material whose

access by unauthorised individuals could be somewhat detrimental to the

undamental interests o the Nation or inringe on the principles, plans and

operational methods o the State.

d. RESERVED: Applicable to any inormation, document or material not included

in the previous categories whose access outside o the previously dened

institutional domains and whose access by unauthorised individuals is not in

the interests o the State.

e. PUBLIC: Applicable to all documentation whose disclosure is not detrimental

to the National Intelligence System agencies and whose very nature permits

the omission o restrictions on its status as public knowledge. This does not

imply that it may leave the ocial sphere, as such action requires the ruling

o the responsible authority.

Article 11

The powers described in the second paragraph o Article 16 o the Act may bedelegated to the National Intelligence Secretary.

In cases in which the documentation and inormation classied in the terms o

Article 16 o the Act have become elements o the ramework o a lawsuit, a review

o the classication will not be necessary when solely ratiying or acknowledging

the signatures o the aorementioned instruments.

Article 12

The obligation o condentiality established in Article 17 and the related provisions

o the Act shall remain in eect regardless o whether the operations responsible

or obtaining knowledge o the classied inormation have been terminated.

Article 13

All National Intelligence System agencies must issue internal resolutions to

expressly notiy, in writing, each o its members o the responsibilities resulting

rom Article 17 o the Act.

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Law 25,520

Sanctioned: 27 November 2001.

Promulgated: 3 December 2001.

Meeting in Congress, etc., the Senate and

Chamber o Deputies o the Argentine Nation

hereby approve, with the orce o a Law, the:

National Intelligence Law

TITLE I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The purpose o the present Law is to establish the

legal, organisational and unctional bases o the

Nations Intelligence System.

Article 2

For the purposes o the present Law and the

activities it regulates, the ollowing terms shall

mean:

1. National Intelligence: the activity

that consists o obtaining, gathering,

systematising and analysing the specic

inormation concerning the acts, threats,

risks and conficts that aect the Nations

external and internal security.

2. Counterintelligence: the specic activity

pertaining to the intelligence eld that is

undertaken with the aim o avoiding or

preventing intelligence activities by actors

that represent threats or risks to the security

o the National State.3. Criminal Intelligence: the part o

Intelligence that concerns the specic

criminal activities which, by their nature,

magnitude, oreseeable consequences,

danger or ormats, aect reedom, lie,

inhabitants assets, their rights and

guarantees and the institutions o the

representative, republican and ederal

system established by the National

Constitution.

4. Strategic Military Intelligence: the part

o Intelligence that concerns knowledge

o the capacities and weaknesses o the

military potential o the countries that are

o interest rom the point o view o national

deence, together with the geographical

environment o the strategic operational

areas determined by strategic militaryplanning.

5. National Intelligence System: the set o

unctional relationships linking the National

States intelligence bodies, which is directed

by the Intelligence Secretariat in such a way

as to contribute to decision-making with

regard to matters involving the Nations

external and internal security.

TITLE II

PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND

GUARANTEES OF THE NATIONS

INHABITANTS

Article 3

The National Intelligence Systems modus

operandi must adapt itsel exactly to the

provisions set out in Part 1, Chapters I and II o the

National Constitution and in the current legal

and regulatory norms.

Article 4

No intelligence body may:

1. Engage in repressive tasks, possess

compulsory powers, or, in its own right,

perorm police or criminal investigation

unctions, save at the specic order o a

The National Intelligence Law,

presented in its original orm

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competent judicial authority issued within

the ramework o a concrete case that

is subject to its jurisdiction, or which is

authorised to that end by law.

2. Obtain inormation, produce intelligence

or store data about persons, due solely to

the act o their race, religious belie, privateactions or political opinion, or to the act

that they have joined or belong to party,

social, trade union, community, cooperative,

charitable, cultural or labour organisations,

or because o the lawul activities they

pursue in any sphere o action.

3. In any way infuence the countrys

institutional, political, military, police-

related, social and economic situation, its

oreign policy, the internal lie o legally

constituted political parties, public opinion,

persons, media, or legal associations or

groups o any kind.

4. Reveal or disclose any type o inormation

with regard to any inhabitant or legal

person, be they public or private, that it has

acquired in the exercise o its unctions, save

by judicial order or dispensation.

Article 5

Telephone, postal, telegraphic or ax

communications or any other system or sending

objects or transmitting images, voices or packetso data, as well as any type o inormation, les,

records and/or documents which are private or

access to or the reading o which is unauthorised

or inaccessible to the public shall be inviolable

throughout the Argentine Republic, except by

means o a judicial order or dispensation to the

contrary.

TITLE III

INTELLIGENCE BODIES

Article 6

The ollowing are National Intelligence System

bodies:

1. The Intelligence Secretariat.

2. The National Directorate o Criminal

Intelligence.

3. The National Directorate o Strategic Military

Intelligence.

Article 7

The Intelligence Secretariat, which shall be under

the authority o the Presidency o the Nation,shall be the senior National Intelligence System

body and its general mission shall be to direct the

System.

Article 8

The unction o the Intelligence Secretariat shall

be the production o National Intelligence.

Article 9

The National Directorate o Criminal Intelligence

is hereby created, and shall be under the authority

o the Secretariat o Internal Security.

Its unction shall be the production o Criminal

Intelligence.

Article 10

The National Directorate o Strategic Military

Intelligence is hereby created, to be under the

authority o the Minister o Deence, in conormity

with the provisions o Article 15 o Law 23,554.Its unction shall be the production o Strategic

Military Intelligence.

The Armed Forces intelligence bodies shall be

responsible or the production o the operational

strategic intelligence and the tactical intelligence

needed to plan and conduct military operations,

and o specic technical intelligence.

Article 11

The creation, structuring and unctioning o

associations, institutions, networks and groups onatural or legal persons that plan and/or execute

any o the stages o the intelligence unctions and

activities which the present Law attributes to the

bodies that belong to the National Intelligence

System is prohibited.

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TITLE IV

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE POLICY

Article 12

The President o the Nation shall set thestrategic outlines and the general objectives o

the National Intelligence policy.

Article 13

In conormity with the outlines and objectives

established by the President o the Nation,

the Intelligence Secretariat shall possess the

ollowing specic unctions:

1. Formulate the National Intelligence Plan.

2. Design and execute the intelligence

programmes and budgets set out in theNational Intelligence Plan.

3. Plan and execute the activities involved in

obtaining and analysing the inormation

or use in the production o National

Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

4. Direct and articulate the National

Intelligence Systems activities and modus

operandi, as well as the relations with the

intelligence bodies o other states.

5. Coordinate the activities included within

the ramework o Law 23,554 on National

Deence and Law 24,059 on Internal Securitywith the ocials appointed by the Ministers

with responsibility or the respective areas,

whose rank may not be less than that o the

Undersecretary o State.

6. Require all the organs o the National Public

Administration to provide the inormation

needed or the ullment o its unctions.

7. Require the provincial governments

to provide their cooperation when it

is necessary to the perormance o its

activities.

8. Coordinate the drawing up o the NationalStrategic Intelligence Assessment and o

the ensuing inormation-gathering plan.

9. Draw up the annual report on intelligence

activities, with a view to its presentation

beore the National Congresss Bicameral

Committee or the Oversight o Intelligence

Bodies and Activities. To this end the

bodies in the National Intelligence System

must provide it with all the applicable

inormation.

10. Make itsel amiliar with the training,

capacity-building, practical training and

updating o the sta who belong to the

Intelligence Secretariat, and participate

in the advanced capacity-buildingo intelligence sta, via the National

Intelligence School.

11. Provide the Ministry o Deence with the

inormation and intelligence that is needed

to contribute to the production o Strategic

Military Intelligence, in conormity with

the provisions on this matter laid down in

Article 15 o Law 23,554.

12. Provide the Internal Security Council with

the inormation and intelligence that is

needed to contribute to the production o

criminal intelligence, in conormity withthe provisions on this matter laid down in

Article 10(e) o Law 24,059.

13. Enter into such agreements with natural or

legal persons o a public or private nature as

are useul to the ullment o its unctions.

Article 14

The President o the Nation may convene an

interministerial council to assist and advise him

with regard to the strategic outlines and general

objectives o the National Intelligence policy, andin each such case shall determine the members

who are to participate therein.

Similarly, when he sees t to do so, the

President o the Nation may require the

consultative participation in the said Council o

representatives o the Armed Forces, the Security

Forces or the Argentine Federal Police.

Article 15

The Intelligence Secretariat shall be the

responsibility o the Secretary or Intelligence,who shall possess the rank o Minister and shall

be appointed by the President o the Nation

ollowing non-binding consultation o the

National Congresss Bicameral Committee or the

Oversight o Intelligence Bodies and Activities.

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TITLE V

CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION

Article 16

Intelligence activities, the sta allocated to them,and the documentation and databases o the

intelligence bodies shall possess the security

classication that is appropriate to the interests

o internal security, national deence and the

Nations oreign relations.

Access to the aoresaid inormation shall be

authorised on a case-by-case basis by the

President o the Nation or the ocial to whom

he expressly delegates this power, with the

exceptions provided or in the present Law.

The classication o the activities, sta,

documentation and databases reerred to in

the rst paragraph o the present Article shall

be maintained even when knowledge thereo

must be submitted to the justice system within

the ramework o a given case or is required by

the Bicameral Committee or the Oversight o

Intelligence Bodies and Activities.

Article 17

The members o the intelligence bodies, the

legislators who belong to the Bicameral

Committee or the Oversight o IntelligenceBodies and Activities and the sta allocated

thereto, together with the judicial authorities,

ocials and persons who, as a result o their

unctions or by chance, gain access to knowledge

about the inormation mentioned in the previous

Article must maintain the strictest secrecy and

condentiality.

Breach o this duty shall render the culprits

subject to the sanctions provided or in Book II

Title IX, Chapter II, Articles 222 and/or 223 o the

National Penal Code, as appropriate.

TITLE VI

INTERCEPTION AND CAPTURE OF

COMMUNICATIONS

Article 18

When, in pursuit o intelligence or

counterintelligence activities, it is necessary to

intercept or capture private communications

o any kind, the Intelligence Secretariat must

request the applicable judicial authorisation.

Such authorisations must be ormulated in

writing and set out the grounds on which they are

issued, and shall give precise indications as to the

telephone number or numbers or the electronic

address or addresses or whatever other medium

may be involved, whose communications are to

be intercepted or captured.

Article 19

In the case provided or in the previous Article,

the judicial authorisation shall be requested

by the Secretary or Intelligence or the ocial

to whom he expressly delegates the power to

do so, beore the ederal penal judge with the

appropriate jurisdictional competence. For the

purpose o determining that competence, regard

shall be had to the domicile o the natural or

legal persons whose communications are to beintercepted or, in the case o mobile or satellite

communications, the registered oce rom which

they are made.

The proceedings shall be classied at every

instance.

The procedural time limits at rst instance shall

be twenty-our hours or both the parties and the

intervening courts.

Decisions to deny such requests shall be subject to

appeal to the applicable Federal Chamber, when

the Bench that is hearing the appeal must decide

within a mandatory time limit o seventy-two (72)hours, with authorisation to sit outside the normal

times, when appropriate.

Authorisation shall be granted or a time limit

o no more than sixty (60) days, which shall

lapse automatically, save i the Secretary or

Intelligence or the ocial to whom this power

has been delegated makes a ormal request and

authorisation is again granted by the Judge who

is hearing it, or by the respective Chamber in the

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event that the request is denied at rst instance.

In such cases the time limit may be extended

or another sixty (60) days at most, when this

is indispensable to completion o the ongoing

investigation.

Article 20

Once the time limits established in the previous

Article have ended, the judge shall order that the

corresponding legal proceedings commence, or

else that whoever is obliged to do so destroy or

erase the mediums on which the recordings have

been made, the copies o the postal, cable or ax

interventions or any other element that would

enable their results to serve as proo.

Article 21

The Directorate o Judicial Surveillance (DOJ)

is hereby created as part o the Intelligence

Secretariat. The DOJ shall be the only State organ

charged with executing any type o interception

authorised or ordered by the competent judicial

authority.

Article 22

Judicial orders to intercept telephone

communications shall be sent to the Directorate

o Judicial Surveillance (DOJ) in the orm o anocial letter signed by the judge, to include

precise and detailed instructions or the guidance

o the said task.

The judge must send another, summary, ocial

letter that solely lists the numbers that are to

be the object o intervention, so that the DOJ

can attach it to the request it is to send to the

telephone service company with responsibility

or tapping the communications.

The ocial letters which the DOJ and its branch

oces in the interior send to telephone service

companies must be signed by the head o theDirectorate or o the branch oce that is making

the request.

TITLE VII

STAFF AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

Article 23

The ocials or members o intelligence bodies

shall be citizens who are native-born, naturalised

or have opted or Argentine citizenship, are o

age, ull the conditions laid down in the present

Law and its regulations, and whose conduct and

public lie provide adequate guarantees that they

respect the National Constitution and the current

legal and regulatory norms.

The ollowing persons may not serve as ocials

or members o any intelligence body:

1. Those in relation to whom there is a record

o war crimes, crimes against humanity or

crimes involving human rights violations in

the les o the Undersecretariat or Human

Rights, which is a dependent entity o the

Ministry o Justice and Human Rights, or o

any other body or dependent entity that

may replace them in the uture.

2. Those who are subject to any o the

disqualications laid down in the statutes

that provide the ramework or the sta o

the respective intelligence bodies.

Article 24

The Intelligence Secretariats personnel roster

shall include:

1. Permanent employees, who shall occupy

the levels or categories laid down in the

regulatory norms.

2. Sta who are engaged under xed-term

contracts to provide services o a provisional

or temporary nature, who shall occupy

the levels or categories laid down in the

regulatory norms.

3. Oce Sta, whose appointments shall

be temporary and shall be made by thehead o the Intelligence Secretariat, whose

number may not exceed 2% o the total

number o permanent employees in the

said Secretariats personnel roster, and who

may only remain in their positions during

the tenure o the person who appointed

them. For the purposes o the present

paragraph, Oce Sta means all those

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persons whom the head o the Intelligence

Secretariat contracts to perorm assistance

and advisory tasks.

Article 25

The duties, rights, remuneration system,categories, disciplinary regime, social security

regime and other normative provisions inherent

in the labour regime governing the sta covered

by the present Law shall be established in the

Special Statutes that are to be issued by decree o

the National Executive Authorities.

The Special Statutes shall be public and shall

be issued in accordance with the directions

established in the present Law.

The sta who belong to the bodies in the National

Intelligence System shall all within the scope o

the provisions o Article 4(4) o the present Law.With regard to the social security regime, any

changes which may occur shall only be valid

or the intelligence sta who join ater the new

statutes come into orce.

Article 26

The training and capacity-building o the sta o

the bodies in the National Intelligence System

must:

1. Develop the attitudes and values required

by the training o responsible persons andocials, with an ethical, solidary, thoughtul

and critical awareness and rame o mind.

2. Help ensure that ull advantage is taken o the

existing and assigned human and material

resources.

3. Increase and diversiy the opportunities or

updating, improvement and reconversion

available to the persons who belong to the

bodies in the National Intelligence System.

4. Favour specic training and capacity-building

in intelligence tasks and tasks related to

the law, general scientic and technicaltraining and capacity-building, and training

and capacity-building with a humanistic,

sociological and ethical content.

Article 27

The training and capacity-building o the

Intelligence Secretariats sta and also that o the

ocials with responsibility or the ormulation,

management, implementation and control o

the National Intelligence policy shall be in the

hands o the National Intelligence School, which

shall be under the authority o the Intelligence

Secretariat.

The National Intelligence School shall be the

higher-education institute with responsibility

or capacity-building and improvement in

intelligence-related matters, and the sta o the

other bodies in the National Intelligence System

may have access to its courses.

Similarly, under the conditions laid down in

the regulations, it may give courses or persons

who do not belong to the National Intelligence

System.

A Permanent Advisory Council shall be ormed

within it, to include delegates rom all the bodies

that are members o the National Intelligence

System. The Council must be consulted about the

curricular programmes or both the intelligence

courses and the sta-improvement activities.

Article 28

The National Intelligence School shall promote

and arrange sta training in accordance with

the principles o objectivity, equal opportunities,

merit and capacity.

Article 29

The studies undertaken at the National

Intelligence School may be the object

o validation by the Ministry o Education,

in accordance with the current laws and

regulations.

Article 30

In order to give the instruction and courses

concerning the studies reerred to in theprevious Article, arrangements shall be made to

promote the institutional collaboration o the

National Universities, the Judicial Authorities, the

Public Prosecutors Oce, non-governmental

organisations and other higher-education

institutions, centres and establishments that are

specically o interest to the aorementioned

teaching purposes.

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Similarly, ormal agreements may be entered into

with non-governmental organisations and other

public or private institutions whose activities

match the matter regulated by the present Law,

with a view to undertaking academic activities,

scientic research, and similar activities.

TITLE VIII

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

Article 31

The Bicameral Committee or the Oversight

o Intelligence Bodies and Activities is hereby

created as part o the National Congress.

Article 32

The bodies that belong to the National

Intelligence System shall be supervised by

the Bicameral Committee, or the purpose o

overseeing whether their modus operandi

is strictly in accordance with the current

constitutional, legal and regulatory norms, to

include verication o strict ullment o and

respect or the individual guarantees enshrined

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