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..Armor Magazine Index.Vo1 .LX. 1951

ALX'HOPSSo. Page

~ B o k r + S............................ 3-ManJhdl .......................... 5B . m c q y l j . J o b n W . ............. S o . L p . 1 6 4Bur.yqj.Ge!n,D.ridc. ..................... 2B o g d . t O s L t ~ W..................... 3~ L L c a L R r n l t K................... 2Bromkg. COL cbulesv ..................... 5BmrsLLBokrtL ......................... 3Bunt&LLBobBLL ......................... 5h t k . W W E .......................... 6C u r . L t . C O L P M f F ....................... 3cawth&y.LChprb .EL .................... 5chnbarfin,UGanS taph tn J............... 5C b m e , Y ~ N . t L . n i d G.J r. .............. IChodhari,Y.j.CB.J.N .................... I~ L L C d W . I h c t L................. 2Collim,GenJ.Lavtoll ...................... 6Cnnfod,Br ig .CB.D.J ..................... ICriftcDbaler. t G s nW i n i aD ......... ... 5Da*LLcdxiclmds .................... 2DemaLtCd.BokrcJ..................... 6Dorta+ L E. ............................... 3Dn&capLBObQtE ....................... 5DmBo&sFcDoo(r ........................... 2D n T ' i . L G e a J a n L o u i a T o ~ t ........ 1&My. LtGenyIlrtoos ..................... 5E&LLL.lrrhY,Jr ........................ 3 l y . C a I o p i . B ............................. 4Ponythe, Crpt Jedrey .......... No 2.p 4 3F ~ L L c o L E m b a c A.................. 2PMUin. + COL Jobn F Jr................. 2Gllarrio.L t C d B ......................... 5- . A T ................................ 1HaDdk. y. 5. .............................. 4Earper.LLBobcrt s. ........................ 3HurL,U.CdJohnE. ...................... 6EurirosI)r.GodonL ...................... 1E a r r o ~ B r i g . G e a T h o m u L ................ 1Hur. . E i dag ...................:...... 3H e dr y . Lt John P ........................ 3-Henry.R&qtselpil ......................... 2Hadge.LtGen.JohuB ...................... 5H d g e a , Yj. W m D ..................... 6Hmra. OL EwdtaIl E :...I... .............. 1Icka.CoLBobarcJ........................... 1J.mu ....................................... JK d k r . L & B o b a r 5. ......................... IK d l e y.LL ThormusW ....................... 3Kintner. L t COL wiIli.m a ................. 3KDott2ummheDadkyw ................. 3Koburgu. Crp. b r hW. Jr., .... o 1.p. 40 3LrueT&LLGaLIrBay ........................ 5r . i0,U m S ................... 6Mdette.YS@.StsdeyB .................. I~ L t . c o L W i T l h m C.................. 6- Y WBpCaw ....................... I54

595143122741626343049262221233038618'34201214562224253429142411325922211463423612021273 i421225431662017232323

Middleton. L s Casi lear ....................... 4Moore.Y Sgt. Earl E ...................... IMU^ ^ Hill&& H BIulthut ........ 6O g o r k i ew i a.Richard M............ N o . p.6 8Per t l .LtCol . Y.C. .......................... 5pick- Lt.CoL George B, Jr ...... No . I . 14 6Pickett. L+ Theodore R, Jr.................... 3proluu. Maj.kmu YcFadden .............. 6Quina, Joaeph Y....... .................... IRnymoad, Col. h u l e a w., 2d ................. 2Rigg. Lt. oL Robert B....................... 3Rob- Brig.Gea P.Y..................... 1honey. Lt. CaL John T...................... 6Sayre. Lt Col.Edwin Y...................... 6

Iehwar tz, SFC Wil l iam D....................t N o . f p . 4 8 INo . . 39 6haw. Dr g e r ................ IStevens. Maj cuth .........................Swing. L .Gen Joseph M....................Tiblob L . Gee* P ........................

253

Von XanteuiYel. aas0 Eccard ................ IWat aoa, Mark S ............................ 1Wayne. J o h n ................................ 1We8tph.u POP1 ............................. 5White. Maj.Gen L D........................ 5W h . Bobert D......................... 3w*m COL Willi.m P ..................... 2Worthington.Maj en.F F ................. 1Yak sc& SF C Raak ......................... 1Zohner. S t. Robert B ...................... I

TITLESAmerican Tankers in Germany With the.Amphibious Tank Experiment, C m t h o n .......Ariete: IWfs Armored Briq.de, Cuerico ......Armies ofArmor. Ety ........................Armor in the Airborne Division. Ehnklin. Jr ..Annor in the Hilb.BPms ....................

wcstpiull ............................... 555I25No.& p.20 IArmor Notea .....................

Ogorkiewicz ............................. 2bred nfantry ia DilYeren Koburger. Jr .. . 1Armored Infantry Platoon Leader Reinforced. Th e

Koburger. r ............................ 3Armofls Interim Bridge. B u n - ............... 4A l u t v l i t t .IdJcnr, S h w .................... 4"Bdkaa Tit0 cn t.lin' (Book Review).H.ndlcr ................................. 4Case in - A. Butler ............... 6Catching the Enemy OR Guard, Quiun ........ 4CC B Geta Enginear Sapport, Barnea .......... 3yCloeing the Ring" (Book Beview). Shaw ...... 6Coagmsa Dances, The. sb.w .................. 5

5 .2 .2.-

4-1;!4;

45513c.24222425492E23242549104330I2324'22

4326113424.343043640643

25

59304616493s

.0.mh ~ g h h b o ~ T.nlt, Foas~m .................. 2 I4DSCP.Forrythe ............................. 2 54D e l i h t i o ~n Armor.Cu r ................. 3 49Don't J o m p o Tanka.Kiutner ................ 3 43Editorid-For Armor and Artillery-A Sew Ins ignia ..In the H a d $ of Troops ...................A-ntion Movie Directors! ...............E l i m i i t e the egat ive ...................Tank Minded Once Again .................

Association to Sponsor Mounted ServiceMuseom ..............................The 1at A r m o r e d Division .................A %le .No t a Weapoa ....................We've Come a Long Way. We Have a LongW a y to Go ..................No 1 18To United Nations Forces .................

1 121 131 131 132 182 182 2 03 4I 19I 18

In Other Y e u a ........................... 1Red Armor in Korea ...................... 5. . ........................s war Deaths 5A m eapons Expansion ............... 5Walter Reed Anniversary ................. 5Atomic Battlefield and Armor .............The Annual Meeting ...................... 6Of Editors. Award8 and Ulcers ............Two-way Besponaibi l iw .................. 668

Fil l ing a N ew ly A c t i v aa A r mo & D iv i si o n .Pertl .................................... 53"Hinge of Fate. The" (Bo& wear)Watson .. 11

Infantry Regiment's Tank Company. The. D r ak e 5Integrated Armor cka ...................... 11

in Preparedness: Link or Obstacle?

Have Armoured Foreeq a F'uture? Hart .......Hitting the Beaehea. Harrison ................

Integrated Training for Armor. Harrold .......Let's Keep the Bo w Gunner.Middleton .........Lets Talk About Armor. Janus ...............h t e r t ................................... 3

I21

F o e ............................... 313I

Let's N am e Our CloseComb8t Units.Raymond 2dLogistics and "mias in the Amnored Division.Yagaziue R o d u p (Service o u r n a l s ) .........Yedd of Honor w ar d of he ................Yen W h o Pu t the Arm in Army Way n e........Yeasqp from the Commanding Genenr l of The

Ma j. avid G.Bur .....................Maj.Gea I.D.White ..................Lutea. hambertin. wing.Eddy

Armored Center : 255obility in the Field A r m y ...................( Sum & Substance) . Cr i t tenberger.Hodge.

*& .Lincbln'a Army" (Book Review) . Henry .. .NCO's on the A r m o r t d c . v . ~ ~ Y Regiment .....

24

(Sum & Substance). Yakeach.a r..Moore. ZoImer. Yarlette. Wesser. Schwar tz

ARMOR-Novem b.r -Doc~m ~, 951

193232323218181s194734491414376

125s57422954610

u30I8

6120

p ctorirl Peatrpc:Air strike ............................... 1 .British ccntprion Tan k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Turkey Builds Some Armor Baekboac ........ 5Armored P a r o a ~ c l arrier. 1pe2 ........ tFrench Armor ............................ iYugoslav Army: AntiSoviet Fo m ......... 62

1Pilgrim Contemporuies. ome . h ar .........."Propaganda" Tauk. The.Hdley . . . . . . . . . . . . .ReconnoiteringAmollgtbe Bushes ........................ 1

'Old Bill" ............. ;................. 5Premiere. A 2.............................What's Ina Same? ....................... 4-An A d " ............................ 62December. 1950, ......................... 1

Repor t from K o r ea Wi t h e r s ..................Report of Annual Meeting (Fear EndingR q u i r e m e n t for Armor, The, H o r a e .......... 1S e d f a Prophet. In. .............. 6Secretary of Defense. A S ew Lo v e t t ..........Self-Propelled Bridges Ri g g ..................Self Propelled Guns.Ogorkieriet ............."Soldids Story A" (BookReview Allen .....

5361Some Ideas from a . 6unior Leader Yarcanto~~io.Something to Stop a Tank K m r ............. 322

-US .h b b ........................ 2Survey of Soviet Armor. A Davison ...........Symbol of Armor. The.Britton ...............Tank Combat Briefs .........................Tank Defense Against Atode Aturk. Stevema. .Tank Economy: U y s h f O p e r a t i d radC o m h t Lassu, Rob- ..................Tank-Inf-autry Team at Work. The. ieke# Jr ..Tank-Inirntrp Teunwork ....................(Su m & Subtame). D e m e m Hedges, H.rrb,Tank Isn't Born Oveniigk~.A, C n d o d ......am yutia -=YTank Platoon Leader.The. Kc l kr .............Tank Platoon Opentiona in Korea ............(Sum & Substance).aUprr Hendry. TitoaEe. JT Kelley.Bmm, Boy rton. W h xTankers Get Tougher. Bmmky ...............Tanka in Defense: Kapyoag. i cketf Jr .......T.nks in KO- lSW1961. Pklrett, Jr ........T h h ia Wu!" Book acriCr).Andre=' T i t o and Goliath" (BookReview).Handler ....T d ontrol.Yueller -Hil lebmnd ............Training Fkblicat ions and Aids.Clement ......Trenda in Armor Ororniytron ................

......

(Sum & Substance). Du V ie r . Cbaudhrui.Worthington. Von YanteutTel

42136

443

51654621

West Point : Clam of 1951 Amor Crduatea ...( S o. 3 4 2.p.

Wh at Wo u l d Y o u D o ? ( F ' r o b l em ) .. . No.3.p.S 41s o . . , u3

6

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ARMOI-Navombw.Docombw. 1951

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ARM.OR.

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service around th ewo rd ..' ' 0 a worMof

languages ' ' '

occupationmilitary government

intelligenceconversation* interpretingcivl1 affairs

attach6 assignmentwrih tor nformoHocl

A Iingwphoue Gmversatiod Grtm is a complete unit conraininge v q -rial element to enable a pemm to kam the new laquaged y . uickly and thomugbly. -The basic v a l ue of a Linguaphone Course is, of couroe, the I V d.\fahod idf-the scient& COOCdiO?ti011 of he spokenw d , the illusaa-nons and the p r h d ext. It ispimnrily because of the pafect aaxracyof this xiedlod chat ringusphaw Couna hove achieved theird-nary popukriry and succus..\Complete Lingwphoae Course CarrSisLI of 16doublefaced records anda set of ~achron i zdrnbooLs in a a a d y cprrping case.Om of these recocds isdevoted to thedLri pcri n d o f he language,~ d e d b y o u p r p a c t i n g n a t i v e e x p e r t s i n ~heZherISrecurdscontain the u ) lasonsof the course. Each lesson casists of two pem:1. A Desarptive Talk. 2. c4nvasatioarl Pnctia. The entire kssondeals with sow scene of everpdoy life. Saw of the lessons d d b ehome life. athers scenes in a restaurant. limct sights and activitiesa bank,miding, shopping, the tka- d n g , o . elevision. spom, cum-mace. Itisallpractical,dPndusbk.

8

The United StatesAmam AssociationC l V a l r g M o nc4mtinuitiooof

ThtUllitdstateJ(EspMirtrd 1885)Howoraq Pnlilrrr

MAJ. EN. GUY V. HENRY, Brt.Pvrs&nl

LT. GEN.WILLIS D.CMlTENBERGERH I ~ O M J &Prednrtr

MAJ. EN. CHNUES L. SCOlTCOL JOHN L. HmES JRVice-P..lik.rr

MAJ. GEN. UOVU E. BYEBSMAJ. GEN. D.W. cGOWAN, N.G.COL HEREERTI.ROST, USARSecremy-Trwwcr

CAPT.WILLIAM GARDNER BELLAUi t iod Co..ril M r m b u s

MAJ. G w . HOEWTI.GAYMAJ. G m . &.BUT Scm JOHNSON. G.But. G m . THO - L.HumomBUG. Gm. OHN T.CoraCor. W n r w c J. BUDWCor.CnAUu V.B p a u w . JR.Cor. R. J. Bmc~auCor. H ~ N I Y . G ~ u t m m , SARCor. -TON H.H o w zCor. L K. m aCor. JOHN c.Cot. JOHN R. PUGX

ARMOR

m:w F c o w " .m n z a s r o r n w r o ~ a

I O

mITopILd .... U-6 lE S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I4

4 R. A. Bur*..L l c y k sUa8rL.Q ......................................... P

BYU CI Ja n L.*T u u t R rJ.Cr J. W-u. CI P. P. 'I- IS s m m a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .EE PROPA6A!!A" TAW .

BY A, . H.hWHAT W'0C-u) YOU DO? ...................................................... 84I X T P C I L ~ ~BMOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . a7

B Y c . l u l . . L a r J . I c bAU IO I P ) I N ? L y I . I IS D m B p E S T ........................................... 40

BY hptahC b r h W.Cmhker. Jr.L E Y S T A L R ~ C I . U S O E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U

BY -fBE OOK(ICCIION ........................................................ 4#f B E H N G B OF ?ATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49. A m t r r h ~ S ' I U W ~MAcAzlxe BOTNDCP .......................................................... 54-n m m OF LWIWAL m c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . u

OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN PUBLISHED CONTRIBUTIONS

P

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LETTERS t o the EDITORBalkas, in the fighting against theP a m rench pnk.@es a false idea of the situa-tion. In order to dcpI up this -, Ishould like omake the dlowmgpoino:

It isuodoubadlpaue that from timeto &ne the armotused forRussian ankswi ls of \'erg poor quality a d ften $dooc b v e th Ksk&uux w peneaaaanaormallprrquutd.But thm are aher reasons for thefact tbat R w i a n PnLS,eeb y :Mm . o f a c a p t u r e d d i sn o s a l o u ~ - ~ u n k s s c o n t j r l u -w mainocnaaceof the vehicles isbk. and thisdepends on he av&=

man- of spare pua ortheT31inGmnanfactorieswaJdbvebeen possible only at the expcnoc of areduction in the number of Gennantanhtuxnedout. F o r t h i s ~ y o n t h e u o eof T34 8nk cnuld OC be co11sidmd.In isolated'bsmnces the Germn

T34, were not used by

part% Aode fr omtechnicaldif-

i m m b l e to $et enoufrom the mat&=] capture9 +EL=a h nvolved an irrational expenditureof effort. which was increased by thefact hat maintenance irwlf requi+ rpe-y tniwd 111 thedm k and the - 42 lu canu of speaal e-pair t o o k.* ir as the Czech and French anksuere concaned the situation was dif-ferent. Facloricsand rrpair instaUati0~~for these types of ranks w a e available.However. the French tank wm at bestne.= altogether infenor to the T34 R-rdess ot the poor materialsused in theuseful only to frighten peasants theyL e r . s consmxtim.

The hct hat in rbe La be capturedT34 was not used excqt in a few PLIEShad a second and equally important rea-m :F m acri al viewpoint the T34was inferior tocrnn?a rank types (PzIl l andR V with long-barrckd 75mmgun) because it canbind the functionsof COmmpDder and g u m n one per-son. As soon as the rosnmander beganfiring,he loa hiroverd l viewpoint andwas unable to direct his tank. Even asgunner, however, he was unable to ful-fill his mission becaue when function-ing assuch he had no commander fromwhicl~o m i t e directions As a -It.the T34 was in most cases hopelesslyinferior to the German tanks, especiallyafter Carman tanks were armed with along gun, in the springof 1942. I oftensaw Russian tank attacks in which theT31's charged like a herd of wild bullsand continuously fired their guns. obvi-ously without aiming, while driti ng for-ward. While the limited training g i v entank crews asa d t f the high losesincurred may have been one of the rea-sons for adopting such tactics, it is cer-tain that the union of the functions ofcommander and gunner in one personwas a conmbuting factor.

Partly as a result of this tactical in-feriority, in the Ukraine my P a m egi-ment, from the end of October to themiddle of December 1943, destroyed356 Russian tanks,most of them T34's.with a total loa of only 12 Germantanks. Th e egiment was equipped witha little more than 100 t an4 half ofthanPz V and the rest SturmgeschueaII I (self-propelled assault gun), bothequipped with the long-barreled T 5 m mgun model L 18.H. B. ~~UELLEE-HILLEBFW~Generalmajor, former Chiefof stag of Germany's=-IP a m Corps& Third Pan=Army .Gzrmany

Fadr,Wh./udiaDar sir:P k o m d al l future irsua of.UL\fOR tomy new .ddrrmc as I haterrwDsd fmm Kac?, due to W v J W l d s .and am no bager asigned to thc zdInfantry Dividon.Theapinioartfacthherebisbaredu p y own observations. as ur l l asdkus chs wid otba &cers of variousb r a n c h (Infantry.Artilkry) aswell as.borperooood.

I wasmuchimprrPrd by tk ingularfact thatLmhwrh?lra,asmlIasour witbdnwl& appual m be b a dupon a *bade ofd eis." This wasreminkmt ofw dah across Fnna.and Locr Cermanv in world war 11m e r 4 bck of a dmbpal road actThe situation being f unber aggravatedby the rrserictiolrsin size and conditiondid DOC lend i d ell to a modernhighly rnahnmd amy . Owe at thed e s i 4 ocation. deployment off he oadcouldm y e c&rocd. But to movefrom oneposition to a n d e r . pacdcallvn o a o s u n m a g m o v e m e n t w a s e ~ .After the widely hd de d and much\a u n d development of "c roacoun~mobility" in the Cavalry.aswell as otherbranches, during the last ten pears.Korea has shown that-the tast majorityofour mobility is+dent upon roads!The mos onvincing actian, and thebitterest ill to swailow when it devel -oped, s &t which is even now continu-ing. A vast force of aoops onsistingpri-d y f foot and horse sol die^^. supE d b P k animllc. has caused ourforcestowithdraw so far, and 50 rap%Initially, the heaviestaeapon tbeewmvuscd was the I2Omm mortar. N o dlery. no enk r SP guns, and no air-craft! Later, of course, hese forces hat ebeen added and ncre9ed.

but was n s d y dieeret becaw of the

of the few roads tharrrlves, a m i n l y

ghly mechanized, heavily q u i

In fact, the verjl ence of ourforces upon the roat%d our ofmss-anmay mobility) caused the with-drawals to d - a l m o s t tragically! Da yand night w machines moved to the

rear. bumperw bum .mod batnd. tumiles. m a n + a K g - m o v i n g a dhalting. sa a m y ~ rf oh. v ehick's kngth. as v o i m 00 tbt fuiauI saw. and spoke uith. oow of ourI nfa m y sdrfim who wm using caphucd hoKcstowppar tbcirunifson rheline. In one gmup of dx animals I O U .tly. of Japanese stock a\erJgmyr K 5 ands) I saw thra with U.S.h y odifndl .\lcckllan pddks on

bokingmue. Iprrauncd~ k a d - k ? a \ i au o r L . a & pour ioureffomtosupponandtrain

In \iew of aiur worid-widc amunit-men% and in ~oasidcnt ioaof snue ofthe &n included in tboahat theossibleomeareas of &on it aand mule still - a place inou r ora+-QXI pack rrains. pack artil-kry. and Cavalry [ ~ -f necessrp. call it"Mounted nfanuy"-it wD u l d nm besomethingnew).-4 f i d and -re disturbing h g h tis based upon the expmsd opinion oflearned statesmen and nientiso m thede c t that an atomic war can karmt along war of attrition. In such a w ar ourClass LI supplieswill be among the firstto become critical (ask tbore who werecivilians in W d Var 11 and whathappened to Cenenl Panon's M %myin Europe one ime::, and subsque ndv -one of the firstto disappear! So aLo willmanufacturing (therefore sporr pans.and replacemen major end items> berapidly diminished in a war of atuidon(ask the Germans who served in thePanzer divisions!). Thedore. men onfoot, and horses (priority on PO L wouklno doubt go to he .%r Force and Sari:c d e the last line of defense undersuch arcurnstancesAs the old saying goes. ".bunce ofprpyention . . **CAPTAINOBERTC. MCCNEB

&?Ill.d h C t b e k b a a s w . l s 2 p A r -

CdX2o ha\* arr ived theretheE&Karrv rs

Tacoma. \\'ashirigton.

II + $ 11 .

e

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U

Now, bow do we thisto life?

A branch member, 10 become a Mnrcvc of htproracioarlrgmrrinn and d v e o plbliariospays a feed 4.75 d y . very pcnpy of rhatmooey Woriw? It goes into the ad ptodrwr--chtlmgazkc st-rrrr? why?

OUrodmiDianave expenses are negligible. Weown no property. Our cent is so ow its laughablestrictly a w&g shop.(WehopedKlandlofddoesltKetbL!). ounis

summing thu up, your money p e s intoth pri-mary pmduct--tbemagazine. You are not payingtoIOaildnmexpmsivecnilirnd. You r r empaying to mpioarin properrp. You are noc payingfor my subsidiary over and above tkpubliaaooof r k wp.rillL

We have in mind also+ lblicrtioaof ScVeraIbooks and pamphlets rhu a r t M y eedLd inArmor. Aod we u e orking at rheacquisitionof alibmry of abaterialon Armor d m il l be ycocld toship we, for cesarcb and for history.noOc--a library for cditori?l pupoKs,for member-

These things canebe ar e widin dx annual in;best be clone ifwe plshaloqg closer to the goal of

cers in d ompooara We doat fool ourselvescbat well ever make that lwebutwe know fromwhat we have now and the acndchnt well come asdoseasanychingcomesinthtline. Wekingreatshape. Thtacscardobrmchiagaeaor! TheNCOwmknhip , tbe Infantxy, Arcillerg, Engineer andMpriw activity, is interest and support chat wehighly value.

come f n w our present rubscription rates. Tbcy can1 W G Mbership.lubsQ1pcioo by all Armor&-

Now lets look briefly at some of the reasoos fornot joining up.

Most of than are bw d in he fa x that the mrcp-h e s teadi ly a4Iabk- For example . . I m d

ARMOR at my ampan? . . (or me^.m.da y ro(45 or f r i d s toom).

At th m o m e ~ e rhinL th e product is pmrpgood. But w e never feel thrt it has nrcbCd per-fection. Winston C h d nce sad to improveoften. Weve got nnnc more chrnga in mindHow about helping o u ~ou mmmnber-dsaib-e n ? How about jumping in tbe pa, oy!

is to chtngc, o k perfect is to luve dmoged

PS. Tbe Mitor isa @-up member.

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Integrated Training for Armor

C.S. A m

Witb bt g o d of stren@bening be d d , ord and pbysical fiber of tbe Amm'canrokiict, tbt Cbief of OUT Army Field Forces some morrtbs ago ditected an accekra-tion and k t ~ * @ a t hf tb e trainingprogram. H o w is tbiz programbeing appliedin Tbc Armored Scbool, tbe f o w training armored divisions, tbe m yarmoredd s f call components? Tbe Deon of OUT College of Armor tells tbe story.

spirit of the offensive; towin over thisvicious foe on the battle6eld. despiteany and all odds.The 1 7 & d r T / W

To achieve these objectives the Ar-mored Branch has prepared 23 pain-ing programs for li-seriesT/O & Eunits which guide a unit from train-ing of untrained 64lm in basic mili-tary sub- to participation in 6eldexercises and maneuvers with otherunits as part of the combined armsteam In addition. two separate pro-grams have been prepared for thetraining of individuals in the basicen? 110s:TankCrewman and Re--crcarmul Theob j j -

tives of these programs are to developuntrained fillers in basic military su bjects; to train them for combat; and otran them as members of a vehiclecrew in any armoredunitThese training programs outlinetraining.mksions and objectives foreach type unit as well as for the indi-vidual.All training programs emphasitepractical work rather than theoreticalinstruction. Lecturesand conferencesare kept to a minimum and are de-signed to bring out brietly the pointsto bedemonsrrated and applied. or toshow the r el at io ns hip b e e n subjecc and the over-all training objsc-Lives.A I MMU - - - , 1951

-a b e db e b w s o f ~InthacnriPingpqrmns v e k..educed o a minimumby eliminating?onesscntial subjects Principles, pro-:he operationalperformance of the n-dividual in annh are forgoaen.rime allotted is COIIsidQed adequateI) i n d u c e ach periodof nstruction.nd fo conduct an initial peMd ofmctical application.

L-edurrsor SLillsnotdirraly related to

Proticien~y through SU~SC-quent application prcn*ided by mte-ptiing t ra in ing. Once a subject or amrtion of a subject is introduced, it hipplied at every appro riate oppor-unity hereafter. ~ n l y .doing thisdl commanders be ab& to accom-plish the objectives in the time al-.a1 training of the individual in cam-tications, and defense against aircraft

med. As an exampleof thismethod,f training, tbe hours devoted to tacri-

A n d annor, fcmerlyscheduled in the

c d n this time if the principle of

J u 5 @and -t, hasty f o dbasic training p q m m for 12 h n .h a v e b e e n d u c e d t o 8 b o u r r T h e

Sub- CM be dequ?oely co\'-integration is followed. Another ex-Ample of integrated training is thqplication of the priDciple of dispa-i on in defense againstaircraft,uscofth e compass and cared the feet dur-ing a period allotted to marches andbivouacs.Also included in erh of tbepreing. This istbe Whichmen

may become rcwomed to and capa-

! p U l S is 'Bat& IndoctriMth" mh-enedphys ica l l ; thepriodwhendis -cipline is msaTbd. in*& that thyble of withstanding tbe shock of bat-tle. B a d e imkctri~tionraining con-sists of subjecting tbt individual tot h e noise of smal- fire; day andnight mgotiatian of prescribed i d l -rration courses; pracrice in h6krationrnetbods; and the experiencing ofeverhead artilhry fire tg demonstrateth e effect of artillery employed inclose support missions

w-since many actual aperations are

least one third of the Ipplkatory stagexmducted d a over of darkness, at)f all t a d raining and training inmoveanent will take place during thehoursofdarlness. k w i l l b e o pARMORAU---, 1951

portunities to stms ndividual nightd = g =rnmdied mining pognmas applied to tbc tnining d visioa,Wbaethencwly inducted rcQuipsareYF""rained,isadkctprxcimcinstruoion. n t b e p a c ct i me army a d t ent throughinglbngwithaIbera)doaofcitizca-s h i p i m m c t h . T h en h ew a sg iv enwhich he was assigned. The presentprogram is broken h n nto besking. The ime fortraining -ins at

f a?ight w~ e k sf byic aain-

brancb training in the rype unit toand k h d v d ndividullaai n-

f ourt een weeks but instead of spend-ing a C0nsida;lbkarnOuntofti me 011

hicles of aLmofed units, their capabili-and mainvnance of vehicles andequipment.A newly mdkted enlisted manu p ntering tbe.urvicc is given aseries of estswhich will determkehisgeneral i n d i p c e and any aptitudeshe m y have fam a particular %o fwork. If it is determined chat 1squalified for armor he will be sent tosions.

ties and limitations, weapons firing,

naissance Crewman along with basicnaining prognnpcinnprixs 6 wecks.h.atring. Badcaaininginthemised

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m. cktemmm. g range, and aperat-ing t a a ka l l y in a squad and platoon.Bivouacs are bdd for both p u p sduxing the twelfth and thirteenthw e e k The field bivouacs are con-du c d& n d . t a n l c a lsituadop requbing a m t i o n to ctsper-s m nd a)PCeatmQlt hum air obser-vatioa. Local Securit)' measues aretal;enwhen hey do not interferewithxbedului training. Bivouac areas arechangal fragndy to a ~ ~ s t o md -V&& to rapid movement re-quired in combat. Combat firing fortank crewmen is em hasized in thewelf ih week while ktb groups re-ceive bat& uaining during r h e thir--3?eIL\ week.The founeenth week is devoted toiring several types of small arms and

mhptahrgThe unit training pqams for 17-

series T OSE un ts are based on a3&Veek aaining penod. Policies ofcc0"omy. of dme. ntegration of pain-; n g . h t i lma f r i l l r a n d t o u g h e n -iag are again f&d. These prcrp n s c a q - he un t not ou+ throughbesi c and dvancd indi\-idual train-* t p through small unit teamsIamon. F,bQttaliOPandcom-gat3-d ombinedannstnin ingof tbcauniowi tharm-+le units of& arm^d e n ' -ka. . .8

3 p a c i e n q est.

p b histeam.The training programs incorporatethe many features of the Tank Crew-

men and Reconnaisamx CrewmenL r maintenance of qu ititular emphasis is p b ~ L i 2nameofwea s,vehicles, an d otherequipment E u g h t mining. Aweapon, a radio, or a vehicle that isn'tsenkeable affecu the efficienq of th eunit. For maximum effectiveness ar-mor must maintain th e ability tomove. shoot and communicate.

T - W J h P = W =Certain of these programs are beingused in the training of newly calledcivilian component tank units and re-cently activated tank battalions. .+Fort b o x , the recently activated 30thTank Battalion. which acquired theunit history and battle streamer of hefamouswartime 702d Tank Battalion.

is using the training programs pre-pared for the tank battalion. This at-talion started with a trained cadre andreceived untrained fillers to bring thebattalion to T/O&E trength. This isan excellent test of the effectivenessofthe programs, since they were de-signed to train units in which a cadrewould take personnel received directfrom civilian status, and mold theminto "armor indoctrinated" SOMiers ca-pable of functioning &ciently abmembers of an armored team. .-\I-though the above unit has not cam-pleted its training at the time of thiswriting, results so ar indicate that he

togram, but more time is p&

:raining objectives will be accom-olished.

ndicationof theeffectitenes of thesen e w d i n g rograms in meeting the.kceleration and Intensification ofrraining" objectives. Most of thentential members of the Anny's fight-'n g team may never have seen a tankir other armored unit vehicle prior to:heir transformation from civilian toaldier status but these proqrams.hculd meet the need for developing{\ell trained armored soldiers in aminimum of time.--

leanwhile, The Armored School.." support th e intensification program.has revised it s exisring program s of in--rruction. It has engthened the train-mg week from forty hours to forty-tour hours and has scheduled nightL lasses to handle the increased studentload and resulting increase in number)f classes. Also, it has eliminated such- 1 ~ ~ m i n gub+ a~ prepam-'ion of research monmphs. remedial-eading, and oth er s u b j j which doTot contribute directly to the training

If an &r or enlisted man to bewdicient in his MOS field. Finally,' t ress has been put on indominationng certain subjects; wh y they mustIf studentswith the S for earn-AIMOI-Jonuq--, 1951

concentrate onacquiring tbe skills req u i d : and thepussibilicy of mmedi-ate commitment to combat.In addition. The k r e d Schoolhas added to the intensification pro-gram by preparing the training pmgrams describedpseviously for trainingindividuals and units of armor. Theseprograms were prepared after con-siderable research was made to deter-mine what t p ~d m t f tain-

ing must be gi\m an ummd sddicrU) insure that k w i l l bcd nCOllhat. 7 le drti on f r a nbade kmnr after-acika cporu ob=mer repons from I V d H' u 11and personal expcr ieaccdothcersande n h d menwh o trained and foughtin units of \\'odd \ V a 11 4 bep e r s o ~ I.\prieroe oZ&n and ra -listed menwh o fought and are fight-for chis research.

O b m e r h dn dingm Korea. were the guldrngfactorsSince these pmgrams have k e nCompleted. preparation of check listsfor training inspecdon d ining

tests for all nQes d4 n i bhave been prepared. In &cion. con-tinuo~~esearch is k i n g conducted atThe .hnored Shod to find new andh e r ethodsof paining for a m r e dpersonnel and units. and to recom-mend changes in amor docnine andons and equipment.tacticsmde "g.taal?.a.new we a p

~ M w i - F a r R o oThe .Gmorrd Center s the hub of.-\mencan .+mor. From this hub.spokes eadOut in man)- irections-toarmored units in all the coinpopents.

front in Korea. Tbesum ofa l l this ising mar for Armor. a componentof the ighting team standing f d orpeace-

to occupation forcer to the 6ghtingOUT aim o SSUR higw mined Cght-

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In be pas2 few weeks nwvk-goets buvebe- twrrrirrg ont to seea s b o w c a d RioGreude." StawingActw IobnWa F , ti s th most receut of a r i logy of screenepics depictkg tbc Cmdry's part i n tbedewelbpem# of anr c o n n t r s frontier.Teamedd b DWU' aytdsfklcactingi s t& fiffc tow& f \ o h Foras Arecting.T& wb d r& p to a real ccmtributimto #bew m t i t m f tbc&story a d ra-rliriel,of America soldiery, tribute toS o s W of

The Men Who Put theArm in ArmyY may have changed theCavalq to Amor, but noth-

ing can ever erase the greatFtior! ot its heroic pas. And intbc 71 change itself the Cavalry islivhg up to il3 famous heritage.In spte of a he glamour of thendmC ibe Cavalry was never just ananu on W h a he and oldbaa&*caJdkdraped-Tbe.\maicanc hasalwaFbeentrained m fight as tbe drcumavreJdrmanded. Hewasah-ra te infan-cr)man when he had to fight- footand he q u d y pt tbe knack of ar-*. b member of the . k rBrancb,thecm&ynanissure togivetheenany%lln wheek".bd wlnt doa movie rtor h o wlbDut the Caval+ Well, poumightup I'm a cavalqum bp Pofejsian:a veteran" datipgback to he 1870s.You I was a cavalryman in "Fort. I w n ?3 e WOEa Yellow Rib

.Am+ I am n a unique positiondthesuvice Inrny6lmroksI'veb u n in t h e h y . the Naw, the Aixbecn a rieanan m the second Km -tu+ Regimclltof CivilWar days.Ifanyme to ask Aic h branch I10

ban,' mct lamldy m tio Gnnde."tobeabkmcbaosemyfavmitebanch

rht h~rio- rw -

by JOHN WAYNE

choase. all 1 GUY say is "give me myboots and saddle."It's LH) accident that a great pmd u m such as John ord at least threet imschose the Cavalryas he subjectfor great motion pictures. Inselectingthe C a d y he chose a subject withbuilt-in thrilk. and with the dramaand spinetingling action recorded inhistory men like "Light H a ~ e

Swamp Fox,'' of R e v o l ~ warfame: men like Jeb Stuart and hisI - I a n f L e e , w M a r i o a , m

J

civilWar aiders; men like PhilSher-idan and his "Yellow-leg"troopers ofthe Arm):of the West. Hist- hasrecorded&an all: Custer, and Patton.and all those nameless heroes whohelped tomold this coun t r y ' s dean!.IM ~oles as a cavalryman awokeaninterest in this p a t branch of ourArmed Forc t i an interest which ledme toa new appreciatioaof thehaoeswho fought on horseback. Of theArnrs which in a modern anny area d a r i a charged with the duty ot"siscing the Infantry in accomplish-ing itsmission, Cavalryis the only onewhich hasa military history as a self-su9icient fighting force.The rmieswith which theMoslemconquerors, as well asGenghis Khan.carved out their empires were com-posed almost exclusively of CavalryWith the pasing of the of Chir-offirearms, the Cavalry inherited thepride and traditions of the ironcladknights. They developed the tech.nique of utilizing the mobility of Ca \.alry for surpr ise, and its shock powe:fa disrupting the enemy lines. Thewell timed Cavalry charge against 3vulnerable Bank or line became th econventional knockout punchof com-

a b , along with the deveopment$

petent commanden.A RM o I - - ) a r ~ 4 0 h a ~ ,951

Even the sxa l k d bliakneg is* a dLrwncanCi dWar, saemhd,moved bymachines instead of horse-power. supplied with i d ire-

m a e l y r b e c a v * t r t i a d t h e

power, -y speeded up.dtroops wth speed and daring carriedout vital reconnaissance missions intherugged mountainsofCentral Italy.They penetrated ravines and reachedprecipitous mountain peaks inacces-sible- to mechanized troops. The\.gained informationofunmapped traiband roedi which the infan- used inmoving up to surround and captureobpctives.Th e Cavalry has been an impor-tant part of the U. S. forcessince thefirst dragoons of Washington's . h y .Butit was n 1832,when the Sacs andFoxes became restive ab n the Upper hiisissippi,and-emf- wa smaking theArmy famous for its paci-tication measures, that the Caval?reallycametothekoat. After the Warof 1812 the Cavalry had falkn intoth e d scard. Now it was rejuvenatedwith aforceof600mounted ranger^."From then on Cavalry grew to itsgolden age. Carealrywas essential topursue the hard ridin Indians, andf i s t a ~ U Uegiment JciragODns wasdrummed to the cdors, and then asecond regiment.When he new territories of NewJlexico, Arirona, colorado,Nevada,Utah, and Californiacame under theBag, with an army of but 8,000 mento cover and pnuect a vast area, therole of the cavalrywas plain.The 3rd Dragoons marched 2500miles from ~venwor t h .Kansas toOregon, in those days. By 1 8 5 5 thearmy had fiveregimentsof Cavalry oten of infant ry. After the CivilWar.Indian tribes in theWest began againa war of extermination against thewhites. and it was tben that the Cay-a1 7 came into its own. Ten regi-menu. he smkingforceof a smallhu ttough and rigidly disciplined army.were placed in the field. There were3OO.OOO Indians facingGeneral Sheri-dan. who had but 1,200 Cavalry and1.400 Infanv when the campaignstarted.It was this great era of the Cavalrythat John Ford chosl for hispictures..4nd somehow. I feel that it was Ford'smost recent, '%io Grande." that mademe a full4edged cat-alryman.It was early in September of 1 9 4 7ARMOR-Jawmphkumy, 1951

that Ford read aaq- alled Yilission\Vi& X o Record" in the k u r +Erening Post. It wasan amazingandlittle known story of a heroic but un-sung chapter in the cdorful histo? oftheU. S. Cavalry followingtheCivilWar. Ford bought the rights to thestory. and the nset it asidefor the timewhen he could produce a picturebased on the event.The time came when Herbert J.Yates and fohn Ford signed a longterm contract, and Ford chose thisthrilling Cavalry epic for his firstmovie for RepublicStudios.The movement of the filming crew

an d L1m to ibe locatio0 site kmanbkditself. Thim -tu'.)piecesof equipmentmen:. Five horse mrL n;mspatedtwen i \ - h te horn from tloll\umd.and (jo moce b o r w ~ ere &uimx~sPUCtiOo crol' built in io en t ie Jm a d -a h fatFilmingof-6 rade' began onlune IS . 19%: andmcapew rmed;he thrills and rtioa that are a m i .ated with a m i e dcprtrng part otthe histon-4 the Cavalry. S5O.OOOwas spentby Republic on stuntsabne.llmths of p r e l i m esearchpe-Grapdc" a d s p t m n ~ f i r c i n a t -ing hour with Fad rcadmg up onG v d y lore. e m to tbe music fa-Back in 1870. for e x amG h e nPhil Sheridan'soutnumbered cco~pdswaged th e i r fierce banks against theApache and Sioux.the ringing notesof "The Girl I Ldt Behind Me."playedhe lastb thinghe tbeostnuepadand. woulde l h -e

leg" de ta c hmu beud Y tb! pal-loped through stakadeguesafte~be *enem!.But no single historian-kan of all3 movie actor-can put intowards thewhole thrilling of the Cavaln.S o more than an y legislation of Con-gress can ever change the true mean-ing of the word C a r e . Thel\- mayhave taken the word out of tbeArmy:but they11never rake t out a ur his-:or!-.

.I h d nd tmurt d l&UMXU\'CTtranSpnrdcaaKra md Lghangequip

tnrmslummdm. gM c b e s . l - k c o c l .

ceded tbe actual fiknrng d 'Rio

v d cav. t \men of tbe

11

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. . . GlwNo PUCE TO NEW

- -

i

FOR AwdoR-A NEW INSHIAOn January 3, 1951, he De-mentof theArmy approvednew in-signia, b d olor, guidon and

B d nder the provisions oftbeArmyOtgidzatioa Act of 19%Annor becamea coatiauuioa of tbe covrlry.Tbe Atmor hs@h (see cover) isa f t o a t view of an M-26taok (original versionof the Pattoo tank) with the gun slightly

The oficers' insignia is theo v a d height. Thenli.arrl irrripninwill be the same, d u c dinsize for wearonaoaeincb disk.Yellow, flw color of theCnvtlry, will be the Armor Branchcolor. Guidons will be yellow, with green insignia, letters and

n d ap braid forThe Department of the Army announced that new insigniawill not be available for sometime. In themeantime,personnel

authorized continued use of present standards and guidonsARMOR is pleased to see this important question settled.It is another step in the professiorul groundingof thebranch;for reprerentPtiveiusignia are somuch a part of all-impomimtidentity-aot only through tangiblemarking of the trade, butin the more intangible matters of mission, morale and esprit.

cap braid colon for the Armor

r r i a d , d S U ~ p o s e d ~ t W O d C a o l r y s a b e n i n ~-sual OIlfliPeith -f go1Toloredp* med, 13/16of an inch hpersoonelwill be yellow.

are outhorited to w- present insignia Tbe Army has a&ountil such time as replacement isMcess;uy.

A N D A R T I L L E R YAt the same time that Armor wasgetting its new insignia, the Ad-lery received a new one, n a sense.Under the provisions of the ArmyOtgmhtioo Act, the Field Arril-. lery, Cora A r t i l l e r y and Antiair-craft Arrillcry brnnches were amsolidad into one, to becometheArtilltryBranch.Tbesingicbranchwillraainthe"aossedfieldguns" imigniawhich bas been used by Field Anillery formore tbnn 100 ears. Thebranch color is thed a d d-lery s a c k ,* carlet guidcms carrying ye l low insignia,leaenrradnumaak ~ b r a i d l l s o i s s c a t l e c .

12

IN ME HANDS OF TROOPS" We are preparing tbe apacicy to prod- 35- crnla ayear. W e re not now ordering dnat many, a d e hope dnatwenever bve tq but we mean tok able to turn them out if

we need tbem"nus spoke tbe President of tbe united stace in his teantS t a t e O f t h e U n i o a ~

anb (T/42) are 00 ardcr with Amtricur L4xanoave works.of poops they will put additional b.drboat intr, tbe Unitedare holding up their end in good style, not by dnim, butthrough-mps " oureyes arefd0 the ait end of tb e assemblyline. whetearethoserpnLsgoing?wbntrmiowi l lga than?Aftsfdleaitid LKeb of any f m t of tbat moment are mcc,

Tketankpmgfamispmgeshg. LighrmaksCT/ll)areono d a with t b c .Cd i k Dividoa of Geoerrl Motors MediumHavy tanks (T/43) are on order witb

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U.S. airborne noopson the Contentinp a r a t r o o p e r slanded near Caen, the invasion Beetwas bringing the main body of the.Ued armies to the shores of Nor-mandy. Tbe assault convoys, afterturning back for the day's r t p o n e -memt, reassembled during t morn-ing of 5 June and sailed again for thetransport areas 22,000 o 23,000 yardsoff the French coast in the Bay of theSeine. Behind mine sweepen whichcleared andmarked ten lanes hroughold enemymine fields in the Channel.the hu convoys, under constant airum~& ofwter squadronseying at3.000 to 5,000 feet, made an unevent-ful voyage unmolested by the enemy

Tbe weather was still cause for- the -a ff""wind blowing from the west at fi teento twenty knots produced a moder-ate ly choppy sea with waves in mid-Channel of fr omfive to six feet inh i n h t . nis was a heaw sea for the

eithrby airorrea.

-

W Vessels, though &ere the wind didnotd fteen knots and th ewaves averaged about three eet. Visi-bility was eightdes with ceilings at10OOO to l2.000 feet. Scattered cloudsfrom 3.000 to 7,000 feet covered abou tr.s. rmv

half the sky over the Channel a tH-hour, *g denrer hrtht in-land Coaditionsinsbortwercdifti-cult though tolerable for both navaldndairfonxs.Most serious were the limitationson air operati'ons. H a w bombers as-signed to hit th e4 &tionsstruments t h w g h the overcast. Wit hconcurrence of Gencral Eisenhowerthe Eighth .4ir Force ordered a &li berate delay of several seconds n its re-lease of bombs n order to insure thatthey were'not dropped among the as-sault craft. Th e result was that th e13.OOO bombs dropped by 329 B-24bombers did not hit the enemy beachan d coast defenses at all but were scat-tered & far as three mile inland.hledium bombers visually bombingUTAH Beach defenses from a lower al-um& had slightly better results. al-though about a third of all bombs ellseaward of th e high-water mark andmany of the sekcted targets were notlocated by pilots. Of 360 bombers dis-patched by I X Bomber Command,293 attacked UTAH Beach defensesand 67 ailed to release their bombsbecauseof the overcast. On the wholethe bombing achieved little in neu-tralizing the coastal fortifications.

AnchaedMobAt about 0230 he Bayfield. head-quarters ship for Task Force U RearAdm. Don P,Moon) and VI1 CorpsX a j . Gen. J. Lawton Collins:.dropped anchor in the transport area

otf UTAH Beach. Twenty minuteslater the Ancon, Bagship of .AdmiralHall and the head uarters ship forTask Force 0 and S C op . reachedthe O I ~each transport area. Un-loading of assault troops into theLCVP's that would take them to thebeaches began.Up to this point there had been vir-tually no enemy reaction. The Ger-man radar stations still in operationhad failed to pick up either the air orth e sea approach. Because of badweather Admiral Krancke had no pa-trol boats in the Channel during thenight, nor did he order them out afterhe heard of the airborne landings.Tidal conditions would not permitt hem to leave the hboa before day-light and, besides, Krancke was stillnot sure that a mapr attack was in'o&reJs shortly afm three o'clodt,

at Beach had to bomb in-

L ~er,N d ommmrdtr Nor-ARMOI-Jan~-Febmay, 1951

-Yr rponednghnng-k rgec n f t t y l n g s o m c s e v e n m i l a ~ t h eingk sharp dehicion of tbeartent ofa r o s t n o r t h o f P o r t ~&a i o . Thknews in conjunction with an imcas-&e airborne landings, at last con-\-ince!dAdmral Krancke that he wasmnfronting a krgcrale anding. H egave such orders as he could. TbeN ' e nmr Defense Forus were to pa-trol th e coastal waters; the Londrirtsubmarhiesw m o be alerted; the 8t hDcJtrpyer Flotillp was to mor-e upfrom Rapan to B m t : the 5thTorpedoh t lorillrr was to teconnoiter theOrnee znur~ ; and the 9th Tor-pedo- i u u was to p a m l ocfC a p d e l a H a g U e . Thetorpedoboatsof the 5th Flotilh left Le Havre at0430.but an hour ou t of port t h vmet six .Ulied warships escortedby 15at th e .Wed vessels. the malf"d""er -to 20 destroyers After firing toman boats were attacked rom the air.They succeeded in driving OB he at-tackers with antiaircraft fire. but thenhad to return toLe H a w e to replenishtheir load o r nd ammuni-tion. Two t o boat Bo& recon-noitering out of Cherbourg weref o r d by hea\~.seaso return to portat dawn. This vk tua l l y concludedGerman naval activity for the day.=Mmiral Krancke wrote in his dia?"It was only to be expected that no ef-fective blow could be suuck at such asuperior force." He madeplans howeveG to attack the .AlliedBeet that night.German4 atteries began spo-radic firing at 0535. or only fifteenminutes before Allied naval bombard-ment opened prearranged counterbat-tery fire. Projectiles from .Ulied bat-tleships and cruisers and d e s t q e r scontinued to thunder over the beadsof the troops making the final run-into shore until a f ewminutes before:he touchdown. Beach drenching wasthen-taken up by the clore-supportcraft. Although the rime schedulewent generaUv lccordin to plan onboth .U beaches tfe volume offirc laid down m vital targetswas con-siderably less at 0 than expected.>lost enemy coastal defenses were

sittdtooonrtbcbeacbesntbcrthnfaedaracc?lcdfromobgn-ldoat b e o e ? i p p o r b a . ~ w c r e r b a r -f r om t h e r e adwmcar r s p ood -ingly liiacdt to hit Tbr btrhd m u b l n g s s a n s ~ a J h \ rm i s v d i t s t u g c o r a pe~ocnugeof&rak eom& %rmuL.Naval gun6re ccupkd with tbe airbombudmcnt.k a . ad 0Oc im-wasnot at fim apparent to thed-in aoopsTbeGcrrmnsaedittbe.& bombanimmt witla b v i n g tix-onatedlugcmipc 6 e l d u a s o n whichtbey counted h i i y to bar the at-LLed out many of the ddrndinp

poN"tdFcctu o!tA4nABoch W h r h

t a c h rom penetrating lnLad be-meal the infamry strong points Pre-ratory fire seems also to haverocket pits. But it was supportinsnaval punfire af-ter H-hour whichmade the substantial contribution tothe battle. in neutrahng key strongpoints. breaking up counmttacl.wearing down th e defenders, anddominating the assaultarea.

MCapbIn the \.TI Corps zone the 4th b-vision

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ion of ;he regiment was at f i r s desig-mted as &-ision rescn'e w pas tod v i o n c o n tr ol i n the vicinity ofTnrquer.de. By the late Xlay changeofplan. followingthe alteradon of the&me missions. the ba&n wasinstead re- to rrgimrnral conaotand the 12th Infantry was assignedth e additional mLdon of seizing acsosgpg over the \lerderet at le PortBtehay ) ~ nouth- of . rhe regi-ment's main o b j j e rea. One regi-ment .

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C.S. Arm7Sere of the mamy. Sokiierr move from craft to tbeir 'rbole horizon of war."smal l-anns he'took toll of about w ethirds of Company -+ and more thanhalf of the Ranger company beforeany reached the com parative shelter ofth e sea wall or the base of the cliff. Ofthe sixteen tanks cheduled to land inthis sector just ahead of the infantry.only eight sunived enemy artillery toreach the shore. -41 ad been broughtin on LCTs as 116th Infant? officersdecided the sea was tca rough tolaunch the DDs.In rhe eastern part of the 116th In-fant? zone the initial landings hadnot gone much better: a 1,000yardgap separated the troops who toucheddown there from the remnants of thetwo companies on the right. The wocompanies of tanks that landed firstwere brought in on L-s withoutlosses. This initial success was notshared by the infantry. Only two ofthe three companies of the 2d B a d -ion. 116th Infantry. landed within theregimental zone. One of these com-panies low a quarter of its men toenemy 6re durin the forty-five min-utes which it too hem to cross thebeach to the protection of the sh inglebank. Th e emainder had better luckin landing in front and just west ofles lloulins where the bluff was obs c u d by smoke fires and enemy firewas sporadic an d inaccurate. Eventhe!se men were sommhat disorgan-ited and the& bo sunivedwith them were confused by tbeknowledge that they had landed eastof their designated beacha.

The experience of the 16th Infan-try on the left Bank of the divisionduplicated that of the 116th. as scat-tered landings and hea\? casualtiesleft the first boat sections incapable ofundertaking their primary assault mis-sions. In th e 16th'~ one. however.one soft spot was discovered. Fourboat sections of the 2dBattalion. 16thInfantry, landing benveen the St.Laurent and Colleville exits. crossedthe beach with only two casualtiesfrom enemy fire. Th e local defense ofthis sector of the beach was the Co lle-dl e strong point. which was plannedas three mutually suppom n resist.fied position atop the bluff midwayk e e n he two draws was unoccu-pied in Februa? 1W and seeminglyremained unoccupied on M y . Ap-parent German negligence that leftthe beach northwest of Collevillewithout immediate defense was bal-anced at first by Allied ill ortune inlanding so few men there. Exce t forthose four boat sectionsof t he J B a t -talion the first wave of the 16th In-fantry (Compank E nd F) toucheddown immediately in front, or east, ofthe occupied fod ca tio ns of theColleville strong point an d was therecaught in machinegun 6n as intenseas hat which decimated the 116th In-fantry. Many of he men of CompanyE, hard hit and exhausted in their ef-forts to wade ashore, Bopped on t h esand and crawled inaheadof the tidenearly balf of them did not survive.A IMOI - J anu~ - f . kwy , 1951

ance nests. Of these the tied forti-

theecaureD ofankshe andwampingmmediatef mostnemyfdesrmt i onof five at the company ofmediums beached from L c T s , the16th Infantry had initially only athird of the planned armor support.Thosetanks vailabk went into actionon th e beach between the St. Laurentand Colh -ille exits.

FWlbQtbDE0UbThe heay losses and disorganiza-tion of the first wave had repercus-sions on each d i n g wave

through the morn'tralizememy beach def- was theinability of the 6th Special EngineerBrigade and naval demolition partiesto blow gaps n thebeach obstaclesasplayed a hand in hindering themgi-neen ftomaccomplishmg their mis-sion. Half the demolition t eam weredelayed n landin and only a third ofthem touched L n thei r a pcamed eastward by the coastal NT-rent, the 116th Infantry one receivedsubstantially less than the scheduledeffort. But enemy 6re a b ook aheaw toll of both men and equiment. Of sixteen bulldozers on&three cod d be put into operation onthe beach.-and one of these was pr evented from maneuvering freely b.riflemenwho sheltered behind it. . . .The second group of assault waves,consisting of five separately timedlandings, was to compiete the build-upof the two assault regiments H-plus-1-hour and bring in the 81stChemical Battalion, two ombat engi-neer battalions whose principal taskwould be to clear mine fields for theadvance inland, naval shore fire con-trol parties, and adv ance elements of. artillery, medical, and antiaircraftunits. In the zone of the 116th Infan-try the remaining three companies ofthe 1st Battalion were to come in be:hind Company A on the right. Onthe left the heaq weapons companyof the 2d Battalion u'ouM land tocomplete that unit and would be fol-lowed by the 3d Battalion.Th e right Bank, however, contin-wd to be an area of particular mis-fortune. Only r a t t e d sections ofthe reinforcing unitsmanaged to landthere and they were hi t by the samedesrmctive fire that had virtuallyknocked Compvly A out of he battle.ARMOR - J o l l ~ ~ - h b r v ~ ,951

first serious &ea of%Y+*allure toTheeu-

planned. W e a h condi t ions also

pointed secton. s ince the rest were

Tbe battalion badquarvrscpmpan) .including the beachmaster for the InBanaion sector. landed at the base ofth e cM west of the riHe cornpan-and under such severe7 mall-arms fire that it was unable to movecompany. ramred and hard hit onthe approach. taA tw o houn o assem-ble survivors. It salvaged onb threem ~ t t a r ~ .hr ee machine guns. and afew rounds of ammunition. Onh onecompan: of the I w Battalion survitedas an organized group capable of pu rring its asyuh missions. This wasCompany C. krhich mislanded 1.ooOyards east o cr laMtd b e r h w i th inthe area oc thc L u ~ s . c o v d . thesmokeof a brusb he. With few casu-alties and quipwnt xinually intact.the company waded m on a front ofnot more than a hundred yards andreorganized in the shelter of the seawall.Sext to land in the 116th zonewere the Rangm. Tbe 5th RangerBattalion togFther with two com-panies of the 2d Rangers had waitedo&re for neux of the assault on

Poiite du Hoe.which would deter-mine whether they landed there orcame in on the 116th Infantr). zone.The Pointe du Hoe assault, however.had been delayed f o q minutesby theeastward driftin of themftc a m i n gthe Rangers. TL as therefon nonews at all. amd the Ranger reinforce-ments. concluding that the assaultmust have failed, proceeded with the

mosf of the day. Th e heaw weapons

dtcmative plan. Tbe5th Ran k Bat-d i o n fdbmd c op l pm y c. 116thInfantry, and shued tbe rciatireky saul t in landing am fa r aa.But the m m companies of tk 2dRanger Battalioname n about w kplanned on th e firrsrprp right %adbehind ckments of Gmpania ..\ a dR. O n l y beru-eena thud and a halfof the hr-o65-n companies urvivedto take shelter at the head of th ebeach.In the 2d Battalion zone. the secondwave bmught in the he?\? ueaponscompan! and banzlion headqaarvrr-Company H sufFered such losses anddisorganization that it could be of lit-tle immediav help m suppking mor-tar or machine-gun support. The bat-talion ranmurdcr. Maj. S i ..Bingham. Jr.. coming ashore near b\foulins. organ& a few secfjons ofCornpan\. F whKh bad landed in thefirst wave and attempted an anault ontheenemyposkiominthcdran. Thattempt made with cn+ a handful ofmen was Llmuaxdd. bu t in themeantime th e 3d Battalion was l and-boundary just east of les h l d n s . Itwas somewhat disotganitcdb.&e in-termingling of units but suffered littlefrom enemy h e n crossing t k each..4x th e end of the first hour th e116th I n f a n e had at least a nucleusof force whic h could be organized foranack against the enemy's beach posi-roughly in the center of the regi-

ing buncbed up astride tbe regimental

tions. .\lost hopefulwas the situacion

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nd i owaeda t r o yedo t u s chs . Fw-t b a m a e i n t h e t b c ~ o f t h emixed unis Wh i c h WQC UDdakaVy6 r e inw mw pbc ~heir mcn huddkdah!qtheohingleembenlmvlrtat seawail and p e r a l l y shaken by theshock of the first few minutes of se-MCaction, twouldhave been m pdble for any CWILmaDdet todcontrol over more than a small groupof on a relatively narmw rc torofthefrontIn tbesc 6xst few hours on OWAHABeach, the OVEB~DBDperation facedits graves crisis. L)epnved of the ex-weather and praxckdby a +yi n e k t i v e beach d m x h n g , the 1stDivision had pne in against tbe OMsectorof tbeNoanandyw hat hadanvthin l ikethewofcOrdOnde-counted on to hold and smash theA l l i e J o n t h e b e d ~ ~ .nsteadofat -tacking in the s+or of one regimentof an overextended sotic division as-expected, General Huebners mopshit on the ront ofa full atrack infan-ay division. the3Std,whose p min thecoosta z o n e h a d k c n miacd byAllied intelligenceeven thaugh t hadbeen in place for almost threemanths.To he German officer in commandof the forti6cations at Pointe et Rat delaP e d e t looked in these first hoursas t h g h the invasion had beenstopped on the beaches. He nw dthat the .-\mencans were lying on theshore seeking cover behind the obsta-

pectcdairouppanbyaccidentot

W L & Manbal Ranmcl

.-

+ hat ten anks anda -great manyother vebicks were burning. Theh eof hisown positionsand he aaillery.be had been accellart, =us-

c a n dBenjamin B. Talky, the a%istanteral Gaow what he d d b s m e ofthe p r o p s of the landings Obser-vation was ditcult,and 011 the wholecobaelTalky refrained from eport-mgmerePeJSimism. However, he hadorpintion. He couid see that thek?.E)la were januned with infantry-men and that enemy art3lery andrnachintgun fire was s t i l l &ective.Hesent amega% to&a t &ea about0930. What particularly c o n c e r n e dhim was the fact that reinforringwa v e were being held up by he con-tinued enemy oppobition and theLCTs were milling around o&horelk ua stampeded herd of cattle, al-though some of the more daring com-maDdm took their craft into th e hailofaKmyhreandbeachedthem. Thissituation semed toTall7to continuewitbout alleviationuntilmidmorning,and it was the situation conveyed toGmealsGerowand Bra*Already, however, as Talley sentforward hi discouraging repom. the

ing Mot0 l,oO0pprdro&borr, a.chictOf~OfVcorps ,radiocdGar-

to reportsowthing of the vident dis-

F O R THC AU S Of PEACE

a sis was bit by bit dissolving. h gth e p p s of scared, tired ri&lwnhuddled alon the beach were a fewandnwepidrivates on wbase individualbacks the bi responsibility at the mczment lay. h e v bcgan by exampkand exl~~rtarion~torod the men toget u , eave such poor shelter as heyhad pound, and walk or crawl acrossthe beach Bat in d up the hills wheretbe enemy was dug in with rifles,mortars,and m a c h uns. From helarger p e r he combinedweight of ed ams was graduallvdown th e deknders. -I-&916thp e g i m t in the center of the352d Doision sector, while reportingthat the landingsbad been fruarated,added that its own casualties u*eemounting c W y rom the heavy Al-lied naval fire and that consequentlyreinforcements were needed. Rein-f0-q ~ W U ,ould C H ) ~ m-mediately be spared since they weremuch more ugmtly needed eke-W h a t .Tbe gavest immediate threat forth e Germans arose to the east of VCo wbae tbe British aJsault-crack-ed~gh+eco oJ t - i n -places during the first few hours. TheBritish second Army attacked withthree divisions abreast under controlof 1 and 30Carps. Immediately onthe Bank of the Amcrioan attack, theBritish 50th Divisim landed two in-

L.IICOIIIS,

theantxyth rigadesrmouredur edhunko figade and assault

teamsof the i 9t h . G m o u d Divis ionand the 47th Royal Marine Corn-mando. The wops touched down a pproximately on time at 0x5.Oppoutionas beat? at certainpoints. but om the ahok it was muchless determined than at OMAHA. Inthe 50th Division zone k Hamel.strongly defeud ed by the 1st Bud-ion, 916th Regimrrrt, resisted untillate in the d+. T o he east.however.the British hisions left brigadest rucka soft spot in the German de-fenses. The trong point at la Rivitrrheld ou t only a few h n nd whenit fell at about loo0 its defenders, the*lst On &nolion, attached to &e716th Dia.ision, b d e and pulled out.leavingthemad toBayeux open. Thisdevelopment, however, was notknown to theBritish. Opposition con-tinued to be-reported outh of Buhot.at Ryes, St. Sulpire, and Summer-vieu. It was always difficult in thedistinguish enemy delaying-actionfrom major o position or to &roverw h m thehOEs were in the Germandefense. Tk 50th Division. more-over, d ll had only its assault forcesashore. Rising ti& had prevented ef-fective clearance of underwater o bstacles Enemy opposition and minesdelayed the opening of beach exits.Caught in the d t i n g c on ge sti on .the two ollow-upbrigades of the 50thDivision were two hours late in land-ing.When they did arrive, they foundtheir assembly areas still no( entirely

early stages of the assault properly to

cleared of enem\. Ekmcnts of rk3jzd Dirisiorr. in fact. were d nthe hkuvlim ndgc after rmddt\.From hcccrmUr point of s-&&crumbling of the *lst Orr Rrmal;mwasadtobeplu&atoacl .mmebut Tk915J1Reginmu reinforred LXMUIC q sreme: had been srationed ncar B.?eus and had often pr ac c id just tbcmaneu\pI rn r e q ~ - c o u n t e r -thrust. toward Crepon. But earlicr inthe morning (at 0400 the 9 1 3 1 hadbeen ordered to tk Carenran-lsiqnyarea to attack reponed lenemy airborne landing between theIire and h v e ivers The repmwas discmered to be unfounded atjust about tbe time th e hole in the-16rh Dia-ision opened up. h t .end with having his who& rightflank rolled up, Generalkutnant Diet-rich Kraiss. the commanding generalof th e 3 W ia.isi0n. ss~dm-papproval fa he mum of the 915t hRed-r. But an bow was consumedtq-ing o reach the regiment. Then ithad to countermarch a h wentymiles from a int nearly five milesmarch was made partly on6 anlyby b+k and French motor vehicleswhich SUMllllYrW mabanicalbreakdowns. .GKltber thee barspasred before even a parion of theunit was in position to attack. Thathoursmuch happened to chvlge thesituationon OMAHA compktety.

. Iy critical. Tbe gap

west of the r2t de celisv. Thedelay pm-ed cnrinl. for in thav

v

I

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s u m &

against blows in8icted upon himby hisadrenary is an instinctiven a x s s i ~or the fightin man.Going badt to ~finerva%egod-dess of ancient widam. we 6ndher depictednot only carrying alancebut takin shelter under ah e kandsll2LasdWith improvement in arma-ment. however. Shia kcamebreastplates, hen armor, and asa result man loa all his agility.ficient-for him OD handle hisw t o p abne So th h ecame to his rescue and fa enturies s t d d a d knightspondem+ hurkd thrmdoa at me another. But theovQIoDdedh i n tsturn nbo bn iomobilicp.erpecl?llp

011 rough terrain. In 1415 knighbmd heard its knelld t ,+zincow where it was unable to escape thearrows a the amhas of theKingof Engknd. nd a few22

His suemgth was no longerd-

years later h e appearance of early firearms completed itsruin. From that time on, instead of protecting him, theb ig h t ' s armor marked him out for the b lo w of his OPponent. This ame m isfortune is threatening today's tank!Terrorsnicken by the e6icienc).of artillery-as we areby the devastatioIlJ of th e atom bomb-our ancestorsthought only of digg ing t heud ves into trenches, or oftaking helter behind fortifications. It requireda Sapoleonto be bold enough to declare that battle on the open fieldwould defide the fate ot a campaign.-h rst his successes were overwhelming but balance

was rescored as soon asNapoleon's foes earned to imitatehim-and so came Leiprig, then Waterloo. T he nine-teenth century vainly endeavored to upset this balance.In 1914 again. opposin g armies continued to struggle andwear t h d v e s out in vain. They had no choice but todie face to face, in front of their barbed wire entangle-ments. beaten down by increasingly powerful and accuratefiring.

Later when light engines made possible the creation ofa i rm f t and tanks. rnaneuv&ng regained its value. Em -ployed en masse, the tank turned Foch's might). 191&of-fensives into victories.Hitler understood this esson. He built up the tool of hisrevenge-the tank, escocted by lanes, and supported bys e l f - p y uns. Like Napo&on.he h e d f subduing umpe; like him again, he succumbed after the.Ulies had finally gathrrd strength enough to upset 'him.1945-Berlin-that was yesterday. Then came Hiro-shima! And there have been many ocher equally terrifying inventions since then. Will the tank be compelled todisappear, like the Adncourt knight, werwhelmed by im-provemeus in weapons specially designed to combat it?It wll not if it canadapt iwlf,as Napoleon did. throughthe resources a modern science.In order toscout tolMCI0w.s maneuver, we must learn tomake full se of all currently available means-elecmdonesk radar, kstaning po5b, elevision, etc.), air poweraxxi panisan comber, ofcourse, and armoreddetails actingwith kibility, speed and daring. A nu mb a of fightingvehicles should be enough to achieve that aim. In orderto be fast, they should be ight, ten to twelve tons shouldbe enough. They should probably be mulawheeled rather

A R M O I - J ~ ~ U ~ - F & U ~ ,951

tban full tracked &ides. in orda to ensue a high stra -tegicmobil iryonroahs. Thcysbouldbe uippbdtri thmunications.=L for the bank, it mi l l be &e only if k mains m h g fomsare erful enough to immediat& tip thebalance in their a*=. The heavy tank veq- smngl!armed and co(ectcd. must be this irrrsirribk ekmau onbehalf ofw L h a ll t he other fighting units will combinetheir etforts. Sothing must be in a position to stop &eixmoving forward-neither torpe dobm ber planes.nor gpns.nor bezooiras normines. This m e a n s itm w e a veritebkmobile forwss. Its weight will probably reach a very bghfigure. perhaps I 0 0 or 150 tons. Under such conditions.research should be immediately initiated. in order to d etermine the technical and tactical requirements it willhave to meet-probably a nuclear energy engine-an assetwhich would replace gas supplies, unfeasible under oom-bat conditions; strategic transport in several distinct lad,.to be reassembled only when tactical use is decided u .the most powerful possible annament against aeriarbwell as ground threats, etc. . . . These v q eat? tankwill be ditkult to build. They will be very expensive.Only th e industrial powers H i l l be in a position to affordthem.On the other hand it mil1 not be necessaq to have agreat many of these tanb available. It will suftice that theenemy be in no their devastating ad-vance, and even ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ i no position todo so..A few elephants were su&ient for Hannibal to cross the=U ; few guns or Charles M I 1 o conquer Italy:a fewli$ a d ehicles for Hitler to achieve the . k h l u s sand a few tanks again forPatton to give the W e h h ta final blow.Th e tank will sunive, but only if it can adapt itself toconditions. To his end w e must follow nature's exampleand produce an "ensemble" embracing the aggressive nim-bleness of the small tiger and the overwhelming bulk ofthe huge elephant, ranging fromlight vehicles useful forscouting missions to powerful tanks strong enough toforce a victor)..

Y a y high grade means of detection cfot&nes mims.tank etc. . . ) and of long and shat range radio com-

p"

LT.Ga. EAN LOUISToum Du VI-.

0 0 0

The writer of the following, a graduate of th e Rqvol.Military College, scmdkunt,England, was commissiorrdin 1928mrd posted 00 the 7thLight Cmd? of the IndianA m y . In World War11he served asboth stpff +er andunit commrmder n Eritreu, Abyssinia, theWcstm nes-ert, and Burma, where he was the fifst lndirm to com-mand an mnored un i t in action. Since the war he bmSCrvQi in French IndeChino, lava and M e a . F&-i n g a u e d a n a in 1947at the I n a p e d afrnsc C a g e nStaff. SinceM q f 1948 he kpfcommanddIrrdio'r FimAnncrrad Dioision, accept for a sevd-mnuh paiod inlore 1948asMil;tca?,Governor of H ~ d c m b o d tate.M M O R - J a n u m y ~ , 1951

London, her- to lndioand the Am y H

1 W like tocoafipc this d k 0 tmds in tbc 01-p isa t ion of uman s t rmght be in cuunois rhich arewmi-devebpd iadustru l \. . d a q p & a t I ! D , m ~ -iions. Trcnds in fbemore hlgld!dcwkpcd couaaia arc lh?under mi- and fbGIgil tbacismuch argument. thue is alsomuch unanimity.F i r u l ~ .fa the tank i d .That the gun it Mjes is themost imponant fanuc of aDTa d ehicle lms l)rvstbc better the performance ofkcn lppurnt. Un-b.the gun. the heavier within ccr-rain l imrr~ t must be. T h i snaturally conditions he rest of

1 - he tank. Despiv crmin dis-advantages with regard tc,weight. the tendency n thecountries I h t ustnot be to sacrificegun perfwmance in the intercas of Over-all weight. -4s ar as possible. e v ~ actor must besubordinated to getting the best gun possible. Oacc h shas been obtained, he designermust thinkof threethings.The powerweight ratio, simplici? in use and ease olmaintenance. In the type of countq over which the u n Lwill have tooperate. it seems hat &g lessthan wen?horses oeach ton will+ut6ce. if it is to have an y perform-ance at all. If complicated in use. the t ~ w s al-. andprobably w i l l not use the re6nements correctly. The a-pense will thus not be jsti6ed. If it is d & d t to main-tain. and this is consideringmaintenance in all forms fromfield maintenance to factop- repair. the numbas on theb a t t l d d d will fall quickly.Secondly. there is the question of whether there shouldbe one tank. tw o typesof tank or a n-pe for m q urpose.Here again. the trend should be towards simpliciv. tcm-pered with reasan. \vbaer-er it fights. theamour must beprepared to desno). the enemy ,tank. t3 su port itsminfantry and to exploit succfss. These will Ke itse-roles. I f t hegun i s a su i t ab l eoned thehandbgo f t hea m s correcf m e tank should be able to do thsetasks. But, the roles that would fall to the vmaped carin highly developed anmaies. roles that will ioclude usein bade as well as use in c i d Will q u i r ea lighter tank. for wbeels don't carrp you very far w k ethere is no roed. Pahaps th rend.will be towpds tspon-pes but rationalised as far as possible.Thirdly. theorganisation. T h e mirm that an a m m u dformation is really a c lmly knit group of al l arms becomes even mer in semi+eloped a wt r i e s . To makeany pragress at a& the armavsupponsdby theinfauq.or \iceversa, and both supported by artillery, is imperativeinallsages. The t radmus tk t owardsanevmdos e r -knit Ocgnnisariocl;not only cbser knit but moRamlplctWhere there s onlv one road, a n d irision s ~ ~ n gabng two hu.idrcd miks of it is not only waaeful butmiIimry absurd. Tk rend must be toward eIiminatingover inwana as rrgards ammunitiorr and fuel;toensLmthat every man has a worthwhile bank task to aispmscw i t l l a l l l -d m tbatevervv&ideisessenaial.is of the carrect y e , s&g &'right load and is inthe right place. Whac possible the nfantry must uavel

23

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satbetanks. Inthisagaaisltion.thewadmwdjobetowards an inatst in &e power of the aon-armouredmore self depldmtborh in l n r k and r.emporaq defence.Funher. in scmi&vebpsd countries, dirrlnrff will begreater. uansponwll move slower and clallltier will be.come a p t e r problem.Thed ill be towards a muchclojer h n ith the air arm. both operationally and ad-minisaatively.

Eiaally. while keepingan eye always on the ideal. th-.wbole crend of thou& on organisation must be to qet theSesr out of ~cx~aLi.here must be a realistic outlook ai:o w'br is3ndwharcan hed e vailable. The d v w nmust not k ovcr or undecestinutad, while the tasks setmust be in confomir)- with capabilities.

cm q x xm l f s 6rc p owa of the tlpe that will make them

>f q. EN.. s.HACIDHUN.0 0 0

It wou ld be futile o forrcast the future nend of a m u rorganitation without knowing what is in the minds of thegeneral su& f both theCommunist and Western groupsof nations. Sot having this OC-cult power I can only render afew a opinions.However. he uture trend oforganizationwill depend largelyupon three basic fundamendswhich have exercised consider-able iduence in the past andpresent organizations of dnnourformations.These hree fundamentals arethe prejudice. design and tacri-cal conception.Inconnecrion with rhe above.it is well to consider some of theimportant lessons of the past. so..ll.'.-far as it concerns tbe 1 ~ e s t . k u p s ~f nations. The

tank came intobemg in the first wor ld war under the mostadverse circumstances possible. It was the ;\dmiralt). andnot rheU-ar046~hat gave the fint impen" o a weaponthat w w k l prove vital to victary on land. .\t the conclu-d m C *&S war. moa of the eminent sddiers of the timealkvwed the orrbodm views of the m i b ~ierarchv tocreate a saoag and rink prej& against annour. E&rtswere made to remOVe r at least paral?te this illegitimate24child of the amy .

A few men, such as Fulkr and Liddcll Hart, wereanumg the fa- advocates of mechanization and ar-m, ut theirs were voices in thewilderness,and for theBecause of this prejudice, design in the armoured fight-ing vebichs and their arud iarieJ lagged behind thore of

OUT rsnnrhile enemies. Therewexe one or two shortspurtstoward the tactical organization potential, but these wereihor: lived. All of this had a profound effect upon :hetrend and developmentof armOur and the older tank menof the time were forced into the position of appeasementin accepting any design or organization as being betterthan nothing. We, herefore, entered the Second U'orldN'ar with fighting vehicles that were undergunned.under-powered nd undex-armoured. Sot did we at anytime overtakeour enemies in this field other than having apreponderance of numbers.The three fundamentals mentioned above are still vi-tally important in the trend of armour organizations.Prejudice. There is evidence that this old prejudice ofthirty years is not yet dead despite many outstanding les-sons of the !%and World War. In the past this prejudicemay have been basedon ignorance and the fear that ar-mour would weersede more favoured arms. Today thereis no such excuse. But un ess a very clear concept of ar-moured potentiaLexisg it may well be that the futurewend of organization will be as spotty, as unsound as itwas in the past.Design. T o o w everlasting shame as nations of g m ttechnical potential we never did produce an amour4vehicle capable of matchingthe best our enemy had. Th edesigners were not entirely to blame, but many of th eeminent men of this fieldcould not or would not producewhat the fighting man wanted. There was a large gapberween the actual fighter and the designer. Nore oftenthan not. the policy of desi was dictated from a level 50interpret the views of the fighting soldier. .%Ixample ofhi s is the well meant policy of producing the universalmli.The modern trend of design appears to be more in thedirection of creatu re comfort^ and gadgetv. The armgurfighting vehicle should be built around the gun; it shouldbe simple and expendable. Th e Russians have done thisand so ca n we.Tactical Concept. The tactics of armoured formationsmust be based on the characteristics of the prime vehiclewithin that fonnation and should not be unduly intlu-mced by the tactics of other arms. One of the prime f unc-tions of an am ur ed formation is the breakthrough ande.xploitation: in other words, mobility and mancame.Therefore,air and armour have a natural affinitv. In con-sequence the tactics of hese two arms should be developedto the highest degree of &iency.Organidon. It is my opinion that an armoured forma-tion should contain no elements incapableof crossauntFperformance. In the last war our armoured divisions con-tained a v e q small war head of afmoufedvehicles with along tail v d mft belly of wheeled transport. U'hen inmarch route formation it occupied upwards of 20 milesof road space. There is still not much change. An ar-moured division should be a tacticalformationdesigned tofightandcontainonly thebate minimum of administrative

mostpartwent*

high that it could not, unrr any stretch of imagination,

ARMO I - l a n v - f ~ h w , 951

andm lyekmcnp. T bi sL nc r i sbn rnpL a dunde c~rpaPR-, I believe it incorrsa to mix amoweddivision s h o u l d ccmuin a suirablghalanceof actilk? aadinfantry, the last named being heavy in fire p e r ndtrained to fight with the annoured elements.I believe that tactical air groups should be trained tofightwtharmoured fbnnationsascombat team,. Sor is#tunreasonable to suppose that air reconnaissznce. and evensupply upon occasiaa, is impracticable. T here arem3.yIf the present conaict develops into a more open s t w -gle, we will be competing againa a manpower army. thebulk of which will be well trained and Masonably wellequipped. In the t when we have faced large nun-power armies they a e , for the most pan, been equippad

with tter weapons have been able to be victorious. Isuggest, therefore, that ou r key to the future is not tomatch man for man, but develop our technical and me-chanical efficiency, and from this create tactical rechqiquesof our own rather than those of our enemy.

and infantry divisionr into thesame Gtpr Aa vmoured

lessons to s u p p his belief.

with rimitive weapons,and in consequence small forcesLA h ] . GEN. .F.WORTHXWXON.0 0 0

The writer of the fvllacing served withGermany's@Jdforces in World W ~ T. In the period 1936-37 he was incharge of Germany's Fir s t Pun= Force S h o d , ond in193941 the S d o n s Force School. During WorldW ar I1 he was a dioisionrrl comnumder in North Africu,and commondcd t k 7t h Pun= Division ad Grm-dewtachland Division on the Eustern Front . He becameCommandingGeneral of th e Fifth Panzm A- ad rospromotedtoGeneralderPmuemuppeonlJauory1W.His nume has been filentiaed in connecrion with the far-nrcltion and comnond of o newWestGennrnr A m y .

The commitment and use of t'oops detennine amongother things their f arm of organization, both on a smalland on a Iarge scale. Th e technical progress of the indi-vidual weapolls alsoMuences their form of organization.For this reason a few of tbe technical demands made byth e fighter upon th e technician will be outlined k i n ,wntl a possible form of troop organitation

Th e designer of tanks is faced with th e following m-quirements, briefly put, which the fighter formulates withrespect to the consrmction of tanks: wea s of great firepower, accuracy and rapidity of fire: S e a n , f obser-vation and aiming; urnor-piercing ammunition uith d kstructive et-, heavy armor; low silhouette: high CTOSS-counmt speed; good means of steering; d e m . easilyhand& and uicldy interchangeable radio equipment;and ability to%mb and QOZC S b a b watercourses.In the cond ctio n of tanks tomeet these requiremen6the limit with regardtoguncapaci?, m o r , and power ofthe engine for giving the tank the necessary high CTOSS-"ne peed is,accordingmmy experienceT;.d rH eAIM00--30numy=F&uay, 1951

: zat w i t i

S p c c d i n d t k c m aw umMU. okkh th e trrrL lIwt k p r r01he TbisistnubaauYwaparscamtptlng. t have impnrvd lib% In hb y IPW. in the Rumanianrbatcr,tbcdivisim which Icomnvadalpt out of ar-jonStalin tankswhich were then appanng tor tbe first tuncthe wor ld with respect to gun>and annor. l k e anL

w m ot dsablsd our Tiqeprs(Mark \'I1 or P a n b : lackfv: but ourM a r t WS.me-dium type of tank a& uiih abngbmled 75mm gun.whxhstealthily appmached these tankmonsen, sU fu l 1 y tahgadvan-tage of the errain and full! es -pbiting their high s p e d . an dfired on them from th e sde.opening fire in w r p k assaulrruith the result that no t a singleScalin tan4 remained in action.It m u e emphasued thattank need improved target re-w e - ' conruissuKp and mmmunica-tion equipment. both for notification within the a m r e dunit and for communication with the tactical air force

most closely cooperatin with it. O n tank armamen:.m d ew and reponLc,ls ~e softened.quippingtanlis with night aiming mechanism should caw no d a -cuities. in viewof experiencegained with night fighter air.planes; this kind of mechanism s urgently neressa? k-cause, in future. march. assembly and combat will takeplace in hours of d a r k o a much greater extent thanwe have been accustomed to. The combat troops accom-panying the tank nucleus. uch as infantry. eng inem. ar-tillery, rocket details. etc.. must have the same spcd onr h e bade6eld as tbe rank unit, in order that aU thesenoops mag be able to fight in dose cooperation with th et a n k Only in chis manner will the). be capable of Lend-ing adequate-meaning effective-assisump to the mh .7 k y too, f course. must be at least lightly armored andrun on caw illars. Th e accompanying infantry in thetank unit wil fight asa rult from its armored vehicles andtinued developmentof "Goliaths" like those which we hadin th e Wehnnacht should be attentively pursued an ds p u d on. Thesevehicles wo re small. armored exphsivescarriers on caterpillars resembling in shape their largecolleagues. the real tanL. % ere steered remoteconrrol and were tremendously effective.For the sake of completeness I shoqld remark here thatsomeof the supply sen-icesofarmored troops-unless theseare supplied by air-must have at their disposal vehvlescapable of bringing necesan supphes to the troopjon hebanldeld. that is. capable ofmoving crosscountq- . T h esame applies to some of the vehicles of the maintenanceservices.he question of the organization of rroops canmt bedealt with in a few words. In add~tion o rhe mamidbask many other factors must k onsideral. such as thesoldierly qualities and the educational kvel of the nationconcuned. he geographic situatioa and condition of thepotential theater or theaters of operation, the mength dtbe presumabk enemy or enemies and the ~ucai on

25

and whicb taiav ace probably srill tbe StIwIgest tan& in

will dismount for fighting only in special cases. Con-

7/27/2019 Armor Magazine

16/32

rUnd& EIenetary of th e Army Arc)ubald 8.Alexander

Before the Society of Automotive Engineers.Th Rcsidcns in his state of theunion message,

O U M . what is before m.There are two pam of the President's addrcstwvhich I should like to recall to your attention. HeScrthekriMUpinpersonneIsan ofourArmedForcesatMminJanandsaid: earegoingto+dl rhewcaponsandequipmentthatsuchad f o r c e w i l l n e e d . FUnbrnnorr ,wewilldeweapous for w Aai~. nd =pons far OW OWDmc n-e suppk Ontopoftbis,wewillbuildthe?Lies thatmay bc needd fora M-seak war."

-+t another point m the Reddest's *and-&is be of p d a r ote to the auoomotiveindusa~-k aid: 'We arc pqar ing the capacitp top d & 35 tbounnd tank year. Ly e are not now-that m a n , and we bape hat wexmm haveLO. but we mean ;Obe aMe to turn them out if +enesdtkm.. . . -GenezalGllins, -tmvc hiefo f StsfF, in an articlepublished thismonth, atCr describingthed ~ aart-ILQshIp- be .em?, a y , .% Force andlfarines, idcntifited tbe basic problem facing ou r

cap+ to aun out on short notice aims and sup

ground forces, the Army and the Marines. Theproblem is to pmduce "sufficKnt mobility and fire. . our plan for t?pLwil l comply with the Presi-

dents diRctive that we equip OUT i ncff ased annedforcesandcreatetheca 'c y tomake 35,000 tanks ayear. And the same w$% done for mber items ofThe h y ' s lans for the fiscal yea. ' ' 3 1 require

mnk-automotive6 eM alone. .Looking at the record of the last war, I am surewe s h a l l succeed in what we are trying. The auto-motive industry, which in 1940 made 331 tanks.made25,ooOinlWZ Andtbou hthetanksofto-day and t amac~owre and will%e-far superior totbose of World War IIvinw.and though the costof mosf things has doubledsince 1942, the tanks weare now baying in quantitycost no more per unit ofhorsepower than the tanks ofWorld War 11 T h echief credit for this is due to the engineering brainsand the manufacturiag of the automotive in-dustry working with the Army tank specialists. . . .

power forw grnund arcer . "

equipmentand supplies. .the spending oP more than 4 bibon dobn in the

ahcrim the campaign will be copducted mass armiesin a small axea a by numerically small armies in a largeting pow- and mobility

must be'rhicrred a d he hi$lmlnd must kable toand quickly. To this principle~ g h a s t o b e a d j jFiqdingthe agan zati anof units up to division levelon a fcur-unit(ratherthan mangu-IJusscsti a r > h a t r o l c k t b c s u ~ c o m m a n d e r a c b m c ein a fast mmring sinutian,to akeimmediateadvantageof. . embliughimtoexpbitatactiollsuccessbprmmaourunitboskbeisina %onto'feed bank"hamhisown -aitbDutKLg towait for the attachmenta t - d &us for he a r r i v a l 4 fuxther forces,ahich akvayscoas ti w We al l have earned that time&us lost pa-@ mehn he enany!

Th e combat trrhrliqw of tbe troopswill have to be inconformit).with mudan wea their passibilitia of a pp lica eiaa andthe ir ciFc n G tm e o fm a r c h a n da s-d y s t isd ightingid.n thefuture.movementsand baohs will have to ake place in h a f darhess toa greater m t han hi- in d e r o im+ enemyma mmh me and action hpm the air.combatpracedurrncedstobe-w'hae Kem@ psmif f . the aoaps.suppongIealer&eCls andbngarangaofthemmodan Weapons

area..+lwavs a maximum of fi

aut its will. .

with

dlbe a& tohght in greater width and depth. In cop-26

uast with 19)s. they can leave certainareas unoccupied,and may even be compelled to do so,baause the weaponsof the enem)r have aL0 mproved.In addition to strategic cOILceament of a l l operations.cludesammg other thine the choiceof terrain in accord-ance withoverdl plans, surprise action, and habitualcon-

The tank tfoaps must not be content with driving offattacking enemy taak romgood fiMg.positions. T h qmust ornihilorc enemy tank whenever t h e see themotsuspectthelr For this reasonthe tanks mustthemselves a c i d gain to destroy those enemytanks which fromgreat distance are giving fire support totheir ow n attackingtank..\ f unher relevant point is the following: The rmored

m o p breathe through their services of supply, that is.nipply of uel and spare parts and their towing and main-tenance. Their importance became plain to us when alarge part of these ynices remained stuck in Russianmorasses and snow fields owingto a lack of organi-zation or leadership. while combat was in F Or -ganitation, equl en6 and mobilization of these various--ices are of 8" .asive signi6cance. Those units whichdirest ly support the combat troops, and that includes al argepan of them, need a tactical command like the com-bat hoops themselves.

tactical concealmeat is of v a y great importance. It in-

centration of all weapons for surprise fire.

HASSOCCARDouMAWCEUFFEL.AIMORAuary-F.kuary, 1951

The Requirement For ArmorOME months after a nation commits its4fa0a.m b d e here normally occllls a k a l & ypnrcess of military s e l f u a m i n a ~ . Manyscvching -uesti ons c being& now, not on ly by p"fcs ioMk&t byallcitiamsamJciousofmili~ attel%I believe we can rlmowbdge hat the war in Korea hasbeen a full-rcale cagict,definitely not aucepibie to dk-

scription asa mere pdicc action. It is also true that it isbeing fought withoutthe employment of a single a ddivision m light lrmored regiwat.There reobvious tlsollswh y these units were notem-tle lists, underarmorsddivisions, exactly one. It n e p e d eployed in K~rea ,m g hem be@ t l ~ tUT order of bat-l e s rarniM rue that tanlu have participeted very i m p -CantlyinthiseXrcIlrnrr~ d n o n e o t t h s e ~ t ilong to what are +y considmd to be the prim?ryformationsofthearmorrdbnach.lhsefacowouldseen! to lead logidly tp the Q)DdusioLI that the Koreanwar is prima facie epidaKx in support of the concept ofthe "universal" division-in e&ct, an infantry divkionbeefed up with sulkient tanks and tion to en-able it to ful6ll not only its own m k z hat com-monly accorded to an