Ministère dé la Sécurité publique D

0 Québec on

Bureau du sous-ministre

Le 23 septembre 2016

OBJET:

Monsieur,

Votre demande en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès aux documents des organismes publics et sur la protection des renseignements personnels (RLRQ, chapitre A~2.1) N/Réf.: 118444

Par la présente, nous faisons suite à votre demande d'accès reçue le 25 juillet 2016, visant à obtenir copie des trois (3) plus récentes études, recherches, analyses en lien avec la mafia et les He/ls Angels dans la province de Québec que détient Je MSP depuis les 10 dernières années jusqu'au 26 juin 2016.

À cet égard, nous vous transmettons une copie de l'article de M. Carlo Morselli sur les Hells Angels publié dans Trends in Organized Crime en 2009.

Vous pouvez aussi consulter le '' Rapport final de la Commission d'enquête sur J'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l'industrie de la construction " sur le site Internet suivant : https://www.ceic.gouv.gc.ca/la~commissionlrapport~final.html

En ce qui concerne la présentation de la Sûreté du Québec sur les Hells Angels au Québec faite dans le cadre d'un témoignage à la Commission d'enquête sur l'octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l'industrie de la construction (Commission Charbonneau), en application de l'article 48 de la Loi sur l'accès, nous vous invitons à communiquer avec la responsable de l'accès aux documents de la Bibliothèque et archives nationales du Québec (BANQ) 1, aux coordonnées suivantes :

M8 Isabelle Lafrance Directrice des affaires juridiques 475, boulevard de Maisonneuve Est Montréal (Québec) H2L 5C4 Téléphone : 514 873-11 01 #3238 Télécopieur: 514 873~7182 Courriel: isabelle.lafrance@bang.gc.ca

... 2

1 Le rapport, ses annexes, la preuve et autres documents de la Commission ont été transmis au Conservateur des Archives nationales du Québec. 2525. boulevard L'!urier Tour des L'!urentides, S• étage Québl!< (Québec) G 1 V 2U Téléphonl! : 418 646·6777 poste 11010 Télécopieur : 418 643·0215

2

Conformément à l'article 51 de la Loi sur l'accès aux documents des organismes publics et sur la protection des renseignements personnels, nous vous informons que vous avez un (1) mois à compter de ce jour pour exercer un recours en révision de cette décision. Vous trouverez, ci-joint, un avis vous informant de ce recours.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, mes salutations distinguées.

Le responsable de l'accès aux documents,

Original signé

GASTON BRUMATTI

Chapitre A-2.1

Loi sur l'accès aux documents des organismes publics et sur la protection des renseignements personnels

48. Lorsqu'il est saisi d'une demande qui, à son avis, relève davantage de la compétence d'un autre organisme public ou qui est relative à un document produit par un autre organisme public ou pour son compte, le responsable doit, dans le délai prévu par le premier alinéa de l'article 47, indiquer au requérant le nom de l'organisme compétent et celui du responsable de l'accès aux documents de cet organisme, et lui donner les renseignements prévus par l'article 45 ou par le deuxième alinéa de l'article 46, selon le cas.

Lorsque la demande est écrite, ces indications doivent être communiquées par écrit.

1982, c. 30, a. 48.

Trends Organ Crim {2009) 12:14S-IS8 DOl JO 1007/sl2117-009-906S-1

Hells Angels in springtime

Carlo Morselli

Publishoo onlinc: 29 April 2009 •f.> Spring,.,. Scic:ncc + Busin~ss Media, LLC 2009

Abstrnct This article presents a case study of the criminal market acttvttJes surrounding the Quebcc Hells Angels between 1997 and 2001. The popular and law­en forcement dcpiction uf the Hells Angels, and most notably its Nomad chapter, follows the stercotypical image of traditional organizcd crime (c.g., monopoly control of the criminal market; a clear hierarchical organization; strict control of the organizatiun's mcmbcrs and associatcs). This gcncml daim is tcsted in this article. The countcr argument emphasizcs thal whcreas the Hclls Angcls organization is a hiemrehical structure with clear and cxplicit rulcs laid out for its mcmbers, thcrc is no clear indication that this formai organzintional structure is relevant when studying the criminal activities of members and associates. Quite differently, whcn it cornes to participation in criminal markets, flexibility offers a better fit than the rigid confines of a formai organization. Data for the study was obtained from law-enforcement files that followed an important crackdown on the motorcycle club in Quebcc during March 2001- this crackdown and the ensemble of investigations leading up to it have bcen commonly refcrrcd to as Operation Springtime. Through the use of elcctronic and physical surveilllancc transcripts that recorded a high volume of communications between membcrs and associates who were targeted by law­cnforccmcnt invcstigators over a five-year period, a representation of the criminal nctwork surrounding th~ Hclls Angcls in thcir criminal market activitics was constructcd and analyzcd. The main objective of the analyses wns to asscss the cxtent to which the Hells Angels hierarchy fits the criminal market activities thar werc targcted. The working hypotheses guiding thcsc analyses follow that ifNomad membcrs were indced domincering criminal market participants, wc would cxpect them to be rclativcly high in degree centrality (hands-on participants) and/or high in bctwcenness centrality (strategie brokers). Findings indicatc thal white the Nomads wcrc, on average, highcr in brokcragc capital when compared with othcr mcmbcrs within the organization, Nomads were not the most central participants in the ovcrall

C. Morsdli (~ School ofCriminology, Univcrsitê 11.: Montréal. C.r. 61 28. sucrursalc Cc:ntrc·vilk:, Montreal, Qucbcc HJC.JJ7. Can;~da e-mail: carlo.morsdli@umonrreal c:a

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146 Trends Organ Cnrn (2009) 12:145-158

nctwork. lnstcad, nctwork participants who wcrc highcst in degree centrality wcre amongst the mid and lowcr·lcvel membcrs of the Hclls Angels organization (suggcsting a vulnerable/visible position), white thosc with the highest brokcragc capital participants who hcld no bikcr or gang status (suggesting thnt the strcngths of the network lay bcyond the formai organization). In sum, the case study highlights the ncccssary nuances thal arc nccdcd whcn approaching organizcd crime from a scholarly and policy outlook.

Keywords Criminal network · Organizcd crime· Brokcragc · Drug trafficking · HcllsAngcls

lt wou!d be difficu[t to teiJ how crime would be likc in Qucbcc throughout the past three decades without the He lis Angcls. 1 Allhougb not a criminal organization per se, the motorcyclc club's mcmbcrs and associates have bccn so intrinsic in the provincc's criminal markets thal they have had not only a key role in shaping the structure of such markets, but also in determining the policies and controls that werc dcvcloped to contain organized crime in such activities.

As oflcn happL"IlS in such contexts, the image of the Hclls Angels as a social thrcat can be so consuming !hat, during certain pcriods, the club has bccome the cmbodiment of organized crime, particularly in political, ]aw-cnforcement, and media circlcs. As a rcsult, Naylor's (1997, 2002) wise advicc not to "confmmd an assodattor~ of criminals with a criminal association" (p.40) is !ost in the midst of rcpcatcd daims !hat the provincc's criminal markets (and primarily illegal drug distribution markets) arc controllcd within an infrastructure govcmcd by the six Hclls Angcls chaptcrs across Quebcc.

Naylor's waming is indccd sound. It is unlikcly !hat the Hclls Angel:;' fonnal organizational structure is transferablc to a criminal market of any scopc. Howevcr, extensive law-en forcement investigations and recent trials of a large number of the club's mcmbcrs and associatcs tend sorne credence to this unlikely transfcr. The present case study uses matcrial from these investigations and trials to examine this possibility. The line of inquiry guiding this study examines the extcnt to which a criminal nctwork mirrors the formai organization in which many of its participants arc mcmbcrs and associatcs.

Hclls Angcls lnc.

At thcir official website, the Hclls Angcls qualify thcmsclvcs as the "oldest and biggest H~ motorcycle club ùrllre world", The 'one-pcrccntcrs' status rcfcrs to those motorcyclc clubs thal arc not rcgistered with the American Motorcycle Association or the Canadian Motorcycle Association (sec Barger 2000; Wolf 1991). With a history spanning more than half a century, the club has cmcrged into a vast organization, with chaptcrs spanning across fivc continents. The organization 's namc

1 A pn:vio~ 1,:'Crsion of th1s paper was published by Springer Science+ Business Media tn fnside Cnminaf -~'mwtH"h by C.ulo Mor.;elli, ISBN; 97S·O·J8J.09S2S-7, Q2009. Pg. 32-33, 123-138.

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Trends Organ Crim (2009) 12:145-158 147

and its skull logo arc officially registcred undcr the Hclls Angcls Motorcycle Corporation and protectcd by international law.

The onset and expansion of the Hells Angcls in Quebec has been similar to their emergence clsewherc, but one fcaturc that rcmains unique to the Quebcc branch is the club 's association with crime and violence from its arrivai in the province during the latc 1970s. Tremblay et al. (1989) and Alain (2003) scanncd the evolution of the one-pcrcentcrs biker groups in Qucbcc and identified threc phases sincc the carly 1970s. ln the first phase, from 1971 to 1978, most of this one-pcrccntcrs population was 1ocated in rural Qucbcc, increasing from a population of roughly 600 to 900 members of various gangs. During this pcriod, many alliances wcrc formed bctwcen small bikcr groups. This period was also markcd by the arrivai, in 1977, of the first He lis Angels chapter (in Sorel, Quebcc) which immediatcly cstablished itself as an ovcrriding organization of the smaller bikcr groups. During the second phase, from 1978 to 1983, 800 individuals were identified within the onc-percentcrs classifica­tion. This pcriod was markcd by incrcased violence betwccn clubs and by the posilioning of sevcnll groups within various illicit drug markets (particularly for synthctic drugs). According to Alain (2003}, the population of onc-pcrccntcrs in Qucbec dropped to 300 during the final phase from 1984 to 200 1. This period a Iso highlights the presence of the Hells Angcls as a dominant group within this bikcr subpopu Jation.

Although these studies providc a hclpful count of the Hclls Angcls and othcr bîkers with onc-percentcrs status, a clcar change in the club's rcach must be established as of 1994, the year in which the sixth chaptcr was ercated in the province. This last chaptcr was a Nomad chaptcr thal was comprised of the most rcputed Hcl\s Angels members across the province. While Nomad chaptcrs arc not restricted to a specifie gcographical territory, this new group quickly becarne a heavy presence in the Montreal region. ln Montreal, the predominant clubs preceding the creation of the Nomads includcd members of Hells Angels chaptcrs from outside the city and a Montrcal-bascd group, the Rock Machine. The Rock Machine was at the core of an amalgam of small bikcr groups and indcpendcnt drug men:hants who joined forces to form the Alliance during the latter half of the 1990s, largely in reaction to the ovcrwhclming presence of the Hells Angcls Nomads in the city's drug markets.

Between 1994 and 200 1, the Hclls Angels and Alliance werc at the heart of a lengthy biker conflict that led to a substantial number of killings in and around the city. The claim in law-enforccmcnt and popular media circ1cs was that control of Montrcal's illegal drug markets were at stakc. Reports vary, but the most valid count maintains that, during this sevcn-year pcriod, 261 victims were implieatcd in the confrontation bctwccn thcse t:wo factions, lcading to 126 murders and 135 attcmptcd murders-55% of thcse victims were mcmbers or associatcs of the Hells Angels (for more details on thesc events, sec Morselli et al. 2008). Previous pcriods (most notab 1 y the \a te 1970s Wld mid-l980s) werc punctuatcd by important events and atypical lcvels in biker-relatcd homicides, but no othcr period in Quebec or Canadian history has becn markcd by such consistent and clustered homicides over such an cxtended pcriod of time and around a specifie group.

The involvement of the Hells Angcls in this lethal confliet increascd thcir alrcady public notoriety and their status as a prime target for law-enforccment contrais in the

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148 Trends Organ Crim (2009) 12:145-158

province. Such attention was not new for the club. Fifteen years earlicr, mcmbers of the Hells Angels were amongst the first group to warrant the attention of a public commission thal focuscd on the criminal activities of its mcmbcrs and the club's expansion across the province (Commission de police de Québec 1980). During the mid-1980s, the perception of the Hclls Angels thrcat bccame important cnough ta warranl the contracting of the province's most controversial killcr-bccomc­informant. The scvcn-year biker conflict bctwccn the Hells Angcls and the Alliance was the most important in terms of its implications on organized crime policy and controls in bath the Quebecois and Canadian context. ln the fall of 1995, following the accidentai dcath of a young boy who was struck by a fragment of a bomb that exploded and killed a Hells Angcls' affiliate, the province's first specializcd organized crime squad was put into operation to con tain the escalating biker contlict in the Montreal region This squad (or task force), dubbed the Wolverincs, combincd the efforts of investigators from the Sûretë du Québec, the Montreal Police, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The main target of the Montreal Wolverines was the criminal activities of the Nomad chapter members, their underlings within the Hells Angels, and an nffiliated group (the Rockers--not to be confuscd with the enemy gang, the Rock Machine) thal was sponsored by the Nomad chapter and whose members were suspected of being the main cxccutors of the Nomads' commands. The specifie focus on the Montreal region ended during the summer of 1996, when the Wolverine squad expanded to include the Quebec City region. The Montrcal/Quebcc Woh,erinc squad was active for another 2 ycars until May 1998, when it was dcccntralized and rcplaccd with a province-widc infrnstucture of six investigative squads (known as the Mixed Regional Teams), designcd to mirror the six Hells Angels chaptcrs across the province.

Asidc from the changes thal took place on Jaw-cnforcemcnt approaches to organized crime, the Hclls Angcls threat also triggercd the first anti-gang (or gangsterism) legislation in Canada. Canadian lcgislators had bccn traditionally rcluctant to adopt such legislation in prcvious decades. Although public commis­sions from the Jale 1960s to the late 1980s had shown the spotlight on various criminal groups and organizations in illegal markets and legitimate industries, public policy was consistcntly rcstroined from mimicking the American neighbours who drafted thcir criminal entcprise (RICO) legislation in 1970 and applicd it widcly and with considcroblc impact throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This ali changed with the He lis An gels thrcat of the last decade. The growing number of murders in Montreal 's crime scene cscalated to the point that citizens wcre increasingly victimizcd as bystanders to the biker contlict ln the spring of1997, Canada adopted its gangsterism legislation. TI1is legislation was modified Jess than 4 years Inter, in 2001, after two prison guards wcre murdercd and a popular newspaper joumalist was shot by individua\s who wcrc suspcctcd to be following orders ofNomad chaptcr mcmbcrs.

The investigativc efforts to contain the criminal activitics of Hells Angcls mcmbcrs and associatcs by the Wolvcrinc squad and its expandcd version, the Mixed Regional Teams, came to a sudden and succcssful hait at the end of March 2001, whcn close to 150 individuals across the province werc arrested and chargcd in what was (and rcmains) "the biggest organized crime sweep in Canadian history" (Shcr and Marsden 2004: 254). This major crackdown against the Hells Angels was named Opemtion Springtime. Criminal charges against those arrcsted ranged from wcapons

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Tr~nds Organ Crim (2009) 12:145- 158 1-19

offcnces, moncy lnundering, conspimcy, drug tmfficking, murder, and gangstcrism. Thcse arrcsts led to Canada's first maxi-trials that spanned into 2004, whcn the last set of accused plcadcd guilty.

The evidence assemblcd against Hclls Angcls membcrs and associates was massive. This includcd the colossal collection of elcctronic surveillance transcripts intcrccptcd throughout the task force investigation that led la the Operation Springtimc crackdown. Also included in the ensemble of evidence werc the affidavits thal dcscribcd the ovcrall workings of the organization and the implication of cach arrcstee thercin. By this point, the description of the Hells Angels' inner workings had bccomc comrnon "knowlcdgc", with the daily covcmgc of the investigation and trials constituting the prime focus for most media outlcts. The general formulation beginning cach affidavit preparcd for the Operation Springtime arrests described the Quebcc J-lclls Angcls, and particularly the Nomad·Rockers segment, as a tightly knit organization with a clcar pecking arder in its domination of the illegal drug distribution activities of its membcrs and thcir underlings. The prosccution 's li ne of argument throughout the case was the following (this description originally appcared in French- the translation is mine):

The present investigation e.vtah/ishes that the membel's of tire Nomadr and Rockers organizations fol'm one gang. in whic/r al/ participate and contribute to an important extent. This gang exüts cm/y for the commission of lucrative crimes thal senre to enriclr the gang and ils members. The most frequent of thcse crimes is illegal drug traffic/..-ing. but ot!Jer crimes, suclr as intimidation, assault, use of explosives, cmrspiracy. and mul'der are also conrmon. ( ... ) The l/ells Atrgels Nomads and Rockers carry emblenrs thot they refer to as ''patelles" and thal such emblenrs identijj• tlreir membcrship statrrs. ( ... ) The wearing of patches or other abjects thal idellli}jl members in the motorcycle club are oftcn used for purposes of intimidation and are proudly exposed by members and ambitious associa/es who aspire to gain official membership in the club. These symbols therefore serve as a mark of commerce and as tools of ùrtimidcrtion for facilitatùrg the control of illegal dntg se/ling terrilories. There exists, wühin the rcalm of the Hells Angels organization and its affiliated gangs, a wel/.estabfished lrierarchical stmcture and mode of function in which each indivùlrtal Iras a role. Tlrere is also interdependence hetll'een members und the cliw!rse crime.f thal they commit. Committùrg crimes rmder the /lells AngeLf banner Iras major advantages thar are due to the criminal statlls and notoriety of the organization, tire terror regime tlrat it Iras developed and the rapport de force thal it has demonstruted throughout recent years, as weil as the national and intemational scope of the organization. A Il individuals who are part of this organization are sponsored by an official member and lrm•e to gain the approval of 1 {)()% of members in order to climb the hiel'arclry. A/1/ra~·e to be usejitlto the etrsemble of tire group. lndivitlua/s at tire lowest lewl of this structure serve tlwse al the highesl level-the contrwy is never the case. Aspiring members climb tire hierarchy in accordcmce with their utility, such as tire l'olrcme of sales in illegal dmgs, their contacts for importing illegal drugs, or tlre1r capacity to commit violent acLf ranging from minor assau/Lv to murder.

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150 Trends Org;m Crim (2009) 12:145-1511

For an affiliated gang, the structure of this organization is composed of Friends, 1/ang-Arowrds, Strikers, and Fu/1-Patched mcmbers. For the Hel/s Angels, the stntclllre is composed of Friends. 1/mJg-AromJds, Prospects, and Fu/1-Patched members. ln general, 1/el/s Angels recruit members from a.ffiliated gangs. but this is not an obligation in thal some memhers do come from elscwheiT!. ( ... ) The Fuli-Patched member of an affi/iated gang mmt have the 100% approval of al/ other membcrs of thut gang. Ait/ris le\·el. the member manages an ri/egal drug trajjicl.:ing network, a/one or with other members. He hus acquired the tnm of the gmup and commits, with or for them, tliffirent crimes. He takes part, at this leve/, itl decisions thal concern the group. Tlu:! a.ffi/iated gang is u/so spoiiSored by a Hells Ange/s clrapter and cxists e:rclrtsivr:(v to sen•e and execllle different tasks for members of this chapter, such as the distribution of illegal dmgs and assuring tlu:ir pmtection. Al/ members and strikers must pa y 10% of the profits generated from illegal actMties to the Club. ( ... ) Within a Hells Angels chaptcr, a Hang-Around has a superior status thun full-patched membcrs of an affiliated gang .. 4 /fang-Arormd may arder and direct them. A Hang-Around mrLvt a/so sen•e members of Ille two .çuperior echelons in the clrapter. At this /e,•el, tire Hang Armmd has a/ready prol'Cll himsclf as a criminal and 1s weil knonm witlrin the group. He is sponsored hy a Fu/1-Patchec/ member. The He/Lç Angel.v Prospect is also sponsored by a Fu/1-Patched member and Iras to have the approml of 100% of memhers in arder to climb tire lrierarclry and hope to become a Full-Pate/red member. At this le••el, Ire manages crimina/ operations in partnership witlr anotlrcr member or association of members. 1 le c/imbs tire hierarclry in accordm1ce with his e.ffectiveness, availability, Joyalty. and colllribution to the group. The Full-Pate/red llel/s Ange/s member is aulonvmous in the criminul actù•ities thal he manages a/one or in associutimr with others. but he must respect the ru/es and philosophy of the chapler. This leve/ is the higlrest in the illegal drug distribution pyramid. His raie iç to supply dntg distrihlllion cel/s. At this leve/, he orders and commands crimes rather than executes them himself 1t is a fact tltat 110 one could climb the leve/s of this hierarr:hy witlwut commilting a crime. 17re members of this gang are therefore al/ crimùral.

This well-rcgulatcd cdminal system was the mode! profcsscd by law-cnforccmcnt officiais, prosccutors, and media outlets throughout the trials of the Hclls Angels membcrs and associatcs following the Operation Spdngtimc crackdown in 200 1. The key points that should be rctained from this interpretation arc thal:

1) The Nomad chaptcr of the He Ils Angcls and its affiliatc clubs cxistcd only for cdminal purposes (spccifically, illegal drug distribution) and rccruited only offcndcrs.

2) Hicrarchy was the govcmancc madel within the organization and of any criminal activitics that cxtcndcd from the organization.

3) Climbing the echelons within the hicrarchy was the motivational rorce driving ali to panicipatc in criminal activities.

4) Top-rankcd mcmbcrs wcrc privilegcd in that they wcrc able to ordcr lowcr-level mcmbcrs, whilc remaining active in profitable criminal activities from a distant and securc position.

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Trends Organ Crim (2009} 12:145-158 151

This description offers the daims against which the present case study is designcd. Using the e\ectronic and physical surveillance records that wcrc gathered during the police investigations leading up to the Operation Springtime crackdown, subsequent analytical sections examine the extcnt to which the Hells Angels hierarchy smoothly translates into the ensemble of interactions bctween its members and associates, as scen by the network analysis of communications betwccn participants. The following section presents the data and mcthods in more detail.

Data and mcthods

The data uscd for this case study rcprcsent the widc range of criminal activities that revolved around a specifie organization~thc Quebcc HcUs Angels. Whilc the nctwork in this case was firmly entrenchcd within illegal drug distribution activitics, the investigation that targetcd ît tappcd inlo an ongoing system surrounding this organization. This system included not simply drug importation and domcstic distribution channcls, but also conduits revcaling the management and movement of profits from the illegal drug tradc.

Although the case carried the name of the final crackdown (Operation Springtimc), this final ensemble of arrcsts was the result of a series of investigations conducted by the task-force tcam throughout the preccding 4 years. The task force includcd investigators and analysts from the Royal Canadian Mountcd Police, the Sürctë du Québec, and the Montreal Police?

The fin;t investigation in this task force, Project Rush, bcgan in 1997. Projcct Rush targeted the cntirc Hclls Angcls organization in Montreal, but more particularly the elite Nomad segment of the Hells Angcls, their undcrlings (Prospects), and the ensemble of participants who were mcmbcrs or underlings of the affiliated gang, the Rockers. lnitially, Project Rush was built on the work of a police informant who was a mcmbcr of the Rockers and maintained close links with severa\ members of the Nomads. Evcntualty, more informants would be incorporated in the investigation and new invcstigativc projccts would spawn from Project Rush.

The most important of thesc spin-off investigations was Project Ocean, which bcgan in the fall of 2000 and was initiated whcn Projcct Rush investigators leamcd that one of the targeted participants was transfcrring moncy obtaincd from drug distribution profits to an apartmcnt in Montreal's cast end. Project Ocean focused on this moncy hideout and mainly targctcd the moncy movcmcnt and management cxtcnding from profits in the Nomads' drug distribution activities. Invcstigators retricvcd an ensemble of sprcadsheets showing the transaction profits and costs extcnding from the Nomads' transactions with drug dealers in the Montreal region. One group ofnamcs found on thcsc spreadshccts includcd a drug trafficker, who was reputcd to have considerable resourccs for moving drug consignments and other contraband through Montreal's watcrfront port. and his associatc, who was responsiblc for carrying moncy from the cast-end apartmcnt to him. The moncy

2 For furthcr details on c~ sclccliun. data acccss, and the limiiS of using law-enfurcc:mcnt datt for social network 01nalysis, sce Chapler 2 in Mor.;elli (2009).

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152 Trends Organ Crim (2009) 12:145-158

carrier eventually became an infonnant and revealed the drug distribution connection between his drug trafficking associate and the Nomads.

The third case that led to Operation Springtimc was Project Hammcr (Projet Marteau, in French). Projcct Hammer also began in 2000, aftcr the complction of another investigation that targcted a cocaïne distribution nctwork in the Montreal region. The previous investigation centrcd on a reputed drug tmfficker and rcvcaled that his main supplier was an associatc of one of the Nomads, who wcre under investigation in Projcct Rush during that time. Following the premise thal 'everything that leads to a Nomad is govemed by the Nomads', the task force initiated Projcct Hammer to monitor and eventually dismantle this extensive cocaïne distribution route.

The final network that is analyzed in this article was extracted from a massive set of elcctronic and physical surveillance records that wcrc submitted as evidence during the trials of 131 individuals. Media reports rcvcaling the seope of this evidence consistently stated thal the police recordcd 270 000 logs of interaction bits betwcen individuals monitored during the ensemble of investigations lcading up to the March 2001 crackdown. This numbcr is indccd a fair asscssmcnt of the initial set of files thal my research team and 1 were dealing with when wc took our first steps toward reconstructing the nctwork surrounding the Hells Angcls during this investigation. A first extraction of ali logs rccording non-conversational interactions (c.g., pager a\erts, unanswcred calls, busy signais, wrong numbers) reduccd this number considcrably. After thrce test trials on random samples of 100 logs, we found that the eut-point in file size was 400 bytes, with non-conversational interactions falling cqual lo or under this file size. Applying this 400-bytc filtcr thus climinatcd nil telephone logs that rcsulted in an empty file and decreased the number of logs to 20 502. Thcsc logs rccordcd interactions between 1,500 individuals. Howcver, not ali individuals falling in the surveillance net were participants in the criminal nctwork.

The final nctwork of 174 participants is the result of a selection proccss that excluded ali individuals who were not largcted by the police and for whom no additional evidence could be provided to illustrate thcir participation in the criminal operations thal were under investigation. Project Rush compriscd 61 of these participants; Projcct Ocean added 81 participants; and Project Hammcr addcd 32 participants

Titis nctwork is examined for various fonns of centrality, which is arguably the most popular opcr.ttional concept used by social network analysts. 3 Ac tor or node centrality mensures tell us how the nodes within a nctwork are positioned. The two most common ccntrality measurcs arc degree ecntrality and betwcenncss ccntrality.

Degree ccntrality is the simplest of the ccntrality measurcs. It is a straightforward mca..'iurc of the numbcr of direct conrocts surrounding a node. Nades with high degree centrality arc thcrcfore those that posscss a high concentration of direct conncctivity within a nctwork. Degree ccntrality scores arc generally prcsented as percentagcs of the ovcrall number of othcr nades, thus, a node with 10 direct contacts in a 20 node network will have a degree centrality score of 10 1 (20-1),

J Ail J!na.lyses were conducted wilh Utinel 6 (Borgani et al 2002).

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Trends Organ Crim (2009) 12:145-ISS 153

equalling 53%. Exprcsscd as such, degree centrality scores vary bctwcen 0 and 100%, with 0% indicating that the node is an isolatc and 100% indicating that the node is in direct contact wilh ali other nades in the network.

Betweenncss ccntrality cxtcnds from degree ccntrality and, like other alternative ccntrality measures, introduccs the nuance that it is not the quantity but the quality of connections that is important. This mcasurc incorporates the indirect contacts thal surround a node. Betweenness centrality mcasures the extent to which a node mediates relationships between other nodes by its position along the geodesies within the nctwork. A geodesie is the shortcst path (or number of degrees) connecting n dyad (a pair of nodcs). The greatcr a node is locatcd along the geodesies in the nctwork, the higher its betweenness centrality. This mensure csscntially rcprescnts the ability of sorne nodes to control the flow of conncctivity (or communication) within a nctwork. Controlling the flow within the network in this indin:ct manncr is the broker's edge. The index for betwecnncss centrality for a given node is equal to the proportion oftimes thal thal node is positioned along the geodesies betwcen dyads. The maximum numbcr of geodesies is equalto the numbcr of dyads not including the node or (g - 1 Xg - 2) 1 2, whcrc g is cqual to the total numbcr of nodes in the network (Wasscnnan and Faust 1994). Thus, in a 5-nodc network, cach node, in theory, will be able to mediate bctwccn six dyads. The minimum score is 0, which mcans that a node falls on no geodesie. The maximum rcsults when a node falls on al\ geodesies (the star graph or pure broker configuration

Annlyticnl scheme

Centrality mensures help dcsignate key participants in the ovcrall network, but different types of centrality mcasures otfcr different interpretations of how a network is strucmrcd. On one hand, wc may expcct the highcst ranked members (the Nomads) to be amongst the most central, particularly in tenns of the number of direct contacts they maintain in the network (degree centrality). On the othcr hand, ccnlrnlity mensures bnsed on direct connectivity (degree ccntrality) are more likely to indicatc a participant's vulnerability to detection within the nctwork- particularly in the case of criminal netv.rorks.

Emphasizing the last poinl in Jhe prosccution 's linc of argumcnl du ring the triol that followed Operation Springtime- that the Fuii-Patched Hclls Angels mcmber orders and comma11ds crimes rather tlla11 executes them himself- , wc would cxpcct the highest rankcd mcmbers to be relativcly low in thcir direct connectivily in the network, thus confirming thcir ability to capilalizc on others who manage and execute crimes in thcir place. This latter scenario, howevcr, is not necessarily consistent with a straightforward command system. The prosccution 's account also ofTcrcd another interpretation in its cmphasis on partncrships betwccn mcmbcrs of different ranks in the organization. High-rankcd membcrs may have becn active as partners in the eriminal aetivitics, but with different networking patterns thon lower­rnnked members. Centrality mensures thal capture a participont's capacity to brokcr betwccn other participants rcprcsent strategie forms of networking. Such mensures aecount for a participant's capaeity to mediate along the shortcst paths uniting disconnceted participants in the network (bctwccnness centro.lity).

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154

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\ • • . . .

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Fig. 1 The Hclls Angcls nclWork in Operalion Springrimc

Trends Org0111 Crim (2009) 12:145-158

0 No Bi~r Sutu

• lbnUd in llelll Aneels/Rtlckm

Th us, in the context of a criminal nctwork structurl!, in which direct connectivity is an indication of visibility/vulnerability and brokerage is a more subtlc and strategie positioning pattern, wc should expect lowcr-ronkcd mcmbcrs of an organization to be more visible (more vulnerable) and higher-ronked membcrs to be more brokeroge-like (more strategie) in their networking patterns. Scttling the issue of whethcr higher-rankcd mcmbers arc hands-on participants or perform strategie manoeuvres in criminal networks (and inversely for lowcr ronked members) will hclp us clarify not only the interpretation hcld during the prosecution of thesc He lis Angels members and associates, but also similar claims that (too) oftcn appear in regnrd to the presence of organizational structures in criminal activities.

The HcUs Angcls network in Operation Springtime

In this section, I examine the extent to which the organizational structure of the Nomadl Rockers organization is coherent with the communications that made up the nctwork intcrccptcd during this extensive task force against these groups :md the drug distribution operations that surrounded them. Figure 1 illustratcs the intcrcepted communication patterns within and betwecn the fonnal ranks thal constirute the Hells Angels organization targeted during the investigations. The 48 participants who had fonnal status in the Hclls Angcls organization (black nades) are distinguishcd nom thosc who did not (white nades).

Once again, formai rankings in the Hclls Angcls are as follows: Fuli-Patclted members arc at the top of the hicrarchy; Prospects rank below full-patchcd membcrs; and J/ang-Aroundv or Friends rank lowest within the organization. The Rockers' organizational structure is similar to that of the Hclls Angels: Full-Patched members had the highcst status, followed by Strikers, flang-Arormds, and Friends. Rcgardless

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Fig. 2 The Hells Angc1s nctwolk in Opmtion Springtimc (key playcr.; design:ued by degree ccnlr.llny}

of thcir r:mk within the organization, Rockers arc subordinatcs to ali members of the Nomad chapter.

To follow the formai ranks, the sociograrn in Fig. 1 is bcst e.'Camined from the core out\vard. Sorne may argue thal a graphie representation that illustratcs the informai nct\vorking of mcmbcrs and associatcs within the formai hicrnrchy making up the organization should follow a vertical display. Figure 1 does present such a vertical display - just imagine that you arc looking at a pyrnmid from above. The highcst mnked Hells Angcls-thc 12 mcmbers of the elite Nomad chaptcr-are presented at the core. The layer surrounding the Nomad mcmbcrs presents the 10 Nomad Prospects. The third layer presents the 26 participants who had an official

.-· -·" 0 of'Y' . . . ...

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Fig. 3 TI1c Hclls Angcls n.;twurk in Op.:r.uion Springii!Tk: (key pluy~'fS d~-signatcd by b.:tw~'tUlCSS ccntmlil)')

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156 Trends Organ Crim (2009) 12:145-158

Tablt- 1 Netwofk char:IC t ~risucs by Hclls Angels organizational r:mkings

1\omad.~ Nomad Rockers Non-Gang Network (n• l:!) Pros!li-'Cts (n• 26) Mcmbers (n .. l26) Ccntrali?.ation

(n• IO) (n= 174)

Dcgn.-e ccntrality l.ow (7,95) High ( 16,13) High { 15,30) {2,15} 22%

BciWL"I!IInCS.~ ccntrahty Hîgh (3,56) High (3,18) l.ow (1 ,30) {1,35) 31%

status with the Rockers. The outer layer of the net\vork presents ali participants targeted during the investigations but who did not have fonnal ranks in cither the Rockers or the Hells Angcls.

Figure 1 also illustrates how participants wcrc targctcd across the investigations that led to Operation Springtimc. The 48 participants wîth fonnal ranks in the Nomads!Rockers and 13 participants without fonnal status (groupcd at the bottom­ccnter of the graph) wcrc targetcd during Projcct Rush. The 81 non-bikers !hat span the upper to right sidc of the graph werc targcted during Project Ocean, which focuscd spccifically on the financial routes cxtending in (profits) and out (costs) of the organization. The 32 participants positioned at the bottom-left of the grnph were targeted during Project Hammer, which focused on a specifie cocaïne traffieking brroup that extended from the Nomad core.

Variations in key participant status across the network

If u bias taints this case study's data, it would be bccausc most of the intcrccptcd communications ccntrcd on the Nomads and Rockers who wcrc at the center of investigations thal gcneratcd this case study's main data sources. Nomads, in particular, were the most hcavily targctcd during the investigations. Thus, if tllcrc were a fundamcntal law-enforccmcnt bias guiding the present analysis, wc would expect Nomads to be amongst the most central participants, in tenns of direct connectivity. This is not the case and the relative importance ofNomads as central participants varies. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how degree and bctwcenness ccntrality arc distributed across the ovcrall network.

Figure 2 presents Ille network with an cmphasis on thosc participants who had highcr degree ccntrnlity. Asidc from a fcw participants scattcred across the Projcct Ocean and Proj cet Hammcr portions of the nctwork, most participants with a high de!,rrce of direct contacts he id an official rank within the He lis An gels organization. Howcver, few of the Nomads had high degn.'C centrality. This pattern was more concentrated amongst the Nomad Prospt..-cts and even more so amongst the lowcr-levcl Rockers.

Brokcragc is a fundamcntal networking pattern in criminal networks (Morselli 2009). Figure 3 shows !hat brokerage is a pattern that is also more particular to Nomads in the Operation Springtimc network- at lcast more so than for lowcr-lcvel mcmbers in the Hclls Angcls. The participant with the highest betwecnness centrality was a non-bi ker who was targcted during Projcct Ocean. Othcr participants with rclativcly high bct\vcenncss ccntrnlity werc targctcd elscwhcrc in Project Ocean and during Projcct Hnmmer. However, within the fonnal ranks of the Hclls Angels (thosc targetcd during Project Rush), the key participant status thal was so vividly

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Trends Organ Crun (2009) 12.145 158 157

nssociated with the majority of Rockers and Nomad Prospects when nsscssing the degree centmlity distributions substantially diminishes. Nomads, on the other band, arc amongst the few participants within the Hclls Ange\s organization that arc also idcntificd as key participants from a bctwccnncss ccntrality out\ook.

Table 1 summnrizes the patterns emcrging from the previous figures."' The findings arc lelling in thal avcr.1ge scores for the distinct mnks in the Hells Angcls organization rcflect the patterns that wcrc typical of rncmbers in thcir nctworking. The two extrcmc ranks in the organization nctworkcd in invcrsed pattcrns-­mcmbers of the Nomads and Rockers- arc at opposite ends for each of the mensures. Whcrcas Nomads wcrc rc\ativcly low in direct connectivity (degree ccntmlity) and rclativcly high on brokcragc-likc connectivity (betwecnness ccntml­ity), Rockers wcrc high in direct conncctivity and low in brokcragc conncctivity. Consistent with the formai organizational structure, Nomad Prospects find thcmselvcs somewhcre in the middle of the elite Nomads and the bottom-levcl Rockers-they wcre high on both forms of networking.

Although the diverging patterns arc consistent with the fonnal ranks within the Hells Angels organizational structure, these rcsults do not ncccssarily rcprcsent a command hicrarchy. A<; a group, mcmbcrs of the Nomad chaptcr werc oldcr (44 ycars of age, on average} than Nomad Prospects and Rockers (36 ycars of age for eithcr subgroup). Criminal carccr experience and criminal rnaturity is thcrcforc relevant and the rclntionships bctwecn a bikcr's age and the nctwork mcasurcs arc consistent with thosc found bctwcen fonnal mnks within the Hells Angels organization. Within the ensemble of participants who hcld an official rank amongst the participants targctcd during the investigations making up this case study. age was negatively corrclatcd with degree centrality and positively corrclated with bctwccnness centmlity.

Conclusion

The formai ranks in the Hells Angels organization do emerge in the communication patterns studied in this case study - the nctwork, in short, did mirror the hierarchy to sorne cxtem. Howevcr, the nctwork was not necessarily 'bchaving' as a hierarchy. If wc lake fonnal rank within the organization to be an indication of prestige or reputation, the higher leve\ gang membcrs in this network were rclatively low in the number of direct contacts they maintaincd. The more rcputcd mcmbers of this cri minai network wcrc thereforc not 'bands-on' participants. They wcrc indircctly involved, as suggestcd by thcir highcr brokerage capital (bctweenness ccntrality).

The rcsults in this study do not clarify the causal order betwecn networking and fonnal ranks. Two scenarios arc possible. The first scenario reflccl<; the law­enforcement and prosecutorial description of the Hells Angcls' implication in the targetcd drug distribution activitics. ln this description, Nomads bad much authority and control ovcr lowcr-rankcd mcmbcrs and ranks within the organization dcfincd how a mcmbcr could position himsclf amongst others- in this sense, fonnal ranks

~ The rcsuh.s in T4bl~ 1 must beconsid..-n.-<1 m the SUUt1l.r.ll nuk~·up of the owl'illl m:twork. wbicil. acconhng to th..: nctwork c.:ntr.JtÎ701tion rcsults, wei\! 1\!btivcly low for ali ccnlr.llity ~- Thus, dtc :malysis invotv.:s a sean: li for central panictp:mts in a nctworlc thar was not hcavily ccntr.llizcd to bc~in with.

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158 Trend.> Organ Crim (2009) 12:145 158

dcfinc the nctwork structure and mcmbers receive nctwork privilcgcs aller rcaching highcr promotional lcvels. The second scenario would follow a toumament setting, as suggestcd by Lcvitt and Vcnkatesh 's (2000) nnalysis of a Chicago gang 's financial structure. If this is the case, promotions arc an extension of what a mcmber has proven to be capable of-strategie networking patterns should thcrefore precede promotion and a good indication of who the up-and-comers arc within an organization 's ranks and the nctwork that mirrors it will be thosc Jowcr-ranked members who network through patterns similar to high-levcl members. Rank, in this sense, is but a prize for knowing how to lit in amongst othcrs and not a formai authorization to govcm the actions of othcrs.

References

Al2m. ~lare (2003). "Les bandL'S de motards au Quebec: la distinction entre crime organisé et criminels organisësfl, Pp. 135-160 in M. Leblanc, M. Ouimct, and D. Szabo (eds.} Trait~! dr! criminologie empirique, Jrd Edition. Presses de l'Université de Monuial: Montreal

Bargcr R (2000) 1/cl/'s Angel. Hrupcr Collïns, New Y orle Borgatti SP, 1!\·erett MG, Freeman LC (2002) Ucinet 6 for Wb!duws. Analytic Technologies, ~larvanl Cmnmission de police de Québec ( 1980). Rapport J 'enquète su•· les ach"vites Je.s gro11pcs rif' motards J~

llavre-Saillt-Picrre, SC'pt·lle.s. Mo111-Jali. Saint-Gédemr. Sherbrooke et Asbestos. Enquêlc sur le crime organi'ié, Éditeur officiel du Québec

Lc\Ïit SD, Vcnkatcsh SA (2000) An Economie Analysis of a Drug-Sclling Gang's Fmanccs. The Quancrly Journal of Economies 115:755-789

Morsclli C (2009) Jnsidc Criminal Networks. Springer, New York Morscll1, Carlo, Dave Tangwy and Anne-Marie Lnbalcttc (2008). "Criminal ConOtcts und Colk-ctive

Violente: Bikcr-RclatL'Ii Account Settlements in Quebec, 1994-2001", Chapter Il (pp.l45-164) in D. Siegel and H. Nclcn (L'lis.) Organi:ed Crime: Cul111œ, Markets, and Pa/ides. New York: Springcr.

Naylor RT (2002) JJagcs of Crime: Black Marlœts, Illegal Finance. and the U11derground Ecotromy. C'omcll Unh·cr.;ity Press, lthaca

Naylor RT 0997) M:afi:JS. Mylhs, and Markets: On the Theory and Practîcc of Organizcd Crime, Tmnsnational Organizcd Crime 3:1---45

Sher J, Marsden W (200·l} Tlu! Raad to IIC!/1. How the Bilcers are ConquC!nllg Canada. Yintagc Canada, Toronto

Tremblay 1', Laisnc S, Cordeau G, Maclcan B, Shcwsbuck t\ (1989J Carrières criminclks collcrlivcs: évoluuon d'une populauon dëhnquanlc (les groupes motanls). Cnmmologie 22:65-94

Wa.~cnnan S, Faust K (1994) Social Ncrnvrk Atra,vsLr: Methodr and App/icatimu. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge

Wolf DR (1991 ) Th~ R~ft..t:s: A Brutherhvod ofOurlaw Bilcen. Toronto, University of Toronto Press

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