LEZIONE SETTIMA · La famiglia reale Il problema centrale è quello della successione al trono Abdul Aziz aveva 43 figli. Moglie principale: Hussa al Sudeiri Ibn Saud 140 figli dei

LEZIONE SETTIMA

●

● L'ALLEATO PIU' FEDELE

●

I responsabili della politica estera

Usa

●Eisenhower Foster Dulles

Dopo Suez

●I dubbi del governo Usa:

●Come opporsi all'Urss dopo la crisi

●Il ruolo di Nasser

●Scegliere un altro partner privilegiato?

●Ma chi?

Ibn Saud Re di Arabia (1953-1964)

Abdul Aziz il primo Re d'Arabia

(1932-1953)

Il Regno d'Arabia creato nel 1932

La famiglia reale

●Il problema centrale è quello della successione

al trono

●Abdul Aziz aveva 43 figli. Moglie principale:

Hussa al Sudeiri

●Ibn Saud 140 figli dei quali 45 maschi

●Le maggiori tribu sono 88.

Una difficile successione

● Ibn Saud (sceicco La Mecca)

● Abdul Aziz ibn Saud (Re di Arabia)

● (1932-1953)

●Ibn Saud bin Aziz Feysal bin Aziz

●(1953-1964) (1964-1975)

Una moglie importante

●Hussah bin Sudeiri (1900-1969)

●Madre di 12 figli dei quali 7 maschi

●

Il guppo dominante

●I 7 figli maschi di Hussah al Sudairi (detti i

magnifici 7 o i 7 Sudairi) hanno costituito il

gruppo dominante nel dopoguerra, ma insidiato da

altri gruppi come:

●Shammar

●Qahtan

Albero genealogico dei Qahtani

Cerimonia di conciliazione con altra

tribu

Shammar, Confederazione di tribu

Il Re attuale, Salman bin AbdulAziz

La forza della religione

●1774

●Alleanza tra

● Saud ibn Mohammed capo politico

●Mohammed Abd al Wahhab predicatore

religioso

●Risultato:

●Conquista e custodia dei luoghi sacri (Meccca e

Medina)

La Pietra Nera

La Kaaba

Islam

●Sunna filone ortodosso dell'Islam

●Shia filone scismatico dell'Islam

●Wahhabismo interpretazione rigida della Sunna

Lo scisma

●Dopo la morte di Mohammed (Maometto) suo

nipote Ali bin Talib reclama la successione

●Il Figlio di Ali, Husayn bin Ali sfida il Califfo

regnante ed è sconfitto nella battaglia di Kerbala

(680 d. C.)

Sunniti e shiiti

Il Wahhabismo

●1. Rigido monoteismo

● Solo Allah deve essere venerato.

●Quindi:

●Lettura letterale del Corano senza aggiunte

●No a venerazione dei santi (incluso il Profeta)

●No a santuari

●No a infallibilità dei capi religiosi

●

●

Distruzione di luoghi sacri

●Finora lo stato saudita e i wahhabiti hanno

distrutto:

●1. Otto Moschee

●2. Otto tombe con spoglie di santi

●3. Dodici luoghi sacri.

La tomba di Aminah, madre del

Profeta

I Wahhabiti controllano tutto

●Sistema giudiziario (700 giudici)

●Consiglio degli Anziani Ulema

●Comitato Generale per emissione fatwa

●Ministero degli Affari Islamici

●Supremo Quartier Genrale delle Moschee

●Comitato per promizione Virtù e persecuzione

del Vizio

Le conseguenze politiche

●Comitato per l'attuazione della Virtù e la

eliminazione del Vizio.

●Elenco di proibizioni:

●- vestiario

●- bevande e alimenti

●- ascolto e visione

●- scrittura

●- relazioni sociali

La Polizia Religiosa

●Il Comitato Virtù/Vizi ha come braccio armato un

corpo di Polizia Religiosa.

●Il Mutaween fu fondato nel 1940 col compito di

controllare il camportamento dei fedeli e

l'osservanza alla sharia (legge islamica).

●E' composto da 3500 regolari più migliaia di

volontari.

●Hanno il potere di arrestare chiunque sia colto in

flagrante violazione della sharia.

La Polizia Religiosa

●E' composta da ex galeotti che per ridurre la pena

hanno imparato passi del Corano a memoria.

●L'incidente del marzo 2002 con 15 morti e 50

feriti.

●Nel 2009 creata una speciale sezione

anti/stregoneria col compito di "Investigare su

possibili streghe, neutralizzare le loro maledizioni

e disarmare le loro formule".

● L'iniziativa formativa ID. 26222 è un Corso

sull'esorcismo e la preghiera di liberazione. Dice il

sito del ministero che "il corso propone un'attenta ricerca

accademica ed interdisciplinare sull'esorcismo e la

preghiera di liberazione. Il corso presenta i temi

concernenti gli aspetti antropologici, fenomenologici,

sociali, pastorali e spirituali gli aspetti liturgici e canonici,

e gli aspetti legali medici e psicologici dell'esorcismo e

della preghiera dii liberazione". Il costo è di 400 euro a

docente e ha 40 ore obbligatorie.

●Ateneo Pontificio Regina Apostolorum.

Polizia Religiosa

●Il suo comandante ha il rango di Ministro e

riferisce direttamente al Re.

●Ha un bilancio di 360 milioni di dollari annui.

Qualche tipo di repressione

●Divieto di celebrare San Valentino

●Divieto del Pokemon

●La Barbie è vietata per le sue "posture

vergognose e rivelatrici".

●Vietata la vendita di cani e gatti

●Campagna contro diffusione dell'oroscopo

●Obbligo che le fognature non scorrano in

direzione della Mecca.

Una potenza economica mondiale

●I capi wahhabiti hanno speso 2-3 miliardi all'anno

tra il 1975 e il 1987

●[Bilancio Urss: 1 MD all'anno]

●E 87 MD tra il 1987 e il 2007.

●1500 moschee e 200 istituzioni religiose.

I maggiori produttori di petrolio in

Medio oriente

Le istituzioni di carità

●International Islamic Relief Organization

●Al Haramain Foundation

●Medical Emergency Relief Charity

●World Assembly of Islamic Youth

●Saudi Red Crescent

I ricavi del petrolio

●Islamic Development Bank

●DMI (Islamic Finance)

●Al Baraka Group

●Nel 1995 nel mondo 144 grandi istituti

●Nel 2014 possedevano 2 trilioni di depositi

●[Reddito Usa = 5 trilioni]

La Jihad afgana

●Nel 1979 la Russia invase l'Afganistan e gli stati

islamici chiamarono i fedeli alla guerra santa.

●L'Arabia spese 4 miliardi di dollari tra il 1980 e il

1990 per finanziare la jiahd.

●Nel corpo di volontari (mujahidin) di 35 mila

uomini almento 25 mila erano sauditi. (Tra essi

Osama bin Laden)

●Per addestrare i volontari furono create decine di

scuole (madrassas) lungo tutto il confine del

Pakistan di impostazione wahhabita.

I Talebani

●Il ritiro dei sovietici lasciò campo aperto agli

studenti delle madrassas (talebani)

●I mujahiddin stranieri tornarono nei paesi

d'origine formando gruppi terroristi che

combatterono contro i loro stessi governi oppure

in Bosnia Uzbekistan o Cecenia.

●Gli afgani fondarono l'Emirato Islamico

dell'Afganistan con un ordine interno imitato

dalla Polizia Religiosa wahhabita.

Task Force 2002

●"Per anni singoli e istituzioni di carità residenti in

Arabia Saudita sono stati la più importante fonte di

fondi per Al Qaeda. E per anni funzionari sauditi

hanno chiuso un occhio su questo problema"

Feysal II, re dell'Iraq (1935-1958)

Nuri as Said, Primo Ministro Iraq

Rachel Bronson

Rethinking Religion:The Legacy of the U.S.-SaudiRelationship

© 2005 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the MassachusettsInstitute of TechnologyThe Washington Quarterly • 28:4 pp. 121–137.

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY � AUTUMN 2005 121

Rachel Bronson is a senior fellow and director of Middle East studies at the Council onForeign Relations. She is the author of Thicker Than Oil: The United States and SaudiArabia—A History (Oxford University Press, forthcoming winter 2006).

At a January 2005 counterterrorism conference in Riyadh, FrancesFragos Townsend, assistant to the president and homeland security adviser,stressed that “the world cannot defeat terrorism without Saudi Arabia de-feating terrorism on its own grounds.”1 Saudi Arabia’s brand of religion,Wahhabi Islam, and its reputation for intense proselytizing have landed it inthe global hot seat. Home to 15 of the 19 hijackers in the September 11 at-tacks, a disproportionate number of Arab fighters cycling through Al Qaedatraining camps during the 1990s, and Osama bin Laden himself, the king-dom has become a central focus in the war on terrorism.2

Saudi Arabia’s religiosity, which the White House once considered an as-set, has become a political liability. For nearly a half-century, the kingdom’sreligious fervor kept the oil-rich country in the U.S. political camp, helpedinoculate future generations against Communist expansion, and aided U.S.causes from Central America to Central Asia. As early as 1954, historianBernard Lewis wrote that “pious Muslims—and most Muslims are pious—will not long tolerate an atheist creed.”3 True to these words, Saudi Arabiastood steadfastly against the spread of communism and was a useful ColdWar partner to the United States. Yet, when the Berlin Wall came down andthe Soviet Union collapsed, Saudi Arabia’s policies did not change. In thisnew global political order, the religious zealots spawned by Saudi fundingand U.S. complicity turned their wrath from Moscow toward Washington,Riyadh, and other capitals. The existence of radical Islamic groups is in parta legacy of political decisions made in another era to address a different setof security concerns.

l Rachel Bronson

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY � AUTUMN 2005122

The role of religion in the U.S.-Saudi relationship has to date garneredfar too little attention. Although oil and security remain enduring features,the utility of Saudi religious proselytizing has changed dramatically, and theUnited States has grown increasingly wary of how Saudi Arabia uses its reli-gious power in international politics. In the past, Saudi leaders did not haveto choose between religious and political ends, yet since the September 11attacks, the international spotlight has focused on Saudi Arabia’s willing-ness and ability to rein in Islamic extremism, both at home and abroad.Funding radical religious inculcation no longer serves U.S. or global inter-ests. The Saudi leadership must now determine whether such activities stillserve its own.

The Rise of Religious Extremism

The basic political bargain that underpins Saudi Arabia’s current powerstructure was made in 1744, in a small town outside Riyadh. Muhammadibn Abd al-Wahhab, then an itinerant religious scholar preaching an austereform of Islam, agreed to provide religious legitimacy to a local potentate,Muhammad ibn Saud, the patriarch of today’s Saudi royal family. Drawingon this history, many conclude that hostile religious proselytizing is endemicto the Saudi state, making change and reform unlikely if not impossible.

The determinism of this political/religious bargain, however, can be over-stated. Although it is true that all Saudi kings have paid deference to the re-ligious establishment and relied heavily on the ulema (the guardians of legaland scholarly traditions) to legitimize controversial decisions, over timeSaudi leaders have calibrated their religious message according to the cir-cumstances at hand. Whereas the first Saudi state (1745–1818) fell becauseunrestrained religious fighters antagonized the Ottoman Empire, the leadersof the second Saudi state (1843–1891) restrained their religious warriors toavoid their predecessor’s fate. In the early 1900s, during the formation ofthe third Saudi state, Saudi Arabia’s founder, King Abdel Aziz bin AbdelRahman al-Faisal al-Saud (ibn Saud), organized and encouraged religiousfighters to settle the population and provide foot soldiers for territorial ag-grandizement. Known as ikhwahn, these fighters emerged as an importantforce to conquer Mecca and Medina, in particular. By 1929, however, Azizdestroyed his religious fighting force after it had served its original purposeand was no longer politically useful.

During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia, whose leaders wielded considerableinternational religious influence because of their ability to speak for Meccaand Medina, became a useful U.S. partner. Realizing that religion could be atool to staunch the expansion of godless communism, U.S. policymakers


Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship l

123

sought to partner with religious believers. As far back as the 1950s, theEisenhower administration had hoped to make King Saud (1953–1964) intoa globally recognized Islamic leader and transform him into “the senior part-ner of the Arab team.”4 Later, Saudi Arabia’s value was augmented by its oilwealth, which provided ample resources to fund anti-Soviet operations. Yet,such funding was often accompanied by religious proselytizing.

The Soviet Union supported revolutionary Arab nationalists to undercutWashington’s more conservative partners, such as Saudi Arabia; Jordan;and, after 1973, Egypt. In response, the United States tacitly supported thepoliticization of Islam and those states and do-mestic groups that rejected godless commu-nism, even though they did not and were neverexpected to embrace liberal democracy. ThisU.S. policy coincided with the Saudi royalfamily’s desire to align religious and politicalinterests in the kingdom. From the mid-1950suntil 1967, for example, Saudi Arabia was en-gaged in a bitter conflict with Soviet-backedEgypt. King Saud welcomed members of theMuslim Brotherhood (a grassroots Islamist organization) to Saudi Arabia asa way to challenge Egypt, from which the Brotherhood was fleeing.

Similarly, Crown Prince Faisal, who became king and ruled from 1964 to1975, was a determined anti-Communist. He created a host of domestic andinternational Islamic institutions that had both political and religious pur-poses. Faisal helped establish the Islamic University of Medina in 1961 tospread Saudi-inspired Wahhabi Islam and, more instrumentally, to competeideologically with Cairo’s prestigious al-Azhar University. The Islamic Uni-versity eventually became a well-known recruiting ground for jihadi fighters.In 1962, Faisal helped found the Muslim World League, a worldwide charityto which the Saudi royal family has reportedly since donated more than abillion dollars.5 In December 1965, Faisal embarked on a nine-nation tourthrough Muslim countries to establish “Islamic solidarity” and check GamalAbdul Nasser’s continued regional appeal.

In 1967, after Saudi Arabia triumphed over Egypt at the Khartoum sum-mit, which put an end to the Egyptian-Saudi proxy war in Yemen and leftEgypt dependent on Saudi aid, Faisal did not disband these Islamic institu-tions or halt the creation of more. Unlike his successor, however, Faisalworked to ensure that the most radical clerics did not assume society’s mostpowerful religious posts. He tried to block extremist clerics from gaining do-minion over key religious institutions, such as the Council of Senior Ulema,the kingdom’s highest religious body, and from rising to high religious posi-

Religion was a toolto staunch theexpansion of godlesscommunism

l Rachel Bronson


tions such as grand mufti, a politically recognized senior expert charged withmaintaining the whole system of Islamic law.6 Still, at least some of theking’s advisers warned early on that, once religious zealots were encouraged,they would come back to haunt the kingdom.7 Faisal, who was assassinatedin 1975, was ultimately unable to control the future direction of the institu-tions he created. These Saudi-based institutions became increasingly

radicalized over the 1980s and 1990s.In response to the dramatic events of

1979—the Iranian revolution, religious ex-tremists’ seizure of the Grand Mosque ofMecca, and the Soviet invasion of Afghani-stan—King Khaled, who reigned from 1975to 1982, and Crown Prince Fahd, who ruledthe kingdom from 1982 to 2005, allowed theunconstrained radicalization of Saudi Arabia’selaborate religious machinery. For two de-cades, it produced severe anti-Soviet and

ultimately anti-U.S., anti-Zionist, and anti-regime opponents who werewilling to die for their beliefs. Harsh laws were imposed on women, andthe king appeared in public with the most rabid preachers. One astuteSaudi political observer recalls that, after 1979, “society was given anoverdose of religion.”8

In the decade that followed, the confluence of U.S.-Saudi anti-Communistinterests was most obvious in Afghanistan. The United States and Saudi Arabiaeach spent no less then $3 billion, channeling assistance to armed, anti-U.S. Is-lamic fundamentalists. Their shared vitriol for communism spawned proselytiz-ing that stretched from Somalia to Sudan, Chad, Pakistan, and beyond—thesame areas where today the Islamist threat is particularly vexing.

Saudi Arabia after 9/11

In the tradition of their predecessors, some members of Saudi Arabia’s royalfamily have sought to subordinate the religious establishment since the Sep-tember 11 attacks. Shortly after the attacks on New York and Washington,Turki al-Faisal, King Faisal’s son and the retired longtime director of SaudiArabia’s General Intelligence Department and recently appointed ambassa-dor to the United States, directly challenged Sheikh Abdullah al-Turki, sec-retary general of the World Muslim League and a member of the Council ofSenior Ulema. In a widely read newspaper article, the prince argued that“those responsible for affairs of state are the rulers,” whereas religious schol-ars “only act in an advisory capacity.”9 Prince Talal bin Abdel Aziz, the

There is reason to beoptimistic about theroyal family’s abilityto stem the radicalreligious tide.



125

king’s half-brother, similarly challenged the “potentially very confusing”claim that rulers and religious scholars should jointly decide affairs of state.10

In June 2004, in a well-publicized op-ed piece published in the Saudi news-paper Al-Watan, Saudi Arabia’s then-ambassador to the United States, PrinceBandar bin Sultan, argued in Arabic that religious fighters operating insidethe kingdom should be “vanquished” the way “King Abdul Aziz did at theBattle of Al-Sabla [in 1929].”11 At least some elements of the royal familyclearly are deeply engaged in the running ideological battle and are makingsome headway against religious extremism.

REINING IN RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Today’s political landscape provides some reason to be optimistic about theroyal family’s ability to stem the radical religious tide. May 2003 marked aturning point in Saudi Arabia’s willingness to confront the worst excesses ofreligious radicalism directly and fight Al Qaeda and takfireen (those willingto define other Muslims as apostates). On May 12, 2003, homegrown sui-cide bombers simultaneously attacked three housing complexes in Riyadh.The Saudi leadership defined the attacks as a “wake-up call” and “our Sep-tember 11” and began to take political, security, and economic action againstlocal terrorists and their support base.12

In June 2003, then–Crown Prince Abdullah instituted an important “na-tional dialogue,” a broad-based series that has given Saudis a forum to en-gage on highly sensitive topics such as intolerance, the role of women, andsocioeconomic challenges. It emboldened moderates within society whonow use the sessions’ findings to build their case for reform, including mostrecently a renewed push in support of a women’s right to drive automobiles.Today, newspapers are increasingly able to publish articles that question fun-damental religious principles. As several Saudi journalists and diplomatshave recently pointed out, for the first time in recent history, Saudis can ex-amine the works of ibn Taymiyya, a central figure in Saudi religious thoughtwho emphasized a literalist interpretation of the Koran and supported thepractice of declaring other Muslims as apostates.13 Although this progress isnot without its obstacles—one daring journalist recently reported that threeof his articles on ibn Taymiyya were rejected, non-Muslims continue to berounded up for privately practicing their religion, and the imprisonment ofthree human rights activists has dampened enthusiasm for reform—the evolv-ing openness does appear designed to address some of society’s grievancesand to question the most radical interpretation of Islam.

From the spring of 2003 until today, a steady stream of reports describeSaudi security forces’ efforts to hunt down militants, disband Al Qaedacells, and seize weapons caches. By late summer of 2004, the forces had suc-

l Rachel Bronson


cessfully foiled a number of potential attacks, rounded up hundreds of sus-pects, and killed dozens of militants. By the spring of 2005, Saudi forces hadeither killed or incarcerated 24 out of 26 individuals on the kingdom’s mostwanted list and issued a new list of 36 men. Radical clerics were warned totone down their fiery sermons; more than 2,000 of them were either banned

from preaching or underwent “reeducation”programs. After the May 2003 attacks, theSaudi government also became more seriousabout reducing the flow of funds featheringthe bank accounts of known terrorists. InJuly 2004, the Financial Action Task Force,an Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development group devoted to combat-ing money laundering and terrorist financing,judged that the kingdom was “compliant or

largely compliant” with international standards in almost every indicator ofeffectiveness.14 Although the report also identified three areas in whichSaudi Arabia was not in compliance with established standards, progress hasclearly been made.15

Over a two-year period, Saudi officials shut down the al-Haramain Is-lamic Foundation, the Riyadh-based charity responsible for disbursing $40–50 million annually with ties to Al Qaeda’s funding stream, although recentreports suggest that some of its offices may still be operational or operatingunder a different name.16 The Saudi government implemented a series oflaws making it much more difficult for its citizens to move money interna-tionally, putting charities under the watchful eye of state regulators andeliminating the practice of placing charitable collection boxes in malls andother places in order to increase accountability. Abdullah urged Saudis tokeep charitable support within their communities. Accordingly, Saudi citi-zens are now contributing more money to local causes than to those furtherafield. In 2004, Saudi domestic giving increased by approximately 300 per-cent as charitable monies were redirected home from foreign countries.17

This shift necessarily reduces the financial flows to terrorists and radical ex-tremists abroad.

The royal family appears committed to crushing Al Qaeda elements oper-ating from its territory. Saudi Arabia’s determination to diffuse the spiritualcontext that nurtures radical and violent groups, however, has been moredifficult to assess, especially as a new generation of Islamic leaders increas-ingly vie for power and influence. Yet, how the House of Saud resists andco-opts its religious opposition, as well as how it manages the kingdom’sgrowing socioeconomic problems and imminent political transitions, will inlarge part determine Saudi Arabia’s direction in the future.

Can the U.S. actuallydo anything to helpreduce the influenceof radical extremists?



127

A NEW GENERATION OF RADICAL CLERICS

Although Saudi Arabia appears to have turned a corner in its fight againstviolent jihadis, it was much easier to galvanize Saudi religious leaders for thebattle against communism than it is against radical Islam, which is less pow-erful but more difficult politically to combat. The legitimacy of the Saudi re-gime has always been based in part on the country’s religiosity, which theroyal family has used purposefully to secure geopolitical ends. Even if theroyal family is inspired to check religious extremism, undoing the decades ofpolitical patronage that served yesterday’s global realities will be an ex-tremely difficult and dangerous task. It is hard to imagine fiery imams con-ferring their support on a government policy that targets Islamic extremistswith the same conviction that moved them to support their government’santi-Communist policies during the 1980s.

Moreover, the regime has become entangledin a delicate and dangerous dance with a groupof non-establishment ulema, often referred toas the sahwa, or “awakening clerics.”18 Led bymen such as Safer al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda, this new generation of Islamic leaderscame of age during the late 1970s and 1980s,when Saudi Arabia was reaping the first ben-efits of its dizzying oil wealth and calls forjihad permeated society. These clerics becamehighly visible in 1990 when they ardently pro-tested the king’s decision and ulema’s fatwa to allow the United States andother non-Muslim governments to defend the kingdom and eject Iraqiforces from Kuwait. These young, intense men, many of whom spent the1990s in and out of prison, represent a generational shift in Saudi Arabia’sreligious hierarchy. Their preachings inspired bin Laden and his followers.The sahwa, who are vehemently opposed to the United States, relentlesslycriticize the traditional ulema’s fawning passivity and call for greater influ-ence over all aspects of Saudi society, including foreign policy.

Since Abdullah released them from prison in 1999 as a goodwill gesture,the sahwa have mellowed somewhat. For the most part, they seem more in-tent on working with, rather than undermining, the Saudi government.Some clerics have even tried to help the ruling family identify and captureSaudi Arabia’s hard-core dissidents in return for limited amnesty. Othershave participated in reconciliation efforts between the Sunnis and Shi‘a. InMay 2003, the sahwa denounced the bombings inside the kingdom and pub-licly questioned the religious justification claimed by those who had carriedout the attacks.

The U.S. shouldcommit to assist indeveloping humancapital.

l Rachel Bronson


Still, the sahwa are virulently opposed to the United States and continueto provide succor to radical elements of society.19 In November 2004, promi-nent sahwa members signed an open letter to the Iraqi people, urging a jihadagainst the United States. In a public scandal, Salman al-Awda’s son was in-tercepted on his way to Iraq, following what he reportedly believed to be hisfather’s exhortations to fight. The royal family faces difficult choices when

confronting the sahwa. Working with thesepopular clerics offers some benefits, and byslowly engaging them, the government canpoint to real gains in co-opting and control-ling their message. Nevertheless, the sahwa’santi-Americanism and the toxic environmentthey have helped to create is profoundly trou-bling. The growing number of Saudis going toIraq—some 2,500, according to one Saudi re-searcher20 —is a disturbing indication that thecontext inside the kingdom has not changed as

much as many had hoped. This poses challenges to the futures of the UnitedStates and Saudi Arabia, as battle-hardened radicals return home trained inthe latest urban warfare techniques. Clearly, the Saudi leadership still has away to go to undo the radicalism that was encouraged over the last decades.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

The question remains, can the United States actually do anything to helpinterested Saudi government members reduce the influence of the radicalextremists? After the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush de-fined the transformation of the Middle East as one of his administration’sforemost foreign policy priorities. He concluded from the attacks that “de-cades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability,have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy.”21 The attention thathigh-level U.S. officials are giving to reform is a welcome departure fromtraditional practices of engaging Middle Eastern governments and only fo-cusing on external security challenges. If not pursued deftly, however, in-creased attention from the U.S. government runs the risk of steamrollinglocal reform efforts and undermining the very people and projects Washing-ton hopes to promote. For the last half of the twentieth century, the UnitedStates was willing not only to coexist with tyranny, as Bush suggested, but tooverlook the politicization of religion. U.S. policies that help encourage op-portunities outside or alongside religious pursuits would be a useful pal-liative to yesterday’s complacent policies.

Joining the WTOwould providepolitical cover torestrict corruptpractices.



129

Certainly, some immediate joint counterterrorism efforts need bilateralattention, particularly those that seek to end terrorist financing. Havinglargely succeeded in shutting down illicit wire transfers of money, Saudileaders must now turn equally aggressive attention to cash couriers whomove easily throughout the kingdom. This task will be difficult in a countrywith a deeply ingrained cash culture. Saudi Arabia has recognized this prob-lem but has been slow to address it. Nevertheless, as part of a long-term ap-proach to depoliticizing religious extremism in Saudi Arabia, Washingtonshould develop a comprehensive social, economic, and political reformstrategy that supports local efforts.

SOCIAL REFORM

The United States should make a commitment to assist in the developmentof human capital in Saudi Arabia and, more broadly, in the region. Higheroil prices will not solve all or even most of Saudi Arabia’s looming socialproblems. Saudi Arabia has one of the world’s fastest-growing populations,and nearly 40 percent is below the age of 15.22 Similar to many of its neigh-bors, the kingdom has a young population and suffers from an exceedinglyhigh rate of unemployment. Between 15 and 30 percent of Saudi men andapproximately 95 percent of women are jobless.

The kingdom is in desperate need of technical training and educationalreform to provide employment for its growing population as well as opportu-nities outside the religious realm. Unfortunately, between 1993 and 2003the number of U.S. Department of State–sponsored exchange programs,which help top students acquire necessary skills, fell by 21 percent in SaudiArabia, Egypt, and Yemen.23 A recent survey found that 29 percent of U.S.colleges and universities polled registered a decrease in Saudi student en-rollment.24 After the September 11 attacks, Saudi student visa applicationsfell 80 percent and have yet to recover.25 The dramatic decrease in thenumber of Saudi students studying in the United States over the last fewyears follows a general decline in Saudi students studying abroad since the1980s. According to the Statistical Yearbooks of Saudi Arabia, the number ofSaudis studying abroad reached a peak of more than 12,500 in the mid-1980s but then dropped to 3,554 in 1990 and to only slightly more than3,400 in 1996.26 Over time, the Saudi government has offered less fundingfor its students to travel abroad. This reduction is partly the result of theSaudi government’s desire to promote its own local universities but also of alack of available resources.

Today, with oil revenues once again increasing, renewed attention shouldbe paid to promoting educational and cultural exchanges between theUnited States and Saudi Arabia. To facilitate these exchanges, the U.S. gov-

l Rachel Bronson


ernment needs to streamline visa and entry procedures. Bush administrationofficials deserve credit for fixing a number of the problems that originallystalled many visa applications after the September 11 attacks.27 Providingmore opportunities for young Saudis to pursue outside or alongside religiousstudy is one way to slowly “drain the swamps” of terrorism. Still, there arefar too many stories of reformers and moderates who opt not to come to theUnited States because of the difficulties and harassment that others haveexperienced.

Bush and Abdullah made significant headway in addressing such issuesduring their spring 2005 meeting in Crawford, Texas. In a joint statement,the two leaders announced a commitment to increase the number of Saudistudents studying in the United States, expand military exchange programsthat provide education to Saudi officers, and facilitate travel to the kingdomby U.S. citizens. In addition to making such proposals a reality, Saudi leadersmust now also commit to real educational reform inside the kingdom. Thisis important not only to the United States but also to Saudi Arabia’s future.

A good model for U.S. assistance to the long-term development of humancapital in Saudi Arabia is a small ($100,000) U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment grant to Effat College, a relatively new Saudi women’s collegebased in Jeddah, which will enter into a partnership with Duke University toestablish an engineering program and provide desirable employment skillsfor new graduates. The Bush administration deserves considerable credit forthis initiative, a public diplomacy coup that is reaping dividends far beyondits cost. Until recently, it was almost impossible to get U.S. foreign aid intothe kingdom, an oil-rich country that few understandably believed worthy ofaid. Yet, if the United States does not support its potential friends, it is nowclear that few others will. Committing to broadening human capital willhelp wean some away from radical religious pursuit and, just as importantly,is a cause many moderates and reformers actively support.

ECONOMIC REFORM

Given its rapidly increasing population and the fact that, when controlledfor inflation, oil prices are nowhere near as high as they were in the late1970s, Saudi Arabia’s oil money does not go as far as it once did. Thekingdom’s per capita revenue from oil exports during the early 1980s was$22,174. In January 2005, with oil prices hovering around $50 per barrel,that figure settled at a mere $4,511.28

In 2000, Condoleezza Rice wrote on a related topic that, “although someargue that the way to support human rights is to refuse trade with China,this punishes precisely those who are most likely to change the system. …[T]rade in general can open up the Chinese economy and, ultimately, its



131

politics too.”29 The same logic applies to Saudi Arabia’s entry into theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), which would benefit those within thekingdom who promote transparency and accountability. Joining the WTOwould also provide cover for Abdullah, allowing him to make some very dif-ficult and potentially explosive decisions at home, such as restricting cor-rupt practices among royal princes.

After a slow start, Washington has been more active in engaging SaudiArabia on WTO accession since September 11,2001. Over the last few years, Saudi Arabia hasalso become more serious about the process,changing the composition of its negotiatingteam and working to meet imposed membershiprequirements. By making the high-level politi-cal commitment to Saudi Arabia’s entry, Wash-ington and Riyadh can overcome the remainingobstacles. The United States will need to pri-oritize its economic concerns and demonstratesome leniency. Because Saudi Arabia’s membership in the WTO will supportthe kingdom’s more Western-oriented business elite and reformers attempt-ing to introduce controversial policies, such prioritization and leniency arewell worth the potential costs. A congressional petition circulated in May2005 calling Saudi Arabia’s WTO accession “premature” is shortsighted.30

Economic reform will help absorb the waves of young Saudis entering themarket. Increased transparency and accountability will also reduce existingcorruption, a chief complaint among the population and the regime’s oppo-sition. It will also expand Saudi Arabia’s business class, which has a directstake in economic stability and domestic security.

POLITICAL REFORM AND DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

Washington should continue to pressure Riyadh to gradually open its do-mestic political arena to ensure that violence is not the only available formof political expression. In particular, the harsh sentencing in May 2005 ofthree nonviolent political activists—Ali al-Domaini, Matruk al-Falih, andAbdullah al-Hamid—has cast a pall over local reform efforts and shoulddraw high-level attention from the United States. They, along with 10 oth-ers, were arrested in March 2004 for circulating a petition advocating a con-stitutional monarchy for the kingdom. The situation provides the UnitedStates a perfect opportunity to defend freedom and increase political partici-pation by regularly calling for the release of political prisoners and wouldalso put the United States squarely on the side of supporters of political re-form inside the kingdom.31

The precedent setby the 2005municipal electionsis significant.

l Rachel Bronson


Another looming domestic political challenge stems from the Saudigovernment’s persistence in defining major Islamic organizations such as theWorld Association of Muslim Youth, the Muslim World League, and the In-ternational Islamic Relief Organization as international nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) rather than charities,32 rendering the new laws cen-tralizing and monitoring charitable organizations less effective. When pressed

by one U.S. representative about the distinc-tion before her trip to the kingdom in early2005, Bandar likened Saudi control overNGOs to U.S. control over the United Na-tions. He pointed out that, just as the UnitedStates could not control the UN, which op-erates on U.S. soil, neither can Saudi Arabiafully control Islamic NGOs. What Bandarfailed to acknowledge is that Congress isconstantly battling the United Nations, threat-

ening or actually withholding funds for activities related to policies conflict-ing with perceived U.S. interests.

Saudi Arabia has not made a similar public effort to rein in Islamic NGOsthat operate on its territory—organizations that receive significant supportfrom Saudi benefactors and whose leadership is often chosen by the royalfamily.33 Steven Emerson, an analyst who closely tracks Islamic radicalism inthe United States, testified before the Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs in July 2003 that “in March 1997, Secretary General [of the MuslimWorld League] Abdullah al-Obaid thanked King Fahd for his continuedsupport, noting that the Saudi government had officially provided morethan $1.33 billion in financial aid to the [Muslim World League] since1962.”34 Until all Islamic NGOs operating on Saudi territory are strictly au-dited and monitored, outsiders will have good reason to suspect that moneycontinues to flow to unsavory people and places. Insisting on such monitor-ing should be a top priority for the United States when engaging in talkswith Saudi officials.

Washington should also explore ways to engage the winners of SaudiArabia’s first municipal elections in more than 40 years, which occurred be-tween February and April 2005. Although voter turnout was thin andwomen were excluded, the precedent set by the election is significant, espe-cially as Fahd had previously declared Islam and voting to be incompatible.Perhaps through a multilateral effort, Washington could support regionaltraining programs for newly elected political officials. Introducing them totheir regional counterparts and providing political training would acknowl-edge the importance of the election, help institutionalize the results, and

To effectively reducethe influence ofradical Islam in SaudiArabia will take time.



133

encourage the Saudi royal family to take this new political group seriously.By reaching out to the winners, Washington could also avoid the chargethat it is cherry-picking supporters and thus unintentionally discreditingthem.

Beyond Oil and Security

Developing constructive policies that help local reformers steadily chipaway at past decades of political decay is a subtle and painstaking exercise.This generational task requires sustained U.S. attention and instruments ofpower beyond the U.S. military. In today’s battle of ideas in the Middle East,technical training, rational visa policies, and educational assistance areequally if not more important than assault rifles and fighter jets. Such sus-tained support cannot include gratuitous, counterproductive, and unwar-ranted anti-Saudi measures such as Representative Anthony D. Weiner’s(D-N.Y.) June 2005 amendment that no funds be “obligated or expended tofinance any assistance to Saudi Arabia,” which specifically targets a paltry$25,000 International Military Education and Training grant for Saudi mili-tary training.35 Although politically popular, such measures are strategicallycounterproductive and impede the ability of the United States to assist in-digenous Saudi reform efforts, which are already fighting an uphill struggleslanted against liberalism and religious diversity.

Oil and security have consistently been defining features of the U.S.-Saudi relationship; religion has figured less prominently in even the mostsophisticated analyses. Yet, Saudi Arabia’s religiosity, whatever its specificteachings, had served a useful political purpose for the United States for halfa century, making the kingdom a reliable Cold War partner and providing itsleaders with a perception of global threats similar to the one held by theUnited States. Now, however, Saudi Arabia’s proselytizing activities havecontributed to today’s dangerous religious environment.

In such a dramatically different global political context, can Saudi Arabiaplay a productive role in altering the course of religious radicalism? Historysuggests yes. Saudi leaders have repeatedly reined in religiously excessivespokesmen and calibrated messages to accord with varying political con-texts. Today, Saudi Arabia’s abilities are difficult to assess. Although theleadership is going after hard-core religious fighters, the extent to which thespiritual context is changing is less clear. The sahwa are still active, popular,and anti-American and have spawned an even younger and more radicalgroup of extremists with which the sahwa are themselves engaging in anideological battle. Such groups present real challenges to moving quickly to-ward altering Saudi Arabia’s social and cultural milieu.

l Rachel Bronson


Riyadh clearly has the public confidence and support of the current U.S.administration. In his 2004 congressional testimony, Ambassador J. CoferBlack, then the State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, con-cluded that Saudi Arabia showed “clear evidence of the seriousness of pur-pose and the commitment of the leadership of the kingdom to this fight[against terrorism].”36 In his acceptance speech at the Republican National

Convention in August 2004, Bush himselfmentioned Saudi Arabia explicitly, statingthat “four years ago … Saudi Arabia was fer-tile ground for terrorist fundraising” but now“Saudi Arabia is making raids and arrests.”37

Unfortunately, if Saudi Arabia is effectivelyto reduce the influence of radical Islam, theprocess will take time. To assist those inSaudi Arabia interested in this long-term re-form struggle, the time has finally come toreformulate the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

The recent meeting between Bush and Abdullah in Crawford providesthe basis for a more strategic recasting of the relationship. Both leaderscommitted to establishing “a high-level joint committee … headed by theSaudi Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State that will deal withstrategic issues of vital importance to the two countries.”38 Although pro-foundly uncomfortable, religion must be part of that discussion; it is thestrategic issue confounding both sides and must be tackled head-on. Theway that each country understands, manages, and engages today’s religioustrends will help shape the future of Wahabbi Islam in Saudi Arabia and sub-sequently the Islamic landscape throughout the Middle East and beyond. Itis the core of the so-called battle for hearts and minds.

Notes

1. Ali Khalil, “Saudi Conference Focuses on Fighting Terrorism,” Arab News, February7, 2005.

2. “The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terror-ist Attacks Upon the United States,” 2004, p. 232, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 71; Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Insidethe Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001), p. 90 (citing an ar-ticle by Rahimullah Yusufzai in The News [Pakistan], December 8, 1995); unnamedofficials, interviews with author, June 2005.

3. Bernard Lewis, “Communism and Islam,” International Affairs 30, no. 1 (January1954): 1–12. See Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy ofSaudi Arabia (London: Ithaca Press, 1978), chap. 6.

Religion is thestrategic issueconfounding bothsides and must betackled head-on.



135

4. “Discussion at the 310th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday,January 24, 1957,” Eisenhower: Papers, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman Files), EisenhowerLibrary.

5. Steven Emerson, “Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention:Saudi Arabia, Terrorist Financing, and the War on Terror,” testimony before the U.S.Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, July 31, 2003, http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/073103emerson.pdf.

6. Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites: Conflict and Collabo-ration (London: Croom Helm, 1988). For Faisal’s role in creating these institutionsand the domestic struggle over them, see Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou:Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for NearEast Policy, 2000).

7. Michel Ameen, interview with author, Houston, January 25, 2005.

8. Saudi national, interview with author, Riyadh, February 2005.

9. Jamal Khashoggi, “Saudi Religious Establishment Has Its Wings Clipped,” DailyStar, July 1, 2002.

10. Ibid.

11. “A Diplomat’s Call for War,” Washington Post, June 6, 2004, p. B1 (English transla-tion of original Arabic article).

12. “Saudi-U.S. Cooperation in War on Terror Sharply Up: Official,” Reuters, October25, 2003. See Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, “Crisis and Opportunitiesin U.S.-Saudi Relations: Ambassador Robert Jordan Interview,” September 7, 2004,http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-09-07.pdf;Hussein Shobokshi, “Our September 11,” Arab News, May 20, 2003.

13. Unnamed Saudi journalists and diplomats, interviews with author, Riyadh andJeddah, February 2005.

14. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, “Annual Report 2003–2004,”July 2, 2004, annex C, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/12/44/33622501.PDF.

15. J. Cofer Black, “Saudi Arabia and the Fight Against Terrorist Financing,” testimonybefore the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on theMiddle East and Central Asia, March 24, 2004, www.saudi-us-relations.org/news-letter2004/saudi-relations-interest-03-29a.html.

16. See, for example, Victor Comras, “Following Terrorists’ Money,” Washington Post,June 4, 2005, p. A17. In September 2004, the U.S. Department of the Treasury des-ignated the U.S. branch of al-Haramain as a source of terrorist financing. Office ofPublic Affairs, Department of the Treasury, “U.S.-Based Branch of Al HaramainFoundation Linked to Terror; Treasury Designates U.S. Branch, Director,” JS-1895,September 9, 2004, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1895.htm.

17. U.S. Department of State official, interview with author, Washington, D.C., Sep-tember 2004.

18. See Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou; R. Hrair Dekmejian “The Rise of PoliticalIslamism in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal 52, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 204–218;Madawi al-Rasheed, “Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition,” Current History 95, no. 597(January 1996): 16–22; Toby Craig Jones, “The Clerics, the Sahwa and the SaudiState,” Strategic Insights 4, no. 3 (March 2005), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/jonesMar05.pdf; International Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: WhoAre the Islamists?” ICG Middle East Report, no. 31 (September 21, 2004), http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/iraq_iran_gulf/31_saudi_arabia_backgrounder.pdf; Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam

l Rachel Bronson


and the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 177–195; StephaneLacroix, “Between Islamists and Liberals: Saudi Arabia’s New ‘Islamo-Liberal’ Re-formists,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 3. (Summer 2004): 345–365; Gwenn Okruhlik,“Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” Current History 101,no. 165 (January 2002): 22–28.

19. See Jones, “Clerics, the Sahwa and the Saudi State.”

20. ABC News Investigative Unit, “Saudi Jihadists in Iraq,” ABC News, May 9, 2005,http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=741525&page=1 (citing the Arabiclanguage newspaper al-Hayat).

21. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President Discusses War on Ter-ror,” Fort Lesley McNair, March 8, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html.

22. Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Fact Book: Saudi Arabia,” June 14, 2005,http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sa.html.

23. Peter G. Peterson et al., “Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for ReinvigoratingU.S. Public Diplomacy,” 2003, p. 47, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/public_diplomacy.pdf.For a more global look at this disturbing trend, see Joseph S. Nye Jr., “You Can’tGet Here From There,” New York Times, November 30, 2004, p. A21.

24. Institute of International Education, “Fall 2003 Survey: The State of Interna-tional Education Exchange—International Students,” November 3, 2003, p. 10,http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/file_depot/0-10000000/0-10000/3390/folder/28491/IIE+Online+Survey+Fall+2003.doc.

25. Unnamed source, interview with author, Riyadh, February 2005.

26. Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Statistical Yearbooks ofSaudi Arabia, 1979–1994, http://www.mohe.gov.sa.

27. Maura Harty, “U.S. Visa Policy: Security Borders and Opening Doors,” The Wash-ington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 23–34; unnamed sources, interviews withauthor, Washington, D.C., January 2005; unnamed sources, interviews with author,Riyadh, February 2005.

28. Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Brief: SaudiArabia,” January 2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html.

29. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1(January/February 2000): 56.

30. Draft congressional letter to United States Trade Representative Robert J. Portman,May 2005.

31. See Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the American University in Cairo,” Cairo, June20, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm; “Joint Press Avail-ability With Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal,” Riyadh, June 20, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48390.htm.

32. Senior Saudi official, interview with author, Washington, D.C., June 2004.

33. See for example, Simon Henderson, “Institutionalized Islam: Saudi Arabia’s IslamicPolicies and the Threat They Pose,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee onthe Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, Sep-tember 10, 2003, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=910&wit_id=2573.See also David B. Ottaway “U.S. Eyes Money Trails of Saudi-Backed Charities,”Washington Post, August 19, 2004, p. A1.

34. Emerson, “Terrorism Financing.”

35. Office of Representative Anthony D. Weiner, “Congress Finally Cracks Down on



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Saudis; Weiner Amendment Prohibits U.S. Aid to Saudi Arabia,” July 16, 2004,http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny09_weiner/saudicrackdown041607.html. SeeAlfred B. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations,” CRS Issue Brieffor Congress, IB93113, March 21, 2005, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46414.pdf.

36. Black, “Saudi Arabia and the Fight Against Terrorist Financing.”

37. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “President’s Remarks at the2004 Republican National Convention,” New York, September 2, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040902-2.html.

38. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Joint Statement of PresidentBush and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah,” Crawford, Texas, April 25, 2005,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050425-8.html.

Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, January-March 2009, 90-105

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

From fragility to stability: a survival strategy for the Saudi monarchy

May Yamani

Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, Lebanon

This paper gives a detailed, insider's look into the history and intricacies of the royal politics of the A1 SaCad examining the factors that characterize and define the course of modern Saudi Arabia from tribal affiliations to Wahhiibi mutdwCah and muftis. The author examines the internal power struggles amidst the famous 'Sudeiri Seven' and their rival claimants to the throne as well as repercussions of the system and its underpinnings on the population as a whole. Oil, power- politics, alliances with the United States and the particular means and apparatuses of control emanating from the Najd all factor in a regime that has marginalized significant sectors of society from inhabitants of the Hijiiz to the Shicah of the Eastern Province and which may or may not survive the effects of a population boom and high unemployment that coincide with an ever-increasing number of claimants to a rule predicated on the 'custodianship' of Islam's two holiest cities.

Keywords: Saudi Arabia; Saudi royal family; Sudeiri Seven; Wahhiibism; 'Abd al- C .Aziz bin al-S2iid; rnu~dwcah; oil; Prince Nayif

For the Saudi regime to be stable, for it to survive domestically and operate

regionally, four necessary conditions must be met. The first is that the Royal Family

must retain near complete unity and establish clarity and transparency in its system

of succession. The second is that it must provide a coherent and persuasive ideology.

The third is that it must be economically viable - oil in the short-term and economic

diversification in the future. The fourth is that it must control society effectively

through the institutions of the state.

The royal rivalries

The A1 SaCad rulers have never been united since they established the kingdom to

which they gave their name - Saudi Arabia - in 1932. Divisions within what is the

largest ruling family in the world are a permanent feature of Saudi politics. However,

current schisms are particularly threatening for the future stability of the Kingdom.

This is because the increasing size of approximately 22,000 members makes the

question of succession far more problematic than normal due to increasing factional

clashes and a greater number of possible claimants. Furthermore, the octogenarian

line of successors to the present aged King 'Abdullah resembles the final years of the

Soviet Union when one infirm leader succeeded another in power - a formula which

made for brief and inert rule. Many Saudis sense a similar pattern of continuous

uncertainty and leadership instability.

The history of this 'magnificent' ruling family is rife with deadly competition

within the court. The founder of the Kingdom, 'Abd al-CAziz bin 'Abd al-Rahmgn

Corresponding Address: Email: infoocarnegie-rnec.org

ISSN 1755-09 12 print1ISSN 1755-0920 online

0 2009 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies

DOI: 10.1080/17550910802576114 . .. . . . .

Contemporary Arab Affairs 9 1

A l - ~ ~ i i d (Ibn al-Saciid) who ruled from 1932 to 1953, had to first eliminate the right

of his own father in order to rule, and then distance and contain the ambitions of his

five brothers - particularly his oldest brother Muhammad who fought with him

during the battles and conquests that had given birth to the state. (Abd al-(Aziz's

cousins posed an additional threat to his succession strategy which focused on

securing the role of his sons as future Kings ((Attar n. d., p. 34; Al-Rasni n. d., p. 30; Ssdiq 1956, p. 30).

King (Abd al-'Aziz had 43 sons. The status of a prince is based on his mother's

tribe and his alliance with other princes. (Abd al-(Aziz's marriages were contracted

mostly to consolidate power among the various tribes of the Arabian Peninsula. The

more powerful the tribe of the mother, the more influence and status that attach to

the son. Power was grouped on the basis of coalitions of full brothers, the most

significant of whom were the seven brothers born from 'Abd al-'Aziz's wife, Hissah

bint Ahmad al-Sudeiri, whose eldest became King Fahd (who ruled between 1982

and 2005). Alternatively, power was also grouped according to smaller, but equally

significant wings such as that of Khslid (who ruled between 1975 and 1982), with his

full older brother Muhammad (Abii al-Sharrayn-'father of the two evils'), whose

mother was al-Jawharah bint Musacid al-Jiliwi. Or, finally, it was also grouped

such as in the case of Sa'iid's rule (from 1953 to 1962) that included his full brother

Turki. Their mother was Wadhah bint Muhammad bin 'Aqab, who belonged to the Qahtan tribe.

There were those who lacked a full brother, such as Faysal (who ruled between

1962 and 1975), whose mother was Tarfah bint 'Abdullah al-Shaykh. Faysal was

backed by the religious establishment, which is headed by the A1 Shaykh the

descendants of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahab. In addition Faysal sought authority through significant Sudeiri backing which he cemented by his marriage to a.Sudeiri.

'Abdullah, king since August 2005, also does not have a full brother. His mother

was al-Fahdah bint al-(Asi bin Shuraym who belongs to the Sharnmar tribe. (Abdullah

managed to group a large number of fringe and marginalized princes discontented

with the prospect of the succession being passed among the Sudeiri brothers one after

the other. His control of the National Guard also was a key factor.

King 'Abd al-CAziz managed to conquer and unite the vast territory of the

Arabian Peninsula and to alienate and control his cousins and brothers so that a

clear and undisputed succession process could be established; however, he could not

secure solidarity among his sons (Aba al-Nasr 1935). His last words to his two sons,

the future king Sacad and the next in line Faysal, who were already battling each

other, were: 'You are brothers, unite!' But, their father's ho,pe was in vain (Foreign

Office document 1968). Fay~a l ousted his half brother ~a 'hd after a fierce struggle

which involved the opposition of 'The Free Princes', al-umard al-ahrar (Le Monde,

31 December 1961),' and the threat of the use of the Royal Guard.

The political battle between the royal brothers lasted until 1964 when official

clerics headed by al-Shaykh issued a fatwd (religious decree) in support of Faysal,

resulting in the official exile of SaCad and his death in Greece in 1969 (Lacey 1981,

pp. 321-336). After ten years as king, Faysal was assassinated in '1975 by his nephew

Faysal bin Musgid, in a revenge killing.

Since then, the Sudeiri branch of the family has been the dominant faction

especially as Faysal's successor Khalid was ill and left political control to his half

brother Fahd, the eldest Sudeiri. Fahd reigned for 23 years, the longest period for a

92 M. Yamani

Saudi king. Since Fahd's death, they have been reduced to al-thaluth, ('the trio'):

Crown Prince Sultan, who is also defence minister; Prince Nayif, the Interior

Minister; and Prince SalmBn the Governor of Riyadh. The three powerful princes

and their prominent and ambitious sons have also become known as A1 Fahd.

'Abdullah's accession to the throne in 2005 was undermined by Sudeiri power in

a continuing struggle for authority where rule of succession is ambiguous and the

next in line is uncertain. Furthermore, 'Abdullah has changed the rules for succession

and thus made things more obscure and unpredictable than ever. 'Abdullah's

authority proved insufficient to appoint the 'Second Deputy' in line of succession

which had been the tradition since 'Abd al-(Aziz and which had afforded some degree

of predictability to the process.

To block a Sudeiri restoration, 'Abdullah created the hayJat al-baycah - 'Allegiance

Council', a very ambiguous and mysterious family council (Al-Rashid 2006). This

Council resembles the Vatican's College of Cardinals but here restrictions are not

entirely based on age but on family bloodlines and include the remaining sons of 'Abd

alJAziz and the sons of his deceased brothers. For example, among members in the

Council are the sons of the late King Faysal known as A1 Faysal, and these include:

SaCnd, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Turki head of the King Faysal Foundation and

previously the head of intelligence as well as ambassador to both the UK and the US;

and Khalid, governor of Mecca and previously the governor of 'Asir. Faysal's sons are

known to maintain their father's alliance with the Sudeiri wing while working closely

with King 'Abdullah - especially in matters of foreign policy.

The question of whether or not 'Abdullah's Succession Council will succeed in

blocking the Sudeiri group hinges upon the longevity of Minister of Defence Crown

Prince Sultan, a Sudeiri who is 84 years old and one year younger than King 'Abdullah.

If 'Abdullah dies first, the Sudeiri will simply lobby and pay off any opponents in order ,

to ensure their return to the throne. The Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif, a Sudeiri

of 80 years, is certain to emerge should t h s scenario become reality, with SalmBn

Governor of Riyadh, a Sudeiri, assuredly in-line for the succession.

Just as 'Abd al-(Aziz wanted to secure rule for his sons at the expense of his

brothers, senior princes also have ambitions for their sons. So Sultan favours KhBlid,

Deputy Head of the Army. Meanwhile, h s other son Bandar, head of the National

Security Council and former ambassador to the US, has obvious ambitions. Nayif's

son Muhammad is also being groomed by his father as the second man in the

Ministry of the Interior. King 'Abdullah has his son Mifib running the National

Guard which he heads. Even Prince Talal, who is excluded from the succession,

publicly expressed the right of his son al-Walid to be Crown Prince.

Despite 'Abdullah's innovation in the succession process, nothing can guarantee

an effective ruler. But, this story of the A1 Sacnd struggle for the succession is no

longer whispered behind closed doors. The Internet has opened a window on all the

family plots, ambitions and double dealings.

The Wahhlbi Nexus

The Saudi rulers base their legitimacy on 'custodianship' of Islam's holiest sites, and,

like communist parties vis-a-vis the working class, claim to be the special

representatives and defenders of the faith. To be sure, the fact that the regime

derives its religious authority from WahhBbism, a narrow, austere Sunni sect, limits

Contemporary Arab Affairs 93

its popular legitimacy among a diverse population that does not subscribe to the Wahhiibi d ~ c t r i n e . ~ However, the Kingdom's leaders believe that control of Mecca and Medina is sufficient justification for authoritarian rule, and that there is no need for popular representation or for democracy in any form. Regionally, their religious legitimacy remains questionable because of the narrow, defensive tenants of the regime despite Custodianship of the Holy Places.

Indeed, it is obvious that a struggle for mastery of the Muslim world is now under way. The two major states involved in this struggle, Iran and Saudi Arabia,

represent the rival sects of ShiCite and Sunni and both are expansionists. The ultimate desire of the Saudi-Wahhiibi leaders is to protect and promote their politico-religious ideology and achieve leadership within the Islamic world. They have often had the financial clout to do so: during the late 1970s and the 1980s, King Fahd, spent more than $75 billion funding schools, charities and mosques abroad (Bronson 2006,

p. 10). With this Wahhiibi explosion, Islamic pluralism and heterogeneous religious culture was deliberately suppressed.

Having conquered Mecca from Hashemite rule in 1926, 'Abd al-CAziz came to rule over the Kingdom of the Hijiiz and the Sultanate of Najd until 1932. Throughout, the Saudi regime was confident that it could reshape Islam in its image and exclude non-conforming Sunni Islamic schools of thought and ShiCite sects from the Great Mosque (Yamani 2006b). The Saudi rulers put an end to the practice known as the 'Circles of Knowledge' connoting an inter-religious debate that represented the pluralism of the religion. No more diversity or debate was allowed. Instead, a compulsory Wahhabism was in effective control.

Wahhiibi control has severely circumscribed the process of political moderniza- tion. There is a deep-seated antagonism between Wahhiibism and democracy, which is rooted in the ideology itself. Saudi Wahhabi clerics stand in principle against democratic reform, owing to their belief in both the infallibility and immutability of Wahhabi interpretations of Islamic texts and al-baycah, the unquestioning political allegiance to the ruler.

Furthermore, Wahhiibism is a minority sect, both in Saudi Arabia and in the Muslim world as a whole, whereas democracy implies the distribution of power through institutional arrangements - particularly universal enfranchisement and elections - that ensure some form of majority rule. This does not mean that the A1 Saciid-Wahhiibi system is incapable of adopting forms of democratic rule. But the form itself is inconsequential and hollow. To appease the US in its calls for

democracy after the Iraq war in 2003, and so as not to appear behind other Arab states in this regard, municipal elections were held in 2005. These were only partial, heavily managed, and of no consequence, reflecting the authoritarian regime's tendency to manipulate electoral reforms in order to strengthen its hold on power (Al-Hassan 2006, pp. 98-99).3 The success of the 'Islamists' was tailor-made by the Saudi regime and intended to warn the US that electoral reforms are undesirable in the long term. In the absence of free, fair, and genuinely competitive elections, the Wahhiibis' share of power as co-rulers of the Saudi monarchy remains highly disproportionate to their share of Saudi Arabia's diverse population.

Moreover, the alliance between the A1 Sactid and the Wahhabi clerical establishment permeates the regime. The Wahhiibi clerics are the kingdom's de facto rulers. The Wahhabi establishment controls the judicial system, the Council of

Senior 'Ularnd; the General Committee for Issuing Fatwiis, al-DaCwah (Islamic call),

94 M. Yamani

and Irshad (guidance); the Ministry of Islamic Affairs; the Supreme Headquarters

for the Council for International Supervision of Mosques; and the Committee for the

Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of Vice. The latter includes the mutiiw'ah

(religious police), whose head is a government minister. The Wahhabis also control

all religious education, which comprises half of the school curriculum; Islamic

universities in Mecca, Medina, and Riyadh; the Ministry of Hajj; and the Ministry of

Religious Endowments (awqiif). Moreover, they influence the Ministry of Finance

through control of al-zakiih (the religious alms tax), and control magazines, radio

stations and websites, as well as exercising power over the military through religious

indoctrination. In addition, in the 'Consultative Council' (majlis al-shiirii) more than

50 per cent of the members are Wahhgbis, and it is headed by a Wahhab? cleric.

This powerful religious body acts to obstruct reform. While King 'Abdullah

announced judicial reforms, in October 2007, there is little indication that his agenda

will bring the introduction of an impersonal rule of law. On the contrary, gross and

systemic miscarriages of justices continue apace, forcing 'Abdullah to exercise

benevolent intervention by pardoning victims through royal decrees (Yamani 2007).

Indeed, the judiciary, led since 1983 by Sheikh Salih al-Haydgn, remains entirely

controlled by the Wahhabi religious establishment. All of the more than 700 judges

are Wahhiibis, and the minister of justice is always a senior member of the Wahhabi

hierarchy. The courts subject all legal decisions to a narrow and selective

interpretation of the Qur'an and the sunnah, based solely on Wahhabi scholars'

interpretation of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhiib and of wider Hanbali Islamic

thought. Even 'Abdullah's tinkering refoims have been met with stubborn and

effective resistance from al-Haydsn and other senior members of this religious body.

The Wahhabi alliance was at the outset certainly a legitimizing force for the A1 Sa'tid

but today it appears as a burden.

Oil revenues have historically strengthened the Saudi rulers' control over the

Wahhiibi clerics, especially in paying for fatwds that support their political interests.

For example, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the highest

religious authority at the time, the late Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Bgz, issued a fatwd

legitimizing US protection of Saudi Arabia. In addition Bin BZz labelled Saddam

Hussein an 'infidel' (kiifir). The following year he endorsed the Oslo peace accords

between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Indeed, Saudi WahhBbism,has since become more addicted than ever to oil, as

rising prices have strengthened control internally and paid for exporting the dogma

regionally and elsewhere, partly through abundantly financed websites and satellite

television stations that are bankrolled by the King and other Saudi royals. Exclusive

fatwas can be launched 24 hours a day, seven days a week (Yamani 2006~). The latter

are intended domestically as protection against the threat which developed since the

Iraq war in 2003 posed by radical and violent Wahhiibis, referred to as 'al-ffah al-

diillah', 'the group gone astray' and regionally against Shi'ite expansionism,

emanating from Iran through Iraq and to Hizb Allah in Lebanon.

Saudi Arabia appears immersed in sectarian politics, and sectarianism has proven

an effective political instrument in the past. Now, however, it is a double-edged sword

and potentially a threat to Saudi national unity and security. The Saudi Wahhabis have

an exclusive vision of Islam even when compared to Iran's system. Whereas Iran is

orchestrating Sunni politics; supporting Hamgs and the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi

Arabia remains in a self-imposed isolation dictated by WahhZbi zealotry.


Against this backdrop, the A1 Saciid narrative of Islamic leadership and control is increasingly fragmented, as globalization gives rise to an ever greater complexity. The A1 Saciid achieved leadership and prominence as a result of oil wealth and control of Islam's holiest places, but the proliferation of new media and the free flow of people and information alarm them as these expose the flaws in their narrative

both domestically and regionally. The complexity and perpetually shifting nature of the region's landscape, of threats and challenges, makes it all the more imperative that the Saudi rulers grasp opportunities to renew their political 'survival' strategies.

The oil chimera

Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil producer, with reserves of 267 billion barrels in 2006, according to the Oil and Gas Journal. Current sustainable production capacity is 11 million barrels per day, with recent oil production at 9.5 million barrels per day. However, the Kingdom's reserve capacity is debatable. According to World Energy Outlook, Saudi oil production is soon on its way to reaching its peak - if it has not done so already (Simmons 2005; Foster 2008)' while others have estimated that Saudi production may be moving towards a period of sustained decline (Simmons 2005; Walker 2008).

Meanwhile, the increase in oil prices since 2002 has given the Saudi regime a new lease on life, enhancing the control of the A1 SaCiid over the security apparatus and military and bolstering their ability to buy domestic opposition and to promote their interests internationally. Oil money has been used by the regime as a weapon against ideological-religious threat; both Sunni political Islam and Shicite Islam.

Oil has not only contributed to the economic resources of the A1 Saciid, but has also bolstered Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and position as a regional power. Despite the development of alternatives to hydrocarbons, the Saudi'regime is likely to continue to benefit in economic and strategic terms as global energy demand continues to increase. Indeed, according to the World Energy Report, 'world energy demand is projected to increase by over 50% between now and 2030'.

Oil prices have quadrupled since 2002 and reached $100 a barrel in February 2008, enabling G n g 'Abdullah to raise the salaries of state employees by 15%, to offer 5,000 scholarships abroad - especially in the US, and to repair ageing infrastructure. 'Abdullah's ambitious plans encompass the building of the world's largest petrochemical plant in record time as part of his $500 billion initiative to build new cities, create jobs and diversify the economy (Miicawwad 2008).

The current oil boom - riding on global insecurity exacerbated by the disaster in Iraq - provides King 'Abdullah with the opportunity to pursue his strategy. So the high price of oil is, in a way, good news. 'Abdullah's plans include the inauguration of 'Jubail 11' estimated to attract industrial projects worth 210 billion Saudi Riyals and to create 55,000 jobs.

The money spent thus far has not improved public services for the vast majority

of people; water, sewerage, electricity, education and health facilities remain abysmal and degrading. And in the past, these gargantuan projects have turned into 'white elephants' instead of helping to transform and modernize the economy. They have become a constant drain on the resources that, perhaps, matter relatively little so long as oil prices remain high but are more dubious if or when prices collapse.

96 M. Yamani

Unfortunately, high oil prices also provide resources for the king's opponents. As

is said in Saudi Arabia, 'the greater the money, the greater the corruption.' There is

also rising social tension, emanating from the vastly unequal distribution of oil

revenues. Ninety per cent of private sector jobs go to foreigners. The repressive

structure of society conceals massive popular resentment and questions about

destabilization (Foster 2008).

Oil prices are unstable and cannot compensate for actual reform. The oil wave

buys the subservience of the people and delays political demands but high oil prices

alone cannot solve the unemployment problems. In the light of the fingdom's excess

demand for labour, reliance on foreign labour is a major factor in unemployment.

There are mismatches between education and the needs of the national economy

(UNDP 2003). Significant changes to the educational system are crucial as well as a

shift from the policy of discrimination based on sect, tribe or gender. Population

growth fuels domestic economic and political pressures for reform.

The traditional patrimonial model is increasingly vulnerable not only to the

inherent uncertainty implied by dependence on oil revenues, but also to a population

explosion and the accompanying need to reduce unemployment. The Kingdom's

population is now more than 22 million (including expatriates), while 50% of Saudis

are under 15 years old and must be accommodated economically and politically

(Ministry of Economy and Statistics 1999). The royal sphere is also expanding

rapidly, with the ratio of royals to commoners at one to a thousand (compared to

one to five million, for example, in the United Kingdom). This has intensified the

challenge of managing princely privileges, salaries and demand for jobs. For

example, royal perks include lifetime jobs and domination of the civil service, which

enable the princes to award contracts and receive commissions on top of their

salaries. Princes, especially important ones, also compete against indigenous

merchants for contracts. The new generations of Saudi Arabia are demanding

citizenship rights in contradistinction to the subdued, subservient subjects of the

past.

Patrimony based on oil revenue is subject to modification and change. Kuwait,

which possesses 10% of world oil, is an example of a rentier state that has embarked

on a democratic experiment offering freedom of the press, increased political

participation, and electoral choice. These reforms impact other oil-rich Gulf

countries similarly ruled by emirs and sheikhs. Thus, while oil money has served the

Saudi absolute monarchy at the expense of democracy, it nolt necessarily an obstacle

to change (Yamani 2006a). Monarchies throughout the ages have had successful

survival strategies. Most of these have opened themselves up to include rising middle

classes who would otherwise be their most likely challengers; as can be seen, for

example in the Moroccan, Jordanian and (more recently) the Bahraini monarchies.

America: the destabilizing patron

The Saudi regime is divided, its legitimacy questioned, its sectarian tensions

heightened, and although oil prices are booming, the environment is highly

revolutionary. The fact is that each of the three pillars of the Saudi state and regime

discussed above is inherently unstable, and each has become a source of domestic

discontent that is compounded by the US-Saudi alliance which makes the Saudi

regime appear weak and dependent.


The external backing provided by the US makes ordinary Saudis wonder whether or not the state is a de facto American colony. In many ways, as a result of the American connection, the regime has staked its survival and authority on international necessity, rather than domestic legitimacy. Since the first oil concession to US companies in 1933, US power has grown to become the main guarantor of both oil wealth and regime stability (Sampson 1975).

The commitment of the' US to provide supporting infrastructure - particularly the US military presence since 1945 in Zahriin, near the Dammgm oilfields - has informed the Saudi rulers' perception of their regional security. The US ensured the Kingdom's survival in the face of external threats. It provided support in the fight against proxy enemies in Yemen from 1964 to 1967 (Safran 1988, p. 140). Military sales to Saudi Arabia during the 1970s reached $5 billion; and, in 1981 following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the US sold Saudi Arabia billions of dollars worth of high-tech arms, including F-15 jet combat aircraft and Airborne Warning and Control System planes (Safran 1988, p. 328). These large-scale military expenditures bolstered Saudi security but also were a means of protecting ties with the US and maintaining Saudi influence in Washington.

Ultimately, however, the huge US military presence in the Kingdom delayed the development of its indigenous army. Indeed, the Kingdom's main problem is a chronic shortage of manpower, with Saudi armed forces numbering only 200,000 soldiers in 2005, including the National Guard. The Saudi regime opted to rely on US security guarantees rather than on its own population, and it trusted the US in regard to the development of the Army and protective military intelligence against coups.

In accordance with US policy-makers' belief that Saudi Arabia's extraordinarily abundant wealth should be put to work, the regime recycles its oil revenues through investments in America - through arms purchases, and loans to international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Riyadh's willingness to invest its revenue in American-supported causes earned it considerable favor in Washington but criticism from the Saudi population. Saudi Arabia also has been willing to increase oil production to advance US interests.

More broadly, the reliance of Saudi Arabia's rulers on external backing has entrenched a historical pattern of articulating national projects in terms of foreign policy - reflected most recently in the Kingdom's efforts to mediate in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict - rather than aligning their interests with the development of the nation. This has generated internal pressures in favor of strengthening domestically rooted authority that is aimed at realizing the idea of a nation-state, conceived in terms of a diverse society in which pluralism is institutionally acknowledged and channeled.

For example, many Saudi intellectuals believe that the strategic relationship with the US does not serve the Kingdom's national interests in the long term, as it diverts resources from internal investment and into military hardware and actually paid for American military presence in the Kingdom for many years - up until 2002. Such intellectuals have no objection to US protection of the Saudi regime but seek to break the link between the defense of international sovereignty and domestic repression in the name of 'fighting terrorism'. Indeed, several reformers were jailed in February 2007 on charges of funding terrorism, and they remain without legal representation - a tactic that has been enabled in part by US policy-makers who

98 M. Yamani

ignore abuses of justice in the name of security (Human Rights Watch 2007).

Repression thrives, enabled by myopic perception of Saudi Arabia as a

homogeneous society rather than as a mosaic of significant but little-known

communities that demand recognition.

The use of diversity

In fact, socio-cultural heterogeneity is central to the question of the Saudi regime's

stability. The regime's reliance on oil revenue has contributed to the creation of a

middle class that in some ways has become another key source of reformist pressure.

However, as a historical and sociological phenomenon, the emergence of a Saudi

middle class is not entirely comparable to historical political development in its

significance. On the contrary, it is more accurate to speak of 'middle classes' whose

concomitant emergence continues to be mediated by ethnic and culturally based

cleavages that reinforce a restrictive political hierarchy that trumps socio-economic

status.

Within this hierarchy, the Najdis who come from the heartland of the A1 Saciid

maintain privileged status, while the Hijiizis of Mecca and Medina are partly

included and the ShiCah in the Eastern Province as well as the southern tribes of

'Asir, especially the Ismacilis, are practically shunned. Given these groups' divergence

of interests, their middle-class members do not present a united front against the

regime. On the other hand, separatist tendencies based on these cleavages render

Saudi national identity itself fragile.

While the Saudi state is perceived by some as a colony from the standpoint of

international relations, domestically the regime resembles a colonial power, ruling

the Kingdom from the central Najd region. The 'Najdification' of the state gained

force during the 1980s, and Najdi representation, starting from the Council of

Ministers and extending to general establishments and local councils, is said to reach

80%. Other segments of the population thus feel alienated and inadequately

represented, further weakening the regime's domestic legitimacy.4

As a result, the emergence of an economically empowered middle class, in

combination with continuing repression, discrimination, and antagonism of

minorities and other politically marginalized groups, could lead to disintegration.

The most challenging group to the A1 Sactid, are currently the Shicah, who constitute

75% of the population in the Eastern Province, the Kingdom's main oil-producing

region especially as their political affiliation to Iraqi and other ShiCite groups in the

region has strengthened.

While a re-working of Saudi national identity in recognition of the country's

religious and tribal diversity is possible, this would eventually require the A1 Saciid to

agree to some form of political empowerment of the Shicah and of other politically

marginalized groups. After all, the response of today's disempowered Shiciah has

been to seek political connections and backing from the wider political ShiCite

movements. So, the choice for the Saudi rulers is a stark one as to whether to

empower the Shiciah, within the system or to see them increase in power because of

their external alliances. This is no abstract threat given that today's borders are

porous.

So far, however, King (Abdullah has shown no sign of creating a policy of

inclusion aimed at the Shicah. Even a tokenism, say, in the form a ShiCite minister


has not been attempted. 'Abdullah is unable to stop the Wahhabi satellite television

stations from denouncing the Shi'ite 'heretics', or the hundreds of Wahhabi websites

that call for the outright elimination of the Shi'ah. (Some 'religious guidance' has

even reached an extreme that suggests killing a Shi'ite Muslim merits more ajr, or

reward in heaven, than killing a Christian or a ~ e w . ~ )

Instead of active political change, 'Abdu11ah's strategy is one of political

decompression: to make just enough concessions to appease Saudi Arabia's

subordinate and disheartened peoples and relieve pressure for reform. To this end,

he appears to be constructing a centrist political alliance equipped to compromise

between demands for recognition of diversity and Saudi repression in the name of

homogeneity and national unity. King 'Abdullah and his camp could vigorously

pursue a policy of political liberalization and decompression - trusting the Saudi

population with greater freedom of expression and influence over government.

However, instead the time of the King and his loyalists is consumed by internal

political fights and feuds within the Al-sacad family and Wahhabi co-rulers.

In this struggle, Wahhabism should be vulnerable to popular pressure for

reform. Democratic experiments in Qatar, the only other Wahhabi state in the

Arabian Peninsula, provide a telling counterpoint, and one that Saudi Arabia's

Wahhabi clerics clearly dread, for they suggest that if Wahhabis accept democratic

procedures, Wahhabism will be forced to change its guiding attitudes and principles.

Similarly, in Kuwait and Bahrain, salafis (a non-madhahb-specific designation for

Muslims who seek to emulate the 'pious ancestorsy-al-salaf al-~dlih, and who thus share an affinity with Wahhabis) have become more moderate as a result of their

participation in those countries' parliaments, where they had to work alongside with

the Shi'ite and female ministers. It is noteworthy that the Salafis in Bahrain and in

Kuwait only joined parliament after securing permission from the highest Wahhabi

authority sheikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Baz and later from his successor, Sheikh 'Abd al-

'Aziz A1 Shaykh. The permission is indicative that while Saudi Wahhiibis object to

democracy at home, they could be pragmatic about political reform for outsiders,

but not in Saudi land where Wahhiibi power would be weakened.

The fact is that it is not religion that obstructs democratic reform but its

manipulation for authoritarian rule. Within the region, only in Saudi Arabia do

members of the mu[aw'ah (religious police), employees of the Committee for the

Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, represent the 'hand of God' and

remain above the law. But popular outrage at their brutal practices is indicative of

pressures for reform. Since May 2007, the mutawcah launched an aggressive

offensive, raiding houses and locking up individuals for days, with some tortured

and others beaten to death.6 The rnutawCah also have a negative impact on business

and tourism; they patrol the streets of the kingdom in their government cars

searching for sinful outsiders. The A1 Sacad are unable or unwilling to stop this state-

sponsored violence, which many Saudis perceive as a form of official terrorism.

Responding to renewed demands by Saudi professionals to bring the mutaw'ah to

justice, Prince Nayif instead praised .them, linking their mission to the fight against

t e r r~ r i sm .~

Islam itself is explicitly presented by the Saudi Wahhabis as an obstacle to

reform. The strategy is to impress upon the Saudi population that other countries in

the region which have embarked on democratic reform are fundamentally different,

because they do not bear custodianship over Mecca and Medina. Hence, from this

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