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Tohoku Forum for CreativityReport from Group 5:
Early Warning, Evacuation, Partnerships
Chair: Yuichi Ono
Co-Chair: Hiroaki Maruya
Tohoku University, IRIDeS2014.11.08
Group 4 Participants
Nyo Nyo Aye, Myanmar
Singo Kochi, IRP, Kobe
Nuan, Sri Lanka
Pradip, Nepal
Hazar, Myanmar
Yashito Jibiki, IRIDeS
Maasaki Miyamoto, IRIDeS
Takako Izumi, IRIDeS
Carrine Yi,
Erich, Mas, IRIDeS
Peter Sammonds, UCL, UK
Rosanna Smith, UCL, UK
Takeshi Mori, Technopro
Tadao, Hasae, DBJ
Hiroaki Maruya, IRIDeS
Yichi Ono, IRIDeS
Reid Basher, New Zealand
Main Topics of Group 5 Discussion
The warnings and evacuation experience in GEJE, Cyclone Yolanda (Tacloban), and Mt Ontake
How EWS work, technical aspects, successes
Problems and failures in EWS and evacuation
Effective, people-centered EWS
Presentations and other experiences
1. Reid Basher: Concepts and practice of early warning systems
2. Yashito Jibiki: Early warning experience with Hainan and Mt Ontake disasters
3. Participants: experience in events in Japan (including Kobe, GEJE) and elsewhere (Cyclone Nargis, Indian Ocean tsunami, Christchurch EQ)
Reduced disaster risk from S&T - EWS
CHINA: Storm and flood forecasting
drives EWS and evacuation - huge
reduction in flood fatalities
1931 3,700,000
1959 2,003,396
1960-2000 p.a. <35,000
2006-2007 p.a. <2,000
BANGLADESH: Community-based
warning dissemination linked to
district offices and national warning
centre has high cost benefit ratio
$40 saved per $1 invested in warning system
$400 - $500 saved per affected household
(equal to about one year’s income)
Key elements of modern storm warnings
Extensive global data collection and exchangePhysics-based high resolution numerical models (NWP)
Automated model-output statisticsIntermediaries (e.g. TV) for communicating to public
Linear systems model of early warning
Monitoring(initial state) System model
(time evolving) Prediction (probabilistic)
Wave propagation,
coastal run-up
Seismicity, sea
level, bathymetryZ(x, y, t) +
Communications
Response (complex)
Preparedness,
response to EW
Z(x, y, t) +
Difficult issues at all steps
Monitoring
(initial state) System model
(time evolving) Prediction
(probabilistic)
Scientific knowledge of
hazard
Communities, politics
Institutional mandates
and mechanisms
Research
Response
behaviour and
experience
Mitigation, education,
preparedness
Technical sub-system
Not quite as simple
as the linear model !
An integrated systems model of EWS
The four elements of systematic
people-centred early warning systems
Risk assessment Warning service
Preparedness Communication
+
+
+ +
EW systems typically fail in the communication and preparedness elements
Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans: risk knowledge failed to penetrate public and policymaker consciousness
Indian Ocean tsunami: failures occurred in all four elements
http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/
Tsunami WS – part of a bigger system
Evacuation capacities Protective structures,
Public education
A broad view of early warning of risks
Natural hazards Second-Minute-Day-Week-Month-Year-Decade
Earthquake, tsunami XXXXXXXXX
Weather, tides, floods XXXXXXXXXX
Volcanic eruption XXXXXXXXXXXX
Reservoirs, soils, snow pack XXXXXXXXXXXX
Ocean anomaly, seasonal climate XXXXXXXXXXXX
Climate change XXXXXX
Complex hazards .
Emergencies, conflict XXXXXXXXX
Crops, food prices, reserves, food aid XXXXXXXX
Environment, industry, urban, infrastructure XXXXXXXX
Land use, economic change, climate change XXXXX
EWS – science-based systems to warn of harmful future conditions
Long interest by UN General Assembly and in Secretary General reports
Interest spurred by impacts of big El Niño events in 1990s.
Key element in DRR processes (IDNDR, UNISDR; HFA)
Strong interest by small island developing states (SIDS); and recognised in UNFCCC as a climate change adaptation
UNISDR Platform for the Promotion of EW (PPEW)
UN support for Indian Ocean disaster recovery and tsunami warning, and upgrading of EWS generally
Early warning in UN processes
In 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan calls for EWS “for all
hazards and all people”
EW systems need to be designed as a system process,
with strong consideration to the human response part of
the system
EW systems have similar fundamental elements as a
scientific system process
But they differ greatly in the detail of their
implementation
We do not have an integrated approach on EW, and are
far from Kofi Anan’s ideal of EW for all hazards and all
people
Early Warning System
in the case of
Super Typhoon Haiyan
• Damages of Haiyan
• Design of the Questionnaire Survey
• Severe Weather Bulletin
• Sources of information on the approaching typhoon
• Timing of receiving information on the approaching
typhoon
• Estimation of typhoon intensity
• Reasons for NO evacuation
• Confidence in PAGASA information
• Terminology: Storm Surge VS Tsunami
• Discussions from the Results
Presentation Outline
Severe Weather Bulletin
•9 warnings2 Weather Advisory
7 Severe Weather Bulletin
•3rd bulletin on 11 AM of 7th Nov
•18 hours before the landfall
•Estimation of storm surge
•7m at maximum
•6m observed in Tacloban
70.1%
64.9%
69.9%
75.5%
65.9%
73.7%
71.7%
71.7%
73.1%
64.5%
5.1%
7.9%
3.8%
3.4%
7.6%
2.9%
3.6%
1.3%
5.0%
10.5%
24.8%
27.2%
26.2%
21.1%
26.4%
23.4%
24.7%
27.0%
21.8%
25.0%
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%
Total (N=589)
Tacloban (N=202)
Palo (N=183)
Tanauan (N=204)
Male (N=276)
Female (N=312)
20s (N=166)
30s (N=152)
40s (N=119)
Over 50s (N=152)
Evacuated to some places except my house
Evacuated to second floor or top roof of my house
Not evacuated
Evacuation Behavior
Site
Gender
Age
29.9%
73.7%
71.2%
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0%
1. TV
2. Radio
3. Newspaper
4. Internet
5. Market
6. School/Workplace
7. Family
8. Relatives/Friends
9. Barangay Leader
10. Church
11. Others
Information Source of Yolanda
Note: multiple answers were allowed in this question.
3.2%
32.9%
20.4%
23.1%
6.0%
4.6%
2.8%
3.7%
3.2%
1.9%25.1%
19.9%
28.0%
9.0%
9.0%
6.6%
0.0%
0.5%
2.6%
29.0%20.1%
25.5%
7.5%
6.8%
4.7%
1.9%
1.9%
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Family
Desa/dusun leader
Local government
PVMBG staff
Informal leader
TV or radio
Other
I don't know
No Answer
Kediri (N=216)
Blitar (N=211)
Total (N=427)
Whom do you trust most for information?
19
Terminology: Storm Surge VS Tsunami
Understood the meaning of “Storm Surge” before Yolanda?
Yes = 12.8%
If you heard it was "tsunami", evacuated to anywhere else except your house?
0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%
Definitely PossiblyCould not judge Did not evacuateNo idea
Just after start of eruption photo by Tourist
Eruption started at 27 October
11:52 am
Source: Chu-nichi news paper
http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/front/list/CK2014100202000269.html
Cause of death
Damaged death 46, Burned death 1
As of 2nd October by DMAT
200 m
110 Active Volcanoes in
Japan
Alert level by JMA
Level 5
0 / 31
Level 4
0 / 31
Level 3
3 / 31
Level 2
5 / 31
Level 1
23 / 31
Background: key perspectives, policies and planning frameworks
1. EWS cover wide range of hazards, and differ greatly
2. Science and technical systems are well developed, but
always have uncertainty and error
3. International mechanisms for cooperation and data exchange
mostly good, but with exceptions
4. Different perspective of the citizen and the authorities on the
risk and on how to act
5. [situations in other sectors – public health, education]
Problems and challenges in implementing early warning and evacuation measures
1. Gap between and early warning and subsequent action
2. Failure in communications, delivery/receipt of warnings.
Need to learn details and address these problems
3. Evacuation challenge; wrong assumption that people
understand what’s at risk and know what to do.
4. GEJE evacuation relatively successful – low fatality rate.
5. But still problem of the unexpected mega event, previous
warning of minor event. Some people did not get good
warning. Problem of how to evacuate
6. Situation of failures more extreme in Tacloban
7. Rarity of events; lack of knowledge and direct experience
(what is a storm surge?)
Problems and challenges in implementing early warning and evacuation measures
1. Need to engage people in advance, developing awareness
and preparedness for appropriate action on warning.
2. People centered – how to do this. Self-responsibility and
reaction on big EQ. understanding local risks (part of 4
elements)
3. Issue of false alarms; need to develop better representation
of intrinsic uncertainty in warnings
4. Evacuation fears, e.g. loss of property, risk of relocation
1.
Based on our findings: Recommendations for EWS and evacuation
1. Much more serious effort to design EWS from
viewpoint of citizen, rather than just top down
2. tailored to – and by - the community
3. Test EWS against 4 elements of effective EWS
4. Telling the story about what the warning means,
creating narratives that makes sense of the situation
and how to act
5. Tools for expanding memory/experience to beyond
the disaster area and time frame
Based on our findings: Recommendations for EWS and evacuation
1. Continued effort to upgrade technical quality
2. New ways to represent uncertainty and celebrating
good responses even when event is weak.
3. More detailed work on reliability of all parts of
system – e.g. during electricity failure
4. Work to ensure authority and consistency of
warnings
5. Better techniques for communicating relative
seriousness of the impending event
Based on our findings: Suggestions and Implications for Future Work of IRIDeS
1. Continue engagement and bridging between science
and practical EWS
2. Use systematic frameworks for developing and
researching EWS
3. Do comparative studies of EWS (e.g. GEJE,
Tacloban, Mt Ontake, etc)
4. Identify critical techical issues such as uncertainty
and the false alarm problem
5. Research space-time memory extension