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Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on Sri Lankan Studies, 28-30 November 2003, Ruhunu U.Do not cite without authors permission.

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9th International Conference on Sri Lanka StudiesFull Paper Number 005

Defining the Public Interest, Negotiating Rights: The Influence of EnvironmentalImpact Assessment Legislation in Sri Lanka

Cynthia M. Caron

Address for Correspondence

Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,USA.

Email: [email protected]

Paper submitted for the

9th

International conference on Sri Lanka Studies,

28th

30th

November 2003,Matara, Sri Lanka


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Defining the Public Interest, Negotiating Rights: The Influence of Environmental Impact

Assessment Legislation in Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) is used to determine a development projects environmental and socialcosts and benefits. In the 1980's, environmental groups in Sri Lanka lobbied for, and in many cases won, inclusionof environmental regulations into their legal systems. Simultaneously, many international financial institutionsbegan to require the completion of an EIA for securing funds. The EIA process institutionalizes opportunities forgroups to enforce public accountability through a provision for mandatory public hearings. In the case of energy-sector development, EIA has forced the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) to interact with citizens in very direct, andoften unpredictable, ways. During public hearings and social protests, disagreements between state officials andlocal residents over a projects potential costs and benefits frequently arise. Litigation following from suchdisagreements has increased the influence of the public in development planning and as a result has influencedpolitical culture. Exploring how the EIA process has been used in energy-sector development (i.e., Norachcholai,Morgahakanda, and Ethul Kotte), this paper examines how different ideas of the public interest are constructed andbecome premised on a notion of citizen rights. Using written documents, participant observation at local protests

and public hearings, and stakeholder interviews, I illustrate how the use of environmental legislation reshapesenergy-sector planning from a technical exercise to a political process and re-orders relationships of power betweenstate institutions and groups in society. An examination of the struggles over producing power in Sri Lanka hasimplications for other states in the process of redesigning energy security strategies and for citizen-action groupstrying to protect their local environments and maintain access to their livelihood resources.

There is a cost for development. You cant run away from that.

(CEB official, 5 December 2000)

There are those who live in order to show their superior power

Electric power is essential for capitalists

In the huts of laborers who toil through farming

Anyone who is smart will understand this fact- they do not have a light

(Excerpt from a Sinhala poem written byMr. B. Ranatunga Perera, translated by author)

The introduction of environmental impact assessment (EIA) legislation into Sri Lanka

has forced project proponents, including state bureaucracies, to account for the environmental

and social impacts of new development projects. As with several national-level policies across

the world, there is often a disjuncture between policy and practice. Policy makers should

examine this disjuncture as more than a simple dichotomy of success or failure in policy

implementation, and be attentive to theprocesses through which decoupling occurs.


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I draw on the disjuncture between policy and practice in three cases from Sri Lankas

energy sector to show the types of possibilities the EIA process enables and how citizens

collectively engage the state or talk back to the state as a social force that shapes their lifes (Finn

1998). In all of the cases below, the non-governmental organization (NGO), Environmental

Foundation Limited (EFL) was involved to a certain extent. Using the states own environmental

policies, EFL assists communities in protecting their local environments and addressing the

adverse effects of electricity-generation infrastructure on their quality of life. It uses the process

as a platform for such collectivities to stake claims, negotiate pre-existing and new rights with

the state, and demand that the state recognize alternative meanings of development.

The Environment: Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Duties

In the 1940s, Sri Lankas various presidents and parliamentarians began the thirty-year

process of crafting a Constitution that could be ratified by the islands ethnically and religiously-

diverse population. The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978)

defines a number of fundamental rights for citizens and a number of fundamental duties for the

State. Fundamental rights and fundamental duties are in a precarious balance. The fundamental

rights and duties relevant to this discussion of the EIA process are:

Freedom from torture and cruel or inhuman punishment (Article 11), Equality before the law (Article 12), Freedom of speech and expression including publication, the freedom of peaceful

assembly, and the freedom of association (Article 14-1a)

Freedom of movement and choice residence within Sri Lanka (Article 14 -1h)(1978: 8).

The duty of every person to respect the rights and freedoms of others and toprotect nature and conserve its riches. (1978: 18)

These fundamental rights are subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the

interests of racial and religious harmony (1978: 9). However, the power of the Executive

Presidency empowers the president at his or her discretion to pass Emergency Regulations that

restrict rights of mobility, public assembly, and speech.


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In addition to the fundamental rights granted to citizens, the Constitution provides the

state with the broad responsibility of environmental protection. Articles 27 and 28 of the Sri

Lankan Constitution outline these fundamental duties. Environmental responsibilities of the state

include: the equitable distribution among all citizens of the material resources (emphasis mine)

of the community, as well as protecting, preserving, and improving the environment for the

benefit of the community (1978: 18). The environment can be defined as a material resource

that should be equitably distributed across society. Citizens, though, have no fundamental right

to access to the environment. The exclusion of such a right disables citizens who wish to

articulate an environmental claim or grievance. In addition, environment is ambiguously

defined. The absence of an official definition provides opportunities for groups in society to

construction their own definitions of what constitutes the environment when they argue claims

both grounded in or against environmental stewardship. With the liberalization of economy in

1977, hydropower projects, free-trade zones and increased foreign direct investment, the

environment has become a site of struggle for groups in society who wish to redirect this

dominant development trajectory.

Article 28, calls upon all Sri Lankan citizens to protect nature and conserve its riches,

providing environmental NGOs and groups of local citizens with an opportunity to challenge

infrastructure planning that alters the environment. The responsibilities of the state as provider of

electric power and protector of the environment are often contradictory ones. The state can undo

the language of Article 28 by invoking the language of Article 27: subserving the common

good. Thus environmental activists have relied on creative legal strategies and the EIA process

to assist them in staking claims and negotiating demands with the state.

Elected officials took the wording of Article 27 seriously. In the early 1980s the Sri

Lankan Parliament passed an impressive number of environmental laws. The National


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Environmental Act (NEA; Act 47 of 1980) validated environmental protection on the island by

creating an enabling environment for establishing the Central Environmental Authority in 1981.

The NEA is a set of environmental provisions for the protection, management, and

enhancement of the environment, for the regulation, maintenance and control of the quality of

the environment, [and] for the prevention, abatement and control of pollution (IRG 1998: 1.1.4).

The use of the EIA process as part of the National Environmental Act began in 1980 as well. The

purpose of an environmental impact assessment was to ensure that

development options under consideration are environmentally sound and thatenvironmental consequences are recognized and taken into account early in the

project design. The EIA process should also help public officials make decisionsthat are based on an understanding of environmental consequences, and take actionsthat protect, restore and enhance the environment (CEA 1995: 1).

Initially, the EIA process only applied to coastal zone development in accordance with

the Coast Conservation Act of 1981. But with the increased international acceptance of EIA as

one of the most powerful tools for creating sustainable development (IRG 1998), by 1984 all

high-impact projects1 required an EIA. This mandatory EIA requirement was amended to the

National Environmental Act (Act No. 56) in 1988.

With financial assistance from the United States Agency of International Development

(USAID) between 1991-1997, the Sri Lankan government refined its EIA standards to fit

specific Sri Lankan conditions.2 USAID consultants helped Central Environmental Authority

(CEA) officials adapt EIA procedures to the unique environmental characteristics of the

country (CEA 1995).3

Today, the CEA together with 14 project-approving agencies (PPA) of

the government monitor the EIA process from the initial application through data collection and

1 High-impact projects include, for example, highway development, energy-sector projects, and hotels with morethan 100 rooms.2 Rather than reinvent the wheel, the Government of Sri Lanka had based its original EIA legislation on guidelinesdesigned by other countries in the region, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (IRG 1998).3 The USAID-funded project was called The Natural Resource and Environmental Policy Project (NAREPP).


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its final approval. Once the CEA and the appointed PPA have approved an EIA report, project

construction may commence. The Ministry of Irrigation and Power, for example, is the PPA for

all energy-development projects.

Requiring an EIA for all high-impact projects including electricity infrastructure has had

significant impacts on the design of Sri Lankan development projects, in general, and for the role

of public participation in energy development in particular. The cases below illustrate how the

EIA process helps to redefine the national interest and reconcile contradictions within the state.

EIA assists citizens to act on their duty to protect nature and conserve its riches (Article 28) as

well as guide the State, to protect, preserve, and improve the environment for the benefit of the

community (Article 27).

Provisions for Public Participation

Public participation is one of the most salient features of Sri Lankas EIA process (Zubair

2001, 1998), providing a 30-day period for public comment that includes provisions for several

public hearings. During public hearings, individual citizens and entire communities may come

forward to question project proponents about the project or state their concerns about the project

for the public record. Public hearings are especially important when the proposed project is

highly controversial or threatens a nationally-recognized environmentally sensitive area (i.e.,

bird sanctuary, national park) (CEA 1995:13). Public hearings are one of the few

institutionalized spaces in the country for concerned citizens and communities to comment

directly on the local impacts of proposed development projects. Citizens may argue for or against

a project, challenge it, and suggest alternatives in the presence of government officials. Thus,

EIA opens up large-scale infrastructure projects to public scrutiny and creates a space for local

communities to talk back (Finn 1998) to or engage the state, its officials, and their overall

national development program. If the project-approving agency listens to comments and


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concerns expressed at a public hearing (and quite often do), then local communities and NGOs

are able to redirect the countrys infrastructure planning.

Public hearings provide an opportunity for a projects potentially-affected persons to

challenge the ways that the authors of an EIA report have describe their area and a projects

potential impacts. EIA reports tend to privilege a projects environmental impact over its social

and cultural ones. The Norachcholai EIA report included a chapter entitled, Description of the

Existing Environment; with a subsection called, Human Population and Socio-Economy. The

project impacts on a sacred place such as St. Annes Shrine and the culture of Sri Lankan Roman

Catholic Church were not taken into consideration. Respiratory problems were statistically

documented at Norachcholai, but the EIA report could not capture the communitys fear that

additional respiratory aliments would result from the coal power plants smokestacks.4

The

inability of the EIA process to take into consideration cultural impacts or perceptions of risk is a

direct result of the process of EIA-knowledge construction: to reduce an areas complexity and

homogenize its culture and its population in order to facilitate economic development (Baviskar

1995; Goldman 2001a).

Since public participation frequently blocks or delays project approval, project

proponents argue against it. Proposals have been submitted to Parliament to reduce the number

of days for public comment from 30 to 14 (Zubair 1998), but such proposals have not passed. As

we shall see in the Moragahakanda case, 30 days often is just barely enough time to raise public

awareness about a project and to organize meetings and letter writing campaigns.

4 The EIA teams unfamiliarity with the Moragahakanda project area produced an error in the EIA report that wasthe subject of a good laugh at one public hearing. In listing the villages that were to be resettled by the project, thewriter used the wrong letter for ra in the Mara of Maragama. They wrote Maragama (dead village) rather thanMaragama (village of the Mara trees).


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Environmental Foundation Ltd. (EFL) interventions in Energy-Sector Development

Grid extensions and the siting of power plants occur in urban and rural areas. Since the

1996 power crisis, Environmental Foundation Ltd. (EFL) has assisted many local communities to

use the EIA process or has used the process itself to intervene in CEB decisions to expand its

electricity-generation capacity. EFL staff travels across the island to guarantee that persons

potentially affected by development projects understand the EIA process and know what their

constitutional rights and the constitutional responsibilities of the state are.

EFL is the oldest public-interest environmental law group in Asia and a foundingmember of the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide (E-LAW), an organization based in

Eugene, Oregon.5

EFL staff organize and teach legal-aid clinics and legal-education programs.

They maintain equipment in the Community Environmental Laboratory to collect scientific data

for litigation. They offer environmental-monitoring assistance for a small fee. They maintain a

library and documentation center with government reports and public debates on environmental

issues. They publish a quarterly newsletter in Sinhala and English that updates subscribers on

current activities and pending court cases. They also publish the quarterly journal, The South

Asian Environmental Reporterwhich provides detailed accounts of evidence and strategies used

in environmental litigation in Sri Lanka and other Asian countries. The Reporter is a valuable

legal resource that updates environmental activists across South Asia of landmark precedents and

new legal strategies.

The legal staff at EFL typically files motions against agencies that have not enforced

environmental regulations or used the EIA process. Over the past decade, they have been

5 E-LAW publishes two electronic documents: E-LAW Advocate and E-LAW E-Bulletin. According to its e-mailcorrespondence, The E-LAW Advocate is a quarterly newsletter which highlights E-LAW's work around the worldand examines innovative legal strategies E-LAW partners are using to protect the environment; E-Bulletins reportbreaking news on E-LAW events and environmental victories around the globe (e-mail communication, 30 July2002).


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involved in eliciting public participation and/or brought suits against the CEB and the central

government with respect to several electricity-infrastructure projects. Below I examine three

projects: The Ethul Kotte Childrens Case, the Moragahakanda Agricultural Development

Project, and the Norachcholai Coal Power Plant to demonstrate how urban and rural constituents

and the NGO sector used the EIA process to interact with or experience the state as the CEB

pursued power-sector development. As a constitutional mandate, the EIA provided an

institutionalized space for citizens to negotiate with the CEB. EFL used it as a platform for the

collectivities that would be disadvantaged by electricity-generation projects to stake claims and

negotiate rights against the state as well as challenge state-sponsored definitions of national

interest and environment.

Suing on Behalf of Your Next Friend: The Ethul Kotte Childrens Case

In response to the 1996 power crisis, the CEB solicited private contracts for several

diesel-powered generators to be connected to the national grid. In July 1996, Koolair Ventures, a

firm specializing in industrial electrical goods such as air conditioning and back-up generators

began to assemble eight diesel-powered generators (11.2-megawatt capacity) in an open-air shed

within the confines of a CEB substation. The substation was located in the lower to middle class

residential neighborhood of Ethul Kotte, a Colombo suburb. Koolair Ventures did not carry out

an environmental impact assessment for the project. The municipal authority did not clear the

generators installation. The CEB substation was adjacent to a bird sanctuary. The National

Environmental Act (Section 23 Z of 1995) restricts activity within 100 meters from the

boundaries of, or within, any area declared as a Sanctuary under the Fauna and Flora Protection

Ordinance (Chapter 469).or a public lake as defined in the Crown Lands Ordinance (Chapter

454). The new Ethul Kotte plant violated both counts.


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Residents formed a local committee, the Ethul Kotte-Environmental Protection

Association, with the intention of halting the generators installation. By October 1996, they had

visited and written to all local government officials and lodged complaints with the police.

Although the land was owned by the CEB, planning clearance for any activity in the

municipality is at Urban Development Authority (UDA) discretion.6

The UDA was the project-

approving agency for any new development that would occur in the municipality. Officials from

the UDA wrote a letter to Koolair executives stating it would not grant clearance to the project as

the substation was within a bird sanctuary. Furthermore, as the only access road to the site was

from the ceremonial drive to Parliament, the road often is closed to vehicular traffic for security

purposes. The site also needed to have an alternate access route. Koolair executives did not

respond to the UDA letter. The next month the UDA reversed its decision to avert a national

crisis and gave permission to Koolair to operate through July 1997.

Failing to stop the project through local government channels, the association secretary

began working with an environmental lawyer at EFL. The Ethul Kotte Association undertook an

extensive letter writing campaign and circulated petitions for the removal of the generators. No

action was taken. On February 7 at 11:00 PM the generators began 24-hour nonstop operation.

According to local residents, the noise was unbearable, homes shook, and plaster fell from

interior walls (Fieldnotes 15 August and 6 December 2000). Within days, the association hired

the Community Environmental Laboratory to conducted sound tests around the site. Results

indicated that at distances of 20 to 70 meters from the substations borders, noise exceeded

permissible levels for medium-noise areas.7

6 Mr. Nihal Fernando, Deputy Director (Development Regulations), Urban Development Authority, wrote a one-page letter to Mr. E.A. de Livera, Director of Koolair Ventures Power (Pvt.) Ltd. outlining the factors that prohibitclearance and you are advised to identify suitable alternate location for your proposed activity (Letter dated 16October 1996).7 A municipality or urban council area is a medium-noise level area. According to Gazette No. 924/12 of 23rd May1996, the maximum daytime noise level for a medium-noise level area is 63 dB. At the Ethul Kotte site earlyafternoon readings ranged between 67 and 92 dB. (Community Environmental Laboratory 1997).


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On February 20, a group of residents filed an injunction against Koolair in the Magistrate

Court of Colombo under Section 98 (Chapter 9) of the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent a

public nuisance.8 A Koolair official claimed that the generators did make a fair amount of

noise and that Koolair executives went to CEB officials to discuss what to do about the

complaints against them. This same individual said that the CEB convinced President Chandrika

Kumaratunga to change environmental laws to undermine the injunction against the plant

(Fieldnotes, 21 November 2000).

Specific changes to environmental laws came in the form of Gazette No. 966/11 of 12th

March 1997, Emergency (Generation of Electrical Power and Energy) Regulation No. 1 of

1997. This public security ordinance suspended four legal provisions in so far as they relate to

the generation of power and energy: The Urban Development Authority Law, No. 41 of 1978,

The National Environmental Act, No. 47 of 1980; The Nuisances Ordinance (Chapter 230); and

Chapter 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code Act, No. 17 of 1979 (Gazette No. 966/11 1997).9

These were the same provisions cited in the legal proceedings filed against Koolair and

the CEB on February 20th by the Ethul Kotte Associations legal consul. Even though their

public nuisance case was pending before the Emergency Regulation was put in effect, as long as

the Emergency Regulation was in force, their petition could not be litigated.

In response, the Ethul Kotte-Environmental Protection Association and its legal counsel

filed another petition. This petition, A.V. Deshan Harinda (a minor) and Four Others v. Ceylon

8 Supreme Court Document 323/97 FR9 A gazette is a statue of an Act. All acts are crafted at the instruction of a Minister and can be changed at his/herdiscretion. While all regulations are crafted under an act, public security ordinances are different in so far as theyenable the President to suspend regulations. This emergency regulation was an executive order by the Presidentcrafted under Section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance (Chapter 40). The Sri Lankan Constitution grants anExecutive Presidency that imparts the post with sweeping powers. Public Security Ordinances are considered bymany to be outdates forms of draconian law. For more information please refer to Cooray, 1996.


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Electricity Board and Six Others marked the first use of the next friend strategy for an

environmental case in Sri Lanka.10 Lead counsel had read about the use of the next friend

strategy in a Filipino case.11 With the Emergency Regulation in effect he considered the

approach encouraging (Field notes, 15 August 2000). The new petition also added an additional

set of demands to the original ones. Legal counsel argued that the Emergency Regulations could

not be applied retroactively to their pending case.

Using their respective parents as their legal next friends, five children from Ethul Kotte

ranging in age from 2 months to 2 years sued the following for violation of their fundamental

rights and their right to life: the Ceylon Electricity Board, the Central Environmental Authority,

the Board of Investment, the Urban Development Authority, the Director of Wildlife

Conservation, Koolair Ventures Power (Pvt.) Ltd., the Officer in Charge of the local police

station who did not pursue their earliest complaints, and the Attorney General. Through a

parental next friend, children claimed that they were extraordinarily sensitive to the loss of

sleep cause by the incessant noise. As infants and toddlers whose bodies, minds and sensory

organs were still developing, prolonged noise exposure could cause long-term damage

(Rajepakse 1998). Backing up the childrens claims was the expert testimony of Dr. Gary Evans

of Cornell Universitys College of Human Ecology, a psychologist who specializes on the effects

of noise on children.12

10 Next friend is commonly used in custody hearings, for example, in divorce proceedings or when parents die andleave small children behind.11 Personal interview, Lalintha de Silva, 15 August 2000. The referred case is Oposa vs. Faetra. Attorney Antonio

Oposa filed a petition as the next friend for his child. According to de Silva, Oposa, while serving in the ForestryMinistry under the Marcos Regime, had awarded more timber-logging permits than there were standing forests. Hecontested that with all the permits awarded, there would be no forest standing for his child to enjoy. He sued onbehalf of his child to nullify many of the permits so that forest cover would remain for his childs enjoyment. All 15judges on the Filipino court unanimously decided in favor of the petitioner. He also was familiar with the success ofthe next friend strategy in an air pollution case in Bangladesh.12 In an affidavit and counter-affidavit submitted to the Sri Lankan Supreme Court, Dr. Evans reports that long-termseffects of high noise exposure include elevated blood pressure and neuroendocrine hormones, reading deficits, and


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In mid-May the Supreme Court granted leave to proceed with the new petition citing

Articles 11, 12, 14(1)(h) of the Constitution and right to life. The judge declared that the

Emergency Order had no retroactive effect and also ordered a stay order of consent that

prohibited the power plants operation between the hours of 10 PM and 6 AM. With the

restricted operation time and later an injunction on operation pending a review of noise-test

results, the power plant was shut down and dismantled in June 1997.

On June 27, President Chandrika Kumaratunge rescinded the Emergency Regulation on

the Generation of Electrical Power and Energy.13

To avoid an even longer court battle, Koolair

settled. In 1998, the petitioners agreed to drop the case and received Rs. 10,000 each in

damages.

The Ethul Kotte Childrens Case had popular appeal: the courtroom drama unfolded with

helpless infants championing their rights against insensitive government institutions and a

private-sector firm. Legal counsel made sure that the crying infants and fidgeting toddlers came

to the courtroom everyday. Although they caused numerous disruptions and could not

understand the proceedings, it was their legal and civil right to stay, a right that the judges

respected.

While the Ethul Kotte case became a landmark environmental case for its legal ingenuity,

it also raised the issue of how the state and groups in society interact in the realm of

environmental law and management. Lead counsel Lalanath de Silva hoped to make the point

through the Ethul Kotte childrens case that environmental obligations are intergenerational

(Field notes 15 August 2000). A low-noise (tending towards a pollution-free) environment

other behavioral and learning effects. Children who learn to tune out high noise levels at a young age also tune outspeech and language cues that delay reading development. (mimeo: 12/9/97).13 Gazette Extraordinary 981/20 of 27.6.97 rescinded Gazette Extraordinary 966/11 of 12.3.97.


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became a legitimate material resource of the community for Ethul Kotte citizens to demand

from the state as one of the states fundamental duties (Article 27). The Association framed its

claim as one in which a healthy auditory environment could not be taken away by the private

sector challenging what the CEB had defined the national interest.

The Ethul Kotte case engaged state policy and practices in another way. The electrical

power and energy regulation was the first emergency regulation ever passed to suspend the

National Environmental Act. Generally a Public Security Ordinance is created under quite

extraordinary circumstances (events of war and terrorism). Equating power generation with

terrorism as a national emergency appeared to many social groups as saw a slippery slope with

respect to what is in the national interest, for who, and when. The power of an executive

presidency that enabled the president to construct and dismantle such legislation at her own

discretion has been controversial. The Ethul Kotte Childrens Case challenged the validity and

legality of the emergency order and ultimately President Kumaratunges better judgment of what

is in the national interest.

The residents of Ethul Kotte could not ignore the installation of diesel generators in their

neighborhood. In some communities, though, residents do not know that a project is being

undertaken until a surveyor comes to survey their land. For citizenship rights to be exercised in

such instances, there must be awareness about the project as well as an understanding of legal

rights. The next electricity-planning project shows how EFL used the 30-day public commenting

period to educate a group of rural residents about both a proposed project and the EIA process

and in so doing taught and exercised their rights as Sri Lankan citizens.


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The Moragahakanda Agricultural Development Project

The Moragahakanda dam, a multipurpose agricultural scheme, is the fifth and final

project planned within the Sri Lankan governments Mahaweli Development Program. The

proposed Moragahakanda dam and reservoir would stand at 61 meters and achieve a water

storage capacity of 500 million cubic meters. Attempts to build the project failed because

geological studies had found porous limestone deposits in the construction area.

In 2000, engineers from the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau (CECB) began a

new feasibility study. After digging in eight locations, they found limestone deposits and cracked

rock in the dam site (Wickramage 2000). Even though their EIA sponsored by the Central

Environmental Authority claimed that the Moragahakanda project was not feasible, officials of

the Mahaweli Development Authority and related government agencies began negotiating bi-

lateral loan agreements with Kuwati officials. At this stage, it was uncertain whether or not the

reservoirs water would be used strictly for irrigation or if a small hydropower station would also

be constructed at the site.

Project construction would displace nearly 1064 families and submerge portions of

twelve villages (Wickramage 2000). The proposed two thousand-hectare resettlement site was

approximately 55 kilometers to the projects northeast. Potentially displaced persons opposed

the project and rejected a resettlement package that included money to build a new home and to

establish new agricultural fields (TEAMS 1998).14

Several public hearings were held in August 2000. Over 80 individuals attended a

meeting at the Kongahawela community center to discuss the projects advantages and

14 Compensation included: Rs. 6000 (less than $85) to build a new house, Rs. 5000 to dig a well, porcelain suppliesto build a toilet, free transportation of belongings to the site, free dried rations for five family members until the firstharvest free seed paddy for the first two paddy cultivation seasons, free agricultural equipment, and free supplies oflime, coconut, and mango seedlings (Wickramage 2000; TEAMS 1998).


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disadvantages with members of two NGOs: EFL and Green Movement of Sri Lanka.

Representatives from these NGOs had repeatedly visited the areas local government offices

beforehand to make sure EIA documents were being made available during the 30-day

commenting period.

At the time of the first visit, the EIA report was not available to the public in Divisional

Secretariat (DS) offices in the affected region. On subsequent EFL visits, one copy of the report

was available at the DS office. With ten days of the commenting period remaining, EFL

organized a series of meetings. They wanted to confirm that community members were familiar

with the project and its resettlement terms, to gather opinions from community members about

the merits and faults of the project, and to urge those who did not want to provide video-taped

statements to write letters to the project-approving agency, The Ministry of Agriculture, Lands,

and Forestry.15

At the first meeting, a member of EFL opened with a brief explanation about the need for

environmental impact assessment and its constitutional history, the types of expert information

gathered to produce the assessment, and the purpose of the public hearing.16 He explained to the

farmer-dominated audience that even though the government officials who were invited to attend

had not shown up, it still was legal to hold the meeting without them.17

He stated that the EIA

process was important because all people have the right to understand the countrys plans for

15 Siril said, This is very important. If during the 30 days you can say something, send a letter or a postcard toBattaramulla [Ministry]. When they make a decision, if a large number opposes then they cant do. We have come

as an independent group. You say favor [the project] or not in favor and give a reason. You need to give a reason.We are videotaping and we will send it to the Lands Ministry without editing. We have brought paper so you canwrite your views. You can post them yourselves or well post them for you. Theyll take a decision only after that(Field notes 19 August 2000).16 Meetings were conducted in Sinhala, Translations are my own.17 He said, We have come very openly. We invited the CEA, Mahaweli officers, all the divisional secretaries andmany other government officers. It is their decision if they come or not. The law doesnt say you cant hold ameeting like this. Legally there is no problem. If you like you can have a copy [of what is said here]. That way youcan point out what you said on 19 August. And well send one to the relevant authorities. This is the last opportunityto say whether you are for or against [the project] (Field notes 19 August 2000).


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national development. Sri Lanka does not have a Community Right-to-Know Act. Extension

efforts by NGO workers are sometimes the only way that potentially-affected persons learn

about a forthcoming project before it starts being built.

Before inviting audience members to express what they like and dont like about the

project, a member of the Green Movement of Sri Lanka repeated that the public hearing was

their right given under the National Environmental Act. He said that the purpose of the meeting

was to discuss the project. Participants must avoid saying anything in connection with

politics,18 but rather to independently and freely express their views about the project and

how it would affect their village (Field notes 19 August 2000). He added that by gathering in

public, their decision-making process about the project was transparent. The government could

not accuse them later of hiding or doing anything in secret. The days statements were video

and audio taped with all participants stating their name and village of residence.

Within 90 minutes, the first meeting was interrupted by a group of police officers. The

Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of police along with two junior officers entered the hall. Backed by

state-sponsored Emergency Regulations and a Public Security Ordinance,19

in less than five

minutes a successful meeting abruptly ended. The OIC said that the public-commenting process

could continue by soliciting ideas and opinions from door-to-door.

The meetings abrupt end suggests that public participation in Sri Lankan infrastructure

planning is fragile. While the public hearing provided an institutionalized space for residents to

negotiate with the states project approving agency, The Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, and

Forestry, the police restricted their ability to exercise that right. Even though the Emergency

18 The reference to politics here is in reference to party politics (UNP or PA affiliation).19 This emergency regulation is not related to the emergency regulation of the Ethul Kotte case. Due to the ethnicconflict, there are always multiple emergency regulations in place to prohibit public gatherings that might drawterrorists.


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Regulation on Power and Energy that was in place during the Ethul Kotte struggle was

suspended by this time, police used another emergency regulation that was renewed every month

by Parliament to restrict public gatherings to break the potential social power of their collective

meeting.

Before the meeting ended, 21 community members had given video-taped testimony,

eighteen opposed to and three in support of project. Opposition to the project was organized

around economic and personal security and community history. The majority of the opinions

expressed dissatisfaction with the resettlement site government-controlled areas of Trincomalee

District. The resettlement site was in a border area that constantly shifts between LTTE and

military-controlled territory. Residents feared that they would be caught in ethnic cross-fire

between Sri Lankan Armed Forces and LTTE terrorists. One woman at the public hearing

mentioned that she had moved her family from that region over fifteen years before to distance

her family from danger. To resettle the residents in that area would bring an LTTE problem to a

people who currently had no problem with the LTTE.

Second, the relocation of Moragahakanda residents to a site to their north and east was

similar to previous Mahaweli colonization programs. The resettlement site for the

Moragahakanda project would again re-settle Sinhalese families into a region with a fairly

balanced Tamil and Sinhala demographic. The introduction of 1000 new Sinhala families into

the resettlement area, however, would change its ethnic composition. Moragahakanda residents

questioned whether or not the 2000 hectares designated for resettlement would be able to provide

the agricultural (livelihood) security that they currently enjoyed. They were also concerned that

site had no infrastructure services. As the LTTE regularly targeted infrastructure in its struggle

against the government, with their proximity to an LTTE controlled area they felt that the


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number and types of infrastructure and public services that would be offered in the resettlement

area would be limited.

Finally, many members of the community placed their settlement within Sri Lankas epic

history. The people of the area traced their settlement history to the period of the great irrigation

works of Ancient Ceylon. Some residents claimed that while gathering data for the EIA the

Geological Survey found tunnels running under the reservoir site. They believed that these

tunnels were remnants of King Vasabhus well-known tank and canal system20

that dates back to

the earliest historical chronicle of Sri Lanka, the Mahavamsa (Fieldnotes, 19 August 2000). By

the end of the fifth century, there was a significant irrigation complex on the Mahaweli River and

its tributaries that includes the present area of Moragahakanda. The new dam project would

submerge and damage this archeological evidence of Sri Lankas technological ingenuity.

The opposition to the Moragahakanda project engaged and challenged government

policy. When it alluded to politicians repeatedly-broken promises, the opposition revealed its

lack of trust in the state and their elected representatives. Residents questioned both what was in

the national interest and the protection of community security to a greater extent than, but not to

the exclusion of, concern about local environmental impacts (such as the loss of wildlife habitat

and flora). The majority of residents were rather fatalistic believing that the project would be

constructed regardless of what they had to say or whatever they would suffer. Elderly persons at

the two meetings were the most dejected. They had lived a lifetime of broken government

promises. One young man spoke eloquently about a great mission: balancing environmental

losses with potential economic and social gains. The gains he referred to were not from

irrigation waters or the power-generating potential of the project, but from social and economic

claims that could be made from community mobilization before shifting to the resettlement site.

20Tanks are shallow structures with a large surface area that permit the collection of the maximum amount ofrainfall. For more on the engineering of this hydraulic period, see Hegewald (2002) and de Silva (1981).


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He began his statement with environmental concerns building upon articulated ideas voiced by

others opposing the project (e.g., destruction of elephant habitat, loss of fertile land), before

moving into how their collectivity should make demands upon the state for their livelihood

security:

I accept that this is not a highly-developed area, but there are a lot of resources,medicinal plants, wildlife. If you think intelligently, no one would want to see thisenvironment destroyed. have we thought about the harm it can do in connectionwith the environment? We are waiting to see what extent of land they will give. Ithink we are only talking about compensation for houses, trees, and agriculturalcrops. People so far have been talking about what they are going to get, about goingto the border areas.. More than this we should talk about how much land isneeded, how much relief we should get. We should talk about this againwell needrelief for about two years. We must demand these things(Video transcript 19 August2000). 21

He then expounded on the opportunities provided by collective action and the role of

protest:

I have heard through the media that the government paid a lot of attention to the

Norachcholai [coal] power station. They were organized. Environmental groups likethis one organized the people. Like this we too must organize the people against (theproject). We organize to get something and make demands to see that we getsomething. But we dont protest against what we will lose. Only if it makes our lifemore prosperous, then we make demands.I dont have statistics about theenvironment. People who spoke before me said they should give us Tiger-free land[without the presence of the LTTE], but we should talk about how the environment isgoing to be affected (Video transcript 19 August 2000).

Finally, he discussed the politics of the project based on his understanding of social and

political relations before closing with a request for institutional support and increased public

awareness.

21 I translated these statements from Sinhala into English and take responsibility for their content.


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Any decision that is done in connection with this project is for someone to get hispower or re-enforce his power. Someone will enhance his or her power with this.People are always telling us what we are going to get, not what we are going to lose.Only the one with the wound knows about what is suffered. We should get groupslike this environmental group to intervene. They should make people aware so they

will speak in one voice (Video transcript 19 August 2000).

This young mans intervention at the public hearing illustrates how the public-

commenting period provided an opportunity for individuals to address the social forces that

shape their lives as they expressed their opinion on the merits or drawbacks of a particular

development project. Prior to amendments made to EIA legislation in the late 1980s and the

establishment of groups such as EFL, strong connections between residents and NGOs did not

exist. In trying to overcome shortcomings in EIA provisions for public participation,22

EFL

staff directly intervened and changed how rural constituents interacted with and experienced the

state and strengthened a communitys understanding of their constitutional rights through a

practice of civic engagement.

When the government constructed earlier projects within the Mahaweli Scheme in the

1980s, no EIA legislation existed. There were no public hearings. The public hearings at

Moragahakanda reveal how state-society relations around infrastructure planning have changed

with EIA legislation, the mandatory public-hearing clause, and the presence of an NGO that

interrogates the processs shortcomings. The residents of Moragahakanda used the public-

hearing process to demand recognition and respect for their agricultural livelihoods and to

include themselves into the decision-making process that would affect their community and its

economic and social security.

22 For example, gathering potentially-affected communities together, guaranteeing that the EIA report is available,explaining the EIA processs constitutionality, and organizing an opportunity for public comment.


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The Norachcholai Coal Power Plant

Since the late 1980s, the CEB has tried to find a place to construct a coal-fired power

plant. In the mid-1990s, they identified a suitable location on Northwestern Provinces Kalpitiya

peninsula. A stretch of beach in the village of Norachcholai possessed the necessary

geographical properties for their undertaking: a seaside location that would allow coal-shipping

barges to approach the plant, a readily available source of water for the systems cooling, and

enough barren sandy space (300 acres) for depositing flue and furnace ash and storing coal on-

site. In addition to locating a suitable physical space, EIA legislation required the CEB to hold

public meetings with potentially-affected communities to explain the project, its necessity, andits socio-economic and environmental impacts on the selected community.

A series of social protests emerged from these meetings. The protests mobilized

themselves around environmental protection, livelihood security, and recognition and respect for

alternative definitions of national interests and security. Protest leaders, including the Bishop of

Chilaw and officials from the Social and Economic Development Centre (SEDEC)23 with EFL

cited that the plants construction would produce acid rain from sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions,

encroach on productive farming land and fishing grounds, and exacerbate coastal erosion that

would threaten the peninsulas entire coastline. Activists against the plant argued that a coal-

transportation jetty that would connect coal-shipping barges to the power station would

exacerbate coastal erosion along the peninsulas entire coastline ultimately reaching and

threatening Saint Annes Shrine 12 kilometers north of the proposed site.24 Norachcholai

residents who would live under the power plants shadow argued that bottom ash buried on site

23 SEDEC is a social-service wing of the Roman Catholic Church.24 Due to the shallow coastline and the depth of a coal-shipping barge, the closest a coal-shipping vessel could get tothe power station is four kilometers. A four-kilometer jetty will extend from the power station into the seatransporting coal from coal-shipping barges anchoring themselves offshore. Groups opposing the plant cited theexpense of building and securing this jetty as another reason to stop construction. They argued that Trincomalee wasa better site. Trinco, located in LTTE territory, has a naturally-deep harbor that would allow coal-shipping vessels toapproach a power station easily were the facility sited there.


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would contaminate the areas high groundwater table. Their fishing and agricultural livelihood as

they knew it would be destroyed. Particulate matter and gases escaping from the smokestacks,

they claimed, would poison the soil, pollute the air and rainfall, and increase risks to public

health.

But their protests also drew upon two previous negative experiences with economic

development: the building of the Puttalam Cement Factory and the construction of the Voice of

America (VOA) rely station. These experiences were exacerbated by the fact that the population

of the Kalpitiya area recently had increased by at least 60,000 persons. In October 1990, the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L.T.T.E.) expelled the entire Muslim population from the

Northern Province. Many of these displaced Muslim were living in welfare centers that stretched

along the entire peninsula. The government did not improve the areas economic and social

infrastructure to meet this population influx, and with the increase in the labor pool, local wages

dropped precipitously as the IDP population would work for wages much lower than the local

host community had. The peninsulas social and economic infrastructure was being stretched

and the population already feeling put upon.

When Norachcholai residents argued that particulate matter and gases escaping from a

power plants smokestacks would create a risk to public health, they based this claim on what

they had seen or knew about the health problems of residents who lived within the shadows of

the nearby Puttalam Cement plant. Asthma and respiratory problems were chronic within a one-

kilometer radius of the cement plant. The EIA authors noted that there was already a high-

incidence rate for respiratory diseases such as pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, and respiratory-

related illnesses (1998:3-61) in the area. Hospital admittance for respiratory diseases (115

persons were hospitalized during four months in 1997) was higher than admittance for malaria,


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gastroenteritis, tuberculosis and urinary tract infections combined.25 People in the area were

already suffering from respiratory-related illnesses that they attributed to the building of the

cement factory. They regarded pollution from a coal-power plant as exacerbating an already-

existing problem.

Second, Church leaders used their experience with state officials during the siting of a

Voice of America (VOA) relay station to inform their strategy for the Norachcholai protests. In

1983, the United States Government re-negotiated and renewed a contract with the Government

of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to continue broadcasting its Voice of America radio programs from a series

of transmission stations located on the islands western coast.26 American engineers chose a

suitable location in the coastal region of Chilaw district described in the EIA report as 410 acres

of an active and abandoned coconut plantation and a former rice paddy on the Iranawila Estate

(USIA 1994:3-1). To the south of the project site was the village of Iranawila. The northern

edge bordered abandon rice paddy. The marshes of the Luna (sic)27 Oya stood at the eastern

edge. (3-5). The impact assessment stated that no residents live on the project site, no

commercial activities or businesses are located in Iranawila and that the only other land use inthe project area was a cemetery (5-11). The village of Iranawila possessed the necessary

geographical and physical properties for constructing new relay stations.

25 From Chapter 3 of EIA Report entitled, Description of the Existing Environment; subsection entitled, Human

Population and Socio-Economy. Cement-plant owners have argued that their plant has the best technologyavailable to contain dust emissions. But with these pre-existing high rates of respiratory illnesses, local residents didnot trust CEB officials when they have claimed that they would use the most sophisticated, pollution-controlequipment available for the coal power plant.26 Other provisions included: expanding the site size from 10 acres to 1000 acres, upgrading transmission capacityfrom 105 kilowatts to 2500 kilowatts, transferring ownership of the station, its administrative operation andmaintenance from the GoSL to the US Government (de Silva 1995).27 In VOA project documents, the name of the river is spelled as Luna. In documents written by local activists andChurch officials the name is spelled Lunu. As lunu is the Sinhala word for salt and the river connects a body offresh water with a salt-water body, salinity in the river leads me to believe that the name of the river is Lunu Oya.


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The EIA consultants acknowledged that coastal resources were an important source of

income in the local economy28, but reported that the only impact to the Lunu Oya would be a

short-term increase in surface runoff that would decrease the rivers salinity. Barges and

tugboats would not transport fuel to the relay station via the Lunu Oya thereby eliminating any

chance of accidental fuel spills. The relay station would have significant impacts on land use

imposing an industrial-type of land use into an area characterized as a small village (6-12), but

no families would need to be resettled. Local people would be hired during the construction

phase. The report did not mention whether or not the relay stations would reside within security

zone and whether or not there were negative impacts on the local fishing industry.

During the construction phase, fishermen were told they could no longer use a small

channel draining Lake Chilaw into the Indian Ocean. In a meeting between a VOA official and

the nearby parish priest, it is reported that the local priest was instructed to inform people that

secondary waterways between two inland lagoons that led into the Luna Oya could no longer be

used for fishing and transport. The reason given was that cable had been laid and the area was

now a security zone of VOA (IPSF 1994:24). On several occasions when fishermen were

fishing in the area, they were told they could not longer land their boats at the outlet where Lunu

Oya met the Indian Ocean as it was now a security zone. While the closure was announced as a

precaution limited to the construction phase, there was no indication when it would be lifted.

Fishermen feared the possible closure of the entire Lunu Oya in the future (44).

In addition to new constraints placed on the fishing community, religious activities were

disrupted. When the local Catholic population was making a regular Way of the Cross, they

were surrounded by a large contingent of police personnel from the surrounding police stations,

28 EIA authors wrote that there was an undeveloped fisheries harbor at the outlet of the Luna Oya as well asevidence of fishing with large nets along the shoreline that included the village of Iranawila. Other income-generating activities of the community mentioned in the EIA report were manufacturing of roof tiles and rope fromcoconut husks.


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in full battle gear, [who] blocked their way and forbade them to move (ibid:42-43). A police

post was established in the middle of Iranawila village. Local residents claimed that Central

Intelligence Department (CID) personnel were stationed in the police post to monitor their

movements and activities (43).

The unannounced security zone, disruption of religious ritual, limitations on fishing, and

police surveillance at Iranawila foreshadowed what might possibly happen if a power plant was

built at Norachcholai. An offshore security zone would disrupt fishing waters and place

limitations on Norachcholais seaside residents. Police surveillance and an onshore security zone

would disrupt pilgrims traveling to St. Annes Shrine.

The activists experience with the Puttalam Cement factory and at Iranawila informed

how residents of Norachcholai and Catholic Church leaders understood potential outcomes of the

Norachcholai project and the extent to which the State could be trusted. The Rtd. Rev. Marcus

Fernando, Bishop of Chilaw, who led protests against the siting of a Voice of America (VOA)

relay station also led the movement against Norachcholai. The State needed his support more

than anyone elses in the Church hierarchy for the Norachcholai project to move forward. Yet,

the VOA case was very much alive in the institutional memory of Church members residing in

the Chilaw diocese.29

Struggles for the Public Interest in Norachcholai

The Norachcholai EIA stated that basic infrastructure facilities (education and health)

were low, incomes were low, and in general Kalpitiya Peninsula can be described as an

economically rather marginal area. The local economy is restricted almost completely to the

primary sector activities in the project area (3-51). Within the project area itself, almost one-

third of the households have no valuable properties at all30 (0-13). The EIA argues that

29 Letter dated 29 April 1997; Construction of a Coal Power Plant Under Emergency Regulations.30 Commodities such as radios, TVs, sewing machines and bicycles that other villagers have.


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Norachcholai is a village that needs development. The report supports the power plant and

advocates resettling families as a way to develop and to improve local lifestyles.31 When writing

an EIA report, information about social and cultural resource is often suppressed because the loss

any unique cultural or social resources can result in expensive costs for proponents (further delay

or cancellation of a project). Catholic Church leaders mobilized around what was left out of the

Norachcholai report: the historical and cultural importance of St. Annes Shrine. Norachcholai

residents also contested EIA claims that the area was unproductive and used by LTTE terrorists.

In their fight against the siting of the coal power plant, opposition-party politicians,

Catholic Church leadership, and members of the local community constructed a multi-

dimensional metaphor of security grounded in differential notions of community. Their multi-

stranded arguments wove together a set of claims rooted in local experience and situated within a

national context. The security of St. Annes, or the Talawila, Shrine was linked together with the

(in)security of the Dalida Maligawa32 attacked by the LTTE in 1998. To insure that nothing of

the sort would threaten St. Annes Shrine, social, cultural and economic concerns coalesced

around its protection. One young farmer at a church-service-cum-demonstration held in

Norachcholai stated,

Im a Buddhist. Just as the Dalida Maligawa has value for us, the Talawila Churchhas for our Catholics. Like that itself, I think our Catholic people feel in the sameway for our Talawila Church. Even though I am a Buddhist I have come today toparticipate in the church service. From the beginning it [opposition] has been withthe goals of protecting the Church. (14 April 2000, public demonstration at theIlanthadiya Church).

31 Baviskar (1995) and Goldman (2001b) have argued that EIA writing is a knowledge-construction process aboutan area that reduces its complexity and homogenizes its society, its culture, and its ecology. Baviskar eloquentlyargued how the EIA process and dam development in Indias Narmada Valley erased history, heterogeneity, and theculture of the Bhilala tribal community. Michael Goldman (2001b) conducted several interviews with ruraldevelopment consultants who had written EIA reports in Laos. One ethnolinguist on an EIA team encountered atleast two previously-unknown languages in a region where a dam was to be built but was not allowed time todocument them (2001b: 198) as the time needed to document that knowledge and protect the community whichspoke it might have slowed done project implementation.


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Another participant exclaimed,

Our Madhu Church has been taken over by the LTTE. Like that, we will loseeverything. Just as the Buddhists are protecting the Dalida Maligawa, we are

protecting our Church. We only have this much. If we were deprived of this, nowhere else do we have another church. We dont have another church (ibid.).

Reverence for the Saint Annes shrine by all, not just the Catholic community, has redoubled

since the church was in a LTTE-controlled area. 33 The example of the Catholics loss of the

Madhu shrine to the LTTE is not the only LTTE-related worry that the local community has

taken into account. Another participant commented,

The other thing, the biggest problem is the LTTE..For the project the CEB haswritten a big book [reference to the EIA report]. They have not written in their bookhow they are going to protect it (e.g. the power plant). The Minster of Irrigation andPower is also the Minster of Defense. He will look after that. We do not accept this.In Sri Lanka, everywhere they are blasting transformers. Now they, LTTE, islaunching these attacks close byif they were to build a power plant? They have notsaid how to protect it. Therefore, I think, in truth, that they [CEB and thegovernment] are deliberately bringing to this place without an LTTE problem, [tomake] an LTTE problem (14 April 2000, demonstration at the Ilanthadiya Church).

This perception and others like it that proclaimed there was no LTTE problem in the area

contradicted government and media reports that had asserted the Kalpitiya peninsula was an

LTTE-staging ground. Even if the LTTE was using Kalpitiya as a staging ground for their

tactical operations (which Norachcholai residents discredited), their assertion that building a

power plant would create a LTTE problem had considerable evidence.34

32 Also known as the Temple of the Tooth Relic. It is believed to have a tooth of Gotama Buddha. As such it isone of the most important pilgrimmage sites outside of India for global Buddhism.33 Letter dated 3 December 1997 from Catholic Bishops Conference Sri Lanka to President ChandrikaBandaranaike Kumaratunga. The Madhu Feast was held for the first time in over 20 years on July 2, 2002. Since aregime change in January 2002 and a cease-fire agreement with the LTTE in February, the new ruling party hasaddressed the Catholic communitys concern over the Madhu Shrine (The Sunday Observer, 30 June 2002).34 The LTTE attacked government oil refineries outside Colombo in 1995 as well as the Dalida Maligawa in 1998.As a matter of national as well as national energy security, essential infrastructure (i.e., power stations, andreservoirs for drinking water supply) has armed security in case of terrorist attack.


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The increased presence of police and military personnel needed to protect essential

infrastructure has extended state surveillance in rural areas. Security forces may secure

infrastructure facilities, but their presence creates insecurity for many Sri Lankans especially for

members of the minority Tamil population (Jeganathan 2002).35 Checkpoints manned by armed

personnel have inconvenienced travelers and increased opportunities for sexual harassment and

molestation and on numerous occasions even rape and murder of young Tamil women, most of

whom ended up in police custody after being detained at police and military checkpoints

(Liyanage 2001). Members of the local community argued that the armed-guards and police that

would be sent to protect the power plant would also compromise the very safety of local women

and children.

Another security concern for those opposing the plant revolved around the proposed

building of a four-kilometer jetty that would transport coal from coal-shipping barges to the

power plant. Often referred to as the power plants lifeline, the jetty too was seen as a potential

terrorist target.36

The LTTE branch named the Sea Tigers had conducted numerous surface and

underwater operations to destroy Sri Lankan naval ships. The Bishop of Chilaw asserted that the

jetty was an invitation to terrorists to turn the presently peaceful area into an area of conflict.37

Furthermore, Naval patrols in the waters around the jetty, the Bishop argued would create a

security zone and restrict local fishermen from fishing in those waters. Despite the countrys

electricity-generation crisis, Church leaders, residents, and many politicians were against siting a

coal-fired power plant in Norachcholai.

35 For more on being Tamil and passing through checkpoints, see Jeganathan. For violence against women atcheckpoints, see (Dugger 2002).36 The destruction of electricity infrastructure is a political statement. In 1999, Sri Lankan newspaper reports (i.e.The Daily News, The Island) documented over 75 LTTE attacks on electricity-related infrastructure in and aroundthe capital, Colombo. Security was tightened around power stations, but targets such as substations and transmissionlines are too numerous to secure individually. The length of transmission line, 17,000 kilometers of medium voltagelines and 46,000 kilometers of low-voltage lines and the number of distribution substations (11,000) make constantsurveillance impossible (CEB Annual Report 1998: 32).


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One activist admitted that the country needed electricity to develop. Yet the siting of the

coal-power plant threatened the communitys livelihood security. After all, she exclaimed, the

people in the area did not build their houses by doing government jobs but rather through

their own sacrifice38 and supplying food for the country. Residents did not sit under a ceiling

fan all day to earn their wages. They worked outside in the hot sun to provide food and fish for

the urban population. Agriculture did not provide a reliable monthly salary as comfortable

government jobs did. In order to survive they often had to forgo a rice-based meal at midday.

Farmers would forage on locally-available foodstuffs such as immature coconut instead. In a

culture when rice is an important dietary staple and cultural symbol, forgoing it is a considerable

sacrifice.

I accept that you cannot develop the country without electricity. But there arealternatives. We have showed them that there are better places than this. Do itbeyond Kalpitiya

39(But) they [CEB] are afraid of the LTTE. The LTTE is over

there they say. So they are setting it up [here] avoiding the LTTE and destroyingus.. The CEB says, If you want to make an omelet, you have to break eggs. Itis wrong to crush people who are innocent like us. So why are they powderingus? We are Lankans. (14 April 2000).

Her friend portrayed the coal-power plant as an unjust punishment for their community,

Why are they trying to do things like this in this small village? We are littlepeople. Why harass us? We are village people. We studied hard. A lot of boysand girls live here. Not even from one person, not from the president or a

37 Open letter written by the Bishop of Chilaw dated 10 February 1998 two weeks after the terrorist bombing at theDalida Maligawa.38Kurumba kanava: literally skipping the noon-time meal (implying rice) and making do by eating kurumba, themeat of the immature coconut that contains neither water inside nor a kernel (14 April 2000).39 While her argument may sound like a not-in-my-backyard argument, the case better parallels an environmentaljustice case. Not-in-my-backyard tends to be associated with upper and middle-class politics. Environmental justicecases involve further exploitation of marginal places and peoples through the siting of polluting industries (SeeHarvey 1996; Collinson 1997; Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss 2001).


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minister, do we ask, Give us jobs. We have never asked for help from anyone.(ibid.) 40

The siting of a coal-power plant in a community that believed itself to be self-reliant

together with negative effects of police and military checkpoints on economic livelihood and

religious freedom loomed large in public debate. According to the Bishop of Chilaw, a coastal

security zone would impose restrictions on pilgrims who traveled to St. Annes by sea and

losing the peaceful atmosphere now prevailing there would be a heart rendering experience to

Catholics living in the whole country.41 Peninsula residents too agreed that the checkpoints

were irksome. Bolder individuals openly questioned why all the security personnel and

checkpoints still remained on the peninsula even after Sri Lankas President, Mrs. Chandrika

Kumaratunga, officially canceled the project in July 2000.

Local Readings of Security

Rural location and ethnicity as an aspect of the ethnic conflict played an important role in

how Norachcholai was seen to be chosen as a site for a new power station. Community interests

constructed by the Church and local residents challenged state-sponsored mandates for national

security and the national interest. Furthermore, understandings of community security shaped the

way that many local residents read one section of the EIA report and responded to the slaying of

a protester by police and reveal how activists engaged state officials through the EIA process.

At checkpoints, police have the power to stop and question everyone without cause.

Church leaders argued that detainment was a threat to Norachcholai residents and to Shrine

worshippers. The stake that some community members had in matters of local security and lack

40 In this womans statement, she is portraying the community as not being a liability to the country (e.g., by askingfor assistance). The women is asking the question, Why would the government try to punish them with a powerplant rather than rewarding them for their perseverance and self-reliance?41 Catholic Bishops urge President to Scrap Norochcholai Power Plant Project. The Island. 1 April 2000, p.2.


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of trust in the EIA process was integrated into their reading of the projects EIA document. A

1998 letter written by Mr. T. M. Ismail, a local Muslim leader, illustrated the extreme gravity of

concern that security zones posed when he argued passionately about the reports failure to

mention the phrase security zone.

For several months in 1998, there was confusion in Norachcholai over a map in the EIA

report that showed a power plant surrounded by concentric circles. The concentric circles

radiating out from the power plant, however, were buffer zones at distances of two, five and

twenty kilometers. They indicated the dispersal of particulate matter from smokestacks and the

spatial distribution of population settlements within the project area. Residents read the map and

translated the circles into security zones. While residents misunderstood the technical term

buffer zone, their translation is not a sign of ignorance. Their reading of the map was a

manifestation of their relationship to the state. Based on their knowledge of what had happened

at Iranawila and the states preoccupation with military security against the LTTE and security

zones around essential infrastructure, residents translated their fears about security and

checkpoints and their lack of trust in government officials into their interpretation of the

concentric circles. Residents had reasons to believe that security zones could be hiding in the

language of buffer zones. They had reasons not to trust officials with vested interests in the

power plants construction as well. At Iranawila, officials told local fisherman that access to

waters would not be restricted, and later it was. And as we will see later in this section, CEB

officials were not always forthcoming about project-related work and what they were doing on

site visits.

Mr. Ismail and others were correct when they stated that security zones were not

mentioned in the EIA report even though the government used the language of security zones in

public meetings and throughout the EIA process. In their struggle to protect their persons and


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livelihood, their demands to know the extent of security zones, and then the absence of any

mention of security zones in the official government document (the EIA report) residents

logically translated these concentric circles into security zones. Buffer zones and security zones

were not one and the same. But given the lack of information provided to residents about

security zones and their fear of them, their translation is not ignorant. It reflects their experience

with state-sponsored development and the EIA process.

The CEB repeatedly used this example to illustrate the ignorance of the public in

matters of science, technology, and engineering and to prove that the general public should not

be allowed to participate in development planning. The error in Norachcholai proved to CEB

officials that the public was not capable of understanding electricity-infrastructure planning and

that such matters should be left to experts.

In defining security, groups challenged and discredited one another through defining

what was in the national interest and in the writing and translation of the EIA report. Even

though this error emerged, it has not stopped environmental NGOs and concerned citizens from

participating in electricity-infrastructure planning. The error shows the fragility of state-society

relations and the tiny fractures that can occur with a lack of credibility and trust. In addition to

the misreading of the EIA, the slaying of a local resident intensified feelings of distrust for the

rural residents of Norachcholai and representative of the state (CEB officials and the police).

In summary, planning exercises in Ethul Kotte, Norachcholai and Moragahakanda

demonstrate the lengths to which the state has gone to protect economic interests and to be seen

as taking an active role in attracting foreign investment. Oppositional narratives of community,

alternative definitions of security, and demanding respect for rural livelihoods traversed

dominant state-sanctioned definitions of national security and the CEBs attempt to achieve


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national energy security. Potentially-affected persons reclaimed ideas of public interest and

security and made them their own. In so doing they made legible their history and culture as

well as highlighted the plural nature of Sri Lankan society.

Ulrich Beck as argues that as a society develops across time its citizenry becomes more

reflexive, and as such, challenges dominant institutions such as the state, science, and the

military. One result of this reflexive modernization with respect to development projects is the

extent to which citizens demand that they be involved in the design of projects that will affect

their health, environment, and livelihood. EIA legislation is one mechanism that helps to

unbind decision-making surrounding the development process from an institutional arena

dominated by politicians, bureaucrats, and other experts towards citizen participation in a more

public sphere.

Conclusion: Public Participation, Collective Claims and Political Culture

Environmental impact assessment is not a tool of litigation to stop development. The

process facilitates development in an environmentally- and socially-responsible manner through

discussion, redesign, and active negotiation with potentially-affected communities. Considering

the use of EIA as a tool of litigation reveals the disjuncture between its design in the West and its

implementation elsewhere.

According to Frank et al. (2000) and Hironaka and Schofer (2002), when EIA policy was

first designed in the West it was created by disinterested professionals (2000: 100) as an

informational tool that would serve as the blueprint for all other states interested in

environmental protection. To consider EIA as a disinterested or apolitical tool designed only to

gather information is to ignore the fact that the very process of information gathering is not only

a knowledge-creating process, but a political one as well. To claim, as these authors do, that the


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EIA process is used as an excuse for litigation (2002:226) or as an excuse to stop development

from occurring in ones backyard is to ignore how oppressive development projects can be for

poor or minority communities.

In the localized practice of EIA in Sri Lanka, we see how the process through which

potentially-affected communities understood an idea of or construct[ed] the state is the very

same process that they used to imagine other social groupings and interests (Gupta 1995: 393).

EFL and the collectivities that they worked with used EIA both as a tool for litigation and as a

critical practice to talk back to the social forces that shape their lives (Finn 1998: 14). In so

doing, the use of litigation had significant implications for their relationship with the Sri Lankan

state from expanding rights to redesigning the implementation of electricity infrastructure.

Each case above illustrated how at the intersection of development, environmental

protection, and social responsibility, citizens and NGO officials staked claims and negotiated

rights through public participation in energy sector development that was essential to defining

what the national interest looked like from alternative points of view and social locations. The

work of EFL demanded that state officials recognize alternative meanings of development and

consider additional sets of interests. The scope of their demands from the right to a safe

environment for childhood development to the right to consider environmental losses in tandem

with economic benefits expands the definition of project impacts and the environment. While

the participation of EFL was different in all three cases, it mobilized around the social, political,

and environmental implications of electricity infrastructure in them all.

In Flexible Citizenship, Aihwa Ong writes that NGOs have become vehicles for the

middle classes to struggle for greater democracy and cultural rights and to define a substantive

citizenship that is based on socioeconomic and universalist human-rights prescriptions


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Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on Sri Lankan Studies, 28-30 Nov

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