Report from Group 5: Early Warning, Evacuation,...

Tohoku Forum for CreativityReport from Group 5:

Early Warning, Evacuation, Partnerships

Chair: Yuichi Ono

Co-Chair: Hiroaki Maruya

Tohoku University, IRIDeS2014.11.08

Group 4 Participants

Nyo Nyo Aye, Myanmar

Singo Kochi, IRP, Kobe

Nuan, Sri Lanka

Pradip, Nepal

Hazar, Myanmar

Yashito Jibiki, IRIDeS

Maasaki Miyamoto, IRIDeS

Takako Izumi, IRIDeS

Carrine Yi,

Erich, Mas, IRIDeS

Peter Sammonds, UCL, UK

Rosanna Smith, UCL, UK

Takeshi Mori, Technopro

Tadao, Hasae, DBJ

Hiroaki Maruya, IRIDeS

Yichi Ono, IRIDeS

Reid Basher, New Zealand

Main Topics of Group 5 Discussion

The warnings and evacuation experience in GEJE, Cyclone Yolanda (Tacloban), and Mt Ontake

How EWS work, technical aspects, successes

Problems and failures in EWS and evacuation

Effective, people-centered EWS

Presentations and other experiences

1. Reid Basher: Concepts and practice of early warning systems

2. Yashito Jibiki: Early warning experience with Hainan and Mt Ontake disasters

3. Participants: experience in events in Japan (including Kobe, GEJE) and elsewhere (Cyclone Nargis, Indian Ocean tsunami, Christchurch EQ)

Reduced disaster risk from S&T - EWS

CHINA: Storm and flood forecasting

drives EWS and evacuation - huge

reduction in flood fatalities

1931 3,700,000

1959 2,003,396

1960-2000 p.a. <35,000

2006-2007 p.a. <2,000

BANGLADESH: Community-based

warning dissemination linked to

district offices and national warning

centre has high cost benefit ratio

$40 saved per $1 invested in warning system

$400 - $500 saved per affected household

(equal to about one year’s income)

Key elements of modern storm warnings

Extensive global data collection and exchangePhysics-based high resolution numerical models (NWP)

Automated model-output statisticsIntermediaries (e.g. TV) for communicating to public

Linear systems model of early warning

Monitoring(initial state) System model

(time evolving) Prediction (probabilistic)

Wave propagation,

coastal run-up

Seismicity, sea

level, bathymetryZ(x, y, t) +

Communications

Response (complex)

Preparedness,

response to EW

Z(x, y, t) +

Difficult issues at all steps

Monitoring

(initial state) System model

(time evolving) Prediction

(probabilistic)

Scientific knowledge of

hazard

Communities, politics

Institutional mandates

and mechanisms

Research

Response

behaviour and

experience

Mitigation, education,

preparedness

Technical sub-system

Not quite as simple

as the linear model !

An integrated systems model of EWS

The four elements of systematic

people-centred early warning systems

Risk assessment Warning service

Preparedness Communication

+

+

+ +

EW systems typically fail in the communication and preparedness elements

Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans: risk knowledge failed to penetrate public and policymaker consciousness

Indian Ocean tsunami: failures occurred in all four elements

http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/

Tsunami WS – part of a bigger system

Evacuation capacities Protective structures,

Public education

A broad view of early warning of risks

Natural hazards Second-Minute-Day-Week-Month-Year-Decade

Earthquake, tsunami XXXXXXXXX

Weather, tides, floods XXXXXXXXXX

Volcanic eruption XXXXXXXXXXXX

Reservoirs, soils, snow pack XXXXXXXXXXXX

Ocean anomaly, seasonal climate XXXXXXXXXXXX

Climate change XXXXXX

Complex hazards .

Emergencies, conflict XXXXXXXXX

Crops, food prices, reserves, food aid XXXXXXXX

Environment, industry, urban, infrastructure XXXXXXXX

Land use, economic change, climate change XXXXX

EWS – science-based systems to warn of harmful future conditions

Long interest by UN General Assembly and in Secretary General reports

Interest spurred by impacts of big El Niño events in 1990s.

Key element in DRR processes (IDNDR, UNISDR; HFA)

Strong interest by small island developing states (SIDS); and recognised in UNFCCC as a climate change adaptation

UNISDR Platform for the Promotion of EW (PPEW)

UN support for Indian Ocean disaster recovery and tsunami warning, and upgrading of EWS generally

Early warning in UN processes

In 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan calls for EWS “for all

hazards and all people”

EW systems need to be designed as a system process,

with strong consideration to the human response part of

the system

EW systems have similar fundamental elements as a

scientific system process

But they differ greatly in the detail of their

implementation

We do not have an integrated approach on EW, and are

far from Kofi Anan’s ideal of EW for all hazards and all

people

Early Warning System

in the case of

Super Typhoon Haiyan

• Damages of Haiyan

• Design of the Questionnaire Survey

• Severe Weather Bulletin

• Sources of information on the approaching typhoon

• Timing of receiving information on the approaching

typhoon

• Estimation of typhoon intensity

• Reasons for NO evacuation

• Confidence in PAGASA information

• Terminology: Storm Surge VS Tsunami

• Discussions from the Results

Presentation Outline

Severe Weather Bulletin

•9 warnings2 Weather Advisory

7 Severe Weather Bulletin

•3rd bulletin on 11 AM of 7th Nov

•18 hours before the landfall

•Estimation of storm surge

•7m at maximum

•6m observed in Tacloban

70.1%

64.9%

69.9%

75.5%

65.9%

73.7%

71.7%

71.7%

73.1%

64.5%

5.1%

7.9%

3.8%

3.4%

7.6%

2.9%

3.6%

1.3%

5.0%

10.5%

24.8%

27.2%

26.2%

21.1%

26.4%

23.4%

24.7%

27.0%

21.8%

25.0%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%

Total (N=589)

Tacloban (N=202)

Palo (N=183)

Tanauan (N=204)

Male (N=276)

Female (N=312)

20s (N=166)

30s (N=152)

40s (N=119)

Over 50s (N=152)

Evacuated to some places except my house

Evacuated to second floor or top roof of my house

Not evacuated

Evacuation Behavior

Site

Gender

Age

29.9%

73.7%

71.2%

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0%

1. TV

2. Radio

3. Newspaper

4. Internet

5. Market

6. School/Workplace

7. Family

8. Relatives/Friends

9. Barangay Leader

10. Church

11. Others

Information Source of Yolanda

Note: multiple answers were allowed in this question.

3.2%

32.9%

20.4%

23.1%

6.0%

4.6%

2.8%

3.7%

3.2%

1.9%25.1%

19.9%

28.0%

9.0%

9.0%

6.6%

0.0%

0.5%

2.6%

29.0%20.1%

25.5%

7.5%

6.8%

4.7%

1.9%

1.9%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%

Family

Desa/dusun leader

Local government

PVMBG staff

Informal leader

TV or radio

Other

I don't know

No Answer

Kediri (N=216)

Blitar (N=211)

Total (N=427)

Whom do you trust most for information?

19

Terminology: Storm Surge VS Tsunami

Understood the meaning of “Storm Surge” before Yolanda?

Yes = 12.8%

If you heard it was "tsunami", evacuated to anywhere else except your house?

0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0%

Definitely PossiblyCould not judge Did not evacuateNo idea

Just after start of eruption photo by Tourist

Eruption started at 27 October

11:52 am

Source: Chu-nichi news paper

http://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/front/list/CK2014100202000269.html

Cause of death

Damaged death 46, Burned death 1

As of 2nd October by DMAT

200 m

110 Active Volcanoes in

Japan

Alert level by JMA

Level 5

0 / 31

Level 4

0 / 31

Level 3

3 / 31

Level 2

5 / 31

Level 1

23 / 31

Background: key perspectives, policies and planning frameworks

1. EWS cover wide range of hazards, and differ greatly

2. Science and technical systems are well developed, but

always have uncertainty and error

3. International mechanisms for cooperation and data exchange

mostly good, but with exceptions

4. Different perspective of the citizen and the authorities on the

risk and on how to act

5. [situations in other sectors – public health, education]

Problems and challenges in implementing early warning and evacuation measures

1. Gap between and early warning and subsequent action

2. Failure in communications, delivery/receipt of warnings.

Need to learn details and address these problems

3. Evacuation challenge; wrong assumption that people

understand what’s at risk and know what to do.

4. GEJE evacuation relatively successful – low fatality rate.

5. But still problem of the unexpected mega event, previous

warning of minor event. Some people did not get good

warning. Problem of how to evacuate

6. Situation of failures more extreme in Tacloban

7. Rarity of events; lack of knowledge and direct experience

(what is a storm surge?)

Problems and challenges in implementing early warning and evacuation measures

1. Need to engage people in advance, developing awareness

and preparedness for appropriate action on warning.

2. People centered – how to do this. Self-responsibility and

reaction on big EQ. understanding local risks (part of 4

elements)

3. Issue of false alarms; need to develop better representation

of intrinsic uncertainty in warnings

4. Evacuation fears, e.g. loss of property, risk of relocation

1.

Based on our findings: Recommendations for EWS and evacuation

1. Much more serious effort to design EWS from

viewpoint of citizen, rather than just top down

2. tailored to – and by - the community

3. Test EWS against 4 elements of effective EWS

4. Telling the story about what the warning means,

creating narratives that makes sense of the situation

and how to act

5. Tools for expanding memory/experience to beyond

the disaster area and time frame

Based on our findings: Recommendations for EWS and evacuation

1. Continued effort to upgrade technical quality

2. New ways to represent uncertainty and celebrating

good responses even when event is weak.

3. More detailed work on reliability of all parts of

system – e.g. during electricity failure

4. Work to ensure authority and consistency of

warnings

5. Better techniques for communicating relative

seriousness of the impending event

Based on our findings: Suggestions and Implications for Future Work of IRIDeS

1. Continue engagement and bridging between science

and practical EWS

2. Use systematic frameworks for developing and

researching EWS

3. Do comparative studies of EWS (e.g. GEJE,

Tacloban, Mt Ontake, etc)

4. Identify critical techical issues such as uncertainty

and the false alarm problem

5. Research space-time memory extension