Berkeley 3 Dialogues

8/8/2019 Berkeley 3 Dialogues

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Selections from

Three Dialogues Between Hylas and

Philonous1

by George Berkeley

TheFirstDialogue

PHILONOUS:Goodmorrow,Hylas. Ididnotexpect to find youabroad

so early.

HYLAS:Itisindeedsomethingunusual.Butmythoughtsweresotakenupwith

asubjectIwasdiscoursingof lastnightthat,findingIcouldnotsleep,I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.... You were rep

resented in lastnightsconversationas onewhomaintained themost

extravagantopinion thateverentered into themindofman, towit, that

thereisnosuchthingasmaterialsubstanceintheworld.

PHILONOUS:Thatthereisnosuchthingaswhatphilosopherscallmaterial

substance, lamseriouslypersuaded.But, if Iweremade toseeanything

absurdorskeptical in this, Ishould thenhave thesamereason torenounce

this,thatIimagineIhavenowtorejectthecontraryopinion.

HYLAS:What!Cananythingbe morefantastical,morerepugnant to com

monsense,oramoremanifestpieceofskepticism,thantobelievethereis

nosuchthingasmatter?

1Thismaterialisinthepublicdomain.


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PHILONOUS:Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who

hold there is, are by virtue of that opinion a greater skeptic, and

maintainmoreparadoxesandrepugnances tocommonsense, than Iwho

believenosuchthing?

HYLAS:Youmayas soonpersuademe, thepart isgreater than thewhole,as

that, in order to avoid absurdity and skepticism, I should everbe

obligedto giveupmy opinioninthispoint....

PHILONOUS:Whatmeanyouby sensiblethings?HYLAS:Thosethingswhichareperceivedbythesenses.Canyouimagine

thatImeananythingelse?

PHILONOUS: Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend

yournotions, since thismaymuch shortenour inquiry.Sufferme then to

ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceivedby the

senseswhichareperceived immediately?Ormay those thingsproperlybesaidtobe sensiblewhichare perceivedmediately,ornot withoutthe

interventionofothers?

HYLAS:Idonot sufficientlyunderstandyou.

PHILONOUS: In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the

letters;butmediately,orby meansofthese,aresuggestedto mymind

thenotionsofGod,virtue,truth,andsoon.Now,thatthelettersaretruly

sensiblethings,orperceivedbysense,thereisnodoubt.ButIwouldknow

whetheryou takethethingssuggestedbythemtobesotoo.

HYLAS:No,

certainly:

It

were

absurd

to

think

God

or

virtue

sensible

things,

though theymaybe signifiedandsuggested to themindby sensible

marks,withwhichtheyhaveanarbitraryconnection.

PHILONOUSItseemsthen,thatby sensiblethingsyoumeanthoseonlywhichcanbe perceivedimmediatelybysense?

HYLAS: Right.

PHILONOUS:Does it not follow from this, that though I see one part of

the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason does thence

evidentlyconcludetheremustbesomecauseofthatdiversityofcolors,

yetthatcausecannotbesaidtobeasensiblething,orperceivedbythe

senseofseeing?HYLAS:Itdoes.

PHILONOUS: In likemanner, though Ihearvarietyofsounds,yet Icannot

besaidtohearthecausesofthosesounds?

HYLAS:Youcannot.

PHILONOUS: And whenby my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and

heavy, Icannotsay,withanytruthorpropriety, that I feel thecauseof


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its heator weight?

HYLAS:Topreventanymorequestionsofthiskind,Itellyouonceforall,that

bysensiblethingsImeanthoseonlywhichareperceivedbysense;andthatintruththesensesperceivenothingwhichtheydonotperceiveimmediately,fortheymakenoinferences.Thededucingthereforeofcausesoroccasionsfrom

effectsandappearances,whichaloneareperceivedbysense,entirelyrelates

toreason.

PHILONOUS:Thispointthenisagreedbetweenusthatsensiblethingsarethoseonly which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform mewhetherwe immediatelyperceivebysightanythingbeside lightandcolors

and figures; orby hearing, anythingbut sounds;by the palate, anything

besidetastes;bythesmell,besideodors;orbythetouch,morethantangible

qualities.

HYLAS:Wedonot.

PHILONOUS: It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities,thereremainsnothingsensible?

HYLAS:Igrantit.

PHILONOUS: Sensible things therefore are nothing elsebut so many sensible

qualities,orcombinationsofsensiblequalities?

HYLAS.Nothingelse.

PHILONOUS:Heatthenisasensiblething?HYLAS:Certainly.

PHILONOUS:Doestherealityofsensiblethingsconsistinbeingperceived?Or

isit

something

distinct

from

their

being

perceived,

and

that

bears

no

relation

tothemind?

HYLAS:Toexistisonething,andtobeperceivedisanother.PHILONOUS: I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask

whetherbytheirrealexistenceyoumeanasubsistenceexteriortothemind

anddistinctfromtheirbeingperceived?

HYLAS:Imeanarealabsolutebeing,distinctfrom,andwithoutanyrelationto,

theirbeingperceived.

PHILONOUS:Heat therefore, if itbealloweda realbeing,mustexistwithout;

themind?

HYLAS:ItMust.

PHILONOUS: Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all

degrees of heat which we perceive, or is there any reason why we should

attributeittosomeanddenyittoothers?Andiftherebe,prayletmeknow

thatreason.

HYLAS:Whateverdegreeofheatweperceivebysense,wemaybesurethesame

existsintheobjectthatoccasionsit.


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PHILONOUS:What!Thegreatestaswellastheleast?

HYLAS:Itellyou,thereasonisplainlythesameinrespectofboth.Theyareboth

perceivedbysense;nay,thegreaterdegreeofheatismoresensiblyperceived;

and consequently, if there isanydifference,we aremore certainof its real

existencethanwecanbeoftherealityofalesserdegree.

PHILONOUS:But isnot themostvehementand intensedegreeofheatavery

greatpain?

HYLAS:Noonecandenyit.

PHILONOUS:Andisanyunperceivingthingcapableofpainorpleasure?

HYLAS:No,certainly.

PHILONOUS:Isyourmaterialsubstanceasenselessbeing,orabeingendowed

withsenseandperception?

HYLAS:Itissenselesswithoutdoubt.

PHILONOUS:Itcannotthereforebethesubjectofpain?

HYLAS:Bynomeans.PHILONOUS: Nor consequentlyof the greatest heat perceivedby sense, since

youacknowledgethistobenosmallpain?

HYLAS:Igrantit.

PHILONOUS:What shallwesay thenofyourexternalobject is itamaterial

substance,orno?

HYLAS:Itisamaterialsubstancewiththesensiblequalitiesinheringinit.

PHILONOUS: How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot

[exist]inamaterialsubstance?Idesireyouwouldclearthispoint.

HYLAS:Hold,

Philonous,

Ifear

Iwas

[mistaken]

in

yielding

intense

heat

to

be

a

pain.Itshouldseemrather,thatpainissomethingdistinctfromheat,andthe

consequenceoreffectofit.

PHILONOUS:Uponputtingyourhandnearthefire,doyouperceiveonesimple

uniformsensation,ortwodistinctsensations?

HYLAS:Butonesimplesensation.

PHILONOUSS:Isnottheheatimmediatelyperceived?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS:Andthepain?

HYLAS: True.

PHILONOUS:Seeingthereforetheyarebothimmediatelyperceivedatthesame

time,andthefireaffectsyouonlywithonesimpleoruncompoundedidea,it

follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately

perceived,andthepain;and,consequently,thattheintenseheatimmediately

perceivedisnothingdistinctfromaparticularsortofpain.

HYLAS:Itseemsso.


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PHILONOUS: Again, try inyour thoughts,Hylas, ifyou can conceiveavehe

mentsensationtobewithoutpainorpleasure.

HYLAS:Icannot.

PHILONOUS:Orcanyouframetoyourselfanideaofsensiblepainorpleasure

ingeneral,abstractedfromeveryparticular ideaofheat,cold,tastes,smells,

andsoon?

HYLAS:IdonotfindthatIcan.

PHILONOUS:Doesitnotthereforefollowthatsensiblepainisnothingdistinct

fromthosesensationsorideas,inanintensedegree?

HYLAS:Itisundeniable.Andtospeakthetruth,Ibegintosuspectaverygreat

heatcannotexistbutinamindperceivingit.

PHILONOUS:What!Areyou then in that skeptical stateofsuspense,between

affirminganddenying?

HYLAS: I think Imaybepositive inthepoint.Averyviolentandpainfulheat

cannotexistwithoutthemind.PHILONOUS:Ithasnottherefore,accordingtoyou,anyrealbeing?HYLAS:Iownit.

PHILONOUS:Isitthereforecertainthatthereisnobodyinnaturereallyhot?

HYLAS:Ihavenotdeniedthereisanyrealheatinbodies.Ionlysaythereisno

suchthingasanintenserealheat.

PHILONOUS:Butdidyounotsaybefore thatalldegreesofheatwereequally

real;or,iftherewasanydifference,thatthegreaterweremoreundoubtedly

realthanthelesser?

HYLAS:True,

but

it

was

because

Idid

not

then

consider

the

ground

there

is

for

distinguishingbetweenthem,whichInowplainlysee.Anditisthis:Because

intense heat is nothing elsebut a particular kind of painful sensation, and

paincannotexistbutinaperceivingbeing,itfollowsthatnointenseheatcan

reallyexistinanunperceivingcorporealsubstance.Butthisisnoreasonwhy

weshoulddenyheatinaninferiordegreetoexistinsuchasubstance.

PHILONOUS:Buthowshallwebeabletodiscernthosedegreesofheatwhich

existonlyinthemindfromthosewhichexistwithoutit?

HYLAS: That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist un

perceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the

mind.Butasforallotherdegreesofheat,nothingobligesustothinkthesame

ofthem.

PHILONOUS: I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was

capableofpleasure,anymorethanofpain.

HYLAS:Idid.

PHILONOUS: And is not warmth,or a more gentle degreeof heat than what

causesuneasiness,apleasure?


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HYLAS:Whatthen?

PHILONOUS:Consequently,itcannotexistwithoutthemindinanunperceiving

substance,orbody.

HYLAS:Soitseems.

PHILONOUS:Since,therefore,aswellthosedegreesofheatthatarenotpainful,

asthosethatare,canexistonlyinathinkingsubstance,maywenotconclude

that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat

whatsoever?

HYLAS: On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a

pleasureasthatagreatdegreeofheatisapain.

PHILONOUS: Idonotpretend thatwarmth isasgreatapleasureasheat isa

pain.But,ifyougrantittobeevenasmallpleasure,itservestomakegood

myconclusion.

HYLAS: I could rather call it an indolence. It seems tobenothing more than aprivationofbothpainandpleasure.Andthatsuchaqualityorstateasthismayagreetoanunthinkingsubstance,Ihopeyouwillnotdeny.

PHILONOUS:Ifyouareresolvedtomaintainthatwarmth,oragentledegreeof

heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise thanby

appealingtoyourownsense.Butwhatthinkyouofcold?

HYLAS:ThesamethatIdoofheat.Anintensedegreeofcoldisapain;fortofeel

averygreatcold, is toperceiveagreatuneasiness. Itcannot thereforeexist

withoutthemind,butalesserdegreeofcoldmay,aswellasalesser,degree

ofheat.

PHILONOUS:Those

bodies,

therefore,

upon

whose

application

to

our

own,

we

perceiveamoderatedegreeofheat,mustbeconcluded tohaveamoderate

degreeofheatorwarmthinthem;andthose,uponwhoseapplicationwefeel

alikedegreeofcold,mustbethoughttohavecoldinthem.

HYLAS:Theymust.

PHILONOUS: Can any doctrinebe true that necessarily leads a man into an

absurdity?

HYLAS:Withoutdoubtitcannot.

PHILONOUS:Isitnotanabsurditytothinkthatthesamethingshouldbeatthe

sametimebothcoldandwarm?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILNOUS:Supposenowoneofyourhandshot,and theothercold,and that

theyarebothatonceput into the samevesselofwater, inan intermediate

state.Willnotthewaterseemcoldtoonehand,andwarmtotheother?

HYLAS:Itwill.

PHILONOUS:Oughtwenottherefore,byyourprinciples,toconcludeitisreally

both cold and warm at the same time that is, according to your own


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concession,tobelieveanabsurdity?

HYLAS:Iconfessitseemsso.

PHILONOUS:Consequently,theprinciplesthemselvesarefalse,sinceyouhave

grantedthatnotrueprincipleleadstoanabsurdity.

HYLAS:Butafterall,cananythingbemoreabsurdthantosaythereisnoheatinthefire?

PHILONOUS:Tomakethepointstillclearer,tellmewhether, intwocasesex

actlyalike,weoughtnottomakethesamejudgment?

HYLAS:WeOught.

PHILONOUS: When a pinpricksyour finger,does it not rend anddivide the

fibersofyourflesh?

HYLAS:Itdoes.

PHILONOUS:Andwhenacoalburnsyourfinger,doesitanymore?

HYLAS:Itdoesnot.

PHILONOUS:Since,therefore,youneitherjudgethesensationitselfoccasionedbythepin,noranythinglikeittobeinthepin;youshouldnot,conformably

towhatyouhavenowgranted,judgethesensationoccasionedbythefire,or

anythinglikeit,tobeinthefire.

HYLAS: Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point and

acknowledgethatheatandcoldareonlysensationsexistinginourminds.But

therestillremainqualitiesenoughtosecuretherealityofexternalthings.

PHILONOUS:Butwhatwillyousay,Hylas,ifitshallappearthatthecaseisthe

samewithregardtoallothersensiblequalities,andthattheycannomorebe

supposedto

exist

without

the

mind,

than

heat

and

cold?

HYLAS:Then indeedyouwillhavedonesomethingtothepurpose,butthatis

whatIdespairofseeingproved.

PHILONOUS:Letusexaminetheminorder.Whatthinkyouoftastesdothey

existwithoutthemind,orno?

HYLAS:Cananymaninhissensesdoubtwhethersugarissweet,orwormwood

bitter?

PHILONOUS:Informme,Hylas.Isasweettasteaparticularkindofpleasureor

pleasantsensation,orisitnot?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS:Andisnotbitternesssomekindofuneasinessorpain?

HYLAS:Igrantit.

PHILONOUS: If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal

substancesexistingwithoutthemind,howcansweetnessandbitterness,that

is,pleasureandpain,agreetothem?

HYLAS:Hold,Philonous,Inowseewhatitwas[that]deludedmeallthistime.

You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not


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particularsortsofpleasureandpain;towhich Iansweredsimply,that they

were.WhereasIshouldhavethusdistinguished:Thosequalities,asperceived

byus,arepleasuresorpains;butnotasexisting in theexternalobjects.We

must not therefore conclude absolutely that there is no heat in the fire or

sweetness in thesugar,butonly thatheatorsweetness,asperceivedbyus,

arenotinthefireorsugar.Whatsayyoutothis?

PHILONOUS: I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded al

together concerning sensible things, which you defined tobe the thingsweimmediatelyperceive by our senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, youspeakof,asdistinctfromthese,Iknownothingofthem,neitherdotheyatall

belongtothepointindispute.Youmay,indeed,pretendtohavediscovered

certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible

qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use canbe made of this to your

presentpurpose,Iamatalosstoconceive.Tellmethenoncemore,doyou

acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness andbitterness (meaning thosequalitieswhichareperceivedbythesenses),donotexistwithoutthemind?

HYLAS:Isee it istonopurposetoholdout,soIgiveupthecauseastothose

mentionedqualities.ThoughIprofessitsoundsoddlytosaythatsugarisnot

sweet.

PHILONOUS:But, foryour farther satisfaction, take thisalongwithyou:That

which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear

bitter.Andnothingcanbeplainerthanthatdivers personsperceivedifferent

tastesinthesamefood,sincethatwhichonemandelightsin,anotherabhors.

Andhow

could

this

be,

if

the

taste

was

something

really

inherent

in

the

food?

HYLAS:IacknowledgeIknownothow....

PHILONOUS:AndIhopeyouwillmakenodifficultytoacknowledgethesame

ofcolors.

HYLAS:Pardonme;thecaseofcolorsisverydifferent.Cananythingbeplainer

thanthatwesee themonthe objects?

PHILONOUS: The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal

substancesexistingwithoutthemind?

HYLAS:Theyare.

PHILONOUS:Andhavetrueandrealcolorsinheringin them?

HYLAS:Eachvisibleobjecthas thatcolorwhichwesee init....

PHILONOUS:What!Arethenthebeautifulredandpurpleweseeonyonder

clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves

anyotherformthanthatofadarkmistorvapor?

HYLAS:Imustown,Philonous,thosecolorsarenot reallyinthecloudsas

theyseemtobeatthisdistance.Theyareonlyapparentcolors.

PHILONOUS: Apparent call you them? How shall we distinguish these


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apparentcolorsfromreal?

HYLAS:Veryeasily.Thoseareto be thoughtapparent which,appearing

onlyatadistance,vanishuponanearerapproach.

PHILONOUS: And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are

discoveredbythemostnearand exactsurvey.

HYLAS:Right.

PHILONOUS:Is thenearestandexactestsurveymadeby thehelpof ami

croscope,orby thenakedeye?

HYLAS:Byamicroscope,doubtless.

PHILONOUS:Butamicroscopeoftendiscoverscolorsinanobjectdifferent

from thoseperceivedby theunassistedsight.And in casewe hadmi

croscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object

whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same color

whichit exhibitsto thenakedeye.

HYLAS:And whatwillyou conclude fromall this?You cannotargue thatthereare reallyand naturallynocolorsonobjects,becausebyartificial

managementstheymay be alteredormadetovanish.

PHILONOUS: I think it may evidently be concluded from your own

concessions, that all the colors we see with our naked eyes are only

apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close

andaccurateinspection,whichisaffordedusbyamicroscope.Then,as

towhatyousayby wayof prevention:Iaskyouwhethertherealand

naturalstateofanobjectisbetterdiscoveredbyaverysharpandpiercing

sight,or

by

one

which

is

less

sharp?

HYLAS:Bytheformerwithoutdoubt.

PHILONOUS:Isitnotplainfrom[optics]thatmicroscopesmakethesight

morepenetratingandrepresentobjectsastheywouldappeartotheeyein

caseitwerenaturallyendowedwithamostexquisitesharpness?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS: Consequently the microscopical representation is to be

thoughtthatwhichbestsetsforththerealnatureofthething,orwhatitis

in itself. The colors, therefore,by it perceived are more genuine and

realthanthoseperceivedotherwise.

HYLAS:Iconfessthereis somethingin whatyousay....

PHILONOUS:.... I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance

andpositionof theobject,whatpeculiar textureand formationof the

eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that

truecolor,anddistinguishingitfromapparentones.

HYLAS: I own myself entirely satisfied that they are all equally apparent and

thatthereisnosuchthingascolorreallyinheringinexternalbodies,butthat


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it isaltogether inthe light.Andwhatconfirmsme inthisopinion is that in

proportion to the lightcolorsarestillmoreor lessvivid;and if therebeno

light,thenaretherenocolorsperceived.Besides,allowingtherearecolorson

external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no

externalbodyaffectsthemindunlessitactsfirstonourorgansofsense.But

the only action ofbodies is motion, and motion cannotbe communicated

otherwisethanby impulse.Adistantobjectthereforecannotactontheeye,

norconsequentlymakeitselforitspropertiesperceivabletothesoul.Whence

it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance which,

operatingontheeye,occasionsaperceptionofcolorsandsuchislight.

PHILONOUS:How!Islightthenasubstance?

HYLAS:Itellyou,Philonous,externallightisnothingbutathinfluidsubstance

whose minute particlesbeing agitated with abrisk motion, and in various

mannersreflectedfromthedifferentsurfacesofoutwardobjectstotheeyes,

communicatedifferentmotionstotheopticnerves;which,beingpropagatedtothebrain,causethereinvarious impressions;andtheseareattendedwith

thesensationsofred,blue,yellow,andsoon.PHILONOUS:Itseemsthenthelightdoesnomorethanshaketheopticnerves.

HYLAS:Nothingelse.

PHILONOUS:Andconsequenttoeachparticularmotionofthenerves,themind

isaffectedwithasensationwhichissomeparticularcolor.

HYLAS:Right.

PHILNOUS:Andthesesensationshavenoexistencewithoutthemind.

HYLAS:They

have

not.

PHILONOUS:Howthendoyouaffirmthatcolorsareinthelight,sinceby

lightyouunderstandacorporealsubstanceexternaltothemind?HYLAS:Lightandcolors,as immediatelyperceivedbyus, Igrantcannotexist

without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and

configurationsofcertaininsensibleparticlesofmatter.

PHILONOUS: Colors then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate

objectsofsight,cannotagreetoanybutaperceivingsubstance.

HYLAS:ThatiswhatIsay.

PHILONOUS: Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible

qualitieswhicharealonethoughtcolorsbyallmankindbeside,youmayhold

whatyoupleasewithregardtothoseinvisibleonesofthephilosophers....

HYLAS: I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any longer.

Colors, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed secondary qualities, havecertainlynoexistencewithoutthemind.ButbythisacknowledgmentImust

notbesupposed toderogateanything from therealityofmatterorexternal

objects, seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who


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neverthelessarethefarthestimaginablefromdenyingmatter.Fortheclearer

understandingofthis,youmustknowsensiblequalitiesarebyphilosophers

divided into primary and secondary. The former are extension, figure,solidity,gravity,motion,andrest;andthesetheyholdexistreallyinbodies.

Thelatterarethoseaboveenumeratedor,briefly,allsensiblequalitiesbesidetheprimarywhichtheyassertareonlysomanysensationsorideasexistingnowherebutinthemind.Butallthis,Idoubtnot,youareapprisedof. For

mypart,Ihavebeenalongtimesensibletherewassuchinopinioncurrent

amongphilosophers,butwasnever thoroughly convincedof its truthuntil

now.

PHILONOUS:Youarestillthenofopinionthatextensionandfiguresareinherentinexternalunthinkingsubstances?

HYLAS:Iam.

PHILONOUS: But what if the same arguments which are brought against

secondaryqualitieswillholdgoodagainstthesealso?HYLAS:WhythenIshallbeobligedtothink,theytooexistonlyinthemind.

PHILONOUS: Is it your opinion [that] very figure and extension which you

perceivebysenseexistintheoutwardobjectormaterialsubstance?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS:Haveallotheranimalsasgoodgroundstothinkthesameofthe

figureandextensionwhichtheyseeandfeel?

HYLAS:Withoutdoubt,iftheyhaveanythoughtatall.

PHILONOUS: Answerme,Hylas.Thinkyouthesenseswerebestoweduponall

animalsfor

their

preservation

and

well

being

in

life,

or

were

they

given

to

menaloneforthisend?

HYLAS:Imakenoquestionbuttheyhavethesameuseinallotheranimals.

PHILONOUS: Ifso,isitnotnecessarytheyshouldbeenabledbythemtoper

ceivetheirownlimbsandthosebodieswhicharecapableofharmingthem?

HYLAS:Certainly.

PHILONOUS:Amitethereforemustbesupposedtoseehisownfoot,andthings

equalorevenlessthanit,asbodiesofsomeconsiderabledimension;though

atthesametimetheyappeartoyouscarcediscernible,oratbestassomany

visiblepoints?

HYLAS:Icannotdenyit.

PHILONOUS:Andtocreatureslessthanthemitetheywillseemyetlarger?

HYLAS:Theywill.

PHILONOUS: Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another ex

tremelyminuteanimalappearassomehugemountain?

HYLAS:AllthisIgrant.


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PHILONOUS:Canoneand thesame thingbeat thesame time in itselfofdif

ferentdimensions?

HYLAS:Thatwereabsurdtoimagine.

PHILONOUS: But from what you have laiddown it follows thatboth the ex

tensionbyyouperceived,andthatperceivedbythemiteitself,aslikewiseall

thoseperceivedbylesseranimals,areeachofthemthetrueextensionofthe

mites foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led into an

absurdity.

HYLAS:Thereseemstobesomedifficultyinthepoint.

PHILONOUS:Again,haveyounotacknowledgedthatnorealinherentproperty

ofanyobjectcanbechangedwithoutsomechangeinthethingitself?

HYLAS:Ihave.

PHILONOUS: But as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible

extensionvaries,beingatonedistancetenorahundredtimesgreaterthanat

another.Doesitnotthereforefollowfromhencelikewisethatitisnotreallyinherentintheobject?

HYLAS:IownIamatalosswhattothink.

PHILONOUS: Yourjudgment will soonbe determined, if you will venture to

thinkasfreelyconcerningthisqualityasyouhavedoneconcerningtherest.

Wasitnotadmittedasagoodargument,thatneitherheatnorcoldwasinthe

water,becauseitseemedwarmtoonehandandcoldtotheother?

HYLAS:Itwas.

PHILONOUS:Isitnottheverysamereasoningtoconclude,thereisnoextension

orfigure

in

an

object,

because

to

one

eye

it

shall

seem

little,

smooth,

and

round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and

angular?

HYLAS:Theverysame.Butdoesthislatterfacteverhappen?

PHILONOUS:Youmayatany timemake theexperiment,by lookingwithone

eybare,andwiththeotherthroughamicroscope.

HYLAS:Iknownothowtomaintainit,andyetIamloathtogiveupextension,

Iseesomanyoddconsequencesfollowinguponsuchaconcession.

PHILONOUS: Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you

willstickatnothingforitsoddness....

HYLAS:Iacknowledge,Philonous,that,uponafairobservationofwhatpasses

in my mind, I can discover nothing elsebut that I am a thinkingbeing,

affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive howa

sensation shouldexist inanunperceiving substance.But then,on theother

hand,whenIlookonsensiblethingsinadifferentview,consideringthemas

so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material

substratum,withoutwhichtheycannotbeconceivedtoexist.


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PHILONOUS: Material substratum call you it? Pray,by which of your sensescameyouacquaintedwiththatbeing?

HYLAS:Itisnotitselfsensible,itsmodesandqualitiesonlybeingperceivedby

thesenses.

PHILONOUS: Ipresumethen itwasbyreflectionandreasonyouobtainedthe

ideaofit?

HYLAS:Idonotpretendtoanyproperpositiveideaofit.However,Iconcludeit

exists,becausequalitiescannotbeconceivedtoexistwithoutasupport.

PHILONOUS: It seems then you have only a relative notionof it, or that youconceive itnototherwisethanbyconceivingtherelation itbearstosensible

qualities?

HYLAS:Right.

PHILONOUS:Bepleasedthereforetoletmeknowwhereinthatrelationconsists.

HYLAS:Isitnotsufficientlyexpressedinthetermsubstratum,orsubstance?PHILONOUS: If so, theword substratumshould import that it is spreadunder

thesensiblequalitiesoraccidents?

HYLAS:True.

PHILONOUS:Andconsequentlyunderextension?

HYLAS:Iownit.

PHILONOUS: It is thereforesomewhat in itsownnatureentirelydistinct from

extension?

HYLAS: I tell you, extension is only a mode, and matter is something that

supportsmodes.And is itnotevidentthethingsupported isdifferentfrom

thething

supporting?

PHILONOUS: So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is

supposedtobethesubstratumofextension?

HYLAS:Justso.

PHILONOUS:Answerme,Hylas.Canathingbespreadwithoutextension?Or

isnottheideaofextensionnecessarilyincludedinspreading?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS: Whatsoeverthereforeyousupposespreadunderanythingmust

have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under

whichitisspread?

HYLAS:Itmust.

PHILONOUS:Consequently,everycorporealsubstance,beingthesubstratumof

extension,musthaveinitselfanotherextension,bywhichitisqualifiedtobe

asubstratum andsoontoinfinity?AndIaskwhetherthisbenotabsurdin

itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the

substratumwassomethingdistinctfromandexclusiveofextension?


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HYLAS:Ayebut,Philonous,you takemewrong. Idonotmean thatmatter is

spread inagross literalsenseunderextension.Thewordsubstratumisusedonlytoexpressingeneralthesamethingwithsubstance.

PHILONOUS: Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term

substance.Isitnotthatitstandsunderaccidents?HYLAS:Theverysame.

PHILONOUS: But,thatonethingmaystandunderorsupportanother,mustit

notbeextended?

HYLAS:ItMust.

PHILONOUS:Isnotthereforethissuppositionliabletothesameabsurditywith

theformer?

HYLAS:Youstilltakethingsinastrictliteralsense.Thatisnotfair,Philonous.

PHILONOUS:Iamnotforimposinganysenseonyourwords;youareatliberty

to explain them as you please. Only, Ibeseech you, make me understand

somethingby them.You tellmemattersupportsorstandsunderaccidents.How?Isitasyourlegssupportyourbody?

HYLAS:No;thatistheliteralsense.

PHILONOUS: Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you un

derstanditin. HowlongmustIwaitforananswer,Hylas?

HYLAS: I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well

enoughwhatwasmeantbymatterssupportingaccidents.Butnow,themore

IthinkonitthelesscanIcomprehendit.Inshort,IfindthatIknownothing

ofit.

PHILONOUS:It

seems

then

you

have

no

idea

at

all,

neither

relative

nor

positive,

ofmatter.Youknowneitherwhatitisinitself,norwhatrelationithearsto

accidents?

HYLAS:Iacknowledgeit.

PHILONOUS:Andyetyouassertedthatyoucouldnotconceivehowqualitiesor

accidentsshouldreallyexist,withoutconceivingatthesametimeamaterial

supportofthem?

HYLAS:Idid.

PHILONOUS:That is tosay,whenyouconceive therealexistenceofqualities,

youdowithal conceivesomethingwhichyoucannotconceive?

HYLAS:Itwaswrong,Iown....

PHILONOUS:....But(topassbyallthathasbeenhithertosaidandreckonitfor

nothing,ifyouwillhaveitso)Iamcontenttoputthewholeuponthisissue.

If you can conceive it possible for ... any sensible object whatever to exist

withoutthemind,thenIwillgrantitactuallytobeso.


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15

HYLASIfitcomestothat,thepointwillsoonbedecided.Whatmoreeasythan

toconceiveatreeorhouseexistingbyitself,independentofandunperceived

by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing

afterthatmanner.

PHILONOUS:Howsayyou,Hylas,canyouseeathingwhichisatthesametime

unseen?

HYLAS:No,thatwereacontradiction.

PHILONOUS:Isitnotasgreatacontradictiontotalkofconceivingathingwhichisunconceived?

HYLAS:Itis.

PHILONOUS: The tree orhouse thereforewhich you think of is conceivedby

you?

HYLAS:Howshoulditbeotherwise?

PHILONOUS:Andwhatisconceivedissurelyinthemind?

HYLAS:Withoutquestion,thatwhichisconceivedisinthemind....PHILONOUS: You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how

anyonecorporealsensiblethingshouldexistotherwisethaninamind?

HYLAS:Ido....

THESECONDDIALOGUE

PHILONOUS: ...Tome it isevident,forthereasonsyouallowof,thatsensible

thingscannotexistotherwisethaninamindorspirit.WhenceIconclude,not

that they have no real existence,but that, seeing they depend not on my

thoughtandhaveanexistencedistinctfrombeingperceivedbyme,theremustbesomeotherMindwhereintheyexist.Assure,therefore,asthesensibleworldreallyexists,sosureisthereaninfiniteomnipresentSpiritwhocontainsand

supportsit.

HYLAS: What! This isnomore than Iand all Christianshold nay,and all

otherstoowhobelievethereisaGodandthatHeknowsandcomprehends

allthings.

PHILONOUS:Aye,buthere lies thedifference.Mencommonlybelievethatall

thingsareknownorperceivedbyGod,because theybelieve thebeingofaGod;whereasI,ontheotherside,immediatelyandnecessarilyconcludethe

beingofaGod,becauseallsensiblethingsmustbeperceivedbyHim.

HYLAS:But,solongasweallbelievethesamething,whatmatterisithowwe

comebythatbelief?

PHILONOUS:Butneitherdoweagree in the sameopinion.Forphilosophers,

though they acknowledgeall corporealbeings tobe perceivedby God, yet


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they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being

perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no

differencebetween sayingThere isaGod, thereforeHeperceivesall thingsandsayingSensiblethingsdoreallyexist;and, iftheyreallyexist,theyarenecessarilyperceived by an infiniteMind: therefore there is an infiniteMind, orGod? Thisfurnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most

evident principle, of the being of a God. Divines and philosophers had

provedbeyondallcontroversy,fromthebeautyandusefulnessoftheseveral

partsofthecreation,thatitwastheworkmanshipofGod.Butthatsetting

asideallhelpofastronomyandnaturalphilosophy,allcontemplationofthe

contrivance, order, and adjustment of things an infinite Mind shouldbe

necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world, is an

advantagetothemonlywhohavemadethiseasyreflectionthatthesensible

world is thatwhichweperceivebyour several senses,and thatnothing is

perceivedbythesensesbesideideas,andthatnoideaorarchetypeofanideacan exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious

search into thesciences,withoutanysubtletyofreasonor tedious lengthof

discourse,opposeandbafflethemoststrenuousadvocateforatheism....Itis

evidentthatthethingsIperceivearemyownideas,andthatnoideacanexist

unless itbe inamind.Nor is it lessplain that these ideasor thingsbyme

perceived,either themselvesor theirarchetypes,exist independentlyofmymind,sinceIknowmyselfnottobetheirauthor,itbeingoutofmypowerto

determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shallbe affected with upon

openingmy

eyes

or

ears.

They

must

therefore

exist

in

some

other

Mind,

whosewillitistheyshouldbeexhibitedtome.Thethings,Isay,immediately

perceivedareideasorsensations,callthemwhichyouwill.Buthowcanany

ideaorsensationexist inorbeproducedbyanythingbutamindorspirit?

This indeed is inconceivable.And toassertthatwhich is inconceivable is to

talknonsense,isitnot?

HYLAS:Withoutdoubt.

PHILONOUS:Butontheotherhand,itisveryconceivablethattheyshouldexist

inandbeproducedbyaSpirit,sincethisisnomorethanIdailyexperiencein

myself, inasmuchas Iperceivenumberless ideasand,byanactofmywill,

can form a great variety of them and raise them up in my imagination

though,itmustbeconfessed,thesecreaturesofthefancyarenotaltogetherso

distinct, so strong,vivid,andpermanent,as thoseperceivedbymy senses,

whichlatterarecalledrealthings.FromallwhichIconcludethereisaMindwhichaffectsmeeverymomentwithallthesensibleimpressionsIperceive.

Andfromthevariety,order,andmannerofthese,IconcludetheAuthorof

themtobewise,powerful,andgood,beyondcomprehension.

Documents

Berkeley 3 Dialogues