Câbles diplomatiques révélés par WikiLeaks sur le Canada

8/7/2019 Cbles diplomatiques rvls par WikiLeaks sur le Canada

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000001

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, CA

SUBJECT: "NEVER APOLOGIZE": PM HARPER'S GOVERNING STYLE

REF: A. 08 OTTAWA 1495

B. 08 OTTAWA 1574

C. 08 OTTAWA 1586

D. 08 OTTAWA 1577

Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reason 1.4 (d)

1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Stephen Harper's reputation

as a master political strategist is somewhat tattered in the

wake of November's stunning near-fatal mis-step to abolish

public financing for all political parties. However, at

least on the surface, he remains unbowed and unapologetic.

Relying on an extremely small circle of advisors and his own

instincts, he has played the game of high-stakes, partisan

politics well, but his reputation for decisiveness and

shrewdness has been tarnished by a sometimes vindictive

pettiness. With only a few exceptions, he has not built the


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bridges to the opposition typical of a minority PM. Moving

from surpluses to deficits, he will face new imperatives in

the changed economic and political landscape of 2009 to adopt

a more conciliatory and inclusive approach. However, this

will go against the grain for such an instinctively combative

Prime Minister. End summary.

Blow to reputation

------------------

2. (C) Canadians have had fifteen years to get to know

Stephen Harper as Reform Party MP (1993-1997), head of the

free enterprise National Citizens Coalition (1997-2001),

leader of the Canadian Alliance (2002- 2003), Conservative

opposition leader (2004-6), and Prime Minister

(2006-present), but he remains an enigma to most Canadians

(including many Conservatives). Supporters and detractors

alike have labeled him a master strategist and cunning

tactician, as well as an extremely partisan but paradoxically

pragmatic ideologue. He calls himself a realist. However,

his reputation as a peerless political chess-master is now

somewhat in tatters, following what most perceive as an

atypical near-fatal miscalculation over a Fall Economic and

Fiscal Statement (ref a) that lacked economic credibility and

proposed the elimination of per vote public subsidies for


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political parties. Faced with an opposition revolt, Harper

first unusually retreated on the latter proposal, and then

bought time by proroguing Parliament on December 4 to avoid a

loss of a confidence vote on December 8.

Party first

-----------

3. (C) As Conservative leader, Harper has pursued two key

objectives: welding the fractured Canadian conservative

movement into one cohesive Conservative Party of Canada

(CPC); and, positioning the CPC to replace the Liberals as

Canada's "natural governing party." He succeeded in the

first goal by imposing discipline and coherence, dangling the

prospect of a majority government, and centralizing power to

an unprecedented degree in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).

He has made no secret of his desire to win a majority

government, or of his determination to occupy and redefine

the political center. As he recently told reporters, "if

you're really serious about making transformation, you have

to pull the center of the political spectrum toward

conservatism . . . we're building the country towards a

definition of itself that is more in line with conservatism."

In a separate year-end interview, he underscored that his

goal since becoming leader has been to create a strong party


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"that can not just win the odd election but can govern on an

ongoing basis." Until now, that strategy has rested on

winning additional seats in Quebec, but the setbacks in the

province during the October election and Harper's

denunciations of Quebec separatists during the early December

mini-crisis may necessitate a change in direction.

4. (SBU) In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set

Q4. (SBU) In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set

out his "Ten Commandments of Conservative Campaigning" that

read like a prescription for Harper's governing style: party

unity; discipline; inclusion (reach out to ethnic

minorities); toughness; grassroots politics; persistence;

and, technology (fundraising and grassroots motivation). On

the policy side, moderation, "incrementalism," and

communication. Conservatives, Flanagan noted, "must be

willing to make progress in small, practical steps . . .

sweeping visions . . . are toxic in practical politics."

Moreover, with five parties on the field, he warned there was

little room for niceties; elections would "not be just street

fights, but all-out brawls."

Governing the country, closely

------------------------------


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5. (C) In office, Harper has rarely made the compromises

typical of a minority PM, nor built the bridges and informal

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channels that usually get things done in a minority

Parliament. In his first term, he practiced confrontation

over cooperation, governing in a kind of faux

majority-minority style that humiliated the already weakened

official opposition Liberals (a task made easier by the often

hapless performance of then-Opposition leader Stephane Dion).

He reached across the floor only twice: in March 2008 to

achieve bipartisan consensus on the extension of Canada's

military mission in Afghanistan through 2011; and, in June

2008 to resolve the Indian Residential Schools issue. More

typical was his free use of confidence votes on a series of

legislation to force passage of his agenda under threat of an

election, and his fait accompli in 2006 recognizing the

Quebecois (i.e. not Quebec province) as a nation within a

united Canada, a step that took both his own party as well as

the opposition by surprise.

6. (C) Tight focus on the leader and close-hold of

information have been the hallmarks of Harper's governing


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style. Initially, strict discipline and scripting made sense

for a new government on probation, whose members had almost

no experience in power. However, Harper has centralized

communications and decision-making within the PMO (an ongoing

trend since the 1970s) to an unprecedented degree, according

to commentators familiar with the public service and

Conservative insiders. "The Center" (PMO and Privy Council

Office) is clearly the arbiter of even the most routine

decisions.

7. (C) For their part, cabinet ministers have mostly kept

on message and in the prime minister's shadow. Since July,

under new Chief of Staff Guy Giorno and communications

director Kory Teneycke, media access to ministers has been

loosened, but ministers are still on a short leash. At a

December conference, one Minister of State confessed

privately that he did not "dare" to deviate from his

pre-approved text, even though fast-moving events had already

overtaken his speech. Discussions with Conservative caucus

members over the past year have also made it clear that they

are often out of the loop on the Prime Minister's plans,

including key committee chairmen in the House of Commons.

Many senior Conservatives admitted that they were stunned to

hear about the ban on public financing of political parties

in the Fall Economic Statement; neither the Cabinet nor the


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caucus apparently had any clue this was even part of the

long-range agenda, much less subject to an immediate

confidence vote.

Inner, inner circle

-------------------

8. (C) Harper's inner circle appears extremely small.

Notoriously hard on staff (Harper burned through a series of

communications directors as opposition leader, and once

reportedly told an aide that he liked to see the "fear" in

the eyes of prospective employees), Harper seems to operate

largely as his own strategist, tactician, and advisor. Often

described by observers as self-consciously the "smartest guy

in the room," he has tended to surround himself with

like-minded people. As a result, some insiders say he lacks

staff willing or able to act as an effective sounding-board

or check his partisan instincts. Following the departure in

July of long-term advisor and chief of staff Ian Brodie and

communications director Sandra Buckler, their replacements

Giorno and Teneycke are known as highly partisan veterans of

two controversial majority Ontario provincial governments

that polarized public opinion.

9. (C) In cabinet, pundits consider Environment Minister


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Jim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign

QJim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign

Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon to have Harper's confidence.

However, few, if any, ministers appear to be genuine

confidantes. Unlike former Conservative PM Brian Mulroney,

who famously called his MPs when their kids were sick and

kept their loyalty even when his personal popularity plunged

to historic lows, Harper lacks the personal touch. He

appears to keep his caucus in line more through respect for

what he has accomplished and with the power and authority

that comes with the position of Prime Minister -- and as the

party's best hope for a future majority -- than through

affection or loyalty. He has worked to quiet the party's

socially conservative rank and file, and to marginalize

contentious issues, such as same-sex marriage and abortion,

notably at the party's November policy conference in

Winnipeg. He will next have to win their acquiescence to

upcoming deficit spending -- anathema for western Canadian

conservatives -- for a new stimulus package. Realistically,

however, they have no credible alternative to Harper or the

CPC at this point, which will help to keep the party base

loyal.

Expect surprises

----------------


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10. (C) After almost three years in power and facing a

changing economic and political landscape for 2009 (ref b),

Harper's new agenda is probably also still evolving. The

2008 Conservative election platform, the November policy

convention, and the 2008 Speech from the Throne provided few

insights, obliging Harper-watchers to parse his comments and

actions for clues about his future direction. Harper has

typically concentrated almost exclusively on short-term

election planning horizons, giving his government a sometimes

improvisational air. Some commitments (such as revisions to

the Anti-terrorism Act and new copyright legislation) have

languished, while others (notably his about-face on his

election pledge not to run a deficit, and his current

proposal to inject up to C$30 billion in fiscal stimulus in

FY 2009-2010) have been surprise reverses. Harper has also

not been bound by party orthodoxy. On December 22, he filled

the Senate with 18 unelected Conservatives and directly named

a Supreme Court justice, contradicting long-standing

commitments to an elected Senate and parliamentary review of

Supreme Court appointments (refs c and d).


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11. (C) According to one insider, Harper "likes surprises,"

not least to keep the opposition off balance. For the

opposition, Harper's unpredictability has been more dangerous

due to his fierce partisanship and his willingness to take

risks. Harper and senior Conservatives prefaced the 40th

Parliament with calls for greater conciliation, a new "tone,"

and a common resolve to work together to tackle the economic

crisis. However, the government's provocative Economic and

Fiscal Statement immediately revived the bitterness and

threat of an election that had hung over the parliament until

the prorogation. Opposition leaders claimed that the PM had

"poisoned the well" and broken their trust. As one national

columnist noted, the Statement "amounted to a declaration of

war."

12. (C) The opposition's ability to turn the tables with a

proposed coalition in turn apparently caught the PM by

surprise, as was perhaps the rumored unwillingness of the

Governor General to rule out this option against his advice.

His ensuing passionate attacks on the "separatist" coalition

undid much of the progress the Conservative party had made in

Quebec. Harper was able to retake the initiative by seeking,

and gaining, a prorogation until January 26, but in year-end

media interviews he remained unapologetic. He denied that he


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had acted like a "bully" in provoking the crisis, adding

"it's our job . . . to put forward things we think are in the

public interest."


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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000795

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019

TAGS: PGOV, PINR, CA

SUBJECT: BLUE DAYS FOR LIBERAL LEADER MICHAEL IGNATIEFF

REF: A. 08 OTTAWA 1543

B. OTTAWA 341

C. OTTAWA 766

D. OTTAWA 735

E. OTTAWA 569

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary. Liberal Party poll numbers continue to

decline, while the Conservatives appear in their strongest

position in at least a year. Fundraising has also slowed

down noticeably. Leader Michael Ignatieff is clearly on the

defensive, but has vowed to do a better job in shaping the

political landscape and his own image. Some insiders are

skeptical that he can do so, at least before a next election,

but see no real alternative right now for the Liberal Party.

End Summary.


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BRIEF STARDOM

-------------

2. (C) Michael Ignatieff was widely seen as the savior of

the Liberal Party of Canada, the "Official Opposition," when

he took over as interim leader from the discredited

then-leader Stephane Dion in dramatic fashion in December

2008 (ref a), and was subsequently voted official leader in

early May 2009 (ref b). Urban, articulate, bilingual, and

with an impressive rolodex of contacts around the world --

including in the new Obama Administration -- Ignatieff

represented the Liberals' newest and best hope that they

could reverse their several years-long slide and emerge in

the next election -- probably, they thought, in summer or

fall 2009 -- at least with enough seats to form a minority

government and finally drive the Conservative Party of Canada

out of office. The worldwide recession, Canada's mounting

recession, and Prime Minister Stephen Harper's seeming

inability to connect viscerally with the voters -- especially

among women and in vote-rich Ontario and Quebec -- fueled the

Liberals' dream of once again serving as "Canada's natural

governing party." (This was, of course, before Harper's now

famous -- at least in Canada -- surprise performance of the

Beatles' "I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends" at the


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National Arts Centre, along with Yo-Yo Ma, on October 3.)

3. (SBU) Instead, the Liberals as a party and Ignatieff as

a leader are again sliding in the polls, while the

Conservatives apparently are going from strength to strength.

In an EKOS poll released on October 14, support for the

Liberals nationwide ("if an election were held today") among

decided voters had dropped to 25.5 pct, down from over 29 pct

only a few weeks ago (ref c). The Conservatives in the same

poll were up to 40.7 pct, which arguably could bring them a

majority government in a new election any time soon, although

the concentration of their support in the western provinces

might mean that they would only win another, albeit perhaps

stronger, minority government. In the poll, the

Conservatives and the Liberals were neck-and-neck in Quebec

at about 22 pct of support each, but -- ominously -- the

Conservatives were far ahead of the Liberals in Ontario, at

44.1 pct to 31 pct. Surprisingly, support for the

Conservatives among women was 36.7 pct versus only 26 pct for

the Liberals. Almost half of those in the EKOS poll felt

that Canada was in only a "mild recession," with two-thirds

expressing the hope that their own personal financial

situation in a year's time will be "about the same" or

"better." Poll after poll has shown that Canadians now put

far more trust -- usually between 14 and 20 pct more -- in PM


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Harper as a leader than they do in Ignatieff, contrary to

Canadian conventional wisdom that the ruling party always

takes a hit in bad economic times.

AND THE BAD TIMES ROLL ON...

----------------------------

4. (C) Many Liberal Party insiders have privately begun to

Q4. (C) Many Liberal Party insiders have privately begun to

express a feeling of "deja vu all over again" -- stuck with

another leader who "just doesn't listen," the same flaw most

attributed to Dion. Complaints have surfaced -- most

publicly, by Liberal MP Denis Coderre (ref c) as he resigned

as the Liberal Lieutenant for Quebec and as Defence Critic

(shadow Defence Minister) -- about Ignatieff's reliance on a

handful of Toronto-based advisors, to the exclusion of all

other viewpoints, a charge that Ignatieff has rebuffed

vigorously. Liberal National Director Rocco Rossi (who,

incidentally or not, is from Toronto) admitted privately to

PolMinCouns that Ignatieff's closest advisers, like Principal

Secretary Ian Davey, do come from Toronto, but indicated that

Ignatieff didn't really listen much to them, either. "He

knows his own mind, and the only person whose opinion he

really cares about is his wife Zsuzsanna," he commented.

Others have also pointed to the close-knit nature of their


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relationship, while insisting that the outgoing Zsuzsanna

could be his "secret weapon" if ever let loose on the

OTTAWA 00000795 002 OF 003

campaign trail or among the Liberal Party loyalists -- which

would, however, go against the Canadian political norm,

according to most pundits. (People say exactly the same

thing about Laureen Harper, the Prime Minister's vivacious

spouse.)

5. (C) Liberal Party officials now confess that Ignatieff's

long summer holiday mostly out of public sight (ref c) was,

in retrospect, a tactical error, only compounding the minor

bounce that the sitting government usually gets when

Parliament is on recess. Another mistake, in hindsight, was

canceling a highly touted trip by Ignatieff to China -- which

PM Harper has yet to visit -- in early September after

Ignatieff stunned a party gathering in Sudbury, Ontario with

the sudden news that the Liberals had finally and truly lost

"confidence" and "trust" in the Conservatives and would

henceforth oppose the government. In what is now seen as yet

again a tactical mis-step, Ignatieff in a CBC Radio interview

that aired on October 10 backtracked by explaining that the


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Liberals would only vote against the Conservatives on formal

confidence votes, while making case-by-case decisions on all

other legislative votes. The Liberals are apparently still

wrestling with how to vote on pending legislation to extend

Employment Insurance benefits, now in a Commons' committee,

but have indicated that they may try to delay passage once it

reaches the Liberal-dominated Senate -- mostly, to avoid

letting the Conservatives and their new-found ally on this

issue, the New Democratic Party, get the credit. They admit

that there is some risk to this strategy if voters perceive

the Liberals as standing in the way of better unemployment

coverage, however.

6. (C) To underscore worrying trends, Liberal fundraising

has plateaued, fundraiser-in-chief Rossi admitted. In the

first six months of 2009, the Liberals raised about as much

as they had in all of 2008 -- about C$5 million -- and almost

as much as the Conservatives had (C$7 million). Since then,

however, they have picked up almost no new contributions or

pledges, although they hold out hopes for some major

fundraising events in the fourth quarter of 2009. New

memberships were up by about 100,000 in 2009, according to an

official of the Office of the Official Opposition, but were

similarly concentrated in the first half of the year.

Liberal officials have estimated that approximately one


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million Liberal voters simply stayed home in the October 2008

election, but are quick to note that many of them were not

actually party members.

NO HAPPY TALK

-------------

7. (C) Many Liberals have been disappointed that

Ignatieff's communication skills -- honed as a TV journalist

in London and as a Harvard University professor -- have

failed to ignite as a politician. According to National

Director Rossi, Ignatieff himself laments his own lack of

humor, claiming "I'm a Presbyterian with a Russian ancestry;

I live in a humor-free zone." (Other Liberals have described

that, in small, private gatherings, Ignatieff can be both

warm and funny, and have even claimed that -- contrary to his

egghead image -- his favorite TV shows are "Desperate

Housewives" and "Sex and the City.") Rossi also commented on

the intellectual Ignatieff's insistence on new substance in

each speech, rather than perfecting a good stump speech for

general use. As a result, he explained, Ignatieff actually

thinks about what he is saying as he says it in each speech,

resulting in him often looking up or at his feet as he

pondered, rather than connecting with the crowd. Rossi

Qpondered, rather than connecting with the crowd. Rossi


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indicated some frustration that Ignatieff seemed unable to

absorb helpful critiques on his delivery.

8. (C) Ignatieff has admitted publicly that the

Conservative Party had been entirely successful in "framing"

who he is -- "Michael Ignatieff: Just Visiting" -- and

insisted that he needed to do more to create his own "frame."

Liberal Party officials are increasingly antsy for Ignatieff

to champion some specific substantive policies, a step that

the Liberals had previously avoided for fear of falling into

Stephane Dion's "Green Shift" disaster, in which the

Conservatives picked away relentlessly -- and successfully --

at the Liberals' then-signature policy. Numerous Canadian

columnists have noted that Canadian voters still do not know

what Ignatieff and the Liberal Party now stand for, or how

they would govern differently from the Conservatives. The

Liberal National Director under Dion, Greg Fergus, wrote in

an on-line "Globe and Mail" op ed article on October 6 that

it was now "Deep Breath Time for the Liberals," requiring

"hard work" and "near pitch-perfect delivery" by Ignatieff

and the Liberals, as well as urging a new "thinkers'

convention" to come up with some "freshly minted ideas."

Fergus told PolMinCouns that Ignatieff quickly called him

personally to praise the article and that the Liberals have

subsequently hired him back as an advisor for the conference,


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OTTAWA 00000795 003 OF 003

which will take place in Montreal January 14-16. Other

Liberals, however, are dismayed that the party has put off

this event until January, leaving the real possibility of

continued slump and slide during the fall. Fergus even

expressed worries that the Liberals may have entered a period

of up to as much as 6-8 years in the "political wilderness"

of opposition.

BUT NO OTHER CHOICE FOR NOW?

----------------------------

9. (C) For the foreseeable future, however, it is Ignatieff

at the Liberal helm. Insiders say that there is no obvious

person to replace him, should he do the unthinkable and

resign before the next election -- which few now expect

before spring 2010 at the earliest (although many remain

suspicious that the Conservatives may surprise everyone by

somehow triggering one this fall). The only name that still

comes up is Bob Rae -- another 62 year old white male from

Toronto -- who has now lost the leadership sweepstakes twice

and who has privately insisted that his sole remaining


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political ambition is to be Foreign Minister. Many Liberals

are concerned that the "new blood" of the Liberal Party is

apparently so anemic, with no real stars on the horizon --

apart from Justin Trudeau, who most describe as eminently

likeable but sadly prone to stray off script -- not the

sure-fire leadership a successful Liberal Party will need.

Visit Canada,s North American partnership community at

http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

JACOBSON

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Câbles diplomatiques révélés par WikiLeaks sur le Canada