This article was downloaded by: [NUS National University of Singapore]On: 18 June 2014, At: 08:56Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Scandinavian Journal of HistoryPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/shis20

“La grönlande, les isles de ferröe et l'islande noncomprises”Finn Gad aa Lecturer and Research Fellow attached to the University of CopenhagenPublished online: 23 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Finn Gad (1979) “La grönlande, les isles de ferröe et l'islande non comprises”, Scandinavian Journal ofHistory, 4:1-4, 187-205, DOI: 10.1080/03468757908578954

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03468757908578954

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representationsor warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Anyopinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoevercaused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Scand. J. History 4: 187-205, 1979

"La Grönlande, les Isles de Ferröeet l'Islande non comprises"

A new look at the origins of the addition to Article IV

of the Treaty of Kiel of 1814

Finn Gad

14 January 1814 was a fateful day in the history of the Nordic countries. Onthat date in Kiel the two plenipotentiaries representing Sweden and Den-mark-Norway, the Swede Gustav av Wetterstedt and the Dane EdmundBourke, signed the treaty which brought a formal end to the 1813-14 warbetween their two countries. Through the agreement he had reached withRussia at Âbo in August 1812, the newly-elected Swedish Crown Prince, KarlJohan (Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte) had obtained "free hands" in rela-tion to Norway. The cession of Norway to Sweden by the Dano-Norwegiangovernment was therefore a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of a peacetreaty. The peace negotiations lasted from December 1813 to the middle ofJanuary 1814 and were conducted simultaneously with Anglo-Danish nego-tiations which led to the signing of an Anglo-Danish treaty in Kiel on the sameday as the Swedish-Danish treaty. The latter treaty was a precondition forthe former. Article IV of the Swedish-Danish treaty defined what territorieswere to be regarded as "Norway" and consequently ceded to Sweden. Thisarticle contained an insertion, which is quoted as the title of this essay.

Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes were not to be included in what wasunderstood by the word "Norway" in the treaty. This may seem a matter oflittle importance, but there has been considerable discussion concerning whyand how this phrase came to be inserted into article IV of the Treatyof Kiel and also about who secured its insertion. Responsibility has beenascribed to Edmund Bourke, the Danish government's negotiator, but bythat these three questions have not received their final answer.

Finn Gad, born 1911, cand. mag. 1937, Lecturer and Research Fellow attached to the University ofCopenhagen, has published Grønlands Historic en oversigt 1500-1945 (1946) and GrönlandsHistorie (until 1808), 3 vols. (1967-1976); English edition, The History of Greenland, 2 vols. (vol. 3under preparation) (1970-1973). He has also written several articles and papers on the political andcultural affaires of Greenland.

13-791913 Smuil.J. Ilkltiry 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

188 F. Gad

A definitive explanation of all aspects of this complex problem will neverbe possible. In this case, as in many others that seemed less important at thetime, the course of developments was only sometimes recorded on paperand very seldom completely. The historian can therefore at best only arriveat the probable course of events. It is essential in this case from a historicalpoint of view to reach one or other form of probability that is as plausibleas possible. The retention of Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland meant thatthe societies which existed on these islands received a more narrowly definednational status. There were, for example, many individuals on Greenlandwho had to decide whether they wished to remain Danish citizens or to returnto Norway. The problem has therefore become, not least because Greenlandwas not ceded to Sweden, a "national" one.

For the Nordic countries, the problem is also an old object of dispute.Discussion has at times been acrimonious, but this topic has now lain dormantfor some time. It is therefore perhaps inopportune to raise it again now.However, the opportunity of looking at the subject from a new perspectivehas suddenly arisen, and it seems worthwhile to reexamine it in order toattempt to establish a new and plausible account of the probable course ofevents. A cool re-appraisal might perhaps also succeed in removing the na-tionalistic atmosphere that has surrounded the question in the past.

The most recent statement on this subject was made by Georg Narregârd,though without "taking sides on national issues":1

Bourke brought off a great coup when he persuaded Wetterstedt to agree that Green-land, Iceland, and the Faroes should be explicitly excepted from the cession of Nor-way. Wetterstedt's knowledge of history was so insufficient that he really believedthat these Atlantic islands had never belonged to Norway. However, he did not thinkit at all necessary to mention in the treaty that they were not be ceded, but gave wayto Bourke's wishes on this point. It can be said in his defence that these islands werenot necessary to the insular security of the Scandinavian peninsula, but the SwedishForeign Minister later remarked sharply upon Wetterstedt's lack of knowledge.

Nerregârd supports this statement by citing Count Engeström's letters toWetterstedt and Karljohan of 5 and 6 February 1814 respectively and certainsecondary works. This quotation from Georg Nerregârd provides a briefsummary of what historians have hitherto believed. However, it is funda-mentally a pure deduction which rests on slight foundations, and it may beasked whether Edmund Bourke really brought off a coup and whether in-deed it is correct to use the word in this context.

Axel Linvald takes a more restrained view of Bourke's achievements.2 He

1 G. Nørregård, Freden i Kiel 1814 (København, 1954), p. 170. This extremely thorough andsober account of the negotiations and the political manoeuvres connected with them, whichincludes much material on the general political situation in Europe, may be referred to generallyfor these topics. It goes without saying that this article can only deal with isolated aspects ofthe negotiations which led to the Treaty of Kiel and that matters which do not relate directly toits topic can only be alluded to.2 Dansk biografisk Leksikon, vol. 3 (København, 1934), pp. 524-525.

Scand. J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Griinlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'lslanile non comprises" 189

maintains that the matter is doubtful, but mentions nonetheless a letter fromBaron Wetterstedt to Count Engeström, the Swedish Foreign Minister, of 16January 1814 and quotes the following extract from it:

Although Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes have never belonged to Norway, Mr. deBourke wished to have them specially mentioned in Article IV of the treaty and Ihave not thought it right to oppose this desire.

Finally, Lindvald shows that Bourke did not mention the Atlantic islands inthe letter to the Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Rosencrantz, which he wroteimmediately after the peace treaty was signed on 14 January 1814.

Before the publication of Georg N0rregârd's book in 1954, a considerablenumber of works on this subject as a whole and Bourke's supposed role inparticular had appeared, including Louis Bobé's brief monographs. In hislast discussion of the topic,3 Bobé argued that whether Bourke had this pas-sage inserted in Article IV at his own or someone else's initiative, it is clearthat Bourke belonged to the circle around the Danish Finance Minister, Hein-rich Ernst Schimmelmann, and that the latter contained personal knowledgeof the administration of the Atlantic islands and may therefore have in-fluenced Bourke or been behind his knowledge of which country the islandsbelonged to. This assertion can be neither proved nor disproved, but it hasa certain plausibility. However, it provides no'certain support for the viewthat the passage in question was inserted into Article IV at Bourke's initiative.

Erik Arup4 has thrown doubt on Bobé's view that Bourke himself madeadditions to his instructions and manifested great presence of mind and re-sourcefulness. Arup is undoubtedly correct in this respect. He also under-took a somewhat forced effort to rehabilitate Wetterstedt with regard to hisknowledge of history in general and his knowledge of the historical relation-ship between the Atlantic islands and Norway in particular.5

Arup maintains that it was the general view around 1800 that the Atlan-tic islands were not closely associated with Norway. The difficulty with ac-cepting this claim is that Arup provides no evidence to support it but merelyasserts that so it was. As far as one can tell, the sources from the time neitherrefute nor confirm his claim. It can, however, be said without going into thisquestion in detail that no one m Denmark could have doubted that Greenland,Iceland and the Faroes were bound to Norway in one way or the other. Ifthis was not apparent for some other reason, then at least it was clear from

3 Meddelelser am Grønland, vol. 55: 3, pp. 410-411.4 E. Arup, Grønland, en historisk redegørelse fremkaldt ved Den norske Konstitutionskomites indstill-ing af 3. juli 1923 (København, 1924), pp. 24 ff. Section 5, entitled "Kielfreden" (pp. 23-32),deals with this whole problem. The Danish professor of international low, Knud Berlin, hasincluded an abstract of the entire Norwegian-Danish discussion in his book: Danmarks Ret tilGrønland (København, 1932), German edition: Dänemarks Recht auf Grönland (Königsberg, 1932).He also discusses Bourke's share in the peace negotiations without getting closer to what mayhave happened.5 Arup, op. cit., p. 31.

Sennit. J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

190 F. Gad

Fig. 1. The "Norway-Monument" in the park of Fredensborg Palace, North Sealand, Denmark.It is formed 1765-1766 by the Danish artist Johannes Wiedewelt. The female genius in the middleholds with her left hand an escutcheon with the Norwegian lion. The four médaillons on plinthsshow from the left, the bearing of the Scandinavian Union (the three crowns), Iceland's stock-fish, Greenland's polar bear and the Faroe Islands' ram. (F. Gad phot. April 1976.)

the Norway monument in the part of Fredensborg castle (Fig. 1). Everyonewho worked in the Danish Chancellery (Danske KancelH) and the Treasury(Rentekammeret) knew that matters relating to these islands fell within thecompetence of the Norwegian divisions. However, trade and communica-tions with and the administration of these islands were channelled throughCopenhagen, that is to say Denmark, not Norway. It is therefore conceivablethat foreigners might have thought that the islands were a part of Denmark,just as Norway was regarded abroad as a part of Denmark or "as an append-age to the Danish crown".

Since the Atlantic islands were expressly excluded in Article IV after theword "dépendances", it is clear that there must at least have been someone whothought that Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland might be understood asbelonging to the category of Norway's "dépendances".

The passage excluding the Adantic islands is situated between the words"ainsique les dépendances" and "de même que prérogatives, droits, et emoluments"etc. Arup's discussion of whether the passage refers to "dépendances" or toall the preceding words in Article IV does not present a convincing argument.If the passage is syntactically linked to all the preceding words in Article IV,then it must also be linked to the summarizing expression that is foundamong diese words, "la totalité du Royaume de Norvège". And in that case themeaning of the passage is that it excludes the islands from this totality,from the kingdom of Norway. We will return to this question later.

The preceding paragraphs describe those parts of the earlier historicaldiscussion that need to be borne in mind for our purposes, leaving aside themore heated contributions to the discussion. It is a curious feature of thearguments presented by both the Danish and Norwegian sides concerning

Smrni.J. History)

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Grönlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 191

Bourke's role in connection with the passage excluding the Atlantic islandsin Article IV that historians seem to have been obsessed with the days 10-14January 1814 and what happened then, without attempting to see the ques-tion at issue, the exclusion of the Atlantic islands from the cession of Norway,in a wider perspective.

Nor has it been fully realized that the problem was seen at the time fromdifferent points of view and on the basis of different assessments of theimportance of this question by the various participants in the negotiationsof the years 1813-14. Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland were not thereforereferred to frequently during the course of the negotiations in notes, des-patches and other documentary sources. The question was a matter of littleimportance for some, of somewhat greater significance for others. In thecase of Bourke, it was, as will be shown to be probable later in this essay,more perhaps an analogous provision. It was not regarded by anyone as theforemost of the matters that had to be resolved.

Bourke had been given fairly free hands in the last instructions he receivedon 7 January. They merely stated that he was to resume negotiations on thebasis of the cession of all Norway and did not define more closely what wasmeant by Norway. After the peace treaty had been signed, Bourke did noteven mention with a single word the exclusion of the Atlantic islands fromthe territories ceded by Denmark in his letter to the Foreign Minister, Rosen-crantz, for the simple reason that the Foreign Minister could see this forhimself when he read the treaty. Bourke did not then himself emphasizethat he had pulled off any coup in connection with the treaty.

But to return to Bourke's instructions of 7 January, which authorized himto negotiate on the basis of the cession of all Norway. These instructions leadus back to the first basis for negotiations which had been established andwhich envisaged a provisional cession of that part of Norway which lay onthe Scandinavian peninsula. Sweden would receive the diocese of Trondheim(right up to the Russian frontier in the north) and certain border fortressesimmediately. The cession of the remaining part of mainland Norway wouldbe the object of negotiations during the final European peace conference.

The Atlantic islands did not figure at all in this plan, which concentratedon the partition of mainland Norway. This idea originated from Austria'sattempt to create a compromise as it were. It would make it easier for Den-mark to swallow the bitter pill of the loss of Norway at the same time as theRussian undertaking to Karl Johan would be partially fulfilled. Time wasshort for those powers which saw the main task as being to assemble allavailable forces and all the legitimate rulers of Europe in order to securethe final defeat of Napoleon and to ensure that he did not re-appear onthe scene and that a violent transformation of Europe should not occur again.Britain accordingly accepted the idea of á partition of Norway, even thoughCasdereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, had no great faith in it.

The British Foreign Secretary had his own, extremely arrogant view on thepossibility of Norway as an independent state. Bourke described Castlereagh's

Stand. J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

192 F. Gad

attitude to Rosencrantz, the Danish Foreign Minister, in a letter from Paris,dated 19 April 1814.«

foi parlé longuement au Lord Castlereagh sur ces affaires (Prince Christian Frederik's"rebellion") et il sent parfaitement toute la justesse de mes raisonnemens. Il sait d'ailleurs quela Norvège n'est pas assis (assez?) considerable pour former un état indépendant: qu'elle nepourrait devenir qu'une espèce de puissance barbaresque tris-incommode a tout le monde.

For Castlereagh, and therefore also for British foreign policy, the territoryof Norway was merely a pawn in a larger game. If Norway was partially orentirely ceded to Sweden was in reality a matter of indifference to him solong as the cession of Norway contributed to the pacification of northernEurope. Denmark should be forced out of her alliance with Napoleon andKarl Johan's Swedish troops had to be released so that they could partici-pate in the final struggle to end Napoleon's disruptions of the Europeanbalance.

British policy in the immediate situation and in the Norwegian questionwas not really fixed in detail nor had it been, as far as we can tell,the subject of any very far-reaching deliberations. This may be becauseBritish foreign policy was characterized by improvisation in matters of detailbut had quite firm guiding principles whose main features were the main-tenance of Britain's security and mastery of the seas and of the Europeanbalance. The individual negotiations in progress concerning agreements ofgreater or lesser importance had to be reconciled with these principles, evenin detailed questions, by the British diplomats involved. Britain had to acceptthe Russo-Swedish treaty of 1812 which gave the Swedes free hands in rela-tion to the acquisition of Norway as afait accompli. It must quite simply havebeen more important for British foreign policy in the long run to set Swedenin motion and to support Russia than it was to preserve the Danish dualmonarchy. However, it is not clear from the documentary evidence whatpolicy in matters of detail Britain wished to follow and followed with theseobjectives in view.

An interpretation of British attitudes is, nonetheless, to be found in thereports which the later Danish Consul-General in London, H. F. Hornemann,and the Advocatus regius, Steen Bille, sent to Denmark in 1813.7 Thesereports reflect to be sure their personal observations, but they present a veryplausible picture. They argued that British policy would in the future acceptthe Russo-Swedish treaty with regard to the cession of Norway because ofthe considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. However, Londonalso had other objectives within this framework. It aimed at a division of the

6 RA. Dep. f. udenl. Anl.: Sverrig 1 e 67, Akter fra og om Kmh. Bourkes dipl. Sendelse til detsvenske Hovedkvarter i Anl. af Fredsforh., 1, dossier Breve fra E. B. til udenrigsminister Rosen-krantz, no. 29, lower part of page 4.7 RA: Dep. f. udenl. Anl. 1800-1848. Hornemann's reports are in England I d, Korresp. omog med Danske Konsuler i Engelske Havne, dossier Rapporter fra Konsuler i London 1771-1814; Steen Bille's reports are in Alm. Korresp. Sager L 4, Licenser og Lejdebreve II, 1812-14,dossier Auditeur S. B.'s Sendelse til London ang. Leidebreve for Norges forsynelse.

Scand.J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Grönlande, les Isles de FerrÖe et l'Islande non comprises" 193

Baltic. Sweden, which had now given up Finland, was to be consolidated andto receive unimpeded access to the Atlantic and therefore also more securelinks with Britain through the proposed cession of the diocese of Trondheim.The acquisition of the Norwegian border fortresses would secure Swedenagainst attack from Norwegian territory. In this way Sweden would obtainan "insular" position, in die phrase used by Georg Nerregârd in the passagequoted earlier, and could dominate the eastern part of the Baltic. Denmarkperhaps after receiving the Swedish possession in Pomerania as a sort of com-pensation for northern Norway, would then, possibly together with southernNorway, act as a stopper in the western part of die Baltic. Sweden and Den-mark could then be bases for the control of the northern part of centralEurope. Britain would retain Helgoland, which she had occupied during thewar with Denmark.

All of this represents, as mentioned above, only the conjectures and ob-servations of the two Danish "diplomats". However, if the demands made bythe British crown for the return of its Hanoverian possessions are borne inmind, die objective of British policy becomes clear: the creation of an effec-tive British influence in central Europe. This objective was an element in theimpression of latent mistrust which characterized relations between Britain,Austria and Russia in the years 1812-14. British policy, though this was notclearly articulated, seems to have been directed against an excessive Austrianinfluence in central Europe.

Britain thus envisaged a partition of Norway in 1813, a fact that is con-firmed by the more officiai source materials. The personal observations of thetwo Danish representatives in London accord well with this picture. Thesituation of Norway, that is to say mainland Norway, was considered sepa-rately, only from a strategical point of view and as a matter oí Realpolitik.

This is also clear from anodier source which is entirely unrelated to theevents surrounding and the negotiations preceding the conclusion of theTreaty of Kiel. Historians have not previously taken it into account in connec-tion wiüi the Treaty of Kiel, quite simply because they could not suspect thatthe passage excluding the Atlantic islands in Article IV of the treaty couldbe elucidated by this source.

It was, of course, purely fortuitous that this new means of approachingdie problem was discovered. It would seem that historians have not previouslynoticed that the reports Steen Bille sent to Copenhagen in the years 1812-13are divided into two bundles, each dealing with a subject of its own but bothfalling under the competence of the same central administrative office, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. One of diese bundles, which appears not to havebeen examined before, contains a dossier of papers on Steen Bille's missionto London concerning safe-conduct for supplies destined for Norway.8 Thisdossier and die whole bundle have now been studied in order to elucidatedie question of Greenland's supplies during the wartime conditions of the

8 See previous note.

Scand.J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

194 F. Gad

years 1808-14. However, while this material was being studied, other prob-lems were also born in mind, including the negotiations before and duringthe meeting in Kiel.

In 1812 Steen Bille was sent at Heinrich Ernst Schimmelmann's initiativeon a mission to Britain in order to secure more regular supplies of grain forNorway. These supplies had come to a standstill because of the war withSweden, and a catastrophic shortage of corn in Norway was in prospect. Atthe same time Bille was entrusted with the task of making soundings as towhether a separate peace with Britain might be possible. Bille's mission wasfollowed up by that of Joachim Bernstorff in 1813.9 For a short time, theywere both simultaneously in Britain. Both their missions were unsuccessfuland there is accordingly no reason to deal with their activities in detail inthis context, except to point out that their task referred only to mainlandNorway, for obvious reasons, and therefore contributed to the differentiationbetween Norway and the Atlantic islands.

The relationship of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes to Britain had,especially after the British Order in Council of 7 February 1810,10 been rela-tively satisfactorily arranged so that supply ships were given a licence to sailprovided they called at Leith or London. These arrangements were largelythe work of Sir Joseph Banks. The latter primarily had a strong interest inconditions on Iceland, but extended his activities also to include Greenlandand the Faroes.

The Atlantic islands were excepted from wartime regulations by the Orderin Council of 1810. They were explicitly designated "Parts of the Dominionof Denmark", and they were therefore, after this Order in Council, excluded

from consideration in connection with any future peace negotiations. They weretaken under the protection of the British crown in the sense that there wasto be no interference with them, their inhabitants and the latter's property,on the part of the British. A British consul was even stationed at Reykjavikfor a time. It was clear that the Atlantic islands would be restored to the kingof Denmark at the end of the war. These islands were not mentioned else-where in connection with the other overseas Danish possessions, some ofwhich had been occupied by the British. Nor was it stated on any occasionthat the Atlantic islands belonged to the Norwegian crown.

It was nonetheless quite natural that Steen Bille approached Sir JosephBanks in 1813 concerning Norway's grain supplies. As a member of the PrivyCouncil, which especially concerned itself in wartime with questions relating9 P. Hertel Rasmussen's article, "Danskudenrigspolitik 1812-13", Dansk historisk Tidsskrift, vol.77(1977) (which includes a brief English summary) contains a detailed account of Danish foreignpolicy during these years. Danish foreign policy seems, judging from his account, to haveshifted constantly in response to political developments in Europe. He does not give a similaraccount of British foreign policy, and aspects relating to Greenland, the Faroes and Icelandas well as the question of the possible return of the Danish overseas possessions are not touchedupon at all.10 Public Record Office, London (PRO): War Office 1, 743, I-E fol. 68-69. Copy in RA:Danica film, arkiv nr. 600. Copy in Dep. f. üdenl. Anl. 1800-1848, Alm. Korresp. Sager J 3,Island og Faerøerne 1758-1846, dossier Koncept ad nr. 708, letter to the king 3 July 1810.

Striiirt.J. History-t

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Grönlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 195

to food supplies, Banks might have been able to do something for Norway,just as he had for the Atlantic islands.

In a report which he sent to the Danish Foreign Minister, Niels Rosen-crantz, from London, dated 23 February 1813, Steen Bille related that

Sir Joseph Banks told me that he had on several occasions asked the ministers of thecrown to allow grain supplies to reach Norway, but they had laughed at times when hespoke of such matters. They had said jokingly that they had left Greenland, Icelandand the Faroes to him but kept Norway for themselves. They had also said that theyhad made an offer lo Denmark and that no blame could be placed on them if theDanish government did not wish to reach a settlement."

The offer referred to was presumably Britain's willingness that any peacenegotiations could be held in, for example, Hamburg, if the Danish govern-ment was so much against a meeting in Stockholm. Steen Bille, however,went on to report that

Sir James Saumarez, who has also taken a great interest in Norway, has been equallyunable to secure any amelioration in the blockade of that country. He told me thathe had completely given up his command in the Baltic and would not return to thisregion.

The fact that the British ministers mentioned Greenland, Iceland and theFaroes in the same breath as Norway when talking to Sir Joseph Banks shouldnot be taken as meaning anything more than that is was he who had addressedhimself and continued to address himself to matters relating to these areas.It cannot be deduced from the statement that the ministers saw the Atlanticislands and Norway as belonging together. It is an entirely different matterthat the passages quoted support the observations of the Consul-GeneralH. F. Hornemann and Steen Bille concerning British policy in relation tothe Baltic. Britain was already withdrawing from that region in that AdmiralSir James Saumarez had laid down his command of the Brutish naval forcesin the Baltic. The quoted passages also show, however, that the Britishgovernment was using the shortage of grain in Norway as a means of puttingpressure on the Danish government.

This brings us back to the British attitude towards the partial or totalcession of Norway to Sweden in relation both to the immediate problem ofsecuring Napoleon's defeat and to the long-term question of the dominationof the Baltic and the northern part of central Europe. This is not the placeto go into all the other aspects that were under consideration in this connec-tion, for example the continued occupation of Anholt and the possibleoccupation of Laese and Zealand in addition to Helgoland. However, it is

11 RA: Dept. f. udenl. Anl. 1800-1848, Alm. Korresp. Sager L 4, Licenser og Lejdebreve 11,1812-14, dossier Auditeur Steen Billes Sendelse etc., Bille's report of that date. There is acurious feature about Bille's early "reports" to the Foreign Minister, Rosencrantz. Bille signedthe letters with a fictitious name, Peder Carlsen, and addressed them to a supposed acquaintancein Elsinore, a merchant called Niels Romberg, who was in reality Niels Rosencrantz. However,Bille soon abandoned this attempt at camouflage, which the British could see through so easily.

Srntifl. ]. History-4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

196 F. Gad

appropriate to remind the reader that these first peace negotiations, likethose that took place later, were held under the pressure of the risk of Den-mark's total destruction.

It is clear that the British government thought in strategic and politicalterms rather than of a restoration of the legitimate rights and territorialpossession of princes and nations. Karl Johan and Swedish diplomats spokeof a "réunion" of Norway and Sweden, harking back to earlier historical con-ditions in an attempt to lend legitimacy to the demand for Norway. Thisargument, however, was never given especial emphasis. In the years 1813-14,as in 1815, historical arguments and legitimacy were used during the peacenegotiations when it was politically expedient to do so. They were over-looked, when it was not. Historically-derived "rights" and claims based onlegitimacy were of no relevance whatsoever in Kiel and nor was any referenceto traditional ties between different areas. The negotiations were a small partof a hard international political struggle for territory and the dominationof the suffering regions of Europe.

The problems of Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes were of very littlesignificance in this context. They were not, however, completely forgotten—by Britain! The problems which these islands raised could not be allowedto impede British policy, but the national affiliations of these islands couldnot be a matter of indifference to Britain. London also had certain, albeitlimited, economic interests to protect: British whaling in the waters offGreenland, British trade with and fishing around Iceland and the Faroes.It can therefore be postulated, though not documented, that Britain, evenif she knew that Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes really belonged to theNorwegian crown, did not wish to see these islands in Swedish hands. Ac-cording to the "personal observations" of Hornemann and Bille, the aim ofBritish policy was that Sweden should limit herself to the eastern Baltic andDenmark to the western part of that sea. Britain would deal with the NorthSea and the waters west of Norway herself. The Faroes, Iceland and Green-land were situated in these waters, but Britain did not want to shoulder anydirect administrative burdens on the Atlantic islands.12

The Danish attempt during the years 1812-13 to reach a separate peacewith Britain was doomed to failure. The negotiations, if these "consultations"can be so called, were immediately diverted into a discussion of at least apartial cession of Norway, that is to say of the Austrian compromise pro-posal. The Russo-Swedish treaty could not be ignored, and both Austria andBritain thought the most important objective was to turn Karl Johan andSwedish troops towards the main enemy in the south. Danish peace feelerswere therefore pointless unless they indicated a willingness to cede Norway.

These attempts to establish peace so as to turn Karl Johan's army south-

11 Rumours that the British would occupy Iceland circulated in Copenhagen for a time. Theserumours were probably set in motion by the actions of certain Englishmen, but the Britishauthorities never aired the idea of annexation. Indeed, the British government had under-taken to return the Atlantic islands to the Danish crown.

Scand. J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Granlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 197

wards meant that for Denmark the question of peace with Britain becamelinked with that of peace with Sweden. In view of her essential objective,Britain was neither able nor willing to make peace with Denmark unless thelatter concluded a simultaneous peace with Sweden, and this could not beobtained without the cession of Norway. It is quite clear that the Britishalways regarded Norway in this context as meaning Norwegian territory inmainland Scandinavia.

The tug of war tfiat began at the end of 1813 and lasted until 6 January1814 will not be described in this essay. It became clear in these first daysof January tfiat Karl Johan wanted the whole of Norway immediately. Weknow the main features of what happened between 6 and 9 January inMiddelfart, where Frederik VI was in residence, but we do not know thedetails of the discussions between the king, the Foreign Minister, NielsRosencrantz, and Edmund Bourke. It is clear from the correspondencedating from these days that the Finance Minister, H. E. Schimmelmann, wasnot present. Bourke received his new instructions on 7 January, and on thefollowing day Rosencrantz sent a letter to the Swedish negotiator, BaronWetterstedt. Neither Bourke's instructions nor this letter contain anythingthat might throw light on the passage excluding the Atlantic islands from thecession of Norway.

It is certainly true, as Arup has maintained,13 that a Swedish draft of apeace treaty with Denmark was first available some time in the days be-tween 10 and 12 January. Both a clerk and Bourke himself made a numberof corrections and additions on this draft, including the insertion into ArticleIV after the word "dépendances" of the passage "la Gr'ônlande, les îles de Ferröe,& l'Islande non comprises". On the draft the passage was not enclosed bycommas or any other punctuation mark, but it was set between two dashesin the final treaty.

The various accounts of what happened in Kiel during the days of 11-13January relate that Wetterstedt and Bourke worked hectically day and night.No great emphasis is laid in this connection on the fact that the Britishnegotiator, Edward Thornton, was also in Kiel. In a report to Castlereaghfrom Kiel, dated 15 January 1814, Thornton wrote that14

The Danish Plenipotentiary M. Bourke returned to this Town on the 10th ... andon the following Morning announced his Arrival to me, informing me that he wasfurnished with full Power to conclude a Peace between Great Britain and Denmark.I had the Pleasure of seeing him the same Day, and though we did not enter uponthe Subject of the Treaty with Great Britain, we had some preliminary Explanationson the general Points which were likely to come into Discussion.

Thornton went on to say that he had been instructed to conduct his nego-tiations "in Concert with Sweden", and that he could not discuss the details

13 Arup, op. cit., p. 29.14 PRO: Foreign Office 73, no. 90. Copy in RA: Danica film 7, FO 73, no. 90.

Scand. ]. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

198 F. Gad

of an Anglo-Danish treaty before the terms of the treaty between Denmarkand Sweden had been agreed. He then reported that

The Objections which Mr. Bourke made to the Swedish Treaty rested principallyon the first Article announced in M. de Rosenkrantz's Letter. Mr. Bourke taking theimmediate Evacuation of Holstein in its most literal Sense ...

These were important matters, but they are not relevant to the subject ofthis essay.

The use of die plural in "Objections . . . to the Swedish Treaty" and of theadverb "principally" later in the same sentence may imply that on the morn-ing of 11 January Bourke and Thornton also discussed Bourke's other objec-tions to the terms of the Swedish treaty and therefore also the cession ofNorway, a matter that was after all of lesser importance to a British negotiator.

According to Thornton's report of 15 January, he and Bourke held pre-liminary discussions on 11 January concerning the main points of the Anglo-Danish treaty. Thornton relates that afterwards he drew up a draft treaty,which he submitted to Bourke, probably on the following day. Bourke onlyhad a few, unimportant changes to this draft to propose. One of the pointsin the draft treaty was that Denmark's overseas possessions, that is to say,Trankebar, the Guinea coast and the Danish Virgin Islands, were to be re-turned to her. This point was probably also raised during the conversationsthe two men had on these days. It was of essential importance for the restora-tion of the Danish kingdom that "the distant dependencies of the DanishCrown" were returned and their return figured in the final Anglo-Danishpeace treaty. These overseas possessions may well have been described exactlyin the phrase quoted in the preceding sentence in the course of the conversa-tions.

Without wishing to postulate the existence of some form of "verbal agree-ment", it should nonetheless be pointed out that this expression was used,as we shall see, to describe Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland by die BritishForeign Secretary, Richard Wellesley, in 1810. During the negotiations inKiel it might also have covered odier overseas possessions of the Danishcrown which, unlike die Adantic islands, had been occupied by the Britishto a greater or lesser degree. In die Order in Council of 1810, which wasmentioned earlier, the expression "Setdements on the Coast of Greenland"was used, but the British sources of the following years only contain refer-ences to Greenland, not to die setdements on diis island. At that time dieword "setdements" meant the same as "colonies" and there can be no doubtdiat the British Foreign Office regarded at least Greenland as a colony, or acollection of colonies, of the Danish crown. Iceland and the Faroes were, as"distant dependencies of die Danish Crown" regarded in the same light asGreenland, and perhaps also as Denmark's other overseas possessions.

The return of diese possessions was a matter between Britain and Den-mark, but in view of die Order in Council of 7 February 1810 the Britishhad also undertaken to restore Iceland, the Faroes and Greenland. However,

SmnrLJ. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Gr'ónlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 199

the Anglo-Danish treaty did not touch upon this point. The Atlantic islandshad been expressly excluded by the Order in Council from the war whichthe negotiations in Kiel were intended to bring to an end. Britain had thusundertaken to effect the return of these islands, and if the matter had beenraised as one that concerned Sweden, Britain would have been obliged atleast to work for the return of the Atlantic islands to the Danish crown.

Whether it was Bourke or Thornton who raised the question of the returnof the Atlantic islands in the course of the conversations cannot, of course,now be ascertained. All this is, after all, only to be regarded as the probablecourse of their conversations. However, it will be shown later that it is veryprobable that their conversations followed this course.

To return to Thornton's report of 15 January: he went on to say in hisletter that "I offered Mr. Bourke, that if he would consent to sign the SwedishTreaty alone, to which the Modifications proposed had so nearly removedall reasonable Objections", he (Thornton) would expedite the conclusion ofthe Anglo-Danish treaty, including those changes which he thought he couldaccept without seeking new instructions from London.

This passage presumably describes a part of the second conversation be-tween the two men, which may have taken place on 12 January. The essen-tial point in the context of this essay is that the additions and correctionsto the Swedish-Danish treaty had proceeded so far that all reasonable impedi-ments to its signing had been removed.

Finally, Thornton wrote that he was enclosing the Anglo-Danish treaty,

which I signed last night with Mr. Bourke in the Apartment of M. de Wetterstedt,who also signed the Treaty of Peace between Sweden and Denmark at the sametime. We were indeed present, both of us, at the collating and signing of the TwoTreaties, and M. de Wetterstedt and myself have on this and on every other Occasionhad the most unreserved and confidential Communication with each other.

This quotation testifies to the close understanding between Wetterstedt andThornton, and such an understanding must have depended on mutualdeference even in matters of detail, perhaps precisely in matters of detail.Since they were both present when the two treaties were collated and signed,Thornton had a further opportunity to check the contents of the Swedish-Danish treaty, even in detail. All this indicates the major role of the Britishdiplomat in the hectic, but always coordinated negotiations which took placeduring the days of 10 to 14 January.

Thornton was undoubtedly able to influence the "Modifications" to theSwedish-Danish treaty which he referred to in his report to Castlereagh andwhich he had discussed with Bourke on 11 and perhaps also 12 January, buthe exercised this influence in constant contact with Wetterstedt.

In this connection, a loose scrap of paper (Fig. 2) among Bourke's papersrelating to the Treaty of Kiel is of some interest.1* The page contains first

15 RA: Dep. f. udenl. Anl.: Sverrig 1 3 69, Akter fra og om Kmh. Bourkes dipl. Sendelse etc.111 1813-14, dossier Kmh. Bourkes Korresp. med Baron Wetterstedt, 20 7 C V.

Scand.J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

200 F. Gad

Fi£. 2. Upper part of Edmund Bourke's note, the whole sheet being 19 by 22 cm. The furtheramcntments are of no interest in connection with our subject. The significant spelling of Ice-land's name and the insertion by the clerk are clearly visible. (RA: Dep. f. udenl. AnL, SverrigI e, 69, Bourkes dipl. Sendelse III, lag 7, mrk. 20 C V; here size 2:3.)

a number of corrections and additions to the treaty's preamble. It then passeson to Article IV and contains the following words, unmistakably in Bourke'shandwriting, "4. dépendances": l'Icelande non comprise". Above and before theword "l'Icelande" the words "la Grönlande les isles de Ferr'ôe et" have been in-serted in the handwriting of the same person who added the passage ex-cluding the Adantic islands from the cession of Norway (Fig. 3) to what isthought to have been the Swedish draft of the treaty.1* However, the spellingof the various words and names in the passage inserted into the draft differsfrom that in Bourke's note. In the addition to the draft treaty, the "comprise"of Bourke's note is changed to "comprises". Bourke clearly corrected "ainsique"to "de même que" just as he made other corrections to the other articles.

It is clear from Bourke's note that the passage added to the draft treatyreferred to "dépendances". It is therefore also probable that the addition wasdirectly occasioned by this word and should not be taken as referring toanything else in this article (IV). Further discussion of this linguistic ques-tion is accordingly unnecessary. Bourke's note suggests, however, anotherpoint of greater importance, which does not seem to have been noticed be-fore or which at least has not been ascribed much significance.

In the note Bourke prepared for his own use, he only added the word"l'Icelande" after "dépendances" (he was writing in haste and left out the accent).The addition about Greenland and the Faroes was inserted later, perhapsat Bourke's dictation, but at all events in someone else's handwriting. In otherwords, at the time of making the note only Iceland lay in Bourke's immediatethoughts. What (and who) led him to jot down Iceland, and only Iceland,on this scrap of paper?

The answer to this question is suggested by the very way in which, in his

16 See the preceding note, dossier 2, Akter vedr. Kmh. Bourkes Udkast til Kieler Traktaten,14 January 1814, Projét de Traité entre la Suéde et le Dannemarc; the Words "Projet de" havebeen crossed out.

Smnd.J. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Grönlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 201

Fig. 3. Bottom of page 3 of the Swedish draft of the treaty between Sweden and Denmark,the latter part of article IV, with the exemption clause intercalated by the clerk (left) andBourke's corrections. (RA: Dept. f. udenl. Anl. Sverrig I e, 69, Bourkes dipl. Sendelse III,lacg 2; here size 7:12.)

evident haste, he spelt the name of Iceland: "Icelande". This spelling repre-sents a linguistic mixture, partly French and partly English. The name ofIceland is written "l'Islande" in all other documents relating to the negotia-tions in Kiel, including the passage excluding the Atlantic islands from thecession of Norway which was added to the Swedish draft treaty. Does notthe quasi-English spelling of Iceland in Bourke's note suggest that he hadheard the word spoken in English around this time? It should be remem-bered in this connection that Bourke was the son of an Irish planter on St.Croix and had been brought ùp in Britain. He spoke, wrote and understoodEnglish, and he became Danish minister in London later in 1814. As wasshown earlier, he had had lengthy conversations with Castlereagh, and theseconversations had not, of course, been conducted in French, though Bourkereported them in French. He normally used French when he wrote to orspoke with Rosencrantz and other Danes. A natural explanation for themixture of French and English in Bourke's note is that, although the textof the draft treaty and the key word "dépendances" were French, the Englishpronunciation of the island's name in the very moment was ringing in hisears.

No one but Thornton could have been speaking English to Bourke at thattime. They had discussed the main points of the Anglo-Danish treaty inEnglish including, as we have seen, the return of Denmark's overseas posses-sions. It would have been natural for Bourke, since he had been born onSt. Croix, to mention them." Thornton had then referred to other "distant

17 Steen Bille had worked as an extra official clerk on St. Thomas in 1798 and had partici-

Smnd.J. Historyt

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

202 F. Gad

dependencies of the Danish Crown" which were to be returned. As weshall see, he had a special interest in Iceland, and it is possible that he onlymentioned that island by name. This is supposition but it seems probableand there is more evidence to support it.

One month after the conclusion of the Treaty of Kiel in 1814 Karl Johanis said to have remarked that Britain had been prepared to prevent Sweden'sacquisition of Norway, and generally to have spoken critically of Britishpolicy. Thornton reported this to Castlereagh, in a letter dated 17 February1814, from Cologne.18 Thornton was unable to understand this view ofBritish policy or the attitude of the Swedish Crown Prince towards the Britishgovernment, but thought that

The best Answer that I can make to this Insinuation is the Zeal and Eagerness withwhich I have seconded the Attainment of the Wishes of Sweden in this Respect,if it is to be supposed, as in Reason it must, that I have acted in conformity to theSentiments and Wishes of my Government, and indeed to their Instructions.

If this is a correct account of British policy towards the re-organization ofthe North, the key lies in the words "Sentiments and Wishes of my Govern-ment" used in Thornton's letter of self-justification. The British governmenthad no particularly warm feelings towards Karl Johan himself. Britishdesires to see Norway ceded to Sweden was an international political im-perative. However, special circumstances applied with regard to the Atlanticislands, particularly Iceland.

The British government and the departments of the British central ad-ministration had been repeatedly drawn into Icelandic affairs since 1810,not least by British merchants. The British government always declined tointerfere in the internal affairs of Iceland, and also of Greenland and theFaroes for that matter. Only when it was a question of encroachments byBritish rítizens on these islands does the British government appear to haveintervened against those British subjects who were responsible.

It was for this reason that the British authorities did not wish to arrestthe notorious "King" Jergensen, when he was brought to Britain from Ice-land, and to send him for trial in Denmark, a country with which Britain was

pated in the negotiations of the years 1801-1803 concerning the return of the Danish VirginIslands after the British occupation of them. In 1807 he was appointed military prosecutor(Auditeur) and Advocatvs repus on St. Croix, but he never took up the appointment. LikeEdmund Bourke, he belonged to the circle around Schimmelmann. Both Bille and Bourkehad been concerned with the Danish Virgin Islands at times. As we have seen, Bille was alsoinvolved in matters relating to the Atlantic islands in the years 1812-1813. He and Bourkecan hardly have failed to discuss these remote regions. Moreover, Bille must have been quiteinvolved in questions relating to the Treaty of Kiel with Sweden. Shortly after the treaty wasconcluded, he was sent to Sweden to negotiate with the Swedes concerning the financialproblems raised by the dissolution of the union between Denmark and Norway.

Bille may have been one of the many reasons why Bourke was aware of the Atlantic islands.In 1813 he had, as we have seen, made certain observations concerning British policy withregard to a union between Norway and Sweden.18 PRO: Foreign Office 73, 90. Copy in RA: Dánica film 7 FO 73, 90.

Smiitl. f. History 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

"Grönlande, les Isles de Ferr'óe el l'Islande non comprises" 203

at war. In a letter which the British Foreign Secretary, Marquis RichardWellesley, contemplated sending to Count Christian Trampe, the Danishgovernor (stiftamtmand) of Iceland, who was in London at the time, 12 March1810, that is to say one month after the above mentioned Order in Council of7 February 1810, it was stated

The Marquis (i.e. Wellesley) after having taken into consideration the whole of thequestion—that the protection of England to the Inhabitants of Iceland against theMiseries of War, should be considered as an expiation and complete satisfaction forall (that?) happened before the existing Relations between England and Icelandcould have been well understood in either country, and that in order to render thefuture tranquility to which England means to bestow on the distant dependencies ofthe Danish Crown perfect and uninterrupted.19

"Distant dependencies of the Danish Crown!" The British Foreign Secretarythus believed that the Atlantic islands were subject to the Danish crown,though the latter term may have covered the concept of the Dano-Nor-wegian crown. In order to acquire some control over the conditions ofBritish merchants on Iceland, a certain John Park was appointed BritishConsul resident in Reykjavik on 27 Juli 1810. His brother, James Park,wrote in a letter at around the same time20 that "I had the pleasure of re-ceiving yesterday Evening through Mr. Thornton an intimation from YourLordship ...". This shows that Edward Thornton was involved in an Ice-landic matter. He must therefore in the years after 1810 (except during amission to the United States) have had some knowledge of Icelandic affairs.

On 15 October 1813 Joseph Bullen, the secretary of the Privy Council,informed the Foreign Office that the proposals made in a despatch from theBritish charge d'affaires in Stockholm and in an enclosed copy of a note fromthe Swedish Foreign Minister, Count Engeström, concerning supplies forIceland, the Faroes and Greenland, had met with the Privy Council's approv-al. Supply ships for these islands would continue to be licensed to sail freelyprovided that they did not call or attempt to call at Norwegian ports. TheAdmiralty however, could not assume the task of convoying such ships (inorder to ensure that they kept to the right course), but since their route ofnecessity passed far from the Norwegian coast it was improbable that theywould in any case attempt to call at Norwegian ports.21 In accordance withthe Order in Council of 1810, this letter reflected once again a clear differ-ence of treatment for and a clear distinction between the Adantic islandsand mainland Norway.

Thornton must have known all this. He was to be sure, residing at thistime at the Swedish headquarters in Germany, but he must have known

19 PRO: Foreign Office 40, 1, fol. 35-37. Copy in RA: Danica film, Arkiv 600, no. 701. Thewords "Copy/draft Sir Joseph Banks communicated April 23, 1810" have been written on thedocument.20 PRO: Foreign Office 40, 1, fol. 46. Copy in RA: Danica film, Arkiv 600, no. 701, fol. 46.21 PRO: Foreign Office 22, vol. 63, 2, no. 235. Copy in RA: Danica film, Arkiv 600, 88.

14-791913 Hmnd.J.Hhtory4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

204 F. Gad

what was happening in Stockholm and in Anglo-Swedish relations. Nor canhe have forgotten about Iceland and the Atlantic islands as a whole. Theymust have been referred to during his conversations with Bourke, and thename of Iceland, spoken in English, must have been mentioned in thesediscussions.

It is not possible to go more closely than this into the question of who mayhave taken the initiative in excluding the Atlantic islands from the cessionof Norway in Article IV of the Treaty of Kiel. It is clear at any rate that aconsiderable part of the responsibility must lie witfi Edward Thornton,perhaps or rather probably the whole responsibility as far as Iceland is con-cerned. He acted in this matter in accordance with the guiding principleswhich had been created by the Order in Council of 7 February 1810 andwhich governed British attitudes towards the "redeployment" of the northernflank in the final great struggle with Napoleon.

It would therefore seem that Edmund Bourke's role was a subsidiary one,restricted to adding Greenland and die Faroes to the note he made. How-ever, in this case too it may be that this was a later addition to the notesBourke kept during his conversations with Thornton and under the impres-sion of what had been said. There can hardly be any doubt that Bourke musthave known that the Atlantic islands somehow belonged to the Norwegiancrown. He may have drawn Thornton's attention to this, and Thornton thenacted on the principles that were implicit in his instructions, especially withregard to Iceland, an area about which he.had some knowledge.

In his report to Castlereagh of 17 February 1814 Thornton emphasizedthe cooperation he maintained with Baron Wetterstedt during the hecticdays of the final negotiations. Edmund Bourke can be added to this team.Wetterstedt, according to his own testimony (in a report of 16 January to hischief, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Count Engeström), felt that he had tomeet Bourke's wishes concerning the insertion of a passage excluding theAdantic islands from the cession of Norway. It is doubtlessly true that it wasBourke who expressed this desire, but this does not mean that Bourke mightnot really have been a mouthpiece for Thornton in this matter. Thorntoncould not have presented it himself, because he had no authority to inter-fere in the contents of die Swedish-Danish treaty, but it was in British in-terests to ensure diat these islands did not pass into Swedish hands. If it wasout of the question that Britain herself should hold them, then it was pref-erable that they should remain in the hands of a weakened Denmark.Thorton had never given the impression that Britain was placing obstaclesin the path of Karl Johan's acquisition of Norway. Because he knew andconsciously acted in accordance with the "Sentiments and Wishes" of theBritish government, he was able to support Bourke's desire for additionsand corrections to the treaty in discussion with Wetterstedt. It was a ques-tion of securing the conclusion of the two, mutually dependent treaties asrapidly as possible. Wetterstedt was enough of a diplomat to know that hecould not disclose tfiis and therefore covered himself by denying that the

Scanrl.J. Hillary 4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014

''Grönlande, les Isles de Ferröe et l'Islande non comprises" 205

Atlantic islands had ever belonged to Norway. Moreover, as far as he couldsee, this was not an important matter for Sweden. Greater or lesser histori-cal knowledge was of no significance in a game in which excessive emphasison historical traditions would have been an impediment to successful action.

This picture is reinforced by the fact that Count Engeström, in a laterexchange of notes with Britain (27 and 28 May 1819) was obliged to concedethat any possible Norwegian-Swedish claims on Greenland, Iceland and theFaroes were "prétentions". Arup22 translates this word as "claims" (pástande),but in the context it could equally well mean "prétentions".

The conclusion to be drawn from all this must then be that the Danesdid not pull off a diplomatic coup or trick in relation to the insertion of thepassage excluding the Atlantic islands in Article IV. Instead, the exclusionof the Atlantic islands from the cession of Norway to Sweden in Article IVof the Treaty of Kiel must be regarded as a consequence of British policy.Countries were later divided without ceremony and without regard to his-torical tradition. The British government tried to divide the lands of the Nor-wegian crown during the negotiations of the years 1812-14, but only a partof this process, the retention of the Atlantic islands by Denmark, Figured inthe Final settlement, and it did so, as far as one can tell on the basis of theevidence presented in this essay, above all because this served British in-terests.

22 Arup, op. cit., p. 37.

Scand. J. History -4

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

NU

S N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

of

Sing

apor

e] a

t 08:

56 1

8 Ju

ne 2

014