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Session ID: Session Classification: Gunter Ollmann CTO, IOActive Inc. STU-W23B Intermediate Building a Better APT Package

Stu w23 b

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Session ID:

Session Classification:

Gunter Ollmann CTO, IOActive Inc.

STU-W23B

Intermediate

Building a Better APT Package

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► Gunter Ollmann ► CTO - IOActive

► University of Georgia Advisory board

► Formerly: ► Damballa CTO & VP Research

► IBM Chief Security Strategist

► ISS Director of X-Force & EMEA SAS

► NGS Professional Services Director

► Can be found/followed/located at: ► Email [email protected]

► Twitter - @gollmann

About Me

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Advanced “Classic”

►Advanced

►Persistent

►Threat

APT

Targeted Threat

► Scary Stuff

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Weaponization Teeter-totter

Co

st ($

$$

)

Ste

alth

ine

ss (P

rob

. De

tect

ion

)

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► ►

► Outsourcing of all complex bits ► Commercial tools for evasion

► Quality Assurance services

► Subscription services to check every malware against all current enterprise network and host-based detection technologies

Cybercrime Evasion

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► ► Multiple campaigns, multiple vectors, multiple tools

► Constant information gathering ►

► Mapping networks, host configurations, incident response metrics

► Tie in to organized crime and cybercrime units ► Buy the info or access

► Mingle cyber with physical world

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► Bypassing automated defenses Sandboxing/Virtual ►

► ► Live Exchange connector & address book

► Age of browser cache

► Webex connectors, etc.

► ►

Stealth within an Onslaught

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► Who needs the front door? ► Other devices being carried in past perimeter (BYOD)

► Substitution of physical components ► Spotting chip & board changes?

► Incorporation of custom FPGA logic, etc.

► ►

Breaking the Supply Chain

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► ► Most commercial crimeware techniques are already sufficient

► ► Buffer overflow conditions

► 0-day, shmo- ► Not normally needed.

► Often increases probability of being detec

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Weaponization Teeter-totter

Co

st ($

$$

)

Ste

alth

ine

ss (P

rob

. De

tect

ion

)

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APT Delivery Framework

Co

st ($

)

Attack (Volume/Frequency)

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Thank you! [email protected]

Twitter: @gollmann