Trans ROMS 25 03 2009.indd

TRANSITIONSNouvelles identités rom

en Europe centrale & orientale

* Les volumes I à XXXIII ont été publiés sous le nom «Revue des Pays de l’Est»

Vol. XLVIII•2édité parAndrea Boscoboinik & François Ruegg

Note

Nous avons adopté en français l’orthographe de Rom/Roms pour le nom propre et rom invariable pour l’adjectif.

Le contenu des articles rassemblés dans ce volume n'engage que leurs auteurs.

© IS/IEUG mars 2009avenue Jeanne, 44, – 1050 BRUXELLES

Tel. 32.2/650.34.42 – Fax 32.2/650.35.21e.mail : [email protected] – http://www.ulb.ac.be/is/revtrans.html

ISSN n° 0779-3812

TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale : la fi n du voyage ? François RUEGG 5

Le jeu des identités rom : dynamisme et rigiditéAndrea BOSCOBOINIK 19

Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia : Employment and EducationBožidar JAKŠIĆ 31

Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of MoldovaIon NEGURA & Veronica PEEV 55

Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes Le cas de la RoumanieAdrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI 71

Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism : How do Religious Conversions of Roma Fit into the Wider Landscape ?From Global to Local PerspectivesSorin GOG 93

Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs : Communicating Religious Change among the Transylvanian RomaLászló FOSZTÓ 109

Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria : Between Capsulation and GlobalizationMilena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA, Velislav ALTANOV 133

La chimère de l’ethnogenèse ou le mirage d’une solution ethnique aux problèmes socio-économiques des populations romChristian GIORDANO 157

• 5

Tandis que la fi lmographie sur les Tsiganes tend à prolonger le mythe des gens du voyage, avec tout ce que cela comporte de folklorisme et d’exotisme facile, la sociologie et l’anthropologie auraient tendance au contraire à faire de cette ethnie, à grand renfort de statistiques, la plus grande et la plus pauvre minorité européenne. Simultanément é européenne. Simultanément éles clichés négatifs se répandent à la suite des incidents survenus ces dernières années en Europe occidentale, surtout en Italie. Or ces scandales ne sont guère nouveaux et la réputation de voleurs (d’enfants(d’enfants( )d’enfants)d’enfants faite aux Tsiganes ne date pas d’aujourd’hui.

Ce numéro de Transitions voudrait, en faisant appel à des recherches de terrain récentes et à travers une vision critique et plus large de la question, identifi er les stratégies que les Roms inventent ou réinventent pour se faire une place dans les sociétés d’Europe centrale et orientale. Les recherches, coordonnées en grande partie par le Séminaire d’anthropologie sociale de l’Université de Fribourg, ont porté sur la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, la Serbie, la Macédoine et la République de Moldova.

Alors donc que l’opinion publique entretient habituellement une image plutôt négative des Tsiganes, image associée à leur statut de marginaux et de mendiants quand ce n’est pas de criminels, et leur en impute la faute, le Conseil de l’Europe et les ONGs de toutes sortes, accompagnés souvent par les sciences sociales, ont tendance au contraire à faire des Tsiganes sous leur nouveau nom de Roms, une ethnie discriminée,victime de son histoire. Leur nouveau nom de Rom, censé chasser les traits péjoratifs attachés à leur ancien nom de Tsigane, n’a pas réussi jusqu’à présent à faire l’unanimité parmi les Tsiganes eux-mêmes. Cette invention, qui n’est pas sans rappeler les avatars des dénominations politiquement correctes américaines, devrait servir aussi à créer un sentiment d’appartenance parmi les divers groupes qui s’y rattachent. Rom veut dire homme en romani et reproduit donc, une fois de plus, le processus ethnocentrique

TSIGANES EN EUROPE CENTRALE-ORIENTALE

La fi n du voyage ?

François RUEGG

6 •

François RUEGG

d’identifi cation consistant à s’approprier la qualité d’homme pour se défi nir par rapport aux autres groupes sociaux que l’on rejette dans une commune altérité. Le phénomène est bien connu des anthropologues qui le rappellent depuis un bon siècle, chacun des nouveaux exemples venant confi rmer cette tendance commune de s’identifi er par opposition aux autres.

LES ROMS D’EUROPE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE : UNE MANIFESTATION NOUVELLE ET OBSESSIONNELLE EN EUROPE DE L’OUEST

A part quelques éclats au sujet des aires accessibles aux gens du voyage, les Gitans, Manouches ou Sintis ne faisaient plus guère la Une des journaux en Occident. L’intégration de la Hongrie et de la Slovaquie en 2004 dans l’Union européenne, suivie de l’entrée de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie en 2007, ont non seulement facilité l’accès des Roms aux pays de l’Europe occidentale mais ont décidément fait pencher la balance ethnique et précipité la formation d’une nouvelle minorité rom dont on dit dorénavant qu’elle est la plus nombreuse en Europe. On se rappellera toutefois que la migration de communautés rom de l’Est en Europe de l’Ouest n’a pas attendu l’intégration politique des anciens « pays de l’Est » dans l’Union. Leur présence n’a cessé de faire couler de l’encre dès la fi n des régimes communistes, faisant ressurgir également d’anciens fantômes. On ne parle en effet des Roms dans les médias qu’en tant qu’ils nous perturbent : il s’agit du retour de fi gures et de caractères que l’on croyait disparus à jamais, ceux du vagabond et du mendiant, ou encore celle de la diseuse de bonne aventure, sorcière à l’occasion.

Alors que nos Romanichels s’étaient fondus plus ou moins dans les franges de la société et ne se faisaient plus voir que dans les processions de caravanes luxueuses lors de leurs déplacements, les Roms eux s’affi chent sur les places et dans les lieux publics des villes et remettent en question nos habitudes, notamment quant à l’exercice de l’aumône. Il y a longtemps en effet que la charité publique ne s’exerce plus que par intermédiaires et que nous ne sommes plus confrontés par conséquent directement à la mendicité et à la misère, sauf peut-être en vacances, ces contre-migrations. Par ailleurs on ne saurait confondre non plus les Roms avec d’autres migrants, car ils sont désormais pour la plupart citoyens européens, davantage que les Bosniaques ou les Kosovars. Aussi sont-ils l’objet de négociations et l’occasion de marchandages politico-économiques à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne. Les récentes politiques de rapatriement françaises en disent assez long sur le malaise que créent ces rapatriement françaises en disent assez long sur le malaise que créent ces rapatriement migrants de l’intérieur qui ne correspondent pas exactement au modèle prévu de libre circulation pour les ressortissants des pays appartenant à l’Union. La mobilité ne serait-elle donc pas souhaitable pour tous également ?

LES ROMS : UN PROBLÈME À RÉSOUDRE ?

L’intérêt qu’on leur porte en Europe de l’Ouest est donc clairement lié à ce malaise, voire à ce qui est considéré comme une plaie et à la question de savoir comment s’en débarrasser. Les moyens imaginés pour y parvenir, et ce n’est pas nouveau, sont principalement de deux sortes. Dans le premier et le meilleur des cas, on tente de nier la différence en élaborant des politiques sociales favorisant l’assimilation. Toutefois cette solution n’est plus très prisée de nos jours, il est vrai, en raison de la prévalence

• 7

Tsiganes en Europe centrale-orientale

de politiques de type communautaristes visant plutôt la défense de la diversité ethnique et culturelle des minorités discriminés discriminé ées, en général, et dans le cas particulier des Roms en raison des expériences passées, considérées comme de véritables génocides, qu’il s’agisse des pogroms perpétrés contre eux durant la deuxième guerre mondiale ou de mesures plus anciennes et plus récentes d’intimidation, de bannissement, voire de déportations ou de politiques d’assimilation forcées enfi n, comme ce fut le cas par exemple au 18e siècle dans l’Empire autrichien1. Celles-ci forçaient les Tsiganes à changer de nom et à se marier à l’extérieur de leur groupe. D’autres séparaient les enfants de leurs parents pour les civiliser et effacer civiliser et effacer civiliser l’hérédité néfasteéfasteé . Faut-il rappeler ici les tentatives opérées en Suisse sur les Jenischs en plein 20e siècle faisant écho à celles-là, plus anciennes. Le plus fréquemment désormais, la différence s’affi rme par des revendications politiques de communautarisation et par conséquent de reconnaissance d’une différence ethnique essentielle assortie de mesures de discrimination positive. On observe ainsi en ce qui concerne les Roms un processus d’ethnicisation, ou pour reprendre la distinction faite en conclusion de ce volume par Giordano, d’ethnogenèse, concept qui signale bien et vise à réhabiliter, dans le cadre plus large des mesures de discrimination positive prise à l’encontre des Roms, le projet de construction d’une nouvelle nation, au sens ancien de ce terme, par de véritables ingénieurs ou entrepreneurs identitaires. Cette entreprise, ainsi que l’observent Benovska & Altanov en Bulgarie, peut prendre des formes non seulement politiques mais également religieuses, témoins en sont les communautés pentecôtistes mixtes, devenues elles aussi monoethniques ou homogènes, c’est-à-dire rom.

Cependant la diffi culté supplémentaire que représente le cas des Roms dans le cadre de l’Union européenne vient du fait que cette minorité est désormais transnationale et que les Etats membres ne peuvent guère être forcés à garder leurs populations à l’intérieur de leurs frontières, en principe abolies et encore moins leurs minorités és é indéindéind sirablesésirablesé ! Aux faits s’ajoutent les représentations sociales et les stéréotypes qui n’ont guère changé, en ce qui concerne les stéréotypes aux couleurs négatives, renforcés par quelques affairesnotoires comme le cas de Rome évoqué plus haut dont les répercussions n’ont pas fi ni de rebondir, au point que désormais tous les Roms d’Italie seraient fi chés au moyen de leurs empreintes digitales. En revanche des stéréotypes nouveaux apparaissent, traduisant à la fois la mauvaise conscience des Européens et l’assimilation des Roms aux immigrés ou demandeurs d’asile, malgré leur citoyenneté, la plupart du temps européenne. En effet, les nombreuses études consacrées récemment aux communautés rom d’Europe de l’Est suivent régulièrement cette même orientation : adoptant le registre humanitaire, elles se penchent sur le sort malheureux des Roms, considérés comme un problème et comme une population globalement pauvre et discriminée, qu’il s’agisse d’études économiques, politiques ou sociologiques.

Pour ceux qui mettent évidence la différence (ethnique) en revanche, l’intérêt positif à leur encontre, se porte sur leur culture, leur langue et leurs traditions communautaires. Les historiens, bien qu’ils mobilisent des sources moins connues, tendent à suivre le même chemin : montrer la longue histoire de leur marginalisation sociale ou rechercher les origines de leur culture à la fois originelle et originale. Ce faisant, ces études reproduisent sans le savoir les schémas de plus anciens travaux publiés par de savants ethnographes des 18e et 19e siècles, qui mettaient déjà l’accent soit sur le sort

8 •

François RUEGG

inéluctablement défavorable aux Tsiganes, soit sur leur marginalité volontaire, mais tout aussi fatale.

Dans les deux cas cependant, on nous donne l’impression que ces communautés assistent passivement à leur histoire et reproduisent celle d’autres minorités opprimées, assimilées ou ethnocidéethnocidéethnocid es, qu’il s’agisse des Noirs de l’Amérique du Nord ou des Indiens d’Amérique, voire des Juifs condamnés és é à errer sans fi n. Des allusions explicites à ces autres minorités nourrissent d’ailleurs les projets d’action en faveur des Roms et sont utilisées par les activistes rom et non rom dans leurs campagnes politiques et fi nancières.

STRATÉGIES IDENTITAIRES DES ROMS

Face à ces représentations simplifi catrices des Roms qui en font aujourd’hui à nouveau des marginaux impuissants ou nuisibles, représentations issues de la seule perception des Roms mendiants émigrés à l’Ouest, qui négligent ainsi ceux qui demeurent en Europe centrale et orientale et leur situation làlàl -bas, nous nous proposons dans ce volume de replacer la question rom dans son contexte géopolitique local contemporain. C’est pourquoi nous avons souhaité apporter un autre éclairage à cette question. Il s’agissait d’étudier les stratégies que les Roms mettent eux-mêmes en œuvre en Europe de l’Est pour se positionner dans une société nouvelle : des stratégies identitaires recourant notamment à la mobilité sociale, géographique et religieuse. Au cours d’une recherche de trois ans, menée en Roumanie du Nord et en République de Moldova, fi nancée par le FNS2, nous avons pu recueillir de la bouche des intéressés leurs conceptions de l’identité rom/tsigane et les stratégies qu’ils ont imaginées, le cas échéant, pour sortir du carcan des stéréotypes qui les affl igent depuis des siècles, quel que soit le régime politique en vigueur. A ces recherches viennent s’ajouter celles de collègues ayant travaillé indépendamment sur des thèmes analogues ou dans des zones géographiques différentes.

Nous avons ainsi été amenés à considérer la situation générale des Roms en Europe orientale et du Sud-est, non pas tellement du point de vue économique ou politique, ce qui est largement étudié, mais bien du point de vue des nouvelles identités qu’ils se donnent, soit en ayant formé de nouvelles élites au sein de la société majoritaire, soit en ayant changé d’identité à travers l’adoption d’une nouvelle religion, c’est-à-dire principalement leur conversion au néo-protestantisme et le plus souvent au pentecôtisme. Notre perspective qui se veut largement émique, à la fois par la place qu’y occupent les chercheurs de la région et les données empiriques mises à profi t, recueillies auprès des Roms, devrait également permettre de nuancer une vision par trop simpliste ou angélique de la question, faisant souvent des Roms les victimes des bourreaux nationalistes est-européens. Cela est particulièrement vrai lorsque les arguments économiques sont avancés et qu’il est question de la pauvreté ou de la misère généralisée des Roms, sur un modèle emprunté à des discours visant davantage à attirer la pitié qu’à donner une perspective nuancée, celui qui parle par exemple de la pauvreté africaine. Or s’il est évident que le manque de ressources est une cause majeure de la migration, on devrait se rappeler que les Roms ne sont pas les seuls affectés et que la majorité de la population roumaine, pour prendre cet exemple, vit dans la précarité, si l’on s’en tient aux critères et au normes internationales élaborées en la matière. Il en

• 9


résulte une compétition d’autant plus grande entre Roms roumains et Roumains, aussi bien dans le pays qu’à l’étranger.

Ainsi, ce numéro de Transitions a l’ambition de présenter un autre point de vue sur les Roms, qu’il s’agisse de démonter la mécanique et de reconstituer l’histoire de l’ethnogenèse (Giordano) qui a lieu sous nos yeux étonnés, ou de se faire l’écho du point de vue des intéressés eux-més eux-mé êmes à travers les résultats de recherches menées par le Séminaire d’Anthropologie de l’Université de Fribourg depuis plusieurs années (Boscoboinik) en collaboration avec le CISS de Rome3, au moyen d’enquêtes sur le terrain, menées par des chercheurs des pays concernés avec la plupart du temps la collaboration de chercheurs rom dans nos équipes. Ces recherches, en grande partie qualitatives, sont également interdisciplinaires dans la mesure où elles ont été menées par des chercheurs venant de la sociologie, de la psychologie sociale et de l’anthropologie sociale et religieuse. Toutefois il ne s’agissait pas simplement de donner la parole aux Roms ou de se mettre à leur place, mais bien de placer la caméra sous un angle différent. Plutôt que de reprendre les indicateurs socio-économiques et politiques classiques, nous avons tenu à privilégier deux perspectives habituellement négligées, la mobilité sociale et religieuse.

• Premièrement il s’agissait de considérer la formation des élites rom (Neculau & alii) et leur rôle dans la constitution des nouvelles identités rom individuelles et communautaires ainsi que les changements induits par celles-ci dans la société roumaine en particulier.

• Deuxièmement de porter notre attention sur les identités religieusesés religieusesé ou plutôt sur la manière dont ces identités sont mobilisées dans la construction plus globale des identités alternatives, c’est-à-dire en d’autres termes, comment la religion permet aux Roms de construire des identités nouvelles, autres que celles que leur imposent habituellement les stéréotypes (Fosztó, Gog et Benovska & Altanov).

Enfi n il nous a semblé utile d’élargir la perspective géographique de notre enquête. C’est pourquoi nous avons demandé à nos collègues de Serbie (Jakžić) et de la République de Moldova (Negura & Peev) de contribuer à la composition de cette fresque.

È

Dans son article consacré aux identités à géométrie variable des Roms en Europe du Sud-est, Andrea Boscoboinik présente un aperçu des recherches menées par notre Séminaire d’Anthropologie sociale4 au sujet des défi nitions identitaires, celles qui sont données par les autres aussi bien que celles que l’on s’attribue soi-même. Elle montre notamment comment, au-delà de la distinction classique opérée par les Tsiganes eux-mêmes face aux Gadje ou non Tsiganes, à l’intérieur même des communautés que nous avons tendance à considérer comme homogènes parce qu’appartenant théoriquement à une seule ethnie affublée de stéréotypes négatifs, des distinctions s’opèrent (ce que confi rme l’article de Neculau & alii) en fonction de critères d’authenticité prétendue, reprenant ces mêmes stéréotypes négatifs. Ainsi malgré ou peut-être sous l’effet de la nouvelle construction ethnique rom, réalisée avec le concours de politiciens européens par les activistes et leaders rom, des groupes rom refusent-ils l’appellation même de

10 •

François RUEGG

rom pour garder le nom traditionnel de tsigane. Elle aborde également la question des représentations sociales interethniques à l’intérieur des nations de l’Europe centrale orientale et du Sud-est, question fondamentale si l’on veut comprendre dans toute sa complexité, la question des identités rom. Les Roms non seulement ne constituent pas une ethnie homogène, ce que nous montre également leur statut social, économique et religieux, mais les représentations de soi et des autres, les stratégies identitaires qu’ils mobilisent, instituent des clivages et des segmentations qui marquent les communautés rom aussi bien aux yeux des autres qu’à leurs propres yeux.

La contribution de Božidar Jakžić nous permet de mieux connaître la situation des Roms en Serbie, pour laquelle nous avions jusqu’à présent peu de données. Loin d’adopter la perspective des faiseurs de Roms ethniques, Jakžić se tourne résolument vers les considérations socio-économiques pour dresser un tableau des circonstances conjoncturelles et historiques qui font des Roms de Serbie, comme de ceux de toute la région d’ailleurs, des marginaux, tant dans leur espace de vie, leur quartier (mahala)(mahala)( , que du point de vue social. Toutefois, contrairement aux nombreuses études misérabilistes consacrées à la pauvreté quasi fatale des Roms, le texte de Jakžić souligne que la pauvreté qui accable les Roms frappe également l’ensemble de la population, ainsi que l’ont aussi remarqué les chercheurs roumains. Aussi consacre-t-il une bonne partie de sa contribution à analyser deux questions plus précisément : celle du chômage et celle de l’éducation. Les raisons pour lesquelles les Roms ne trouvent pas d’emploi sont bien connues par ailleurs et liées à la fois à leur manque de formation et à une discrimination de la part des groupes majoritaires, thème repris sous son aspect positif par Neculau & alii, insistant sur le rôle des études supérieures pour avoir accès à un nouveau statut social supérieur. Toutefois Jakžić nous montre l’incidence de ces défi cits de reconnaissance dans le niveau de vie des Roms et met ainsi en évidence une fois de plus le cercle vicieux que constituent la pauvreté, le chômage et le manque de formation. Ainsi est-il amené tout naturellement à traiter par la suite la question de l’éducation, mais dans une perspective critique. La vieille question de la ségrégation et de l’apartheid scolaire, justifi é par les mauvais traitements dont les enfants rom sont victimes dans les écoles publiques, ressurgit ici. L’approche éducative assimilationniste pèche pour sa part par paternalisme, proposant un modèle unique de citoyenneté civilisée, tandis que la ségrégation pèche par idéalisme, tentant à la fois de protéger les enfants rom de la discrimination en les isolant, et leur culture en leur enseignant leur prétendue langue ethnique commune, le romani. Les mêmes problèmes se posent ainsi aux Roms serbes qu’à ceux de toute la région du Sud-est européen. Face à la redistribution des cartes politiques et des systèmes d’organisation sociale, les Roms font souvent les frais de la paupérisation généralisée. Ils sont en outre aisément tenus pour responsables de la mauvaise situation économique et de la mauvaise réputation que les pays est-européens (et encore davantage ceux qui n’ont pas pu entrer encore dans l’Union européenne comme la Serbie ou la République de Moldova) ont acquise auprès des pays membres de l’Union Européenne qui, de leur côté, tentent vainement de les convaincre de garder leurs Roms chez eux. Ainsi les Roms deviennent-ils facilement les boucs émissaires d’une crise généralisée.

Les Roms de la République de Moldova sont moins connus que ceux de la Roumanie pour des raisons assez simples. Ils sont sédentarisés depuis longtemps et

• 11


orientent traditionnellement leurs activités vers l’Est (URSS/Ukraine/Russie) plutôt que vers l’Ouest. L’article de Negura & Peev, nous restitue les résultats d’une enquête effectuée dans le cadre du projet commun mentionné plus haut. Il les décrit en suivant pas à pas le questionnaire qui a servi aux entretiens. Les caractéristiques générales les concernant, décrites dans la partie introductive ne nous surprendront pas, tant elles correspondent à celles des pays voisins, qu’il s’agisse de la diffi culté d’établir un recensement fi able, du taux de chômage, de la (mauvaise) situation de la femme ou de la (faible) scolarisation ou encore des préjugés à leur encontre et de leur marginalisation. Les questions posées au sujet de l’identité, telle qu’elle est perçue et construite par les Roms, font apparaître la même souplesse et mobilité en fonction des circonstances, mais simultanément un fort attachement aux valeurs traditionnelles qui constituent cette identité. Celles-ci prennent racine dans l’héritage culturel, tel qu’il est transmis et imaginé : appartenance au groupe restreint (famille ou clan) des anciennes catégories professionnelles, désigné selon les occupations et/ou objets fabriqués, démarcation vestimentaire, lieu de résidence, pratiques sociales dont font partie ce que l’on appelait les coutumes. En défi nitive, il semblerait que chez les Roms de la Moldova, du moins ceux qui ont répondu à l’enquête, l’attachement au passé et aux traditions, ajouté à des pratiques d’exclusion réciproques qui marquent fortement les différences ethniques au sein de la Nation, demeure le facteur d’identifi cation majeur, la construction identitaire se faisant à partir des origines, de la famille et du groupe élargi. La langue serait, elle aussi, un facteur supplémentaire d’identifi cation ethnique.

Trop souvent encore relégués dans la catégorie de mendiants-voleurs ou d’assistés, profi teurs de l’aide sociale, les Roms ne sont que rarement considérés comme capables de concevoir des stratégies économiques propres. Tout au plus leur reconnaît-on une certaine habileté dans une économie parallèle. Or sans un sens aiguisé des affaires, on voit mal comment certaines de ces familles et communautés auraient pu non seulement survivre mais prospérer, ainsi que le montre avec éclat la classe des nouveaux riches (cf. Neculau & alii). C’est cette économie, certes non conforme nécessairement aux critères habituels du rendement ou de la légalité qu’il conviendrait d’analyser plus avant. Une telle étude viendrait heureusement compléter les données concernant la pauvreté des Roms et leur marginalité. En effet il ne nous semble pas suffi sant de dénoncer les maux qui affl igent les Roms pour les comprendre.

LES NOUVELLES ÉLITES ROM

Nous avons dit qu’un des mouvements les plus dignes d’attention, parmi les changements survenus depuis la chute du régime antérieur, était celui de la création des élites rom. En effet, leur seule existence prouve la capacité des Roms non seulement de réussir fi nancièrement et socialement, mais encore de revendiquer légitimement leur origine ou leur culture, sans vouloir nécessairement y attacher l’idée de la constitution d’une nation ou d’un peuple rom distinct dans les Etats dans lesquels ils vivent. Adrian Neculau et ses collègues restituent ici les résultats de leur enquête auprès de représentants de ces élites. Comme on sait, la notion même d’élite est ambiguë, puisqu’elle englobe toutes les formes du pouvoir, politique, intellectuelle et économique.

Partant de la formation des élites en général dans les pays post socialistes et en Roumanie en particulier, et de leurs stratégies, il nous montre comment les membres rom

12 •

François RUEGG

de ces anciennes élites socialistes redécouvrent peu à peu leurs racines et deviennent à leur tour des promoteurs d’une romanité distincte de la é distincte de la é roumanité tout en demeurant é tout en demeurant édans l’élite. Les membres rom des élites sont parfaitement assimilés et reproduisent les mêmes comportements que les autres membres de l’élite, la nomenklatura, à tel point que certains sont appelés les Roms invisibles. Une deuxième élite rom, très visible celle-ci et très présente dans les médias, est constituée par les ressortissants des chefferies traditionnelles, suivant les différentes familles dont les noms se réfèrent comme on a dit à leurs anciens métiers : travailleurs du bois, du métal, montreurs d’ours etc. C’est également parmi eux que se trouvent les nouveaux riches rom, sur les stratégies sociales desquels l’article reviendra, prenant à témoin des informateurs rom de l’élite intellectuelle qui ne les tiennent pas en très haute estime.

L’étude se concentre cependant surtout sur une autre élite encore, celle que constituent non pas les nouveaux riches mais les Roms entrés dans le monde académique et politique ou administratif et qui servent de trait d’union entre les Roumains et les Roms. Même si certains membres de cette élite appartenaient à la nomenklatura, l’ensemble de cette classe se distingue par sa formation académique et son activisme politique, au sens large. Ce sont certes des « parvenus » issus des classes pauvres ou basses de la société. Toute proportion gardée, cette élite joue le rôle qu’ont joué les intellectuels dans la formation des Etats-Nations au 19e siècle et qui ont été les pères de la Nation, non seulement du point de vue ethnique mais également du point de vue de la constitution d’une minorité active, capable de se faire entendre et de s’imposer au sein de la communauté académique. Si l’on peut parler d’intégration, c’est bien à propos des Roms qualifi és qui sont sortis de la problématique ethnique et qui ont compris que leur qualifi cation les valorise aux yeux de la communauté tout entière. Nous avons été témoin d’une expérience semblable lors d’un séminaire consacré aux Roms mendiants à Genève, auquel participait une activiste (rom) des droits de l’Homme qui, à la question de savoir si elle militait pour la cause de la femme rom a répliqué qu’elle luttait pour les droits de la femme et non pour les droits de la femme rom. Cette réponse illustre bien, à mon sens, ce que l’on pourrait nommer la sortie de l’ethnie, et par conséquent l’assimilation non seulement au niveau national mais bien international, dans la mesure où l’on sait très bien que les élites sont en principe cosmopolites.

Toutefois les élites les plus visibles demeurent les élites économiques rom qui, en attirant l’attention des médias et du public international, roumain et rom, renforcent les préjugés et stéréotypes négatifs au sujet des Roms qui seraient certes riches, nouveaux riches sans culture et ne faisant preuve d’aucune solidarité envers les Roms pauvres. Cette nouvelle vitrine rom dessert en défi nitive la cause rom et suscite jalousies chez les uns et soumission chez les autres. Un informateur les appelle d’ailleurs les élites en carton. En conclusion, pour Neculau & alii, la voie royale pour que les Roms fassent désormais partie des élites nationales, à savoir des élites utiles à la Nation qui faciliteraient à long terme l’intégration sociale de l’ensemble des Roms, c’est l’accès aux études supérieures.

RELIGION, ETHNICITÉ, CONVERSIONS ET MISSIONS

Sur un autre registre, peu étudié encore et souvent méconnu ou peu prisé, celui de la conversion religieuse, trois contributions donnent un éclairage nouveau à la

• 13


question des stratégies identitaires rom en Europe de l’Est et du Sud-est. En Bulgarie comme en Roumanie et ailleurs dans la région, le phénomène des conversions rom au pentecôtisme a pris des proportions telles qu’on commence à l’étudier avec plus d’intérêt. Fosztó consacre ainsi une partie de son introduction à faire le point sur les manières d’interpréter les conversions dans les sciences sociales, et plus particulièrement les conversions au pentecôtisme, mouvement qui se distingue par sa tonalité particulièrement charismatique. L’article de Benovska & Altanov présente également un bon survol de la littérature existante dans le domaine de l’étude de la conversion, lequel se développe parallèlement aux conversions elles-mêmes, il faut le souligner, ce qui permet certes de recourir à l’observation participante, mais d’autre part rend le regard éloigné parfois é parfois éplus diffi cile.

Les communautés sur lesquelles Benovska & Altanov ont fait leur enquête en Bulgarie sont urbaines, alors que celles étudiées par Gog sont situées dans la campagne transylvaine. Benovska & Altanov adoptent une perspective historique et transnationale tandis que Gog analyse la situation dans le contexte national et local. Benovska & Altanov ont pratiqué en outre l’observation participante, non sans provoquer quelques perturbations dans la communauté, tant il est vrai qu’il est diffi cilement possible de rester inaperçu dans une communauté néo-protestante. Fosztó a également basé son analyse de la conversion sur une enquête de terrain en Transylvanie roumaine mais il s’attache plus particulièrement aux récits de conversion à travers lesquels il tente de restituer la dynamique psycho-sociale qui y a présidé. Nous bénéfi cions ainsi d’une image contrastée, à la fois large et très circonstanciée (récits et témoignages individuels de pasteurs et de convertis) du phénomène des conversions dans la région. Nous avons eu nous-même l’occasion de mener des entretiens avec des convertis et un pasteur pentecôtiste, lors de récentes missions en Moldova et en Roumanie. Leurs témoignages viennent confi rmer la complexité du phénomène dont il est parfois diffi cile de démêler les aspects, tant les motivations religieuses peuvent se doubler de motivations sociales et identitaires.

La première communauté étudiée par Benovska & Altanov, l’Eglise de Dieu bulgare, a été fondée contrairement à d’autres Eglises plus récentes au début du 20e siècle. Elle connut une époque ultra-rigoriste et conservatrice dans ses pratiques, notamment concernant le renoncement à toute propriété et récolte d’argent, lié au refus de toute innovation, un peu à la manière de mouvements semblables bien connus, comme les Mennonites. De même que durant le régime communiste dans la plus grande partie des pays de l’ancienne Union soviétique, les prêtres, pasteurs (ainsi d’ailleurs que les imams5) de ces communautés religieuses locales souterraines occupaient d’autres emplois, participaient aux travaux collectifs et furent persécutés. Cette pratique de pasteur polyvalent se vérifi e encore parfois aujourd’hui ainsi que nous l’avons constaté pasteur polyvalent se vérifi e encore parfois aujourd’hui ainsi que nous l’avons constaté pasteur polyvalentdans un quartier de Timişoara en Roumanie, où le pasteur était en même temps forgeron. Cependant cette Eglise de Dieu bulgare a noué peu à peu des contacts internationaux et changé radicalement de philosophie, dès la chute du communisme, ce qui n’a pas manqué de provoquer un affl ux de fi dèles : elle a même été jusqu’à envoyer ses propres missionnaires rom en Turquie. L’organisation et la hiérarchie de ces Eglises néo-protestantes sont dictées par le modèle spirituel apostolique qui établit entre ses membres une égalité de type confraternelle. Le clergé ne constitue guère une classe,

14 •

François RUEGG

dans la mesure où chaque Eglise garde une forte indépendance. Toutefois ce sont les dons ou charismes reconnus chez des membres individuels de ces communautés qui les distinguent et leur confèrent un statut particulier. Globalement, ces Eglises ne diffèrent guère de leurs consoeurs situées dans d’autres pays, à l’Est comme à l’Ouest.

Ce qui est nouveau en revanche dans le contexte post-communiste, c’est le type de sociabilité qu’instaurent ces Eglises. Si elles sont toutes fondées certes sur le même é qu’instaurent ces Eglises. Si elles sont toutes fondées certes sur le même émodèle apostolique, il ne faut pas oublier qu’elles ont été également modelées par les traditions démocratiques et puritaines anglo-saxonnes du 19e siècle, centrées à la fois sur l’individu et la communauté des croyants. L’attrait et l’exotisme de ces nouvelles formes de religiosité sont d’autant plus marqués, pour les chercheurs bulgares et roumains aussi bien que pour les convertis, qu’il s’agit là en principe d’une expression de la même religion, le christianisme, mais qui prend des formes radicalement différentes de l’orthodoxie traditionnelle, marquée elle par une présence cléricale forte et des expressions religieuses strictement canalisées par le rite, par défi nition invariable. Dans le pentecôtisme au contraire, comme l’illustre Fosztó dans les exemples présentés, les révélations personnelles, les guérisons miraculeuses, la diffusion des dons et autres manifestations d’une communication directe avec Dieu, c’est l’individu qui est au centre de la manifestation divine. Cette révolution anthropocentrique et individualistede la religiosité correspond évidemment doublement aux aspirations de populations marquées à la fois par un césaro-papisme ésaro-papisme é civil et religieux.

D’une part, d’un point de vue politique, l’Eglise orthodoxe, malgré ses martyrs, n’a pas cessé d’être, offi ciellement au moins, liée d’une manière ou d’une autre au pouvoir durant le régime communiste, ne serait-ce que parce qu’elle était la seule reconnue ou tolérée. Si de nombreux fi dèles ont rejoint l’Eglise orthodoxe en Europe de l’Est après la chute du régime communiste, précisément à cause de la tradition des Eglises nationales qui veut que pour être un bon citoyen, il faut également être un bon orthodoxe, il n’en reste pas moins qu’aux yeux de certains, celle-ci avait perdu sa crédibilité. Par ailleurs, la sociabilité communautaire introduite par le régime socialiste n’est pas complètement étrangère à la sociabilité traditionnelle de l’orthodoxie qui considère les laïcs comme le peuple de Dieu. La hiérarchie sociale contestée par le communisme est remplacée par une hiérarchie d’appartenance idéologique de type exclusif, au sein du parti. Ainsi les Roms, selon les recherches menées en Roumanie du moins (Gog), sont-ils ségrégés, dans l’Eglise nationale orthodoxe, à l’église et au cimetière, comme ils le sont à l’école et dans les villages.

D’autre part, du point de vue religieux, l’Eglise orthodoxe, dans la tradition byzantine, se situe dans un contexte clairement clérical et hiérarchique traditionnel, un système pyramidal où chaque catégorie occupe sa place, répondant au principe de complémentarité ou de subsidiarité, mais certainement pas d’égalité ou de permutabilité. Le service du culte est exercé par des clercs et les notions de participation ou de démocratisation, voire d’égalité des sexes lui sont complètement étrangères. La modernité avec ses idéaux de démocratie et de participation n’y trouve donc pas son compte.

Dans ces conditions, et en se référant à la littérature classique concernant l’émergence simultanée du protestantisme et de la modernité, on comprendra l’attrait que représente le protestantisme pour les personnes avides de modernisation de la religion et du

• 15


pentecôtisme, en particulier pour celles qui souhaitent être reconnues en tant qu’objet personnel de la manifestation divine.

Il est un autre trait à souligner du point de vue des stratégies d’émancipation sociales, et c’est l’irruption de la mission et par conséquent de la mobilité des pasteurs indigènes, bulgares et rom dans le contexte de la mobilité internationale ou de la mondialisation comme l’indiquent Benovska & Altanov. Ce qui nous a semblé recouper d’autres stratégies de mobilité ou d’élévation sociale par la mission, celles-ci ayant été pratiquées depuis le 16e siècle au moins dans les « pays du nord » colonisateurs, et plus récemment dans les pays d’émigration, Suisse, Irlande, Italie mais aussi France par exemple, avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, comme en témoignent de nombreux récits, romans et fi lms6.

Gog commence, pour sa part, par retracer les changements intervenus dans les affi liations religieuses de la société post communiste en Roumanie. Il nous rappelle la situation spécifi que de ce pays demeuré rural et où par conséquent, malgré les campagnes d’athéisation, la population est demeurée largement affi liée aux Eglises chrétiennes traditionnelles, majoritairement orthodoxes. Parmi les changements survenus après la chute du régime communiste, il relève une plus forte mobilité chez les Roms et chez é chez les Roms et chez éles Roms de la campagne qui se sont convertis pour la plupart au pentecôtisme, ayant abandonné soit l’Eglise orthodoxe, soit l’Eglise protestante. Phénomène nouveau, le pentecôtisme a créé des Eglises rom qui n’existaient pas comme telles sous le communisme et qui regroupent un dixième de la population rom aujourd’hui. Nous sommes loin, avec le cas de ces conversions des Roms ruraux au pentecôtisme, des conversions forcées faisant partie de l’arsenal de l’assimilation, notamment du temps des Empires. Au contraire, Gog nous fait voir comment ces communautés, fondées à la fois sur une commune appartenance identitaire (ethnique) et éthique (puritaine), permettent aux Roms de se créer un espace identitaire propre et une nouvelle image de soi. Tandis qu’ils étaient et sont encore discriminés ou rejetés par la population majoritaire ethniquement roumaine ou hongroise et religieusement orthodoxe ou réformée de manière perceptible dans l’espace villageois, leur quartier étant clairement séparé et situé à la périphérie, et même dans les cimetières où ils sont enterrés dans des carrés distincts, la création de ces espaces nouveaux, ethniquement homogènes certes mais fondés sur l’idée d’une nouvelle identité, celle que leur donne leur appartenance pentecôtiste de né à nouveau (born again(born again( )born again)born again semble leur permettre d’échapper à la ségrégation des autres. La question de l’appartenance confessionnelle, on le voit, n’est pas, tant s’en faut, seulement religieuse mais bien sociale. Ce que les Roms demandent aussi à la religion, c’est un espace de sociabilité qui leur est refusé par les institutions existantes. Toutefois ils peuvent très bien recourir tout de même aux Eglises traditionnelles lorsque leurs coutumes religieuses l’exigent, une religiosité fondée sur la sacralité coutumière, notamment la sacralité des serments (Gog). Il conviendrait à ce sujet de poursuivre des recherches sur les syncrétismes opérés par les Roms, soit dans un contexte chrétien, soit dans un contexte musulman dans les provinces roumaines et bulgares qui comptent encore des minoritésésé turques.

A côté de cet aspect sociologique de la conversion et de la progressive communautarisation des Eglises pentecôtistes rom, il faut voir ce que la nouvelle religion induit du point de vue certes, religieux, mais également et surtout du point de vue de

16 •

François RUEGG

l’éthique personnelle, point qui sera développé davantage par Fosztó. Cela est bien connu dans d’autres contextes historiques et culturels, à savoir d’abord ceux qui ont vu naître la Réforme. Ce que le protestantisme lui-même induit, c’est la personnalisation et la modernisation de la religion. Ce que la naissance des mouvements néo-protestants signale, avec le même décalage en Roumanie que dans d’autres périphéries européennes, c’est la modernisation de la conception de la religion, une religion à la fois individuelle par la lecture de la Bible, et collective par la création d’une communauté de foi quasi démocratique qui peut ignorer en son sein les différences ethniques et sociales. La lecture de la Bible et la solidarité confessionnelle ont depuis longtemps permis aux classes les plus défavorisées d’avoir accès à l’éducation c’est-à-dire aux études et ensuite à des positions sociales élitaires. Cela n’est nullement le privilège du protestantisme : c’est une des voies classiques de l’ascension sociale, témoins en sont les nombreux personnages illustres qui l’ont reconnu. On pense ici entre autre à Stoliaroff7personnages illustres qui l’ont reconnu. On pense ici entre autre à Stoliaroff7personnages illustres qui l’ont reconnu. On pense ici entre autre à Stoliaroff qui, ayant appris à lire avec le pope de son village, pourra étudier l’agronomie en ville et occuper une position importante dans l’administration. Sorin Gog nous fournit ici une preuve encore des effets secondaires de l’éthique protestante.

Or il se trouve que même au sein des Eglises pentecôtistes roumaines, les Roms se trouvent ségrégés : ce serait une des raisons principales pour lesquelles les Roms ont fondé d’emblée leurs propres Eglises pentecôtistes. La situation, on s’en souvient, n’est pas la même en Bulgarie, mais tendrait à le devenir, selon Benovska & Altanov, sous la pression du communautarisme dont il resterait à voir de plus près s’il est lié aux projets de constituer une minorité rom transnationale, induit par des activistes et des politiques au niveau international ou s’il refl ète une simple volonté d’autonomie. Il est donc extrêmement intéressant de constater la progression de l’homogénéisation ethnique au sein des communautés religieuses pentecôtistes, immédiate dans le cas des Roms Roumains et tardive dans le cas des Eglises rom bulgares. Dans le cas des Eglises bulgares mixtes, telles qu’elles l’étaient jusque dans les années 2000, l’ethnicisationa également fait son apparition, c’est-à-dire que les Roms ont peu à peu créé leurs propres Eglises pentecôtistes rom.

Les stratégies identitaires civiles et religieuses semblent suivre ainsi un mouvement contradictoire, si l’on tient compte des élites qui tendent, au moins dans un premier temps, à abandonner leur identité ethnique pour se fondre dans l’identité de classe (élite), quitte à revendiquer plus tard, comme c’est le cas des minorités en général, leur origine dans un deuxième temps ou à quelques générations de distance, une fois leur assise sociale reconnue.

Pour pouvoir replacer la question Rom dans un contexte plus large et théorique, nous avons demandé à C. Giordano d’analyser le processus de construction d’une nouvelle minorité rom telle que nous la voyons s’opérer par les ingénieurs sociaux rom et non rom au niveau national et international.

Après avoir rétabli l’histoire des termes d’ethnos et d’ethnogenèse dans leur contexte germanique et soviétique respectivement, Giordano établit une distinction claire entre la théorie dynamique de l’ethnogenèse émise par son fondateur, Širokogorov, et celle, statique et essentialiste, de ses émules et successeurs, empêtrés dans des problèmes politiques insolubles. Il relève ensuite comment les concepts d’ethnicisation et ethnogenèse sont différemment connotés, le premier négativement dans la mesure où

• 17


la manipulation ethnique y est perceptible, le second positivement, dans la mesure où l’on peut considérer comme plus noble de créer un écrin pour le joyau national que d’utiliser la notion d’ethnie à des fi ns politiques pas toujours avouables.

Si nous pouvons revendiquer quelque mérite dans la publication de ce volume, ce sera seulement d’avoir essayé de montrer la complexité de la question rom, qui ne saurait se résumer à des théories réductrices de type socio-économique (pauvreté, exclusion), politique (discrimination/minorité) ou culturel (ethnique) ou encore religieux (mondialisation des mouvements néo-protestants). Qui plus est, il n’existe pas à notre sens de question rom, mais bien d’un côté des discours globalisants et réducteurs qui se positionnent pour ou contre les Roms, comme si ceux-ci constituaient une communauté homogène et statique, un peuple nomade aux pieds nus auquel il faudrait faire un sort, et de l’autre, des attitudes et des stratégies variées parmi lesquelles fi gurent comme on va le lire, la volonté de rejoindre les élites et la modernité, et celle surtout de sortir des catégories et des représentations sclérosées forgées de part et d’autre.

NOTES1 Voir les travaux publiés par la Gesellschaft füGesellschaft füGesellschaft f r Antitziganismusforschung.2 Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifi que.3 Voir les volumes d’Ethnobarometer, www.ethnobarometer.orgEthnobarometer, www.ethnobarometer.orgEthnobarometer4 Voir la note précédente.5 Pour l’Asie centrale voir Roy, 1997. La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des

nations. Paris : Seuil.6 Ces mêmes stratégies continuent d’être pratiquées, au sein de l’Eglise catholique

romaine avec toutefois un renversement de la situation missionnaire, les anciens pays de mission et de colonisation envoyant aujourd’hui leurs recrues en Europe de l’Ouest pour compenser le « manque de vocations ».

7 Voir : Stoliaroff Ivan, 1996. Un village russe : récit d’un paysan de la région de Voronej égion de Voronej é1880-1906. Paris : Pocket.

• 19

Qui sont les Roms ? Depuis quelques années, cette question se fait de plus en plus insistante et différents acteurs, du côté rom comme du côté non-rom, se sont appliqués à essayer de donner des réponses. En Europe centrale et orientale, ceux que l’on appelle traditionnellement Tsiganes ont été considérés pendant longtemps comme un groupe différent et étrange, duquel il fallait se méfi er. Au mieux, il fallait les assimiler à la population majoritaire ; au pire, les expulser. Ces trente dernières années, lorsque l’appellation rom rom r a commencé à s’imposer au niveau international, les Roms/Tsiganes sont devenus un enjeu clé pour l’intégration de ces pays dans l’Union Européenne. La situation des minorités dans les pays aspirants à l’UE devait être réglée pour pouvoir en devenir membre. Dès lors, des acteurs politiques, tant locaux qu’internationaux, commencent de plus en plus à s’occuper de la « question » ou du « problème » rom.

A l’heure de l’uniformisation où l’Europe cherche à effacer ses frontières et à se donner une identité commune, nous voyons surgir un groupe qui réclame son droit à une identité spécifi que, source d’une appartenance ethnique et au nom de laquelle ils revendiquent certains droits et certaines prérogatives (des politiques ciblées, des fonds spécifi ques, une reconnaissance de nation sans territoire, etc.). Ainsi, nous sommes témoins du développement d’une élite, constituée des Roms qui ont saisi l’enjeu conjoncturel que constitue le fait d’être la minorité la plus importante en Europe aujourd’hui et qui cherchent à donner aux Roms une identité clairement défi nie, dans laquelle tous les groupes rom pourraient se reconnaître.

Les leaders visent à ce que l’identité rom soit une entité concrète dont on pourrait relever les caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. Il s’agit donc d’une réifi cation de l’identité. Or, lorsqu’on essaye de trouver ces caractéristiques communes, on comprend qu’elles sont pour le moins diffuses. En effet, qu’est-ce qui compose « l’identité rom » ?

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

LE JEU DES IDENTITÉS ROM

Dynamisme et rigidité

20 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

Il n’y a pas une identité, mais des possibilités d’identité, donc des identités possibles. Il existe une telle diversité de Roms qu’il est diffi cile de donner une défi nition certaine de ce qu’un « Rom » est. Autrement dit, il n’est pas évident de réunir les composantes parfois contradictoires d’une identité rom. Il y a des groupes nomades et des groupes sédentaires, il y a ceux qui parlent un dialecte de langue romani et ceux qui n’en parlent aucun, il y a ceux qui suivent les traditions rom et ceux qui ne la suivent pas. Ils ne partagent ni une même religion ni un même pays de résidence. Il existe des éléments qui pour certains sont spécifi quement rom et pour d’autres sont complètement gadjo (non-rom). Chaque groupe et chaque famille garde une hiérarchie de valeurs différentes. Pour certains, il vaut mieux être intégré dans le pays où ils habitent ; pour d’autres, il est plus important de garder les traditions.

Cet article se focalisera sur les mouvements et réponses identitaires chez les Roms/Tsiganes dans certains pays d’Europe centrale et orientale.

NOTRE RECHERCHE

Le présent article se base sur les résultats d’une recherche socio-anthropologique organisée par Ethnobarometer, un réseau international de chercheurs indépendants et d’experts, menée en Bulgarie en 2002, dans la République de Macédoine en 20031, et en Roumanie et en République de Moldavie en 2006, dans ces deux derniers pays conjointement avec un projet fi nancé par le Fonds national suisse pour la recherche scientifi que2.

La méthodologie qualitative de notre recherche constitue une nouvelle approche de la « question rom ». Notre objectif n’était pas de recueillir des chiffres, ce qui est déjà fait par plusieurs études consacrées aux Roms3, mais plutôt les idées et les opinions des Roms à travers le dialogue. Nous nous sommes intéressés à leur perception d’eux-mêmes, à leurs expériences et leur présentation identitaire. Pour cette raison, nous ne cherchions pas la Vérité, mais leur vérité, ou bien ce qu’ils voulaient transmettre dans le jeu des identités toujours compliqué. Afi n de connaître leurs histoires de vie et leur présentation de soi, un nombre d’entretiens ont été menés dans chaque pays par des chercheurs locaux (anthropologues, sociologues, et psychologues sociaux) avec des personnes ayant une origine rom, qu’ils l’avouent par auto-défi nition, ou qu’elle leur soit accordée par hétéro-défi nition.

Nous n’avons pas voulu nous confi ner au Rom stéréotypé, pauvre, vivant dans les marges de la société et sans ressources, mais nous avons souhaité au contraire disposer d’une ample gamme de portraits. Nos entretiens couvrent donc un vaste éventail d’informateurs, tant hommes que femmes, vivant en campagne et dans les villes, de différents âges et niveaux sociaux, de différente affi liation religieuse, du Rom sans éducation au Rom ayant fait des études universitaires, du Rom sans engagement jusqu’au Rom politiquement engagé.

Cette diversité nous a permis de disposer d’un matériau riche et varié pour chaque pays, ainsi que la possibilité de comparer et analyser les situations entre les pays. Cette diversité révèle également les nombreuses catégories sociales et les identités multiples observables dans les différentes communautés rom.

Les problèmes des Roms dans les pays post-communistes sont similaires sous plusieurs aspects. Malgré les caractéristiques propres à chaque pays, les Roms

• 21

Le jeu des identités rom

présentent dans l’ensemble un grand nombre des similitudes quant à leur situation et à leurs stratégies identitaires. Lorsqu’on parle de « situation », il ne faut pas supposer que nous faisons référence à leur pauvreté et discrimination au sein de leur pays, mais bien à la multitude des situations socio-économiques dans lesquelles les Roms sont insérés. Ils ne se trouvent pas uniquement tout au bas de l’échelle sociale, mais nous les trouvons dans presque tous les échelons, des plus pauvres jusqu’aux plus riches, sans éducation ou avec des études universitaires. Les Roms occupent des positions sociales très diverses, liées à leurs activités d’artisans, de commerçants, d’ouvriers, mais aussi de fonctionnaires, de patrons d’entreprises, d’artistes ou d’intellectuels.

Néanmoins, ils sont nombreux, dans les différents pays, ceux qui partagent un certain nombre de caractéristiques sociales : le manque d’emploi, le logement précaire, l’accès restreint aux ressources et aux soins, etc. Ils partagent également le fait que, historiquement, ce sont des groupes qui ont vécu dans les marges de la société depuis le Moyen Age.

LES ROMS ET LES TSIGANES

Dans les questions touchant l’identité ethnique, beaucoup de discussions tournèrent autour de l’auto-identifi cation et de l’hétéro-identifi cation. Après Fredrik Barth (1969), plusieurs auteurs ont observé et analysé comment l’identité ethnique est infl uencée des deux côtés de la frontière4. L’identité ethnique ne se développe donc pas exclusivement au niveau de l’identifi cation personnelle, mais elle est également assignée de l’extérieur. Sa construction est le résultat de la négociation permanente entre les représentations individuelles et celles de la société environnante.

Jusqu’au début des années 1990, l’appellation « rom » était très peu connue dans la partie occidentale de l’Europe, mais on connaissait l’existence des « Tsiganes ». Or, suite aux changements géopolitiques de 1989, le nom de « rom », considéré comme l’auto-appellation de ceux qui sont perçus de l’extérieur comme Tsiganes, est devenu le terme « politiquement correct » et est celui revendiqué par les promoteurs d’une identité commune. Pourtant, tous ceux qui de l’extérieur sont appelés Tsiganes, ne se reconnaissent pas sous l’appellation Rom.

Plusieurs groupes, amalgamés avec les groupes rom depuis l’extérieur, comme les Sinti, les Béas, les Ashkali, les Kalé, les Travellers, défendent leur spécifi cité propre et leur différence5. Il n’est pas rare que lors des réunions offi cielles, les membres des différents groupes rom et groupes apparentés s’efforcent à souligner leurs différences, se focalisent sur ce qui les sépare au lieu de ce qui les rapproche. Pour les leaders de chacun de ces groupes, l’enjeu identitaire est lié à un enjeu politique et d’allocation des ressources.

Les différents éléments qui composent l’identité nous permettent de marquer une limite entre Nous et Eux. Dans leurs discours, il apparaît presque toujours cette volonté de distinguer Nous de Eux. De prime abord, on pourrait penser que Eux sont les Gadje, les non-Roms, mais ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Eux sont une multitude d’Autres, le plus souvent les autres Roms. Ce sont toujours les Autres Roms qui méritent tous les stéréotypes négatifs et les préjugés, ce sont les autres qui sont sales, qui sont agressifs, qui sont des voleurs, qui ne veulent pas travailler, qui salissent le nom de toute la communauté rom. On a affaire à toutes les catégories de contrastes : les Roms

22 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

modernes en opposition aux Roms traditionnels, les Roms pauvres en contraste avec les Roms riches, les Roms convertis en contraste avec les Roms orthodoxes, les Roms qui ne sont pas engagés en contraste avec les Roms engagés dans des partis politiques ou des ONGs.

Nous avons remarqué dans les entretiens, en particulier en Bulgarie et en Roumanie, que lorsqu’on parle de Nous et d’Eux il y a des jugements de valeur, des stéréotypes, du mépris. Par exemple : « Ce sont Eux, qui ne sont pas propres, Eux, qui n’étudient pas, Eux, qui ne sont pas intelligents ».

Nous avons aussi remarqué que souvent Nous sommes Roms, mais Eux, ils sont Tsiganes. Ou inversement, nous sommes Tsiganes et Eux ils sont Roms. Pour les Roms pauvres et sans éducation, ils se désignent souvent comme Tsiganes, tandis que Rom est le nom réservé à ceux qui ont une meilleure position sociale, qui sont plus riches ou ont une éducation. Du côté des Roms éduqués et qui ont atteint un certain niveau social, parfois ils appellent Tsiganes ceux qui sont au plus bas de l’échelle sociale et qui n’ont pas d’éducation.

En conclusion, il apparaît clairement que les deux noms semblent avoir une dimension symbolique différente. Les identités associées à chacun des noms semblent être différentes. Tsigane est le nom donné de l’extérieur et qui est considéré comme être péjoratif. Rom est par contre le nom politiquement correct et c’est le nom associé à un projet d’une ethnie commune. Il a donc une connotation plutôt positive.

DES RÉPONSES IDENTITAIRES AU PROCESSUS D’ETHNICISATION6

Malgré l’hétérogénéité des groupes, des intérêts et d’appartenances, l’ethnicisation promulguée par les leaders rom se base sur la fermeture d’un groupe englobant les « Nous Roms ». Des activistes rom ambitionnent de développer une solidarité ethnique qui puisse exprimer que tous les Roms et les groupes apparentés forment un seul et même peuple, qui partage des éléments culturels et des problèmes communs résultant des injustices, de la discrimination et de la violence.

A travers ce processus d’ethnicisation, les membres de l’élite rom aspirent à l’émergence d’une identité ethnique collective partagée afi n d’unifi er et mobiliser les Roms pour une lutte commune à des fi ns politiques. Ce que l’on poursuit à travers ce processus d’ethnicisation est une mobilisation ethnique, laquelle peut être considérée comme une politisation de l’identité ethnique (Barany, 2002 : 70). L’ethnicisation à but politique est avérée quand la composante ethnique domine les discours, les charge émotionnellement et est instrumentalisée dans les négociations sociales et politiques.

La diffi culté majeure pour accomplir cette unité est l’énorme disparité des groupes qui sont censés la constituer. L’identifi cation basée sur le groupe d’appartenance, les clans, les relations entre les familles est encore aujourd’hui source d’une forte fragmentation et animosité parmi les différents groupes qui composent les communautés rom.

Précisément, il convient d’introduire ici une distinction entre des communautésésé , au pluriel, comprises comme populations, groupes locaux ou minorités, et une communauté, au singulier, en tant que modèle conceptuel, voire idéaltype. Cette idée de communautéau singulier, unie et homogène, est celle recherchée par l’élite rom à travers le processus d’ethnicisation.

• 23


Avec le mouvement d’ethnicisation favorisé par les membres des élites, les Roms non-engagés, qu’ils appartiennent à un groupe rom ou à un groupe apparenté, peuvent se voir assigner à nouveau une appartenance identitaire venue de l’extérieur. La réponse des Roms non engagés à ce mouvement d’ethnicisation est en grande partie constituée par un rejet, exprimé par une méfi ance ou une recherche identitaire personnelle, ou bien par l’indifférence.

Face au processus d’ethnicisation, je relèverai donc quatre réponses possibles :

L’émergence de deux classes : Roms et Tsiganes

Certains individus rejettent ce qui est ressenti comme une nouvelle imposition. Ils ont toujours été « Tsiganes » et dorénavant ils doivent être « Roms ». Or, ils ne veulent plus se voir assigner une identité, soit stigmatisée de l’extérieur comme celle de « tsigane » ou valorisée de l’intérieur comme celle présentée sous l’appellation « rom ».

Comme mentionné précédemment, aux yeux des « Tsiganes » pauvres (permettez-moi d’utiliser ce raccourci) et qui ont peu d’éducation, le nom « rom » est réservé pour ceux qui possèdent un certain niveau d’éducation et a une forte connotation politique. Ils ne veulent pas être désignés par ce nom, auquel ils ne s’identifi ent pas. Ils estiment qu’ils n’appartiennent pas à la même catégorie que les autres, ceux qu’ils considèrent engagés, éduqués, plus aisés économiquement.

Malgré le fait que « Tsigane » a été historiquement un terme péjoratif donné de l’extérieur, certaines personnes se le sont approprié, en le valorisant. Le défendre est encore une manière d’opposer une résistance à ce qui peut être ressenti comme imposé de l’extérieur. « J’ai toujours été Tsigane. Pourquoi devrais-je être Rom maintenant ? ».

L’adoption d’une identité religieuse

Le rejet peut également être exprimé par une recherche personnelle d’identité. Il s’agit d’une recherche identitaire résultant d’un rejet d’une identité ressentie comme assignée de l’extérieur. Certains membres répondent ainsi d’une part aux stéréotypes négatifs de Tsiganes : « je ne suis pas celui que vous croyez que je suis » ; et d’autre part, à la volonté de rassemblement de tous les Roms/Tsiganes : « je ne suis pas celui que vous voulez que je sois ». Par contre, ils veulent chercher par eux-mêmes une identité qui leur convienne.

De manière générale, comme le rappelle De Vos (2006 : 7) la conversion religieuse peut être un moyen d’abandonner son identité ethnique par l’adoption d’une vision du monde transcendantale, ou bien peut être utilisée pour maintenir une identité séparée. Bien qu’elles existent depuis longtemps, ces dix dernières années, les conversions au Pentecôtisme ont considérablement augmenté parmi les membres des communautés rom. Nous nous sommes donc intéressés à cette dimension dans notre recherche en Roumanie pour analyser les liens entre ces conversions et les processus identitaires7. Contrairement à l’interprétation répandue selon laquelle la conversion religieuse serait liée à l’obtention de bénéfi ces matériels ou autres avantages fi nanciers, nous nous sommes aperçus qu’elle a une forte infl uence sur la construction identitaire et sociale des convertis. Les « avantages » (si l’on peut en parler ainsi) ne sont pas matériels mais symboliques.

24 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

Ces conversions volontaires ne sont pas ressenties comme imposées de l’extérieur, et suivent un mouvement de boule de neige : cela commence par un membre de la famille qui se converti et les autres le suivent progressivement. Après plusieurs années de conversions, il est rare qu’un membre de la famille reste en dehors.

Les personnes qui se convertissent ont la conviction d’avoir choisi cette voie, qui généralement suit, en plus d’un effet de diffusion parmi la famille et les connaissances, une expérience mystique. Il s’agit pour eux d’une décision personnelle qui ne se limite pas au moment où ils entrent dans cette nouvelle Eglise et au moment du baptême, mais qui est une décision quotidienne car ils doivent suivre jour après jour des règles de comportement très strictes liées à une morale puritaine. La conversion implique un dévouement total, dans tous les aspects de la vie quotidienne. Toutes les actions font référence à la Bible qui impose des règles de conduite fort distinctes de celles que nous donne l’image, vraie ou fausse, de la vie des Tsiganes (ne pas boire, ne pas faire la fête, ne pas dépenser tout son argent, ne pas être violent, etc.). La nouvelle religion induit l’acceptation de normes sociales, tant morales que légales. Grâce à la religion, les Roms pentecôtistes ont commencé à respecter les lois et les autorités nationales, puisque ces comportements découlent d’un ordre biblique. De la sorte, les Tsiganes/Roms convertis offrent à la majorité une autre image, valorisante et fi able. Ils deviennent « respectables ».

En résumé, en réponse à ce processus visant à englober les « Nous Roms », nous pouvons trouver notamment deux formes de rejet : le rejet d’être Rom qui peut parfois conduire à une valorisation d’être Tsigane ; ou le refus d’être Rom et Tsigane, mais quelqu’un d’autre, choisi par l’acteur lui-même. Il se peut également qu’il n’y ait pas de rejet d’une identité rom ou tsigane, mais que cette catégorie ethnique ne soit pas estimée la plus pertinente pour l’identité. Pour plusieurs Roms convertis, l’identifi cation religieuse est plus importante que l’ethnique. La preuve en est que les mariages avec des non-Roms sont souvent acceptés, tandis que les mariages avec des personnes d’une autre affi liation religieuse restent interdits.

Ethnocentrisme et communautarisme tsigane

Nombreux individus rom/tsiganes manifestent une méfi ance envers tout ce qui est ressenti comme « externe », comme autorité ou pouvoir. Il existe une méfi ance publique parmi certains Roms. Ce qui appartient à la sphère publique est souvent perçu comme suspect, incertain, douteux, voire ennemi. La confi ance se développe presque exclusivement dans le cadre restreint de la sphère privée et à l’intérieur des réseaux de connaissances : tout d’abord dans la famille et la parenté, ensuite avec les amis et connaissances. La plupart des Tsiganes accordent une importance tout à fait particulière aux relations personnalisées. Dès lors, il existe une tendance marquée à faire davantage confi ance à un leader personnalisé, proche ou membre de la communauté, qu’à une autorité institutionnelle, représentée par un activiste rom.

Cette méfi ance n’est pas particulière aux Roms, car c’est une attitude partagée par de nombreux citoyens des pays où ils habitent. Cependant, les Roms la déclarent également à leurs leaders, censés les représenter. Barany (2002 : 204) parmi d’autres, signale l’énorme distance culturelle qui sépare l’intelligentsia rom de la multitude des Tsiganes souvent méfi ants et désintéressés des affaires publiques.

• 25


L’ironie évoquée par Claude Cahn (2003) à propos du recensement de la République Tchèque en 2000 illustre bien cette méfi ance. Le recensement avait été précédé par une campagne des organisations rom pour « faire confi ance au système » et déclarer son appartenance ethnique. Cela, disait-on, était important pour des raisons politiques et de collecte de fonds. A juger par les résultats (22.000 personnes de moins que dans le recensement de 1990 ont déclaré publiquement être Roms), les Roms Tchèques n’ont pas suivi ce conseil. Au lieu d’un vote de confi ance et de soutien, le recensement constituait une méfi ance et un rejet retentissant envers les organisations rom et les leaders politiques.

Malgré les efforts des leaders rom pour mobiliser les Tsiganes et valoriser le fait d’appartenir à une culture riche et variée, leur faire comprendre les effets positifs de reconnaître leur appartenance ethnique, ils n’ont pas réussi jusqu’à maintenant à obtenir l’adhésion espérée. Beaucoup d’entre eux se méfi ent jusqu’au nom « rom » et critiquent les leaders politiques rom d’être corrompus et de profi ter des projets ayant pour but l’amélioration de la situation des Tsiganes.

Indiff érence à l’ethnicité

Une autre réponse au processus d’ethnicisation est l’indifférence. La majorité des Tsiganes a d’abord d’autres problèmes beaucoup plus urgents à résoudre comme l’accès à la nourriture, à la santé et au marché de travail. Si elle ne résout pas les problèmes quotidiens, les manques et les absences, la question identitaire n’est pas primordiale. Pour certains, l’identité ethnique n’est pas d’une importance particulière.

Pour d’autres, cette indifférence leur permet encore de se distancer des stéréotypes négatifs qui sont collés à l’étiquette rom/tsigane. Ils ne s’identifi ent ni comme Rom ni comme Tsigane, mais comme individu, comme homme ou femme, comme époux ou père, par leur métier, leur citoyenneté ou leur religion. Ils mettront en avant l’une ou l’autre identité, voire celle de rom ou tsigane, en fonction du contexte ou des enjeux. Cela constitue un exemple montrant que l’identité est situationnelle et n’est pas toujours associée au premier plan avec l’ethnicité. L’ethnicité est une partie de l’identité totale, mais pas forcément l’élément central. Les catégories identitaires ne sont pas fi xes, elles peuvent se déplacer d’une dimension telle que l’ethnicité à une autre telle que la religion, le niveau social ou l’appartenance à un groupe déterminé d’âge ou de sexe.

QUELQUES CONSÉQUENCES POSSIBLES DU PROCESSUS D’ETHNICISATION

Une conséquence contraire aux expectatives des leaders rom est que le processus pour renforcer une conscience ethnique, au lieu de rassembler, a creusé encore plus le « fossé de civilisation » entre les Roms avec éducation et ressources et ceux sans éducation ni ressources.

De plus, cette ethnicisation peut même provoquer plus de problèmes qu’elle n’en résout. Elle peut par exemple intensifi er des stéréotypes négatifs et des préjugés sur les Roms, les enfermer plus encore dans leur groupe, ce qui facilite le mécanisme de bouc émissaire. Par conséquence, l’ethnicisation peut favoriser le processus d’exclusion. Elle peut en outre attiser les ferveurs nationalistes, avec les conséquences que l’on connaît.

26 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

On devrait également tenir compte des réseaux de solidarité qui se forment ou se détruisent comme conséquence de ce processus d’ethnicisation. D’un côté, grâce aux nouvelles ONG rom, un nouveau tissu se forme pour défendre certains droits, mais en même temps, le développement de certaines pratiques ou organisations peut affaiblir les réseaux d’entraide communautaire et locale.

Finalement, les problèmes sociaux et économiques ne devraient pas devenir des problèmes ethniques. Les solutions doivent s’adresser aux Roms mais également aux autres secteurs ou minorités défavorisées notamment, sans s’appuyer sur l’appartenance ethnique.

LES REPRÉSENTATIONS AMBIGUËS

Les Roms, criminels et privilégiés

En plus des managers identitaires rom qui présentent une image positive et valorisante de l’identité rom qui contraste avec les stéréotypes courants, les Tsiganes/Roms doivent encore faire face à une représentation ambiguë de la population majoritaire dans les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale. En effet, pour les non-Roms l’image du Rom oscille entre deux représentations : leur image des « dangereux » apparaît à coté de celle des « privilégiés ». D’un côté, le « Rom criminel », le « Rom désocialisé » qui fait peur à la majorité, tant pour les affaires nationales qu’internationales. D’un autre côté, l’image des privilégiés, car les Roms seraient ceux qui « exploitent » leur pauvreté, qui profi teraient des aides sociales, des moyens fi nanciers de l’étranger, etc.

A l’intérieur, on craint la supposée criminalité des Roms et également que la mobilité des Roms ne crée des répercussions pour les co-nationaux, lesquels se verraient fermer les frontières à cause des incivilités et des abus supposés être perpétrés par les Roms. Par conséquent, le Rom est souvent représenté comme le visage déshonorant de son pays d’origine.

Nous en sommes témoins encore aujourd’hui suite à l’affaire italienne d’automne 2007 qui a déstabilisé tous les Roumains pour un crime commis par un Rom roumain. D’une part, cette affaire a déclenché une visibilité accrue des Roms dans plusieurs pays d’Europe occidentale : huit mois après ils font encore la une des journaux en Suisse (cf. La Liberté du 19.6.2008) et d’autre part, des mesures restrictives d’accueil et de é du 19.6.2008) et d’autre part, des mesures restrictives d’accueil et de émobilité pour tous les Roumains.

Les discours reprenant ce rapport de majorité nationale vertueuse vs. une minorité ethnique criminelle et profi teuse sont par ailleurs ceux que l’on trouve chez les membres des partis européens d’extrême droite entre la majorité nationale et les « étrangers », mot utilisé comme raccourci pour désigner les personnes qui sont arrivées au pays par voie de migration, qui seraient par défi nition des « criminels » et des « profi teurs ».

La mobilité valorisée et le nomadisme dénigré

Nous vivons une période caractérisée par une grande mobilité des hommes et des informations. De tout temps, la quête de meilleures ressources a incité au déplacement. Cependant, notre époque semble reposer sur une valorisation suprême de la mobilité, notamment géographique, censée à la fois assurer l’adaptation à un marché du travail fl exible et le développement personnel.

• 27


Les représentations collectives sont néanmoins constituées par deux images contrastées de la mobilité :

– d’une part, la mobilité est devenue une valeur européenne, englobant les qualités de fl exibilité, de multiculturalisme, de démocratie et de tolérance. Cependant, cette image positive de la mobilité est limitée pour une élite de citoyens européens engagés dans des activités prestigieuses, ayant un statut social élevé et exerçant une activité économique bien rémunérée. Elle se réfère à des cadres supérieurs, des diplomates, des fonctionnaires internationaux. Elle s’appuie sur le changement, la capacité à se mettre en mouvement et à s’adapter à des environnements divers.

– d’autre part, la mobilité des nomades et des migrants avec moins de ressources est toujours connotée négativement, les considérant comme profi teurs, malfaiteurs et vagabonds. Le terme migration a une connotation plus négative que celui de mobilité et s’associerait davantage à l’image traditionnelle et simpliste de l’immigré en situation précaire.

Pour tous les groupes rom en déplacement, cette connotation péjorative de la migration intensifi e encore plus leur exclusion et leur marginalisation. La mobilité des Roms est alors largement considérée comme un « problème ». La complexité de ce sujet dépasse le cadre de cet article, notamment parce qu’aux communautés rom traditionnellement nomades, qui se déplacent sans se fi xer sur un territoire, s’ajoute aujourd’hui le Rom migrant en quête de nouvelles opportunités.

Ce qui nous intéresse par contre est que le développement du processus d’ethnicisation ne ferait que renforcer ce type d’images et de stéréotypes du migrant, à cause de l’amalgame souvent fait entre un statut social ou un comportement et une appartenance ethnique. L’image du Rom se verrait ainsi liée à celle de migrant pauvre et le plus souvent criminel. Elle deviendrait également une menace pour l’identité nationale de son pays d’origine et un frein pour la mobilité de ses co-nationaux.

CONCLUSION

Les identités rom se trouvent actuellement dans un processus impliquant deux mouvements. D’un côté, au travers de l’ethnicisation, ou selon eux l’ethnogènese, les leaders rom cherchent l’essentialisation, c’est-à-dire enfermer les membres dans des catégories identitaires fi gées et rigides. De l’autre, les identités individuelles rom s’adaptent aux mouvements actuels et aux circonstances nouvelles. C’est une identité fl uide et situationnelle. Ayant vécu historiquement dans des pays qui ne les ont pas toujours considérés comme citoyens à part entière, les Roms se sont créés une identité en mouvement. Cette fl exibilité n’a pas empêché certains groupes de maintenir leur culture et certaines spécifi cités qui les sont propres.

Au travers des siècles d’exclusion, de marginalisation, de discrimination et parfois d’assimilation forcée, des groupes rom ont gardé une certaine forme de conscience de soi, et surtout de différence vis-à-vis des « autres ». Certains groupes sont restés très fermés, gardant une protection renforcée contre l’infl uence externe et le tabou qu’elle représente ; d’autres se sont plus ou moins intégrés sans pour autant perdre certains éléments de leur mode de vie, leurs valeurs, leur culture, leur langue et leurs traditions.

28 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

L’héritage culturel s’est transmis oralement de génération en génération et a survécu jusqu’à nos jours. Ce sont ces éléments que récupèrent aujourd’hui les leaders comme base pour marquer les limites d’une identité rom précise et distincte.

Pourtant, ce que relève notre enquête est que les identités rom sont de nature changeante et adaptative, plutôt que fi xe. L’identité est davantage un facteur de changement qu’une source de stagnation. Les réponses possibles au processus d’ethnicisation des Roms non-engagés que nous avons mentionnées précédemment peuvent donc être comprises comme des réponses pour maintenir des identités négociables plutôt que constituer une identité rigide, qui serait de surcroît ressentie comme imposée de l’extérieur. En outre, ils doivent faire face aux représentations ambiguës de la population majoritaire.

Les leaders rom déploient de nombreuses stratégies censées réunir les différents groupes rom et groupes apparentés afi n de gommer leurs différences et leur donner une identité ethnique claire et commune. Les éléments principaux sont cherchés dans une origine commune et un passé partagé de discrimination encore actuel. Un effort soutenu est destiné à l’homogénéisation de plusieurs dialectes dans une seule langue romani. Faute d’un territoire commun, les managers identitaires rom doivent trouver d’autres éléments pouvant faire la démarcation du groupe.

Pourtant, l’appartenance ethnique ne peut être rapportée à un catalogue de critères objectifs. Le contenu de l’ethnicité est élusif. Finalement, ce qui réellement importe dans la construction d’un groupe ethnique n’est pas tant les défi nitions identitaires qui le composent, que la croyance de ses membres à l’existence réelle du groupe (Weber, 1995 : 130). Et c’est précisément cette croyance dans un groupe homogène qui fait défaut aujourd’hui parmi les communautés rom et ses groupes apparentés.

• 29


BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Banks, Marcus, 1996. Ethnicity : Anthropological constructions. London : Routledge.

Barany, Zoltan, 2002. The East European Gypsies. Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik, ed., 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries : the social organization of culture difference. London : George Allen & Unwin.

Boscoboinik, Andrea, 2006a. Becoming Rom : Ethnic Development among Roma Communities in

Bulgaria and Macedonia, in : Ethnic Identity. Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century. Fourth Edition. Edited by Lola Romanucci-Ross, George de Vos and Takeyuki Tsuda. Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press, 295-310.

2006b. Ethnicization Process among the Roma communities in Bulgaria, in : Interculturalism and Discrimination in Romania. Policies, Practices, Identities and Representations. Edited by François Ruegg, Rudolf Poledna and Calin Rus.Münster : Lit Verlag, 95-103.

Cahn, Claude, 2003. The Unseen Powers : Perception, Stigma and Roma Rights, in : www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2870.

De Vos, George A., 2006. Ethnic Pluralism : Confl ict and Accommodation, in : Ethnic Identity. Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century. Fourth Edition. Edited by Lola Romanucci-Ross, George de Vos and Takeyuki Tsuda. Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press, 1-36.

Giordano, Christian and Andrea Boscoboinik, 2003. Introduction, in : Roma’s Identities in Southeast Europe : Bulgaria. Ethnobarometer. Working Paper No. 8, 14-29.

Guibernau, Montserrat, and John Rex, eds., 1997. The ethnicity reader : Nationalism, multiculturalism, and migration. Cambridge : Polity Press.

Hutchinson, John, and Anthony Smith, eds., 1996. Ethnicity. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Liégeois, Jean-Pierre, 2007. Roma in Europe. Strasbourg : Council of Europe Publishing.

Ringold, Dena, Mitchell A. Orenstein, Erika Wilkens, 2004. Roma in an Expanding Europe – Breaking the Poverty Cycle. World Bank Publisher.

Roma Inclusion Barometer, 2007. Bucharest : Open Society Foundation, in : www.osf.ro

Romanucci-Ross, Lola, George de Vos & Takeyuki Tsuda, eds., 2006. Ethnic Identity. Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century. 4th Edition. Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press.

Weber Max, 1995 [édition originale en allemand 1956]. Economie et société/2. L’organisation et les puissances de la société dans leur rapport avec l’économie. Paris : Plon.

30 •

Andrea BOSCOBOINIK

NOTES1 Les résultats de la recherche dans chaque pays peuvent être consultés sur :

www.ethnobarometer.org.2 “Nomads and Parliamentarians. The infl uence of mobility and religious affi liation on

identity building and on the development of integration social policies. Roma people in Northern, Eastern Romania, and the Republic of Moldova”. (Scopes 2005-2008)

3 Notamment les publications de l’Open Society Foundation ou de la Banque Mondiale. A titre d’exemple : Roma Inclusion Barometer, 2007, OSF ; Dena Ringold, Mitchell Roma Inclusion Barometer, 2007, OSF ; Dena Ringold, Mitchell Roma Inclusion BarometerA. Orenstein, Erika Wilkens, 2004. “Roma in an Expanding Europe – Breaking the Poverty Cycle”, World Bank.

4 La liste bibliographique est longue. Quelques-uns parmi les plus récents : Romanucci-Ross, De Vos, Tsuda 2006 ; Guibernau & Rex 1997 ; Banks 1996 ; Hutchinson & Smith 1996.

5 Ce sont les groupes que l’on nomme offi ciellement « groupes apparentés » ou « related groups » par rapport aux Roms.

6 Pour la distinction entre « ethnicisation » et « ethnogenèse » voir l’article de Christian Giordano dans ce numéro.

7 Sorin Gog et László Fosztó explorent dans ce numéro cette dimension plus en détail.

• 31

SOME BASIC OBSERVATIONS

The social position of Roma in Serbia, as it is in other countries of the region, is extremely unfavorable. The reasons for this state of affairs are numerous and derive, among others, from societal indifference and lack of sensitivity towards the problems Roma have been facing. The problems caused by persistent prejudice and discrimination against Roma are present in many spheres of their social life. It is nevertheless encouraging that the data collected in the research carried out so far show that the degree of ethnic distance towards Roma in Serbia is below the regional average.

The extent to which Roma life is on the margins of social life and of concern to state bodies is illustrated by the fact that data on the size of the Roma population are extremely unreliable. Data on the number of Roma settlements are virtually non-existent; dependable estimates are equally unavailable. According to the offi cial data of the 1991 census, 137,000 people live in FR Yugoslavia, and according to the 2002 census, 109,000 people declare themselves as Roma. Since Roma are a very much dispersed population in spatial terms, there are different estimates on their number. According to estimates within Roma circles, it is believed that between 700,000 and 900,000 Roma live in Serbia, but these fi gures are obviously unrealistic. Estimates offered by researchers and demographers, on the other hand, range between 400,000 and 450,000 Roma. Since Kosovo – now with self-proclaimed independence – is under international protectorate, Roma have become the largest national minority in Serbia/FRY, eventhough they only obtained the offi cial status of national minority in 2002. It is assumed that the recently adopted Law on the Protection of Rights and Liberties of National Minorities has conclusively redressed an old injustice toward Roma.

TWO MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE ROMA IN SERBIA

Employment and Education

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

32 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

A majority of Roma in Serbia are urban. Thus the “place of permanent residence of Roma families” is a town or a city. In Belgrade, for example, over 150 Roma settlements have been registered. In Niš, the number of settlements is smaller, but the concentration of the Roma population is higher. In Serbia, there virtually is no city or town, except for a couple of places in west Serbia, where Roma settlements have not been registered. Living in a mahala, rural, urban, or suburban, is the traditional form of Roma way of life, not only in Serbia. The mahala is often interpreted as the symbol of the spatial segregation of the Roma community. Although a majority of the interviewed Roma families already live in urban, suburban or rural mahalas, mahala can hardly be called their priority option in terms of residence. The results of this study show that the attachment of Roma families to mahala has loosened. “I don’t want my child to live in a mahala, I want him to go to school and live like everybody else”, one family said.

As to the type of settlement Roma live in, the belief is very widespread that it is better for Roma to live in their own mahalas. If they could choose between a mixed community and a Roma mahala, it is believed a majority would opt for a mahala and see their future in living in a mahala. This view seems self-evident to many, including some researchers, because they hold it to be deeply rooted in the traditional Roma lifestyle. As numerous researchers have noted, the mahala and the cserga (the traditional movable tent of nomadic Roma) have not only been the usual places of living for Roma, but also, in the words of Vladimir Stanković, “their authentic ethnic symbols”. He writes that “... mahala-type housing areas are still the dominant form of residence among urban and even rural Roma. These ethnic-urban islands have traditionally been located on the periphery, although in recent times some of them have merged into the central city cores, due to intense urban expansion. The mahalas, however, most often persist as ethnic-urban backwaters, genuine material testimony to a traditionally miserable social existence. Their ‘historical role’ in conserving ethnic compactness and a spontaneous cultivation of the Roma cultural identity has been paid too dearly: by the near total ethnic marginality in all areas of socio-economic and cultural life.”1 The fi ndings of my research, similarly to previous ones, show that a majority of Roma is still ready to pay this high price. It is a challenge for researchers today to explore the actual power of tradition in Roma residential style. True, if they deem it useful, they will take advantage of elements of “ethnic mimicry” and “statistical exodus” from their ethnic community and pretend to accept integration and even assimilation; nevertheless, in the end, they will strive to preserve their integrity and identity – which is completely natural and justifi able in humane terms. Any policy for helping Roma as an extremely deprived social group should take this fact into account.

The stereotypical image of a Roma house or apartment consists of a heap of sooty dishes, bedding on the fl oor, scattered clothes, an old stove burning with merry fl ames, a gang of children, and an occasional mouse popping up from somewhere. Superfi cially speaking, in the past decades this impression was based on some realistic assumptions, but today it is basically fl awed, although most Roma families live in poverty. Everyday life of today’s Roma family in Serbia does not differ much from the everyday of the majority. The question whether this has come as a consequence of the economic advancement of a part of Roma families, especially in the period when Serbia was under

• 33

Two Main Problems of the Roma in Serbia

international sanctions, or of an overall impoverishment of all citizens of Serbia which brought equalization in poverty, has not been investigated and remains open.

Furthermore, Roma are a social group which is the target of various strongly manifested stereotypes. Therefore some research includes the examination of the prevalence of stereotypes, in order to learn more about attitudes towards and views on this socially marginalized ethnic community. Avoidance of contact, manifest or latent social distance is one indicator of the lack of acceptance of an ethnic group. Generally speaking, social distance may grow into open hostility. A negative attitude towards Roma and social distance are factors which must be taken into account with utmost care in exploring the possibilities for Roma integration, as evidence shows that these factors are very unfavourable.

Steady employment is perceived as a desire of the Roma family to improve its status and is put at the forefront of one’s ambitions. Employment is seen by a majority of the interviewed Roma families as the fi rst and foremost precondition for integration. Facing challenges of everyday life and caught in the daily struggle for survival, Roma families therefore consider the problem of employment to be of great importance. Some other Roma families, some experts and representatives of state bodies, put children education in fi rst place. Obviously, it is far easier to enrol a Roma child in a school than to fi nd a decent steady job for an adult Roma citizen.

EMPLOYMENT

The poverty of an overwhelming majority of Roma is a handicap in the formal, institutional economic network as it is in the informal one as well. It is paradoxical, but nevertheless true that they are unemployed because they are poor and unskilled, and they are poor because they are unemployed or work at jobs with the lowest pay. The circle of their poverty is complete. The fact that some families manage to get out of the whirlpool of poverty does not deny its existence. Large dumpsites outside the cities and garbage bins in the cities seem to be the basis of Roma economic activity. The authorities cannot sever this “economic connection”, even if they had the political will to do so: neither can they move Roma far from the dumpsites, nor do the Roma themselves want to go away. Their economic activity is largely in the sphere of black economy, such as petty trading, selling things on the black market and at open-air markets, or still working at toilsome physical jobs for a small daily wage. Some Roma families live simply on humanitarian aid and welfare. Poorly differentiated socio-professional structure is an indicator of a low social position. Roma are the most numerous in those occupations where no skills are needed. A majority of these neighbors of ours, often invisible, put up with very diffi cult living conditions. An insight into their daily struggle with life shows that they have developed this struggle for survival into a lifestyle.

According to the results of my fi eld research from 2002 to 20042 the percentage of unemployed Roma in Serbia is especially dramatic – 68.4%. The cumulative percentage of occasionally employed, those on paid leave and the unemployed is 78.3%. 57% of heads of family are permanently registered at the employment offi ces. To this fi gure we should add 6.9% who occasionally register as unemployed at the employment bureaus. What are the reasons for calling this data very dramatic? Simply put, unemployment

34 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

refers to heads of family who are, as a rule, the most vital members of the family and the ones most responsible for the life of others.

To evaluate living conditions of Roma families, it is not enough to look at the (lack of) infrastructure in the settlement or the (lack of) equipment in the households. The working status of the head of family also plays a prominent role. An insight into the basic data obtained in this study leaves a bleak picture of the daily life of the Roma family, as a struggle for survival.3 As an example, 18.6% of the heads of families and 2% of Roma women only hold a steady job. If we also keep in mind that these steady jobs are located at the lowest rank of the ladder of skill and income, then the basic impression of the material poverty in which the Roma population has been living is still stronger. On the other hand, the number of unemployed heads of family is very signifi cant – 68.4% are unemployed, while 8.3% work occasionally, as seasonal labourers. The number of people on “paid leave” (a phrase engendered by Serbia’s economic disaster over the past years) and pensioners is virtually negligible: only 1.6% and 2.6%, respectively. This tells us that, actually, most Roma heads of family have never had the chance of holding a steady job from which they could retire.

Though it may seem strange at fi rst sight, the sources of income of the interviewed Roma families are diverse. Their answers range from stating that the basic source of income is the salary of a member who holds a steady job, to the characteristic answer, paradoxically precise in its vagueness – “we don’t really know how we manage”. The ways of earning an income refers to all members of family capable of economic activity, not just to the head of family, and therefore differences arise from data gathered on employment. Roma family members were reluctant to talk about smuggling and the “black market” as sources of income in front of interviewers and researchers. The interviewees also minimized the importance of humanitarian aid, probably because the level of aid was below their expectations.4 In 50% of the cases, they did not provide data on second occupation. The most frequent modalities however, obtained in over 1,000 answers, were, in percentages: employment 18.5, agricultural labour 1.7, trade 3.2, smuggling 9.5, begging 0.6, selling waste 9.1, seasonal work 18.2, welfare 18.3, pensions 5.6, help from relatives 1.0, humanitarian aid 4.3. The reply “we don’t really know ourselves” was provided by 1.9% of the interviewed Roma families, and 7.4% said “something else”. As we can see, almost ten percent of Roma families engage in collecting secondary raw materials, i.e. waste. The percentage of those for whom this is the only occupation is slightly higher. No doubt, this is for Roma a promising possibility for employment and self-employment. However, it would be good if “collecting secondary raw materials” did not turn into a “business reserved for Roma exclusively”, for in this way the principle of segregation of the Roma population in Serbia would be confi rmed.

As aforementioned, the percentage of pensioners is the lowest among Roma, and the percentage of unemployment is the highest; only every sixth head of family has a job. Still, it is very interesting to compare working status with the infrastructural equipment of the settlement. In absolute numbers and in percentages, the unemployed are the most numerous; they also are the most numerous in the group without access to electricity. Conversely, among those who are connected to the sewage system or own bathrooms and toilets in the house, steadily employed heads of family are the

• 35


most numerous. Other data may be seen on the graph presenting the combined data on working status and infrastructure of the settlement Roma live in.

Table: Sources of subsistence of the Roma family

Sources of income % Summary%

no answer 0.4 0.4

job 18.4 18.8

agriculture 1.7 20.5

various trades 3.2 23.7

trading/black market 9.5 33.2

begging 0.6 33.8

selling waste 9.1 42.9

seasonal work 18.2 61.1

welfare/child allowance 18.3 79.4

pension 5.6 85.0

help from relatives and friends 1.0 86.0

humanitarian aid 4.7 90.7

we don’t really know 1.9 92.6

something else 7.4 100.0

Total 100.0 100.0

36 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Roma families: Working status and infrastructural equipment

If we keep in mind this correlation between working status and infrastructure of their settlement, it becomes clear why Roma put the problem of employment at the forefront, and why the problem of education is secondary. For them, “educating children” as an important or very important problem comes only after health, employment, food, clothes and shoes, and housing.

• 37


Roma families: How important are these problems for you

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

There is one more data signifi cant for these considerations. The skill structure of Roma changes slowly and only slightly, but employment is on the decline. Roma displaced from Kosovo are in an especially diffi cult situation. In their case it can be claimed that they are victims of discrimination in employment.5 The interviewed Roma feel employment to be the key problem for the family life. They are consistent in that, putting employment at the forefront in 51.6% of cases, and stressing they would accept any kind of job in 38.3%. Steady employment of a family member is seen as the crucial problem to be solved in almost 90% of cases.

The low level of education among Roma refl ects adversely on their socio-professional structure. Very few Roma in Serbia have an identifi able occupation. Most of them belong into the undifferentiated group of workers “without occupation”. Among those who do “have an occupation”, skills learned at work rather than occupations acquired through formal education prevail. The undifferentiated socio-professional structure is an indicator of a low social position and the vicious circle of poverty. This confi rms the fi ndings of previous studies concerning Roma communities in ex-Yugoslavia which pointed out that Roma are most numerous in the occupations requiring no skill, such as maintenance workers or cleaners, porters, warehouse workers, or still construction workers.6 The conditions of overall impoverishment are detected through high unemployment and rising poverty in the society at large, and to quote Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić, “the rate of economic activity is an essential indicator of the exclusion of Roma from the main social and economic processes. Low economic activity, very young age structure of the population, and a large share of inactive population are the key factors in sustaining and deepening the differences or, to put it more bluntly, the socio-economic gap between Roma and the majority people.”7

Apart from the objective data on living conditions which make Roma a highly deprived social group (intolerably bad housing conditions, high unemployment of the potential workforce, insuffi cient inclusion of children in the school system, poor communication with the majority population, poor hygiene and health situation), an important part of the overall depiction of their life are subjective feelings. Some researchers argue that subjective feeling is a more signifi cant indicator of the quality of life than a set of objective criteria.8 Yet, on either account Roma are a specifi c population displaying typically low aspirations and extremely well developed capacities for instant adaptation. Similarly, their subjective statements are often in contradiction

38 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

with objective living conditions.9 Or more precisely: they complain about unbearable living conditions less than the researchers could ever assume.

EDUCATION

Serbia is unfortunately one of the few European countries that have not yet eliminated illiteracy: “According to the 2002 population census in Serbia (Kosovo and Metohija excluded) 232,925 people were illiterate, which represents 3.5% of the total population over 10 years of age”.10 Illiteracy is almost non-existent in the most developed Serbian municipalities, but is still quite high in the most underdeveloped ones (such as Bojnik, 15.4%). The north, especially Vojvodina, and Belgrade are more “literate” than the south, while over 10% of all the illiterate are concentrated in the 12 municipalities in the south-west. What is particularly disturbing is that among the illiterate 2.7% are young people aged 10-19. Let us leave aside here the question of how many inhabitants of impoverished Serbia are functionally illiterate, never actually reading or writing anything, and whose “literacy” amounts to being able to sign. It is much more important to stress that illiteracy is very strongly correlated with poverty and underdevelopment. This practically means that the Roma, as the poorest community of all, are also the community where illiteracy is the most widespread.11 It is enough to cite the fact that among illiterate young people aged 10-14, 50% are Roma girls and boys, and among those under 30 years of age, Roma comprise 44%, although Roma make up just 109,000 within the total of over 7 million inhabitants of Serbia, according to the latest census. If one looks separately at illiteracy among minorities in Serbia, Roma again rank fi rst according to the illiteracy rate.12

Roma are a people of different lifestyle, cultural patterns, customs and language, compared to the majority populations – Serbian, Albanian, Bosniac or Hungarian – in the local communities, as well as at the global societal level. Such differences, however much they may sometimes provoke misunderstandings and distrust, are the richness of a democratic society. Andrzej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorge in their inspiring work “Roma People in Historical Perspective” discuss the problem of Roma education in all its complexity: “In the traditional Roma community there were no intellectuals: without writing and written culture education was not considered a high priority. Moreover, fearing assimilation, many Roma families resisted the education of their children.”13 And if a Roma child does go to school, what his or her experience will be – nobody cares. He or she does not necessarily have to – and, in most cases, will not – fi nish it at all.

School is for any child, and particularly for a Roma child who comes from a different social and cultural milieu, a novel life experience which generates mixed feelings of joy and fear. Hence the question of how Roma children will be received and accepted in their school classes is especially important. Mostly poor, insecure in the new environment, poorly dressed, and with diffi culties in communication because of insuffi cient language profi ciency, Roma children at school are often faced with the arrogance of the management, soulless indifference of the teacher, and refusal of other pupils to accept them as their “mates”. They usually sit in the back rows, they are sneered at by teachers and pupils, and during breaks they are practically isolated from participation in children’s games. Of course, the situation is not so bad in every

• 39


school, and not all teachers and pupils behave in this way, but this is valid as a general description.

Differences in language, as the chief means of communication among people, are particularly emphasized when Roma children have a poorer school performance or drop out. Subtler analyses might show to what extent the (lack of) knowledge of the local majority language can be and is an obstacle to a better school performance of Roma children, and to what extent the “lack of language profi ciency” is used as a pretext to mask some other problems in the process of educating Roma children. An overwhelming majority of the interviewed Roma families speak Roma language at home – 500 families, i.e. 71.4%. Serbian (Serbo-Croat) comes second, being spoken in 95 families (13.6%). A “mixture of languages” is in third place, with 81 families (11.8%). In very few families Hungarian, Albanian or some other language is spoken (2.7%). Of Roma dialects, the arlija is the most represented (292 families or 41.7%), then gurbet (164 families or 23.4%). Other Roma dialects are spoken in 127 families (18.1%), while in 18 families they were not able to specify which dialect they speak (2.6%).

Since Roma communities are highly adaptable to the surrounding environments, these data do not allow for the conclusion that language is the chief barrier to the education of Roma children. The causes should also be sought in tradition, and particularly in the family’s economic condition and parents’ level of education. On the other hand, causes also lie in the lack of understanding on the part of the wider community of specifi c features of the Roma life, and especially in the refusal of school authorities and teachers to pay adequate attention to Roma children. Similarly, Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić write: “Education of children is a possible channel of social promotion for Roma which, however, is too long, uncertain and expensive, demanding a lot of patience and work… Education of children is an effort Roma families cannot master by themself.”14

Not all of the interviewed Roma families have school-age children. Indeed, out of 700 interviewed families, 405 have school-age children (57.9%), 275 or 39.3% do not, and 20 families failed to answer the question (2.9%). To the general question of why Roma children do not go to school, 26 families (3.7%) cited the language barrier (i.e. acquaintance with the language of the majority people), 4 families said, in line with the tradition, that children do not need school at all (0.6%), 27 families said that “kids do not want to go to school” and the parents cannot force them (3.9%), 29 families said that schools are “reluctant to receive Roma children” (4.1%), while the largest number, 135 or 19.3% failed to cite any specifi c reason for children not attending school, or dropping out very quickly. The range of education of the Roma family stops mostly at incomplete or complete elementary school.

Assistance to Roma pupils to overcome obstacles and barriers they encounter at school is often minimal and at any rate insuffi cient. The data obtained in this study referring to the previous school year (2001/02) show that 9.6% of Roma children i.e. every tenth Roma child received all or some of textbooks, notebooks and other school supplies. 4% obtained free clothes or shoes, while about 5% of Roma children received aid for excursions or some other form of aid. Thanks to the efforts of humanitarian and

40 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Roma organizations, actions of the state institutions such as the Ministry of Education of Serbia, have improved the situation signifi cantly to the benefi t of Roma pupils.

Although more than a half of Roma children still do not attend school regularly and drop out early, it is interesting that Roma families, no matter whether their housing conditions are good or bad, send their children to school in equal numbers, while abstention of school-age children from Roma families with no permanent residence is extremely high, as seen from the following graphs:

The level of tolerance of non-Roma parents towards the presence of Roma pupils in the class attended also by non-Roma children decreases as the share of Roma pupils grows. So, 79.7% of neighbors agree that “several Roma children attend the same class”, and if Roma children would comprise over a half of the class, the percentage drops to 52.3%. Rejection of mixed classes with “several Roma children” mounts from 4.9%, to 31.4% for classes “with over a half of Roma children”. This impression is alleviated by the category of those who say “it is all the same” to them how many Roma children go to the same class with non-Roma children, while 13.7% in both cases say “the same”. We can conclude, keeping in sight all the modalities of answers to this question, that the interviewed non-Roma population is by far more tolerant than in many other countries.

The results of this study may sound optimistic, but at the same time one should bear in mind that this is incomplete education. Roma families enroll their children in school, but this does not mean that the children attend the school regularly, and even less that they complete the grades or the school as a whole. As previously mentioned, the education of children most often ends at the level of incomplete elementary school. For various reasons families send their children to school, and then very soon “get them out”. The practice of assigning Roma children – for reasons of lack of language profi ciency, poverty, housing and urban segregation, etc. – to special schools, where they as a rule perform very well, is not really a solution for Roma children.

It is not surprising therefore, that other researchers have already noticed the striking correlation between the level of (un)education and low material standing of Roma families. Thus Milutin Prokić takes the data on Roma education to be the most dramatic form of “manifestation of their professional and social inferiority”, one of the “darkest sides of the reality of Roma life”. His conclusion is precise and pessimistic: “Closed into their ethnic confi nes, Roma reproduce each other. Semi-literate and uneducated, they cannot teach their children the secrets of a better school performance or professional advancement. As poorly paid and undervalued workers, they cannot provide themselves or their families with a decent living, nor can they serve as an example to anyone.”15

The practice of sending Roma children, because of language incompetence, poverty, housing and urban segregation, to special schools, where they regularly achieve good results, is ultimately not a good solution for Roma children either. “The special school and the conditions of life in the Roma enclave ‘guarantee’ poverty and low social and cultural status of the Roma adult-to-be”, rightly argues Sulejman Hrnjica.16

• 41


Roma families: Housing conditions and children's choc attendanceHousing conditions and children's choc attendanceH

Roma families: Education of head of household and children's school attendance

housing conditionshousing conditions

children attending school

42 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Interestingly, at the beginning of the 2002/03 school year, virtually identical problems with enrollment and organization of teaching for Roma children arose simultaneously in Medjimurje, Croatia, and in the district of Subotica, Vojvodina. This kind of problem may be treated, if not as racist resistance of the wider community to the education of Roma children, then certainly as a demand to segregate Roma from an early age already.

One study of stigmatization and interethnic relations, conducted in early 2002 in Croatia, shows that in all countries of the Western Balkans the Roma population faces similar problems.17 Educational authorities see the “peculiarities” of Roma pupils almost exclusively in terms of their handicaps (little or no knowledge of the Croatian language, poorly developed cultural and hygienic habits, poorly developed speaking, motor abilities and functional capacity, lack of work discipline and sense of responsibility). Stigmatization and segregation of Roma children, writes Marta Vidaković Mukić who presents the results of the study, begins in the kindergarten (if Roma children attend it at all) and becomes very pronounced from the 1st grade of elementary school on: in st grade of elementary school on: in st

97.1% of the cases, the best friend of a Roma child is also Roma, 86.9% of Roma pupils would like to have Croat friends, but during breaks 92% of Roma children do not play with other children – a practice that is even stimulated by the schools by designating a special portion of the schoolyard for Roma children to play. It is no wonder then that 89% of interviewed Roma children feel they are not well accepted in the school environment, while 79% say that majority children insult them, make fun of them and refuse them any social contact.18

The situation in Central and East European countries is not much better either. Thus in the paper “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe” written by a group of authors (Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić and Ágnes Székely) it is argued that governments have used the school as a means to encourage assimilation. The authors write that the collapse of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe has been accompanied by an economic crisis and a dramatic rise in racism: Roma are abused in the regular school system and teachers mistreat them physically, verbally and emotionally. Pupils and their parents also harass the Roma, while school authorities, teachers and headmasters fail to prevent and/or punish such behaviour. It is particularly worrying that in many Central and East European countries the school system is segregated: Roma are educated in separate classes and separate schools. Such a situation, the authors argue, has nothing to do with minority education advocated by some Roma activists. The existing separate classes and schools are inevitably of poorer quality than classes consisting mainly of non-Roma pupils. This effective segregation is in some countries even offi cially codifi ed in the institution of the so-called “special school”, which in practice means school for the mentally disabled. In such schools Roma are so strongly overrepresented that the suspicion becomes justifi ed that – like it happened before in Roma history – school authorities see the Roma ethnic group as synonym of social and mental disability. Finally, the authors reassert the well known truth that in many countries Roma do not go to school at all or, once enrolled, quickly drop out.19 Furthermore, they also highlight that young Roma suffer abuse at school, including physical abuse by the teachers. Non-Roma children

• 43


laugh at and harass Roma children, while teachers often do not intervene effectively. They conclude: “Abuse in the regular school system leads to segregation”.20

By the fi fth grade, Roma children have usually already dropped out of elementary school.21 Stigmatization and segregation of Roma children at school, often tolerated and even supported by both school’s authorities and the parents from the majority population, give rise to disappointment among Roma children, and their initial strong desire to attend school is weakened.22

Roma children are exposed to insults and humiliation by their peers, and in conditions of economic crisis the poor and uneducated do not have the chance to fi nd a job and earn their livelihood, says Marta Vidaković Mukić. “A school system that encompasses Roma children in the same way as the children of the majority and that does not tolerate ethnically clean classes, is certainly an important means of eliminating discrimination, stigmatization and segregation of the Roma population. By integrating children into the society, encouraging their self-respect and awareness that they are equally worthy as anybody else, that they have the chance to live in the way the majority lives, with a similar standard of living and similar problems, within a certain period of time it will be possible to reach the point where the stigmatization of Roma does not begin at birth already, where adults will not be discriminated against in employment, and where never again the ambulance will refuse to come into a Roma settlement to help a woman in post-natal period.”23

The state could make the school “descend” into the Roma settlement. Sometimes it is enough to employ one Roma teacher and the education of Roma children will function well. This is currently done by NGOs, but they will withdraw after fi nishing their programs. It is imperative that state bodies promote the learning of the Roma language and culture, not only for Roma and Roma children. Of course, there is the problem of the adequately trained personnel, who could work systematically and long term. Psychologists often send Roma children to special schools. In these schools Roma children are successful, but they remain stigmatized. Here everyone has their own interests, but it is Roma children who suffer from the promotion of these interests. While other children learn the curriculum, Roma children learn the Serbian language. By the time Roma children have learned the Serbian language, other children have advanced so far in mastering the curriculum that Roma children again perform poorly. Special schools are satisfi ed, because Roma children raise their overall performance, while many principals and teachers of other schools are satisfi ed because they have “gotten rid of the Gypsies”. The psychologists are satisfi ed because they have “saved Roma children”, “taken them off the street” and “protected them from possible mistreatment and discrimination in regular schools”24. Finally, the parents of Roma children are not discontent either, because their children, after all, go to some sort of school.

In comparison with the results of previous research, as well as the data of the offi cial statistics, the number of Roma children attending school regularly has risen to 48.4%. The percentage of children attending school occasionally is considerably lower, 6.6%, while the number of children not at all included in the system of compulsory elementary education is still high – 17.1%. The percentage of school-age children for whom it could not be ascertained whether or not they attended school is also high (27.9%).

44 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

The view that education is more important may, apart from benevolent (mis)understanding of the living conditions of the Roma family, also contain a trace of racism: “They should be educated so as to become like us”. From these answers, a certain paternalism emanates, especially when education is rated fi rst. When Roma, having passed through the educational system, get “civilized”, everything will be well. Paternalism is also guided by the self-interest of the speaker, derived from egotism. Chauvinism has a thousand faces and disguises, and can be so subtle! What do we care if a Roma starves to death, what matters is only that he or she does not contaminate our environment. Let them receive education on the basis of our curricula! In this logical sequence there is no place for the question of what if these curricula are often bad for both “us” and Roma. Roma ought to behave like “us”, they should also adopt the chauvinist posture, which is alien to their tradition, and then they will be “well off”, just as “we” are. We shall provide them with everything they need to become like “us”! Although this consistently nationalist attitude, sliding into chauvinism, is not predominant, it is often underlying the opinions of the “experts” on education as the dominant problem of the Roma family.

If Roma are to get any serious chance of fi nding employment in the formal economic structure, the prerequisite is education of Roma children. This, along with the development of cultural activities and general prosperity of Serbian society, is a necessary precondition for a permanent improvement of life of Roma families. Most often they do not speak the language of their new milieu, or do not speak it well enough to complete the school curriculum. How will Roma children overcome the language barrier which – instead of their alleged mental retardation (a very widespread racist prejudice) – is the chief obstacle to the integration of Roma children into the school system, along with poverty, absence of the tradition of education, particularly for girls, lack of interest on the part of parents and rejection by the wider milieu? Even children who do go to school show unstable motivation and poor concentration. The price for this will be paid by future generations as well. This is educational segregation! And one of the most effi cient and simplest avenues of successful integration is inclusion of Roma children into the educational system.

There is no dilemma that the Roma community in Serbia should be emancipated from poverty. These people deserve maximum possible support. Such support also fl atters Europe’s conscience. But there also are political reasons, and these are very important. Help goes both ways: if Europe helps Roma to survive, Roma can help developed and less developed European countries to get rid of xenophobia and racism. There is a lot in Roma life and Roma culture that Europe can learn from, on its way to overcoming xenophobia. Help and gifts that Europe extends to Roma will be returned, multiplied.

(Translated by Dr. Ivana Spasic)

• 45


REFERENCESAcković, Dragoljub,

Konstitucionalni problemi Roma (Constitutional Problems of Roma(Constitutional Problems of Roma( )Constitutional Problems of Roma)Constitutional Problems of Roma , Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije (Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems and Tendencies), SANU, Beograd, 1992.Problemi obrazovanja Roma(Problems of Roma Education(Problems of Roma Education( )Problems of Roma Education)Problems of Roma Education , Društvene promene i položaj Roma (Social Change and the Position of Roma), SANU, Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.Čitajte ljudi (Ginavnen Romalen (Ginavnen Romalen ( – Read People)Read People)Read People , Rrominterpress, Beograd, 1997.Nacija smo a ne Cigani (We are a Nation, not Gypsies)We are a Nation, not Gypsies)We are a Nation, not Gypsies , knjiga prva, Rrominterpress, Beograd, 2001.

Acton, Thomas, Gypsy Politics and Traveller Identity, University of Hertforshire Press, 1993.Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity, University of Hertforshire Press, 1991.

Banski, Marija, Porodica kao ekonomska zajednica kod Roma u Novom KnežPorodica kao ekonomska zajednica kod Roma u Novom KnežPorodica kao ekonomska zajednica kod Roma u Novom Kne evcuževcuž (Family (Family (as Economic Community among Roma in Novi Kneževac)evac)evac , u: Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Barany Zoltan, The East European Gypsies, Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, NY, 2002.

Barjaktarević, Mirko, Cigani u Jugoslaviji danas (Roma in Yugoslavia Today(Roma in Yugoslavia Today( )Roma in Yugoslavia Today)Roma in Yugoslavia Today , Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta, XI-1, Beograd, 1979.

Bašić, Goran, Političko pravni poločko pravni poloč žaj Roma u Centralnoj i Jugoistižaj Roma u Centralnoj i Jugoistiž čnoj Evropičnoj Evropič (Political (Political (and Legal Position of Roma in Central and Southeast Europe)and Legal Position of Roma in Central and Southeast Europe)and Legal Position of Roma in Central and Southeast Europe , Romi, Sv. 1, Pelikan Print, Niš, 2000; In English: Facta Universitatis, Series Philosophy and Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 8, 2001.The Roma in Yugoslavia, in: The Roma Population in South Eastern Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002.Role of Religion, Language and Other Factors in the Process of the Building of the Roma National Identity, Roma Religious Culture, JUNIR, Niš, 2003.

Bečin, Aleksandar, Socijalni problemi Roma u Vojvodini (Social Problems of Roma in (Social Problems of Roma in (Voivodina)Voivodina)Voivodina , Pokrajinski zavod za socijalna istrazivanja, Novi Sad, 1974.

Berberski, Slobodan, Romi i iredenta na Kosovu (Roma and Kosovo Irredentism (Roma and Kosovo Irredentism ( )Roma and Kosovo Irredentism)Roma and Kosovo Irredentism , Naše teme, XXVIII, br. 5-6, 1984.

Blagojević, Marina, Stavovi studenata o Romima: širok osmeh i zlatan zub (Students’ Attitudes

toward Roma: A Broad Smile and a Golden Tooth), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Društvene karakteristike etničkih grupa: Kako meriti diskriminaciju (Social Characteristics of Ethnic Groups: How to Measure Discrimination), Položaj manjina u Saveznoj republici Jugoslaviji, SANU, Beograd, 1995.

Bobić, Miloš i Vujović Sreten (ur.), Krov nad glavom (A Roof over One’s Head), Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 1985.

46 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Bovy, Yannick et Delcourt, Barbara, Que nos valeurs sont universelles et que la guerre est Jolie – Guerre en Yougoslavie, Editions du Cerisier, Cuesmes (Mons), 1999.

Cekić, Nikola, Arhitektura sedam romskih enklava u Nišu, (Architecture of the Roma Settlement in Nis) Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present), SANU, Beograd, 2000.

Cahn, Claude, (ed. by) Roma Rights: Race,Justice, and Strategies for Equality, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, 2002.

Cahn, Claude, Chirico David, McDonald Cristina, Mohácsi Viktória, Perić Tatjana and Székely Ágnes, Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe, in: Roma Rights: Race,Justice, and Strategies for Equality, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, 2002.

Crowe, David and Kostly, John (eds), The Gypsies of Eastern Europe, New York, 1991.

Crowe, David, A History of the Gypsies in Eastern Europe and Russia, New York, 1994.

Đorđević, Dragoljub B. (ed.), Roma Religious Culture,JUNIR, Yuroma Center, Punta, Niš, 2003.

Đorđević, Dragoljub B. and Đurović, Bogdan, An Opportunity for the Roma: Interculturalism in Education, Facta Universitatis, Series Philosophy and Sociology, 2 (6/2), 1999.

Đorđević, Tihomir, O Ciganima uopšte i o njihovom doseljavanju na Balkansko poluostrvo i u Srbiju (On Gypsies in General and on their Arrival in the Balkans and Serbia(On Gypsies in General and on their Arrival in the Balkans and Serbia( )On Gypsies in General and on their Arrival in the Balkans and Serbia)On Gypsies in General and on their Arrival in the Balkans and Serbia , Srpski književni glasnik, Beograd, 1904.Die Zigeuner in Serbien, Budapest, 1903.Vrste Cigana u Srbiji (Different Types of the Roma in Serbia), Naš narodni život, Beograd, 1932.

Đurić, Rajko, Kulturni i vrednosni sistem romske zajednice (Cultural and Value System of (Cultural and Value System of (the Roma Community)the Roma Community)the Roma Community , Sveske, br. 17-18/1986, Sarajevo, 1986.Seobe Roma (Roma Migrations(Roma Migrations( )Roma Migrations)Roma Migrations , BIGZ, Beograd, 1987.Cigani sveta (Gypsies of the World), BIGZ, Beograd, 1988.Bez prava nema demokratije (Without Rights There Is No Democracy)Without Rights There Is No Democracy)Without Rights There Is No Democracy , Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Đurović, Bogdan i Đorđević B., Obredi pri velikim verskim praznicima kod Roma u Nišu (Rites Performed on the Occasion of Big Religious Feasts by Roma in (Rites Performed on the Occasion of Big Religious Feasts by Roma in (Niš)š)š , Etno-kulturološki zbornik, 2, Svrljig, 1996.

Đurović, Bogdan, Društvena segregacija i getoizirana svest Roma (Social Segregation (Social Segregation (and Ghettoized Consciousness of the Roma)and Ghettoized Consciousness of the Roma)and Ghettoized Consciousness of the Roma , Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present), SANU, Beograd, 2000.

Findak, Sunčica, Potreba i stvaranje uvjeta za obuhvat romske djece u predšPotreba i stvaranje uvjeta za obuhvat romske djece u predšPotreba i stvaranje uvjeta za obuhvat romske djece u pred kolske školske šorganizacije (The Need and Prerequisites for Inclusion of Roma Children in (The Need and Prerequisites for Inclusion of Roma Children in (Pre-School Organizations)Pre-School Organizations)Pre-School Organizations , Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

• 47


Fira, Aleksandar, Ustavni položaj Roma u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslavijižaj Roma u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslavijiž (Constitutional (Constitutional (Status of the Roma in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)Status of the Roma in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)Status of the Roma in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present), SANU, Beograd, 2000.

First-Dilić, Ruža, Prostorna stabilizacija i udomaćivanje Roma (Spatial Stabilization (Spatial Stabilization (and Roma Households)and Roma Households)and Roma Households , Sociologija sela, Vol. XXIII, No. 87-90, 1985.

Fraser, Angus, The Gypsies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.Haliti, Bajram, Romi, narod zle kobi (Roma, the People of Ill Fate(Roma, the People of Ill Fate( )Roma, the People of Ill Fate)Roma, the People of Ill Fate , Pergament, Priština,

1997.Hancock, Ian, The Trend to Minimize the Romani Holocaust, A review of Guenther

Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies, Oxford University Press, 2000.Hodžić, Alija, Životni standard romskih domaćinstava (Living Standards of Roma

Households), Sociologija sela, God. XXIII, No. 87-90, 1985.Hrnjica, Sulejman, Izrada kompenzatorskih programa obrazovanja za učenike romske

etničke grupe (Compensatory Educational Programs for Pupils from the Roma Ethnic Group), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Ionescu, Mariea and Cace, Sorin, Best Practices In Rroma Communities, Agency for Community Development Impreuna, Bucharest, 2000.

Jakšić, Božidar, «Life of Displaced Kosovo Roma in Montenegro and Possibilities for Integration»,

Filozofi ja i društvo, XVII, Beograd, 2000. Displaced Roma from Kosovo in Montenegro, u: Dušan Šimko and Heiko

Hausmann (eds), Peace Perspectives for Southeast Europe, Akademia (Basel University), Basel, 2000.

«Romi između diskriminacije i integracije» (Roma between Discrimination and Integration), Filozofi ja i društvo, XIX-XX, str. 333-356.Ljudi bez krova/Roofl ess People (Život izbeglica i raseljenih Roma u Crnoj Gori – The Life of Refugees and Displaced Kosovo Roma in Montenegro) Republika, Beograd 2002, str. 327.

«Jedna romska glavobolja. Romi u traganju za ličnim dokumentima, posebno Romi sa Kosova», “Roma Headache: Roma in a Searching for Personal Documents” Filozofi ja i društvo, 1/XXVI, str. 229-252.

Jakšić, Božidar i Goran Bašić, Umetnost preživljavanja, Gde i kako žive Romi u Srbiji, (Art of Surviving, Where and How Living Roma in Serbia), Institut za fi lozofi ju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd 2005.

Kalember, Dragica, Kolektivna osuda skitničkog naroda Romačkog naroda Romač (The Collective Condemnation of the Nomadic Roma People), Naše teme, Vol. XXVIII, No. 7-8, Zagreb, 1984.

Knežević, Srebrica, Žene Roma i njihov smisao za adaptaciju u skladu sa ekonomskim Žene Roma i njihov smisao za adaptaciju u skladu sa ekonomskim Žpromenama (Roma Women and their Capacity for Adaptation to Economic (Roma Women and their Capacity for Adaptation to Economic (Change), Etnološki pregled, br. 17, 1982.

Kenrick, Donald and Puxon, Grattan, The Destiny of Europe’s Gypsies, London: Sussex University Press, 1972.

Kuzmanović, Bora, Stereotipije o Romima i etnička distancačka distancač (Stereotypes about Roma and Ethnic Distance), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

48 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Kymlicka, Will, The Rights of Minorities Culture, Oxford University Press, 1995.Ethnic Relation in Eastern Europe and Western Political Theory, 2001.

Ladanji Janoš i Selenji, Ivan, Socialnata struktura na romskija etnos v Bulgarija, Rumjanija i Ungarija vo vreme prehoda km pazarna ikonomika, u: Ivan Selenji (Sastavitelj), Bednostta pri postkomunizma, Institut za socijalni cenosti i strukturi, Sofi ja, 2002.

Liegeois, Jean-Pierre, Roma, Gypsies, Travellers, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1994.

Macura, Vladimir, Jedan način sanacije fi zičin sanacije fi zič čkog okvira romskih enklavačkog okvira romskih enklavač (A Way to (A Way to (Repair the Physical Framework of Roma Enclaves), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Belgrade, 1993.

Macura, Vladimir, Petovar Ksenija i Vujović Sreten, Siromašna podrušna podruš čja Beograda čja Beograda č (Poor (Poor (Areas of Belgrade), Institut za arhitekturu i urbanizam Srbije, Beograd.

Marušiakova, Elena i Popov, Veselin, Ciganite v Osmanskata imperija, Interfas, Pariz, 2000.

Marjanović, Miloš, U susretu sa etničkim stereotipijama o Romimačkim stereotipijama o Romimač (Encountering (Encountering (the Ethnic Stereotzpes about the Romanies), Romi, Sv. 1, Pelikan print, Niš, 2000. Na engleskom u Facta Universitatis, Series Philosophy and Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 8, 2001.

Milosavljević, Milosav, Romi i devijacije (Roma and Deviance (Roma and Deviance ( ), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Milić, Vladimir, Romi kao marginalna društvena grupa (Roma as a Marginal Social (Roma as a Marginal Social (Group), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Miluckov, Mirjana, Etnološka graška graš đa o Romima đa o Romima đ – Ciganima u Vojvodini (Ethnological Evidence on Roma – Gypsies in Voivodina), Novi Sad, 1979.

Mirga Andžej i Mruz Leh, Romi – Razlike i netolerancija Roma- Differences and Untolerance, Akapit, Beograd, 1997.

Mirga, Andrzej and Gheorghe, Nicholae, Romski narod u istorijskom kontekstu (Roma (Roma (People in the Historical Context), Romološke studije – Romology Studies, People in the Historical Context), Romološke studije – Romology Studies, People in the Historical ContextSeries I, Vol.I, No. III–IV, Aug.–Dec, 1997.

Mitrović, Aleksandra, Brak i porodični odnosi kod Roma kao čni odnosi kod Roma kao č činilac njihovog dručinilac njihovog druč štvenog položajažajaž(Marriage and Family Relations among Roma as a Factor of their Social (Marriage and Family Relations among Roma as a Factor of their Social (Position), Yugoslav Conference Porodica i društvena kriza (Family and Social Crisis), Jugoslovenska konferencija za socijalne aktivnosti, Beograd, 1988.Romi na granicama siromaštva (Roma on the Verge of Poverty (Roma on the Verge of Poverty ( ), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.Karakteristike Romske populacije (The Characteristics of the Romanies Population) u Romi, Sv. 1, Pelikan print, Niš, 2000. Na engleskom u Facta Universitatis, Series Philosophy and Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 8, 2001.Društveni status Roma (The Social Status of the Roma), Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present) SANU, Beograd. 2000.

• 49


Integracija dece iz romske etničke grupe u obrazovni sistemčke grupe u obrazovni sistemč (The Possibilities of Integration of Romani Children into Educational System). Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present), SANU, Beograd. 2000.

Mitrović, Aleksandra and Zajić Gradimir, Social Position of the Roma in Serbia(Dru(Dru( štveni položaj Roma u Srbijižaj Roma u Srbijiž ), Centre for Anti-war Action and Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade, 1998.

Pavlović, Marina, Uslovi stanovanja i života u romskim naseljima u Leskovcu (Housing (Housing (and Living Conditions of Romani Boroughs in Leskovac), Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present) SANU, Beograd, 2000.

Petrović, Đurđica, Naučna istračna istrač živanja Roma u Jugoslaviji (Scientifi c Research on Roma in Yugoslavia), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Petrović, Edit, Stereotipije o romskim zanimanjima i zanimanja Roma (Stereotypes and Reality of Roma Occupations), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Petrović, Ruža, Demografske osobenosti Roma u Jugoslaviji (Demographic Properties (Demographic Properties (of Roma in Yugoslavia), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Prioritetna pitanja razvitka i modernizacije (Priority Questions of Development and (Priority Questions of Development and (Modernization – panel discussion), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Prokić, Milutin, Stanković Vladimir i Janković Jovanka, Popis stanovništva kao izvor podataka o Romima (Population Census as a Source of Data on Roma (Population Census as a Source of Data on Roma ( ), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Prokić, Milutin, Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji (Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji (Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji Socio-economic Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Radojević, Miodrag, Specifi čnosti obrazovanja romske decečnosti obrazovanja romske deceč (Peculiarities of Roma (Peculiarities of Roma (Education), Nastava i vaspitanje, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 1984.

Rakić-Vodinelić, Vesna, Pravni položaj Roma u SR Jugoslavijižaj Roma u SR Jugoslavijiž (Legal Position of (Legal Position of (Roma in FR Yugoslavia), Romi u Srbiji (Roma in Serbia), Centar za antiratnu akciju – Institut za sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja, Beograd, 1998.

Ringold, Dena, The Roma in Central and East Europe – Trends and Chalanges, The World Bank, 2000.

Rihtman-Auguštin, Dunja, People Cheated by History on Both Banks of the Drina River, in: Exile, Everyday Life: Cultural Perspectives,River, in: Exile, Everyday Life: Cultural Perspectives,River Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, Zagreb, 1996.

Romi u Srbiji, (Roma in Serbia, (Roma in Serbia, ( ) Izveštaj Fonda za humanitarno pravo, Beograd, 2003.

Romsko naselje “Mali London“Mali London“ ” u Pančevučevuč – Problemi i moguća rešenja (The “Little “Little “London” Roma Settlement in Pančevo čevo č – Problems and Possible Solutions), Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, 1999.

Rose, Arnold, Migrants in Europe, University of Minnesota Press, 1960.

50 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

Savić Svenka, Aleksandrović, Marija, Dimitrov, Stanka i Jovanović, Jelena, Romkinje, biografi je starih Romkinja u Vojvodini (Roma Women: Biographies of Old Roma (Roma Women: Biographies of Old Roma (Women in Vojvodina), Futura publikacije, Novi Sad, 2001.

Selenji, Ivan, (Sastavitelj), Bednostta pri postkomunizma, Institut za socijalni cenosti i strukturi, Sofi ja, 2002.

Sikimić, Biljana, Banyash culture in North Serbia in Roma religious culture, Niš, 2003.

Simić, Đuro, Studija o socijalnoj integraciji Roma (A Study of Social Integration of (A Study of Social Integration of (Roma), Savez društava Rom Republike Srbije, Niš, 1993.

Stakić, Đurađ, Modeli socijalnog rada sa marginalnim grupama (Models of Social Work (Models of Social Work (with Marginal Groups), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Stanković, Vladimir, Romi u svetlu podataka jugoslovenske statistike (Romanies in (Romanies in (Light of Yugoslav Statistical Data), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Stewart, Michael, The Time of the Gypsies, Westview Press, 1997.Stigmata, “Sagregated Schooling of Roma in Central and Estern Europe”, ERRC,

Budapest, 2004.Stojaković, Vitomir, Međunarodna saradnja u druđunarodna saradnja u druđ štvenoj zaštiti romske dece

(International Cooperation in Social Care of Roma Children(International Cooperation in Social Care of Roma Children( ), Društvene promene i položaj Roma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

Soulis, C. George, The Gypsies in the Byzantine Empire and the Balkans in the late Middle Ages, Dumberton Oaks Papers, XV, 1961.

Surdu, Mihai, The Quolity of Education in Romanian School with High Percentages of Romani Pupils, Roma Rights 3-4, 2002.

Šijaković-Blagojević, Marina, Društveno ekonomski položaj i kultura Romažaj i kultura Romaž (Socio-Economic Position and Culture of Roma), Marksistička misao, No 6/1983, Beograd, 1983.

On the Margins – Roma and Public Servicies in Romania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, Report to the Open Society Institute, New York, 2001.

Tomova, Ilona, The Gypsies in the Transition Period, IMIR, Sofi a, 1995.The Gypsies in the Transition Period, IMIR, Sofi a, 1995.The Gypsies in the Transition PeriodCourrier International, « Tsiganes, Naissance d’un nation – Un dossier spécial », , « Tsiganes, Naissance d’un nation – Un dossier spécial », , « Tsiganes, Naissance d’un nation – Un dossier spécial »

nº 364, 23-29, Octobre 1997. Uhlik, Rade i Beljkašić, Ljiljana, Neka vjerovanja Cigana čergačergač šašaš (Some Beliefs Held

by Nomadic Gypsies), Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja, XIII, Sarajevo, 1958.Vlada Savezne Republike Jugoslavije: Ed Memoar o problemima izbeglica u SRJ (The

Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Ed Memoir on Refugee Problem in FRY)Problem in FRY)Problem in FRY , Beograd, 1993.

Vlahović, Petar, Etnoantropološke odlike Roma u Jugoslavijiške odlike Roma u Jugoslavijiš (Ethnoanthropological (Ethnoanthropological (Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia), Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, SANU, Beograd, 1992.

Vujović, Sreten, Romi i stanovanje (Roma and Housing (Roma and Housing ( ), Društvene promene i položaj Roma and Housing), Društvene promene i položaj Roma and HousingRoma, SANU – Institut za socijalnu politiku, Beograd, 1993.

• 51


Vukanović, Tatomir, Romi (Cigani) u Jugoslaviji (Roma/Gypsies in Yugoslavia(Roma/Gypsies in Yugoslavia( ), Nova Jugoslavija, Vranje, 1983.

Weyrauch, O, Gypsy Law, University of California Press, 1997.Živković, Jovan, Sudbina Roma sa Kosova (The Destiny of Romanies from Kosovo),

Romi, Sv. 1, Pelikan print, Niš, 2000, in English: Facta Universitatis, Series Philosophy and Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 8, 2001.

Zajić, Gradimir, Položaj i perspektive Roma na tržaj i perspektive Roma na trž žaj i perspektive Roma na tržaj i perspektive Roma na tr ištu rada (The Changes in Labor Market and Status and Perspectives of the Roma), Cigani/Romi u prošlosti i danas (Gypsies/Roma in Past and Present), SANU, Beograd, 2000.

Zirojević, Olga, Romi na području danačju danač šnje Jugoslavije u doba turske vladavinešnje Jugoslavije u doba turske vladavineš (Roma (Roma (in the Territory of Today’s Yugoslavia in the Period of Turkish Rule’s Yugoslavia in the Period of Turkish Rule’ ), Glasnik Etnografskog muzeja, XLV, Beograd, 1981.

NOTES1 Vladimir Stanković (1992), „Romi u svetlu podataka jugoslovenske statistike“ (“Roma

in Light of Yugoslav Statistical Data”), in: Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije [The Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems and Tendencies], SANU, Belgrade, p. 164. Similarly, Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić (1998) argue that “... life in a mahala, however segregated, has helped Roma in a way to preserve their ethnic identity.” See Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić, “Društveni položaj Roma u Srbiji”, [Social Status of Roma in Serbia] in: Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia], Centar za antiratnu akciju i Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade, p. 56.

2 If not stated otherwise, all data in this paper are results of these fi eld researches...Results of this research were published in Jakšić, Božidar i Goran Bašić, Umetnost preživljavanja, Gde i kako žive Romi u Srbiji, (Art of Surviving, Where and How Living , (Art of Surviving, Where and How Living , (Roma in Serbia), Institut za fi lozofi ju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd 2005. (partly in English, p. 219-272).

3 The unit of survey research has been, then, the family which is – not only in the Roma culture and tradition – the basic unit of social life and the basis of the internal solidarity of the Roma community. The examination of Roma and non-Roma families was supposed to show whether and under what conditions the integration of Roma, especially displaced Roma, is possible – if it is possible at all.Apart from survey fi eldwork on interviewing Roma and non-Roma families, empirical evidence was collected from other sources as well: municipal and regional administrative bodies, Red Cross organizations, Roma associations and societies, previously published and unpublished research, etc. Members of the research team and their assistants in the fi eld have also used methods of description and observation.700 Roma families and 350 families of Roma’s neighbors (Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians), in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo excluded, have been chosen according to the sample obtained from the members of the Republican Statistical Institute of Serbia, Belgrade, on the basis of the offi cial population census conducted in 1991. In the fi rst step, the sample was a quota one, while in the second, it was pro-random. Also, during survey fi eldwork we have had 40 interviews with the activists of Roma societies and institutions, public opinion makers, representatives of concerned institutions and NGOs. Most interviewers were either sociologists experienced in researching the Roma population, or Roma who had an excellent knowledge of the fi eld and had been previously acquainted with the subject and the goals of the research, and specially

52 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

trained for conducting the survey. In cases when the interviewers were non-Roma professional sociologists, the contact person in the settlement was most frequently a Rom. Members of the research team, coordinators of the fi eldwork moved through the Roma settlements, whenever possible, together with Roma activists, acquainted with the local situation. In this way the principle «nothing about Roma without Roma» was respected in the research procedure as well.

4 Maybe also out of fear that someone who makes decisions on the basis of the results of this study may conclude that the aid given so far has been too large and too diverse. For the same reason they sometimes concealed data on who in the family is engaged in economic activities. This did not mean simple distrust of the research and the interviewers, but an accumulated life experience that has taught one to be wary when “the state gets interested in Roma”, for, “with the state, you never know”.

5 As the following example illustrates, Roma are discriminated against not only in employment, but also in the manner of losing their previous steady jobs. The example is characteristic and refers to Roma from Kosovo who held steady jobs “with the railways”. They fl ed to central Serbia, for example, to Kraljevo, together with Serbs also employed “at the railways”. And while Serbs did not lose the status of permanently employed, Roma lost this status. Serbs employed in the judiciary, in education and health institutions regularly received their monthly “salaries”, while Roma received decisions on being fi red. The fi rst explanation was that, after coming to Kraljevo, they did not register for work at the appropriate offi ce and that such was the reason for being fi red. But later on, this explanation was replaced by another one, saying that they are mostly unskilled workers “who are not needed”.

6 See Milutin Prokić (1992), “Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji” [“Socio-economic Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia”], in: Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije, [Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems and Tendencies] SANU, Belgrade, p. 107.

7 Aleksandra Mitrović and Gradimir Zajić (1998), “Društveni položaj Roma u Srbiji” [“Social Position of Roma in Serbia”], in: Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia], Centar za antiratnu akciju/Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade, p. 29.

8 See also Romsko naselje “Mali London“Mali London“ ” u Pančevu (The čevu (The č “Little London“Little London“ ” Roma Settlement in Pančevo), čevo), č (2000) Društvo za unapređivanje romskih naselja / Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Belgrade, p. 26. Similarly, in the collection of papers Javno mnjenje Srbije (Public Opinion in Serbia) (1999) (Udruženje za unapređivanje empirijskih istraživanja, Belgrade), a contributor, Dragan Popadić, writes: “Subjective feeling is a considerably more important indicator of the quality of life than a set of objective criteria such as income, property, etc. Thus the questionnaire constructed by the World Health Organization to measure quality of life, apart from the general assessment of the respondent’s own health condition and life in general, includes a set of questions referring to depression, anxiety and neurasthenia. These symptoms are known to be indices of stress, i.e. typical reactions to short- or long-term stressful circumstances. Subjective well-being is also continuously measured in “Eurobarometer” polls conducted since 1973 in most European Union countries” (p. 91).

9 During the winter this researcher has several times visited a Roma family living in impossibly poor housing conditions. In one encounter with the 70-year-old head of household, exceptionally old for the average life span of the Roma population, the researcher wondered how they would survive the cold winter at all. To the question of how they were doing, the host replied: “Why do you ask? Excellent, of course!”

• 53


10 Source: Demografski pregled [Demographic review], Belgrade, Vol. IV, No. 16/2003, p. 1.

11 According to Slavoljub Đorđević, program director of the Roma Information Center in Kragujevac, 70% of Roma are illiterate or semi-literate. “With illiteracy so widely spread, Roma fi nd it diffi cult to escape from the margins of society”. Quoted in the daily Danas, 5-6 July 2003, p. 5.

12 In the second section of the volume, titled “Strategies and Approaches”, where data on desegregation of “Roma schools” are supplied, we may fi nd the fi gures for Bulgaria in 1992: just 4.9% of the relevant Roma population had secondary education, and 0.1% university diplomas. This practically means that only every thousandth Roma person in Bulgaria at the time had university education. The respective percentages for the majority Bulgarian population are: 36.5% secondary education, 4.9% university. See, Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality,( 2002) ed. by Claude Cahn, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, p. 82.

13 Andžej Mirga and Nicolae Gheorge, “Romski narod u istorijskom kontekstu”, [The Roma in Historical Perspective] Romološke studiješke studiješ ⁄ke studije⁄ke studije Romology Studies, ⁄Romology Studies, ⁄ Series I, Vol. I, Aug.-Dec. 1997, p. 11. The authors explicate this basic claim in the following way: “Roma are facing the fundamental dilemma of whether to preserve traditional differences contributing to their differential and unequal treatment, or to accept the need for change and modernization, which might help them achieve equality, but might also change their identity. A majority of Roma political and cultural elite is aware that education is the key to modernization. However, education, particularly nowadays, requires material resources and obligations. In the case of many Roma communities both are lacking. Since deteriorated and humiliating living and housing conditions predominate, Roma have not been accustomed to schooling, and high percentages of the parents are illiterate, many view the investments demanded by education with suspicion. Moreover, traditional families and groups are convinced that education would result in the disappearance of Roma identity. Therefore they oppose the education of their children. Thus the crux of the matter is: how to win equality and stay different.” Ibid. p. 39-40.

14 Aleksandra Mitrović i Gradimir Zajić (1998), “Društveni položaj Roma u Srbiji” [Social Status of Roma in Serbia]. Uporedi Romi u Srbiji [Roma in Serbia], Centar za antiratnu akciju i Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd, p. 43. The quoted opinion ought to be taken cum grano sali. For, Serbia is a society with extremely high unemployment of precisely the highly educated: physicians, teachers, lawyers, engineers etc. The percentage of unemployed in Serbia ranges about 30% of the total workforce! The low level of education is certainly a handicap in competing for better paid jobs and in this respect the authors are right. But Serbia is a place where jobs are scarce for anyone, including Roma. In a situation where the “black market” is fl ourishing, the “black labor market” included (the so-called grey economy), Roma are even better equipped to cope than the majority.

15 Milutin Prokić (1992), “Socijalno ekonomske karakteristike Roma u Jugoslaviji” [“Socio-economic Characteristics of Roma in Yugoslavia”], in: Razvitak Roma u Jugoslaviji – Problemi i tendencije [Development of Roma in Yugoslavia – Problems and Tendencies], SANU, Belgrade, p. 112.

16 Sulejman Hrnjica (1993), “Izrada kompenzatorskih programa obrazovanja za učenike romske etničke grupe“ [“Compensatory Educational Programs for Pupils from Roma Ethnic Group”], in: Društvene promene i položaj Romažaj Romaž [Social Changes and Status of Roma], SANU, Institut za socijalnu politiku, Belgrade, p. 183.

54 •

Božidar JAKŠIĆ

17 Suffi ce it to say that in Slovenia for instance in 1994 just 18% or Roma kids were going to school. See Mladen Tancer (2000), “Primarna defi citarnost u odgoju i obrazovanju dece Roma u Sloveniji” [Primary defi cit in education and training of Roma children in Slovenia], in: Cigani⁄Cigani⁄Cigani Romi u pro⁄Romi u pro⁄ šlosti i danas [Gypsies/Roma in the Past and Today], SANU, Belgrade, p. 153.

18 Marta Vidaković Mukić, “Stigmatizacija i međuetnički odnosi – primjer Roma u Međumurju” [Stigmatization and interethnic relations – the example of Roma in Međumurje], paper prepared for the symposium “Stigmatizacija i identitet marginalnih grupa u procesu globalizacije kulture” [Stigmatization and identity of marginal groups in the process of cultural globalization], based on the study conducted by Ombudsman’s Bureau and the Croatian Helsinki Committee during 2001 and the fi rst three months of 2002. The cited data are found in the Appendix, p. 4. In light of these results the following statement by Neven Horvatić sounds almost cynical: “Elementary school is for Roma pupils an immanently educational and integrational institution”. See Neven Horvatić, “Odgoj i izobrazba Roma u Hrvatskoj” [Education and training of Roma in Croatia], Društvena istraživanja, (Quarterly) Zagreb, Vol. 9 (2000), No. 2-3 (46-47) p. 80.

19 Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić and Ágnes Székely (2002), “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe”, in: Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for Equality, ed. by Claude Cahn, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, p. 71-72.

20 Ibid, p. 73.Ibid, p. 73.Ibid21 Marija Vidović writes: “Education of Roma children as a channel of social promotion

has been blocked for the already well known economic and socio-cultural reasons: deprived social milieu, absence of elementary economic preconditions for studying, absence of support on the part of parents and the broader social environment, low premium placed on education, lack of familiarity with the language of the majority, failure to attend pre-school institutions. Dropping out of elementary school in such circumstances becomes almost inevitable, and the more persistent ones who do fi nish elementary school are often sent to schools for kids slightly developmentally retarded, as pseudo-retarded or ‘borderline cases’”. See Marija Vidović (2000), “Romi i srednje stručno obrazovanje” [Roma and Secondary Vocational Education”], in: Cigani⁄Cigani⁄Cigani Romi ⁄Romi ⁄u prošlosti i danas, [Gipsies/Roma in Past and Present], SANU, Belgrade, p. 177.

22 “Centuries of discrimination have alienated the Roma from the modern educational system in the region, just as they have been alienated from others spheres of society. Discrimination in education reproduces the effects of intergenerational discrimination. Governments and other authorities do not demonstrate willingness to act in good faith to punish abuse at school or to desegregate the schools…. so that most Roma children in the educational system in Central and Eastern Europe are still at the zero point (the beginning) of their struggle for equal success in the quality of education.” Ibid, p. 80.

23 Marta Vidaković Mukić, Op.cit. p. 6.24 See Claude Cahn, David Chirico, Cristina McDonald, Viktória Mohácsi, Tatjana Perić

and Ágnes Székely (2002), “Roma in the Educational Systems of Central and Eastern Europe”, u Roma Rights: Race,Justice, and Strategies for Equality, ed. by Claude Cahn, International Debate Education Association, New York, Amsterdam, Brussels, str. 75.

• 55

INTRODUCTION

Before launching the fi eld study concerning identity constructions amongst the Roma, we met the Roma’s baron in Moldova, Mr. Artur Cerari, in order to discuss the Moldovan Roma’s situation, the problems they face and their community development perspectives. At the end of our discussion, which lasted for quite a while, the baron said some words that impressed us a lot: “We, Roma and Moldovans, have been living together for centuries, but you, Moldovans, have always watched us from a distance”. We rendered justice to the baron with a single reservation that Roma watch Moldovans “from somewhere far away” too.

During the study we carried out with Roma, we tried to watch them not “from somewhere far away”, as the baron reproached but rather from somewhere as close as possible in order to understand the way they perceive the world and refl ect themselves in it. We were also interested in the way they plan and imagine their life, and the identity problems they are confronted with. Although very present in everyday reality, and moreover, in the collective mentality, where negative labels are often attributed to them, Roma represent quite an inciting and challenging problem in the wider socio-cultural cognition.

The data collected in this fi eld study refl ect the way Roma from Moldova perceive and understand different aspects of identity building processes. In a second part, we present this material analysis, but we thought it important to fi rst offer a short descriptive note on the Roma community from the Republic of Moldova.

MOLDOVA’S ROMA

According to the latest population census data (2004), there are 12 268 people of Roma ethnic origin residing in the Republic of Moldova, that is 0,2 % of the total

IDENTITY PATTERNS IN THE ROMA MINORITY FROM THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Ion NEGURA & Veronica PEEV

56 •


population. The UNDP-Moldova 2007 report on the Roma community from the Republic of Moldova (Cacea et al. 2007) shows a number of 15,000 Roma, according to their own personal survey. This offi cial data is contested by Roma NGOs and their leaders. The Roma National Centre, for instance, states that the number of Roma in the Republic of Moldova is of about 200,000, which represents 4% of the population of the Republic of Moldova (http://www.roma.md). Nevertheless, this fi gure does not have a corresponding statistical coverage to back it up. The confusion concerning the number of Roma is generated by the fact that certain Roma hide their ethnic origin, declaring for multiple and various reasons a different identity.

Roma are dispersed, according to their residential place, over the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. They can be found in all the country districts, but most of them are settled in Ocniţa, Soroca and Nisporeni districts, where one can fi nd locations compactly inhabited by Roma communities.

Roma living conditions do not tend to reach high standards. Indeed, according to the UNDP 2007 report, over 80% of Roma settlements do not have facilities such as: running waters, WC, bath and canalization system (Cacea et al. 2007).

Roma life expectancy is estimated to be at around 63 years of age; that is 3 years less compared to the whole of the Republic of Moldova’s population. Only 23% of Roma have medical insurance policies, while the policy-holder ratio among non-Roma is of 59%.

Roma education and literacy levels are lower compared to the country’s average. Every fi fth Roma can neither write, nor read. A Roma with a University degree is a rare occurrence. Only 4% of Roma are University diploma holders, while University the degree-holder ratio among non-Roma is of 38%.

The Roma situation on the labour market is quite diffi cult too; indeed, unemployment among Roma is twice as high than among non-Roma. The long periods of unemployment have profound and negative effects on the Roma community. It is also clear to see that Roma women are decreasingly present on the labour market scene. This can be explained by the traditional perception of a woman’s role; that is, being a mother, bringing up children and “employed” as a housewife in order to keep the house clean and tidy. Low levels of schooling for the women are also considered another reason for their absence on the labour market. Low levels of education mean poor qualifi cations and allow for employment in low-paid jobs only. It also increases poverty incidence risk within the Roma community. Given that Moldova is considered to be the poorest European country, the Roma minority is qualifi ed as the most vulnerable ethnic group from economic and social points of view (Cacea et al. 2007).

Research methodology

This study is a qualitative research based on the qualitative analysis of data gathered by means of a thorough semi-structured interview. The purpose of the investigation was to obtain information concerning identity building strategies in people who accepted (more or less) their Roma belonging. We guided the interviewees towards the issues of our interest allowing them to speak freely about their lives.

The target that our fi eldwork aimed at was the individual identity strategies used by Roma for gaining recognition and integration in the wider civic and political society.

• 57

Identity Patterns in the Roma Minority from the Republic of Moldova

We were interested in the diversity of Roma representations and group references, and this is why we selected a sample of 15 informants matching the following criteria:

1. Age: the oldest – 67 years old; the youngest – 21 years old; average: 39 years old.

2. Gender: male – 10 informants; female – 5 informants.3. Place of residence: rural- 5 informants; city – 10 informants.4. Religion affiliation: orthodox – 13 informants; neo-protestant – 2

informants.5. Education level: 1-8 years of schooling – 4 informants; vocational college – 6

informants; university education – 5 informants.6. Social activity: involved in NGO – 9 informants; not involved – 6

informants.

Empirical Data and Research Results

Our research resulted in 15 transcription texts which were subjected to content analysis. Each transcript consists of 15 to 30 pages.

The results of the interview analysis have been organized, for convenience, in categories corresponding to different themes of discussion or questions and answers (which are taken from the interviewed informants’ statements).

1. Who has the right to assume Roma identity?

We received a single and very categorical answer: “a Roma is Roma by birth” (I.D., 34 years), but this fact has to be proven daily by: 1) respecting the ancestors’ traditions taken from the Gypsy camp; 2) knowing and using the Roma language; 3) wearing the Roma clothes; 4) obtaining recognition within the Roma community; 5) living among Roma; 6) doing different good, useful and honorable things for the Roma community’s

welfare.

From the content analysis, we can identify different and frequently opposing ideas regarding the Roma identity and the way the informants themselves perceive it. Some informants consider that identity uncertainty does not exist among Roma: they either are Roma or are not (M.S., female, 40 years old; R.N. male, 30 years old). Nevertheless, cases where Roma identity is neglected but at a later stage sought after and valued to re-integrate the Roma community are not rare.

The Roma community holds control over the processes of acceptance and refusal of a Roma who intends to reintegrate into his/her native ethnicity. It is worth mentioning that before one takes the fi nal decision of giving up their Roma identity, the community gives them time to refl ect on the situation. Meanwhile, Roma discuss the issue with the concerned individual in order to convince him/her to change his/her mind. By doing so, they give that person another chance to think over the decision. They care about their ethnic image as well as that of every member of the community. They do not give up easily on a member.

58 •


Among the reasons for refusing one’s ethnic identity that emerged from the interviews we carried out, we can mention the following:

1) the person was forced, by attitudes persisting in the wider society, in the form of prejudices and stereotypes towards Roma people;

2) the person lives among other ethnicities (far from Roma communities); 3) the person was brought up in a mixed family.

In the case where the individual rethinks his/her decision and regrets it, he/she can regain the trust and recognition of the Roma community only if the individual proves his/her change of mind by actions and deeds. This usually takes time.

“To regain his Roma identity he has to try and fi ght. He has to do important things for the Roma community, to share the same values and feelings.” (R.N. male, 30 years old).

Roma attitudes towards the person who once refused his Roma identity and wants to regain it are ambivalent; it usually depends upon the gender of the person. A woman, compared to a man, is discriminated by the community. It can also happen that the Roma who denied his ethnic identity once, is never accepted by the community even if he desires to assume it again.

Those who refuse to fully assume and yet keep their Roma identity are severely punished by the community; they are usually driven out and neglected. In this case “blood relations” lose their value. “They lose the community respect. Because of them the entire family suffers” (D.M., female, 43 years old); “They are perceived as a nobody” (I.D., male, 34 years); “It’s a big shame not to be proud of your ethnicity. We don’t respect that person because he/she is refusing us” (M.S., female, 40 years old).

2. How do the Roma become conscious of their ethnicity?

Resulting from the statement content analysis, we identifi ed the following sources as to how Roma become ‘ethnically conscious’:

1) from the education they received in the family where they assimilate the laws and the Roma lifestyle; “The child must learn all Gypsy laws from his parents as he/she grows up”.

2) from their ethnic belonging as taught by their parents; “My parents told me simply that I am a pure seed from Gypsy and that I have to be proud of It”.

3) from understanding the attitude (which is more often negative) displayed by other ethnicities towards Roma people; “When I was a child the children from my village were calling me “Gypsy, Gypsy”. So I understood that I am different, I am a Gypsy”.

4) by their own understanding, judging from circumstances, from the context.“It came through discussions, we spoke Gypsy language, and you understood that a different language was spoken; the circumstances made me understand that I am different.”

3. The ethnic identity and other forms of identities

From interviewing our informants, we observed that the concerned individuals assumed more than one identity. We noticed that this, in turn, formed a unique hierarchical

• 59


structure in which different identities were put forth depending on the context and circumstances. Synthesizing the statements we identifi ed the following structures:

1) One’s ethnic identity comes fi rst: “I am a Gypsy, Roma by ancestors; I am a true Gypsy, without any mixture, I am an orthodox Christian; I am a citizen of the Republic of Moldova” (D.M. female, 43 years old). “According to my origin I am Gypsy; I am a citizen of Moldova; I respect the native people’s religion; I am obliged to respect the law of this country” (I.F., male). “So I come from ancestors, I belong to ironsmith’s clan. I am an ironsmith Roma” (I.S., male, 21 years old).

2) One’s personal identity comes fi rst, followed by one’s ethnic identity: “personal identity comes fi rst, followed by one’s ethnic identity: “personal I identity comes fi rst, followed by one’s ethnic identity: “I identity comes fi rst, followed by one’s ethnic identity: “am A.D., a Gypsy woman, wife and mother” (A.D., female, 30 years old). “I am S. M., but according to my identity card I am Ecaterina … I am a woman … a housewife, a wife what else I can say …” (M.S., female, 40 years old). “I am I.D., I have graduated from the Political Sciences and History Department at State University of Moldova. I took my doctor degree at Academy of sciences in political domain at the Institute of Sociology and Law. I identify myself as Roma, but among the Roma I am not recognized as one of them” (I.D., male, 34 years old).

3) The religious identity comes fi rst: “First of all I am Christian. Secondly, identity comes fi rst: “First of all I am Christian. Secondly, identity comes fi rst: “I feel Roma in my soul, mind, and body. And thirdly, I am a citizen” (P.F., male, 30 years old). “The most important for me is to be a Christian, I am Roma” (F.F., male, 44 years old). “I choose just God, I am not Orthodox I am not Baptist, I am just the child of God” (V.S., male, 57 years old).

4) The family identity comes fi rst: “My name is A.C., the son of M.C., God identity comes fi rst: “My name is A.C., the son of M.C., God identity comes fi rst: “forgives him, and the well known baron of the ex-Soviet Union. I was his right hand: no matter where he went I was near” (A.C., male).

4. Roma self-perception

We can divide the interviewed people into two categories: those who form the elite of the Roma community and the common Roma. These categories are characterised by the differences we identifi ed within the Roma community. The common Roma tend to present their ethnicity in a favourable light, but the elite spotlight the weak points of their ethnicity as a group.

The common Roma perceive their ethnicity as: 1) an old civilization, 2) a talented nation, 3) an ethnicity where respect and mutual help are the distinctive notes, 4) a nation with industrious people.

In the elite’s perception, the Roma nation consists of people: 1) scattered on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, 2) who lack a person with authority who would favour the implementation of

new elements in the Roma lifestyle, 3) with a lack of union between Roma from different clans, 4) with a strong conservative character kept over the centuries, 5) who are unemployed in the social work fi eld (this is the situation specifi c

to the majority of them),

60 •


6) who do not advertise their ethnicity. We noticed that Roma coexistence with other nations contributed towards the production of changes in Roma ways of living. This process of change is slow, but it nonetheless certifi es the possibility of rethinking the Roma life style.

5. Roma distinctive peculiarities

Roma are distinguished between other ethnicities due to the following characteristics:

1) physical characteristics: thick-lipped, with big noses and eyes, dark-skinned, men are pot-bellied;

2) clothes: longer skirts, coloured clothes adorned with different specifi c ornaments for women;

3) verbal and physical behaviour: loud voices, have a specifi c accent, a lot of gesticulation;

4) worn symbols: different symbols, fl owers, jewellery, gold;5) intuition: their sixth sense;6) traditions

6). Roma tradition

Roma traditions are almost the same to those of the majority, but there are some distinctive peculiarities that witness to their ancestors’ way of living. The most important traditions are described by our informants as follows.

Engagement: The parents decide which family they will be related to through the marriage of their children. This decision may take place at the child’s birth or during his/her childhood up until adolescence.

Wedding: This represents an indispensable event which marks the beginning of the newly formed family among the Roma community. Through the years, they have kept to their ancestors’ way of celebrating this event in spite of individual families’ fi nancial situation. The crucial elements of their party are:

1) presents: gold, different household objects, big amounts of money; 2) Roma music; 3) bride’s virginity check and the symbols related to it: the bottle of red wine

decorated with a red ribbon, basil and a red fl ower (a rose); 4) food: dishes prepared from fresh meat are predominant; 5) guests being placed at the table: women and men sit separately, that is, at

different sides of the table.We also highlighted some benefi ts that are, for Roma, equated with the wedding

and getting married: 1) a way of earning for the bride’s parents; 2) a way of self affi rmation for the groom’s parents; 3) a way of obtaining a social status (“The richer the wedding, the higher the

groom’s parents’ authority” (I.D., N.R.));

• 61


4) a way of self affi rmation for each Roma (“You feel like a sultan at the wedding” (R.N.)… “The wedding is the place where Roma can get together and present dances and songs…” (P.F., I.F.);

5) family pride (D.M.)

Remarriage: It is possible but seldom occurs, and only in the situation when the spouse is deceased. Only the man has the right to remarry: “… the widow remains under her brother’s care; if the woman remains alone and without children, she fi nds her mission” (A.D).

Birth: A child’s birth represents a great joy for parents. The reasons are presented here:

1) “ for Roma, the child means wealth” (D.M., P.F.); 2) “[a child is] a source of making money: if the girl is honest, you get money

for her; begging; the presents brought for the new born are money, gold and other things related to the child’s gender” (I.D.);

3) the family’s continuation (all the informants mentioned this aspect)(all the informants mentioned this aspect)(The birth is celebrated like the wedding, the gold presents are indispensable and in

this case acts as a sign of child purity and is for his/her protection from evil.Death: Roma are religious people (according to their testimonies), but at the same

time they do not respect the religious laws entirely, they adjust them to their way of thinking and living: “We keep the dead person for 9 days… because of our way of living – they travel and work in Russia, Ukraine, Romania – it takes time for them to come back and take farewell, it’s impossible to do everything in one day” (P.F.).

Gypsy Law: It represents a code of laws conveyed orally from generation to generation which refl ect different life situations and their possible solutions. These laws are related to Roma culture, language and traditions. Roma are acquainted with the consequence of law breaking from their youngest years.

These laws determine the type of relations to entertain within the ethnicity, community and family and, at the same time, they suppose obedience to the oldest person’s word. There is a hierarchy of obedience among the family’s men relations: “the grandfather can interfere only in case of a quarrel between husband and wife, but he has no right to interfere in the grandson’s education” (R.N.).

The man, in Roma culture, takes all the decisions in the family; he is the master of the family and has to be listened to even if it does not seem right. If there is a confl ict, the woman must submit; the husband is the one to take the deciding steps. The woman can address the eldest man only through his wife. Problems connected with women are resolved through the abbot’s wife.

The CRIS represents Roma trials where the judges are the oldest men from the community and those with authority (baron), who expect the obedience of Roma laws by the Roma community.

Purity rituals: These remain to be a distinctive element for Roma. Some of them are: the woman and man’s clothes are kept and washed separately; the husband takes place fi rst at the table and just after this his wife and children. This tradition is based on the belief that a Roma woman is less pure than a man due to the physiological differences (i.e. menstruation) (I.D., I.S., A.C.).

62 •


7. Roma symbols

Another distinctive sign for Roma culture is represented by the symbols present in their houses, on their clothes and for their holidays.

Gold is considered to be the defi ning element for Roma, without gold Roma would Gold is considered to be the defi ning element for Roma, without gold Roma would Goldnot exist. We identifi ed some of the meanings of gold in the Roma worldview:

1) a symbol of material welfare; 2) a means of exchange “Our ancestors had gold which was taken from them

by the authorities; they used it as an exchange currency” (N.R.); 3) as a sign of tidiness, of Roma soul purity (all informants mentioned this); 4) a way of improving one’s self image “ for Roma, gold is for being seen in

a better light” (V.S., P.F.).

The red rose and red wine are the symbol for the bride’s purity.The sweet basil signifi es The sweet basil signifi es The sweet basil “the girl’s obedience and belief in her husband” (A.D.,

M.S.).Houses have different meanings, such as: a way of gaining authority within Roma

community; a source of pride; a refl ection of their ancestors’ needs and a sign of their wealth; the fi nancial possibilities of the master who built it; proof of the owner’s originality and uniqueness. Roma houses are decorated with different elements which become strictly necessary to a Roma house. Thus they refl ect the house master’s essence as well as the spirit of the entire nation. “…they make different fl owers from iron plates, and decorate the house showing that a certain person is the householder” (M.S.).

8. Roma relations within the community

Another element of self-perception within the Roma community is related to the essence of their relations within the community: “The relations among Roma are characterized by mutual help, understanding, respect, and solidarity” (R.N., I.D., M.S., I.C.). To be Roma supposes to help other Roma unconditionally, when he/she is in need. In this case the most important linking element is the language. Their ethnic affi liation links the Roma together. Furthermore, the maintenance of this kind of relations is ensured by Roma laws.

The Roma community, from the welfare point of view, is homogeneous. We identifi ed rich as well as poor Roma, nevertheless there cannot be found one single way of perceiving poor and rich Roma. A poor Roma is most frequently declared to be lazy and is not helped by the community, with the exception of some circumstances which are particularly diffi cult. The richer Roma are considered to be people with other possibilities of earning money, and with higher intellectual abilities. This difference could serve as a rationale for the poorer Roma’s envy. Yet in order to avoid such a problem, the elderly people deal with this subject by offering all the needed explanations to the younger generations. Judging from those explanations, reported by some of our Roma informants, the “poor Roma” phenomenon does not exist, as Roma help each other out.

• 63


9. Roma family

The family represents another defi ning element in terms of ethnicity. Indeed, within the Roma community, family is sacred. It represents the supreme value for them. Life habits, traditions, specifi c gender roles, types of behaviour in the future family, etc. – all of these are learned within the family. Roma family is like a fortress: “What has happened in my family remains there. Only the Roma could know but not the neighbors” (M.S.).

The traditional Roma family consists of grandparents, parents and grandchildren. They consider each other as relatives up to the third generation. In the worldview of some Roma, the godparents, who have to be and thus usually are Roma, are considered to be relatives too. It is interesting to note that relatives from other ethnicities are not accepted or considered as part of the family.

The fundamental bond in the family are the parents, if they are dead, the older brother or sister take over and become the family’s main reference.

Existing relations within the family are established in advance by means of the law code which settles Roma life:

• “the man and the woman respect each other”;• “the man rules the family”;• “the woman listens to and obeys the man, if he makes a mistake she has to

forgive him”;• “the woman has to listen to her parents-in law”;• “the ‘familial garbage’ is not taken outside of the family: that is, the quarrels,

the misunderstandings”;• “the wife has to serve her husband”;• “if there are guests in the house, the woman is not allowed to pass in front

of the husband, she can only pass behind him”;• “if the husband dies his place is offered to a man from the family, if there

are just girls the entire Roma community takes care of them. [The wife] does not stay alone, there is always somebody nearby who guides and protects her. Our law does not let the woman rule the family because she does not know how to perform this task by herself” (I.S., R.N. and others).

These rules contribute to the maintenance of family purity; they prevent betrayal, the husband’s or wife’s corruption and, at the same time, this set of rules ensures the avoidance of potential problems between the members of the family. The person responsible for family welfare is the man, he takes all the decisions. If the wife betrays her husband, she is driven out of the family; the husband’s infi delity is not a topic of discussion.

The election of the future partner takes place at a very early age (between one’s birth until the age of 13-14, by means of an agreement between parents) and is based on the criteria of ethnic affi liation, which requires the same social status on both parts.

In the case of assimilated Roma, this principle is not rigorously observed, although the most successful marriage is considered to be strictly between Roma: “…they say it is better to marry a Roma woman, she wouldn’t discriminate her husband”(I.D.).

64 •


In the last decades the existence of Roma mixed families has became a more regular occurrence, which is considered to be a way of facilitating Roma integration into the wider society. The presence of a Gadjo within the family no longer means Roma laws have been violated. A Roma mixed family is the result of a Roma and non-Roma’s unity; but only when the Roma is a man. Indeed, the Roma woman’s marriage to a non-Roma man is not accepted by the tradition. The non – Roma woman is accepted and recognized by the Roma husband’s clan as a member of the family as long as she accepts to learn the Roma language, identifi es herself as Roma, respects Roma traditions and considers her children to be Roma.

The permission for such a marriage is given by the “council of the oldest”, where the younger members of the community are asked to think properly over their decision before forming the family. The man’s parents also take care to ensure the young family with a house.

10. Roma and non-Roma relationships

The way Roma build their relationships with other ethnicities represents a facilitative strategy of their integration into society by means of the conciliating attitude towards others. This attitude is formed due to the education received in the family and ensures their peaceful coexistence with other ethnicities. They were taught, from their youngest years, to be prudent with others and to build their relationships on the same principles of respect and help which govern the relationships between Roma.

Some Roma tend to keep people of other ethnicities at a distance from their family, yard, and territory. The explanation of such behaviour is: “What has happened in my family remains there. Only the Roma should know but not the neighbors. Why should they know if we live well?” (M.S., I.C.)... “Why should Moldavians live among the Roma?” (A.C.). “The Moldavian has to look for another place, as it is Gypsy territory” (I.S.).

In the Roma perception, the attitudes of others towards them are impregnated with discriminative elements. “People discriminate Gypsies; they don’t respect any human rights. The Gypsies are the most humiliated nation in the world” (I.F.).

Nevertheless, as a result of the interview content analysis we identifi ed a large variety of attitudes towards Roma: positive, negative and neutral.

Positive: “Roma are accepted and have equal rights if compared to other ethnicities”, “They can attend public houses, buy a place where and when they want” (A.M.).

Negative: “Moldavians discriminate Roma when they automatically attribute to them the responsibility for all the offences which happened in the village” (R.N.) or when they are treated as follows: “In the Moldavians’ point of view, Roma are on a lower level, they can’t see Roma as smart, civilized, intellectual people” (I.D.).

Neutral: “The attitudes towards Roma are formed as a result of their work, due to their way of behaving towards others. Many people respect Gypsies because they are talented, but if they deceive others, they receive the corresponding attitude” (I.D., I.F.).

Common as well as elite Roma agree that the police represent the authority which most frequently causes problems to Roma; the policemen’s discriminative attitudes are said to be experienced the most intensely.

• 65


11. The Roma’s linguistic identity

The Romani language represents a means of identifi cation for Roma among other ethnicities: “Roma that don’t speak their native language or are ashamed when they do this, aren’t considered to be Roma” (A.M., F.F.).

Romani language is learned at home in the discussions held with the parents or with other Roma people. Roma are polyglots; they learn the languages of the ethnicities they live with. They easily switch from one language to another, depending on the situations and the people that are involved: “… if we are with Moldavians we speak Romanian language, with Russians – Russian language, with gypsies – Romani language” (D.M., R.N.) Although, they speak other languages they still think in their native language. Romani language has more dialects due to the wide word borrowing from the ethnicities they live with.

The respondents’ opinions regarding learning Romani language at school are divided into two categories:

1) for the learning of Romani language at school; 2) against the learning of Romani language at school.

In other words some people are in favour of and others are against Romani language learning.

Those who see the future perspectives of the Roma ethnicity’s development through the acquisition of Romani language at school think that it would be benefi cial to their ethnicity. They believe that many problems which they face today could be solved. The language learning process would be seen to:

• help Roma children avoid the diffi culties they face in learning different subjects; at present Roma children’s situation is a detrimental one: they are forced to learn and think in a language unknown to them, or which they have just begun to learn (I.D., I.S.);

• create a new image of Roma, and recreate the values which have been lost;

• change the existing image, the stereotypes regarding the Gypsies and who they are (R.N.);

• bring forth the existence of textbooks in Romani language (I.F.);• engender Roma general culture levels to rise and encourage Roma teachers

within the community (P.F.).

Romani language, according to some informants, V.S. and D.M., could be an optional subject in the school curriculum that would be studied by those who want to do so. Besides this, the idea of learning the languages spoken in and out of the country has also been emphasized (R.C.).

The reasons why some of the informants adopted the negative attitude towards Romani language learning at school are:

• Romani language does not have wide usage, it is not a written language, it is more of a spoken one and is needed only for Roma;

• learning in Romani will have opposite effects on the Roma’s integration tendency into the wider society, but studying other languages will facilitate this process. “Romani language is the language learned at home, I know

66 •


it perfectly well. There is no need to learn it at school. First of all we don’t have Gypsy teachers, then it’s more convenient to know more languages, Moldavian is richer than Roma” (D.M.). “I don’t think it is possible to study Roma at school because it isn’t used by the entire population. It is not correct; it is not good if we want them to be integrated in the society. We will block them if we interdict them to learn other languages” (R.C.).

12. Religious identity

Roma from the Republic of Moldova are affi liated to the majority population’s religion, namely the Christian Orthodox faith. The affi liation to the majority’s religion represents an effi cient strategy of social integration for Roma; this has been practiced over centuries: “The Gypsies have affi liated to the religion of the zone they live in. The Gypsies don’t have one single religion” (R.N.).

Although, they consider themselves as being religious people, they do not get involved in church activities. “Roma do not get involved in church activities because they don’t have such an experience” (P.F.). An exception would be the case of those Roma who sing in the church choir: “there are Roma who sing in the church choir” (I.C., A.D.).

Roma have spoken about themselves as being religious people, who fear God’s power. They cannot imagine their life without God: “For me religion is … you know when I pray I have a kind of relief, we have diffi culties but when I say God help me, I feel that I purify my soul, all rage comes out of me, and all Roma are alike. The Gypsies live with faith and music” (D.M.).

Their religiosity is spotlighted by:• frequent use of God’s words, in their oral speech, and God's name frequently

risen during conversation. For instance, “God’s will” (A.C.);• church attendance during holidays and other occasions;• calling on God's power in case of confl icts with other ethnicities.

For Roma, the church carries the status of a court of law, with a judge, and where justice is made. “When a confl ict happens, only the church helps us. We go there and declare the situation and that is all. And if you affi rmed untruthfully, then one day God may punish you” (A.C.).

Religious conversion is defi ned as a personal choice and is permitted by the “council of the old Roma”. As a result, new laws are worked out to settle the social-family life of the converted person:

1) if the husband changes his religion at any time, the wife keeps the clan’s religion no matter what her husband’s choice is;

2) if the woman changes her religion according to her own will, she will be isolated from the clan;

3) all confl icts of a religious nature are solved within the clan;4) the converted person has to listen to and obey the clan’s chief’s word;5) the converted Roma continue to respect Roma traditions.

The adoption of these laws represents a requirement addressed to the Roma community to be tolerant and accepting of the confessional choice of their brothers. The endeavors

• 67


of Roma leaders to keep the community united are very much understandable.The explanations for religious conversion are:

1) precarious fi nancial state;2) the offered humanitarian help;3) the existence of a leader which keeps them together;4) lack of discrimination between the members of the religious community

(they are all equal, they consider themselves as brothers in spite of their ethnicity);

5) the possibility given to a person to express him/herself (by means of songs, or reading prayers);

6) the sincerity and the positive psycho-social climate;7) curiosity;8) the high levels of suggestiveness of the converted person.

Interestingly, one’s affi liation to another religion does not contribute towards communication or relational problems between Roma; although some minor religious misunderstandings may occur. People who have affi liated to the neo-protestant confession assert that they found the real God; that their way of living is taken from the bible; and thus the quality of their spiritual life has been improved.

13. Roma mobility

Social and geographical mobility represent ways in which ethnic identity is constructed.

Roma geographical mobility is explained by their ancestors’ way of living; i.e. the nomadic lifestyle. They gained their existence by marketing different goods acquired from abroad. Although they have houses in Moldova, they work abroad for better earnings in order to ensure their survival. Moreover, Roma men do not take their wives abroad with them often and their destination tends to be Russia or Ukraine. There they work in agriculture, get into the building or commercial business or are involved in other kinds of businesses.

From a lifestyle perspective, geographical mobility does not exist for Roma; indeed they are now established in houses. On the other hand, to earn a wage, we see that Roma seek the most favourable environment for this to take place, already since their ancestors’ time. Some decades ago, they were moving to those favourable environments with the entire camp, today they tend to limit themselves to what they have earned at home.

Those who come back are not the same as when they left; they present some signs of change from the foreign conditions they incurred: “I think they change their points of view. The youngest leave and on their return home they tell the oldest what and how to do things, because they know more, so they rule. And they are accepted by the others” (R.N.).

Roma social mobility is extremely reduced. Seldom people from this ethnicity succeed in achieving a career, or in being promoted on a social level. If and when this occurs, it usually concerns men as they have more chances to succeed than women.

68 •


Indeed, women are to dedicate their life to family as Roma law ‘enforces’; even after their school, college, or university graduation they must ask for the husband’s or community’s permission to get involved in social life. “I have graduated from Medical College. At the moment I am a housewife and I practise medical service in the Roma community. The Gypsy woman stays home and takes care of the family, children, and husband. I have tried to work at the hospital, but there we are treated differently” (A.D.).

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The Roma identity is not given; it is formed during one’s life experience. Furthermore, one’s identity can be confi rmed or invalidated. This is done on the basis of the next three elements: the nation/clan the person proceeds from; the level of Roma language knowledge; and lastly, the person’s lifestyle. These criteria apply to almost all Roma. The most important elements of Roma identity are the clothes, the language, the family he/she comes from and the trade of their family. If a Roma assumes the Roma identity but some elements are missing, he is then isolated from the community.

The clan represents the most important identity criterion – and more importantly, represents the family’s source of prestige. Roma pay great attention to family prestige, as it can be handed down from one generation to the next, from one member to another. The other’s attitudes towards a member of the family affects the other members of the family.

The clothes and the language constitute the exterior signs of the person who holds and respects the traditions. The Roma language is the main means of communication used by Roma in different life situations, especially in those where ethnic identity is discussed. Besides Roma language, they speak and use, depending on the context, Russian and Romanian languages.

One’s trade has to bring benefi ts and be practised far from home. Roma’s mobility is highly appreciated by the Roma community. This mobility ensures the person can foster wide social relationships. Their business activities allow them to have a high rate of mobility within the country or abroad, which in turn gives a particular specifi city to the traditional as well as assimilated Roma lifestyles.

Their activity implies a high risk rate (the revenues are not constant), but they also bring in high benefi ts. When it comes to obtaining new benefi ts, it is very important for them to be independent and use their resources according to their will.

Through our research, we have noticed that Roma solve their problems within the confi nes of their own community, and do not relate to or call upon the authorities. They thus have an informal economy and their dependence on social institutions is minimal.

Finally, we can say that the community’s symbolical expression is related to a presumptive past or to tradition, which actually represents a selective construction of the past. Roma have clear representations regarding the past of their family, where the “nation” represents the fi rst element of their identity, followed by the clothes and language which also play a signifi cant role. We can also add to these elements which seem to form the Roma identity the value they place on economic benefi ts and social relationships.

• 69


REFERENCESBenovska-Sabkova M., “I am a pure Gypsy...” The Roma Individuality in the Distorted

Mirror of Group Stereotypes. In: Roma’s Identity in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria.Rome: Ethnobarometer Working Paper, June, 2003.

Cace S., Cantarji V., Sali N., Alla M., Romii în Republica Moldova. Raport PNUD-în Republica Moldova. Raport PNUD-îMoldova. Chişinău, 2007.

Chelcea S., Memorie socială şi identitate naţională. Bucureşti, 1998.Drăgulescu A., Lungu O., Neculau A., Ţiganii: o abordare psihosociologicŢiganii: o abordare psihosociologicŢ ă (Studiu

transcultural). Iaşi, 1996.Gennep A.V. (1996). Rituri de trecere. Iaşi: Polirom.Roma’s Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria’s Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria’ , by Giordano Ch., Boscoboinik A.,

Kostova D., Benovska-Sabkova M., Chanteraud A.. Ethnobarometer Working Paper June 2003. Rome, 2003.

Kostova D., The Perceptions and Self-Perceptions of Roma in Bulgaria. Individual and Community Crisis. In: Roma’s Identity in Southeast Europe : Bulgaria. Rome, Ethnobarometer Working Paper, June 2003.

Liebkind K., Ethnic Identity – Challenging the Boundaries of Social Psychology. In: Social Psychology of Identity and the Self-Concept. London: Surrey University Press, 1992.

Liégeois J.-P., Roma in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2007.Negură I., Peev V., Construcţiile identitare la romii din Republica Moldova. In : Revista

de psihologie, psihopedagogie specială şi asistenşă socială. No. 2/11, 2008.Sali N., Drosu V., Etnia Roma în Republica Moldovaîn Republica Moldovaî . Chişinău, 2002.Sali N., Duminica I., Emergenţa societăţii civile. Romii în Republica Moldova: în Republica Moldova: î între între î

toleranţă şi prejudecăţi. Chişinău, 2006.Stewart M., The Time of the Gypsies. Colorado & Oxford: Vestview Press, 1997.Tajfel H., An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Confl ict. London, 1979.Tarnovschi D., Identitatea romilor: construct istoric şi mediatic. Cluj-Napoca, 2002.

• 71

LA SÉLECTION DES ÉLITES DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS OCCIDENTALES

Le terme d’élite est attaché à quelques caractéristiques qui déterminent la sphère d’action de ceux qui en font partie – classe dirigeante, oligarchie, pouvoir, notoriété, classe politique – ou bien qui désignent la spécialisation de ceux qui occupent des positions dans une hiérarchie des compétences : managers, hauts fonctionnaires, gouvernementaux, « techniciens », bureaucrates (Coenen-Huther, 2004). Ceux-ci sont formés dans de hautes écoles pour devenir les professionnels du pouvoir. Puis ils montent par le truchement du « pôle formel » qu’ils représentent – dans la politique, dans la vie sociale, dans l’économie, occupent des places dans les structures du pouvoir, et se placent convenablement dans une hiérarchie (Collovald, 1985). Ces personnes expriment la « politique de l’Etat », le pouvoir institutionnel. La France témoigne d’un phénomène intéressant : lorsque le parti socialiste est arrivé au pouvoir, la logique partisane (exprimée à travers l’idéologie socialiste) a commencé à diminuer peu à peu et à se soumettre à la « logique d’Etat » ; ou, comme Pierre Birnbaum (1985) le dit, « au profi t du pouvoir d’Etat ». Le phénomène n’est pas spécifi que à la France mais au contraire s’est institutionnalisé. Il semble aujourd’hui que la constitution des groupes dirigeants soit plus ou moins contrôlée par les Etats-nations (Broady, Chmayko, Saint-Martin, 1997). Le destin des élites est de devenir un groupe dirigeant, une classe dirigeante. Au moyen de leur compétence professionnelle, de leur haute spécialisation ou vocation sociale, les représentants des élites occupent des positions d’où ils peuvent organiser, infl uencer, décider. Les représentants des élites gravitent autour des positions de pouvoir, des cercles gouvernementaux, des décideurs.

Toutes les sociétés ou les collectivités sont gouvernées par des élites ; c’est une tautologie à travers laquelle s’exprime la position d’autorité d’un groupe. Toute élite

ELITES ROM DANS LES ANCIENS PAYS COMMUNISTES

Le cas de la Roumanie

Adrian NECULAU, Mihai CURELARU, Daniela ZAHARIA & Daniela TARNOVSCHI

72 •


détient ses propres moyens de s’imposer, toujours différents des moyens des autres, le principal étant la compétence. L’institution de l’élite, pour fonctionner, a besoin d’être acceptée, sous la forme de reconnaissance de la compétence, alors que les positions-clés dans la société doivent être attestées (Suleiman, 1979). La réputation semble être la condition majeure de la reconnaissance d’une élite, tandis que la mauvaise réputation mène à des discriminations, elle disqualifi e, stigmatise (Croizet, Leyens, 2004). S’affi rmer contre le courant social discriminateur, acquérir la réputation dans les conditions où l’on appartient à un groupe social négativement étiqueté – n’est qu’un des problèmes auquel est confrontée la nouvelle élite rom dans la Roumanie contemporaine.

Le terme élitisme semble être un déterminant qui disqualifi e, rejette dans le dérisoire une position acquise par compétence et effort, de même qu’un corps social qui s’affi rme par son talent. Mais ce terme peut également être compris comme une réponse idéologique issue du discours républicain uniformisant, de l’appel au partage du pouvoir, répondant en fait à la tentation de considérer l’institution de l’élite comme un phénomène normal et sous-entendu. En voici une tentative de réhabilitation : « Par élitisme, j’entends la création et le maintien d’un certain nombre d’institutions où l’accès est extrêmement diffi cile, qui accordent une participation à vie, et qui ont la responsabilité de défi nir l’excellence et d’en attester la réalité » (Suleiman, 1979 : 12).

L’APPARITION DES NOUVELLES ÉLITES DANS LA ROUMANIE POST-COMMUNISTE

Les changements sociaux et politiques qui ont eu lieu en Roumanie, la démocratisation progressive de la société, ont infl uencé le mode de sélection et d’affi rmation des nouvelles élites. Certains groupes, devenus rapidement des groupes dirigeants, ont réussi à s’emparer de positions, et à s’y maintenir, grâce à l’occupation de positions-clés dans les espaces politiques et institutionnels. Cette élite a appris à coexister avec la démocratie. Les hauts fonctionnaires, à en croire la littérature, puisent leur pouvoir dans les fonctions qu’ils détiennent, et également dans leur appartenance à un groupe professionnel ou à une classe sociale (la haute bourgeoisie dans les sociétés occidentales, la nomenklatura politique et administrative dans les anciens pays communistes).

Dans les pays de l’Est, la grande majorité des dirigeants politiques et des hauts fonctionnaires apparus à la suite des événements et des changements politiques et sociaux de 1989, ont des liens avec l’ancienne nomenklatura communiste, ou proviennent de familles appartenant à cette catégorie. Ils ont parcouru un processus de reconversion, à la suite duquel ils sont devenus des spécialistes des politiques publiques, pouvant aussi virer vers le secteur privé. C’est ce qui s’est passé en Russie, où ceux qui ont formé la nouvelle élite politique proviennent de l’ancienne nomenklatura idéologique, formée dans les écoles du parti (Tcherednidtchenko, 1997) et qui ont choisi « la voie de la démocratie » (Zdravomyslov, 1997). On a affaire à une situation pareille en Roumanie, où une bonne partie des hommes politiques, les décideurs d’après 1989, sont issus des dirigeants du parti, ou sont de ceux qui ont gravité autour des sphères du pouvoir. Ils ont été formés aux écoles du parti et ont détenu des fonctions de pouvoir avant le changement (Ioan, 1997). Ceux-ci ont conservé et utilisé les compétences acquises dans les postes publics durant leurs positions antérieures, en se servant des réseaux et des liens personnels pour aboutir à la promotion de leurs groupes. Une analyse récente portant

• 73

Elites rom dans les anciens pays communistes

sur la reconversion des anciennes élites communistes en Roumanie souligne le fait que le succès enregistré par certains membres de ce corps social est dû à leurs compétences psychosociales exceptionnelles : ils ont su utiliser le capital symbolique acquis pendant la dernière période du régime Ceausescu, lorsqu’ils ont été marginalisés ; ils se sont associés avec les élites sociales qui n’avaient pas été impliquées auparavant dans la vie politique. Ils ont structuré leur discours en fonction du public choisi, en le rassurant quant à la transition qui aurait dû être douce et lente, sans produire des changements brutaux. Ils ont géré la crise d’après le changement politique en utilisant des schémas socio-cognitifs que la population pouvait comprendre et agréer (Grosescu, 2008).

« Nous sommes une nomenklatura tzigane »

Il n’était pas possible que le phénomène de l’affi rmation de la nouvelle élite, dans la Roumanie post-communiste, ne touche pas la population rom qui vit en symbiose avec la population majoritaire et qui en emprunte souvent les modèles sociaux, les stratégies d’affi rmation et la gestuelle publique. La communauté rom a appris à développer des stratégies de cohabitation avec la population majoritaire, en empruntant les politiques de celle-ci. Ce n’est pas seulement le conformisme communautaire qu’elle a appris et les techniques de retranchement et de survie, mais surtout les stratégies d’innovation sociale et d’orientation vers les valeurs qui mènent directement au succès. On comprend bien que la spécifi cité du contexte communautaire et la culture que cette population y avait acquise ont représenté un atout important dans le processus de personnalisation des stratégies de succès. Il était prévisible que les histoires de vie qui décrivent le succès, celles que nous connaissons, ou celles décrites par d’autres (voir Voicu, Tufi s, 2008), présentent des trajets de formation académique et professionnelle comme une voie de redécouverte de l’ethnie et des possibilités de promotion au succès. En voici un premier exemple : M. E., qui se perçoit comme étudiante d’ethnie rom, mais qui en même temps reconnaît être plus habituée aux traditions roumaines qu’à celles de son ethnie. Etudiante en 4ème année à l’époque où elle a été interviewée, en 2006, à présent licenciée en psychologie, elle partage son expérience et nous fait connaître ses opinions, après avoir vécu la majeure partie du temps parmi les majoritaires c’est-à-dire les Roumains. Notre interlocutrice se sent « presque assimilée par la population majoritaire ». Mais, il y a environ un an, elle a commencé à redécouvrir la culture rom à l’occasion de sa participation à une rencontre organisée dans le but d’identifi er le nombre d’étudiants rom faisant partie de l’université de Iasi. Depuis lors, elle prend part aux séminaires, aux rencontres, elle s’implique de plus en plus dans la redécouverte de la culture non-assimilée afi n de connaître les traditions et la manière de vivre des Roms. Elle raconte : « Je me suis redécouverte et j’ai ainsi cessé d’avoir honte d’appartenir à cette ethnie rom. Jusqu’ici je me sentais plutôt appartenir à l’ethnie roumaine qu’à l’ethnie rom, mais les choses ont changé depuis environ un an ; ça ne veut pourtant pas dire que je rejette la citoyenneté roumaine ». Ce processus de redécouverte des origines, nous l’avons souvent rencontré parmi nos interlocuteurs.

Les représentants de la communauté rom qui projettent d’accéder à des positions sociales élevées doivent constamment s’adapter aux changements produits autour d’eux, aux paramètres de l’évolution sociale post-communiste. Si la société roumaine change, la population rom est censée suivre ce processus de changement ; si la société s’oriente

74 •


vers une formation académique plus élevée, vers l’innovation, le développement culturel, vers de nouvelles normes politiques, la minorité rom suit de près cette tendance. On est en présence d’une vieille culture qui change rapidement, assimilant de nouvelles valeurs. « Personnellement – nous confi e un important responsable de la communauté rom de Roumanie, V. N., Secrétaire Général ERGO (European Roma Grassroot (European Roma Grassroot (Organisation)Organisation)Organisation – je considère que les différences entre les élites roumaines et les élites rom sont non seulement dépourvues de signifi cation par rapport aux ressemblances, mais pour la plupart elles sont inventées, elles n’existent pas réellement ». Monsieur V.N. considère qu’il existe des différences plus importantes entre différentes catégories de Roms qu’entre celles-ci et la population majoritaire : « Les Rudari (artisans du bois), les forgerons, les Roms musulmans, les joailliers, les orpailleurs, les Roms hongrois (Gabors), les vǎtrasii (sédentaires), les montreurs d’ours (ursari(ursari( )ursari)ursari , les Roms de Ferentari, les Roms de Berceni, les Roms assimilés qui vivent tous à Bucarest sont plus différents les uns par rapport aux autres que par rapport à leurs voisins roumains ».

L’idée de la similarité existante entre les élites de la population majoritaire et celles de la population rom se retrouve aussi chez un autre interlocuteur, G. D., directeur de l’agence « Ensemble » (Agency for Community Dev(Agency for Community Dev( elopment)lopment)lopment : « Il existe certainement une élite rom, qu’on parle d’une élite intellectuelle, fi nancière et/ou d’une élite culturelle », soutient notre interlocuteur. « Je ne trouve pas que la représentation des élites soit différente chez les Roms par rapport à la population majoritaire. Certainement qu’il existe en Moldavie des professeurs universitaires, musiciens, professionnels de tous les domaines, des gens qui amassent des biens, comme il en existe partout. Je ne crois pas qu’il y ait une distinction nette entre élite rom et élite majoritaire, avec la seule réserve qu’un groupe de l’élite rom fait partie de la catégorie des « Roms invisibles ». Notre répondant ne tarde pas à préciser son statut : « Malheureusement ou heureusement, je ne pense appartenir ni à l’une ni à l’autre de ces deux catégories. Je peux dire que j’appartiens à la trop mince classe moyenne, ou à ce que j’appelle les Roms invisibles(cette catégorie de Roms qui ne serait pas perçue en tant que rom si elle n’assumait pas son identité, pour la seule raison que ses représentants ne répondent pas à la perception stéréotypée que les majoritaires ont au sujet de la population rom ».

Qui plus est, certains ont emprunté de mauvaises habitudes à un segment de l’élite majoritaire. Un professeur de sociologie, V. B., est particulièrement critique à ce sujet : « Tout comme chez les majoritaires, on retrouve chez les Roms les mêmes caractéristiques, la même motivation. Les gens d’affaires et les dignitaires, les parlementaires tout spécialement [se font remarquer] par une infatuation effrontée et le mépris envers la loi et envers leurs semblables, ceux qui les ont aidés ou servis ». Quant à l’élite intellectuelle, « elle n’est pas reconnue ; elle est ignorée et délibérément passée sous silence. La valeur suprême de la communauté est le plus souvent l’argent, qui, d’habitude, est associé au pouvoir physique. Les deux créent des élites ».

Avec une particularité tout de même, que nous pouvons maintenant souligner sans hésitation. Dans le cas de la nouvelle élite rom, ses représentants ne proviennent pas d’une ancienne nomenklatura communiste, mais ils appartiennent à la couche moyenne ou même pauvre de la population rom. Les success-stories racontées par Delia Bobîrsc dans le livre de Madalin Voicu et Claudiu Tufi s évoquent la situation matérielle précaire qui caractérise le milieu de provenance des interlocuteurs, la pauvreté de leurs

• 75


familles d’origine. Ils forment un groupe nouveau, sans traditions et sans liens. Ceux qui proviennent de familles soi-disant « nobiliaires » (on se réfère ici à une catégorie spéciale, folklorique qui se signale par les vêtements et les coutumes) n’ont pas eu besoin d’études ou de hautes qualifi cations pour s’affi rmer et être reconnus, parce qu’ils détiennent de toute façon une autorité locale, transmise par voie héréditaire, par tradition. « Ceux-ci, étant des esprits traditionalistes et fermés, se font facilement voir, ils sont différents… Chez eux, c’est l’argent qui prime » (M. D., licenciée en psychologie). Raison pour laquelle ils n’ont pas été motivés et encouragés à poursuivre des études. Ils constituent « une élite autoproclamée, comme on peut voir dans le groupe des forgerons, mais forment en fait une fausse élite. Ils sont vraiment pittoresques, les médias les préfèrent, mais ils ne constituent pas les véritables élites » (c’est l’opinion de D. I., 32 ans, informaticien et étudiant en assistance sociale, spécialiste en marketing, directeur de ventes dans une entreprise de publicité).

La nouvelle élite rom représente un groupe qui s’est affi rmé par ses propres forces. Ce groupe se distingue du trajet de l’élite gouvernementale des majoritaires, la plupart sont des fi gures neuves, inconnues avant le changement politique de 1989. Ce sont des gens relativement jeunes. Ils ont gagné leur réputation et la reconnaissance de leurs mérites suite à leurs efforts personnels, à leur engagement dans une course pour le développement de la communauté et l’occupation de positions dans l’espace public. « Ce groupe – affi rme D. I. – n’est pas une « élite de télévision » (notre interlocuteur se réfère à une certaine catégorie de leaders folkloriques – chefs de communauté (boulibasha),(boulibasha),( rois, empereurs – qui occupent souvent les écrans de la télévision, étant promus pour ce qu’ils ont de spectaculaire). Ce sont des intellectuels capables d’entreprendre une analyse critique, d’émettre des théories, d’élaborer des stratégies. Il existe en Roumanie une telle élite rom qui affi rme son identité, dont les membres sont très impliqués, qui n’oublient pas leurs dettes morales et qui ont la conscience d’appartenir à une communauté ». C’est le processus d’affi rmation de cette élite qui constitue notre principal objectif dans cette étude.

Notre débat porte essentiellement sur les Roms de l’Est, plus exactement du nord-est de la Roumanie, qui se trouvent dans la période post-communiste dans des situations similaires à celles de la population majoritaire ; ceux-ci ont bien supporté toutes les rigueurs des régimes totalitaires et ils ont été obligés de s’adapter pendant environ un demi-siècle aux contraintes des régimes communistes. A présent ils supportent à nouveau des bouleversements, comme le dit Auzias (1993), cette fois-ci « les bouleversements du post-communisme, à un tournant-clé de leur histoire ».

Comment est apparu et comment a évolué le groupe socioprofessionnel dont on parle ? La pensée stéréotypée, comme nous l’avons déjà dit, accorde le statut d’élite rom aux membres de cette communauté qui se font remarquer par le coté spectaculaire, aux personnes ayant une visibilité à part, connues par des signes extérieurs, médiatisées. Leur réputation résulte souvent de l’association avec le phénomène « châteaux tsiganes », limousines, riches parures en or, vêtements pittoresques parfois et comportements ostentatoires. Ces membres de la communauté ont acquis la notoriété par l’intermédiaire du capital économique et symbolique, par des actes personnels, individuels, et aussi par des gestes de façade à l’intérieur de la communauté ; mais ce statut ne dépasse pas les limites d’une communauté restreinte.

76 •


Depuis environ dix ans est apparu en Roumanie un groupe social assez nombreux qui illustre parfaitement le sens donné au terme élite dans la sociologie occidentale ; la catégorie des personnes éduquées, des formateurs d’opinion, des personnes-clés des institutions qui assurent l’interface entre les majoritaires et la population rom. Leur réputation provient du capital social acquis à la suite de la fréquentation de hautes écoles – jadis inaccessibles à ce segment social –, ou par l’occupation de positions privilégiées dans les structures institutionnelles de l’Etat : dans l’enseignement, dans la police, dans l’assistance sociale, dans les services d’assistance communautaire, mais aussi dans des entreprises à succès du secteur privé.

En 1993, lors d’une table ronde ayant comme sujet la situation des familles rom en Europe de l’Est en pleine période post-communiste, quelques années seulement après la chute du communisme dans tous les pays de cette région européenne, un sociologue roumain, Nicolae Gheorghe, affi rmait la nécessité de l’apparition et de la constitution d’une élite intellectuelle rom.

Chercheur dans un institut de recherches de l’Académie Roumaine, représentant de la communauté rom de Roumanie, N. G. précise sans aucune retenue le fait que ce groupe existait déjà, sous une forme plus frêle : « Nous sommes une nomenklatura tzigane » – cette nomenklatura ne devrait que se développer, occuper des positions sociales, s’institutionnaliser et se faire reconnaître. Les prémisses en existent, affi rme N. Gheorghe, les Tsiganes de l’Est ont été sédentarisés, et intégrés aux économies de leurs pays, ils offrent la main-d’œuvre qualifi ée dans plusieurs domaines, peuvent dynamiser l’économie de marché par leur talent d’entrepreneurs et par leur force d’innovation, ils peuvent sans doute devenir un moteur du développement social : « Il y a aussi une couche tsigane éduquée dans les services, une petite bourgeoisie qui se refl ète aujourd’hui dans la vie politique » (Gheorghe : 10-13). Il a pourtant fallu quelques années pour que cette minorité active se décide à s’orienter vers des études supérieures, vers la carrière, pour que certains des représentants de cette communauté comprennent que l’éducation et l’enrichissement spirituel peuvent devenir une manière de sortir du ghetto et de la pauvreté.

Comme on l’a déjà énoncé, la nouvelle élite rom est une classe ou un groupe relativement récent, parue suite à une tentative de la société roumaine – en pleine transition – de remédier à la discrimination à laquelle la minorité rom avait été soumise et d’offrir une chance d’affi rmation à ses représentants. Nous allons citer, à titre d’exemple emblématique, le discours d’une représentante de cette élite rom qui occupe une position importante dans l’administration de la Ville de Iasi. M. H. est conseillère du préfet de Iasi, assurant à la fois le rôle de plaque tournante des informations et des décisions qui concernent la formation de la nouvelle élite rom. Elle reconnaît son appartenance à ce groupe socioprofessionnel (« j’appartiens à la nouvelle élite rom, au nouveau groupe instruit et formé dans de hautes écoles ») et revendique une ascendance qui passe par une série de personnalités du monde de la littérature et de l’art, qui ont enrichi le patrimoine culturel roumain. Cultivée, ayant poursuivi des études dans le domaine des sciences sociales, notre interlocutrice n’oublie pas d’évoquer ses prédécesseurs, des écrivains comme Anton Pan, des musiciens, des chanteurs appartenant à l’élite rom qui s’est affi rmée dans l’entre-deux-guerres. « Il y a eu même une publication de la communauté rom à Craiova, Le Temps, il y a eu des organisations, sorte de

• 77


précurseurs des ONG d’aujourd’hui. Mais après la guerre, l’avènement du communisme a déterminé, entre autres, la disparition de cette vie spirituelle. La communauté n’était plus reconnue. Personne n’osait plus à l’époque affi rmer son origine ». On menait alors une politique d’assimilation, d’intégration à la majorité et de ralliement aux valeurs imposées par le pouvoir (voir aussi Voicu et Tufi s, 2008). Après la révolution de 1989 on assista à un changement des mentalités. « Il y en a eu qui ont décliné leur origine ; d’autres – qui ne l’ont pas fait, ils n’en ont pas eu et ils n’en ont pas même aujourd’hui le courage. L’explosion s’est produite après 1990 lorsque les membres de cette communauté ont eu accès aux écoles, aux universités. De 1990 jusqu’à aujourd’hui une élite rom s’est formée. A Iasi il existe à présent (l’interview date de mai 2008) plus de 80 étudiants, comme l’année passée. Certains parmi eux occupent les places réservées aux étudiants rom, mais d’autres ont postulé pour des places avec les étudiants majoritaires. Ces derniers sont encore plus nombreux que ceux qui occupent les places spécialement conçues pour les Roms. Ces jeunes sont les futurs professionnels et ils s’impliquent effectivement dans ce qu’ils font, étant à la fois activistes, militants pour le développement de leur communauté. Ce qui est à remarquer pour leur communauté de Moldavie, c’est qu’ils appartiennent aux Roms Ursari. Ceux-ci sont toujours restés plus près des majoritaires, ont vécu avec eux, se sont plus facilement adaptés, et ont assimilé les stratégies de promotion sociale. La plupart sont maintenant des musiciens et des commerçants, ils représentent des catégories sociales actives et innovatrices ». Les opinions de l’interlocutrice sont renforcées par d’autres sujets interviewés, qui insistent sur les deux dimensions : formation et spécialisation professionnelle, mais aussi l’implication dans les problèmes de la communauté. M. D., inspecteur dans une Direction d’Assistance Communautaire, qui travaille parmi les majoritaires, souligne : « les élites sont les personnes qui ont poursuivi des études, mais qui aident aussi la communauté, qui militent pour les droits, pour l’amélioration du niveau de vie des Roms ». En outre, ces gens doivent faire preuve d’aptitudes particulières, y compris les aptitudes sociales. A plus dix ans de la révolution de 1989, l’accès à l’université se fait encore à travers un concours d’admission très diffi cile. On peut avoir dix candidats pour une place (voir les facultés de Droit, de Sciences économiques, la psychologie, l’assistance sociale). Les chances de réussite dans l’enseignement supérieur étaient liées à la réputation du lycée terminé et aux possibilités de la famille d’assurer les moyens fi nanciers pour bien préparer le concours d’admission. Les candidats de la communauté rom provenaient d’habitude de lycées industriels, où la formation théorique était précaire, et leurs familles n’étaient pas intéressées, ou n’avaient pas la possibilité d’assurer une préparation suivie en vue de l’examen d’admission. Dans ces conditions, tout comme dans la période communiste, les jeunes Roms réussissaient rarement à accéder à l’enseignement de haute qualité.

En 1998, lorsque le ministère de l’Education était conduit par Andrei Marga, on a assigné des places spéciales pour les Roms, et l’on a organisé un concours d’admission spécial pour les membres de cette communauté. On a ainsi facilité l’accès à l’enseignement supérieur aux jeunes gens provenant des rangs de cette communauté. C’est dans ces conditions qu’on a vu apparaître les premiers groupes d’étudiants rom dans des facultés comme celles que l’on vient d’énumérer. A l’université de Iasi, par exemple, en psychologie, on a formé un groupe de 15 étudiants rom, ceux-ci étant

78 •


redistribués, à partir de la deuxième année, dans d’autres groupes. Dans ce premier groupe compact d’étudiants rom on a admis également des personnes moins jeunes, à condition qu’elles passent le concours d’admission, même si ce concours promouvait la discrimination positive.

En Roumanie, il n’a jamais existé et il n’existe pas non plus aujourd’hui le phénomène des « hautes écoles » comme par exemple en France, offrant des fi lières qui assurent la formation de l’élite. Un diplôme universitaire permettait et assure encore l’accès vers les hautes positions dans les institutions d’Etat, dans des positions de prestige. Dans notre cas, le rôle de haute école est détenu par l’université, de façon générale par les études supérieures, jadis un rêve impossible à réaliser pour les membres de la communauté rom. Un diplôme universitaire donne accès à des carrières d’Etat, de la fonction publique. En même temps, ces diplômes singularisent, ils confèrent une distinction. Les diplômés universitaires sont ceux qui constituent le corps de ce que l’on pourrait nommer « les élites de l’Etat », ce sont les spécialistes qui se mettent au service de l’Etat. Ils sont des conseillers de divers notables (maires, préfets, présidents de Conseils régionaux) responsables des services de relations publiques dans différentes institutions, professeurs, inspecteurs de personnel, offi ciers de police, assistants sociaux, mais aussi avocats, ingénieurs et informaticiens. C’est de ces statuts qu’ils tirent leur remarquable infl uence. Ils n’ont pas seulement un pouvoir limité à une communauté restreinte, comme dans le cas des élites rom traditionnelles, mais détiennent le pouvoir que leur confère un poste-clé reconnu par le sceau de l’institution de l’Etat.

Ils se détachent des élites « en carton », comme on nomme les politiciens récemment enrichis, ironisant ainsi au sujet de leur inconsistance et de leur superfi cialité. La distinction en est une des caractéristiques. Les membres des élites traditionnelles, de même que les enrichis des élites « en carton » peuvent exercer une certaine infl uence locale et peuvent devenir des leaders, même des modèles de réussite dans les communautés restreintes « en se servant de leurs biens, en affi chant une opulence qui fascine ». Ceux-ci ne s’approchent jamais de leurs co-nationaux, ne les aident pas, et ne constituent donc pas une véritable élite. L’élite est formée – tous nos interlocuteurs sont d’accord sur cette défi nition – par des personnes éduquées, des spécialistes qui peuvent accorder assistance et conseils, qui peuvent orienter la population de la communauté dans le labyrinthe de la bureaucratie. Ce sont des personnes motivées, provenant de la classe moyenne ou des basses classes pauvres, qui ont compris que c’est seulement l’éducation qui peut les sauver. La condition pour que ces individus soient reconnus c’est qu’ils s’impliquent socialement, qu’ils deviennent les promoteurs de la réussite sociale, qu’ils offrent des modèles de réussite par l’éducation. E. M., inspectrice à l’Inspectorat Scolaire de Iasi, nous communique que dans le village de Zece Prăjini, lieu d’origine d’une fanfare célèbre, reconnue aujourd’hui dans le monde entier, le modèle culturel c’est d’avoir suivi des études de plus de dix classes. Ce village pauvre a donné des professeurs, des magistrats, modèles de réussite par l’éducation. La conseillère du préfet, M. H., nous raconte que dans sa famille plusieurs fi lles ont suivi des études supérieures, ont franchi la barrière sociale, ayant comme modèle l’ascension de leur cousine.

Pour synthétiser : la formation de l’élite rom authentique est liée à l’accès aux « hautes écoles », aux universités ; ces institutions confèrent des compétences et des positions, de la légitimité, améliorent l’image de soi, distinguent et sélectionnent,

• 79


confèrent de la supériorité et de la sécurité ; elles consacrent, elles confèrent « un certain charisme », elles sacralisent, pouvant même parfois créer une aura mythologique. Certains individus se spécialisent dans les relations humaines, d’autres deviennent des musiciens ou des informaticiens, spécialistes de haute tenue qui pénètrent dans les réseaux des professionnels de marque. Cela leur confère le pouvoir que détiennent les spécialistes de notoriété. Leur capital professionnel et culturel peut se convertir en capital politique et/ou économique.

LES ÉLITES ROM COMME MINORITÉ ACTIVE

Pour Charles Wright Mills (1969) les élites sont formées par des gens qui occupent des « postes-clés » dans des organisations essentielles de la société. Leurs représentants accèdent à ces positions et s’y maintiennent en établissant des contacts sociaux avec les catégories sociales du même niveau de formation, en entretenant des liens, apprenant les normes et les codes de ceux qui ont formé les réseaux ; leurs interactions sont des relations de complicité. Dans le cas des nouvelles élites rom, la diffi culté consiste à se faire accepter par les élites majoritaires comme spécialistes, professionnels, experts à statut égal. Ces individus doivent donc apprendre les codes et les signes de reconnaissance pratiqués par les majoritaires, doivent développer des stratégies d’interaction utilisées par les autres et les utiliser fréquemment dans leur travail, afi n de se faire reconnaître. Voici l’opinion d’une inspectrice dans une Direction d’Assistance Communautaire : « Pour pénétrer dans le monde des majoritaires, les Roms ont besoin d’une meilleure information que ces derniers. Ils font partie de deux mondes différents, le monde de leur communauté et le monde des majoritaires, de façon qu’ils doivent toujours prouver leur compétence. Ils doivent avoir une meilleure formation que les majoritaires, qui sont reçus les bras ouverts ».

Les premiers groupes d’étudiants rom reçus à l’université à la suite du décret Marga se sont confrontés à deux types de contraintes : les hautes exigences académiques qui sollicitent des efforts particuliers pour rattraper les handicaps dans leur formation initiale, et la réticence de les accepter, manifestée par certains collègues majoritaires (parfois même par les professeurs), très réservés par rapport à la manière dont ils ont pénétré dans ce corps d’élite. C’était une première : pour la première fois des groupes compacts d’étudiants rom étaient admis à l’université. Leur simple présence, leurs prestations, leur participation à la vie de la communauté académique, l’affi rmation de leurs talents artistiques pendant les réunions de socialisation imposaient déjà une reconsidération de la représentation sociale quant à leur possibilité de s’affi rmer comme intellectuels.

Les recherches sur les « minorités actives », concept proposé et développé par Serge Moscovici (1979), ont prouvé que les minorités n’exercent pas une infl uence manifeste (directe ou publique), mais une infl uence latente (indirecte, différente, ponctuelle, privée). Dans notre cas, la seule présence en faculté d’un groupe minoritaire a provoqué une certaine ambiguïté, une interrogation. Elle a remis en question la pression que la majorité exerçait pour maintenir une certaine uniformité et unanimité. Elle a permis de découvrir qu’il existait une alternative à la façon de concevoir la condition d’étudiant. Les minoritaires proposent en effet un modèle de pensée différent, non conforme à celui de la majorité. Ils innovent et exercent eux aussi une pression qui témoigne d’une infl uence active, visible, en vue de changer les mentalités, de modifi er les idées reçues,

80 •


les conceptions traditionnelles, l’ancien mode d’envisager le domaine académique. Si le concept de minorité se trouve à l’origine du processus d’innovation (Moscovici, Doms, 1984), alors ce qui s’est passé dans les facultés a permis de modifi er les opinions concernant la condition d’étudiant, de repenser les valeurs et de restructurer les jugements concernant la vie quotidienne dans les universités. Il est important de noter qu’un confl it cognitif s’est déclenché, provoquant un débat public (parfois explicite, souvent implicite). Il est devenu évident que les facultés devraient accepter dorénavant un groupe minoritaire qui n’avait pas eu jusqu’ici accès à ce corps d’élite. A travers un problème pratique, on obtint des renseignements sur une minorité sociale jadis invisible dans ce milieu social. Symboliquement, des signifi cations se dégageaient, on découvrait de nouvelles modalités d’interaction entre les acteurs sociaux majoritaires et minoritaires, et l’on imposa de nouveaux styles de comportement. Les étudiants rom furent une source d’infl uence. Ce sont eux qui ont déterminé la reconnaissance et la validation d’un groupe minoritaire dans un milieu social exclusiviste, déclenchant un mouvement d’innovation dans la pensée sociale dominante. Leur présence et leur prestation sont devenues source de changement et la communauté universitaire ne pouvait plus fonctionner comme avant.

Eux-mêmes ont changé. Lors d’un focus-groupEux-mêmes ont changé. Lors d’un focus-groupEux-mêmes ont changé. Lors d’un organisé en 2000 avec les étudiants rom de la faculté de Psychologie, une étudiante nous dévoila ses hésitations et ses craintes quant à l’évolution ultérieure des relations avec les autres collègues : « Les attentes envers nous sont plus grandes, nous avons maintenant accès au statut de vrais étudiants… et, à voir nos collègues, leur façon de s’habiller, leur vocabulaire, leur prestation aux cours et aux examens…, je considère vraiment qu’ils sont supérieurs… je répète, personnellement je voudrais me considérer leur égale et tout aussi capable, mais … ce qui me manque c’est la volonté… je n’ai pas de volonté… et pour cela je respecte mes collègues… c’est ici que je situe le problème d’intégration tel que je le vois. Mes collègues de faculté… j’ai eu l’impression qu’ils ressentaient une injustice, au moins c’est ce que je crois… ils se sont sentis défavorisés, c’est pour cela qu’ils ont été un peu distants, parce que nous, nous avons été admis à l’université tout simplement, sans concours… je crois qu’ils ont été défavorisés, c’est ce que j’ai senti. Plus tard ils ont réalisé qu’en fait chacun gardait sa place et puis tout a changé… ». Un autre collègue ajoute : « Nos collègues croyaient que les Roms sont récalcitrants… mais lorsqu’ils ont vu que nous étions sociables, ils ont changé d’opinion ».

Notre discussion a laissé voir que les étudiants rom ont compris assez vite qu’ils avaient beaucoup à rattraper et qu’ils ne seraient pas traités comme un groupe privilégié : « nous ne voulons pas un régime spécial aux examens, nous voulons passer les examens dans les mêmes conditions, et c’est ici la subtilité ; il y en a parmi nous qui en sont mécontents, mais il y en a aussi qui trouvent ça normal… nous sommes arrivés ici avec l’idée préconçue d’être traités différemment, cela s’est passé pendant un semestre, puis nous devions rattraper…, nous avons aimé les évaluations pendant le semestre et je dis que nous devons être traités comme des égaux ». Ces étudiants ont assimilé les normes et se sont adaptés aux exigences du statut.

Les étudiants rom ont parcouru rapidement un programme intensif d’apprentissage social et d’articulation au nouveau contexte. Ils ont été impliqués dans différents programmes de formation, ils ont connu d’autres collègues d’autres centres universitaires,

• 81


ils ont commencé à prendre des initiatives : « … nous avons souvent été invités à une conférence à Bucarest… à un séminaire, à une séance, à une table ronde. On discute… ça m’a plu. J’ai participé à une conférence à Cluj, puis on nous a invités à Oradea pour voir comment ça se passe, comment ça fonctionne… Maintenant nous voulons faire la même chose à Iasi ».

Les étudiants rom réalisent qu’ils sont appelés à changer quelque chose dans leur communauté, ils assument des responsabilités. Une étudiante partage son expérience : « J’ai été à Ciurea pour y ouvrir une école maternelle… et là-bas j’ai été très surprise de voir combien ils étaient nombreux ceux qui voulaient apprendre… ils avaient 20 ans, 22 ans, 25 ans qui disaient ‘nous voulons apprendre’. Ils ne savent rien, même pas lire… Ce sont des gens oubliés, nous voulons mettre en place cette école maternelle, ça fait plus de cinq mois que nous ne trouvons pas un mur séparateur, le programme coûte… très cher, nous n’avons pas d’argent, le programme n’as pas prévu les aménagements… c’est-à-dire que nous voulons avoir deux salles de classe… une pour la première classe et l’autre pour la maternelle. Ce mur est un vrai problème, croyez-moi, ça fait longtemps que nous ne trouvons pas de solution… pas d’argent, lorsqu’il s’agit de Roms tout le monde dit ‘ils ont de l’argent’. Il y en a qui ont, mais ils n’en donnent pas, parce que… comment vous dire… ils n’ont pas confi ance. Ils n’ont pas confi ance parce qu’ils ont déjà donné de l’argent au maire de Bucium, à d’autres personnes qui n’ont rien fait pour eux. Et boulibacha Goliat (le chef des Tsiganes de cette communauté), il dit ‘à quoi ça leur sert d’avoir des livres’, et qu’il ne serait pas content qu’on le fasse (le projet)… ».

Notre expérience a confi rmé l’idée de Moscovici selon laquelle la présence et l’action d’une minorité visible et cohérente peut changer la conception de la majorité et son mode de fonctionnement. La présence de la minorité rom dans les universités a déclenché un processus d’innovation sociale mais qui n’a pas été déterminé par le nombre des étudiants rom, ni par leurs compétences spéciales, mais par leur présence même et par leur discours alternatif. Ils ont d’abord exercé une infl uence privée en tant qu’individus, avant d’occuper des fonctions publiques et d’acquérir de l’expertise et du pouvoir d’infl uence.

LE POUVOIR DE LA MINORITÉ ACTIVE

Qui a l’autorité et qui exerce le pouvoir dans les communautés rom ? Notre guide d’interview contenait une question formulée de la manière suivante : « Lorsque vous pensez à la communauté rom, vous pensez d’abord aux riches ou à ceux qui occupent des positions grâce à leur formation professionnelle ? Expliquez votre choix ». Nos interlocuteurs, appartenant à la seconde catégorie, nous ont expliqué que si ces derniers devaient occuper les positions de pouvoir, les choses seraient complètement différentes. V.B. nous répond sèchement : « Je pense à ceux qui ont une formation professionnelle, mais la communauté pense aux riches ». Et de nous expliquer : « L’élite apparaît dans le mental collectif comme groupe, malheureusement indistinct, massifi é, comme imaginaire et non pas comme existant réellement, comme un groupe de spécialistes qui réfl échit ; lorsqu’il s’agit de l’identifi er… les gens se tournent vers l’autre catégorie. Cela leur semble plus facile ». Après avoir invoqué « les coutumes et les particularités culturelles spécifi ques à une minorité », un autre interlocuteur, G. D., plaide pour la valorisation

82 •


des professionnels impliqués socialement, ceux qui s’occupent de l’intégration sociale des Roms : « personnellement, je pense que la majorité des Roms a de gros problèmes d’inclusion sociale. C’est peut-être à cause de mon expérience de travail (ça fait 9 ans que je travaille dans des programmes de développement locaux communautaires dans des communautés de Roms), mais aussi de la littérature parcourue, doublée par ma trajectoire académique (diplôme en sociologie et assistance sociale). Les catégories auxquelles vous faites référence me passent par la tête lorsque je réfl échis aux modalités d’utilisation des ressources intracommunautaires afi n d’initier et de mettre en oeuvre un processus de développement durable ». M. V. plaide aussi pour l’implication et le militantisme social par le moyen de l’exemple personnel et offre son modèle d’activisme à l’usage de la communauté comme dette morale de quelqu’un qui a réussi socialement : « Je suis membre de deux fondations, la Fondation Internationale Ion Voicu, qui a comme but la promotion des jeunes talents, et membre de la fondation Tot arc qui organise des spectacles, des séminaires, cours, bourses pour les enfants doués dans tous les domaines et de toutes les couleurs ; nous n’avons donc pas un système focalisé sur l’ethnie rom. Je fais un travail qui ne m’apporte aucun bénéfi ce, dans lequel j’investis beaucoup, même de l’argent, mais qui excite mon dynamisme et qui m’ennoblit ».

Un autre exemple de militantisme pour le développement social de la communauté nous a été offert par un pasteur protestant d’un village pauvre du département de Iasi. Interrogé sur la manière dont il est devenu pasteur, il répond qu’il a été important pour lui non pas d’être un leader, mais de changer, d’avoir le pouvoir de changer la situation qui existait dans cette localité. Depuis son enfance, il a détesté ce qui se passait dans cette communauté (agressivité, violence, prises de bec) et il a rêvé de faire quelque chose qui puisse améliorer la vie des Roms, et sa propre vie. Il ne savait pas quoi exactement, mais il y avait en lui ce désir, et de plus, la conviction que Dieu peut rendre les gens meilleurs, plus charitables. A la fi n de ses dix années d’étude, notre interlocuteur n’était pas content de l’éducation reçue, c’était insuffi sant pour lui ; c’est pourquoi il a décidé de lire plusieurs livres pour amasser des connaissances, et pour enrichir son vocabulaire. Il aurait pu être payé par les autorités pour travailler dans la communauté rom. Mais il a choisi une autre voie. C’est un leader communautaire, mais non pas offi ciel, donc il n’est pas payé, mais il est respecté pour sa prestation, pour son style et sa conduite. L’important pour lui c’est d’avoir changé le mental collectif et le comportement de ses concitoyens.

Les spécialistes, les professionnels, les intellectuels rom ne sont pas suffi samment valorisés dans la société. On a rencontré cette opinion chez plusieurs de nos interlocuteurs. Souvent, ces personnes sont obligées de taire leur appartenance ethnique devant les majoritaires. De façon paradoxale, il leur arrive de ne pas être appréciés par leur communauté non plus. « Ce sont des universitaires, des médecins, des magistrats, des offi ciers, etc. Ils n’ont aucun prestige dans la communauté, ils s’en sont détachés, la communauté les ignore (V.B.) ». Notre interlocuteur nous conseille d’observer quels sont les modèles culturels valorisés : le monde de la périphérie, de ceux qui se débrouillent, qui construisent des stratégies de succès tout en ignorant le travail, la culture, l’instruction, l’éducation. « Ecoutez les paroles des manele (chansons d’inspiration orientale adaptées à des réalités locales, de qualité douteuse) », nous invite celui-ci, en nous suggérant que dans ces chansons nous ne trouverons jamais une exhortation

• 83


à la valorisation de l’élite intellectuelle. N’étant pas reconnus, ces intellectuels n’ont aucun pouvoir d’infl uencer l’opinion.

Avoir le pouvoir, se soumettre au pouvoir, déléguer le pouvoir, prendre le pouvoir – voici des préoccupations constantes des individus qui représentent les élites. Les psychologues ont identifi é plusieurs types de « sources » du pouvoir, les unes extrêmement visibles et faciles à démonter, les autres qui dénotent l’élaboration et la compétence à diriger. Parmi ces sources, la possession des moyens de sanction (récompense et punition), les compétences interactionnelles spéciales, les compétences techniques (le degré d’expertise), la possession des moyens de contrôle, la légitimité, la capacité de susciter « l’amour » de la communauté (Enriquez, 2007) : par exemple la possibilité de contrôler l’organisation de la vie, l’existence des autres. Avoir les moyens de contrôle signifi e détenir la base matérielle du pouvoir. Dans le cas des communautés traditionnelles de Roms, le processus d’acquisition et de maintien du pouvoir est simple, mais effi cace. C’est D. E. qui nous le dévoile, un interlocuteur particulièrement important. En ce qui concerne l’organisation des Roms, notre interviewé soutient qu’il existe des différences d’un groupe ethnique rom à l’autre : chez les forgerons, chez ceux qui gardent les traditions, les vêtements… l’organisation est du type caste, le boulibacha en tête, et avec des règles très strictes. D’habitude ils choisissent pour chef (boulibacha) (boulibacha) ( le plus intelligent parmi eux, mais il se constitue également des centres de pouvoir dans la communauté, en fonction du pouvoir fi nancier. A Ciurea (communauté rom aux environs de Iasi) deux familles riches se sont disputé le pouvoir ; leurs membres ont constaté que ça n’allait pas, on risquait de désintégrer la communauté, et dans ces conditions ils ont décidé de choisir comme boulibacha un ancien, pauvre, mais le plus respecté par tous dans la communauté. De façon générale, le pouvoir se transmet par héritage, étant basé sur le respect avant toute chose. Autrement, on risque la désintégration de la communauté. Dans ces communautés de Roms organisées sous forme de caste, où le chef a encore le pouvoir, les membres ont moins de liberté de quitter la communauté pour choisir d’autres métiers ou pour faire des études. Les leaders contrôlent le mouvement des individus. « Le chef a un pouvoir incroyable ; les membres de la communauté font ensemble le même métier et participent tous à un projet économique. Par exemple, à Ciurea, ils ont mis sur pied, ensemble, une fabrique de briques. Ça leur convient. Ils vont tous bien du point de vue économique. Vous avez vu les châteaux qu’on y a bâtis ! ». En ce qui concerne les différences sociales et économiques existantes entre les Roms, notre interlocuteur trouve que dans les communautés, il existe une sorte d’acceptation tacite de ces différences, et elles sont maintenues à cause du niveau très bas de l’éducation. Les Roms pauvres acceptent ce statut parce que, s’ils ne le respectaient pas, ils devraient partir de la communauté. Il y aurait la possibilité de changer le système s’il ne convient pas. Or, ils acceptent tout, parce que les riches de la communauté donnent aux pauvres la possibilité de gagner leur pain, ils leur donnent du travail. Il semble que c’est le manque d’éducation qui les maintient dans le système. Dans les communautés rom bien organisées, les différences économiques sont acceptées telles quelles et la hiérarchie est respectée.

Comme nous venons de l’exemplifi er, le détenteur de moyens de contrôle peut devenir ainsi un objet de vénération, il peut susciter l’admiration, voire même l’amour ; en tout cas, il suscite le respect pour la force que dégage les symboles extérieurs du pouvoir.

84 •


Ce mécanisme nous a été expliqué par un observateur et théoricien très compétent : « Les valeurs actuelles de la société roumaine sont basées sur la mise en évidence de pareils éléments. Très éloquent à ce sujet est le fait que la majeure partie des Roms, s’ils gagnaient au Loto par exemple, gaspilleraient l’argent pour s’acheter une limousine et une maison. La situation est la même pour les Roumains qui travaillent à l’étranger. Les gens d’affaires font la même chose… Je ne vois pas pourquoi les Roms riches devraient agir différemment par rapport aux majoritaires… » (G. D.). De la transformation du détenteur du pouvoir symbolique en un objet d’admiration sacrée il n’y a pas loin. Cela veut dire que cet individu peut induire des pulsions de vie, qu’il peut orienter le parcours des autres et peut leur demander de se consacrer à ses propres projets. Le dérapage de l’ensemble (la communauté, l’organisation) vers la direction des ambitions de l’initiateur, de celui qui assume la structuration de la pensée de chaque individu et l’organisation cognitive de la collectivité, est une des plus perfi des conséquences de l’abandon au pouvoir.

Détenir le contrôle veut dire aussi disposer des moyens de sanction ou de récompense ; le fait extrêmement banal d’avoir à sa disposition les instruments de sanction et/ou la possibilité d’offrir des récompenses (position sociale, petites attentions, dons en nature – distribuer des biens et des emplois c’est rendre le bénéfi ciaire dépendant de la source de pouvoir, organiser sa vie, ordonner son existence). Celui qui offre illégalement l’argent, à titre public ou individuel, suggère aussi l’ouverture au pouvoir. Les riches de la communauté rom, tout comme les politiciens, utilisent deux stratégies pour obtenir la notoriété et la réputation – c’est un aspect sur lequel tombent d’accord tous nos interlocuteurs. Ils sont tentés de faire des gestes publics spectaculaires, des dons et des cadeaux qui étonnent. Ils offrent par exemple des dons importants aux Eglises, ce qui a pour résultat des gains d’image. Ou bien ils gaspillent sans mesure aux noces et fêtes privées et publiques ou, tout simplement, ils épatent, en descendant de limousines de luxe, en faisant saillir les signes de la richesse, l’or excessif des parures. Tout cela est censé impressionner, et crée des relations de domination-soumission. En fait, il se forme une spirale de dépendances et de complicités.

Un moteur de l’affi rmation/reconnaissance du pouvoir est aussi l’identifi cation avec ceux qui ont réussi, qui ont amassé beaucoup de richesses – la richesse étant le plus sûr signe du succès. Deux étudiantes à la faculté de Psychologie, et plusieurs de nos répondants, nous fournissent des opinions que nous avons rencontrées chez tous les interlocuteurs. Roxana est étonnée par cette conviction très répandue parmi les majoritaires : « les majoritaires disent que les Roms sont riches, qu’ils ont beaucoup d’or, mais il y a aussi des Tsiganes qui n’ont rien, qui sont très pauvres. Il y en a, c’est vrai, qui sont très riches, qui font voir leur richesse ; à Vaslui il y a de très grandes maisons, on dirait des écoles, et, en plus, très ornées, mais pas le genre ‘châteaux’. S’ils sont riches, ils le font voir ! » La famille de Roxane fait partie de la « couche moyenne » ; ils ont deux appartements, une grande maison, mais n’ont pas une vraie villa. Mais elle tient à préciser leur condition de famille éduquée : « nous ne voulons pas faire voir ce que nous avons, nous voulons vivre décemment, c’est tout ». Ses déclarations témoignent d’une haute maturité et d’un niveau culturel élevé : « Les grandes maisons ont été bâties pour montrer l’opulence de leurs habitants, les biens détenus, l’argent, les bijoux n’étant plus à la mode. Avant, on faisait du commerce illégal,

• 85


on apportait de la marchandise de l’extérieur et on vendait bien, mais maintenant ça ne va plus. La plupart de ces commerçants ont leurs propres sociétés, ils vendent des autos de l’extérieur. C’est comme ça qu’ils ont amassé leurs biens, grâce au commerce clandestin, ils apportent des jeans par exemple, s’ils sont très nombreux dans leur famille ils partent à l’étranger et envoient de l’argent à ceux qui restent à la maison ». Les maisons à tours sont un signe de la « supériorité et de suprématie ». La maison de la famille de Roxana est grande, mais elle n’a pas de tours ni de décorations. Sa collègue Crenguta ajoute : « Les sources d’argent des riches sont d’habitude héritées, et maintenant, ils vont à l’étranger où ils volent pour envoyer de l’argent chez eux, à leurs familles ». Ils y font des travaux illégaux, du trafi c de chair, ils recrutent des fi lles plus naïves, qui vivent à la campagne. Ceux qui se sont enrichis « ont le respect » – gagné de force. Ce qui est intéressant, c’est que la manière dont on a acquis les richesses ne compte pas, ce qui compte c’est que la richesse impose le respect, l’admiration et la soumission. Cette opinion est partagée par tous nos interlocuteurs et elle porte surtout sur les représentations sociales des pauvres, de ceux qui n’ont pas réussi. « Les pauvres ne considèrent pas les riches avec rancune, ils s’entraident », ajoute Roxana. L’aide est cependant occasionnelle, payée par le travail. Les pauvres sont plutôt méprisés, et justement parce qu’ils sont pauvres, parce qu’ils ne réussissent pas à se débrouiller. « Ils sont aidés par la Mairie, mais le problème c’est qu’ils ne travaillent pas, ils attendent que tout leur tombe du ciel ». Tandis que les riches sont enviés, tout le monde aimerait avoir des maisons qui confèrent du prestige. Ils ne sont pas enviés seulement par les Roms, mais aussi par les Roumains.

Un classique de la psychologie clinique, F. Redl (1963), en analysant le rôle central de la personne dans différents groupes, a trouvé que ces personnes peuvent devenir objets d’identifi cation, elles peuvent contenir l’idéal de soi de l’individu, et arriver au statut d’objet d’amour ; l’amour qui provoque la fusion. Ou bien, il peut aussi produire la peur, et dans ce cas-ci la solution est l’identifi cation avec l’agresseur, avec le Grand Frère. Mais la richesse, la chance d’avoir réussi ? Toutes les formes de possession (les maisons, les terrains, l’argent) peuvent impressionner, même si rien des éventuelles qualités humaines de ceux qui les possèdent n’y est contenu. La manière dont la richesse a été obtenue n’importe pas, ce qui importe c’est que ça existe, et que c’est une garantie du succès personnel. On a affaire à une pensée restrictive, simplifi catrice, mais qui étonne par son réalisme et son pragmatisme. Même si nous n’acceptons pas les moyens par lesquels on obtient rapidement la richesse, nous en sommes impressionnés, nous accordons du crédit aux personnes qui ont réussi une performance de ce type. Avec cela nous entrons dans un jeu obscur de la mise en scène de la réputation. L’affi rmation dans la lutte de concurrence, l’effort pour la reconnaissance impressionnent la plupart des gens, il y en a même qui en sont hypnotisés. Toutes ces observations sont applicables aux communautés de Roms. Ceux qui font voir leurs richesses (« palais », limousines, or) – même si tout ça a été obtenu illicitement – fascinent, ils éveillent l’envie. Ils mettent en œuvre un système de relations sociales auquel il ne manque pas la transmission de la compétence de produire de l’argent, les stratégies interindividuelles, les gestes symboliques, voire même la sexualité (Foucault, 1993) et qui sont associées à un grand nombre de caractéristiques de personnalité comme autorité reconnue, la force,

86 •


le prestige, le pouvoir d’infl uence, la capacité de domination et celle d’obtenir la soumission (Ruano-Borbalan, 2002).

HISTOIRES DE SUCCÈS

La littérature mentionne le fait que le pouvoir de leader s’acquiert par qualités personnelles, par les aptitudes exceptionnelles de certains chefs, par leur capacité de susciter le respect et l’admiration de la communauté ; par la renommée reconnue à l’intérieur du groupe, par la qualité d’interaction avec les autres (par le pouvoir du mot, du geste symbolique ou du style personnel effi cace), la capacité de communiquer (Neculau, 1977, 2007). Nous faisons référence à des spécialistes de haute classe, à des professionnels, ce que nous allons exemplifi er par deux études de cas, M.V. et D.E. et, par la suite, le parcours de quelques militants impliqués dans le développement de la communauté.

Le premier, M.V., est un personnage fort médiatisé, leader politique, musicien reconnu, fi ls d’un grand violoniste. Il a été et est encore professeur de musique, chef d’orchestre, il est devenu à un moment donné le chef d’une formation politique, Partida Romilor, et membre dans la Chambre des Députés. Il se présente comme un produit de talents et de motivations personnelles : « Je suis quelqu’un d’ambitieux, et lorsque je me propose quelque chose, je fais tout pour y aboutir, je ne fuis pas la responsabilité. Politiquement parlant, je suis membre du PSD, vice-président du PSD de Bucarest, leader rom, et je me préoccupe de tout ce qui se passe ; j’ai quitté le Partida Romilor après avoir Partida Romilor après avoir Partida Romilorconsidéré que ce n’était pas là la meilleure place, car cela impliquait un comportement hypocrite du point de vue politique ; j’ai assumé et j’assume encore le rôle non pas de leader, mais d’exemple ; tant pour les majoritaires que pour les Tsiganes, l’exemple de ce qu’une personne publique devrait représenter, une place, un modèle, j’aide et je fais tout ce que je peux dans toutes les directions politiques, sociales et culturelles pour aider les gens de qualité, les doués, les talentueux, pour les promouvoir, quel que soit leur âge, et je crois que beaucoup d’Occidentaux veulent me parler, ils demandent mon avis, ils me font comprendre que quelque part mon comportement est surveillé, de même que le travail que je fais dans ce sens. Mais je ne peux pas accepter (beaucoup d’attitudes et comportements –n.n.) ; cela tient à l’éducation, chez nous à la maison, on n’a jamais discuté de ce qui est bon et ce qui est mal au sujet des Tsiganes ».

D.E. a connu un trajet professionnel et social de succès, ce qui le recommande comme analyste et interlocuteur très compétent : il a suivi un lycée de musique où il a étudié le violon et puis il s’est présenté cinq fois au Conservatoire pour passer l’examen d’admission où il pense avoir été discriminé ; chaque fois il lui manquait très peu pour y être reçu. L’admission au Conservatoire en ce temps-là était très diffi cile, parce qu’il y avait 3 ou 4 places et 20 à 30 candidats par place. A partir de 1992 il a évolué à la Philharmonie de Iaşi, et il a enseigné au Conservatoire pendant six ans, de même qu’à l’Ecole normale de Iasi. Puis, il a suivi des cours à la faculté de Psychologie et a fait un master en Relations humaines et Communication. Il est impliqué dans des projets d’intégration des Roms et de recherche du talent musical de ceux-ci. Sa famille a valorisé l’éducation et s’est orientée vers le progrès et vers l’acquisition d’un statut social : « Mon père a pensé qu’il était bon pour moi d’aller à l’école, d’apprendre la musique, de faire des progrès. L’orientation de la famille a été pour le progrès, l’étude

• 87


et l’éducation. Ils on fait ce pas vers un statut social. Ils n’ont pas imposé le métier traditionnel de nos ancêtres musiciens, mais ont été ouverts à d’autres métiers. J’ai des cousins avocats qui n’avaient pas d’affi nité pour la musique ». D.E. a beaucoup voyagé, il a entrepris des tournées à travers le monde avec l’orchestre dont il fait partie (Italie, Angleterre, le Japon). Il a une grande ouverture d’esprit et connaît beaucoup d’éléments de la culture des pays où il voyage. Il allie la compétence professionnelle et la notoriété avec le militantisme et l’implication dans les problèmes de la communauté.

Dans la même catégorie font partie des personnes à compétences techniques particulières, spécialistes reconnus qui prouvent à la fois une connaissance supérieure des mécanismes du développement social, des lois économiques et fi nancières. Ce sont des magistrats, des juristes, des économistes, gens de lettres qui ont une carrière professionnelle, mais qui sont en même temps impliqués dans le social, contribuant ainsi au développement et au progrès de la communauté. C’est la cas de I.D., un informaticien qui travaille dans les ventes et qui a obtenu le statut de directeur pour la Moldavie dans une entreprise de publicité. Il suit les cours d’assistance sociale dans une autre faculté pour pouvoir s’impliquer avec plus de compétencesdans les problèmes de la communauté.

Il s’agit d’une catégorie à part, largement répandue et très appréciée, celle des activistes, de ceux qui valorisent leur vocation militante. Presque tous les interlocuteurs de cette catégorie nous ont parlé de leur trajet d’activistes conscients de leur tâche morale, nous ont parlé de la voie par laquelle ils ont pris conscience du besoin de s’impliquer.

Voici le cas de A.V., 34 ans, qui travaille pour l’organisation Romani CRISS (Roma (Roma (Center for Social Intervention and Studies), une organisation non-gouvernementale qui promeut les droits de la population rom en Roumanie. Notre interlocuteur raconte :

« Quand j’étais étudiant, je travaillais avec un professeur, je gagnais mon argent, j’avais un statut différent parmi mes collègues et c’était bien. J’ai entendu parler de Romani CRISS qui organisait des cours d’ordinateur et j’ai voulu voir en considérant Romani CRISS qui organisait des cours d’ordinateur et j’ai voulu voir en considérant Romani CRISSque c’était pour moi l’occasion d’améliorer mes compétences en matière informatique. J’ai eu de la chance, car j’ai rencontré une ancienne activiste qui m’a demandé où j’étais, ce que je faisais, et elle m’a invité à leurs réunions. J’y suis passé, elle m’a fait entrer dans diverses tâches qui ont été très stimulantes pour moi, ça m’a plu, ça m’a donné de la confi ance et beaucoup de responsabilités, le reste est allé de soi. Deux mois plus tard je coordonnais déjà le projet Romani CRISS, ce qui était très diffi cile pour une personne dépourvue d’expérience. Maintenant non plus je n’ai pas beaucoup d’expérience, j’ai beaucoup de choses à apprendre. Petit à petit, je me suis impliqué dans cette question… ». C’est l’histoire de la plupart de nos interlocuteurs.

L’exemple des deux personnalités que l’on vient de citer (M.V. et D.E.) nous a semblé être vraiment représentatif des success-stories et surtout de la manière d’infl uencer la vie de la communauté par l’exemple personnel, par une carrière construite sur l’effort, le talent et le mérite personnel.

Les quatre « histoires de succès » de Delia Bobîrsc, insérées dans le volume de Mădălin Voicu et Caludiu Tufi ş racontent des expériences d’apprentissage en vue d’une carrière professionnelle, bien qu’ils proviennent tous de familles pauvres, où les modèles culturels et la tradition de l’orientation vers l’éducation étaient absents.

88 •


Le dénominateur commun aux quatre interlocuteurs est le fait que, grâce à leurs qualités, ils ont parcouru des trajets de formation ascendante et ils ont construit des scénarios de vie en investissant dans la haute éducation. Ioana parcourt le trajet d’une étudiante attardée qui se rattrape et qui se réinvente jusqu’à ce qu’elle devienne une spécialiste reconnue. Elle monte l’échelle sociale grâce à ses performances, devient haut fonctionnaire public (souvent discriminée), elle doit gérer des fonds européens importants, elle voyage, écrit, observe et évalue. Elles sont très intéressantes ses observations concernant les attitudes des offi ciels européens envers les problèmes des Roms ; ceux-là sont souvent réticents, distants, ne manifestent pas d’intérêt à ce sujet, mais ils sont « diplomates ». Elle utilise ses compétences pour faciliter l’expression des « sans voix », elle croit pouvoir transférer à ses semblables son énergie et son affection, « l’activisme et le militantisme » qu’elle a appris à son tour. Claudiu est lui aussi « fasciné » par l’école, il obtient de bons résultats ; encouragé il suit un trajet ascendant et fait des études universitaires de littérature. Ensuite, il découvre sa vocation d’activiste pour les droits de l’Homme : il suit la faculté d’Etudes politiques, puis le Master, s’implique dans le développement de la communauté rom, dans l’organisation politique des Roms, et acquiert la conscience de militant. Andrei a bénéfi cié de l’appui inconditionnel de sa mère pour faire ses études ; comme étudiant (faculté d’Assistance sociale), il travaille comme bénévole dans trois organisations non gouvernementales, il écrit des projets, participe à des workshops et travaille avec des enfants handicapés. A la fi n de ses études post-universitaires, Andrei se spécialise dans les « politiques sociales et institutions européennes », reçoit un prix comme activiste, et devient très compétent dans le management de projets. Dans ce cas aussi, la conscience de militant s’avère être motivante pour une carrière réussie. Elena provient d’une famille où l’éducation a été considérée comme une valeur. Les parents doivent se limiter – à cause des conditions précaires – aux études moyennes. Mais ils investissent dans les enfants. Elena connaît le succès à l’école, elle est très appréciée par les professeurs, elle assume ouvertement son identité, s’engage dans des actions publiques, dénonce les stéréotypes négatifs qui visent les Roms et pratique le bénévolat. Elle pense être idéaliste parce qu’elle s’implique dans des actions sociales, d’où il ne résulte pas un profi t personnel. Elle théorise sur le concept d’idéalisme social, étant pleine d’espoir et de projets.

Certains de nos interlocuteurs ont invoqué la propension à l’éducation issue de leur famille, chaque génération montant plus haut sur l’échelle du succès social. I.D. évoquait avec émotion le parcours de ses parents qui ont quitté le village, se sont établis en ville, sont allés à l’école, se sont qualifi és dans des métiers complexes, voulant transmettre à leurs enfants leur désir irréalisé de faire des études universitaires. Leur rêve s’est réalisé, leurs enfants ont suivi les cours de l’université et ils sont très actifs comme militants dans leur communauté. V.R., 58 ans, qui a fait seulement le lycée, s’exprime dans une langue remarquable, et évoque son père, membre respecté de la communauté, qualifi é dans un métier, « qui parlait bien, était fi er, s’habillait soigneusement et était renommé pour sa sagesse ». A son tour, V.R. a la renommée d’un homme sage, qui n’oublie pas « d’où il est parti », respecte « les coutumes et les traditions tsiganes qui transmettent une spiritualité profonde et une modalité particulière de vivre ». Il est très fi er de ses cinq enfants, ayant tous fait des études : une fi lle actrice à succès, mentionne son origine à la télévision ; une autre a fait des études de philologie, un garçon est professeur de sport

• 89


et psychologue, un autre, étudiant en assistance sociale. Il se félicite d’avoir transmis aux enfants le désir de l’éducation, le respect pour les traditions de la communauté et pour la culture en général.

La famille élargie contribue dans ces cas à la sauvegarde et à la transmission des traditions ; elle constitue l’élément fondateur de l’organisation sociale et des groupes. Dans la famille, qui est l’unité psychosociale de base, se construisent des modèles culturels, de même que la stratégie pour la société extérieure. Dans ces familles se développent des stratégies pour vivre « à coté » des politiques de la population majoritaire, et l’on peut y retracer des trajectoires formatives réussies. Elles doivent s’adapter constamment aux changements extérieurs, aux changements sociaux post-communistes (Auzias, 1993), et par ces efforts se trouve modelé le trajet de la nouvelle élite rom.

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Ce qui manque aux communautés rom, particulièrement aux communautés pauvres, c’est l’organisation, l’unité d’action et la confi ance dans les représentants locaux et nationaux. Il existe une perception collective de frustration, le sentiment que d’autres (qui appartiennent ou non à la communauté, des notables), manipulent les ressources qui devraient leur revenir, y compris les aides venues de l’Union Européenne pour les Roms.

La majorité de nos interlocuteurs sont tombés d’accord sur ce diagnostic. Il nous est confi rmé aussi par d’autres recherches (Baltasiu, Dobrica, Jderu, 2005) qui évoquent l’instauration d’une culture de la pauvreté, ayant pour corollaire l’apathie et le fatalisme, le rejet des responsabilités vers l’extérieur, l’appel à des solutions minimales de survie et la crainte envers les forts. L’effet obtenu est « un manque réciproque de confi ance », l’envie, la compétition exagérée entre les groupes et « l’incapacité d’unifi er les efforts dans des directions d’intérêt majeur, comme par exemple l’amélioration des voies d’accès, le soutien accordé aux pauvres, l’accès à l’électricité et à l’eau courante ». Les gouvernants adoptent envers les Roms des solutions d’assistance sociale (qui peuvent être intéressantes pour les futurs votes de la part des Roms). Les politiques d’auto-gestion économique manquent (requalifi cation ou qualifi cation professionnelle, emplois permanents, mise en valeur des métiers traditionnels), de même que les leaders authentiques capables de mobiliser, d’unifi er et de diriger l’effort communautaire. Parfois trop « intellectuelles » et trop « idéalistes », les élites que nous avons interrogées ne trouvent pas encore d’audience suffi sante ni les modalités pour infl uencer de manière décisive les communautés. Elles n’ont pas l’esprit d’entreprise et ne peuvent pas offrir des modèles personnels de succès. Les élites que nous avons identifi ées et décrites sont encore trop faibles et le nombre de leurs représentants est encore très réduit. Mais elles ont la possibilité de compenser ces handicaps par leur compétence dans les positions-clés qu’elles occupent, par mobilisation et implication, comme il arrive dans beaucoup de cas. L’avenir des communautés rom se trouve dans les mains des élites authentiques, conscientes de leur pouvoir et de leur responsabilité.

L’Europe étant confrontée à une dispute sans précédent dans sa tentative d’adopter une politique cohérente par rapport à la population rom, l’appel aux leaders rom, à l’élite professionnelle et culturelle, nous semble être une solution plus que nécessaire.

90 •


BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Auzias, C., 1993. Les familles tziganes d’Europe de l’Est, in Auzias, C. (sous la direction de), Les Familles rom d’Europe de l’Est. Paris : IDEF, p. 6-9.

Baltasiu, R., Dobrica, P., Jderu,G. (sous la direction de), 2005. Reprezentari si reprezentativitate. Perspective asupra comunitatii roma. Bucaresti : Editura Omega Ideal.

Birnbaum, P., 1985. Introduction, in Birnbaum, P. (sous la direction de), Les élites socialistes au pouvoir. Les dirigeants face à l’Etat. 1981-1985. Paris : PUF.

Bobîrsc, D., 2008. Povesti de succes, in Voicu, M., Tufi s, C.D., Romii. Povesti de viata, Fundatia Soros Romania.

Broady, D., Chmayko, N., Saint Martin, M., 1997. Formation des élites et culture transnationale, Centre de Sociolgie de l’Education t de la Culture. Paris/Uppsala : EHESS et l’Université d’Uppsala.

Coenen-Huther, J., 2004. Sociologie des élites. Paris : Armand Colin.Collovald, A., 1985. La République du militant. Recrutement et fi lières de la carrière

politique des députés, in Birnbaum, P. (sous la direction de). Les élites socialistes au pouvoir. Les dirigeants face à l’Etat. 1981-1985. Paris : PUF, p. 11-52.

Croizet, J-C., Leyens, J-Ph., 2004. Mauvaises réputationséputationsé . Paris : Armand Colin.Doms, M., Moscovici S., 1984. Innovation et infl uence des minorités, in Serge Moscovici,

Psycholgie sociale. Paris : PUF, p. 51-89.Enriquez, E., 2007. Clinique du pouvoir. Ramonville Saint-Agne : Editions Erès. Clinique du pouvoir. Ramonville Saint-Agne : Editions Erès. Clinique du pouvoirFoucault, M., 1993. Surveiller et Punir. Histoire de la prison. Paris : Gallimard.Gheorghe, N., 1993. Introduction générale aux Roms d’Europe de l’Est, in Auzias, C.,

(sous la direction de), Les Familles rom d’Europe de l’Est. Paris : IDEF, p. 10-13

Grosescu, R., 2008. Conversia elitelor comuniste din Romania in perioada de tranzitie : 1989-2000, in Gheorghiu, M.D., Lupu, M., Mobilitatea elitelor in Romania secolului XX, Paralela 45, Pitesti, p. 229-338.secolului XX, Paralela 45, Pitesti, p. 229-338.secolului XX

Ioan, M., 1997. L’internationalisme prolétarien et l’invention des écoles de parti, in Broady, D., Chmayko, N., Saint Martin, M., Formation des élites et culture transnationale, Centre de Sociolgie de l’Education et de la Culture. Paris/Uppsala : EHESS et l’Université d’Uppsala, p. 319-336

Mills, C. W., 1969. L’élite au pouvoir. lite au pouvoir. lite au pouvoir Paris : Maspero.Moscovici, S., 1979. Psychologie des minorités actives. Paris : PUF. Neculau, A., 2007. Dinamica grupului si a echipei. Iasi : Polirom.Neculau, A., 1977. Liderii in dinamica grupurilor. Liderii in dinamica grupurilor. Liderii in dinamica grupurilor Bucaresti : Editura Stiintifi ca.Redl, F., 1965. Emotion de groupe et leadership, in A. Levy, (coord), Psychologie sociale.

Textes fondamentaux anglais et américains, tome 2. Paris : Dunod.Ruano-Borbalan, J-C., 2002. Introduction générale, in J-C. Ruano-Borbalan, B. Choc,

Le pouvoir.Le pouvoir.Le pouvoir Auxerre : Sciences Humaines Editions.Suleiman, N. E., 1979. Les élites en France. Grands corps et grandes écoles. Paris :

Editions du Seuil.

• 91


Tcherednitchenko, G., 1997. Les dirigeants du parti « Choix démocratique de la Russie »,Russie »,Russie » in Broady, D., Chmayko, N., Saint Martin, M. Formation des élites et culture transnationale, Centre de Sociolgie de l’Education et de la Culture. Paris/Uppsala : EHESS et l’Université d’Uppsala, p. 5- 108

Voicu, M., Tufi s, C.D., 2008. Romii. Povesti de viata, Fundatia Soros Romania.Zdravomyslov, A., 1997. Les nouvelles conditions de formation des élites politiques

russes, in Broady, D., Chmayko, N., Saint Martin, M., Formation des élites et culture transnationale, Centre de Sociolgie de l’Education et de la Culture. Paris/Uppsala : EHESS et l’Universite d’Uppsala, p. 81-94.

• 93

The present paper explores the issue of Roma religious conversion to Pentecostalism and the impact it has on their ethnic and social identity. I endeavour to analyse how religious conversions restructure the practices and narratives of self and how post-socialist established communities of Pentecostals create a new sense of identity among this marginalised community.

By looking at the offi cial data provided by the national censuses from 1992 and 2002, I analyse how the religious structure of post-socialist Romania has changed. These data allow us to see how the different religious denominations evolved in this period and where exactly they were most successful.

Drawing on sociological and ethnographic1 data we will try to explore how the social marginalisation of Roma leads to religious exclusion as well as the impact of religious conversion by taking these facts into consideration. I do not try to explain by this why the religious conversions among Roma take place, but rather what the social and cultural implications of this are. A new social narrative has appeared within Roma Pentecostal communities and this paper tries to explore the conditions for and consequences of these conversions.

The post-socialist period meant the abolition of secularism logic and atheist regulation of religious practice. The Communist ideologists and bureaucratic party networks managed to expulse religion from the public sphere and push forward a process of societal secularisation. Because this was not accompanied by a genuine social modernisation (Romania remained one of the most rural countries of Eastern Europe), the “atheisation process” was one of the Communist regime’s big failure (Gog 2007). As a result, the religiosity that was still alive at the private level eventually invaded the public sphere.

Sorin GOG

POST-SOCIALIST RELIGIOUS PLURALISMHOW DO RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS OF ROMA FIT

INTO THE WIDER LANDSCAPE?

From Global to Local Perspectives

94 •

Sorin GOG

The neo-protestant religious movements were part of this religious revival as well. Suppressed by the Communist regimes, the neo-protestant churches actively made use of the post-socialist democratic pluralism and invested a great deal of energy in “spreading the Gospel” (Coleman 2000) and becoming much more visible on the religious market. Resulting from this, a lot of new neo-protestant churches were established in the past two decades, especially among the Roma community. Before analysing the impact of these religious conversions we will start by analysing the general post-socialist religious context.

As we can see from Table 1, the religious structure of Romania underwent only minor transformations in the post-socialist period. All major religious denominations kept the same proportion of religious adherents during the turbulent post-Communist period: besides the neo-protestant denominations (Baptists, Pentecostals, Adventists and the Brethren Assemblies) that managed to increase the number of their believers (from 2.01% to 2.72% of the total population, in absolute numbers 131.452 new believers) all other denominations lost only a small and insignifi cant number of their followers.

Religious belonging does not refl ect religiosity or a distinct religious perspective on life. We thus have to look at these numbers as indicators regarding religious affi liation, not necessarily mirroring the dramatic religious changes that happened in post-socialist Romania. For a great segment of the Romanian population the religion to which one belongs does not have any public and/or private religious currency. As I have shown elsewhere (Gog 2006) the increasing post-socialist pluralisation of life-worlds (Lebenswelt(Lebenswelt( ) led to an erosion of the traditional religious world-view and amplifi ed a distinct logic of secularisation. This, in turn, manifested itself as a de-Christianisation of the religious worldview, a de-institutionalisation of religious practice and de-moralisation of the practical sphere of life. This distinct secularisation process affected mostly the younger generations that were socialised in the new post-socialist world and that were living in an urban area.

The religious affi liation is generally assigned at birth and signals the belonging to a distinct cultural tradition (Orthodox-Romanian; Reformed-Hungarian; Lutheran-German, etc.) that is sometimes employed as an ethnic marker. Although it does not refl ect the religious transformations that happened in this period, when we look at the religious affi liation at a national level we can see that the religious structure of the different ethnic minorities of Romania underwent specifi c pathways of change.

From Table 2 we can see that the neo-protestant movement gained an increase of 5.72% within the Roma population compared to only 0.6% within the Romanian population and 0.35% among the Hungarian population. At the same time, according to the offi cial data from the two censuses, the Orthodox Church lost more members within the Roma population (3.42% from the total Roma community) than from the Romanian population (0.6%).

It is worth mentioning that the Orthodox Church does not have any distinct Roma clerical hierarchy or Roma Churches. Roma and Romanians are part of the same Orthodox ecclesial setting just like Hungarians and Roma are part of the same Reformed local church. In spite of this, there were more Roma that left the Orthodox Church than Romanians, and we will take a look at this issue later on.

• 95

Post-Socialist Religious Pluralism

Tabl

e 1:

The

evo

lutio

n of

the

relig

ious

den

omin

atio

n st

ruct

ure

in th

e Ro

man

ian

Soci

ety:

from

199

2 to

200

2

Ort

hodo

xR

oman

- C

atho

licG

reek

- C

atho

licR

efor

med

Luth

eran

Evan

gelic

alU

nita

rian

Neo

-Pr

otes

tant

With

out

relig

ion

/ Ath

eist

1992

- C

ensu

s86

.81

%5.

09 %

0.98

%3.

52 %

0.26

%0.

34 %

2.01

%0.

36 %

2002

- C

ensu

s86

.79

%4.

73 %

0.88

%3.

23 %

0.17

%0.

31 %

2.72

%0.

01 %

Sour

ce: N

atio

nal C

ensu

s 199

2 an

d 20

02

Tabl

e 2:

The

den

omin

atio

nal s

truc

ture

of t

he m

ajor

eth

nic

grou

ps e

xist

ing

in th

e Ro

man

ian

soci

ety

acco

rdin

g to

the

1992

and

200

2 Na

tiona

l Cen

sus

Ort

hodo

xR

oman

- C

atho

licG

reek

- C

atho

licR

efor

med

Luth

eran

Evan

gelic

alU

nita

rian

Neo

-Pr

otes

tant

With

out

relig

ion

/ Ath

eist

Rom

ania

n-19

9294

.68

%1.

77 %

0.94

%0.

08 %

0.03

%0.

01 %

1.99

%0.

12 %

Rom

ania

n-20

0294

.08%

1.78

%0.

83 %

0.09

%0.

02 %

0.01

%2.

59 %

0.07

%

Hun

garia

n-19

921.

71 %

41.2

0 %

1.44

%47

.10

%1.

23 %

4.56

%1.

72 %

0.24

%

Hun

garia

n-20

021.

98 %

41.0

0 %

1.37

%46

.47

%1.

15 %

4.54

%2.

07 %

0.23

%

Rom

a-19

9285

.30

%4.

81 %

0.89

%4.

39 %

0.07

%0.

23 %

2.85

%0.

86 %

Rom

a-20

0281

.88

%3.

80 %

1.15

%3.

06 %

0.06

%0.

13 %

8.57

%0.

35 %

Sour

ce: N

atio

nal C

ensu

s 199

2 an

d 20

02

96 •

Sorin GOG

Another important aspect of the post-socialist conversion of Roma to neo-protestant religious movements is that it gained impetus within rural areas but not within urban parts of Romania. More often than not, the rural population has a strong traditional attitude towards religious pluralism, regarding it not only as heresy but as a betrayal of the intimate texture and values of the community of the villagers as well. Because of this it is surprising to see (Table 2b) that among Roma communities living in rural areas the neo-protestant movement gained an increase of 6.83% compared to an increase of 3.92% among the Roma living in the urban areas (Table 2c).

At the same time, if we take into account the rural/urban variable we can again see that there is a stronger decline of the Orthodox Church among the Roma within the rural sector (4.57%) than the urban sector (1.56%). These numbers do not necessarily refl ect religious mobility from one religious denomination to another but it is also dubious to consider the changes within Roma religious structure as the result of different fertility patterns among the Roma from the two denominations. Indeed, taking into account that most of these religious conversions occurred in the past decade, it is very unlikely that a different religious belonging produced, in such a short time, a different demographical pattern. As our fi eldwork highlighted, the presence of a neo-protestant community in the Roma section of a village has usually appeared after the fall of Communism and its members have been recruited from the dominant religious denomination: Orthodox in the case of Romanian villages and Reformed in the case of Hungarian villages.

By analysing the data from the two censuses we can conclude that the biggest changes in the religious structure of post-socialist times are related to the expansion of the neo-protestant religious movements. Furthermore, we can also note that this expansion has had a greater impact on the Roma community living in Romania, and more precisely on the Roma living in the rural areas of this country.

Another important conclusion we can draw by analysing the data regarding the religious structure of the different ethnic groups inhabiting Romania is related to the nature of these religious conversions. Within the Roma community, most of these religious conversions are effectuated into Pentecostalism: 75.14% of the total Roma neo-protestants belong to a Pentecostal Church while only 55.06% of the Romanian neo-protestants belong to this religious community. Among the Hungarian, the dominant neo-protestant community is that of the Baptists that constitute 42.84% of the neo-protestant believers while the Pentecostals have only 16.51% Hungarian neo-protestant believers. Within the Hungarian community we can nevertheless also observe a weak growing trend of the Pentecostal movement: in 1992 they constituted 13.56% of the Hungarian neo-protestant population while in 2002 they represented 16.51%.

Because the denominational demography shows that Pentecostalism is by far the major option for the Roma who convert to another religion, we focus, in our analysis, in what follows from the impact Pentecostalism has on community building and conceptualisation of the social self among this ethnic group.

At the level of the entire social system the religious structure (analysed in terms of the declared religious belonging) has not been altered dramatically. We cannot talk about a major religious mobility that took place in post-socialist Romania. But if we take a look at this issue by analysing each distinct ethnic group we can see that today around 10% of the Gypsy population belongs to one of the neo-protestant churches

• 97


and that the majority of these believers have been recruited in the decade after the fall of Communism.

There is another important hallmark to the religious conversions into neo-protestant churches that take place in this period: according to the Roma pastors we interviewed, around 90% of the Roma Churches have been founded in the past decade. During the Communist period most of the Roma neo-protestant believers attended the same church as their Romanian or Hungarian spiritual brothers.

The post-socialist period meant not only the expansion of neo-protestant movements among the Roma but the institutionalisation of distinct religious services as well. There has been a growing religious autonomy of the Roma Pentecostal community through the creation of distinct religious Pentecostal associations or through the creation of a distinct ecclesial structure where the religious hierarchy is solely composed of Roma people.

This process of religious ethnicisation triggers, as we will see, a distinct perspective on Roma identity in which the institutional mechanisms of the local Pentecostal church plays a very important role. The local church is organised mainly by local Roma religious elite, but all members of the church are actively involved in the life of the community as well. Through the creation of specifi c social spaces within and outside the church, through a religious language that enables this disempowered community to articulate a unitary identity and a new image of the self and through the communitarian ethic that rigorously guides the life of the born-again believers, the Roma fi nd in the Pentecostal established ecclesial structures the institutional means to elaborate a social, cultural and ethnical narrative of their own.

One way of exploring the religious conversion among Roma that takes place in rural areas essentially is by looking at the social exclusion to which this community is subjected. By drawing on quantitative and qualitative data we will show that there is a much stronger exclusion and discrimination of Roma going on within the rural part of Romania and although this cannot be linked directly to the religious conversion to Pentecostalism it accounts for the lack of religious socialisation of this ethnic minority. The social exclusion is prolonged within the religious community as well and this has a certain impact on Roma religiosity. It would be wrong to assume that this is the reason of their conversion to Pentecostalism, but I argue that it nevertheless plays an important role. In comparison to how the local Orthodox Church integrates the Roma believers (the same applies to the Reformed Church), the Pentecostal Church acts among other things as an institutional platform that enables them to be the agents of their own ethnic identity.

In a recent nationwide and statistical representative survey2 that explored the ethnic relationships and the issue of Roma inclusion, people were asked to name those groups that they would not want to have as neighbours. As we can see from Table 3 the groups that rank highest are the homosexuals and Roma. 32.5% of the urban Romanian population (regardless of their ethnicity) and 38% of the rural population declared that they did not want to live next to Roma.

98 •

Sorin GOG

Table 3: The percentage of the Romanians that would not like to have the following groups as their neighbours

Urban Rural

Muslims 23.8 % 29.8 %

Immigrants 21.0 % 25.6 %

Homosexuals 42.9 % 49.2 %

Jews 19.9 % 25.4 %

Roma 32.5 % 38.0 %

Hungarians 19.9 % 25.9 %

Source: The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006

It can easily be noticed that the discrimination against these groups is stronger in the rural areas than in urban ones. In all cases, people living in villages expressed the desire not to have such neighbours. As we will see, within the rural areas of Romania the exclusion and discrimination of Roma is stronger and very intensely felt by the Roma living within the confi ned borders of the village.

Most of the villages explored in our research reveal how the social distribution of space depicts this discrimination against Roma. The Roma are usually located at the end of the village in a quarter where only Roma people live. They are not allowed to build a house next to the Romanians and are separated from them by a strong social border that signals the existence of a distinct territory. Sometimes even the public spaces become problematic and Roma are excluded from these as well:

“After the 1989 revolution, there was a new bar where Romanians from different villages gathered; I had a confl ict with them as they called me ‘hey, Tzigane’. I had to leave even if I had all the rights, as it was my village. There were streets where I could not walk on as a child because of the Romanians.” (A. D. male; 36 years old, graduated from a locksmith industrial school, married).

This spatial segregation overfl ows even into the organisation of cemeteries. Although the Roma in each village share the religious belonging of the majority of the population (Reformed in the case of Hungarians, Orthodox in the case of Romanians) they have to be buried separately: the cemetery reproduces the same ethnic border that exists in the real life; just as Roma and Romanians are not allowed to live next to each other they are not allowed to die together either. The cemetery acts in this way as a mirror of the social space that refl ects the religious transformations going on in the Roma quarter. The neo-protestants Roma have to be separated from the Orthodox Roma and so a new border is created in the cemetery just as the neo-protestant community is surrounded by a new exclusion rule within the wider community.

Most of our interviews highlighted that the Roma are aware of the different problems existing in their community (lack of education, disempowerment, unemployment, etc) but none bother them so much as the discrimination and demeaning to which

• 99


they are subjected. This is intensely felt by all Roma and in the different strategies of self-presentation that they employ they try to show themselves as honest people just as all the others:

“they say Gypsies steal. But did they ever catch me? Why are they suspecting me? You have to blame it all on me as I am Gypsy? Many times Romanians steal and Gypsies pay for it. (A. D. female 28 years old, single, no permanent job).

In addition to the social and spatial exclusion to which Roma are subjected to, the ethnic majority tries to make the most of their poverty and destitution at an economical level. The unemployment rate is very high among the Roma community and the economical situation of the Roma community is deplorable. A lot of the Gypsies we interviewed stated that the Communist period was much better for them, because they had a stable job that allowed them to care for their large families. Nowadays they barley survive.

In some parts of Romania their situation is dramatic and resembles very much the times when the Roma were enslaved. After the fall of Communism, the Roma did not receive any land from the government as they did not own land before the collectivisation, and the ones who did had a diffi cult time claiming it back. Because of this, the Roma from the rural areas of Romania were left with nothing and in order to survive they worked the lands of the Romanians. During the winter time, when there is no land to work, my interlocutors told me, they have nothing left to do but beg for food from door to door in the village. They do not have money to pay for food so they promise to work during the following summer for so many days in exchange of the food they receive. The villagers know that this is a good time to contract very cheap labour force, so they overcharge them and require a lot of days of work from them. In the summer time some of the Gypsies have to work for the food they have already used the previous winter.

Local Roma leaders are aware of this and see that the ethnic majority fi nds this very convenient:

“Everybody wants to exploit the Gypsies. Because – of course, it is understandable – a patron thinks about effi cient labour force, by spending less money, and getting a huge quantity of work done. Yes. Everybody thinks like that.” (F.B. male, Gherla, single, 29 years old, works at city hall)

The results of our research are consistent with the quantitative data provided by the national survey. Here we can see how strongly Romanians (regardless of their ethnicity) react to living together with Roma or getting married to Roma. 51.1 % of the people living in the rural areas disagree with inter-ethnic marriages with Roma people and 40.9 % of them disagree with sharing the same social space with them. All the other values regarding Roma and Romanians, such as playing, studying and working together stand very high and show that different practices of discrimination that we encountered in our research are consistent with the perceptions and attitudes of the ethnic majority.

Again we can notice that the discrimination against Roma is much higher in the rural areas than in the urban parts of the country. This is explainable both by traditionalism and the lack of social modernisation of people living in the countryside, and also by

100 •

Sorin GOG

the fact that within the closed community of a village, social relationships with ethnic minorities are unavoidable and this leads to a lot of confl icts.

Table 4: The percentage of Romanians who disagree with …

Urban Rural

… Roma and Romanians living together

31.1 % 40.9 %

… Roma and Romanians studying in the same classroom

19.3 % 27.7 %

… Roma and Romanians working in the same offi ce/workshop

17.2 % 25.6 %

… Roma and Romanians getting married

35 % 51.1 %

… Roma and Romanian children playing together

20 % 31.5 %


Our research revealed that the exclusion that operates within the villages is sometimes extended within the Church as well. Not in the sense that the priest of the local Church has a negative attitude towards them (some of the priests we interviewed actively take part in helping and supporting Roma) but in the sense that Roma have diffi culty in integrating themselves into the religious community.

The interviewed Romanian Orthodox priests confi rm the low religious participation of Roma and their lack of religious socialisation. The priests would like to have them within the Church but Roma strongly refuse to come.

“I don’t understand why. This is how they were accustomed. I tried to bring them [to Church]. But they don’t like it. They say that the Romanians do not look nice to them.” (Father L. Romanian Orthodox Priest, 30 years old, rural area).

Most of them refuse to get married in the Church as well, according to our informants.

Most of the time, the Church is seen by the Roma community as an institution of the ethnic majority. The ecclesial life that surrounds the religious service is perceived as a social space from which they are excluded. As a result of this, we fi nd within the church the same enclaves as we do in the rest of the existing social spaces within the villages:

• 101


“The Romanians separate themselves from them, but I can say that sometimes they separate themselves as well from the Romanians.” (Father L. Romanian Orthodox Priest, 30 years old, rural area).

The lack of religious socialisation and their separation from the institution of the Church was mentioned by many of our informants. They stated that they were treated badly by the Romanians and that their presence was not welcomed at religious meetings. The Roma Pentecostal Pastors were very critical about this issue and claimed that Roma never actually belonged to the Orthodox Church because the Church was never really interested in Christianising them:

“Even today the Orthodox Church reproaches me that I left the faith. But I cannot understand which faith I left, because the Roma did not have any faith. Practically their only contact with the Orthodox Church was at Easter, for baptisms and funerals. Besides this they did not have any connection with the Orthodox Church”. (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).

The same issue is raised by Roma that live in villages where Reformed Hungarians are the majority. Here as well the social and spatial exclusion functions just like in Romanian Orthodox villages. All the Roma, no matter what their religion is, get buried in the same cemetery, separated from the Hungarians. “There is not a single Roma buried in the Hungarian cemetery.” (Mr. K. 50 years old, member of the Roma Party). This, according to my informants, is an old custom from the time of the Hungarian landlords.

In the opinion of the people we interviewed, the problem is that the Hungarian and the Romanian communities are closed ones. For example, in the church “each one has his own bench inherited from their ancestors.” Reformed Hungarians object to the fact that Roma do not pay the necessary membership fee to the Reformed church. One of my informants raised this issue to the Reformed priest.

“I told the priest about this problem and I said to him: if thirty of us (Roma) start paying this fee, will you let us be part of your community? His answer was no.” (Mr. K. 50 years old, member of the Roma Party).

Most of the people from the Church do not say that they will not receive them, but act as such, according to my informant. The only contact the Reformed Roma have with the Church happens at baptisms, weddings and funerals. The Reformed religious leaders

“do not teach the (Roma) community about the Reformed faith.” (Mr. K. 50 years old, member of the Roma Party).

The post-socialist pluralisation that led to the appearance of new religions also created some confusion among the Roma, as they have found it hard to discern the “true religion”. The lack of religious socialisation makes them think that all religions can be reduced to humans trying to impose their will on others:

102 •

Sorin GOG

“I met many religious people, but I don’t think anyone really understands religion. It is not something to understand, the Catholic says one thing, the Orthodox says another thing, a Pentecostal comes with a third idea…” (A.D. (A.D. (Roma, 36 years old, married, no children).

Our research also showed that the social exclusion of Roma occurs within the religious community as well. As a result of this, it is not surprising to see that when it comes to religious participation, Roma have a very low rate of attending religious services: only 25% of the Orthodox Roma regularly attend Church in comparison to 41.4% of the entire Orthodox population. The difference regarding religious participation is a very big one, considering that the Roma population thinks of itself as being very religious. Surely this is not the product of a secularisation process triggered by social modernisation to which Roma are more exposed than other ethnic groups.

Table 5: Church attendance and trust in the institution of the Church at national level and among Roma

Orthodox population National sample Roma sample

Trust in the institution of the Church 79 % 67.4 %

Attend the Church at least three times a month 41.4 % 25.6 %


What is even stranger is the fact that religious participation is lower among Orthodox Roma from the rural area than the ones from the urban area. This is very strange as other studies have shown that church attendance, religious beliefs and religious practices are lower in those strata exposed to a process of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation. This is why we usually fi nd lower religious values in the urban sector: among the Orthodox Romanians living in cities 40.4% of them regularly attend Church, while the percentage of those living in the rural area is slightly higher: 42.6%. Among the Roma the opposite is true: there are 29% Orthodox Roma that attend church in the urban sector compared to only 23.4% in the rural parts of Romania.

This low participation rate among Roma in the rural area has to be explained as a result of the treatment to which this ethnic minority is exposed within the confi ned borders of the village and not as the occurrence of a secularisation process. This has also an impact on the trust capital that the Roma have in the institution of the Church (Table 5) which is signifi cantly lower to that of the Romanians.

If we analyse the religious beliefs of Roma, and not the institutional expression of these beliefs, we fi nd that they are very religious, even more religious than the majority of the population. Looking at religious beliefs such as the belief in God, Heaven, and life after death, which are important articles of faith of all Christian denominations in Romania, they are shared in greater proportion by the Roma than by the Romanians.

• 103


Table 6: Religious beliefs among the Roma compared to the national level

Orthodox population National sample Roma sample

Belief in God 91 % 93 %

Belief in Heaven 65.8 % 74.7 %

Life after death 50.9 % 57.5 %


We thus have a very paradoxical situation where an ethnic community is much more religious than the Orthodox Romanians but does not have the structural possibility of expressing this religiosity within the local church. Later on we will take a look at how the Pentecostal Church is able to provide the Roma community with an environment where this religiosity not only becomes manifest but is shaped by their cultural and social codes as well.

We encountered, throughout our research, the same paradox when we interviewed Romanian Orthodox priests that are just as intrigued by the religiosity of Roma and their lack of religious participation in the Church rituals. A priest said, for example, that when Roma from his village go abroad to work, he knows that they are decent people – that they go there for honest work and not to beg or steal. This has to be so because before departing

“many of them come and say: Father I am going abroad, please pray that God helps me and that I arrive safely there.” (F.B, young Orthodox priest).

Although they are not very churchly, the priest thinks of them as God-fearing people.

The priests also remark that Roma are very afraid of breaking oaths. When some insolvable issues appear among them, the priest is asked by Roma people to mediate between them. This way his sacred character and his spiritual power are recognised by the Roma community and so he becomes a symbolic sacred mediator between them in solving their profane issues, although most of them do not attend his church:

“I ask him to promise in front of God that they did not do this, that they did not steal from that person or did not sleep with the other one.” (Father L. Romanian Orthodox priest, 30 years old, rural area)

– in fact this same priest sees in them a religious-magical honesty that prevents them to break their oaths.

In spite of this religiosity, as pointed out earlier, the Roma avoid the Church because they say that they feel discriminated within the Church just like all the other social spaces where they interact with the Romanians and Hungarians. The same priest, that praised the Roma’s religiosity and “fear of God”, proudly told me about one Gypsy individual from his eparchy that takes part in every religious service together with the Romanian believers: by this he tries to show that Roma could become full members

104 •

Sorin GOG

if they wanted to, and at the same time reveals the extent of the religious participation of Roma within his community.

According to the Roma Pentecostal converts we interviewed, the same situation of exclusion practices exists within the Romanian Pentecostal Church. The Roma feel themselves marginalised by their Romanian brothers:

“There are brothers that, as the Word of God says, do not make any distinction between Roma or Gypsies and Romanians … we are brothers in the Lord and they receive us exactly as they would receive a brother. But approximately 90% of them make a racial discrimination. […] Only 10 % of them do not make a distinction.” (S.G., late 30s, entrepreneur in the construction sector).

According to a Roma Pentecostal leader – the president of an important Roma Pentecostal Association that has over 150 Pentecostal Roma Churches under its care – this was precisely the issue that determined them to create separate churches that where led by Roma pastors. This would lead to an autonomy of Roma and allow for local Churches where Roma had full “religious rights”. A lot of Roma Pentecostals told him that

“the Romanians make them sit on the last benches in the Church, that they are seldom allowed to preach the Word of God during the service and that the Romanians don’t look nice to them.” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).

Because the Romanians did not treat the Roma very well, he decided to start a new religious organisation that was their own. According to my informants, in some Romanian churches a Roma person has to wait over thirty years in order to be ordained as a deacon.

“Why then not have our own movement, our own teachers, or own religious ministers?” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).

In the past two decades the religious conversion of Roma to neo-protestant movements was followed by the creation of distinct Roma neo-protestant churches. The churches were located in the very quarters where the Roma were living and the religious clergy was recruited among their own people. Although this religious movement is still a small one, in a lot of villages where there are Roma people a new institution appeared: that of the local Church. An important dimension of our research was then to explore the impact of the appearance of this institution on the ethnic identity of Roma and the specifi c mechanisms for the articulation of a new “heavenly citizenship” that were set in motion by the religious conversion and the creation of a religious community.

The strong mystical experience and the religious conversion that follows lead to a new conceptualisation of the self and the grounding of a new type of social practices. The religious experience is not a ritualistic one, but one that invites the believer to experience for himself the religious realities. This individualisation of the religious faith is very different from the Orthodox communitarian way of conceptualising religiosity and this process of individualisation leads to a strong ethical rationalisation.

• 105


“The Orthodox allow you to do whatever you want. You go to church on Sunday, the Priest forgives you for your sins and then on Monday you start over again with your sinful life. Such a thing is not possible. I say that here (in the Pentecostal Church) there is the true faith; a faith that you have to live as well.” (C.F. Roma pastor and political leader, 55 years old, converted to Pentecostalism in the early 90s).

If there is no outworking and application of what God says, then “it is useless to say that you love God, if you don’t follow his commandments”. For a Pentecostal, religiosity is not a ritual activity, something to which one can formally participate. The true religiosity expresses itself, for a Pentecostal, in a moral life that he has to live out.

The religious gatherings that take place a few days a week are meant to create a religious environment where each convert can enhance his faith and fi nd out about how “to save himself”. Religious participation is compulsory and actively taking part in all the religious activities is a requirement for all members of the Church.

As a result of this we can clearly see that the neo-protestants Roma have a signifi cantly higher church attendance rate than the Orthodox Roma. 88.1% of the neo-protestant Roma regularly attend church compared to only 22.6% of the Orthodox Roma. For the neo-protestant Roma the local Church is the centre of community life. The spiritual kinship that they form within the religious community establishes a social network that extends beyond the religious services as well.

The strong emphasis on bible studies and religious practice that exists within the Church and the institutional requirement of personal relationship with God leads to a strong religious socialisation: the converts we interviewed used a strong religious framework to interpret their experiences and often quoted from the bible in order to give to their reasoning an undisputed authority. As a result of this, we can clearly see that at the national level, neo-protestant Roma share religious values in a higher proportion than do the Orthodox Roma.

Table 7: Religious values among the Orthodox and Neo-protestant Roma

Orthodox Roma Neo-protestant Roma

Attend the Church at least three times a month 25.6 % 88.1 %

Trust in the institution of the Church 67.4 % 81.1 %

Belief in God 93 % 92.8 %

Belief in Heaven 74.7 % 85.6 %

Life after death 57.5 % 80.2 %


Not only is the religious participation higher among the neo-protestant Roma but so are the religious beliefs and religious practices. The frequency of praying, according

106 •

Sorin GOG

to what our informants stated, is much higher among the neo-protestant Roma: 84.7% declared that they prayed daily compared to only 45.5% of the Orthodox Roma.

Table 8: Frequency of praying among the Orthodox and Neo-protestant Roma

Frequency of praying Orthodox Roma Neo-protestant Roma

Every Day 45.5 % 84.7 %

A few times a week 9.8 % 10.8 %

Once a week 4.3 % 0.9 %


As many other researchers have pointed out, the Roma communities are strongly fragmented (Gay y Blasco 1999) and lack an ethnic-national narrative in order to articulate an overarching “imagined community”(Anderson 2006). The lack of political mobilisation and their marginalisation triggered by the ethnic majority coupled with their economical destitution leads to a widespread disempowerment of Roma from Romania. This is especially true of Roma in rural areas where the structures of opportunities are limited and from which they are mostly excluded.

The Pentecostal movement does not offer social opportunities for the inclusion of Roma among the Romanian Pentecostals, as some have argued; indeed, our research showed that they themselves feel excluded from these religious communities as well. This is the main reason for the creation of distinct Roma Pentecostal churches.

Through its specifi c religious mechanisms, the local Pentecostal Church manages to create a sense of a new transfi gured community grounded on an ethical rationalisation of life. The religious environment creates a social space dominated by an ethic of brotherhood that manages to overcome the strong kin fragmentation that exists among the Roma community and to diminish the effects of discrimination and exclusion by emphasising the strong spiritual bonds grounded in the love of God.

Through the institution of the Church the disempowered Roma can fi nd the means to articulate a distinct social and cultural identity. The Pentecostal Roma become the agents and managers of their own identity and they fi nd in the religious language the tools to refl ect and elaborate this new identity in the different contexts of life. The institutional management of the local Church is composed of Roma people who manage the day to day issues of the religious community and act as spiritual leaders.

The strong emphasis on bible studies, sermons and devotional literature creates a high literacy rate among the Pentecostal converts that in turn leads to a valorisation of education as a way of social achievement. Pentecostal Roma insist that education is an important priority within their family and encourage their children to go to school. The religious activities that take place within the Church lead to the creation of a local religious elite that are able to articulate the needs and problems of their community.

The new “heavenly citizenship” and the promise of eternal salvation create strong bonds among them and through this, a cohesion that diminishes the exclusion and discrimination attitudes of the majority against them is born. The strong emphasis on

• 107


TAB

LES Ta

ble

2b :

The

relig

ious

den

omin

atio

nal s

truc

ture

of t

he R

oman

ian

soci

ety

livin

g in

the

urba

n ar

eas a

ccor

ding

to th

e 19

92 a

nd 2

002

Nat

iona

l Cen

sus

Ort

hodo

xR

oman

- C

atho

licG

reek

- C

atho

licR

efor

med

Luth

eran

Ev

ange

lical

Uni

taria

nN

eo-

Prot

esta

nt

With

out

relig

ion/

A

thei

st

Rom

ania

n-19

9294

.96

%1.

57 %

1.11

%0.

12 %

0.04

%0.

01 %

1.70

%0.

19 %

Rom

ania

n-20

0294

.52

%1.

51 %

0.99

%0.

13 %

0.03

%0.

01 %

2.17

%0.

11 %

Hun

garia

n-19

922.

22 %

42.3

1 %

1.52

%45

.76

%1.

42 %

4.15

%1.

42 %

0.30

%

Hun

garia

n-20

022.

49 %

42.17

%1.

42 %

44.9

9 %

1.38

%4.

21 %

1.67

%0.

26 %

Rom

a-19

9285

.99

%5.

10 %

0.86

%2.

94 %

0.06

%0.

12 %

2.61

%1.

31 %

Rom

a-20

0284

.43

%4.

16 %

1.24

%1.

85 %

0.03

%0.

13 %

6.53

%0.

43 %

Tabl

e 2c

: The

relig

ious

den

omin

atio

nal s

truc

ture

of t

he R

oman

ian

soci

ety

livin

g in

the

rura

l are

as a

ccor

ding

to th

e 19

92 a

nd 2

002

Nat

iona

l Cen

sus

Ort

hodo

xR

oman

- C

atho

licG

reek

- C

atho

licR

efor

med

Luth

eran

Ev

ange

lical

Uni

taria

nN

eo-

Prot

esta

nt

With

out

relig

ion/

A

thei

st

Rom

ania

n-19

9294

.34

%2.

01 %

0.74

%0.

03 %

0.01

%0.

00 %

2.34

%0.

05 %

Rom

ania

n-20

0293

.59

%2.

09 %

0.64

%0.

05 %

0.01

%0.

00 %

3.06

%0.

03 %

Hun

garia

n-19

921.

06 %

39.7

6 %

1.34

%48

.82

%1.

00 %

5.08

%2.

09 %

0.16

%

Hun

gari

an-2

002

1.40

%39

.68

%1.

31 %

48.1

3 %

0.91

%4.

90 %

2.50

%0.

20 %

Rom

a-19

9284

.81

%4.

60 %

0.91

%5.

40 %

0.08

%0.

30 %

3.04

%0.

54 %

Rom

a-20

0280

.24

%3.

56 %

1.09

%3.

84 %

0.09

%0.

13 %

9.87

%0.

31 %

108 •

Sorin GOG

the internalisation of moral codes and the puritan ideals allows the converted Roma to articulate distinct practices that are totally contrary to the general perception or Roma as vagabonds that steal, cheat and are dirty.

Our research put to light that most of the Roma regard the local NGOs as a private way to make money and the different political projects as a way to enrich a small number of people from their community. The local Pentecostal Church is increasingly regarded in many parts of Romania as the single local institution that creates the structural conditions for the formation of a unifi ed community that has the power and the language to articulate a specifi c social and cultural identity, capable of politically mobilising a fragmented ethnic group.

REFERENCESAnderson, B.R.O.G., Imagined communities: refl ections on the origin and spread of

nationalism. London; New York:Verso, 2006.Coleman, S., The globalisation of charismatic Christianity: Spreading the gospel of

prosperity. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.Gay y Blasco, P. Gypsies in Madrid: sex, gender and the performance of identity.

Oxford: Berg, 1999.Gog, S., “The construction of the religious space in post-socialist Romania.” Journal

for the Study of Religions and Ideologies(15): 37-53, 2006. “Ateizmus után. Románia a vallási újjászületés és szekularizáció között.” ErdéErdéErd lyi

TáTáT rsadalom 1: 51-64, 2007.

NOTES1 The ethnographic data I am using in this paper is the end-product of the research “Nomads

and Parliamentarians. The infl uence of mobility and religious affi liation on identity building and on the development of integration social policies Roma people in Northern, Eastern Romania, and the Republic of Moldova. 1989-2005” (NOMAPARLIA).

2 The Barometer of Inclusion of Roma, The Soros Foundation, 2006.

• 109

INTRODUCTION

Religious conversion is often followed by personal transformation of the convert and of his/her social relations. Analysts have pointed out the centrality of the conversion narrative in these self-transformative attempts (Snow and Machalek 1983; Stromberg 1993). In this paper my starting point is similar to that of the analysts, but I take the argument one step further: I start with an analysis of the ritualised narrative that accompanies conversion but subsequently develop my analysis to other (non-verbal) aspects of the conversion, considering social constraints on the performance of the narrative and other self transformative attempts based on ethnographical data. Empirically speaking, I am concerned with the maintenance and transformation of the moral self in the context of religious conversion among a group of Roma from Romania who live in the Cluj area, Transylvania.2

The study of religious conversion is an expanding subfi eld within the anthropology of religion (see recent volumes: Buckser and Glazier 2003; Hefner 1993; Lamb and Bryant 1999; van der Veer 1996), but the commencement of anthropological studies of conversion can be traced to the late 1960s and early 1970s (Goody 1975; Horton 1971; Peel 1968). At that time, the debate focused especially on the problem of tradition (in Africa) versus modernity. Special attention was paid to differences in the modes of thought, and particularly to the role of rationality in different societies (see Horton 1993). More recent debates (Coleman 2000; Lehman 1998, Robbins 2004b; van der Veer 1996) centre on the relative similarities and divergences of social processes observed across regions where conversions are increasingly commonplace. The scope of conversion studies has been broadened to consider transformations of other ‘world religions’. Some analysts adopted the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ in order to explain parallel

László FOSZTÓ

CONVERSION NARRATIVES, SINCERE HEARTS, AND OTHER TANGIBLE SIGNS

Communicating Religious Change among the Transylvanian Roma1

110 •

László FOSZTÓ

transformations observable in Christian, Islamic, and Hindu societies (Eisenstadt 2002; Hefner 1998; van der Veer 2002), and there are many recent ethnographies from nearly every region of the world. In addition to African societies (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991; 1997; Meyer 1999; Peel 2000), Latin American (Chesnut 1997; 2003), European (Coleman 2000), Papua New Guinean (Robbins 2004a), and post-Soviet societies (Pelkmans, et al. 2005; Wanner 2003; 2004) have also been studied, and likewise, comparative analyses are available (Lehman 2001). The problem of modernity seems to be an enduring issue within conversion studies. Nevertheless interpretations of the concept of modernity and approaches to the process of modernisation encompass a wide theoretical range.

At one end of this theoretical spectrum we fi nd works adopting primarily individual-oriented, cultural or psychological models that focus on changing ideas and practices related to the construction of personhood, self, community, and commitment. The methodology of such studies usually focuses on linguistic aspects of social behaviour such as religious rhetoric and conversion narratives (Harding 1987; 2000; Stromberg 1993), or, more broadly, on changes in representational practices amongst the converted (Keane 2002). At the other end of the spectrum are explanations emphasising the importance of dynamic socio-political contexts and the political economy of conversion. These models are often supplemented by historical discussions of the changing socio-political context of religious expansion.3 Other approaches can be placed between these poles; reconstructions of the ‘religious encounters’ between natives and missionaries (Peel 2000) and inquiries into the translation of ideas (Keane 1997; Meyer 1999) are often supported by documents, procured principally from the archives of missionary societies. Those authors who take such an approach provide conscientious reconstructions of the historical interactions that took place in missionary encounters, while criticising socio-political accounts of conversion for their purported economic determinism and neglect of ‘local voices’.4

My own approach is closer to the fi rst pole, though I advocate a perspective that integrates the communicative practices observable in conversion into the wider context of ritual communication emerging in the post-socialist era. Some authors contend that conversion narratives should be viewed as a key component to the transformations of self that are inherent to conversion, and not simply as retrospective accounts of the phenomena itself (Snow and Machalek 1983; Stromberg 1993). I am interested in how alterations to individual communicative practices and relationships brought about by religious conversion lead to more general personal transformations. I proceed by analysing both verbal and non-verbal aspects of conversion and, furthermore, describe the social contexts, which support or subvert attempts at expressing converted personhood. The wider social and economic changes transpiring in post-socialist Romania are connected to practices and ideas of conversion and other religious practices. I trace the link between different levels of social organisation through an ethnography of communicative practices.

Conversion narratives contain features of performance (see Austin 1976); they are not simply accounts of past events, rather their performance creates and maintains the act of conversion. The impact of the conversion narrative on personhood is considerable, but my analysis of conversion will not solely be confi ned to the verbal

• 111

Conversion Narratives, Sincere Hearts, and Other Tangible Signs

aspects (i.e. the narrative) of the act. I would like to single out a problem here; while analysts of conversion stories recognise the importance of the narration in transforming the converts’ personal identity, and demonstrate the impact of conversion on the self (Stromberg 1993), they do not pay enough attention to the ways in which narration and other verbal actions are embedded in and transform the social world of converts and how these transformative performances can act as social constraints.

I approach conversion as a form or ritual that includes both verbal and non-verbal elements. I defi ne the performance of the narrative as part of a ritual sequence, and therefore the connection between the performance and social context must be described and analysed. If conversion narratives are seen as part of a broader domain of ritualised communication, non-verbal ritual codes (i.e. dressing, gestures, visible changes in consumption, etc.) must be included in the analysis. Indeed, both verbal and non-verbal aspects are integral parts of the communicative practices which undergo changes in the process of conversion. Moreover, the pragmatic aspects of this transformed communication should be analysed because they reveal the interconnectedness of the converted person to the immediate social structures that either undermine or support his or her attempt at self-transformation. Identifying the social limits on ritual communication reveals how, in some contexts, the willingness or unwillingness of a convert to retell his or her conversion narrative, and, alternatively, the willingness or unwillingness of an audience to listen are part of a dialogical construction of moral personhood.

For my analysis of conversion amongst the Roma, the most relevant connection is with the work of Paloma Gay y Blasco.5 Through her case study of the Gitanos of Madrid, Gay y Blasco demonstrates how the group maintains its identity via an everyday focus on personhood. Gitanos neither subordinate the individual to the group nor link ‘Gypsiness’ to communal unity and solidarity. Their emphasis is rather on a specifi c modality of moral personhood existing in each and every Gitano man and woman, and that is distinct from that found in non-Gitanos (Payos(Payos( )Payos)Payos . An “awareness of each other as moral beings” underpins the Gitano community (Gay y Blasco 1999: 41). Gay y Blasco discusses the impact of Evangelical Christian conversion on this ideal of morality and suggests that conversion reinforces some aspects of the distinctive Gitano morality. In this sense converts become “better Gitanos”, while a new sense of community simultaneously emerges, which extends group solidarity further than the narrow boundaries of kinship, which was the main organising principle for non-converted Gitanos.

The structure of this paper is as follows: I start with a case study of a convert and his narrative about his encounter with God. I seek to demonstrate the role of narration in the performative transformation of personhood. I analyse the limitations of such transformative attempts through another case study. The third section is an analysis of a debate about a biblical passage and explores social constraints on conversion attempts, through a consideration of the problem of social rejection of transformative narrations (together with the denial of the feasibility of a born-again personhood). The fourth section is concerned with the ‘tangible signs’ of actions or attitudes, which are not primarily communicative or are communicated indirectly. The fi fth section focuses on emerging spiritual kinship-ties, practices, and ideals. My conclusions point to the importance of the changing social orientation of the converted self.

112 •

László FOSZTÓ

CONVERSION NARRATIVES: SYMBOLIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE PERSON

In this section I quote passages from a long autobiographical narrative by ‘Dani’, a middle-aged male convert who is a Pentecostal6 preacher in Gánás. Dani was born in Gánás to a very poor Roma family and spent part of his life outside the village. We became acquainted as soon as I started to visit the Pentecostal gatherings that were regularly held in a house in Dani’s neighbourhood. I was already familiar with some events from his narrative because he often included personal examples and testimonies in his preaching. I asked Dani if he would tell me the ‘whole story’, and he agreed. He is trilingual, as are most of local Roma, but before we started to record his narrative Dani told me that he would only speak Romanian for the interview; ‘This is the language in which I can speak about my encounter with God’ – he added. His choice of using a single language rather than the usual composite of quotations in various languages indicated that this was to be a special narrative form, more ritualised than everyday narratives. The relatively mono-vocal narration also conferred more authority upon Dani in his account of the past, and, as I will argue, Dani’s mono-lingual performance acted to emphasise his transformed personhood in the present. The following narrative is a product of our interaction in a supportive environment; Dani’s own house in the presence of his wife and a few other sympathetic listeners. Sometimes I intervened with short questions, but the construction of the whole of the narration was clearly under Dani’s control.

Dani:

Maybe God wanted it to be like this: because if God hadn’t put me to suffering I might not have turned to God, and probably I would never know him. Probably I wouldn’t be a convert (Rou: pocăit)7 as I am now.

In my life, before I converted, I would drink one or two glasses of brandy, like every man. But I was stupid when I was drunk. If somebody insulted me, I beat him and cut him, I did … the devil carried me (Rou: dracul m-a purtat). And once I was in Zalău, because then I was living there at Poarta Sălajului. I was married there. I was a son-in-law there. And there were some wicked people: some tent-dwelling Gypsies (Rou: ţigani corturari) with big moustaches and long hair. And those Gypsies would come there when we would be drinking with my brother-in-law at my mother-in-law’s house. They came and they scoffed at us… because they said we are Gypsy-like… anyway… Then on a Saturday afternoon I started to drink there, and those Gypsies came and started to quarrel with us. We were drunk… the other guy owed some money to my brother-in-law, the guy who we killed, because we killed one of them… (…)

I was condemned to 16 years in prison. I had been in prison several times before, but I never had gotten a big punishment. I was frightened, when I heard that I was getting 16 years, I was frightened. (How old were you?) Me? I was then 35. Then I said: Lord, if you will set me free I will change (Rou: o să mă întorc), I will convert, I will serve you for the rest of my life. But as I knelt down, the guard saw me through a small window and took me out to the lobby. That was a real beating I received! ‘So you are praying here? Didn’t you have time to pray while you were outside? You are praying here in order to show the thieves you are a believer!’ He beat me. But I continued to pray day and night to God, I was asking him to help me get free.

• 113


The man who had beaten me, the same policeman… because I had no education, I wasn’t able to read or write… But at once God put the intention in his mind and on his heart (Rou: a pus in minte si i-a pus pe inima), and he returned to me, as he saw me continuously praying and crying. I was desperate and I was not eating. He came and asked me: ‘Don’t you have the right to appeal?’ I said to the sergeant: ‘Sir, I cannot read and I cannot write.’ He took me out to the lobby and put a chair next to a table because he felt pity for me as desperate as I was and I was crying. He said: ‘Listen, I’m going to prepare an application for you. Request an appeal, but keep in mind what you now declare to me, because I take it down, and after three months when you are called for the hearing, you must say the same. If you make even a small mistake it will be bad for you. You might forget…’ I told him everything. I dictated everything without a devious word because if they were to catch me lying at the appeal, I probably even could have gotten additional years. He fi led the appeal, and they took the application to Bucharest. After three months I received the decision. The guard came: ‘Have you fi led an appeal? Prepare your pack for the trip. You will go to the hearing.’ I prayed throughout these three months: ‘Lord, you know that I have no education. Lord, help me to speak there. Because there are a lot of people, I might get scared. But you, my God, you can help me. You’ve always helped me.’

My brother, when I was there at the court, there were eighteen of us. Eighteen people were there for appeals. Who knows how it happened, because I was the last, from the beginning, but we had gotten there who knows how, and they took the fi les and I was the fi rst. You know, how could this happen? As they took the fi les those that were on top came out at the bottom and mine came fi rst. When we reached the courthouse, we were all in chains, and they called my name. I stood up, there was such a crowd there… there were more than fi ve hundred people. He asked me a question. The judge asked me if I admitted to all the declarations that had been recorded after my arrest. I do not want to praise myself, let the praise be for God, I was even in prison before and I was aware of all the laws… It is not good to be in prison, but it is good to know a bit of hardship… I started courageously: Sir, and honoured Supreme Court, I recognise only one of the declarations: the last one. Except this last declaration I can recognise none. ‘Look, they are all signed.’ ‘They are signed because I was obliged to sign. I was desperate; I was desperate because of the beating I received. I was obliged to sign what they told me to sign!’ ‘But here in front of you, I know that you are here to interrogate, and solve our problems, I know that you are here and you will not beat me…’ And then I explained this, and this… and then he took that book, and turned the pages, and the judges discussed something. ‘Sit down!’ … They were listening to the others. ‘Wait outside in the lobby because I will give the result immediately.’ Then we waited outside and a sergeant came: ‘Who is S. Dani?’ ‘I am, at your command.’ He said: ‘Prisoner S. Dani you have 8 years to serve.’ (Reduced to half…) Yes. They changed my punishment because I was classifi ed anew (Rou: mi s-a schimbat încadrarea) (…)

But you see, I went out to work. On a Saturday when we were outside I asked the commander: ‘Sir, if I were to work, from my eight years, how much would remain?’ And I explained: ‘I had sixteen years and the Supreme Court reduced my punishment, and I was left with eight. Now I would like to go out to work

114 •

László FOSZTÓ

in order to gain some days, if I go, how much can I reduce from these eight?’ ‘What is your occupation?’ ‘I am a mason.’ ‘We need masons. You are the only one.’ And then they took me out to work as a mason, and he said: ‘From the eight years you will remain for four. And you are free! But you must have good conduct and no reports, because if you get a report, that will be added when you are released and you will stay six more months, or nine months, or even a year, depending on the report.’ My brother, I had such good conduct that in four years I had no reports. God saved me, praise him, and that is why I converted. I converted because I saw the love of God. After all that I had done in the prison, how much I had sold, how I was fi ghting, how much bad I had done there… and I had no reports, because God took care of me. I was fasting. I fasted twice a week. (When?) Tuesday and Friday… And God saw me: Look this is in suffering, and even in suffering he is fasting, praise the Lord. That is why I converted. (…)

When I returned from prison I forgot about God. If a brother-in-law would come, or a friend or a relative, I would start to drink and I had forgotten God. Six months passed like this. After six months I started to drink even harder. I was beating this poor woman… how much she got it, God forbid. The drinks did it, not because I was a bad man. I was not bad, but when I drank the devil worked. And listen now: because now comes the thing!

I was attending the assembly… (Who encouraged you to go?) … just me alone. (But there, while you were inside were people coming to you to talk? To teach…) Yes, they came. But they came to talk about God, not to teach me. (Who were they?) Some converts came on Sundays, and they took us out, those who wanted to come… (Were they Pentecostals?) Pentecostals… But I knew before… I even went to congregations. And then I went to the assembly. And when I went to the assembly I liked it, but I was not able to pray. Because if you have no education, just: Help me God! You know my God! Help me God! I was not able to say more. (…) When I would come home from church, I would drink two-three decilitres of brandy and even put a bottle in my pocket. I came home and drank. Six months passed again, I went to the assembly and I drank. I was drinking and smoking.

But one night, after six months, because the Bible says: he who is in God’s plan to convert, God will convert him even from his mother’s womb. Whether you want it or not, you will be a convert! The Bible says that. Because if you do not want it, he will put you on a bed of suffering (Rou: patul de suferinţa), and from the bed of suffering you will cry: Lord if you help me I will convert! Like I was in prison: Lord, if you liberate me I will convert, and since then God has not let me down. God saw that I was drinking and fi ghting… I was fi ghting with the Gypsies and attending the assembly!

And then, one night at two o’ clock the face of Jesus Christ appeared to me. I have a book, I can show you… Jesus was wearing a mantle and he was coming through the air. And I heard a voice. I heard a voice: ‘How long do you want to continue like this?’ I got up, and woke her [the wife]. We kneeled down: and then I got scared indeed. I said then: ‘Lord, starting from today…’ It was dark; I had not turned the light on. I said: Lord if I do not serve you truly, put my mouth on my nape. If I put drinks in my mouth or smoke. Whatever will be in my life, I will convert. And thank my Heavenly Father since I made this

• 115


covenant with him… I would say in vain to you or to Misi… You do not need to know me… I want God to know me! Because… people are enemies. People say bad things about you, but I do not care what the world says, because the Bible says: If you want to be saved, do not look to the right or look to the left, look ahead. (…)

After a week I felt very, very bad: I wanted to smoke, I wanted to drink. But if you take an oath in front of God (Rou: jurămînt în faţa lui Dumnezeu) you must be very ambitious… because I was a hard drinker. But thank God that I said: Lord, I feel like drinking, and I feel like smoking, but how bad these are! I know you do not like these, because when Jesus Christ came to save us, to clean sin, he did not come with drinks and cigarettes in his pockets, to distribute to the drinkers and smokers. No, he came to reject cigarettes and drinks. Because only in this way can you turn to the Word of God.

(From whom did you learn?) I tell you that too: while we had children around, I could not pray at home, because children are children, especially if you are a convert, you cannot hurt a child. When I was going to the forest to collect wood I knelt down and prayed: ‘Lord, I have no education. Lord I don’t know. Lord, teach me! If you want me to be a convert and to serve you all my life, teach me!’ And then, I took the Bible in my hand, and I could not recognise the letters. I knew none of the letters. And I looked into the Bible and I was crying. I was crying and crying and my tears were fl owing on the Bible. I said how good it would be to know what is written here… Lord it would be very good to know what it says here. Lord, I converted in vain if you do not grant me understanding to know what your Word says. Lord, teach me Lord! Show me that you are God, show me now, because if you show me now that you will teach me to read, I will believe in you even more. Isn’t it a big thing to learn to read at fi fty years old when I didn’t attend school at all. Not even for a minute. I wasn’t at school. It passed two months like this. I couldn’t get anything… And once as I took the Bible in my hand, I opened to John 3. And I looked there and at once I read: Jesus and Nicodemus… And then I asked Józsi, I asked him fi rst: ‘Józsi come tell me what it says here.’ But I said nothing that I had read… He says: Jesus and Nicodemus… when I heard this my hair rose on my head. I would learn to read! I didn’t sleep all night. I stayed up with the light on and I read the Bible. This was on a Saturday. In the morning, the next morning, it was Sunday, and I spoke in the assembly… I took the Bible and I knelt down, and I prayed to God. Everyone knew that I couldn’t read. But when I started to read from the Bible everybody was amazed. ‘You couldn’t read!’ ‘I couldn’t, but God is good.’ And with him you can do whatever you want; if you are a believer and you say: let this forest move, the forest will move. And God has taught me, my brother. And I thank God, because without any school, without any education, without any teaching … not taught by anybody… nothing at all! (And the pastors didn’t teach you?) When I was at church he wouldn’t speak to me personally (Yes…), he preached to everybody, but I listened in vain, because what I would hear from him, in two-three days I would forget. (Yes…) But God purged me… he made me pure, and when God saw that I walk his paths and I want to be a real convert, God gave me understanding (Rou: pricepere). Do you realise that without any education you will go among three to four hundred people and preach the Word of God? It is a big thing, my dear Laci.

116 •

László FOSZTÓ

One main motive of this narrative is the recurrent demand on Dani to speak in public: Dani repeatedly presents situations where he is expected and compelled to speak. This motive can be interpreted from the present identity of Dani as a preacher; his self-construction as a person who has become a public speaker. Throughout the narration his personal development is connected to suffering and the intervention of God. This motive emphasises Dani’s personal development through a continuous overcoming of obstacles. As Dani puts it: “It is good to know a bit of hardship…” He might be considered a ‘self-made man’, but divine support is always involved. This is particularly salient in the culminant point of his personal development, when Dani is able to read and begins to understand the Scripture (Rou: pricepe) the changes he is undergoing are already beyond his infl uence. According to his narrative, only God could teach him to read. Dani’s account of this radical change disconnects his achievement from his abilities and skills, and transforms the event into a miracle: achieving wisdom without learning or education. This idea is consistent with the traditional Roma form of constructing personhood in an individualist and authority-defying manner, but also contains a resigned acceptance that without divine intervention, his condition could not have changed.

Another particularity of this narrative is the symbolic rupture that separates sinful past behaviour from the virtuous present person. This dualistic construction of conversion narratives has been remarked on by other researchers (Snow and Machalek 1983). Throughout his narration not only does Dani reject his pre-conversion behaviour, he also asserts a continuity in his character. The tension between these implicit statements is resolved by the presence of evil infl uences in his life: ‘Not because I was a bad man, but [because] the devil worked’. Conversely, the point of rupture and Dani’s new, converted personhood is supported by the continuous presence of God. Dani attributes his initial suffering that triggered his conversion to God, who he sees working in the lives of other characters mentioned in the story. The apex of Dani’s relationship with God occurred when he had a vision one night. For Dani, the apparition of Jesus signals God’s care for Dani’s own personal development: ‘He for whom it is in God’s plan to convert, God will convert even from his mother’s womb’. This divine sign scares Dani and he responds by submitting himself and making a ‘covenant’ with God.

In Dani’s narrative, conversion is presented as having social consequences: Dani refuses to consider the opinions of others, instead focusing solely on his connection with God. He seeks to ‘understand’ and enact religious ideals: ‘If you want to be saved, don’t look to the right or to the left, look ahead’. Such radical decisions and personal changes need not be central to a conversion narrative. This emphasis on radical change and rupture indicates that the new personhood of the convert is still embedded in his earlier commitments. The spiritual and social process of conversion is initiated by a covenant with God, and repeated public performances of the conversion narrative are necessary (though not suffi cient) for the convert to gain social acceptance as a new person.

• 117


RELUCTANT CONVERT: CAUGHT IN FAMILY TIES

Róza:Róza, a Roma in her sixties, was one of my neighbours in the village. For a good

part of my stay I was not aware that Róza was a Pentecostal convert. After I learned that she had converted in the early 90s, I asked her about the circumstances surrounding her conversion, and she recounted her and her family’s story. In addition to eliciting her conversion narrative, I spoke with other members of her family who seemed to share Róza’s view of many of the events surrounding her conversion.

The process was set in motion when Róza became severely ill. She was taken to the city hospital where a doctor told her that she had leukaemia. Her family knew that this was a deadly disease, and her three daughters cried in desperation. She was taken home where she was confi ned to her bed for months on end, losing weight and unable to move on her own. Her family resigned itself to the fact that she would die in a matter of weeks.

Róza was divinely inspired to seek out the healing practices of Pentecostalism. She recounts how the idea came to her during a long night of ‘discussions with the Lord’. God told her to go to a Romanian-run Pentecostal church in the city, where, during the powerful public prayer session, she would be healed. Róza’s family attributed her intentions to confusion brought on by her suffering and was unwilling to bring her to the city. One of her married daughters had strong objections to her mother’s wish to abandon her old religion. Shortly after this, the daughter nevertheless decided, under the infl uence of a dream, that Róza should be taken to a Pentecostal assembly.

Róza was taken to her sister’s home in the city in preparation to being taken to the church. Róza’s brother-in-law worked in construction industry and had Pentecostal colleagues. He invited them to come pray for Róza. Róza believes that “the Lord was working” since her fi rst contact with the Pentecostals. She was fi nally able to sleep well after months of being unable to do so. After a few days she was taken to the church and there, was healed. Her strength returned as she took part in the collective prayer. She “received Jesus” during the same service, and after several months she was baptised.

Her journey as a convert remained unfulfi lled because when the Holy Spirit came to give her the gift of tongues and prophecy, she could not get the “baptism in the Spirit”.8 Still staying with her sister, one evening Róza felt the presence of the Holy Spirit coming on, but her husband stopped her from speaking in tongues so as to avoid frightening the children. Disturbed by this, the Holy Spirit departed and Róza received only ‘the seal’ (Hun: “le voltam pecsételve”).9 She blames her husband for not supporting her in her attempt to be baptised by the Holy Spirit, but she says (and her husband confi rmed this) that he was scared by the changes she underwent during the visitation of the Holy Spirit.

Other members of Róza’s family were also adherents of Pentecostalism, though none of them had fully converted. Her husband had regularly visited an assembly for months. He was almost baptised, but “there were no application forms that day”, and that day Róza’s brother-in-law called him, half seriously inviting him to “have some more drinks together and pay some more visits to the chicks”. Thus, Róza’s husband remained unconverted. Soon after Róza’s baptism, her daughter (the same daughter who

118 •

László FOSZTÓ

had the divinely inspired dream) became ill. Her ailment was due to satanic infl uence and could not be diagnosed by medical doctors. She was taken to and healed at the same church at which her mother had been healed. She received Jesus and was to be baptised, but her husband, a musician, told her that he would divorce her if she joined the Pentecostals. Róza took her daughter’s case to the Pentecostal assembly and explained to the converted brothers (Hun: hívíví őtestvőtestvő érek) that her daughter could not be baptised rek) that her daughter could not be baptised rekbecause it would destroy her family (she and her husband had two young children at that time). The assembly agreed that it would be unwise to break apart the family: “Nevertheless, God wouldn’t leave her alone.” – they commented. The later material success (house, car, etc.) of Róza’s daughter’s family is attributed by Róza to divine help, but she also fears that the time for admonition (Hun: dorgálálál sásá ) will come.

In their attempts to convert, Róza and her family members walked a markedly different path than did Dani. Physical suffering and miraculous healing play a part in many conversion narratives, and this is not unique to the Roma. But Roma converts share a common experience of having a direct, intimate connection with the Lord and Jesus. When asked about their belief in God, they often mention their ‘knowledge of God’ (Rom: me prinzhanaw le devles). Therefore, prayer as a ‘conversation’ with God is not unusual among Roma converts. In Róza’s story, she and her daughter had already had direct relations with God even before being converted. Divine signs and answers are often close at hand; one must only open his or her eyes and heart. Therefore, in Róza’s narrative the moment of conversion itself does not mark a sudden and novel encounter with the supernatural. In Róza’s case conversion came along with her having been healed. The diffi culties of her post-conversion life had only just begun with her acceptance of God. The process of conversion burdens the convert, who must work through his or her new commitments. Among these commitments kinship seems to be the most important.

Neighbours and friends form another category of social contacts with whom the convert must deal in his or her new personhood. Converts are often faulted for being selfi sh. This has partly to do with the convert’s awareness of being saved while others might be doomed. But converts are also seen as being selfi sh in more worldly ways: the convert, as part of the renegotiation of his or her life, may have to sever pre-existing social relations and abandon social networks that stretch outside the bounds of the faith community, or those that could potentially be seen as ‘sinful’. Róza and other similarly isolated converts I met, however, were not thought of as selfi sh. The fact that I had gone so long without realizing Róza was a convert, though partially due to the fact that I was preoccupied with work I was conducting in a different part of the village, was also due to the fact that Róza did not conspicuously display her piety or have the physical appearance of a convert (i.e. adopting a dress code).

When Róza speaks about her incomplete baptism by the Holy Spirit, she is aware of her husband’s scepticism (Hun: ne csináld az eszed) and her family’s fear of her ld az eszed) and her family’s fear of her ld az eszedecstatic displays. Róza imagines an ideal scenario of spiritual support: upon the fi rst signs of the Holy Spirit appearing in the convert’s behaviour, the family members would kneel down around him or her and pray for his/her baptism. She experienced the signs: trembling and against her will, her hands rose, a power like a strong wind or fi re came down to her, and she began to speak loudly, but the family refused to support her. The

• 119


presence of their young children is strategically referred to by Róza’s husband; small children should not be frightened. This preoccupation with the well being of children was also exhibited by Dani, who prayed in the forest so as to not disturb the children in his house. Roma fi nd great pleasure in playing with their kids, and babies and children are sources of great joy, they also tend to believe that fright can cause serious illness, particularly for children.

Family values and the safety of babies are called upon once more, when Róza’s daughter is threatened with divorce by her husband. At this moment, Róza takes responsibility for protecting her daughters’ marriage, even risking violating one of the ethical tenets of Pentecostalism – that the faith should be spread as much as possible. In practice, Róza was able to maintain most of her life as a convert, remaining low-profi le and doing little missionary work. She recognises the inherent tension between her religious and family life, and she fears that her family members will suffer for not converting. Her fear is expressed in the dualistic language of the Pentecostals: God will not leave the family alone, but Satan will also approach them, and as they are not converted, her family members are vulnerable to his attack.

It is worth noting that Róza’s son-in-law (Rom: zhamutro) did not oppose his wife’s conversion because of any deference to the values of another religion, but simply for pragmatic reasons: he would be unable to practice his job as a musician (which involves parties and drinking) being married to a pious, converted wife. Róza’s brother-in-law (Rom: kumnato) relied on a bias towards male superiority when he prevented Róza’s husband from being baptised.

The fi rst preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that conversion should not be viewed as a single event, and should not be attributed solely to a personal decision. It is analytically more useful to look at conversion as a process, which, though potentially triggered by an individual’s choice, nonetheless sets in motion a succession of events that affect and are affected by the convert’s position in local social networks and his or her pre-conversion values and commitments. Even in extreme cases in which the convert is cut off from his/her everyday world, it is still worth looking at the convert’s shifting commitments and values. Therefore, prison conversions (as is the case of Dani) can be of special interest. A second conclusion is that studying conversion can be useful for understanding more than just the particular religious movement in question. Nonetheless, individual religions may be objects of study in their own right, and studying conversion could lead to a better understanding of religious phenomena. There is a further reaching consequence of social-anthropological approaches to conversion: For the ethnographer, individual conversion attempts offer a window into the social-cultural context surrounding the convert. The tensions and transformations experienced by converts reveal much about larger social systems.

REFUSAL: JOHN 3: 4-7 IN A ROMUNGRO SETTLEMENT

Accompanied by my host Misi, I paid a visit to the preacher (Dani) with whom I was by then familiar with. We found him outside his house with a group of several other converts (two males Jani and Zoli and several females) who were in a heated discussion with a non-converted Rom, Bandi, who had recently returned to the village from the city. Some non-converted Roma joined the circle and listened on with intrigue and curiosity.

120 •

László FOSZTÓ

As I later found out, Bandi was a rather educated person; his parents were from the village, but he had grown up in an orphanage and fi nished vocational education in the city. Occasionally he would visit his relatives in the village, and as they lived in the same neighbourhood as the preacher, Bandi dropped by for a chat that developed into a quite intellectual discussion with the converted families. The discussion attracted more people, and when we arrived the group was discussing the idea of being ‘born again’. I recorded the scene with their permission. I think it is fair to say that the discussion was not considerably infl uenced by my presence and use of the camera.

The preacher assigned various passages from the Bible for Bandi to read, and together they would then interpret the passage. In some cases Bandi reluctantly accepted the scriptural interpretation offered by the converts, but often he claimed that the text was inconsistent and because of this refused to admit that the Scriptures could provide a basis for any normative framework. Bandi loudly declared that he had been “educated by the Communists”, and so his knowledge was based on material existence. In some cases he was surprisingly well informed; he referred to the Dead Sea Scrolls when talking about the non-canonical texts of the Bible, and about DNA when the discussion came to the topic of reproduction.

On the issue of being born-again (as accounted for in John 3: 4-7)10, Bandi proved to be a rather tough opponent for the preacher: he refused to accept that Jesus had been thoroughly honest in his talk with Nicodemus who asked him a simple question: ‘How can a man be born when he is old?’. In order to show how unfair Jesus had treated his interlocutor, Bandi recounted the following story. During the course of Bandi’s narration Dani tried to interrupt several times, dismissing the whole story as having nothing to do with heavenly matters, but the audience remained rather puzzled by the situation, some of them refusing to believe that Bandi was totally wrong. Their growing sympathy for Bandi’s challenge was based on the text’s built-in ambivalence: Jesus’ metaphorical answer to Nicodemus: ‘Flesh gives birth to fl esh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit. You should not be surprised at my saying, you must be born again.’ Bandi was quick to point out that Jesus offers no direct answer to the question and that written texts often have more than one meaning. Bandi also argued that literate people can interpret scripture to suit their own tastes and agendas. As a result of the discussion the non-converted audience became increasingly sympathetic to Bandi’s line of argumentation. Bandi’s story went as follows:

BANDI: - A great fortune-teller was living before the Second World War...what he said would come true, remember: before the war it came true! A man came to him and asked: “Look, my son is going to the war, is he going to live or not?” Look what he did! [Bandi takes a piece of wood and draws lines on the ground, to imitate how the fortune-teller writes.]

BANDI: - You all know Romanian, right?... [He fails to complete his writing because the stick breaks. He throws it away.] Dammit!...

DANI: - Look, take this! [Dani throws a sharp stone to Bandi’s feet. Bandi takes the stone and continues to write on the soil.]

BANDI: - Look here! What does he reply? “NU; - Look here! What does he reply? “NU; - Look here! What does he reply? “NU VA TRAI”. [It is a pun, which can be interpreted as ‘He will live’ or ‘He will not live’]

• 121


ZOLI: - He will not... [He reads the signs.]

BANDI: - So: NU; VA TRAI. Keep it in mind! The boy goes to the war and he is killed. “Didn’t you say to me, that he would live!?” He replies: “Me? What have I written to you? NU; va trai.”

BANDI: - Whatever you might do he will get the upper hand!

DANI: - Fine, so what?

BANDI: - Wait, wait, wait... let me...

JANI: - Let him, let him...

BANDI: - So if he lives: “I said to you that he would live!” ...if he dies “I told you he is going to die! He will not live!” You know why this is? Because of this: a point and a comma [ ; ]. So look at what I am not able to understand...

DANI: - Just a moment...

JANI: - Let him, let him...

ZOLI: - Wait a moment...

DANI: - Do you know what this means?... Compared to the works of Jesus Christ? It is like heaven to earth... Exactly nothing! That is all you’ve said!

BANDI: - OK. So look, what I am unable to understand is: “unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter...”

DANI: - Are you done?

JANI: - Let him, let him... He should say when he is fi nished!

BANDI: - So this is what Jesus says: if one is not born out of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. This is 5... Let’s start at 4. Nicodemus says the following... So this is what Nicodemus asks, and what I’ve just read is how Jesus replies. The question is: “How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother’s womb and be born?” So that is what a countryman asked.

DANI: - Right...

JANI: - It is true! Right...

BANDI: - It is exactly like how the father asked: “Will my son survive?” And you reply “NU; VA TRAI”. You put point and a comma. So you cheat me!

DANI: - But...

In order to interpret this scene it is important to point out that even if some of the participants had received primary education, most were at least functionally illiterate. Therefore most would be unable to appreciate the subtleties of Romanian orthography such as the ambiguous use of the semicolon. They thus easily accepted that a semi-colon could be turned into a tool of deception. On the other hand, this generalised scepticism can be seen as the protective strategy of those who feel powerless in the face of written documents. The credibility of the story is enhanced by its reference to fortune telling which can be practiced with success by using creative invention and manipulation of signs.11

122 •

László FOSZTÓ

As soon as Bandi felt that he had gained the sympathy of his audience, he pushed his challenge further:

BANDI: - But keep in mind, that I cannot understand this Part 5 at all. “That which is born of the fl esh is fl esh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.” The only one who is born of Spirit is Jesus, I am sorry.

ZOLI: - Praise him!

JANI: - That is why he says...

BANDI: - So he is the one! He is the only one.

DANI: - Right...

BANDI: - So we can’t give examples that you or somebody else was born of the Spirit. He is the one, so he should not be considered here.

DANI: - ….

BANDI: - So now... “You must be born again.” This is beyond my understanding, again... I am born again if... I swap my faith...

DANI: - Some light is coming...

JANI: - You see that you will...

BANDI: - But wait a second, man!

DANI: - Don’t you see I am sitting here!

JANI: - Take it with more gentleness!

BANDI: - But, this is not what Nicodemus asked. He is asking if he, as an old man in fl esh and bones, can enter his mother’s womb again. This is what he asks! And he [Jesus] does not reply!

These allegedly down-to-earth arguments and Bandi’s refusal of the more subtle or metaphorical interpretations are backed by a moral claim on respecting the everyday rules of discussion. While Dani made several attempts to turn the discussion to more spiritual concerns, the debate slipped into a discussion of the problems related to being born in a biological sense. The conversation took on an even more frivolous twist, forcing Dani onto the defensive, so he changed the topic and opened the Bible to a different passage and handed it back to Bandi. “He does not need to look. He knows it by heart, because he has recited it so many times...” Dani’s wife commented supportively.

• 123


SINCERITY, THE HEART AND OTHER TANGIBLE SIGNSNa dikh tu, na dikh tu ke hom kalo,

numa o Del, numa o Del prinzhanel munro jilo.12

(Do not look, do not look that I am black,God alone, God alone knows my heart.)

These two lines are taken from a Pentecostal song popular among Roma converts. The opposition it expresses between the outer appearance of the person, which is seen as kalo (black) by others, and his or her inner quality, which can only be recognised through the divine relationship, is a major distinction that builds the converted self. The statement that God knows (Rom: prinzhanel) the heart of the convert is seen as prinzhanel) the heart of the convert is seen as prinzhanelreciprocal, as the verb prinzhandel isprinzhandel isprinzhandel used to express a more intimate acquaintance between two people as opposed to the more distant relation between a person and an object known from the ‘outside’ (Rom: zhanel). Therefore, once God recognises the heart zhanel). Therefore, once God recognises the heart zhanelof the convert, the convert also comes to know the personal God for him or herself. I often heard the same expression when I asked people if they ‘knew’ God. People rarely responded negatively to this, even among the non-converted Roma.

One can come to know God due to the passage of either fortuitous or inauspicious events, through divinely inspired dreams, or still through hearing voices. All of these paths to God are available for converts, but the main difference between converts and non-converts is that converts claim to have a more intimate connection with God, using their open hearts to communicate. Escaping from a diffi cult situation (as in the case of Dani), or being miraculously healed (like Róza) do not necessarily lead to conversion. If a ‘covenant’ with God had not been made by Dani, or if the Holy Spirit had not ‘sealed’ Róza, both would have continued with their pre-conversion lives. But as Róza and Dani fostered a special connection with God (as they account for in their narratives), both claim they started to become different people. However, this new personhood is not always easily validated in the social contexts of the converts.

Even if a special connection between converts and God is accepted by outsiders, a puzzle nonetheless persists: What can secret relationships with God, which are encapsulated in the hearts of converts, reveal to and validate for the outside world? The unconverted may either refuse to accept or not recognise these relationships as real. An outsider, even if he or she accepts the existence of God, may doubt the veracity of the convert’s claimed connection to God. Converts have their own way of dealing with outsiders; they insist on the truth of their special relationship with God and express this connection in ritual forms. A convert can distinguish between those who ‘think of themselves as being Christians’ and ‘real believers’ based on the verifi able existence (or lack thereof) of a strong relationship with God.

The construction of this relationship is contingent upon a defi nition of the inner self engendered by an opposition between outside and inside. The oft repeated phrase “God does not look at the face of a person, but at his heart.” (Rou: Dumnezeu nu se uita la fata omului se uita la inima) is a clear example of this opposition. This opposition places the heart at the centre of the inner self. It is important that the heart be ‘open’ because the only path to self-transformation is through inviting and accepting Jesus into one’s heart. The main cause of failed conversions is a refusal on the part of the

124 •

László FOSZTÓ

would-be convert to accept the word of God into his or her heart. (Rou: Nu primesti cuvintele lui Dumnezeu la inima.)

Once the centre of the self is established and opened to the infl uence of God, changes become observable in the life of the convert. Ideally, the main consequence is an inner-driven unity of the self and behaviour that can be recognised in the everyday practices of the convert. Adopting a term utilised by Keane (2002), I refer to this unity of self and behaviour as sincerity. There is no exact equivalent for this term in the everyday speech of Roma converts, but I nonetheless hope to show that these two aspects are intertwined in the behaviour of converts. The closest term Roma use is patjivalo (‘honest’), which refers to reliability in social interactions. Patjivalo is opposed to ravasz (‘cunning’, a loan word from Hungarian), which describes people who hide their true intentions. The ideal of converted selfhood requires honesty and complete transparency. Keane points out that the ideal of sincerity assumes a clear distinction between words and thoughts; presupposes a hierarchical relation between inner self and speech; and seeks the authority of words as accurate refl ections of inner states. Moreover the ideal of sincerity demands an effort from the speaker to match his/her words to his/her inner states. Therefore sincerity connects ideas about language to moral questions (Keane 2002: 75). When the sincerity of words uttered by a convert is contested by non-converts, as often happens, the morality of the convert is called into question.

While I was recording conversion narratives in the village, my host’s daughter-in-law, who was in her early twenties and whose parents had converted to Pentecostalism when she was a teenager, warned me against accepting these narratives as “true”. “Converts lie a lot!” (Rom: O pokaiti but xoxavel!) – she told me. Her view was shared by others who expressed their reservations not only behind the backs of converts, but also directly to some of them. One middle-aged male convert who was trying to publicly recount his conversion narrative was interrupted and ridiculed by some youngsters. The notion of sincerity is also useful for describing and explaining why non-verbal emotional expressions are so important for Pentecostals inside their communities. These observations point to the variable success of self-transformation attempts, as successful conversions are largely dependent upon the convert being socially accepted and his or her choice being reinforced by forces that are beyond his or her control.

Verbal utterances must be accepted as valid by the audience in order to attain their performative force (see also the earlier discussion of John 3:4-7). Therefore, the importance of the assembly and ritual gatherings in providing a sympathetic audience in the process of self-transformation cannot be overestimated, though there are accounts of the process being initiated outside of a ritual setting. Such was the case with Dani. After being beaten, Dani knelt in front of the guard who mocked Dani for what the guard believed to be Dani’s excessively conspicuous pious display of religiosity in front of the other prisoners. But because Dani persevered in his prayers day-in and day-out, crying and asking God to help him escape, the same offi cer who had formerly mocked him had a change of heart and helped Dani fi le an appeal some days later. Dani attributed the change in the guard’s attitude to the fact that “God put an intention in his mind and in his heart” to help him. Dani mentioned this event as one of the catalysts of his conversion, which happened after he was released. In this story the perseverance and sincerity of the prisoner changed his fate. The way Dani interprets the change in the

• 125


guard’s attitude illustrates that even a cruel jailer is able to experience the benefi cial effect of God in his heart and change his attitude for the better.

Though prayers uttered by a kneeling, crying man provoked the prison-guard to beat a prisoner, this overtly emotional form of worship and dedication tends to be the norm in Pentecostal assemblies. During services emotional individual prayers are encouraged during long prayer sessions that are alternated with singing, individual testimonies, and preaching. Church services provide an ideal setting for developing and practicing connections with the divine in the presence of fellow converts. The uttered prayers are improvised; the emphasis is on affective expression and immediate communication with the Holy Father and Jesus. These occasions also provide a setting in which congregants speak in tongues, a practice considered to signal that the speaker is being overcome by the Holy Spirit and is in immediate communication with God. Such an atmosphere can impress even a non-believer. Nico, an elder Roma described to me her fi rst experience at a Pentecostal service, which she attended with her adult daughter. During the collective prayer the two exchanged sceptical looks and suppressed smiles. On the way home they joked about the people who had been crying during the prayer. As they continued attending subsequent services they too started to cry during the prayer sessions. “First I thought they were crazy (Rom: dinjile), but then we started to cry also.”

‘Opening one’s heart’ is not necessarily an intentional act; it can spontaneously occur during the ritual beyond the control or will of the affected individual. The further step of ‘fi lling one’s heart’ with God (that is, making a commitment) requires more conscious activity and social control. A ritual in which the convert raises his or her hands, goes to the front of the congregation, and verbalises some variant of a prayer marks the initiation of this process. Following this commitment the active contribution of the assembly is of paramount importance. Most assemblies in the city have special structures for the incorporation and education of future members. So-called ‘groups for growth’ (Rou: grupuri de creştere) are small study groups that gather at the house of a member for this purpose, though hardly any of the Roma converts I met had been incorporated into their congregations through such structures. My informants usually participated in less systematic and usually informal gatherings in village homes, or went through a short preparatory course in a church before their baptism. Baptism may happen as soon as the course has been completed, and people drop out of the church rather frequently. When discussing his experience with Roma converts, a Romanian Pentecostal pastor in the city expressed his view that Roma converts may more easily accept Jesus, but they are not consistent enough in repenting. He gave the example of a young Roma who cried loudly in the assembly, “Oh, how nice it is along with you, my Lord!” (Rou: Oh, ce mişOh, ce mişOh, ce mi to e cu tine Doamne!), 13 but the pastor found the man’s commitment superfi cial.

There is one aspect of assembly life where the sincerity of church members is continuously tested. Pentecostal churches rely heavily on contributions from members, who are expected to regularly tithe (Rou: zeciuialăzeciuialăzeciuial ). Nevertheless, as most Roma live of irregular (and often very low) incomes, the pastor and other members cannot directly determine the amount of money that each member should be expected to contribute. If a church member does not pay his or her tithe for some time, his or her survival can be seen as proof of insincerity in the domain of the material world, because the member

126 •

László FOSZTÓ

is thought to be hiding his or her income and failing to fi nancially support the church. Therefore, the fi nancial obligations of church members constitute a recurring sermon topic. The pastor of the Roma church in the city spent a considerable amount of his sermons reminding congregants that their donations would be multiplied and returned to them by God.

Converts fi nd support and encouragement inside the assembly, but sometimes also fi nd themselves to be the target of suspicious looks in their broader community. In the village, non-converted Roma and the Hungarian majority consider the ascetic rules of the Pentecostals as very foreign. This is perhaps best exemplifi ed in the case of male converts who were once known as drinkers. In a community where drinking is a common form of male sociability those who quit drinking rupture connections with their peer-groups. This is compensated for by the alternative community with which converts are connected through the process of conversion, though converts may still be tempted to join their former drinking friends for drinks.14 Discussing alcohol consumption with two converted Roma in the village, I was told that it would be wrong for a converted person to drink even an alcohol-free beer. They explained that if one is a known convert and is seen by non-converts drinking beer it would encourage the non-converted to continue drinking and would thus damage the image of the Pentecostals in the larger community.

In this way converts exclude themselves from many of the settings of male sociability. On Sundays one can also see these same people dressed in elegant suits, carrying Bibles or hymnals, and even donning eye-glasses that they do not usually wear on weekdays. Peace greetings (Rou: Pace!) are exchanged and converts shake hands. Even when the gathering is at a local home there is a visible attempt to celebrate the day. When there is a bigger event such as a visit by a guest pastor, a group of converts from the city or from neighbouring villages may gather for bigger a service in the local Baptist prayer house on the main square of the village. Pentecostals and the few Baptists (also local Roma) celebrate such occasions together.

Dani is married to a Roma from another village and his wife usually joins the Pentecostals in their services. She was baptised along with a young Roma by a Baptist pastor from the city at a missionary event in her village. The priest had brought a large plastic container and had fi lled it with water. The converts were submerged in water, much to the astonishment of the onlookers, amongst which was the local orthodox priest. The services of a photographer were also called upon to immortalise the event for the newly baptised members. The photograph that Dani’s wife displays in their house is tangible evidence of her conversion. She showed me the picture, proudly proclaiming that the entire event had been organised solely for their baptism, and this in order to show a ‘real baptism’ to the villagers.

THE PHRALA (BROTHERS): A NEW FORM OF SPIRITUAL KINSHIP

The refrain of the aforementioned Pentecostal song is the following:Oh che shukar, oh che shukar o Isus si amaro phral,Oh che shukar, oh che shukar vas amenge vo muleas!(Oh, how wonderful [it is]; oh how wonderful, Jesus is our brother,Oh, how wonderful [it is]; oh how wonderful, He died for us!)

• 127


The idea of brotherhood expressed in these lines is composed of several elements. On the one hand, fraternity with Jesus is a privilege for those who join assemblies. On the other, the option of joining an assembly is open to the wider community. I argue, therefore, that this ideal of spiritual kinship is simultaneously inclusive and yet elitist. The all-encompassing element of this brotherhood can be demonstrated through its trans-local character. ‘Brothers’ are everywhere in Romania and abroad, and this spiritual kinship network can be further extended through the incorporation and conversion of ‘outsiders’ found in the immediate social surroundings of the congregants.

The practice of brotherhood in Gánás is neither uprooted from nor totally defi ned by existing local and kinship ties. There is indeed a signifi cant overlap between the kinship based on pre-conversion social ties and the broader connections created through the conversion. These broader connections also use kinship terms (brother, sister, etc.) to denote the social ties. It is more accurate to describe the practice of brotherhood as a public expression of belonging. Thus, the boundaries of the local assembly are salient, and converts who do not regularly attend the assembly or who are reluctant to express and practice the ethic of their religion are eventually excluded.

Figure 1: Distribution of aid shown on a kinship diagram

Figure 1 is based on my observation of a situation in which aid was distributed among the converted brothers. A pastor (18), who lived in another village but who had familial connections with Gánás (e.g. 16) sent word to Dani (1), that Dani was to be entrusted with managing the distribution of clothing donations from abroad. The pastor did not drive all the way into the village, so Dani waited for the aid truck by the side of the main road. From there, Dani hired a local cart to carry the cargo to the village. There were 17 large bags fi lled with clothes. Dani loaded the cargo on the cart and brought it to the Roma neighbourhood in which he lived. The clothing was distributed according to kinship lines as shown in fi gure 1. Dani kept for himself and his brother-in-law 12 bags (6 each), and distributed the remaining fi ve to the most active converts in the assembly, each receiving one bag. The clothing was further distributed, exchanged, or sold by the recipients among the local Roma.

In its ideal form, the brotherhood is both a voluntary association and an elite organisation, but these ideas must be contextualised in the broader local social structure. When considering stratifi cation in the village, it becomes apparent that the transformation of the self and construction of the converted community offers an opportunity for

128 •

László FOSZTÓ

social mobility for people from lower status positions. This desire for mobility does not directly challenge existant ethnic and status divisions. Everyday practices and signs of conversion create a sense of belonging for the religious elite without relying on or opposing pre-existing local social structures. People who have otherwise been seen as marginal by the local majority acquire access to symbolic resources, which promise to change their position through recourse to resources external to local structures. The practice of brotherhood relies on existing local ties and reinforces the boundaries of the converted ‘elite community’.

CONCLUSION

Although advocacy of inner-directed conversion is hardly a novelty for missionaries, and although ‘the heart’ is thought to be the centre of the self in other contexts as well,15

Pentecostalism diverges from most other forms of Protestantism in its emphasis on not only the transparent and inner-governed self, but also in its acceptance of a wide spectrum of emotional expressions as being spiritual. Unity of the self is grounded in emotional experiences, and these experiences can be validated as divinely inspired. I suggest that this aspect of Pentecostalism can be best understood with an enhanced concept of sincerity that incorporates and credits these experiences as authentic. An implication of Pentecostals’ experience-centred orientation is that their potential target group is humanity as a whole. Converts insist that everyone is capable of opening their heart to emotional-spiritual experiences.

The concept of sincerity offers an answer to the question of why the universally oriented Pentecostal church has been most successful amongst socially segregated groups. The social life of a convert depends on communal recognition of the sincerity of the convert. Pentecostal Assemblies provide a space for expression of emotions and verbal utterances that are repudiated by outsiders. Boundary-maintenance of these groups is realised through a small number of ascetic elements present in Pentecostal ethics (i.e., non-smoking and zero tolerance for alcohol) and to a certain degree in tangible representations of religious elitism. Apparently these groups rely more on the micro-dynamics of the local societies in which they are embedded than they do on any form of centralised structure.

REFERENCESAustin, John Langshaw, How to Do Things with Words? Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1976 [1962].Buckser, Andrew, and Stephen D. Glazier, The Anthropology of Religious Conversion.

Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2003.Chesnut, R. Andrew,

Born Again in Brazil: The Pentecostal Boom and the Pathogens of Poverty. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1997.Competitive Spirits: Latin America’s New Religious Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Coleman, Simon, The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity : Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity. Cambridge studies in ideology and religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

• 129


Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa (Vol. 1). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier (Vol. 2.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Engelke, Matthew, Discontinuity and the discourse of conversion. Journal of Religion in Africa 34.1-2, 2004, 83-109.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., ed, Multiple Modernities. New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

Fosztó, László, Mono-ethnic Churches, the “Undertaker Parish”, and Rural Civility in Postsocialist Romania. In: C. Hann and the “Civil Religion” Group (eds.).The Postsocialist Religious Question: faith and power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. 2006, Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia 11. Münster: LIT, 269-292.

Revitalisation of diverging rituals: The case of Roma and Gadje in a Transylvanian village, The Anthropology of East Europe Review, 2007, 25 (2), 121-131.

Gay y Blasco, Paloma, Gypsies in Madrid: sex, gender and the performance of identity. Mediterranea series. Oxford ; New York: Berg, 1999.

Goody, Jack, Religion, Social Change and the Sociology of Conversion. In: Changing Social Structure in Ghana: Essays in the Comparative Sociology of a New State and an Old Tradition. Ed. Jack Goody. London: International Africal Institute, 1975, 91-106.

Harding, Susan F., Convicted by the Holy Spirit: The Rhetoric of Fundamental Baptist Conversion. American Ethnologist 14.1, 1987, 167-81.American Ethnologist 14.1, 1987, 167-81.American Ethnologist

Hefner, Robert W., ed., Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Hefner, Robert W., Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age. Annual Review of Anthropology 27, 1998, 83-104.

Horton, Robin, African conversion. Africa 41, 1971, 85-108. Tradition and Modernity Revisited. In: Patterns of Thought in Africa and the

West: Essays on Magic, Religion and Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 301-46.

Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Keane, Webb, Sincerity, “Modernity”, and the Protestants. Cultural Anthropology 17.1, 2002,

65-92. From Fetishism to Sincerity: On Agency, the Speaking Subject, and Their

Historicity in the Context of Religious Conversion. Comparative Studies in Society and History 39.4, 1997, 674-93.

Kearney, Michael, Drunkenness and Religious Conversion in a Mexican Village [első publikáció 1970]. In: Changing Fields of Anthropology. From Local to Global. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers Inc., 2004, 51-70.

130 •

László FOSZTÓ

Lamb, Chistopher, and Darol M. Bryant, Religious Conversion: Contemporary Practices and Controversies. London and New York: Cassell, 1999.

Lehmann, David, Fundamentalism and Globalism. Third World Quarterly 19.4, 1998, 607-34.

Leschber, Corinna, Romani Lexical Items in Colloquial Romanian. In: Romani in Contact. The History, Structure and Sociology of a Language. Ed. Yaron Matras. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1995, 149-76.

Meyer, Birgit, Translating the Devil: Religon and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.

Peel, John D. Y.,Aladura: A Religious Movement among the Yoruba. London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

The Colonization of the Conciusness. Review on Of Revelation and Revolution Vol. 1. Journal of African History 33, 1992, 328-29.Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000.

Pelkmans, Mathijs, Virginie Vaté, and Christiane Falge, Christian Conversion in a Changing World: Confronting Issues of Inequality, Modernity and Morality. In: Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology, Report 2004-2005. Halle/Saale: Max Plank Institute for Social Anthropology, 2005, 23-34.

Ranger, Terence, Book Review: Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba. African Affairs 100. Oct 2001, 2001, 653-56.

Robbins, Joel, The Globalization of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christianity. Annual Review of Antropology 33, 2004, 117-43.

Robbins, Joel, ed., Becoming Sinners: Christianity and Moral Torment in a Papua New Guinea Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Snow, David A., and Richard Machalek, The Convert as a Social Type. Sociological Theory 1 (1983): 259-89.

Stromberg, Peter G., Language and Self-transformation: A Study of the Christian Conversion Narrative. Publications of the Society for Psychological Anthropology; 5 index. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

van der Veer, Peter, Conversion to Modernities: the Globalization of Christianity. Zones of religion. New York: Routledge, 1996.

Religion in South Asia. Annual Review of Anthropology 31, 2002, 173-87.Wanner, Catherine, Advocating New Moralities: Conversion to Evanghelicalism in Ukraine. Religion,

State & Society 31.3, 2003, 273-87. Missionaries of Faith and Culture: Evangelical Encounters in Ukraine. Slavic

Reviev 63.4, 2004, 732-55.Williams, Patrick, Pour une approche du phénomène Pentecôtiste chez les Tsiganes, Études

Tsiganes. 1984, 30(2), 49-51. Le miracle et la nécessité: a propos du développement du Pentecôtisme chez

les Tsiganes, Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, 1991, 73, 81-98.

• 131


NOTES1 This paper is based on a chapter of my PhD dissertation defended in July 2007 at the

Institute for Ethnology, Martin Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg. The research was part of the ‘Religion and Civil Society’ project of the Post Socialist Eurasia Department at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle. I owe thanks to Chris Hann and all the participants of the writing up seminar organised at the MPI for commenting on an earlier draft of this text.

2 The people I am concerned with belong to the Romungro group also called “magyarcigány” meaning ‘Hungarian Gypsies’. I carried out fi eldwork in the city of Cluj and in a nearby village I refer to as Gánás. Most of the local Roma are trilingual: in addition to their native dialect of Romani they are profi cient in Romanian and Hungarian. Throughout this study I refer to this group simply as ‘Roma’ following the in-group usage of the term. All personal names are pseudonyms.

3 For a discussion of conversion in the context of colonialism see Comaroff and Comaroff (1991).

4 The exchange between John Peel (Peel 1992) and the Comaroffs (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 42-53) exemplifi es these tensions. See also the Terrence Ranger’s (2001) review of Peel.

5 Patrick Williams’ studies (1984; 1991) initiated anthropological interest in the conversion of Roma to Pentecostalism. In these seminal essays Williams introduces many of the ideas which were further developed and illustrated in ethnographical examples by others. On one hand he connects Pentecostal conversions to the processes of urbanisation, because many of the problems emerging through in this process are addressed and ‘treated’ by conversions. On the other hand, the community of the converted offers new social space and facilitate new forms of identifi cations which overarch the divisions between the different subgroups.

6 I cannot introduce here the history of the spread of Pentecostalism in Romania. For an overview see my discussion in Fosztó (2006).

7 The everyday term Roma use for converted people, ‘o pocaiti’, is derived from this Romanian word. They sometimes also use a derivative from the Hungarian term (hívő),: ‘o hivövi’. Actual members of these churches most often refer to themselves simply as Christians (Rou: crestin). I use the following code for the different languages Rou – for Romanian, Rom – for Romani, and Hun – for Hungarian.

8 The baptism of the Holy Spirit is considered to be the sign of the true conversion in Pentecostalism. It is often accompanied by extraordinary experiences and receiving the ‘gifts of the Spirit’ (e.g. glossolalia).

9 The ‘seal’ is the sign of being chosen for salvation.10 “How can a man be born when he is old?” Nicodemus asked. “Surely he cannot enter a

second time into his mother’s womb to be born!” Jesus answered, “I tell you the truth, no one can enter the kingdom of God unless he is born of water and the Spirit. Flesh gives birth to fl esh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit. You should not be surprised at my saying, ‘You must be born again.’ (New International Version)

11 Apart from one attempt by a Roma in the initial period of my fi eldwork, nobody tried to tell my fortune, nor did I see anybody practicing fortune telling with the villagers.

12 This song circulates in a wider context than the local Roma group or the assembly in the city with which I am most familiar. The dialect found in the song is different from

132 •

László FOSZTÓ

local Romani. Romungre call the heart ‘vodji’ not ‘jilo’ not ‘jilo’ not ‘ ’ – they readily point out that the song comes from other Roma assemblies.

13 ‘Mişto’ [Rom: mishto ‘good’] is a loan word from Romani in Romanian meaning ‘good’ or ‘nice’. It is used in informal contexts and often has an ironic connotation (Leschber 1995: 167).

14 Michael Kearney (2004) describes a similar problem in the case of a peasant community in Mexico.

15 Based on archival research, John Peel (2000:250-5) describes 19th century evangelicalism th century evangelicalism th

as “a religion of the heart”.

• 133

The changes in the religious identity of the Bulgarian Roma have been important and intriguing. These started decades ago acquiring mass character and social signifi cance in the wake of 1989. The process of conversion among the Roma and their joining the ranks of Protestant churches was noted by Bulgarian ethnologists and sociologists, as far back as the start of the 1990s (Marushiakova, Popov 1993: 166-167; Tomova 1998: 343). They paid particular attention to the rapidity and growth with which these processes developed. Nevertheless, these noted events are not an isolated phenomenon; such processes have proceeded in a similar way in neighboring countries such as Romania (cf. Fosztó 2006: 269-292; Fosztó 2005: 1-12) and Serbia (Todorovic 2002: 175-186; Dordevic 2004: 103-112). However, the mass extent of evangelization among the Roma should undoubtedly be discussed within the context of globalization, or, in other words, as part of the advance of the Pentecostal movement throughout the whole world (cf. for instance Czegledy 2007: 1-22; Coleman 2000).

Some Bulgarian authors explain the Roma conversion in relation to phenomena like ‘ghettoization’ and social marginalization. The role of conversion has also been pointed out as being a key instrument of social reorganization for threatened communities, as well as a mechanism of keeping its psychological balance (Marushiakova, Popov 1993: 177-167; Tomova 1998: 343)1. Essential progress was made in the familiarization with and the study of this scholarly problem with the publication of a pioneering study dedicated to the Evangelical Roma (Slavkova 2007). The author showed the processes of a sweeping social and cultural change, entailing “the formation of a new Gypsy community” (Ibidcommunity” (Ibidcommunity” ( . 268).Ibid. 268).Ibid

EVANGELICAL CONVERSION AMONG THE ROMA IN BULGARIA

Between Capsulation and Globalization

Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA, Velislav ALTANOV

134 •

Milena BENOVSKA-SABKOVA & Velislav ALTANOV

The purpose of the present work is to review the change of religious identity among Bulgarian Roma within a specifi c social and historical context. Our starting point of view is the conviction that the study of conversion among Roma should be based on thorough knowledge of the Protestant denominations in Bulgaria: “old” (“traditional” Protestant) and “new” (the Pentecostal charismatic churches). The availability of a monograph on “the Evangelical Roma” made it possible to take the next step and to discuss the question of conversion among Roma in its procedural aspect. This has been one of our basic tasks; the other has been combining, on an equal level, the interest in Roma culture with the historical and anthropological study of a certain religious community. The main research questions are the following: How do the Evangelical churches function in their capacity of social communities, structured on a religious basis? How should the religious conversion of Roma be qualifi ed: as a fait accompli, or as an open and controversial process? Does evangelization engender changes in the identity, traditional culture and values of Roma, and if so, how? To what extent is this process characterized as an original local phenomenon and how far may it be discussed as a product of globalization?

This article has been written on the basis of fi eld work effectuated in two churches, located in the outskirts of Sofi a, both of them belonging to the Bulgarian Church of God (further referred to as BCOG; prior to 1990 it was known as the Church of God, further referred to as COG). The restricted scope of the observations narrows down the research, but also carries undisputed advantages. The endeavor was, in this way, to show conversion not as an anonymous process but as the result of real social actions and interactions with real social actors. The informants were selected from the denomination embodied by the BCOG, for two specifi c reasons. First, the BCOG, being Pentecostal, is of prime interest as it is the Pentecostal churches, precisely, that have had a leading role in the attraction of believers in Eastern Europe, since 1989.2 Second, the historical presence of the COG dates back to the inception of the Pentecostal movement, from 1921 onwards, and has been characterized by a certain Bulgarian specifi city.

The fi eld work was carried out over the course of fi ve months in 2008 in Gornitsata [Upstairs], a Bulgarian Church of God in the Hristo Botev residential district, and in the BCOG in the Lyulin-5 residential district. Serving as additional sources of empirical data have been: a) the fi eld work, carried out independently by Velislav Altanov (further referred to as Velislav in the text) in 2007 among charismatic Christians in different places across Bulgaria3, and b) fi eld work among Roma, carried out by Milena Benovska-Sabkova (further referred to as Milena) in 20024.

THE METHODS OF FIELD RESEARCH

We defi ned the fi eld research strategy after the “case study”’s qualitative method model; we opted for the optimal comparison between two case studies (cf. for instance Orum et al. 1991: 1-26; Warner 1991: 174-1995). The fi eldwork techniques include: observation, participant observation (Bernard 1988: 148-179) and autobiographical interviews. We engaged in participant observations mostly in the Lyulin-5 church. This became possible insofar as we started attending this church without having established preliminary contacts and in this way we remained anonymous to most of the believers. In the case of Gornitsata, in the Hristo Botev district, we were familiar

• 135

Evangelical Conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria

with the priest and some of the believers beforehand, which provoked the so-called “reactivity” (Bernard 1988: 150), i.e. it left an imprint on the proceeding of the very church services. Our presence, for instance, prompted a prolongation of some religious events (sometimes almost twice as much) at Gornitsata. In this sense the work carried out there may be qualifi ed as observation rather than participant observation. We attended church services, women’s (“sisters’”) gatherings, sacraments (“Lord’s Supper”) etc. During the interviews, we rarely used tape recorders, instead we mostly took notes. We also documented telephone calls with believers. We also had to make some of the observations singly (Milena took part in “sisters’” gatherings without Velislav; he, in turn, documented other events independently). Finally, we individually kept fi eld diaries (cf. Bernard 1988: 183-185).

To provide backup data, we also held observations among the most numerous church community (with about 1000 active members); the BCOG in the town of Samokov with Pastor N.V. (cf. Velev 2002: 126). We likewise took part in a few non-denominational events and interviewed some of the most active members of the two churches (priests, heads of the women’s groups, regular parish). We also accepted and analyzed as specifi c autobiographical narratives the so-called “testimonies” [of benefi cial interference from the Lord], which are rife in various kinds of religious services. Our contact and conversations with Pastor Pavel Ignatov6, Chief Elder of the BCOG, considerably helped the progress of our fi eldwork.

We not only interviewed Roma, but Bulgarians too, because of our interest in the interethnic relations in the churches, and because of Bulgarians’ longer experience as Evangelical Christians. We have kept the informants’ anonymity (those whom we quote by initials) with the exception of public persons such as Pastor Ignatov. This article’s authors’ religious orientation infl uenced the perceptions and assessments of the carried out research (cf. Woodhead, Healas). We therefore have combined the “emic” and the “etic” points of view to the researched subject, insofar as one of us has an Eastern Orthodox family background, while the other is a Protestant. We have therefore mutually enriched our competences – that of the ethnologist with that of the theologian.

THE CHURCH OF GOD AS A “PRIVATE” RELIGION (1921-1990)

The COG is a Pentecostal church. The establishment of Pentecostal churches in Bulgaria had been prepared by the earlier existence of “traditional” Protestant communities in the country. It has not however been clarifi ed, with any precision, at what point Protestantism fi rst arrived among the Bulgarians. The year 1850 has been fairly tentatively assumed to be the start of Protestant missionaries’ activity in Bulgaria (Ignatov 2006: 55, 60; Slavkova 2007: 51). “The Methodist Episcopal Church started its activity mostly in North Bulgaria in 1857”, the Baptist Church – in 1863; the Congregational Church had established its fi rst church in 1871, whereas the Adventists – in 1895 (Ignatov 2006: 126). Researchers, both neutral and coming from Protestant circles, have been unanimous regarding the signifi cant contribution made to culture and education in Bulgaria by missionary activity, particularly in the 19th century (Nestorova 1991: 51-97; Karapetrova, Kohen 1998: 311; Slavkova 2007: 52-53; Kulichev 1994: 94-121).

136 •


The COG traces its “pedigree” directly to the pioneers of the Pentecostal movement in Bulgaria. These were missionaries, sent and fi nanced by the Assemblies of God, an infl uential Pentecostal denomination from the USA (Ignatov 2006: 149-150)7. Most prominent among them were the Russians Ivan Voronaev (founder of the Pentecostal movement in Russia) and Dionysus Zaplishni (Kulichev 1994: 348-349; Ignatov 2006: 132, 138; Slavkova 2007: 53), who set up eighty churches within a short span of time8.

In 1928 there was a split of the unsteady Pentecostal movement in Bulgaria. The causes were mainly due to the different ritual practices cultivated. On the one hand there were those practiced by Voronaev and Zaplishni, and on the other, those of another couple of missionaries from the Assemblies of God, which came somewhat later, viz. the Bulgarian Nikolai Nikolov and the Russian Schmid (Ignatov 2006: 151-153; Velev 2002: 33-44; Slavkova 2007: 54). A constituent assembly of the Union of the Evangelical Pentecostal Churches was organized in March 1928 in the city of Burgas. Pastor Stoyan Tinchev’s (1880-1965) followers, subsequently called Tinchevists after him, refused to join. But Tinchev upheld adherence to the spiritual principles bequeathed by Voronaev, whereas Nikolov and Schmid were carriers of the Pentecostal movement, which had developed and become established in the meantime. The teaching inherited from Voronaev had some specifi c features such as the act of washing of the feet9

during the Supper of the Lord (the Holy Communion), the ritual of “denunciation in sin”, a specifi c appearance and dress code (Mollov 2006: 254-255), which were not encouraged by Nikolov and were not practiced by other Pentecostals (Mollov 2006: 211-280; Ignatov 2006: 152, 158-159).

In this way the “Tinchevists” split into an independent Church of God, which until 1990 operated without having been offi cially registered and for that matter had been treated by the state as a “sect”, both prior to and under socialism. The “Tinchevists” adopted the strategy of capsulation not only with respect to the then formal Bulgarian institutions, but also with respect to the kindred Pentecostal and other Protestant denominations: “Stoyan Tinchev banned contacts with foreign missionaries; he did not admit them to his churches; he banned the reading of translated church books and aids. He likewise refused any fi nancial backing and spiritual relations”. This contributed to the peculiar Bulgarian image of the “Tinchevists” movement (Ignatov 2006: 159-160). Besides the specifi c set of rituals, worth mentioning is also the emphatic charismatic image of the CL, and its extreme ‘rigorism’ (concerning this term cf. Makrides 2007). Knowledge and education were played down (Ignatov 2004: 117, 118-119); fi rst-rate importance was instead attached to “spiritual gifts” like prophesies, visions, healings, “interpretations” (i.e. “translations” of what had been said via glossolalia – “heavenly tongues” in everyday speech) (Ignatov 2006: 214-244; Mollov 2006: 218-246, 254-255; Altanov 2007a: 257-260).

The “Tinchevists” were generally those who pertained to the lower social strata and were also rather undereducated (Ignatov 2004: 117; Mollov 2006: 56-57). In addition to their emphatically charismatic orientation, they were also connected with the rejection of formal organization and administration. The written word had no essential role in the administration of the church communities; communication was by and large achieved orally (Ignatov 2006: 244-245). The latter aspect was also connected with

• 137


the specifi cities of the primarily oral traditional rural culture present in the Balkans where lack of education and literacy were not rare even up until the middle of the 20th

century.The believers had diffi culties legalizing their marriages and birth certifi cates,

particularly prior to the introduction of the civil marriage in 1944; indeed, by not having been registered until 1990, the COG was not entitled to issue such documents. Pavel Ignatov, having been an Elder of the COG for many years, testifi ed to the degree of self-isolation: “[….] There are no church archives, either. The events are conveyed by word of mouth. The teaching is memorized. There is no attempt at chronicling the movement. There is no written history. No photos. Stoyan Tinchev had banned taking photos. […] Musical instruments had also been rejected.” (Ignatov 2006: 247). The utter conservatism also found expression in giving up money in church life; there was no real estate, there were no church buildings; religious services were performed at home; the collection of tithe or donations were also avoided. “Money is collected for needs, cropping up at the moment, and is spent straightaway. No one earns his living preaching the Word of God. No one gets a salary. The presbyters have some other employment to earn their living, while church servicing is by free will and free of charge” (Ibid: 251; cf. also Mollov 2006: 281-285). Also present was quite a few extreme anti-modern manifestations like refusal of medical aid, rejection of military service and military oath, giving up the possession of a TV or radio set (Ignatov 2004: 61-62; 77; Altanov 2007a: 255-257).

By the irony of fate, the legal operation of other Protestant denominations had turned them into an easier “prey” for total control under socialism (Kulichev 1994: 383; Altanov 2007a: 252-253). At that time, the Churches of God suffered serious reprisals from the atheistic policy (cf. Ignatov 2004: 15-153). The closed character of their community, however, and the decades-long practice of holding religious services in private homes10 were obstacles to being followed by the socialist special services. For instance, a secret document of the Committee on the Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Church and the Religious Cults, dated February 22, 1984, reads that “the sect” of the COG of the “Tinchevists”, “create great obstacles for the authorities in their attempts to control them. They are scattered in groups of 5-6 people and more, in different parts of the country” (Kulichev 1994: 383).

An important feature of the COG is that its organizing principle is based on family and kinship structures. Stefan Mollov, a grandson of founder Stoyan Tinchev, emphasizes the importance of the kith and kin as a form of dissemination and keeping up of the faith: “Should one of the adults start to believe in the Truth about Jesus Christ, the entire family follows in his wake. Not hesitating very long, the rest of the families of the kin join in: the brothers, sisters, cousins, in-laws… The COG is set up in numerous villages and towns by families by fl esh, which later become forever in families by spirit, too” (Mollov 2006: 21). Some of the present-day pastors are sons and grandsons of pastors, i.e. second or third generation of religious leaders. It would not be an exaggeration if we qualify the principle thus described as “patriarchal”.

Therefore, the unoffi cial and by and large capsulated existence of the COG caused considerable hardships and persecution for its members (cf. Petrov 2001: 35-39; Ignatov 2004: 120-152), but likewise, it was an essential factor for the survival of these

138 •


communities under socialism (cf. Altanov 2007a: 252-254, 265), as they functioned as informal social networks. The self-isolation of the churches, in the period preceding 1990, into private spaces, their isomorphism with respect to family and kinship structures lead to characterize this movement as “private” religion (cf. Casanova 1994).

However, this changed with the registration of the church under the name of the Bulgarian Church of God on December 27, 1990 (Velev 2002: 55; Ignatov 2006: 321; Slavkova 2007: 58).

FROM THE PERIPHERY TO THE CENTRE: TRANSFORMATION OF THE BULGARIAN CHURCH OF GOD INTO A PUBLIC RELIGION (1990-2008).

The changes in the BCOG started long before its registration. The fi rst (unsuccessful) attempts at registration were made as early as in 1962 and 1969 (Ignatov 2004: 99). After the demise of Stoyan Tinchev in 1965, the church remained without leadership until 1974. At that point, it was Dimiter Pankov, Chief Presbyter, who took the lead until his death in 1977 (Velev 2002: 44; Ignatov 2004: 99). After this, the church was headed by Pastor Pavel Ignatov (Velev 2002: 54), who remained its leader until 2005.

The new Chief Elder was an exponent of the views of new generation church leaders, pleading for “a more modern style and interpretation of the Gospel” (Mollov 2006: 72), and more importantly for overcoming the church’s isolation and its extreme “rigorism”. In this way the earliest contacts were established with churches outside Bulgaria: initially, in 197311, with the Church of God in Yugoslavia, and through it, with the World Church of God12 (Velev 2002: 55; Ignatov 2004: 102). In 1981 the COG was recognized as part of the World Church of God (Ibid: 124). Through its contacts, the COG gradually got out of its anonymity. Its international relations probably also stimulated the strategy for attracting Roma to the COG.

Quite a few books have been devoted to the reprisals against the COG under socialism (Mollov 2006: 73-85, 88, 99-127; Velev 2002: 54-58; Ignatov 2004, among others) and for this reason, we do not dwell on them at this time. In spite of these reprisals, however, the COG increased its membership, particularly in the 1989s. Shrinking to barely 600 in 1974, its membership increased to 3000 in 1985 (Ignatov 2004: 100-215).13 The COG also gradually changed its character of “private” religion: through the street protests it organized in the centre of Sofi a in 1983 (Ibid: 170-171), it transferred its activities to the public space. Along these lines were also the numerous attempts of the early 1980s to get registered in court. The international defence for the COG including publications in foreign mass media and diplomatic notes helped it get out of anonymity. The social base of the COG gradually changed, too: it developed its own intelligentsia (Ignatov 2004: 119; Altanov 2007).

In the wake of the political changes of 1989, the activities and character of the BCOG radically changed. The religious services held from 1988-1989 took place in the outlying Hristo Botev poor Roma residential district but have, since 1990, been transferred to one of the big halls of the National Palace of Culture. This action has had an unambiguous symbolic meaning. It has testifi ed to the social, political and economic changes having taken place in the BCOG, but most of all to its transformation into a public religion (cf. Casanova 1994). In fact, the history of the BCOG has followed some of the general laws of the post-socialist development of religious life: “religion has

• 139


become much more visible in the public sphere and much more open to transnational infl uences” (Hann 2006: 2). However, the BCOG’s ambition to occupy a central place of prestige in the “symbolic geography” of Bulgarian public space has been obvious. The “private” religion has become “public”, having traversed the road – as much as in the real, as in the symbolic space – from the periphery to the centre.

Almost coinciding with these events was the split of a group from the BCOG which was registered on November 25, 1991 under the name United Churches of God (Slavkova 2007: 58). This was the result of a split which had begun much earlier in the Church of God. Starting from the early 1980s, this wing of the congregation took shape, dissatisfi ed with the new development of the denomination (cf. Mollov 2008: 72-73). The tendency to split and the continuous formation of new branches, however, has been a common feature not only of neo-Protestantism, but of Protestantism as a whole. Therefore such a development was not unexpected.

The 1990s were a period characterized by an upsurge of the BCOG: its congregation swelled (according to unconfi rmed data – up to 33 000)14; it carried out massive evangelistic events; it accepted a multitude of foreign missionaries, preachers and guests. The BCOG engaged in sweeping social activities, the peaks coinciding with the two periods of the most acute social and economic crises in Bulgaria: 1991-1992 and 1996-1997. The BCOG currently maintains ten social centres, fi ve of which are in the territory of Sofi a and the others are dispersed across the country (Velev 2002: 126, 63; Slavkova 2007: 163).

PARTICIPATION AND ROLE OF ROMA IN THE STRUCTURES OF THE BULGARIAN CHURCH OF GOD (1979-2008)

Notwithstanding the massive Roma involvement with the BCOG, there is scarce and fragmentary written evidence of this process. Directly questioned about the start of this process, Pastor P. Ignatov pointed out both rational and spiritual incentives for the start of evangelistic work among the Roma. This happened in 1979 as a well developed strategy from the leadership of the Bulgarian Church at the time. This strategy targeted at increasing the membership of the church congregation and helping the struggle for the registration of the Bulgarian Church under socialism:

“This was the main objective – massive involvement. I established that the Pentecostal movement had always been successful among the poorest in the outlying residential districts, the working class, the minorities, the groups of immigrants, women. […] In a group of intelligent brave young people we decided that wherever we happened to be we had to speak about the faith in a revolutionary manner; that this society had to be given freedom. I understood that there [among the Roma] I was to fi nd a soil. Moreover, as these people had nothing to lose. Our stand was that we had to tell about ourselves even if we should die […] Of course, I prayed, I fasted – do not preclude the spiritual!…” (P. Ignatov).

The fi rst family which “came to believe” in 1979 and passed over from Islam to the Church of God (COG) was that of H.Ch.: a big and infl uential family of popular Roma musicians. “After we won over that family our infl uence incredibly rose.”Roma musicians. “After we won over that family our infl uence incredibly rose.”Roma musicians. “ Let us only add that during our fi eldwork, we happened to meet one of the younger female

140 •


representatives of this family – a woman dedicated to the faith. To put it in other words, the generations following from the fi rst Roma to believe have not changed their religious belonging for almost thirty years after the original conversion.

Comparing what Pastor Ignatov said with the indubitable data on the wide-scale conversion of the Roma in a number of countries in the world (cf. Slavkova 2007: 60-71), we can assume that the COG had received an impetus for this “mission” also by way of its contacts with the Pentecostal congregation outside the confi nes of the country.

The process of people of Roma origin joining the COG in the 1980s was also testifi ed by the documents of State Security following the activities of the COG. In a secret report to the Sixth Department of State Security dated November 21, 1984, concerning a check-up at the home of P. Ignatov and his father Boris Ignatov in Sofi a, it is pointed out that attending the “gathering” (religious service) had been 55 people: 28 were listed by names, personal data and addresses. What is curious is that the remaining 27 people attending had been Roma, and had been characterized in the following manner: “The remaining persons were of the Gypsy minority of advanced age”15. The conclusion stands out that Roma participation had been played down, notwithstanding that it amounted to almost half of the attendance; the Roma had not been distinguished by “the honor” of being listed by names. This document casts some light on the random and qualitatively non-representative “sample” concerning the Roma membership of the COG, which was gaining momentum even as early as in the 1980s.

M. Slavkova presents these trends on a broader scale. The Pentecostal religion permeated the Roma communities in the 1970s and 1980s. The data, which the author quotes, give grounds to conclude that in most of the cases this was due to the intervention of the COG or of representatives of the United Church of God, which later split from it (Slavkova 2007: 93-97). At the same time, church representatives from the “traditional” wings of Protestantism interacted among Roma. M. Slavkova tentatively distinguishes two stages in the process of conversion among the Roma in Bulgaria in the wake of 1989. The fi rst one was during the fi rst half of the 1990s – “the massive spread of evangelism among the Gypsies in the early years following the changes”, when there was a connection between conversion, marginalization and the hard economic problems confronting the Roma population. The second stage was characterized by the “stabilization of the processes during the late 1990s and the establishment of a constant number of believers” and “the segmentation of the churches under the infl uence of individual Gypsy priests, who were looking for a public outlet for their prestige” (Ibid).

In what concerns the BCOG, what has to be noted are the recent changes which have given a new orientation to the Roma’s involvement within it. During the gathering of presbyters belonging to the BCPG, in 2005, in the city of Plovdiv, the Roma businessman and pastor A.T. (Slavkova 2007: 107) was elected Chief Elder of the BCOG, with the backing of the long time leader P. Ignatov. Different versions of that event then emerged but it nevertheless provoked discontent and eventually the withdrawal of some members of the big church communities (those in the towns of Smolyan and Dobrich, for instance) belonging to the BCOG. In this way the Roma involvement has become determining for the BCOG. We are probably witnessing the next successive split of the BCOG now. This has become possible in the BCOG precisely because of its democratic statute. Other Protestant denominations have restrictive conditions with

• 141


regards to the leadership, such as one’s level of education, which indeed operates as a barrier to most Roma. “We wanted to provide a good example of ethnic tolerance”, P. Ignatov said. “Alas, this failed to take place, however.”

The contribution of the BCOG to the Pentecostal conversion of Roma in Bulgaria has, since the 1980s, been of considerable proportion. In spite of its impact on this process, the BCOG is just one of “the faces” of this phenomenon. It is common knowledge that Protestantism as a whole infi ltrated the Roma communities considerably earlier – as early as the 1920s (cf. Kulichev 1994: 342-343; Slavkova 2007: 76-84). Suffering over a few decades under socialism, it wanted to be revived again in the 1980s. The process, however, has been uneven with regards to the geographical spread of the churches; it fl ourished in waves and pockets, but was not massive.

THE GORNITSATA [UPSTAIRS] CHURCH IN THE HRISTO BOTEV ROMA RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Its name - Gornitsata - originates from the location of the church on the top fl oor in Pastor I.I.’s home, but it probably also has a biblical analogy with Jerusalem’s Upstairsfrom the Acts of the Apostles, 2d. Its founders Pastor I.I. and his wife L.I. converted from Orthodox Christianity to the COG in 1985 through the evangelization of Boris and Pavel Ignatov, who were preaching at that time in the Hristo Botev residential district. Somewhat later I.I offered his home as a place for holding the religious services of the COG. This was essentially due to the fact that after Pastor P. Ignatov was interned in 1987, the church community in Sofi a did not have a single house of prayer. The home centres existing up to that time had been closed down by the authorities. In 1989, Gornitsata became the only house of prayer of the COG in Sofi a; P. Ignatov held sermons in it and at that time it was not rare that the capacity of about 200 seats was insuffi cient and a great number of the believers remained outside.

Even back in 1990, the church drew the interest and involvement of a great number of foreign pastors and missionaries. I.I. was ordained a pastor by P. Ignatov in 1992 (Velev 2002: 68-69) and continues to hold religious services in Gornitsata to this day. He also continues to exercise his trade as a shoemaker as well. In 1996 pastor I.I. started the construction of a new church building after an architect’s design, but because of the shortage of funds, it has still, to this day, not been completed.

Gornitsata has been an embodiment of a stage in the history of the COG and has been one of the unifying “places of memory” for the believers of the denomination as a whole. This has been a source of pride and legitimization for the activity of the pastor, as well as a specifi c spiritual resource for his reputation of a powerful mediator between the believers and the Lord Jesus Christ.

At the end of the 1980s, the attendance of Gornitsata was made of Bulgarians and Roma together. This was not only a matter of tolerance (concerning tolerance, cf. Hann 2006: 8-9; Buzalka 2006: 293-314), but also of a deliberate manifestation of solidarity in an authentic Christian spirit. P. Ignatov testifi es to the atmosphere in the Gornitsataat the end of the 1980s in the following way:

“And then Ivan says to my father that we can go at their place and they can adapt the upper fl oor [as a house of prayer]. And therein the best features of

142 •


the Roma have come to the fore: tolerance, solidarity. I was interned and in order that the church may be saved, it moved into the Roma residential district. It was mixed: Bulgarians and Roma. The Roma protect the Bulgarians. […] Because that was an honor, if Bulgarians went to the neighborhood. Then we moved to the Gornitsata. We were then living with the idea that people of different cultures and languages could be together.”

Today, M. Slavkova defi nes this church community as Romani (Slavkova 2007: 129). As a matter of fact, expecting just that, during her fi rst visit in that house of prayers in 2005, Milena was surprised by some Bulgarian attendance, though of not very big proportions. In 2008 the Bulgarian believers’ presence still remained. The Sunday religious services bring together more than 100 believers. During one of the “sisterly” (female) gatherings for prayer, Milena took short interviews from two of the attending Bulgarians, who had now been coming to this church without interruption for twenty years. The trend of a Roma homogenization of the church seems to be at hand, but this is not yet a fait accompli. The mixed Bulgarian and Roma attendance has been a source of satisfaction for pastor’s wife. “These Bulgarian women, they come to us, they love us. You may start to love us, too”, she said to Milena.

THE BULGARIAN CHURCH OF GOD IN THE LYULIN-5 RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT

Lyulin-5 does not differ much from the other outlying residential districts of Sofi a. Its residents are mostly Bulgarian, although there are some Roma too. The charismatic events have given an impetus to the establishment of that religious community. Its founder has been pastor Ch.Ch., a former Muslim. Having witnessed and taken part in wonderful healings, he started to believe during a religious service in Gornitsata, in June 1988. About one year later, a small household group of fi ve or six believers took shape around him and his wife in the Lyulin-5 district. It had also been operating as a group of mutual assistance. Regardless of the fact that the group had increased its composition to about 40, it had been operating in household conditions and in 1993 it started meeting in a deserted former refectory of a special police force in Lyulin-5. Pastor Ch.Ch. has been ordained by P. Ignatov and is a member of the national leadership of the BCOG; he is greatly involved in the activities of the churches located in the Roma residential districts of Sofi a (Velev 2002: 63).

During our fi rst visit in Lyulin-5 we sat in different places, according to the requirement of the BCOG that men and women sit separately during religious service. Milena was immediately approached by two women, who invited her to sit next to them, and one of them said joyfully: “A new sweet soul!”. The women – a Bulgarian and a Roma – embraced Milena and in an embrace the three of them started praying and chanting. This warm welcome made Velislav assume that Milena had known these people from a previous encounter, but this was not the case.

This fi eldwork episode has been a testimony of the integrative moods and openness in the church. Attendance during Sunday services ranges from 70-80 to as many as 120 people and about one-quarter of them are men. The ethnic composition is mixed; the Bulgarian participation ranges within the frameworks of 10-15 percent.

A peculiarity of the church in Lyulin-5 is that in charge of it are two pastors. For fi ve years now – since July 20th 2003, Pastor Ch.Ch. and his wife have been missionaries

• 143


of the BCOG in P., a town in Turkey with a population of about 50 000, and in his absence Brother S.D. has been preaching. The current residence conditions for foreign citizens in Turkey makes it necessary that the pastoral couple alternate three-months stays in Turkey and Bulgaria. So the two preachers alternate in performing services in intervals of three months.

Infl uencing the social character of this church has been the fact that it is located in a common city district rather than in a compact Roma populated neighborhood. This also refl ects very much on the social compositions of the Roma themselves. Among them are well-to-do families with businesses of their own, although they do not necessarily represent the Roma in church. This church is attended, for instance, by the parents of Azis, the scandalous Bulgarian show star. Undereducated members of the working class predominate, but these do not solely belong to the lower strata of society. Our observations bear out the conclusion that the time has gone when there still was a direct interdependence between conversion and marginalization (Slavkova 2007: 96).

THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY: STRUCTURE, INTERNAL HIERARCHY AND DYNAMICS

The believers in the two churches do not just make up communities, but may be defi ned as groups as Homans means it (Homans 1950: 1). This differentiation has been prompted by the high degree of connectivity, communion and interaction among the believers. In this sense it may be claimed that the two churches, respectively, are operating and have the structure of a local religious group. There are also a multitude of acquaintances and kinship relations among the believers in the two districts, as well as similar relations with other churches of the same denomination. For that reason the believers of the BCOG in Sofi a may be presented as a community, made up of separate groups.

The main structural differentiation is between: a) the core of the church group composed of its most committed members, whom

we shall call “church activists” (the leaders of the female and youth prayer groups, cashiers, cooks, etc.);

b) regular participants in the religious services; c) the rest of the believers, attending the house of prayer irregularly or rarely. The

latter make up “the periphery” of the group and are the most unstable part of it. This mainly expresses itself in leaving the church or passing to another church group, quite often of another denomination, too.

The church “activists” are connected with the leader – the pastor (cf. Slavkova 2007: 144-163) and entertain strong personal links. This is a fi gure of outspoken power positions, combining the charismatic power through “spiritual gifts” and social capital through the management of the social networks both in the group itself and between the group and the macro society. In Gornitsata these relations are reinforced by the fact that the church is operating in the pastor’s home. In Lyulin-5 the relations with the leader also fi nd expression in the visits, paid by “the activists” to the pastor in Turkey, as well as through regular telephone calls.

144 •


This hierarchy is based on the degree of incorporation in the life of the group and the voluntary implementation of certain functions (accounting, cooking for “the brotherly meals”, teaching Sunday school, etc.). Equally important for the position in the group hierarchy are the charismatic “skills” – “the spiritual gifts”: the gift of prophesy, speaking in more than one of “the heavenly tongues”, the skill of their interpretation (during the Supper of the Lord). The latter is not common and is a privilege of two or three people in the group only. Similar to these “gifts” is also the composing of spiritual verses, which are read in public during religious services. The internal hierarchy in the group is visible in the spatial arrangement of the believers during the religious service. Besides the spatial division by gender, there is also an endeavor on the part of the “activists” to occupy seats in the front part of the hall. The male “activists” occupy the front-most part of the space, which is also occupied by the pastor during the church service. This is proof of determination to symbolically come close to the leader, and a means of self-presentation and reaffi rmation of the positions in the group. The female “activists” occupy the front rows in the hall. Sitting in the back are the new members of the church.

The believers identify with the religious group to which they belong. This is a matter of loyalty and of a positive acceptance of “one’s church”, based on its importance for the denomination (Gornitsata) and/or on the conception of the church as a place where God’s blessing is shown, most often through healings. In this way, in the 1990s, the church in Lyulin-5 became known under the name of the “Hospital at the End of the Town”.16

Churches are places of active communication. Spiritual messages are publicly exchanged within a ritual context (most of all through “testimonies”), as well as information of everyday nature (such as offers or searches for employment, for instance). Outside the framework of religious ritual communication, we fi nd elements which may be found in any other kind of community: conversations about family and everyday affairs, fl irting among teenagers at the door of the church, etc. At the same time, the level of social control in the church community is high. Sometimes the private life of a certain “sister” or “brother” is discussed in public; accusations are made in a non-Christian manner. This is no doubt a repercussion of the rituals of “denunciation of sin”, a manifestation of the “rigorism” of the “Tinchevists” of yore. In this way confl icting situations come to the fore and a transfer to another church is also possible for the concerned “brother” or “sister”. We have observed such cases in both the studied churches.

This transfer option bears witness to the dynamism within the church groups, which are sometimes joined by new members, while others leave them, while others still temporarily get out of the circle of the “activists”, by reducing the regularity of their church attendance. The high dynamism of the changes within a certain religious community is nothing unique: similar processes have been witnessed in Protestant denominations in other countries (Warner 1991: 174-178: Fosztó 2005: 3-5). During the time of our fi eldwork, changes occurred in the membership of the churches, as well as in their conditions for operation. The church in Lyulin-5 was threatened to lose its building: private persons made claims on the ownership of the terrain. This was not

• 145


only the object of worried discussion but also of attempts to take pertinent action. The outcome still remained unclear at the time we wrapped up our fi eldwork.

Most of all, the changes concerned the membership within the churches. At times, the changes also refl ected on the activities of the churches. Between Milena’s fi rst visit of Gornitsata in 2005 and our most recent fi eldwork, the children’s gatherings had been discontinued because of the work load their leader was under and the lack of a trained substitute in the church. In June 2008 the youth gatherings there had also been interrupted (probably only temporarily) as their leader gave birth to a second child.

New members joined the churches, others left. During the religious services two young girls underwent “baptism in the Holy Spirit” (expressed in glossolalia): a group of women, holding their hands, backed up the neophyte through an emphatically emotional prayer. This was the fi rst stage of the ritual acceptance of new members in the community. Group baptisms in water were also held twice a year – which is considered to be the next step to gain membership to the group.

On the other hand, one of the churches lost two of “their sisters”, who passed away during the time of our fi eldwork. Some “brothers” left to work abroad; one of the “sisters” started to attend a more prestigious church in the centre of Sofi a. An unpleasant surprise for us was the fact that such a change also happened with our key informant from Gornitsata, which hampered our work there for some time. She also started attending church in another district of Sofi a, which, moreover, was not of the same denomination. It was an intriguing situation when she referred to us for information as to what denomination that church belonged to. In fact, her family has been a good example of the uneven nature of the conversion and a strong reminder of the heterogeneous nature of the Roma communities. She, her two daughters and her mother had been attending Gornitsata for about 10 years, but her brother had not been converted. He is Muslim, while her sister-in-law is an Orthodox Christian. This provoked her brother’s comment: “Sister, we shall not be together in the netherworld!”

All this comes to show that the conversion is not necessarily a completed fact but an open process. László Fosztó’s observations among the charismatic churches in Romania are of a similar ilk (Fosztó 2005: 10-11).

This dynamism of joining and leaving the churches makes it imperative to ask the question what part of the Roma in Bulgaria have been converted to different Protestant denominations? Notwithstanding the joining of new members, “the brothers” and “the sisters” of the two studied churches are of the opinion that their numbers are now dwindling. The pastors share the same view. It is hard to even approximately estimate the number not only of the converted Roma, but more generally the number of Protestants in Bulgaria. According to the National Statistics Institute, Protestantism has been the only confession, which has, in recent years, seen an increase in its followers. In the period between the two latest censuses, the number of Protestants has doubled in the country – from 21 878 in 1992 to 42 308 in 200117. Different sources give unoffi cial data which greatly vary: from 24 651 to 80 000 (Slavkova 2007: 43-44). According to some estimates, about half of the Protestants in Bulgaria are Roma (Ibid). The approximate values of these assessments are obvious. We shall take the risk of adding one more. Indeed, not claiming to be precise, we shall mention that out of about 3500 people who took part in the World Day of Prayers on May 1118, a little less than half were Roma.

146 •


When shared with Bulgarian pastors, this view provoked their disagreement. The numbers of converted Roma seem to be a disputed question, insofar as it is used as an argument in the contest among the pastors for access to prestige, resources and power.

TRENDS IN THE IDENTITY AND IN THE CULTURE OF THE ROMA EVANGELISTS

The processes of evangelical conversion are connected with changes in Roma identity and culture. The Roma pastors, converted in the 1980s, had been guided by the strategy of modernization and the integration of Roma in Bulgarian society. This can still be observed in Gornitsata and particularly in the church in Lyulin-5. The children of these Roma pastors have a higher social status than that of their parents: they are educated and belong to the Roma intelligentsia, while their lifestyle does not differ in any way from that of most Bulgarians.

The relations among Roma and Bulgarians in the two churches need not be idealized: they are brotherly (cf. Slavkova 2007: 176-177) in an authentic Christian spirit. We became convinced of this throughout our fi eldwork.

The language of communication in the churches is Bulgarian. In Gornitsata, songs sung during the service alternate between Bulgarian and Romani19. Whereas in Lyulin-5, there is a cappella singing during the church service (i.e. with no instrumental accompaniment): Bulgarian evangelical songs are performed from the collection Sion Songs20 and only one song is in Romani language. When this one is sung, the Bulgarian worshippers can be recognized as they do not sing, not knowing the Romani language. When both vocal and instrumental music is performed, the number of bilingual and Romani songs increase, the musical style being specifi cally Romani in the latter instance. This is a general characteristic of the Roma churches (cf. Slavkova 2007: 115-120). In the second case “the brothers” and “the sisters”, Roma and Bulgarian alike, are more passive and behave instead as an audience.

With an increase in number of Roma evangelists and the multiplication of Roma ethnic character churches21, what can be observed is a striving of the church community to recruit its members amidst a specifi c Roma group (cf. Slavkova 2007: 99). In fact this striving is also one of the reasons underlying the segmentation of the churches. The churches – Gornitsata and Lyulin-5 – however, do not follow this principle. As a whole, the establishment of churches on the basis of a certain Roma group is still a trend and not yet a rule or obligation.

According to P. Ignatov, one of the architects of the conversion trend among Roma, the process in question has been part of the problem, referred by him as “Gypsifi cation”of the BCOG. He denotes in this way the process of capsulation within ethnically homogeneous churches, accompanied by a certain retreat from modern values, which the evangelizers have been trying to cultivate alongside the conversion. In his view, a new generation of Roma pastors has joined the BCOG, after 1995, for whom education is no longer a value as it had been for their predecessors. One of the successes of the evangelizers has been the struggle against alcoholism and drug abuse and the imposition of sobriety as a standard (those who fail to comply with this requirement drop out – cf. Benovska-Sabkova 2002: 82). This success has not by far been the only one: a number of modernization changes have been observed in the behaviour and values, in the everyday life and the festivities of the Roma (Slavkova 2007: 190-195). Some of the

• 147


more infl uential Roma pastors have been successful in negotiations for non-acceptance of interethnic confl icts provoked by criminal incidents involving Bulgarians and Roma. As a whole, the evangelization has added a new and positive identity among the Roma (Giordano, Boscoboinik 2002: 18-19; Slavkova 2007: 256). Nevertheless, this process does not revoke the Roma identities which rest on internal divisions and differences in the cultures of the different groups (Slavkova 2007: 256).

Certain hardships can also be encountered in the co-habitation of some specifi cities of Roma culture with Puritanism, particularly strong among the BCOG. This concerns partnership cohabitations, which are traditional and are practiced extensively among the Roma. “The pastor must be the husband of one woman!”, P. Ignatov imperatively says and this implies the rejection of divorce as an option: “If the pastor divorces he shall not serve”. There are rumours in the local communities that some of the Roma pastors have extramarital relations (cf. Slavkova 2007: 152). In this way double standards come to the fore in the BCOG, because the older generation of Pentecostal Christians continues to uphold the marital institution, most of all because of its religious implications. During our fi eldwork we watched a confl ict between two Bulgarian “sisters”, engendered by the fact that one of them “denounced in sin” the other one because her daughter was cohabitating with her partner. Nevertheless, cohabitation has been practiced even by some Roma church “activists” of the same church, but this has not become an object of discussion.

Certain obstacles to the upkeep of common moral standards by all believers have also been the early marriages among the Roma, which are practiced, but not encouraged by the pastors. We had the opportunity of witnessing how the pastor was trying to adapt modern standards to social practices among the Roma. Blessing the children before the start of Sunday school, he called all the children under 14 to come to the fore and added: “If there are married among you, let them come to the fore, too!” Apparently, the mutual adaptation between religious values and Roma traditions are a process of continuous negotiation. At the same time the striving of some of the Roma pastors to keep Roma churches homogeneous has been prompted by the desire to protect the Roma traditions from “modernizing encroachments”. The capsulation, on the one hand, is supported by some foreign missionaries, while on the other, it fi nds a political expression. We shall dwell on these matters in the following sections.

CONVERSION AND ROMA NATIONALISM? POLITICIZATION OF THE CHARISMATIC CHURCHES

The trend some churches have followed since 1995, towards Roma homogenization, has not been apparent in the BCOG, regardless of the existence of ethnically mixed churches too. Slavkova (2007: 176-177) and Altanov (2007: 1-18) tell us of charismatic churches with mixed ethnic composition: Turks and Bulgarians, Roma and Bulgarians. To some extent, homogenization has also been connected with segregation in that converted Roma now live in compact Roma neighborhoods. There are, however, other reasons for this too: the striving for independence of a big share of the Roma pastors; transnational contacts and infl uences, which some authors conceptualize as an act of globalization (cf. Coleman 2000: 49-71); the ambitions of the secular Roma elite, too, for nationalization of the Roma.22 In other words, the existence of homogeneous

148 •


Roma churches has been the result of social, economic and political factors. Worth mentioning among the economic factors of homogenization is the competition for the access to fi nancial and other material resources (most often coming from the activities of foreign missions and missionaries in Bulgaria); the possibility that the religious leadership may legalize activity in the non-governmental sector or simply in the business sphere. By far, not all the churches receive permanent fi nancial support by foreign missions or organizations. But it is a safe bet that more sweeping projects (such as the maintenance of social centres or educational structures) are being fi nanced with foreign assistance (cf. Slavkova 2007: 98-99; 161, 163, 247). All this has been connected with transnational contacts and infl uences. It is most probably a matter of the Roma pastors’ wish to communicate directly with the foreign sponsors, without the mediation of the denomination’s national leadership.

Homogenization may be described as the result of multilateral interactions among various social actors: Roma pastors, central leadership of the BCOG, foreign evangelical missions and individual missionaries, international Roma organizations, Bulgarian non-governmental organizations, and ethnic Roma political structures. Pastor P. Ignatov’s view, though not neutral, helps in getting our bearings in the picture. The idea of separate Roma churches is also backed outside the frontiers of the country – by Roma pastors in Western Europe as well as by individual Western missionaries, operating in Bulgaria:

“[The Roma pastors in Bulgaria] have established contacts with the Roma evangelical societies in Spain, Germany and France. The leaders there suggested to them to go back to Bulgaria and to do what was not allowed in the West – to Gypsify the evangelical churches. The Western Evangelical churches do not allow Gypsifi cation. Coming back [to Bulgaria], they [the Bulgarian Roma pastors] begin to take pride in the negative traits. For instance, this striving and interest to get education has disappeared. [….] They have learnt a sermon – and they think that this is enough. If there were any social support or some other assistance – then yes…. And so their movement for independence was begotten.”

Tangible in Pastor P. Ignatov’s standpoint is the bitterness of the loss of control over processes, which had been initiated thanks to his activity.

“I ask them: ‘Shall we make one society?’ – They say: ‘We shall be forced to set up a Roma church.’ And they take no interest, generally, whether it is a Pentecostal or what it is…[…] I am greatly concerned about the future. At the point when the advantages are exhausted, they will withdraw.”

What has been symptomatic of the advanced homogenization of Roma churches in the BCOG has been the foundation, in 2002, of an independent Association of the Roma Pastors, Churches and Societies in Bulgaria. The setting up of a Roma Church of the Lord in 2004, defi ned as “independent”, has had a symbolic meaning (Slavkova 2007: 107-108, 164).

This trend of deepening ethnic capsulation of the churches also has a political follow-up. Since 2000, Roma pastors have gradually turned out to be politically committed to the structures of the EuroRoma ethnic Roma party (on this topic cf. Benovska-Sabkova

• 149


2002: 80). According to P. Ignatov, during the 2005 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, “a political party – EuroRoma - decided that it could use the Evangelical churches as its clubs. All [the Roma pastors] to the last one became supporters of EuroRoma.”Some of the Roma were elected municipal councillors, and others have been nominated by EuroRoma to be national representatives. Though not complying with the moral standards of the charismatic BCOG, which requires a clear-cut distinction between the church affairs and lay matters, the political instrumentalization of religion has not been something unexpected. Indeed, “no aspect of religious identity after socialism could be free of the political” (Hann 2006: 6).

“FOREIGN AID” - A CONTROVERSIAL DISCOURSE BETWEEN EXAGGERATION AND REALITY?

To avoid simplifi ed interpretations we shall fi rst point out that the role of fi nancial aid from international sources (religious or other) should not be overrated. Most of the Roma pastors earn their living exercising their lay trade or professions (cf. Slavkova 2007: 150-151). The international aid is an important factor, but on the other hand, is not, by far, conditio sine qua non for the existence of all the evangelical churches at any period of time. Some of the churches are fi nanced by their own means (Slavkova 2007: 122-123), as is also the case with the churches we studied. The two churches, however, have had periods of more intensive fi nancial backing from international sources.

The fi nancial aid coming from Protestant missionaries and missions have been a strongly contested question, whose signifi cance has long and regularly been used in manipulative discourses. Thus back in the 19th century, the Protestant proselytism in the Balkans was attacked by the local political forces and religious institutions as something brought from outside and mercenary, because of the funds invested by West European and American missions (cf. Ignatov 2006: 66-67). This attitude has essentially not changed under the post-socialist conditions of today, either. Anthropologists have been repeatedly reporting on sharp accusations in self-seeking motives levelled against those who have accepted Protestantism (particularly the Pentecostal denomination) in different post-socialist countries (Pelkmans 2006: 32-37; Hilgers 2006: 80, 82, 86). These attacks have been coming from the traditional religious institutions (the Orthodox Church, Islam and others), striving to enforce their hegemonic role. This discourse has been common also among the broad strata of the population. Similar discourses are used as an argument in the internal disputes between the different Protestant denominations, and fairly often, also by one and the same denomination, including the rivalries between Roma pastors. The exaggerated idea of a generous fi nancial support from abroad sometimes even threatens the safety of a certain pastor and his family. For instance, the wife of Pastor I.I. from Gornitsata had been attacked and abused by Roma of the neighborhood with the accusation that the family allegedly “had money” from foreign aid, but had not distributed it among the rest of the residents in the neighborhood.

In fact the attitude to foreign aid has not been unambiguous in the circles of the Evangelists themselves, moreover, not only among the Roma. It has been acknowledged that not a single important project can be realized without foreign aid (Ignatov 2006: 145-150, 361). Dependence on the latter, however, is recently recognized as a problem and has been the object of mixed feelings (Ibid: 361-362).

150 •


It would be simplifi ed and incorrect to present the process of evangelization of the Roma as the result of an interest in foreign aid. The humanitarian aid in the form of food and second-hand clothes were also available in the Gornitsata and Lyulin-5 churches, but this aid generated no particular interest from the believers. Instead, these items have been distributed among socially underprivileged people, who do not attend these churches. The attractiveness of charismatic Christianity among the Roma has been due to more factors; here we can primarily highlight the proselytism of the Protestants, particularly of the charismatic trend. The intensity of the emotional experience during religious services and the faith in the possibility of healing should also be mentioned (Slavkova 2007: 158-159), or still the belief that devotion guarantees the resolving of everyday problems (“God fi nds jobs!”, A. says from the church in Lyulin-5). The sense of belonging and community life, which the churches offer, also attract the Roma.

LOCAL SOCIAL ACTORS COME OUT ON THE GLOBAL STAGE

What seems paradoxical in the politicization of the Roma Church has been its close relation between opposite ideologies: globalization, on the one hand, and the capsulation of Roma “nationalist” ambitions, on the other. Of course, we are using the term “nationalism” provisionally only (Fosztó 2003: 104). In fact the process of Roma homogenization in the BCOG has again been the Roma elite’s project in which some shifts have occurred with the advent of certain pastors. It is also a matter of the Roma pastors’ struggle for an access to and control of resources, available on “the religious market”23, and about the legalization of the claims of “exclusive rights” on this market. In this sense, the conclusion that what is necessary is “a reinterpretation of the opposition local – global” is justifi ed (Fozsto 2003: 106-170). What has been observed is the strengthening of the local social actors through their inclusion in global movements.

There is yet another trend of globalization of charismatic Christianity, in which the Roma take part already, not as an object of impact, but rather as an active instrument of proselytism. This is the missionary activity of Roma pastors within and out of Bulgaria. The Roma participation in this process cannot be separated from the overall missionary activity among the Protestants in Bulgaria. Since 2000, the missionary movement has been gathering force and Bulgarian missionaries are engaging in activities in India and the Republic of South Africa, for instance. A Bulgarian network of missionaries has been established which has, since 2002, been publishing a bulletin of its own24. The fi nances for missionary activities are collected from different sources: aside from those international sources, the fi nancing is also secured by Bulgarian sources: individual Protestant denominations, and sometimes even the personal fi nances of the missionaries themselves.

The Roma participation here emphasizes once again the importance of globalization as a concept, within the frameworks of which the progress made by charismatic Christianity should be discussed. As we have mentioned, Pastor Ch.Ch. and his wife have been carrying out missionary work in Turkey since 2003. This has happened with the mediation of the central leadership of the BCOG, fi nanced by the American Church of God. The missionary work is carried out under the leadership of an American missionary, and his communication with Pastor Ch.Ch. has been in Turkish. Pastor

• 151


Ch.Ch. has two native tongues: Turkish and Roma. This makes him suitable for his mission in Turkey. It is well known that Protestantism has no big successes in that country. “The Turks are people of stone hearts, it is very hard to work with them”, Pastor Ch.Ch. says. The sending of Roma missionaries relies on the familiar strategy of evangelization among the Roma, this time in Turkey. “Because the Roma are not either with these or with the others” (i.e. neither Christianity, nor Islam have authentic roots among them). Obviously this strategy has been mostly based on the heterogeneity of the Roma culture. In other words, successful work is expected of the Pastor among other Roma people, but the potential of the Roma cultural adaptability to a different cultural context is also appreciated. During our fi eldwork, we learnt about R., another Roma pastor from Sofi a, a missionary in Romania. For her part, Slavkova (2007: 143) says that she had witnessed evangelization, organized by Bulgarian Roma among Roma in Spain.

The incorporation of the Roma in world missionary networks has been a comparatively recent process, whose future is hard to foresee. What is more important, however, is that it can be discussed as the reverse of ethnic homogenization and capsulation.

CONCLUSION

The evangelization among the Roma in Bulgaria has been a process, resulting from the interaction of local, national and global social actors under the impact of various historical factors. It has come into being as part of the dissemination of Protestantism and of the Pentecostal movement, in particular, in Bulgaria in the early 1920s; it almost completely waned under socialism but nearing the end of this period (the 1980s), gained strength to become rapidly widespread after the political changes of 1989. We have reviewed this process through the prism of the historical development of the Pentecostal Bulgarian Church of God. Till the end of the 1960s this denomination had a defi nitely rigorist character and capsulated life in its decentralized structures. During that period it had the features of a “private religion”. The renovation and modernization of this church has resulted in its centralization and has been accompanied by successful evangelization among the Roma at the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s Bulgarians and Roma shared their religious experience together in ethnically mixed churches.

Immediately after the political changes of 1989, the Bulgarian Church of God turned into a “public religion” and social actor, having the ambition to play a central role in the Protestant movement in Bulgaria. During the subsequent two decades, almost, Roma participation became massive in the Pentecostal movement as well as in other Protestant denominations. This has entailed quite a few changes in the culture of the Roma and the acquiring of a new positive identity, without the latter replacing “the old” identifi cations among Roma. Hardships have also been observed in the adaptation of Roma culture to the culture of the puritan moral standards of charismatic Christianity. Under the impact of global (foreign missionaries) and local (Roma pastors) factors, trends of ethnic homogenization and capsulation have been observed in Evangelical churches with Roma participation. This has enabled the politicization and political use of the Bulgarian Church of God and its integration for the purposes of an ethnic Roma party, since the early years of the new millennium. The universalist philosophy of the charismatic churches is no obstacle to the development of “nationalistic” trends in

152 •


Roma churches insofar as this conforms to the power ambitions of the Roma pastors, joining the Roma elite.

Globalization fi nds its expression in the opposite direction, too, through the infi ltration of international networks of missionaries by Roma pastors.

The evangelization among the Bulgarian Roma is an incomplete and contradictory process, accompanied by changeability in the life of the church communities as well as by vacillations, the joining of new believers and the withdrawal of older members. A painstaking analysis of the social practices in the two church communities has shown an organic community life and internal cohesion, notwithstanding the existence of an outspoken internal hierarchy and social control, based on religious criteria.

It would be incorrect to play down the evangelization process of Roma and to limit their conversion to their interest in foreign fi nancial aid. The attractiveness of charismatic Christianity among the Roma has been due to many more factors: the proselytism of the Protestants, the intensity of the emotional experience in the charismatic churches, the faith in the possibility of healing, and the sense of belonging and community life, which Roma acquire in their local religious communities.

REFERENCES

Bernard, H.R., Research Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Newbury Park – Beverly Hills – London – New Delhi: SAGE, 1988.

Benovska-Sabkova, M., “I am a pure Gipsy…”. The Roma Individuality in the Distorted Mirror of Group Stereotypes. – In: Giordano, C. et al. Roma’s Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria. Rome: Ethnobarometer, 2002, 57-93.

Casanova, J., Public Religions if the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Public Religions if the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Public Religions if the Modern WorldPress, 1994.

Coleman, S., The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity. Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Czegledy, A. P., Distinctly African Christians: Situating His People Christian Church within Social Transformation. – Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Working Papers, N 97, 2007.

Fosztó, L., Diaspora and Nationalism: an Anthropological Approach to the International

Romani Movement. – In: Regio, 2003, 1-12. Conversions to Pentecostalism among Roma in Romania. – In: http://adatbank.

transindex.ro/vendeg/htmlk/pdf5619.pdf, 2005. Mono-Ethnic Churches, the “Undertaker Parish”, and Rural Civility in Post-

Socialist Romania. – In: Hann, C. & the “Civil Religion” Group. The Post-Socialist Religious Question. Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, 269-292.

Giordano, C., Boscoboinik, A., Introduction. – In: Giordano, C. et al. Roma’s Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria. Rome: Ethnobarometer, 2002, 15-29.

Hann, C., Introduction: Faith, Power, and Civility after Socialism. – In: Hann, C. & the “Civil Religion” Group. The Post-Socialist Religious Question. Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, 1-26.

• 153


Hilgers, I., The Regulation and Control of Religious Pluralism in Uzbekistan. – In: Hann, C. & the “Civil Religion” Group. The Post-Socialist Religious Question. Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, 75-98.

Homans, G. C., The Human Group. Harcourt: Brace & World, 1950.Makrides, V. N., A Unique and Exclusive Truth? Rigorist Currents in Orthodox Christian

Cultures. – Public lecture on 22.04.2008 at Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology – Halle/Saale 2008.

Orum, A. M., Feagin, J. R., Sjoberg, G., The Nature of the Case Study. – In: Feagin, J. R., Orum, A. M., Sjoberg, G. (eds.) A Case for the Case Study. Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1991, 1-26.

Pelkmans, M., Asymmetries on the “Religious Market” in Kirgyztan. - In: Hann, C. & the “Civil Religion” Group. The Post-Socialist Religious Question. Faith and Power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2006, 29-46.

Radenkovic, I., Romska kultna mesta – Kadijski krst kod Knjazevca. – In: Dordevic, D. et al. Sociologija Romskog identiteta. Nis, 2002, 189-192.

Todorovic, D., On the Phenomenon of Roma Conversion (An Empirical Experience). – In: Mitrovic, L. et al (eds). Kulturni I etnicki identiteti u procesu globalizacije I regionalizacije Balkana. Nis, 2002, 175-186.

Warner, R. S., Oenology: The Making of New Wine. – In: Feagin, J. R., Orum, A. M., Sjoberg, G. (eds.) A Case for the Case Study. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991, 174-199.

Алтънов, В. 2007: Непроучени протестантски общности (ръкопис). [=Altanov, V. 2007: Unstudied Protestant Communities (manuscript)].

Алтънов, В. 2007а: Религиозното дисидентство в България през време на тоталитаризма. – В сб.: Реформацията – история и съвременни измерения. Доклади от конференция 27-28 октомври 2005. София, Нов български университет, 231-274. [Altanov, V. 2007a: Religious Dissidence in Bulgaria during the Time of Totalitarianism. – In: The Reformation: History and Current Dimensions. Conference Papers, 27-28 October 2005, New Bulgarian University, Sofi a. In Bulgarian]

Велев, В. 2002: История на Божията църква в България. Българска Божия църква. [= Velev, V. The History of the Church of God in Bulgaria. Bulgarian Church of God. In Bulgarian].

Зарев, И. 1993: История на евангелските петдесетни църкви в България. Благовестител, София. [Zarev, I. 1993: The History of Evangelical Pentecostal Churches in Bulgaria. Sofi a, Blagovestitel. In Bulgarian]

Игнатов, П. 2002: Безкръвното гонение на църквата. Тоталитарната държава срещу Божията църква в България 1960-1991. ЛИК, София. [= Ignatov, P. 2002: The Bloodless Persecussion of t he Church. The totalitarian State against the Church of God in Bulgaria 1960-1991. LIK, Sofi a. In Bulgarian].

Игнатов, П. 2006: Проблеми на евангелизма. ЛИК, София. [= Ignatov, P. 2006: Problems of Evangelism. KIK, Sofi a. In Bulgarian].

154 •


Карапетрова, Р., Коен, Е. 1998: Протестанти (Евангелски християни). – В: Кръстева, А. (съст.) Общности и идентичности. София, Петексон, 309-328. [=Karapetrova, R., Koen, E. 1998: Protestants (Evangelical Christians). – In: Krasteva, A. (ed.) Communities and Identities. Sofi a, Petekson. In Bulgarian].

Куличев, Х. 1994: Вестители на истината. История на евангелските църкви в България. София, Издателство „Българско библейско дружество”. [Kulichev, H. 1994: The Messengers of the Truth. The History of Evangelical Churches in Bulgaria. Sofi a, Bulgarian Biblical Society. In Bulgarian].

Марушиакова, Е., В. Попов 1993: Циганите в България. Клуб ’90. София. [= Marushiakova, E., Popov, V. Gypsies in Bulgaria. Club’90. Sofi a. In Bulgarian].

Моллов, С. 2006: Духовен споменник за Българска Божия църква. Художествено-документални повествования 1919-1990. София, Издателство Български писател. [= Mollov, T. 2006: Spiritual Memoir About Bulgarian Church of God. Sofi a, Balgarsi pisatel. In Bulgarian].

Несторова, Т. 1991: Американски мисионери сред българите 1858-1912. София, Университетско издателство „Св. Климент Охридски”. [= Nestorova, T. 1991: The American Missionaries amongst the Bulgarians 1858-1912. Sofi a, The University of Sofi a Publishing House “St. Kliment Ochridski”. InBulgian.]

Петров, М. 2001: История на българското протестантство между двете световни войни. Дипломна работа. Софийски университет „Св. Кл. Охридски”. [Petrov, M. 2001: The History of Bulgarian Protestantism between Two World Wars. Diploma Thesis. University of Sofi a “St. Kliment Ochridski”. In Bulgarian].

Славкова, М. 2007: Циганите евангелисти в България. София, Парадигма. [= Slavkova, M. 2007: The Evangelical Gypsies in Bulgaria. Sofi a, Paradigma. In Bulgarian].

Томова, И. 1995: Циганите в преходния период. Международен център по проблемите на малцинствата и културните взаимодействия. София, 329-355 [= Tomova, I. 1995: The Gyspieds in the Transitional Period. International Centre for the Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations. Sofi a]. Quotations by the Bulgarian Edition.

Томова, И. 1998: Роми. – В: Кръстева, А. (ред) Общности и идентичност в България. Петекстон, София, 329-355. [= Tomova, I. 1998. Roma. – in: Krasteva, A. (ed) Comminities and Identities in Bulgaria. In Bulgarian].

• 155


NOTES1 Cf. a detailed bibliographical review of the works on conversion in Slavkova 2007:

35-41.2 These processes have been observed by anthropologists in different post-socialist

countries. Concerning Romania cf. Fozsto 2006: 269; Fozsto 2005: 1-12; concerning Kirghistan, cf. Pelkmans 2006: 35, 41-42; Hilger 2006: 85.

3 We gratefully acknowledge the fi nancial support of the New Bulgarian University for the research of Velislav Altanov in 2007.

4 Concerning the fi eld work, accomplished by Milena Benovska-Sabvkova in 2002, cf. Benovska-Sabkova 2003: 57-93.

5 The latter work has been especially devoted to the application of the method in the study of one specifi c Presbyterian congregation.

6 Pastor Pavel Ignatov offi ciated as Chief Elder from 1980 to 2005. He is also the author of two books we have quoted here: Ignatov 2004; Ignatov 2006.

7 Assemblies of God have been directly connected with the initial establishment of Pentecostalism in the USA (Ignatov 2006: 154) and more specifi cally with “the miracle in Azusa Street” - 1906, Los Angeles (about it cf. Coleman 2000: 21).

8 Voronaev stayed in Bulgaria for about a year until the middle of 1921, while Zaplishni stayed on, but was forced to leave the country for political reasons in 1924 and returned again in 1927 (Ignatov 2006: 150-151; 155-156).

9 Washing of the feet, as a ritual analogy of the biblical text, had been adopted by Voronaev under the infl uence of the practices of the Adventists, cf. Ignatov 2006: 137-138.

10 In whose homes, specifi cally, had religious services been held since 1928, cf. for instance, Mollov 2006: 64-65; 68-81; 88-89 et al.

11 There is a certain inconsistency in the data, quoted by Ignatov, himself (2004). On p. 102, he indicates 1972 as the year of the fi rst international contact, and on p. 120 he gives the year 1973.

12 The Church of God, seated in Cleveland, Tennessee, currently holds branches in 150 countries and boasts of a membership of 6 million, cf. http://www.churchofgod.org. It is important to remember that the Pentecostal organization in Bulgaria had been established by missionaries of the American Assemblies of God, whereas later the Church of God opted for associating with another branch of the Pentecostal movement, viz. the same-name Church of God. The connection with the Church of God had also been prompted by the refusals of the Assemblies of God to cooperate with an unoffi cial and unregistered denomination, as the Church of God was until 1990. Cf. Ignatov 2004: 124.

13 These fi gures are approximate as there are no offi cial statistics about membership in the BCOG.

14 According to data provided by Pastor P. Ignatov. He refers to the 2001 data of the Council of the Elders of the BCG, when representatives of about 550 church communities supplied data about their memberships.

15 A copy of a document published by Mollov 2006: 83-86.16 The name is a response to the title of a popular Czech serial TV fi lm of the 1980s.17 www.nsi.bg/.

156 •


18 The event took place in Hall No. 1 of the National Palace of Culture, the largest concert hall in Bulgaria, seating 3380, cf. http://www.ndk.bg/halls.php.

19 Slavkova 2007: 118 informs us about religious chanting in other mother tongues among Bulgarian Roma-Turkish or “Wallachian”.

20 No year of publication.21 Concerning mono-ethnic churches, cf. Fosztó 2006.22 A number of authors have been dwelling on the striving of the Roma elite for the ethnic

mobilization of the Roma.23 About this term cf. Pelkmans 2006: 30-31.24 Cf. http://bulmn.com/Specials/Bulletins/Bulgarian. About Bulgarian missionary Ivailo

Shatrovski, cf. www.hvalenie.com.

• 157

ETHNOS ET ETHNOGENÈSE : UNE BRÈVE ARCHÉOLOGIE TERMINOLOGIQUE

Le lien entre la notion d’ethnogenèse, telle qu’elle est utilisée aujourd’hui aussi dans les discours concernant l’identité des Roms en Europe, et celle d’ethnos est diffi cilement contestable. Aussi l’ethnogenèse peut-elle être défi nie comme le processus spécifi que qui aboutit à la formation d’une communauté stable et quasi immuable, fondée sur des critères ethniques quels qu’ils soient, et que les anthropologues ont appelée ethnos.

Mais d’où vient cette notion et qui en a fait usage et l’a divulguée ? Sans remonter à la Grèce antique d’où elle dérive certainement d’un point de vue strictement étymologique, on peut dire en toute bonne foi que le terme ethnos se répand avant tout parmi les ethnologues de la première partie du 20e siècle pour se distancer du concept germanique de Volk ou russe de narod devenus désormais assez vagues et idéologiquement trop narod devenus désormais assez vagues et idéologiquement trop narodconnotés (Mühlmann, 1964 : 56 ss.). En effet aussi bien la notion de Volk, si habilement rendue populaire à travers l’idée herdérienne d’un Volksgeist et d’une Volkseele, que celle de narod, propagée dans les milieux slavophiles de Saint Petersbourg et de Moscou, devinrent durant le 19e siècle des expressions favorites de la rhétorique nationaliste en Allemagne et en Russie. Ce n’est donc pas par hasard que ce fut l’ethnologue russe S.M. Širokogorov qui lança la théorie de l’ethnos et par conséquent de manière quasi automatique celle de l’ethnogenèse. Selon cet auteur, l’ethnos, dans la mesure où il est l’expression d’un processus permanent d’adaptation et de reproduction sociale, culturelle et biologique, peut se défi nir comme une unité sociale en mutation constante qui se distingue des autres par les cinq aspects fondamentaux suivants :

1. L’ethnos se reconnaît à ses formes spécifi ques d’adaptation culturelle et donc, en particulier, par l’existence d’une culture matérielle commune. Cela constitue l’aspect typiquement ethnographique, selon Širokogorov.

LA CHIMÈRE DE L’ETHNOGENÈSE OU LE MIRAGE D’UNE SOLUTION ETHNIQUE AUX PROBLÈMES SOCIO-ÉCONOMIQUES DES POPULATIONS ROM

Christian GIORDANO

158 •

Christian GIORDANO

2. L’ethnos représente l’unité linguistique par laquelle ses membres s’expriment dans un idiome commun. Pour notre auteur il s’agit de l’aspect psycho-mental.

3. L’ethnos se distingue par un passé commun et par des traditions partagées. Ici l’ethnologue russe parle de continuité historique.

4. Les membres individuels de l’ethnos sont conscients d’appartenir à une unité sociale singulière et c’est l’aspect psychologique.

5. Par le processus de transmission héréditaire garanti par des pratiques endogames, les caractéristiques physiques des individus appartenant à l’ethnos se reproduisent. Širokogorov parle alors d’un aspect biologique (Širokogorov, 1935 : 14)

Cette construction théorique élaborée par Širokogorov durant son exil à Pékin sur la base de données recueillies en grande partie dans quelques sociétés tribales d’Asie centrale, a eu peu d’écho dans la partie occidentale du vieux Continent, sauf en Allemagne, bien que l’auteur eût l’occasion de publier sa volumineuse monographie intitulée Psychomental Complex of the Tungus en Grande Bretagne et certains articles sur le thème de l’ethnos en français et en allemand (Širokogorov, 1935; Širokogorov, 1936; Širokogorov, 1937; Gossiaux, 2002 : 7 ss.)

En revanche ce furent les ethnographes soviétiques et en particulier Yulian V. Bromlej qui utilisèrent, instrumentalisèrent et abusèrent des idées théoriques par ailleurs fort subtiles et complexes au sujet de l’ethnos qu’avait développées Širokogorov. On peut dire sans hésitation que l’etnografi ja postrévolutionnaire s’appuyant plus ou moins ouvertement sur Širokogorov a, jusqu’à la fi n des années quatre-vingts, fonctionné essentiellement sur le concept d’ethnos à des fi ns politiques, à savoir pour légitimer le système soviétique (socialiste) et ses déviations par rapport aux prophéties de la théorie marxiste-léniniste (Bromlej, 1977).

Lorsque les ethnographes soviétiques se consacrèrent à l’étude de la diversité culturelle, sortant du contexte restreint de leur société nationale, ils durent tout de même garantir, au prix d’acrobaties théoriques et de mystifi cations empiriques, la compatibilité entre la réalité des spécifi cités ethniques ou nationales d’une part et l’idéal internationaliste d’autre part, selon lequel les diversités ethniques sont des résidus, ou encore comme l’écrivait Engels, des décombres du passé ou dans le meilleur des cas, des monuments ethnographiques sans aucune incidence politique (Engels, 1971 : 13, 225). L’internationalisme socialiste est un idéal qui prophétise clairement l’homogénéisation graduelle mais inéluctable de la société en marche vers le soleil de l’avenir communiste. le soleil de l’avenir communiste. le soleil de l’avenirPour ces académiciens il s’agissait donc de concilier la doctrine marxiste-léniniste, revue par Staline, avec la persistance obstinée d’une multitude d’affi liations culturelles, linguistiques et religieuses. En effet, comment expliquer que la fi n de l’impérialisme grand russe, l’élimination des rapports de production capitalistes et donc la liquidation de la hiérarchie de classes après la révolution d’octobre n’aient pas résolu la question nationale dans l’espace du territoire soviétique et dans celui des pays satellites?

De fait, après la mort de Staline, l’ethnographe soviétique Yulian V. Bromlej, avec sa théorie de l’ethnos empruntée à Širokogorov, proposa un compromis qui, à notre avis, peut se résumer d’une manière peut-être schématique de la manière suivante (Skalnik, 1988 : 164; Skalnik, 1990 : 185). L’ethnos possède une essence naturelle propre et par conséquent immuable dans le temps, que des événements historiques du calibre de la

• 159

La chimère de l'ethnogenèse ou le mirage d'une solution ethnique

grande révolution d’octobre et de la grande guerre patriotique ne sauraient affecter. Selon cette perspective la naissance et l’expansion du pouvoir soviétique neutralisent de manière irréversible le potentiel confl ictuel entre les groupes ethno-nationaux. De cette manière la question nationale est résolue... mais les différences ethniques demeurent: c’est l’oeuf de Colomb imaginé par Bromlej sur le modèle d’un passage de Lénine dans lequel, contredisant Engels, il écrivait sur son ton prophétique bien connu que les différences nationales se maintiendraient encore pour un temps très long si ce n’est même au-delà de la réalisation de la Dictature du prolétariat à l’échelle mondiale (Bromlej, 1977 : 161, Lenin, 1978, Vol. 20 : 19).

Que la proposition théorique de Bromlej soit un faux compromis est désormais amplement démontré par la renaissance des confl its ethniques à la périphérie de l’ex-empire soviétique. Cependant un communiste orthodoxe et bien rôdé à la dialectique marxiste pourrait sûrement expliquer ces phénomènes à connotations souvent violentes comme une conséquence de la dissolution de la division harmonieuse du travail entre les républiques de l’Union soviétique et de la restauration perverse de la propriété privée dans les rapports de production capitaliste.

Cependant on pourrait répliquer que Bromlej en appliquant la théorie de l’ethnos a volontairement mis en scène et mythologisé l’harmonie interethnique, créant ainsi un véritable rideau de fumée à même de cacher la permanence de violents contentieux et tensions. Cette mise en scène réalisée par les spécialistes de l’ etnografi ja soviétique, dominés par la fi gure de Bromlej, s’est avérée en dernière analyse un instrument fort commode pour le Parti Communiste de l’Union soviétique lui permettant de cacher à long terme la réalité et de nier ainsi l’évidence. Ainsi Peter Skalnik a parfaitement raison lorsqu’il fait remarquer que la théorie de l’ethnos développée par Bromlej et ses pairs ne doit pas être prise pour une déviation par rapport au marxisme-léninisme de fabrication stalinienne. En dernière analyse elle n’est rien d’autre qu’une façon typique du totalitarisme soviétique de créer des mythes au service de l’appareil d’Etat et du parti (Skalnik, 1988 : 170-172; Cannarsa, 1994).

Toutefois la mystifi cation politique opérée par Bromlej et d’autres ethnographes soviétiques recèle un changement de nature méthodologique apparemment léger mais cependant substantiel du concept d’ethnos tel que l’avait créé Širokogorov. Cet auteur, comme le remarque à juste titre Jean-François Gossiaux, entend l’ethnos comme une réponse collective aux multiples défi s du milieu et non comme une communauté immuable et préconstituée qui persiste malgré les turbulences historiques comme par exemple une révolution ou une guerre ou encore une catastrophe naturelle (Gossiaux, 2002 : 8). Si aujourd’hui on peut reprocher quelque chose à Širokogorov c’est probablement une certaine vision organiciste de la société et de la culture pas très éloignée au fond de ce que pensaient les fonctionnalistes britanniques de l’époque et en particulier Alfred Reginald Radcliffe Brown. L’ethnos est par conséquent comparable aux organismes étudiés par les biologistes et l’anthropologie doit être considérée comme une sorte de biologie sociale.

Bromlej et les ethnographes soviétiques ont dénaturé la conception dynamique de Širokogorov pour les raisons mentionnées ci-dessus et ce faisant, ont donné à la notion d’ethnos une forte connotation essentialiste et évolutionniste. La notion d’ethnos devient avant tout volontairement essentialiste et de ce fait redevient statique, afi n de

160 •

Christian GIORDANO

mettre en évidence la carte pluriethnique de l’Union soviétique. Celle-ci est de ce fait représentée comme un ensemble d’ethnies en harmonie les unes avec les autres. L’idée d’ethnos devient ainsi un instrument très utile pour la mise au point d’un système de classifi cation politiquement opportun.

En même temps qu’à l’essentialisation de la notion d’ethnos, on assiste à la fabrication d’une théorie de l’ethnogenèse, ou processus d’ethno-transformation qui se nourrit de la vision évolutionniste inhérente à la philosophie de l’histoire marxiste-léniniste. Bromlej parle explicitement, dans ce contexte, de processus ethno-évolutifs (Bromlej, 1977 : 143).

L’ethnogenèse n’est donc pas un phénomène qui se manifeste exclusivement durant la phase première de la formation et de la consolidation de l’ethnos lui-même, mais également un processus qui continue durant les diverses phases du développement historique. Au contraire, ces stades semblent presque déterminer le processus de l’ethnogenèse, à savoir les mutations de l’ethnos. Les termes d’ethnie/ tribu/ peuple/ nationalité et enfi n de é et enfi n de é nation ne sont rien d’autre que les expressions d’une séquence évolutive d’entités ethniques pré-nationales et donc d’ordre inférieur à la nation vue comme la communauté ethnique d’ordre supérieur (Bromlej, 1977 : 26-27). De manière plus concrète, on peut préciser que l’ethnie, la tribu ou le peuple (synonyme de Volk) Volk) Volksont des formes d’ethnos spécifi ques des phases plus primitives de l’humanité, lanationalité témoignerait d’une époque intermédiaire, tandis que laé témoignerait d’une époque intermédiaire, tandis que laé nation représente donc l’expression la plus évoluée de l’ethnos, lequel domine surtout dans la phase historique du capitalisme.

En conclusion on peut dire que par rapport à la notion d’ethnos élaborée par Širokogorov, laquelle malgré son caractère processuel, faisait preuve déjà de quelques traces assez évidentes d’essentialisme, Bromlej s’évertuera à en essentialiser encore le caractère. Cela à des fi ns non étrangères à la politique soviétique, préoccupée de la persistence de la diversité ethnique à l’intérieur d’un ordre socialiste contraint de tenir compte des différences ethniques, mais en réalité fondé sur une vision universaliste peu sensible à la diversité. La transformation conceptuelle de la notion d’ethnos dans l’etnografi ja soviétique a bien entendu infl uencé aussi l’essentialisation de l’idée d’ethnogenèse qui n’est pas le produit d’une construction sociale de la réalité dans le sens où l’entendent Peter Berger et Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) mais advient plutôt lors d’un processus d’évolution primordiale et quasi naturelle, que l’ethnologue révèle par son intervention.

L’ETHNOGENÈSE DES ROMS: ILLUSION IDENTITAIRE OU ALTERNATIVE POUR L’ÉMANCIPATION?

Malgré l’hétérogénéité des groupes, certains activistes et politiciens rom tentent de développer une sorte de solidarité ethnique censée exprimer le sentiment que tous les Roms appartiennent au même peuple particulier, qu’ils partagent des traits culturels communs ainsi que les problèmes communs issus d’un large spectre d’injustices et de préjugés, d’hostilité ethnique et de violence.

Au risque d’encourir les foudres de certains gestionnaires de l’identité,é,é d’origine rom ou non, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de constater, eu égard aux données récoltées durant nos enquêtes, que l’identité rom est extrêmement diversifi ée. De ce fait, il serait

• 161


probablement plus exact de parler d’identités plurielles et d’identités multiples, fl exibles et situationnelles. Mais cette affi rmation remet en question l’adéquation des discours par ailleurs fort en vogue parmi les membres infl uents de l’élite politique et culturelle rom qui préconisent la naissance d’une ethnie-nation rom issue d’un processus d’ethnogenèse plus ou moins encouragé par le haut, sinon carrément gérée par des institutions et des organisations transnationales et/ou supranationales.

L’ethnogenèse en tant que processus social de mobilisation pourrait donc s’avérer un instrument valable grâce auquel les Rom seraient en mesure d’exprimer un sens plus fort de cohésion et d’exercer par conséquent un impact majeur dans le domaine politique (Barany, 2002 : 70).

Dans le cadre de ces conceptions et projets, l’ethnogenèse, néologisme aujourd’hui par ailleurs non seulement un peu vieilli mais encore héritage, comme on l’a dit précédemment, d’une anthropologie essentialiste et issu d’une conscience collective de nature ethnique, fondée par conséquent sur le partage d’une origine et d’une culture communes, devrait induire les populations rom à développer nécessairement un esprit communautaire, lequel à son tour aurait une fonction émancipatrice et se révélerait encore utile pour réduire les préjugés et les discriminations de la part des collectivités ethno-nationales dominantes. Par l’ethnogenèse on éliminerait ainsi un grave défi cit social des Roms par rapport aux autres communautés. Ils deviendraient de cette manière paradoxalement moins diffédiffédiff rents et par conséquent plus égauxégauxé par rapport aux autres, puisqu’eux aussi atteindraient un niveau plus élevé d’organisation sociale comparable à celui des autres.

D’un point de vue purement éthique le but du processus d’ethnogenèse, tel qu’il est conçu par ses promoteurs, est sans doute louable. Cependant la question ne porte pas tellement sur la valeur morale du projet que sur sa faisabilité au 21e siècle, siècle marqué par une phase de mondialisation accélérée. En vérité, deux aspects importants au moins ne manqueront pas d’éveiller un certain scepticisme chez celui qui s’occupe de sciences sociales.

• Il est évident que le modèle fondé sur l’idée de l’ethnogenèse s’inspire implicitement ou, ainsi que le fait remarquer un de ses concepteurs, le sociologue roumain d’origine rom Nicolae Gheorghe, se réclame explicitement de la nation-building du 19e siècle. En effet les projets de l’ethnogenèse actuelle des communautés rom suivent plus ou moins fi dèlement l’exemple de la formation des Kulturnationenen général et en particulier celui de l’Europe centrale et orientale et du Sud-est entre la fi n du 18e et le début du 19e siècles.

Pour les leaders de l’élite, la nation, en tant que formation sociale, semble une solution viable, d’une part pour lutter contre la stigmatisation et la marginalisation de leur communauté et d’autre part c’est une manière de traiter les problèmes sociaux et culturels qu’ils doivent affronter (Fosztó, 2003 : 102). Cependant il convient de faire une distinction ici entre deux écoles de pensées. La première, plus traditionnelle et plus simple, suit les modèles classiques du nationalisme ethnique selon lesquels, à travers l’ethnogenèse, on se propose de redonner vie à la culture et à l’identité rom à l’intérieur des contextes nationaux et territoriaux particuliers. Ainsi naîtraient des communautés ethniques rom singulières sans relations entre elles au niveau transnational. L’ethnogenèse serait alors une simple

162 •

Christian GIORDANO

réédition des processus qui ont abouti dans les siècles passés à la formation des nations européennes actuelles.

La seconde est bien plus subtile et sophistiquée dans la mesure où elle s’appuie sur une vision explicitement transnationale et déterritorialisée de l’identité ethnique rom. L’ethnogenèse serait ici la voie choisie pour arriver à un sentiment d’appartenance d’une portée bien plus vaste et de dimension européenne. Dans un langage plus institutionnel, on pourrait parler de l’émergence d’une nation ethnique rom qui outrepasse les frontières restreintes des Etats nationaux et qui se construirait en tant que stateless political community. Cependant même dans ce cas il est impossible de passer sous silence la référence évidente à l’idée de Kulturnation, même si ce concept est habilement adapté à une réalité plus diffuse du point de vue spatial, socialement moins articulée et culturellement moins cohérente.

A ce moment, il est toutefois légitime de se poser deux questions, à savoir si d’une part on ne propose pas là un modèle obsolète et si, d’autre part, on n’a pas affaire à une vision séduisante mais irréaliste. Dans le premier cas, celui qui reproduit fi dèlement la formation des nations durant le 19e siècle, ce qui donne une impression anachronique et d’une certaine manière anti-historique, c’est la suggestion de faire répéter à presque cent cinquante ans de distance et dans des conditions socio-économiques globales si différentes, le même parcours à la population rom. En fait, c’est comme si on proposait une théorie simpliste du dédéd fi cit sociocultureléfi cit socioculturelé censé être comblé en reproduisant tout simplement un fi cit socioculturel censé être comblé en reproduisant tout simplement un fi cit socioculturelmodèle expérimenté avec succès par d’autres groupes dans un passé désormais trop lointain.

Au second projet, celui de l’émergence d’une communauté rom transnationale et déterritorialisée, même s’il s’inspire lui aussi de modèles du 19e siècle, on ne peut reprocher son anachronisme, du fait qu’il tient justement compte des tendances sociopolitiques actuelles liées au processus de la mondialisation. Celui-ci semble en outre très séduisant parce qu’il adopte un langage aux accents postmodernes par ailleurs fort en vogue auprès des organisations transnationales et internationales, (comme par exemple l’Union européenne et certaines ONGs). Toutefois, la grande variété des rôles, des statuts et positions sociales, les différences culturelles notables, sans compter la dispersion territoriale des populations rom risquent de constituer un obstacle quasi insurmontable à la réalisation de cette vision spécifi que de l’ethnogenèse en en faisant ainsi un projet peu réaliste, voire velléitaire, ce qui revient à dire qu’il s’agit d’une alternative d’émancipation improbable.

• Le concept d’ethnogenèse se fonde lui-même, comme d’ailleurs toute forme d’ethnicisation, sur la création de frontières entre nous et les autres. Celles-ci ne doivent pas nécessairement être de nature territoriale. D’un point de vue théorique, c’est Frederik Barth qui nous a rendu attentifs au fait que les appartenances ethniques sont le résultat d’un mécanisme ou mieux, d’une stratégie sociale et que, à travers l’utilisation plus ou moins intentionnelle de marqueurs singuliers ou de la combinaison de ceux-ci, fort variables entre eux, les groupes sociaux

• 163


signalent leurs frontières réciproques, territoriales ou culturelles (Barth, 1969). Il est évident que dans ces situations un système d’auto- et d’hetéro-attributions se met en place, basé sur la représentation de soi et des autres. Il est donc logique et naturel de se poser la question de savoir si l’ethnogenèse en général et celle des Roms en particulier, ne fi nit pas par renforcer en défi nitive les vieux stéréotypes et préjugés des autres au sujet des populations rom et par conséquent à augmenter les discriminations dans les pratiques sociales. Ainsi le résultat de l’ethnogenèse pourrait bien induire une aggravation des processus d’exclusion.

Ces réfl exions cependant confi rment la vraie question de fond relative à tous les projets d’ethnogenèse qui est la suivante: est-il vraiment nécessaire de donner à l’aspect ethnique de l’identité rom une telle importance, quitte à mettre les problèmes sociaux qui affl igent depuis toujours les populations rom au second rang? Les doutes demeurent entiers quant à la question de savoir si l’ethnogenèse est vraiment la bonne formule pour permettre aux populations rom et particulièrement à celles de l’Europe orientale et de la Roumanie de s’approprier leur propre destin collectif, tout en améliorant ainsi leur situation socio-économique plus que précaire, ou de se libérer de leur longue histoire d’exclusion et de discrimination fondées sur les préjugés et les stéréotypes de type culturels et raciaux, ceux-ci étant en outre ici à nouveau mis en évidence.

ETHNOGENÈSE OU ETHNICISATION? UNE DISTINCTION IMPERCEPTIBLE SEULEMENT EN APPARENCE

Au cours des vingt dernières années le terme d’ethnicisation s’est peu à peu imposé (Giordano & Boscoboinik, 2003; Giordano & Boscoboinik, 2005; Boscoboinik, 2006 : 295 ss., Boscoboinik, 2006b : 95 ss.), tandis que celui d’ethnogenèse a pratiquement disparu de l’usage. A première vue, les deux termes pourraient paraître identiques ou du moins très similaires. Toutefois ils sont de nature différente, ce qui explique pourquoi les managers des identités préfèrent le second au premier.

Le concept d’ethnicisation trouve sans doute ses racines épistémologiques dans l’approche constructiviste de l’ethnicité et des é et des é appartenances ethniques. C’est pourquoi le processus d’ethnicisation est avant tout le résultat d’une activité bien précise que l’on peut attribuer aux élites politiques et/ou culturelles. Il s’agit donc d’une action voulue, fondée sur l’intentionnalité et par conséquent de nature stratégique. En outre, l’ethnicisation possède ainsi de manière évidente une connotation instrumentale, puisque celui qui recourt à une telle stratégie poursuit un but bien précis, à savoir d’unifi er les individus et de construire ainsi une identité ethnique de groupe. Cependant à côté de ces caractéristiques pour ainsi dire neutres, l’ethnicisation cache un revers à première vue peu perceptible, mais qui bien souvent revêt un aspect plutôt désagréable pour ceux qui s’engagent dans le management identitaire. En fait, la démarche peut être facilement prise pour un acte d’instrumentalisation et donc de manipulation. Cette dimension, négative et quasi répugnante de l’ethnicisation a été souvent remarquée dans le cadre du paradigme théorique néo-marxiste qui y voit une astucieuse stratégie des groupes dominants ou hégémoniques visant à créer une fausse conscience de classes subalternes. Pour certains auteurs de tendance néo-marxiste tout ce qui est ethnique revient à une disengagement strategy, mise en oeuvre par les élites pour distraire les couches sociales défavorisées de leurs véritables intérêts (Aronson, 1976 : 9 ss.).

164 •

Christian GIORDANO

Dans ce genre d’analyses, l’ethnicité et/ou l’ethnicisation, ainsi que, du reste la tradition, pour reprendre ici comme exemple la célèbre thèse de Hobsbawn et Ranger, sont présentés comme le produit d’une invention et donc d’une mystifi cation, c’est-à-dire comme le résultat d’une pure et simple escroquerie (Hobsbawn et Ranger, 1983). Il est évident que cette façon de concevoir l’ethnicisation ne se limite plus à la décrire comme un processus top down, mais se propose également, en vertu d’une vision normative déclarée, de lui donner une valeur négative et par conséquent de la discréditer moralement. Enfi n, l’idée d’ethnicisation en tant que construction sociale pose aux managers identitaires le problème de l’authenticité. Les identités ethniques, étant un produit de la société, donnent l’impression d’un artifi ce auquel fait défaut une qualité fondamentale, celle de la spontanéité.

On voit bien de ce qui précède que ceux qui se consacrent à la besogne identitaire ethnique ont de nombreuses raisons pour éviter l’emploi du concept d’ethnicisation, empreint d’une sévère critique de leur activité. Peut-être avons nous là les raisons qui font préférer à ceux qui se sont engagés dans la promotion d’une identité ethnique au sein de la communauté rom, la notion d’ethnogenèse. En fait ce terme possède une connotation implicitement positive du fait qu’il suggère l’existence d’une identité ethnique préexistante dont il suffi t d’ôter le voile qui la cache pour la modeler ensuite au gré des besoins et intérêts réels de la communauté. Ainsi les élites occupées au management identitaire assument-elles un rôle positif, puisque par leur louable activité, elles parviennent à capturer et donc à revitaliser quelque chose d’authentique risquant d’être irrémédiablement perdu. A travers l’idée de l’ethnogenèse le management identitaire est réévalué et ennobli. Il paraît être également une aide désintéressée pour la renaissance bottom up de l’appartenance ethnique. On tente ainsi d’oblitérer tous les soupçons et reproches de manipulation et de mystifi cation qui, à tort ou à raison, semblent inhérents au concept d’ethnicisation et pourraient discréditer le management identitaire. Le choix délibéré des rares élites intellectuelles rom en faveur de la notion d’ethnogenèse prend une connotation vraiment positive et paraît être, en dernière analyse, une stratégie pour mieux légitimer leur action.

• 165


BIBLIOGRAPHIEAronson, David R., 1976. Ethnicity as a Cultural System: An Introductory Essay, in

Frances Henry (ed.), Ethnicity in the Americas. The Hague/Paris : Mouton, p. 9-19.

Barany, Zoltan, 2002. The East European Gypsies. Regime Change, Marginality and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Barth, Fredrik (ed.), 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. London : George Allen & Unwin.

Berger, Peter L. & Luckmann, Thomas, 1966. The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York : Doubleday.

Boscoboinik, Andrea. 2006a. Becoming Rom: Ethnic Development among Roma Communities in

Bulgaria and Macedonia, in Romanucci-Ross, Lola; de Vos, George & Takeyuki Tsuda (eds.), Ethnic Identity. Problems and Prospects for the Twenty-First Century: Fourth Edition. Lanham, New York, Toronto, Oxford : Altamira Press, p. 295-310.

2006b. Ethnicization Process among the Roma communities in Bulgaria, in Rüegg, François, Poledna, Rudolf & Rus, Calin (eds.), Interculturalism and Discrimination in Romania: Policies, Practices, Identities and Representations. Münster : Lit Verlag, p. 95-103.

Bromlej, Julian, V., 1977. Ethnos und Ethnographie. Berlin : Akademie Verlag.Cannarsa, Stefania, 1994. Etnografi a ed etnos. L’etnografi a sovietica di fronte alle

questioni delle nazionalità e delle religioni. Milano : Edizioni Unicopli.Engels, Friedrich, 1971. Po und Rhein, in Marx, Karl und Engles Friedrich, Werke,

Berlin : Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Dietz Verlag, Vol. 13, p. 225.

Fosztó, László, 2003. Diaspora and Nationalism: an Anthropological Approach to the International Romani Movement, Regio, p. 102-120.

Giordano, Christian & Boscoboinik, Andrea, 2003. Introduction, in: Roma’s Identities in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria. Roma :

Ethnobarometer, Working Paper No. 8, p. 14-29. 2005. Roma’s Identity and the Political Arena, in: Roma’s Identities in Southeast

Europe: Macedonia. Roma : Ethnobarometer, Working Paper No. 9, p. 7-17.Gossiaux, Jean-François, 2002. Pouvoirs ethniques dans les Balkans. Paris : Presses

Universitaires de France.Hobsbawm, Eric, J. & Ranger, Terence (eds.), 1983. The Invention of Tradition.

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.Lenin, Vladimir Iljič, 1978. Werke. Berlin : Dietz Verlag, Vol. 31.Mühlmann, Wilhelm Emil, 1964. Rassen, Ethnien, Kulturen, Moderne Ethnologie.

Neuwied & Berlin : Hermann Luchterhand Verlag).Skalnik, Peter. 1988. Union soviétique-Afrique du Sud : les théories de l’etnos. Cahiers d’études

africaines, 110, XXVIII-2, p. 157-176 1990. Soviet etnografi ia and the national(ities) question, Cahiers du monde russe

et soviétique, Regards sur l’anthropologie soviétique, XXXI, 2-3, p. 183-191.

166 •

Christian GIORDANO

Širokogorov, Sergiej, M., 1935. Psychomental Complex of the Tungus. London : Kegan Paul & Co.. 1936. La théorie de l’Ethnos et sa place dans le système des Sciences

anthropologiques, L’Ethnographie : Nr. 32, p. 85-115. 1937. Ethnographie und Ethnologie, Archiv füArchiv füArchiv f r Anthropologie und

VöVöV lkerforschung, XXIVlkerforschung, XXIV.lkerforschung, XXIV

NOTES SUR LES AUTEURS

Velislav Altanov is a PhD student at the New Bulgarian University, Sofi a, Bulgaria.

Milena Benovska-Sabkova is professor of ethnology at the New Bulgarian University, Sofi a, and senior research fellow at the Ethnographic Institute of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofi a, Bulgaria.

Andrea Boscoboinik est assistante-docteure à la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université Andrea Boscoboinik est assistante-docteure à la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université Andrea Boscoboinikde Fribourg, Suisse.

Mihai Curelaru est maître de conférences, Laboratoire de psychologie sociale, Université de Iasi, Roumanie.

László Fosztó is researcher of the Institute for Studying National Minorities’ Issues, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. [email protected]

Christian Giordano est professeur titulaire de la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université de Fribourg, Suisse et président d’Ethnobarometer (Consiglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali).

Sorin Gog is assistant-lecturer at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca , Romania.

Božidar Jakšić is sociologist. He is senior research fellow and member of the research team of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

Adrian Neculau est professeur de psychologie sociale, Université « Al.I.Cuza » Iasi, Roumanie.

Ion Negura, PhD in Psychology is professor and head of Psychology Department, Pedagogical University of Chisinau, Republic of Moldova.

Veronica Peev is lecturer at Psychology Department, Pedagogical University of Chisinau, Republic of Moldova.

François Ruegg est professeur associé à la Chaire d’Anthropologie sociale de l’Université de Fribourg, Suisse.

Daniela Tarnovschi is a PhD student at the Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania and program coordinator at Soros Foundation Romania.

Daniela Zaharia is PhD student and assistant-lecturer at the Laboratory of Social Psychology, at “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Iasi, Romania.