Conseils de Brzezinski à Obama

8/13/2019 Conseils de Brzezinski Obama

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Major foreign policy challenges

for the next US President

International Affairs: () The Author(s). Journal Compilation Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI*

This article appears as a new president assumes office in the United States. Hedoes so in the middle of a widespread crisis of confidence in Americas capacity

to exercise effective leadership in world affairs. That may be a stark thought, butit is a fact. Though American leadership over the decades that have passed sincethe United States replaced Great Britain as the Great Power of the world has beenessential to global stability and to global development, the cumulative effects ofnational self-indulgence, of financial greed and irresponsibility, of an unnecessarywar of the countrys own choice, falsely justified, and of ethical transgressions havediscredited that leadership. Making matters worse is the global economic crisis.

The resulting international challenge that now confronts the new US Presidentis compounded in its complexity by the fact that it is occurring in the context oftwo simultaneous, and interacting, transformational developments on the worldpolitical scene.

The first concerns the emergence of global issues pertaining to human well-being as critical worldwide political concernsissues such as climate, environ-ment, starvation, health and social inequality. These issues are becoming morecontentious because they have come to the fore in the context of what I havedescribed in my writings as the global political awakening, itself a truly transfor-mative event on the global scene. For the first time in human history almost all ofhumanity is politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive.There are only a few pockets of humanity left in the remotest corners of the world

that are not politically alert and engaged with the political turmoil and stirringsthat are so widespread today around the world. The resulting global politicalactivism is generating a surge in the quest for personal dignity, cultural respect andeconomic opportunity in a world painfully scarred by memories of centuries-longalien colonial or imperial domination.

The second pertains to yet another fundamental change: a shift in the distribu-tion of global power from the West to the East. The -year-long dominationof the world by the Atlantic powersPortugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands,Britain and, more recently, the United Statesis coming to an end with the new

* This article is an edited version of the John C. Whitehead lecture delivered at Chatham House, London, on November .


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Zbigniew Brzezinski

International Affairs: , The Author(s). Journal Compilation Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs

political and global pre-eminence of both China and Japan (the latter alreadythe number two economic power in the world). Waiting in the wings are Indiaand perhaps a recovered Russia, though the latter is still restless and unsure of itsidentity, ambivalent about its recent past and very insecure about its place in the

world.But these major world powers, new and old, also face a novel reality: whilethe lethality of their military might is greater than ever, their capacity to imposecontrol over the politically awakened masses of the world is at a historic low. Toput it bluntly: in earlier times, it was easier to control one million people than tophysically kill one million people; today, it is infinitely easier to kill one millionpeople than to control one million people. That insight bears directly on the useof force, particularly by societies that are culturally alien even if technologicallysuperior. As a result, in the current post-colonial era, it is too costly to under-take colonial wars. That is a reality some recent American policy-makers failed toassimilate, to Americas detriment.

In this dynamically changing world context, the crisis of American leadershipcould in fact become the crisis of global stability. Yetdespite the Schadenfreudeat Americas financial travails evident in some capitals during the early stages ofthe current crisisin the foreseeable future no state or combination of states canreplace the linchpin role America plays in the international system. The fact ofthe matter is that without an American recovery there will be no global recovery.But there could be an American recovery without the recovery of some majoreconomies. That reality underlies the proposition that at this stage of history there

is no international alternative to a central American role. In fact, the only realalternative to a constructive American world role is global chaos.

It follows from the foregoing that the monumental task in foreign affairs for thenewly elected President of the United States (beyond coping with the immediatefinancial crisis) is to regain global legitimacy for America by spearheading a collec-tive effort for a more inclusive system of global management. Four little butstrategically pregnant words define the essence of the response required: to unify;to enlarge; to engage; and topacify.

To unify means to re-establish a shared sense of purpose between America

and Europe (more specifically, between the United States and the EU), as wellas in NATO, pointing towards more truly shared decision-making. To that end,informal but frequent top-level consultations are badly needed, especially afterthe last eight years of sloganeering under the banner If you are not with us, youare against us. However, it is much easier to define this as a desirable goal than toaccomplish it. Americans and Europeans alike are very well aware that there is nosuch thing yet as a politically unified Europe. The absence of a politically unifiedEurope creates real complications for any process of revitalizing, re-establishing,and making central a renewed transatlantic dialogue.

What, then, is a viable alternative? To rely on the institutional arrangementsimplicit in the Treaty of Lisbon might be the formal response, but that wouldsimply ignore the political realities of intra-European divisions regarding key


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strategic issues as well as the great disparities of power among the various sovereigncomponents of the EU. Therefore, the only practical solution in the near futureis to cultivate a more deliberate dialogue between the United States and the threeEuropean countries that have a global orientation and, in varying degrees, global

interests: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.But a US dialogue with the European Triad can in turn only be effective andmeaningful if those three countries establish a broad and fundamental consensusamong themselves. One of the key problems of the past eight years, irrespectiveof the shortcomings of US foreign policy, has been that there was no Europeanpartner for the United States to consider seriously, no partner who could giveWashington its honest advice, no partner with whom America could sharecommon decisions and burdens. The United States had a very close, personal andloyal ally in the United Kingdom, a country with which America shares genuinekinship. But if one were to assign historical responsibility for Americas war of

choice in Iraq, the unfortunate fact is that such responsibility has to be shared withthe UK, whose prime minister publicly defended the war vigorously, and privatelyadvocated it persuasivelyeven if occasionally whispering some reservations andmaking alternative suggestions which the US President could safely ignore whilepocketing the much needed public endorsement. France and Germany, for theirpart, engaged essentially in competitive public denunciations of US policy (which,even if merited, are still painful to Americans), and that was not helpful to theemergence of a serious transatlantic dialogue. As a result, there was no conversa-tion of any note between President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder and equally

little between President Bush and President Chirac (who in the process offendedparts of Europe by asking them to shut up when they were inclined to supportthe United States).

As a practical matter, there is no alternative to an informal arrangement betweenthe United States and the three leading European powersonce they have cometo share a common strategic purpose. If that should materialize, America wouldlisten. And together, America and the EU, which between them account for morethan half of global GDP, could muster a weighty capacity for influencing theworld in a positive and responsible direction.

If this new unity is to be meaningful, both sides have to be willing to share both indecisions and in the resulting burdens. For too many years now, the general patternhas been that the United States makes the decisions and expects the Europeans toshare the burdens. For too many years, the Europeans have complained they areexcluded from decision-making but have been perfectly willing to let the Ameri-cans assume the burdens of implementation. The current differences among theallies over Afghanistan are but the latest example of that persisting dilemma.

It is, therefore, to be hoped that the new US administration will make adeliberate effort to revitalize the AmericanEuropean dialogue at the highest level.This task could be assigned personally to the Vice-President, who has impressiveexpertise in foreign affairs, knows the continent well, and is personally known inits political circles. The task cannot be a full-time job for the President himself,


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though his unique global standing should help in the pursuit of this transatlanticgoal. Similarly, the new Secretary of State can play a constructive role, thoughobviously she will be occupied with many other issues.

To enlargeentails a deliberate effort to nurture a wider coalition of principal

partners who are committed to the principle of interdependence and preparedto play a significant political, as well as economic, role in promoting more effec-tive global management. The partners have to be genuine practitioners of inter-dependence and be ready to participate in the necessary consultations, in therequired institutionalization of the process, and in the assumption of some jointlydetermined burdens.

It is evident by now that the G, subsequently enlarged to G, has outlivedits function. The G started as an informal council of the advanced industrialdemocratic societies. Russia, an industrial society, was admitted at a time when itsdemocratic credentials were debatable but at least to some extent evident. Today,

these democratic credentials are discredited. In any case, neither the original G orthe later G reflects existing global realities.

Accordingly, some formula for regular consultations ranging in compositionfrom G to G should be devised to bring together countries that possess notonly economic and financial weight but also regional geopolitical significance.To be sure, such an arrangement would somewhat duplicate the existing formalmechanisms of the UN, which have attained an almost eternal lifespan becausethey require international unanimity to change them. Those who benefit themost from the arrangements are clearly not prepared to reform the UN

in order to reflect the current realities of global power. A politically mindedgrouping of states with clout consulting regularly outside the UN is thereforeessential.

To engagemeans the cultivation, in addition to a wider circle of partners, ofregular top-level but informal dialogues among the several powers of the worldthat are crucial to global geopolitical stability: specifically, the United States, theEuropean Triad, China, Japan, Russia and possibly India. A regular and mutuallyconfidence-building personal dialogue between the top US leader and the topChinese leader would be especially beneficial to the development of a shared sense

of global responsibility between the only current global superpower and the mostlikely next global power. China is the most important rising power in the world,and without China many of the key problems we face collectively cannot be effec-tively tackled.

Admittedly, China is economically nationalist, and that is a problem, but it isalso a fundamentally cautious and a patient revisionist power. It wishes to changethe international system as China rises peacefully, but it is cautious in the way itis pursuing that objective. Indeed, among the hallmarks of Chinese leadership areforesight, prudence and patience. I have dealt with Chinese leaders for yearsnow, and I have come to respect their sense of balance and proportion. To me,what Deng Xiaoping said in the early s articulated best how China defines itsinternational approach: Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs


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calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile;and never claim leadership.

These words also underline the significant distinction between Chinas andRussias conduct on the international scene. Russia, like China, is a revisionist

power in that it wishes to revise the existing international patterns; but in pursuitof this end it tends towards impatience, frustration and sometimes even posturingin a threatening fashion. Nonetheless, it is in the interest of the United States andof Europe to engage Russia, with regard to the larger strategic issues as well asmore specifically European geopolitical dilemmas.

In so doing, America should concentrate on the strategic issues and seek newarrangements and agreements with Russia that would enhance global stability,promote reductions in nuclear weapons and also deal with such regional problemsas Iran. At this stage, however, Russia is more a regional power than a global power.Hence, Europe has a special responsibility to try to engage Russia in a fashion that

draws it into a closer association with Europe but without bringing its imperialbaggage.

Unfortunately, the current generation of Russian leaders, notably Putin,are still unable to come to terms with Russias diminished global status and itsregional realities. It is unreconciled to the loss of its empire. It is unwilling tocome to terms with its totalitarian and specifically its Stalinist experience. TheForeign Minister of Russia recently declared that to equate Nazism and Stalinismis a blasphemy. Yet there are millions of people in Europe who recall that thetwo were profoundly similar and equally inhuman to their victims. The difficult

process of self-recognition will take time until a new Russian elite emerges.Nonetheless, the current financial crisis may create conditions for a gradual

improvement in relations with Russia. That financial crisis has made the Russianelite aware of a circumstance unprecedented in Russian history: Russia today is infact interdependent with the rest of the world. The top political leaders of Russiauntil recently seemed to be oblivious to that reality, and they premised Russiasfuture development on the notion of a continued spiral in the price of oil and onthe erroneous assumption of Russias economic invulnerability vis--visthe restof the world.

In the context of Russias painfully learned awareness of its interdependencewith the global economy, it may be more feasible to deal with such difficult issuesas those posed by Ukraine and Georgia. Both for strategic and for historical reasons,neither the United States nor the EU can be indifferent to what transpires in therelations between Russia and these two countries. Last but not least, neither theUnited States nor the EU can lose sight of the fact that if the Georgian governmentwere to be overthrown (and both Putin and his foreign minister, Lavrov, havespoken openly of that being their desire), the strategically vital access of the Westto Azerbaijan, to the Caspian and to Central Asia would be cut, to the detrimentof our collective interests. But if Russia is able to suborn either or both of theseregimes, its imperial nostalgia will be stimulated, and Russia will become a moredifficult geopolitical problem.


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It follows, therefore, that the April NATO summit should provide anopportunity for some collective steps designed to enhance a sense of securityand stability in Ukraine and Georgia, though not in a manner that could exacer-bate tensions with Russia. Both America and Europe will have to find a way of

reaffirming their commitment to the territorial integrity and democratic viabilityof these two states, while conveying to Russia that the western interest in them isrelated to the gradual construction of a larger democratic Europe and not designedto threaten Russia itself. Ultimately, Russia can be a more engaged participant inthe Euro-Atlantic community only if its immediate neighbours to the west andsouth do not feel threatened by its lingering imperial aspirations. If Ukraine andGeorgia are gradually assimilated into the Euro-Atlantic structures, Russia willhave no alternative but to follow suit. The reality of interdependence is not onlyeconomic or financial; it is now also geopolitical.

Topacifyrequires a deliberate American effort to avoid becoming bogged down

militarily and politically in the vast area ranging from east of Suez to west ofIndia. An America bogged down in this area will be an America engaged in aprotracted post-imperial war in the post-colonial age, a war not easy to win againstaroused populations. The United States could even find itself confronted simulta-neously with an escalating IsraeliPalestinian conflict (if the peace process falters),continued instability in Iraq impeding military disengagement and (possibly)the eruption of a conflict with Iran, as well as a deepening and widening war inAfghanistan and Pakistan. It follows, therefore, that urgent decisions need to bemade by the United States, with the help of Europe, regarding these critical and

potentially interactive issues.The IsraeliPalestinian peace process needs to be addressed as a priority. It

is evident by now that the parties in the conflict will never reach a solution bythemselves. Therefore, they have to be helped. America, with Europes help, cando so by defining explicitly the fundamental requirements of a genuine peace ofreconciliation. The US President, even before sending a new envoy to the region,should state on the record that a peaceful accommodation between the two partieshas to involve, first, a demilitarized Palestinian state, perhaps with a NATOpresence on its soil to enhance Israels sense of security; second, a territorial settle-

ment based on the lines with equitable exchanges permitting Israel to incor-porate the more heavily urbanized settlements on the fringes of those lines; third,acceptance by both parties of the fact that Palestinian refugees cannot return towhat is now Israel, though they should be provided with some compensation andassistance for settling preferably in the independent Palestinian state; and last butnot least, acceptance by Israelis that a durable peace of reconciliation will requirethe genuine sharing of Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with some kind ofjoint arrangement for the old city and a Palestinian flag over the golden dome.

The war in Iraq is clearly waning, unless it is reignited by conflicts in theadjoining regions. To bring it to a final close, not only will American troops haveto be withdrawn, but the United States will have to engage in serious discussionswith Iraqi leaders regarding a firm date for US disengagement, as well as a serious


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realities. That is an essential task that only he can undertake effectively. Withoutsounding overly partisan, and I am certainly not seeking to flatter him, I believethat the newly elected US President has unique intellectual and rhetorical gifts forrising to the occasion and doing just that. So let me end my remarks by asserting

simply, Yes, we can.

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