This article was downloaded by: [Case Western Reserve University]On: 01 December 2014, At: 13:07Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

The ExplicatorPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vexp20

Montaigne's A Demain lesAffairesZahi Zalloua aa Whitman CollegePublished online: 07 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: Zahi Zalloua (2006) Montaigne's A Demain les Affaires, TheExplicator, 64:3, 134-136, DOI: 10.3200/EXPL.64.3.134-136

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/EXPL.64.3.134-136

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cas

e W

este

rn R

eser

ve U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

07 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

Montaigne’s A DEMAIN LES AFFAIRES

Barely two pages long in modern editions, Montaigne’s chapter A demain lesaffaires (book 2, chapter 4) has received minimal attention from readers of theEssais. When critics do evoke it, the essay is used either to illustrate Mon-taigne’s negative assessment of curiosity or as evidence of his great admirationof Plutarch, as the beginning part of the essay (about a fourth of the chapter) isan accolade to Plutarch’s French translator Jacques Amyot.1 Montaigne usesPlutarch’s example of Rusticus as an entry into the question of curiosity. Rusti-cus becomes an exemplary figure, demonstrating how one should relate tocuriosity. While attending Plutarch’s public lecture, Rusticus received a letterfrom the Emperor that he delayed opening, not wanting to interrupt the speak-er. The reasons for his delay, and Montaigne’s evaluation of his decision, com-prise the matter of the chapter. Montaigne clearly approves of Plutarch’s praiseof Rusticus’s composure, stating: “[I]l a eu raison de louer la gravité de Rusti-cus” (364) (“he was right to praise the composure of Rusticus” 263). Why wasthe action worthy of praise? First, it revealed a resistance to curiosity, to thisunruly passion that plagues society. Second, and this is Montaigne’s addition toPlutarch’s narrative, it demonstrated not only Rusticus’s self-mastery, but alsohis respect for others—both for Plutarch himself and for the other audiencemembers. His delay demonstrates “sa civilité et courtoisie de n’avoir vouluinterrompre le cours de sa declamation” (364) (“his civility and courtesy in nothaving wanted to interrupt the course of his lecture” 263), writes Montaigne. Inrefusing to succumb to his curiosity Rusticus thus combined stoical self-carewith a care for others. Yet Montaigne moves to complicate this assessment byraising a further concern: Is it in fact prudent to postpone opening a letter fromthe Emperor? In doing so, does not Rusticus fail to meet his responsibility to theletter-writer? By raising these questions, Montainge points out that delaying toopen a letter is neither morally good nor bad in itself. To evaluate Rusticus’s act,we must consider additional factors: the origins of the letter, Rusticus’ motiva-tions for not opening it immediately, and his public status. We know that the let-ter came from the Emperor. Rusticus’s motivations, Montaigne suggests, werealtruistic, an expression of “civility and courtesy.” But Montaigne statesemphatically that wisdom would have dictated that he open the letter on thespot: “car, recevant à l’improveu lettres et notamment d’un Empereur, il pouvoitbien advenir que le differer à les lire eust esté d’un grand prejudice” (364) (“forone who receives letters unexpectedly, and especially from an emperor, it mightwell be very harmful to defer reading them” 263). At this juncture of the essay,Montaigne’s critique of curiosity metamorphoses into a critique of nonchalance:“le vice contraire à la curiosité” (“the vice contrary to curiosity” 263) of whichRusticus is guilty (364). By countering the vicious passion of curiosity, Rusti-cus, according to Montaigne, ended up acting nonchalantly. Montaigne then

134

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cas

e W

este

rn R

eser

ve U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

07 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

lists a series of examples where nonchalance resulted, or nearly resulted, in thedownfall of rulers. The title of the essay, a Greek proverb, comes from Archias,a tyrant of Thebes, who, after receiving a letter during his supper informing himof a plot to murder him, foolishly put off opening it with the words “A demainles affaires” (“Let business wait till tomorrow” 263). After enumerating theseexamples of nonchalance, that is, examples to avoid, Montaigne considers whata wise man would do when confronted with unexpected news. Rusticus, inter-estingly, is now invoked as an example of a wise man: “Un sage homme peut, àmon opinion, pour l’interest d’autruy, comme pour ne rompre indecemmentcompaignie, ainsi que Rusticus [. . .] remettre à entendre ce qu’on luy apportede nouveau” (365) (“A wise man may in my opinion, out of consideration forothers—for example, in order not to break company unbecomingly, like Rusti-cus [. . .] put off put off hearing the news that is brought to him” 263). But ear-lier in the essay, Montaigne had precisely argued that, although Rusticus actedout of consideration for others, he did not act prudently. Now, acting “out ofconsideration for others” is an excusable form of nonchalance; indeed, noncha-lance is acceptable only if it is motivated by consideration for others. Herein liesthe problem with Rusticus’s nonchalance. It is motivated by Rusticus’s concernfor others yet violates his duties as a public official. Montaigne seems to giveRusticus the benefit of the doubt by saying that his nonchalance differed fromthat of someone like Archias. But this observation is not unproblematic. Fromthe outside, we can only observe Rusticus’s Stoical nonchalance, his public dis-play of self-mastery. Deciphering Rusticus’s “true” motivations involves adegree of speculation. It is possible that Rusticus was not merely displayingcold self-control, but enjoyed his public performance, affirming his singularityin overcoming the impatience of curiosity. Such a reading would of coursenegate the moral value Montaigne imputes to Rusticus, because his nonchalancewould have stemmed from “son interest ou plaisir particulier” (365) (“personalinterest or pleasure” 263) and not, or, at least not exclusively, from “l’interestd’autruy.” If Montaigne does not choose to problematize Rusticus’s motivation,he does invite us to problematize our reception of it, raising doubts, in turn,about Rusticus’s status as exemplary.

Despite the interpretive ambiguity surrounding Rusticus’s ethos of noncha-lance, one can infer from this essay an attempt on Montaigne’s part to navi-gate between these two dangerous vices, to find the middle ground betweencuriosity and nonchalance.

Yet the paradoxical ending of A demain les affaires seems to call into ques-tion this lesson: “Mais, quand tout est dit, il est mal-aisé és actions humainesde donner reigle si juste par discours de raison, que la fortune n’y maintienneson droict” (365) (“But when all is said, it is hard in human actions to arriveby reasoning at any rule so exact as to exclude Fortune for her rights in thematter” 263). Regardless of what human subjects desire or set out to accom-

135

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cas

e W

este

rn R

eser

ve U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

07 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

plish, fortune, that which is beyond or contrary to reason, will ultimately havethe last word. On one hand, the ending can be read as a pirouette, coming asit does just after Montaigne establishes the normative parameters of noncha-lance. Laughter becomes the appropriate response to the impossibility of self-mastery. On the other, the essay as a whole can be interpreted more seriouslyas highlighting both a qualified ideal of nonchalance and a recognition thatany ideal involving the promise of self-mastery needs to remain open to thecontingencies of Fortuna. This, in turn, can be reformulated as a productivetension between Montaigne’s yearning for self-detachment and his opennessto the new, a tension that informs much of the Essais.

—ZAHI ZALLOUA, Whitman CollegeCopyright © 2006 Heldref Publications

NOTE

1. Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais de Michel de Montaigne, ed. Pierre Villey and V. L.Saulnier (Paris: PUF, 1965). English translations are from The Complete Works of Montaigne,trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1967).

136

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Cas

e W

este

rn R

eser

ve U

nive

rsity

] at

13:

07 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014