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Selections from
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and
Philonous1
by George Berkeley
TheFirstDialogue
PHILONOUS:Goodmorrow,Hylas. Ididnotexpect to find youabroad
so early.
HYLAS:Itisindeedsomethingunusual.Butmythoughtsweresotakenupwith
asubjectIwasdiscoursingof lastnightthat,findingIcouldnotsleep,I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.... You were rep
resented in lastnightsconversationas onewhomaintained themost
extravagantopinion thateverentered into themindofman, towit, that
thereisnosuchthingasmaterialsubstanceintheworld.
PHILONOUS:Thatthereisnosuchthingaswhatphilosopherscallmaterial
substance, lamseriouslypersuaded.But, if Iweremade toseeanything
absurdorskeptical in this, Ishould thenhave thesamereason torenounce
this,thatIimagineIhavenowtorejectthecontraryopinion.
HYLAS:What!Cananythingbe morefantastical,morerepugnant to com
monsense,oramoremanifestpieceofskepticism,thantobelievethereis
nosuchthingasmatter?
1Thismaterialisinthepublicdomain.
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PHILONOUS:Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who
hold there is, are by virtue of that opinion a greater skeptic, and
maintainmoreparadoxesandrepugnances tocommonsense, than Iwho
believenosuchthing?
HYLAS:Youmayas soonpersuademe, thepart isgreater than thewhole,as
that, in order to avoid absurdity and skepticism, I should everbe
obligedto giveupmy opinioninthispoint....
PHILONOUS:Whatmeanyouby sensiblethings?HYLAS:Thosethingswhichareperceivedbythesenses.Canyouimagine
thatImeananythingelse?
PHILONOUS: Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend
yournotions, since thismaymuch shortenour inquiry.Sufferme then to
ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceivedby the
senseswhichareperceived immediately?Ormay those thingsproperlybesaidtobe sensiblewhichare perceivedmediately,ornot withoutthe
interventionofothers?
HYLAS:Idonot sufficientlyunderstandyou.
PHILONOUS: In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the
letters;butmediately,orby meansofthese,aresuggestedto mymind
thenotionsofGod,virtue,truth,andsoon.Now,thatthelettersaretruly
sensiblethings,orperceivedbysense,thereisnodoubt.ButIwouldknow
whetheryou takethethingssuggestedbythemtobesotoo.
HYLAS:No,
certainly:
It
were
absurd
to
think
God
or
virtue
sensible
things,
though theymaybe signifiedandsuggested to themindby sensible
marks,withwhichtheyhaveanarbitraryconnection.
PHILONOUSItseemsthen,thatby sensiblethingsyoumeanthoseonlywhichcanbe perceivedimmediatelybysense?
HYLAS: Right.
PHILONOUS:Does it not follow from this, that though I see one part of
the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason does thence
evidentlyconcludetheremustbesomecauseofthatdiversityofcolors,
yetthatcausecannotbesaidtobeasensiblething,orperceivedbythe
senseofseeing?HYLAS:Itdoes.
PHILONOUS: In likemanner, though Ihearvarietyofsounds,yet Icannot
besaidtohearthecausesofthosesounds?
HYLAS:Youcannot.
PHILONOUS: And whenby my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and
heavy, Icannotsay,withanytruthorpropriety, that I feel thecauseof
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its heator weight?
HYLAS:Topreventanymorequestionsofthiskind,Itellyouonceforall,that
bysensiblethingsImeanthoseonlywhichareperceivedbysense;andthatintruththesensesperceivenothingwhichtheydonotperceiveimmediately,fortheymakenoinferences.Thededucingthereforeofcausesoroccasionsfrom
effectsandappearances,whichaloneareperceivedbysense,entirelyrelates
toreason.
PHILONOUS:Thispointthenisagreedbetweenusthatsensiblethingsarethoseonly which are immediately perceived by sense. You will farther inform mewhetherwe immediatelyperceivebysightanythingbeside lightandcolors
and figures; orby hearing, anythingbut sounds;by the palate, anything
besidetastes;bythesmell,besideodors;orbythetouch,morethantangible
qualities.
HYLAS:Wedonot.
PHILONOUS: It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities,thereremainsnothingsensible?
HYLAS:Igrantit.
PHILONOUS: Sensible things therefore are nothing elsebut so many sensible
qualities,orcombinationsofsensiblequalities?
HYLAS.Nothingelse.
PHILONOUS:Heatthenisasensiblething?HYLAS:Certainly.
PHILONOUS:Doestherealityofsensiblethingsconsistinbeingperceived?Or
isit
something
distinct
from
their
being
perceived,
and
that
bears
no
relation
tothemind?
HYLAS:Toexistisonething,andtobeperceivedisanother.PHILONOUS: I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these I ask
whetherbytheirrealexistenceyoumeanasubsistenceexteriortothemind
anddistinctfromtheirbeingperceived?
HYLAS:Imeanarealabsolutebeing,distinctfrom,andwithoutanyrelationto,
theirbeingperceived.
PHILONOUS:Heat therefore, if itbealloweda realbeing,mustexistwithout;
themind?
HYLAS:ItMust.
PHILONOUS: Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all
degrees of heat which we perceive, or is there any reason why we should
attributeittosomeanddenyittoothers?Andiftherebe,prayletmeknow
thatreason.
HYLAS:Whateverdegreeofheatweperceivebysense,wemaybesurethesame
existsintheobjectthatoccasionsit.
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PHILONOUS:What!Thegreatestaswellastheleast?
HYLAS:Itellyou,thereasonisplainlythesameinrespectofboth.Theyareboth
perceivedbysense;nay,thegreaterdegreeofheatismoresensiblyperceived;
and consequently, if there isanydifference,we aremore certainof its real
existencethanwecanbeoftherealityofalesserdegree.
PHILONOUS:But isnot themostvehementand intensedegreeofheatavery
greatpain?
HYLAS:Noonecandenyit.
PHILONOUS:Andisanyunperceivingthingcapableofpainorpleasure?
HYLAS:No,certainly.
PHILONOUS:Isyourmaterialsubstanceasenselessbeing,orabeingendowed
withsenseandperception?
HYLAS:Itissenselesswithoutdoubt.
PHILONOUS:Itcannotthereforebethesubjectofpain?
HYLAS:Bynomeans.PHILONOUS: Nor consequentlyof the greatest heat perceivedby sense, since
youacknowledgethistobenosmallpain?
HYLAS:Igrantit.
PHILONOUS:What shallwesay thenofyourexternalobject is itamaterial
substance,orno?
HYLAS:Itisamaterialsubstancewiththesensiblequalitiesinheringinit.
PHILONOUS: How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot
[exist]inamaterialsubstance?Idesireyouwouldclearthispoint.
HYLAS:Hold,
Philonous,
Ifear
Iwas
[mistaken]
in
yielding
intense
heat
to
be
a
pain.Itshouldseemrather,thatpainissomethingdistinctfromheat,andthe
consequenceoreffectofit.
PHILONOUS:Uponputtingyourhandnearthefire,doyouperceiveonesimple
uniformsensation,ortwodistinctsensations?
HYLAS:Butonesimplesensation.
PHILONOUSS:Isnottheheatimmediatelyperceived?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS:Andthepain?
HYLAS: True.
PHILONOUS:Seeingthereforetheyarebothimmediatelyperceivedatthesame
time,andthefireaffectsyouonlywithonesimpleoruncompoundedidea,it
follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately
perceived,andthepain;and,consequently,thattheintenseheatimmediately
perceivedisnothingdistinctfromaparticularsortofpain.
HYLAS:Itseemsso.
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PHILONOUS: Again, try inyour thoughts,Hylas, ifyou can conceiveavehe
mentsensationtobewithoutpainorpleasure.
HYLAS:Icannot.
PHILONOUS:Orcanyouframetoyourselfanideaofsensiblepainorpleasure
ingeneral,abstractedfromeveryparticular ideaofheat,cold,tastes,smells,
andsoon?
HYLAS:IdonotfindthatIcan.
PHILONOUS:Doesitnotthereforefollowthatsensiblepainisnothingdistinct
fromthosesensationsorideas,inanintensedegree?
HYLAS:Itisundeniable.Andtospeakthetruth,Ibegintosuspectaverygreat
heatcannotexistbutinamindperceivingit.
PHILONOUS:What!Areyou then in that skeptical stateofsuspense,between
affirminganddenying?
HYLAS: I think Imaybepositive inthepoint.Averyviolentandpainfulheat
cannotexistwithoutthemind.PHILONOUS:Ithasnottherefore,accordingtoyou,anyrealbeing?HYLAS:Iownit.
PHILONOUS:Isitthereforecertainthatthereisnobodyinnaturereallyhot?
HYLAS:Ihavenotdeniedthereisanyrealheatinbodies.Ionlysaythereisno
suchthingasanintenserealheat.
PHILONOUS:Butdidyounotsaybefore thatalldegreesofheatwereequally
real;or,iftherewasanydifference,thatthegreaterweremoreundoubtedly
realthanthelesser?
HYLAS:True,
but
it
was
because
Idid
not
then
consider
the
ground
there
is
for
distinguishingbetweenthem,whichInowplainlysee.Anditisthis:Because
intense heat is nothing elsebut a particular kind of painful sensation, and
paincannotexistbutinaperceivingbeing,itfollowsthatnointenseheatcan
reallyexistinanunperceivingcorporealsubstance.Butthisisnoreasonwhy
weshoulddenyheatinaninferiordegreetoexistinsuchasubstance.
PHILONOUS:Buthowshallwebeabletodiscernthosedegreesofheatwhich
existonlyinthemindfromthosewhichexistwithoutit?
HYLAS: That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist un
perceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the
mind.Butasforallotherdegreesofheat,nothingobligesustothinkthesame
ofthem.
PHILONOUS: I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was
capableofpleasure,anymorethanofpain.
HYLAS:Idid.
PHILONOUS: And is not warmth,or a more gentle degreeof heat than what
causesuneasiness,apleasure?
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HYLAS:Whatthen?
PHILONOUS:Consequently,itcannotexistwithoutthemindinanunperceiving
substance,orbody.
HYLAS:Soitseems.
PHILONOUS:Since,therefore,aswellthosedegreesofheatthatarenotpainful,
asthosethatare,canexistonlyinathinkingsubstance,maywenotconclude
that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat
whatsoever?
HYLAS: On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a
pleasureasthatagreatdegreeofheatisapain.
PHILONOUS: Idonotpretend thatwarmth isasgreatapleasureasheat isa
pain.But,ifyougrantittobeevenasmallpleasure,itservestomakegood
myconclusion.
HYLAS: I could rather call it an indolence. It seems tobenothing more than aprivationofbothpainandpleasure.Andthatsuchaqualityorstateasthismayagreetoanunthinkingsubstance,Ihopeyouwillnotdeny.
PHILONOUS:Ifyouareresolvedtomaintainthatwarmth,oragentledegreeof
heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise thanby
appealingtoyourownsense.Butwhatthinkyouofcold?
HYLAS:ThesamethatIdoofheat.Anintensedegreeofcoldisapain;fortofeel
averygreatcold, is toperceiveagreatuneasiness. Itcannot thereforeexist
withoutthemind,butalesserdegreeofcoldmay,aswellasalesser,degree
ofheat.
PHILONOUS:Those
bodies,
therefore,
upon
whose
application
to
our
own,
we
perceiveamoderatedegreeofheat,mustbeconcluded tohaveamoderate
degreeofheatorwarmthinthem;andthose,uponwhoseapplicationwefeel
alikedegreeofcold,mustbethoughttohavecoldinthem.
HYLAS:Theymust.
PHILONOUS: Can any doctrinebe true that necessarily leads a man into an
absurdity?
HYLAS:Withoutdoubtitcannot.
PHILONOUS:Isitnotanabsurditytothinkthatthesamethingshouldbeatthe
sametimebothcoldandwarm?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILNOUS:Supposenowoneofyourhandshot,and theothercold,and that
theyarebothatonceput into the samevesselofwater, inan intermediate
state.Willnotthewaterseemcoldtoonehand,andwarmtotheother?
HYLAS:Itwill.
PHILONOUS:Oughtwenottherefore,byyourprinciples,toconcludeitisreally
both cold and warm at the same time that is, according to your own
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concession,tobelieveanabsurdity?
HYLAS:Iconfessitseemsso.
PHILONOUS:Consequently,theprinciplesthemselvesarefalse,sinceyouhave
grantedthatnotrueprincipleleadstoanabsurdity.
HYLAS:Butafterall,cananythingbemoreabsurdthantosaythereisnoheatinthefire?
PHILONOUS:Tomakethepointstillclearer,tellmewhether, intwocasesex
actlyalike,weoughtnottomakethesamejudgment?
HYLAS:WeOught.
PHILONOUS: When a pinpricksyour finger,does it not rend anddivide the
fibersofyourflesh?
HYLAS:Itdoes.
PHILONOUS:Andwhenacoalburnsyourfinger,doesitanymore?
HYLAS:Itdoesnot.
PHILONOUS:Since,therefore,youneitherjudgethesensationitselfoccasionedbythepin,noranythinglikeittobeinthepin;youshouldnot,conformably
towhatyouhavenowgranted,judgethesensationoccasionedbythefire,or
anythinglikeit,tobeinthefire.
HYLAS: Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point and
acknowledgethatheatandcoldareonlysensationsexistinginourminds.But
therestillremainqualitiesenoughtosecuretherealityofexternalthings.
PHILONOUS:Butwhatwillyousay,Hylas,ifitshallappearthatthecaseisthe
samewithregardtoallothersensiblequalities,andthattheycannomorebe
supposedto
exist
without
the
mind,
than
heat
and
cold?
HYLAS:Then indeedyouwillhavedonesomethingtothepurpose,butthatis
whatIdespairofseeingproved.
PHILONOUS:Letusexaminetheminorder.Whatthinkyouoftastesdothey
existwithoutthemind,orno?
HYLAS:Cananymaninhissensesdoubtwhethersugarissweet,orwormwood
bitter?
PHILONOUS:Informme,Hylas.Isasweettasteaparticularkindofpleasureor
pleasantsensation,orisitnot?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS:Andisnotbitternesssomekindofuneasinessorpain?
HYLAS:Igrantit.
PHILONOUS: If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal
substancesexistingwithoutthemind,howcansweetnessandbitterness,that
is,pleasureandpain,agreetothem?
HYLAS:Hold,Philonous,Inowseewhatitwas[that]deludedmeallthistime.
You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not
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particularsortsofpleasureandpain;towhich Iansweredsimply,that they
were.WhereasIshouldhavethusdistinguished:Thosequalities,asperceived
byus,arepleasuresorpains;butnotasexisting in theexternalobjects.We
must not therefore conclude absolutely that there is no heat in the fire or
sweetness in thesugar,butonly thatheatorsweetness,asperceivedbyus,
arenotinthefireorsugar.Whatsayyoutothis?
PHILONOUS: I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded al
together concerning sensible things, which you defined tobe the thingsweimmediatelyperceive by our senses. Whatever other qualities, therefore, youspeakof,asdistinctfromthese,Iknownothingofthem,neitherdotheyatall
belongtothepointindispute.Youmay,indeed,pretendtohavediscovered
certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible
qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use canbe made of this to your
presentpurpose,Iamatalosstoconceive.Tellmethenoncemore,doyou
acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness andbitterness (meaning thosequalitieswhichareperceivedbythesenses),donotexistwithoutthemind?
HYLAS:Isee it istonopurposetoholdout,soIgiveupthecauseastothose
mentionedqualities.ThoughIprofessitsoundsoddlytosaythatsugarisnot
sweet.
PHILONOUS:But, foryour farther satisfaction, take thisalongwithyou:That
which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear
bitter.Andnothingcanbeplainerthanthatdivers personsperceivedifferent
tastesinthesamefood,sincethatwhichonemandelightsin,anotherabhors.
Andhow
could
this
be,
if
the
taste
was
something
really
inherent
in
the
food?
HYLAS:IacknowledgeIknownothow....
PHILONOUS:AndIhopeyouwillmakenodifficultytoacknowledgethesame
ofcolors.
HYLAS:Pardonme;thecaseofcolorsisverydifferent.Cananythingbeplainer
thanthatwesee themonthe objects?
PHILONOUS: The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
substancesexistingwithoutthemind?
HYLAS:Theyare.
PHILONOUS:Andhavetrueandrealcolorsinheringin them?
HYLAS:Eachvisibleobjecthas thatcolorwhichwesee init....
PHILONOUS:What!Arethenthebeautifulredandpurpleweseeonyonder
clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves
anyotherformthanthatofadarkmistorvapor?
HYLAS:Imustown,Philonous,thosecolorsarenot reallyinthecloudsas
theyseemtobeatthisdistance.Theyareonlyapparentcolors.
PHILONOUS: Apparent call you them? How shall we distinguish these
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apparentcolorsfromreal?
HYLAS:Veryeasily.Thoseareto be thoughtapparent which,appearing
onlyatadistance,vanishuponanearerapproach.
PHILONOUS: And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are
discoveredbythemostnearand exactsurvey.
HYLAS:Right.
PHILONOUS:Is thenearestandexactestsurveymadeby thehelpof ami
croscope,orby thenakedeye?
HYLAS:Byamicroscope,doubtless.
PHILONOUS:Butamicroscopeoftendiscoverscolorsinanobjectdifferent
from thoseperceivedby theunassistedsight.And in casewe hadmi
croscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object
whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same color
whichit exhibitsto thenakedeye.
HYLAS:And whatwillyou conclude fromall this?You cannotargue thatthereare reallyand naturallynocolorsonobjects,becausebyartificial
managementstheymay be alteredormadetovanish.
PHILONOUS: I think it may evidently be concluded from your own
concessions, that all the colors we see with our naked eyes are only
apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close
andaccurateinspection,whichisaffordedusbyamicroscope.Then,as
towhatyousayby wayof prevention:Iaskyouwhethertherealand
naturalstateofanobjectisbetterdiscoveredbyaverysharpandpiercing
sight,or
by
one
which
is
less
sharp?
HYLAS:Bytheformerwithoutdoubt.
PHILONOUS:Isitnotplainfrom[optics]thatmicroscopesmakethesight
morepenetratingandrepresentobjectsastheywouldappeartotheeyein
caseitwerenaturallyendowedwithamostexquisitesharpness?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS: Consequently the microscopical representation is to be
thoughtthatwhichbestsetsforththerealnatureofthething,orwhatitis
in itself. The colors, therefore,by it perceived are more genuine and
realthanthoseperceivedotherwise.
HYLAS:Iconfessthereis somethingin whatyousay....
PHILONOUS:.... I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance
andpositionof theobject,whatpeculiar textureand formationof the
eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that
truecolor,anddistinguishingitfromapparentones.
HYLAS: I own myself entirely satisfied that they are all equally apparent and
thatthereisnosuchthingascolorreallyinheringinexternalbodies,butthat
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it isaltogether inthe light.Andwhatconfirmsme inthisopinion is that in
proportion to the lightcolorsarestillmoreor lessvivid;and if therebeno
light,thenaretherenocolorsperceived.Besides,allowingtherearecolorson
external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no
externalbodyaffectsthemindunlessitactsfirstonourorgansofsense.But
the only action ofbodies is motion, and motion cannotbe communicated
otherwisethanby impulse.Adistantobjectthereforecannotactontheeye,
norconsequentlymakeitselforitspropertiesperceivabletothesoul.Whence
it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance which,
operatingontheeye,occasionsaperceptionofcolorsandsuchislight.
PHILONOUS:How!Islightthenasubstance?
HYLAS:Itellyou,Philonous,externallightisnothingbutathinfluidsubstance
whose minute particlesbeing agitated with abrisk motion, and in various
mannersreflectedfromthedifferentsurfacesofoutwardobjectstotheeyes,
communicatedifferentmotionstotheopticnerves;which,beingpropagatedtothebrain,causethereinvarious impressions;andtheseareattendedwith
thesensationsofred,blue,yellow,andsoon.PHILONOUS:Itseemsthenthelightdoesnomorethanshaketheopticnerves.
HYLAS:Nothingelse.
PHILONOUS:Andconsequenttoeachparticularmotionofthenerves,themind
isaffectedwithasensationwhichissomeparticularcolor.
HYLAS:Right.
PHILNOUS:Andthesesensationshavenoexistencewithoutthemind.
HYLAS:They
have
not.
PHILONOUS:Howthendoyouaffirmthatcolorsareinthelight,sinceby
lightyouunderstandacorporealsubstanceexternaltothemind?HYLAS:Lightandcolors,as immediatelyperceivedbyus, Igrantcannotexist
without the mind. But in themselves they are only the motions and
configurationsofcertaininsensibleparticlesofmatter.
PHILONOUS: Colors then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate
objectsofsight,cannotagreetoanybutaperceivingsubstance.
HYLAS:ThatiswhatIsay.
PHILONOUS: Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible
qualitieswhicharealonethoughtcolorsbyallmankindbeside,youmayhold
whatyoupleasewithregardtothoseinvisibleonesofthephilosophers....
HYLAS: I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any longer.
Colors, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed secondary qualities, havecertainlynoexistencewithoutthemind.ButbythisacknowledgmentImust
notbesupposed toderogateanything from therealityofmatterorexternal
objects, seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who
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neverthelessarethefarthestimaginablefromdenyingmatter.Fortheclearer
understandingofthis,youmustknowsensiblequalitiesarebyphilosophers
divided into primary and secondary. The former are extension, figure,solidity,gravity,motion,andrest;andthesetheyholdexistreallyinbodies.
Thelatterarethoseaboveenumeratedor,briefly,allsensiblequalitiesbesidetheprimarywhichtheyassertareonlysomanysensationsorideasexistingnowherebutinthemind.Butallthis,Idoubtnot,youareapprisedof. For
mypart,Ihavebeenalongtimesensibletherewassuchinopinioncurrent
amongphilosophers,butwasnever thoroughly convincedof its truthuntil
now.
PHILONOUS:Youarestillthenofopinionthatextensionandfiguresareinherentinexternalunthinkingsubstances?
HYLAS:Iam.
PHILONOUS: But what if the same arguments which are brought against
secondaryqualitieswillholdgoodagainstthesealso?HYLAS:WhythenIshallbeobligedtothink,theytooexistonlyinthemind.
PHILONOUS: Is it your opinion [that] very figure and extension which you
perceivebysenseexistintheoutwardobjectormaterialsubstance?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS:Haveallotheranimalsasgoodgroundstothinkthesameofthe
figureandextensionwhichtheyseeandfeel?
HYLAS:Withoutdoubt,iftheyhaveanythoughtatall.
PHILONOUS: Answerme,Hylas.Thinkyouthesenseswerebestoweduponall
animalsfor
their
preservation
and
well
being
in
life,
or
were
they
given
to
menaloneforthisend?
HYLAS:Imakenoquestionbuttheyhavethesameuseinallotheranimals.
PHILONOUS: Ifso,isitnotnecessarytheyshouldbeenabledbythemtoper
ceivetheirownlimbsandthosebodieswhicharecapableofharmingthem?
HYLAS:Certainly.
PHILONOUS:Amitethereforemustbesupposedtoseehisownfoot,andthings
equalorevenlessthanit,asbodiesofsomeconsiderabledimension;though
atthesametimetheyappeartoyouscarcediscernible,oratbestassomany
visiblepoints?
HYLAS:Icannotdenyit.
PHILONOUS:Andtocreatureslessthanthemitetheywillseemyetlarger?
HYLAS:Theywill.
PHILONOUS: Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another ex
tremelyminuteanimalappearassomehugemountain?
HYLAS:AllthisIgrant.
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PHILONOUS:Canoneand thesame thingbeat thesame time in itselfofdif
ferentdimensions?
HYLAS:Thatwereabsurdtoimagine.
PHILONOUS: But from what you have laiddown it follows thatboth the ex
tensionbyyouperceived,andthatperceivedbythemiteitself,aslikewiseall
thoseperceivedbylesseranimals,areeachofthemthetrueextensionofthe
mites foot; that is to say, by your own principles you are led into an
absurdity.
HYLAS:Thereseemstobesomedifficultyinthepoint.
PHILONOUS:Again,haveyounotacknowledgedthatnorealinherentproperty
ofanyobjectcanbechangedwithoutsomechangeinthethingitself?
HYLAS:Ihave.
PHILONOUS: But as we approach to or recede from an object, the visible
extensionvaries,beingatonedistancetenorahundredtimesgreaterthanat
another.Doesitnotthereforefollowfromhencelikewisethatitisnotreallyinherentintheobject?
HYLAS:IownIamatalosswhattothink.
PHILONOUS: Yourjudgment will soonbe determined, if you will venture to
thinkasfreelyconcerningthisqualityasyouhavedoneconcerningtherest.
Wasitnotadmittedasagoodargument,thatneitherheatnorcoldwasinthe
water,becauseitseemedwarmtoonehandandcoldtotheother?
HYLAS:Itwas.
PHILONOUS:Isitnottheverysamereasoningtoconclude,thereisnoextension
orfigure
in
an
object,
because
to
one
eye
it
shall
seem
little,
smooth,
and
round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and
angular?
HYLAS:Theverysame.Butdoesthislatterfacteverhappen?
PHILONOUS:Youmayatany timemake theexperiment,by lookingwithone
eybare,andwiththeotherthroughamicroscope.
HYLAS:Iknownothowtomaintainit,andyetIamloathtogiveupextension,
Iseesomanyoddconsequencesfollowinguponsuchaconcession.
PHILONOUS: Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you
willstickatnothingforitsoddness....
HYLAS:Iacknowledge,Philonous,that,uponafairobservationofwhatpasses
in my mind, I can discover nothing elsebut that I am a thinkingbeing,
affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive howa
sensation shouldexist inanunperceiving substance.But then,on theother
hand,whenIlookonsensiblethingsinadifferentview,consideringthemas
so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material
substratum,withoutwhichtheycannotbeconceivedtoexist.
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PHILONOUS: Material substratum call you it? Pray,by which of your sensescameyouacquaintedwiththatbeing?
HYLAS:Itisnotitselfsensible,itsmodesandqualitiesonlybeingperceivedby
thesenses.
PHILONOUS: Ipresumethen itwasbyreflectionandreasonyouobtainedthe
ideaofit?
HYLAS:Idonotpretendtoanyproperpositiveideaofit.However,Iconcludeit
exists,becausequalitiescannotbeconceivedtoexistwithoutasupport.
PHILONOUS: It seems then you have only a relative notionof it, or that youconceive itnototherwisethanbyconceivingtherelation itbearstosensible
qualities?
HYLAS:Right.
PHILONOUS:Bepleasedthereforetoletmeknowwhereinthatrelationconsists.
HYLAS:Isitnotsufficientlyexpressedinthetermsubstratum,orsubstance?PHILONOUS: If so, theword substratumshould import that it is spreadunder
thesensiblequalitiesoraccidents?
HYLAS:True.
PHILONOUS:Andconsequentlyunderextension?
HYLAS:Iownit.
PHILONOUS: It is thereforesomewhat in itsownnatureentirelydistinct from
extension?
HYLAS: I tell you, extension is only a mode, and matter is something that
supportsmodes.And is itnotevidentthethingsupported isdifferentfrom
thething
supporting?
PHILONOUS: So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is
supposedtobethesubstratumofextension?
HYLAS:Justso.
PHILONOUS:Answerme,Hylas.Canathingbespreadwithoutextension?Or
isnottheideaofextensionnecessarilyincludedinspreading?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS: Whatsoeverthereforeyousupposespreadunderanythingmust
have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under
whichitisspread?
HYLAS:Itmust.
PHILONOUS:Consequently,everycorporealsubstance,beingthesubstratumof
extension,musthaveinitselfanotherextension,bywhichitisqualifiedtobe
asubstratum andsoontoinfinity?AndIaskwhetherthisbenotabsurdin
itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the
substratumwassomethingdistinctfromandexclusiveofextension?
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HYLAS:Ayebut,Philonous,you takemewrong. Idonotmean thatmatter is
spread inagross literalsenseunderextension.Thewordsubstratumisusedonlytoexpressingeneralthesamethingwithsubstance.
PHILONOUS: Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term
substance.Isitnotthatitstandsunderaccidents?HYLAS:Theverysame.
PHILONOUS: But,thatonethingmaystandunderorsupportanother,mustit
notbeextended?
HYLAS:ItMust.
PHILONOUS:Isnotthereforethissuppositionliabletothesameabsurditywith
theformer?
HYLAS:Youstilltakethingsinastrictliteralsense.Thatisnotfair,Philonous.
PHILONOUS:Iamnotforimposinganysenseonyourwords;youareatliberty
to explain them as you please. Only, Ibeseech you, make me understand
somethingby them.You tellmemattersupportsorstandsunderaccidents.How?Isitasyourlegssupportyourbody?
HYLAS:No;thatistheliteralsense.
PHILONOUS: Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you un
derstanditin. HowlongmustIwaitforananswer,Hylas?
HYLAS: I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well
enoughwhatwasmeantbymatterssupportingaccidents.Butnow,themore
IthinkonitthelesscanIcomprehendit.Inshort,IfindthatIknownothing
ofit.
PHILONOUS:It
seems
then
you
have
no
idea
at
all,
neither
relative
nor
positive,
ofmatter.Youknowneitherwhatitisinitself,norwhatrelationithearsto
accidents?
HYLAS:Iacknowledgeit.
PHILONOUS:Andyetyouassertedthatyoucouldnotconceivehowqualitiesor
accidentsshouldreallyexist,withoutconceivingatthesametimeamaterial
supportofthem?
HYLAS:Idid.
PHILONOUS:That is tosay,whenyouconceive therealexistenceofqualities,
youdowithal conceivesomethingwhichyoucannotconceive?
HYLAS:Itwaswrong,Iown....
PHILONOUS:....But(topassbyallthathasbeenhithertosaidandreckonitfor
nothing,ifyouwillhaveitso)Iamcontenttoputthewholeuponthisissue.
If you can conceive it possible for ... any sensible object whatever to exist
withoutthemind,thenIwillgrantitactuallytobeso.
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HYLASIfitcomestothat,thepointwillsoonbedecided.Whatmoreeasythan
toconceiveatreeorhouseexistingbyitself,independentofandunperceived
by any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing
afterthatmanner.
PHILONOUS:Howsayyou,Hylas,canyouseeathingwhichisatthesametime
unseen?
HYLAS:No,thatwereacontradiction.
PHILONOUS:Isitnotasgreatacontradictiontotalkofconceivingathingwhichisunconceived?
HYLAS:Itis.
PHILONOUS: The tree orhouse thereforewhich you think of is conceivedby
you?
HYLAS:Howshoulditbeotherwise?
PHILONOUS:Andwhatisconceivedissurelyinthemind?
HYLAS:Withoutquestion,thatwhichisconceivedisinthemind....PHILONOUS: You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how
anyonecorporealsensiblethingshouldexistotherwisethaninamind?
HYLAS:Ido....
THESECONDDIALOGUE
PHILONOUS: ...Tome it isevident,forthereasonsyouallowof,thatsensible
thingscannotexistotherwisethaninamindorspirit.WhenceIconclude,not
that they have no real existence,but that, seeing they depend not on my
thoughtandhaveanexistencedistinctfrombeingperceivedbyme,theremustbesomeotherMindwhereintheyexist.Assure,therefore,asthesensibleworldreallyexists,sosureisthereaninfiniteomnipresentSpiritwhocontainsand
supportsit.
HYLAS: What! This isnomore than Iand all Christianshold nay,and all
otherstoowhobelievethereisaGodandthatHeknowsandcomprehends
allthings.
PHILONOUS:Aye,buthere lies thedifference.Mencommonlybelievethatall
thingsareknownorperceivedbyGod,because theybelieve thebeingofaGod;whereasI,ontheotherside,immediatelyandnecessarilyconcludethe
beingofaGod,becauseallsensiblethingsmustbeperceivedbyHim.
HYLAS:But,solongasweallbelievethesamething,whatmatterisithowwe
comebythatbelief?
PHILONOUS:Butneitherdoweagree in the sameopinion.Forphilosophers,
though they acknowledgeall corporealbeings tobe perceivedby God, yet
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they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being
perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no
differencebetween sayingThere isaGod, thereforeHeperceivesall thingsandsayingSensiblethingsdoreallyexist;and, iftheyreallyexist,theyarenecessarilyperceived by an infiniteMind: therefore there is an infiniteMind, orGod? Thisfurnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most
evident principle, of the being of a God. Divines and philosophers had
provedbeyondallcontroversy,fromthebeautyandusefulnessoftheseveral
partsofthecreation,thatitwastheworkmanshipofGod.Butthatsetting
asideallhelpofastronomyandnaturalphilosophy,allcontemplationofthe
contrivance, order, and adjustment of things an infinite Mind shouldbe
necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world, is an
advantagetothemonlywhohavemadethiseasyreflectionthatthesensible
world is thatwhichweperceivebyour several senses,and thatnothing is
perceivedbythesensesbesideideas,andthatnoideaorarchetypeofanideacan exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious
search into thesciences,withoutanysubtletyofreasonor tedious lengthof
discourse,opposeandbafflethemoststrenuousadvocateforatheism....Itis
evidentthatthethingsIperceivearemyownideas,andthatnoideacanexist
unless itbe inamind.Nor is it lessplain that these ideasor thingsbyme
perceived,either themselvesor theirarchetypes,exist independentlyofmymind,sinceIknowmyselfnottobetheirauthor,itbeingoutofmypowerto
determine at pleasure what particular ideas I shallbe affected with upon
openingmy
eyes
or
ears.
They
must
therefore
exist
in
some
other
Mind,
whosewillitistheyshouldbeexhibitedtome.Thethings,Isay,immediately
perceivedareideasorsensations,callthemwhichyouwill.Buthowcanany
ideaorsensationexist inorbeproducedbyanythingbutamindorspirit?
This indeed is inconceivable.And toassertthatwhich is inconceivable is to
talknonsense,isitnot?
HYLAS:Withoutdoubt.
PHILONOUS:Butontheotherhand,itisveryconceivablethattheyshouldexist
inandbeproducedbyaSpirit,sincethisisnomorethanIdailyexperiencein
myself, inasmuchas Iperceivenumberless ideasand,byanactofmywill,
can form a great variety of them and raise them up in my imagination
though,itmustbeconfessed,thesecreaturesofthefancyarenotaltogetherso
distinct, so strong,vivid,andpermanent,as thoseperceivedbymy senses,
whichlatterarecalledrealthings.FromallwhichIconcludethereisaMindwhichaffectsmeeverymomentwithallthesensibleimpressionsIperceive.
Andfromthevariety,order,andmannerofthese,IconcludetheAuthorof
themtobewise,powerful,andgood,beyondcomprehension.
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