flux d’immigration seraient de plus en plus difficilement contrôlables et «les immi-grants ne se fondent plus, totalement du moins, dans le moule national» ~23!. Ladifférence avec le passé serait que «de nos jours, des groupes revendiquent d’unemanière active leur attachement à un groupe culturel particulier qui ne relève plus dela nation» ~25!. Encore une fois, les mêmes peurs quant à la capacité d’intégrationde ces vagues d’immigration existaient à l’époque, comme le relève l’ouvrage clé deTimothy Hatton et Jeffrey Williamson, The Age of Mass Migration ~1998!, et pour-tant, ces vagues d’immigration ont généralement été bien absorbées par les nouv-elles nations. On pourrait avoir l’impression que l’auteur tend à fixer l’identiténationale dans des termes par trop rigides, un peu comme l’a fait Samuel Huntingtondans son livre Who are we? The Challenges to America’s National Identity ~2004!.En fait, l’État-nation a survécu à bien des défis qui lui ont été posés, et peut-être quece qui est en déclin ici, c’est l’image projetée par certains auteurs d’un État-nationidéal-typique. Qu’on soit en accord ou en désaccord avec la thèse de l’auteur, L’étatde la nation demeure un livre brillant, qui constitue un passage obligé pour les étu-diants et chercheurs sur la question.

NICOLAS LEMAY-HÉBERT Sciences Po Paris/Princeton University

Creating European CitizensWillem MaasLanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, pp. 179doi:10.10170S0008423909090507

In this short but very detailed work, Willem Maas seeks to outline the history ofcitizenship as it applies to the European Union and its antecedent organizations. Thefocus is both on “the ‘high politics’ of intergovernmental conferences”—and theirbehind-the-scenes compromises—and “the ‘low politics’ of interpretation by the Courtand implementation by the Commission” ~9!. Developments in both of these areasare clearly outlined and analyzed by Maas. Initially the central issue was that of theright of labour mobility ~that is, the free movement of workers and their families!,first concerning coal and steel and then other economic sectors. Not surprisingly, itwas the main labour-exporting member state, Italy, which was behind these earlyrights. Likewise, the greatest opposition came from Luxembourg, which proportion-ally had ~and has! the greatest share of foreign workers.

The real shift to a broader notion of citizenship came in the 1980s and 1990s,culminating in its “constitutional moment” ~45! in the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. AsMaas summarizes, “the Mediterranean countries @especially Spain#—supported bythe French and German ‘motor of integration,’ by a post-Cold War climate in whichcitizenship quickly came to be seen as one way of combating the democratic deficit,and by the institutional background of years of agitation in the Parliament and theCommission—succeeded in finally passing citizenship at Maastricht” ~9–10!. Spe-cifically, the Treaty of Maastricht granted four things: the freedom to move and resideanywhere in the European Union as a right of all EU citizens, not just workers; theright of all EU citizens to vote and be a candidate in both European elections andlocal elections ~but not national elections! in the same way as citizens of the memberstate in which they reside; the right of EU citizens to consular and diplomatic pro-tection by the foreign services of other member states; and the right of EU citizensto petition the European Parliament ~50–52!. These specific rights ~at least the firsttwo! are now well known by EU citizens, even if the concept itself of EU citizenshipis less well known ~106–07!.

Yet in hindsight Maastricht has to be seen as the high water mark of achievingEuropean citizenship, at least for this generation. Indeed, right away opt-outs con-

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cerning most citizenship issues ~as well as other issues! were given to Denmark sothat said country could approve the Treaty of Maastricht in a second referendum afterhaving narrowly rejected it the first time. The subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam thusmade few additions to European citizenship, and indeed emphasized that this wouldremain a complement to and not a replacement for national citizenship ~69!. Morerights might have come with the proposed European Constitution, but this did notcome to pass—and in any case, the federalist notion of dual citizenship ~national andEU! with the EU one of equal if not greater importance that was included in the firstdraft of the Constitution was removed due to strong opposition, including from manyof the larger member states ~85!.

There has also been very little created in terms of the right to EU welfare stateprograms, central to the notion of modern citizenship with social rights in the schol-arly analysis of T.H. Marshall. Social programs of health and welfare remain firmlyin the jurisdiction of member states, and there has been great reluctance amongst EUmember states to allow non-nationals access to these ~103!.

“Of course, citizenship is not only about rights but also about duties” writesMaas ~103!. However, there is little discussion in this work about the duties of Euro-pean citizenship, beyond some instances of the taxation of cross-border commuters.That said, the fact remains that the European Union does not levy direct taxes on its“citizens,” nor does it conscript them into any European army—to emphasize two ofthe main duties of citizens worldwide.

What comes through in Maas’s work is the sense that European Union citizen-ship is a clear illustration of both the achievements and limitations of European inte-gration: achievements in the sense of it being the only transnational “citizenship” inthe world, and limitations in the sense that it is far from a complete citizenship anal-ogous to those of ~even! federal systems such as Canada or the United States. Thatsaid, Canadian citizenship did not exist before 1947, and likewise national UnitedStates citizenship did not come until the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, and eventhis was not strongly enforced for some decades afterwards. Given that the Europeanintegration project is only some sixty years old, one should not be surprised by thelack of full citizenship. Yet to some extent this simply leads us to a bigger stumblingblock, that of the mythical pan-European demos. Again, though, the notion of a sharednational political community was something that in the United States took at least acentury if not two to arise ~102!. So one should not assume that there never will be apan-European demos, but it does seem that unless and until one arises there will notbe a full European Union citizenship.

ALAN SIAROFF University of Lethbridge

Provisional Politics: Kantian Arguments in Policy ContextElisabeth EllisNew Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, pp. xiii, 194doi:10.10170S0008423909090519

In Provisional Politics, Elisabeth Ellis argues that “we ought to learn to use provi-sional rather than conclusive reasoning” ~1! in the study of politics. By provisional-ity, Ellis means we should treat political principles, and so on, with the proviso thatwe accept them for the time being, rather than imagining we can establish them onceand for all.

The reason for provisionality is a gap between ideals and reality. Ellis writes,“Our language of competing conclusive political principles is inadequate to theimmense complexity, uncertainty, and dynamism of the world of politics” ~1!. Inother words, there is a place for morality and ideals in politics and in the study of

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