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‘Dans la cour des grands’: France 98Hugh Dauncey a & Geoff Hare aa University of Newcastle upon TynePublished online: 25 Apr 2008.

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Modern & Contemporary France (1998), 6(3), 339-350

'Dans la cour des grands': France 98

HUGH DAUNCEY and GEOFF HAREUniversity of Newcastle upon Tyne

AbstractFrance's hosting of the 1998 World Cup not only fits the French State'straditional use of international sporting events for asserting nationalgrandeur, but suggests both a coming of age of French football itself, andmore widely, a statement of national economic and political self-confidence. France 98 may be seen as an example of the particular Frenchrelationship between public authorities and sport, in which Republicanvalues pervade areas of civil society where in other European nations, themission de service public would be unknown. The financial organisation ofthe Finals also illustrates the way football is becoming an agent ofglobalisation used by multinational commercial interests, provoking uneaseamong traditional stakeholders in the sport.

Introduction: sport, nation and symbolic capital

France has traditionally used sporting events to contribute to grandeur byhosting the 1900 and 1924 Olympics, the 1938 World Cup, the 1968 WinterGames at Chamonix, the 1984 European Soccer Championships and the 1992Winter Olympics at Albertville, and has arguably been keener to host theseevents than comparator European nations. In the mid-1980s Paris was a candi-date in the competition to host the 1992 Olympics, whose staging, had the finaldecision of the IOC ultimately not been made in favour of Barcelona, wouldhave focused world attention on the French capital in a way far exceeding thatin which the Bicentenaire of 1989 publicised France's cultural and politicalgenius.

When France's bid for the 1992 Olympics failed in October 1987, attentionturned to the 1998 World Cup, for which French candidature was declared asearly as 1983. In 1987 the Fédération française de football (FFF) confirmedFrance's bid and the presidential election of 1988 saw Mayor of Paris andcandidate Jacques Chirac support France's candidature by calling for theconstruction of a new, national high-capacity stadium in or around Paris capableof hosting the biggest and most prestigious international sporting events. InJanuary 1989 the FFF created its own candidature committee, France's bid being

0963-9489/98/030339-12 © 1998 Association for the Study of Modern & Contemporary France

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presented to FIFA in September 1991, and France being awarded the compe-tition in July 1992.

In the 1920s and 1930s, France's hosting of the Olympics and the third WorldCup must be set within the context firstly of nationalism and a desire to showthe strength of French manhood after the Great War, and secondly of initiativeslaunched by the Popular Front in favour of sport and leisure for all. In the 1990s,motivations are perhaps less straightforward in terms of the national andideological implications of sporting success in a post-Cold War environment ofsporting détente and where even traditional Franco-German rivalries are almostforgotten, and are enacted as pastiches of former more bloody conflicts. Theideological gain of France's medals haul at the Atlanta Olympics is less easilydefinable, except in general terms of symbolic capital, 'prestige', or grandeur,than say a French football victory against the Germans in the interwar period.

Economically and financially however, it is clear that the commercial import-ance of competitions such as the Olympics and the World Cup is now as obviousand complex as it was slight and uncomplicated in former times. The organis-ation of France 98 is predicated on the belief that the World Cup will bringfinancial gain to France, above and beyond the stimuli given to the localeconomies of the ten towns hosting games. The Comité français d'organisation(CFO) has planned a competition which will not only bring a smile to people'sfaces (the slogan of the CFO is 'C'est beau, un monde qui joue'), but which willalso be commercially profitable to the State, to the host cities and to the myriadof official partners and sponsors involved in the marketing of the event.

The World Cup mobilises multiple stakeholders and multilateral relationshipsboth inside and outside France. The tensions and synergies inherent betweenstakeholders must be negotiated because for many stakeholders the stakes arehigh in terms of power and influence and economics. In this sense the WorldCup is a very political event. But its multiple facets cross traditional distinctionsbetween the political and the non-political, between the State and civil society,or, in another light, the organisation of the 1998 World Cup illuminates theparticular understanding, in France, of where the line is drawn between thepolitical and the non-political. Sport, recreation and entertainment are activitiesthat might normally be expected to fall into areas of life that individuals canmanage for themselves through autonomous bodies, clubs and 'associations',community groups, private businesses and so on, set up and funded by individualcitizens to satisfy their own interests. However, the World Cup and the complexinterrelations of its stakeholders seem to require a wider view of the politicaldomain which extends to public institutions such as businesses and sports clubs.

Football and politics: tensions between stakeholders

Organising the World Cup has illustrated many issues of French politics andadministration related to the politics of sport. If the organisation of France 98 isviewed as something which demonstrates enduring French 'specificity' it is

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perhaps not insignificant that in two separate domains—the contracting for theStade de France (SdF) and the sale of tickets—France has been criticised by theEuropean Commission for flouting EU practice.1 More specifically, the sitingand planning of the SdF revealed tensions between the Mairie de Paris andMatignon and between local and central government. The stadium and the WorldCup became a political football at the change of government in 1993 and duringthe 1995 Presidential election. Furthermore, the design and building of the SdFexemplified endemic French problems of dubious dealings in large constructionprojects. On another level, the institutional framework devised to prepare andmanage France 98 reflects the relationships between the Ministère de la Jeunesseet des Sports, sporting associations and the sporting public which characteriseFrance's particular approach to state intervention in sport.

Every stage of the life of the SdF has been problematic, including its futureuse after France 98. Mitterrand's 'grands travaux' illustrated the State's use ofmonumental architecture for national identity and pride and the SdF is in manyways part of this tradition; however, the stadium is more 'grand chantier' than'grands travaux'.2 The Grand Stade (as it was originally called) project neverhad explicit presidential backing, and was beset by quarrels over who wasresponsible for it, demonstrating some of the complexities of the multipleinterests involved in organising the World Cup. During 1988-1993 socialistMatignon and right-wing Mairie de Paris competed over the Grand Stade ascentral government and Paris vied for control over the choice of site. Primeministers Rocard, Cresson and Bérégovoy had an agenda for the Grand Stade,which conflicted with that of the Ville de Paris. Rocard's priorities for theIle-de-France were outlined in the Livre blanc on the aménagement of theregion, prioritising Saclay, Massy, Tremblay and La Défense, and defining villesnouvelles such as Melun-Sénart as 'development centres' (and therefore potentialhomes for the stadium), while Chirac preferred a site as close to Paris aspossible. Whereas Rocard eventually chose the new town of Sénart—35 kilo-metres from Paris—as the site for the stadium in February 1991, Saint-Denis wasalways the preferred location of the Mairie de Paris once Chirac accepted publicconcern in Paris against a stadium being sited any closer to Paris intra muros.

Periodically, politicians with local interests lobbied in favour of their ownpreferences (Pasqua and Nanterre), but competition eventually narrowed toSénart (favoured by the Left and confirmed as the site by Bérégovoy inDecember 1992) and Saint-Denis (favoured by the sporting authorities and bythe Right). In favour of Chirac's plans to thwart the socialists' attachment toaménagement du territoire through the development of Sénart was the fact thatLa Plaine du Cornillon in Saint-Denis contained apparently suitable land ownedby the Mairie de Paris, and that the creation of the national stadium so close toParis itself would strengthen future bids from Paris to host the Olympics. Oneof the disadvantages of building the Grand Stade well outside Paris was that thismight jeopardise the financial viability of the stadium, for which it was hopedthat private enterprise would provide the lion's share of funding. Initially an ideaof Chirac's, but also dear to Rocard's ambitions to keep as far as possible to an

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état modeste, the hope that the national stadium would finance itself failedprogressively in the face of private sector scepticism over profitability, even inits final home of Saint-Denis. The hope at the time of writing is that it willbecome the home ground of France's richest club side, Paris Saint-Germain.

The prestige of hosting the World Cup was used by national politicians as anelectoral instrument, firstly by Chirac in 1988 when he announced France's (andParis's) candidature during the presidential campaign, and secondly, by bothChirac and prime minister Edouard Balladur during the 1995 presidentialelections, when both claimed responsibility for bringing the Finals to France andthe Grand Stade to Paris. The final choice of the site was similarly influencedby party politics, when the change of government in March 1993 led to theU-turn of choosing Saint-Denis, even though planning was already engaged forSénart.3

Choosing the site for the stadium was not the only political problem. InJanuary 1997, the European Commission ruled that choosing of the design andcontractors for the Stade de France had flouted European law, reflecting concernin France over the suspicious ease with which the Bouygues constructionconsortium was awarded the stadium contract.4 During the concours organisedto decide the best design and construction contractors, some competitors felt thattransparency and fairness were not being respected, to the manifest advantage ofsome of the tenders. The architect Jean Nouvel described the selection processas being flawed by 'une rupture manifeste de l'égalité', and took the problem tothe European Commission.5 The fact that Nouvel's design for the stadium, ifsuccessful, was to have been built by Dragages, a subsidiary of Bouygues, andthat the other finalist in the concours was the MZCR design team associated withBouygues-SGE-Dumez, underlined the apparent stranglehold exercised byBouygues over the Grand Stade dossier.

Elsewhere in this issue both Richard Holt and Philip Dine consider aspects ofthe French State's special approach to the management of sport. The hosting ofthe World Cup has revealed interesting examples of France's 'middle way',modified to fit the exigencies of convergence criteria-determined governmentfinances. Comparisons from 1993 established by the Council of Europe foundthat France was top of the western-European league for public finance for sportas a percentage of the whole of sports spending, and spending from the Frenchcentral state budget was ten times that by the UK.6 Public investment in theorganisation of Euro 96, the European Nations Cup held in England in 1996(admittedly smaller than the World Cup) was limited to £100,000, but despitebudgetary rigour the French government is subsidising the World Cup by theequivalent of £190 million (in addition to the 1.2 billion francs contributed to thebuilding of the SdF).7

French theorists have identified a typological split between northern andsouthern European nations in their approach to state-sport relations. The north-ern liberal model, as in Great Britain, treats sport as essentially dependent onindividual initiative, and its organisation and regulation are left to the sportsgoverning bodies or federations. In the interventionist model, promotion and

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development of sport are seen as a public service for which the State takes someresponsibility. If the State does not take direct responsibility for organising orregulating a given sport, the relevant sports authority is under some degree ofstate control.8 In France official recognition (agrément) by the Ministry forYouth and Sport allows, for instance, the imposition on sports governing bodiesof model statutes ensuring democratic functioning and accountability,9 and inreturn for this state tutelage and recognition of the sport's public service missionas being of 'public utility', a sporting body or affiliated club becomes eligible forofficial grant aid. Thus the Ministry for Youth and Sport delegates to the FFFthe monopoly of organisation, regulation and representation of football inFrance. The tutelage exercised by the State is real and allows supervision of thelegality and fairness of the Federation's activities because the FFF's authorityhas simply been delegated by the State on the behalf of French citizens. ThisFrench model of promoting sport is exemplified by the structures set up tomanage France 98, namely the Comité français d'organisation de la Coupe dumonde (CFO) and the Délégation interministérielle à la Coupe du Monde(DICOM).

The CFO was set up by the FFF as an association loi 1901 in November 1992.Co-presided by Michel Platini and Fernand Sastre (former FFF president), theCommittee is responsible for preparing and organising the World Cup in accordwith FIFA guidelines and within financial conditions prescribed by the FrenchState. The chief executive of the CFO is énarque Jacques Lambert, who hasclose links to the State (he was formerly préfet de la Savoie 1990-1993,responsible for safety and security at Albertville 92). Because of the State'sdisinclination to invest too heavily itself in the World Cup where otherfunding is possible, financially the CFO is dependent on ticket sales and on itsmarketing programme launched in early 1994. The success of the marketingprogramme and the huge demand for tickets has allowed the CFO's budget togradually increase since 1992, reaching 2.4 billion francs in September 1997.The overall financial objective of the CFO is to break even, and in early 1998this seemed a likely prospect, since despite escalating costs of personnel, thecreation of accreditation and media centres and hospitality villages, the turnoverof the France 98 marketing programme was already more than twice that ofUSA 94.

DICOM is more directly answerable to the government, and was created inMarch 1993 to help coordinate the interactions between the State, the CFO,cities, and local and regional authorities. Délégué interministériel Noël deSaint-Pulgent works with the Sports minister Marie-George Buffet (PC) andanswers to the prime minister's office. DICOM's responsibilities include coordi-nating the activities of the government bodies and public-sector companiesinvolved, implementing investment and infrastructure development programmesfor public amenities financed jointly by the State and the public sector, andproviding liaison between government, regions, departments and cities involvedin hosting games. More generally, DICOM intends to maximise the economic,social and cultural benefits that France will derive from the World Cup.

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Decisions about the World Cup, from the highest level of the State through themultilateral relations linking the many and varied stakeholders enumerated aboveillustrate the way sport in France, both participatory and spectator, has been seenas a public service, 'une mission de service public', at the very least since theLiberation governments, and as a legitimate concern of the public authoritiessince the Popular Front and Vichy. One of the official statements made by theFrench State about what the World Cup is to be about reveals some of the publicservice missions of football and France 98. In addition to the politics and theeconomics of the month of competition, for Mme Buffet, the summer of 1998should foster a 'rassemblement fraternel' and a 'fête de la jeunesse et de lacitoyenneté, de la solidarité':

Lieu de partage et d'émotions: voilà ce que le football ne devrait jamais cesser d'être.Rassemblement fraternel autour d'une même passion: tel est le sens que nous donnonsà cette Coupe du Monde. La France l'accueille avec fierté. Toutes les administrations del'Etat, de nombreux services et entreprises publics sont mobilisés pour la réussite de cetévénement exceptionnel. Nous voulons que la fête soit belle et que personne n'en soitexclu. [...] Tournois de foot, concerts, expositions, rencontres internationales,retransmissions des matchs sur grand écran: la fête se vivra aussi en dehors des stades,dans les quartiers populaires, avec la participation de milliers d'associations et debénévoles. [...] Ce sera une fête de la Jeunesse et de la citoyenneté, de la solidarité.10

However, beyond its important social impact, the 1998 World Cup is also ofmajor economic importance for the French economy nationally, for the ten hostcities and their regions and for the development of French football as aprofessional sport. It is to these economic and commercial issues that we nowturn.

Football and economics: national, regional and sporting dimensions

A few figures suggest the 1998 World Cup is the single biggest commercialevent in history. Total cost has been estimated as 9.4 billion francs (approxi-mately £1 billion) of which 6.6 billion has been spent on sporting and transportinfrastructure, also creating jobs in the construction industry building the publicfacilities that will remain after the World Cup circus has left town. Public moneyaccounts for 57 per cent of the total: the state has invested 3.2 billion, the restbeing covered by local authorities, the RATP, and the SNCF. The new nationalstadium alone cost 2.6 billion francs, just over half of which was paid by privateinvestment. With no direct public subsidy, the CFO's budget is 2.4 billion. Itstwo income streams are commercial sponsorship and ticket sales. Its national andmultinational 'partner' companies, in addition to the purchase of the logo asofficial sponsors for 150-200 million francs each, will also spend millions onadvertising before and during the event. Merchandising is a further majorcommercial opportunity around such events. The Sony subsidiary that bought themerchandising rights to the France 98 logo and mascot expects a turnover of8 billion francs, from the 140 or so licensed manufacturers of T-shirts and ties,

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badges and balls. Additionally broadcasting rights are a major source of incomefor FIFA."

The fact that world football championships generate such huge sums todayreflects the sport's globalisation, the power of television, and the sophisticationof modern marketing techniques. FIFA has sold rights to 12 major officialsponsors: Adidas, Anheuser-Busch, Canon, Coca-Cola, Fuji, Gillette, JVC,Mastercard, McDonald's, Opel, Philips, Snickers. Their exclusive rights topitch-side advertising gives about seven minutes TV exposure per match. TheCFO has in turn arranged all of the second-tier sponsorship: eight partenairesofficiels, nine suppliers of produits et services ojficels; and 16 prestatairesagréés. The activities of these sponsors will include providing the technologyand other back-up services for organising the event, for instance the Créditagricole bank provided the infrastructure for selling the tickets; Manpower ismanaging 12,000 volunteers to help with organisation.12

Sponsors names will be seen everywhere, inside and outside stadia. TheirWorld Cup themed television commercials will proliferate worldwide, specialsponsored events tied to the tournament, such as Adidas's Football Village inParis, are scheduled throughout the month. The eagerness of multinationals tobe involved with such a massive event is understandable: in addition to the2.5 million spectators attending the matches, the whole world's televisionaudience will be concentrated on France 98. Held only two years after Euro 96in England, it represents the culmination of a two-year campaign to spreadmarketing messages across Europe. Mastercard sponsored Euro 96 just as theyare sponsoring France 98, seeing it as the ideal way to demonstrate the relevanceof their brand to young men in particular. The credit card company is keen tobuild brand loyalty in Europe, where it is less well known than other moreestablished cards. Similarly Hewlett Packard is providing the hardware forFrance 98, as it gears up to tackle the European market to sell its multimediahome computers.13

The commercial impact derives from the visibility of the World Cup on globaltelevision. The 33 days of the World Cup, with its 64 matches broadcast to 195countries, constitute the single most watched series of programmes in the historyof global television, with an average of 500 million viewers per match, and acumulative total of 37 billion viewers (four times the population of the earth).The main beneficiary of the marketing bonanza will be FIFA, which has sold thebroadcasting rights as far back as 1987 to the European Broadcasting Union, agrouping of European public broadcasters—undersold them, it has been claimed,in the light of the way television has developed.14 FIFA's 12-year broadcastingagreement expires after France 98. For the two future World Cups, FIFA'ssubsidiary ISL will run everything, marketing and television. The marketingrights will be worth 3.4 billion francs, and the broadcasting rights, sold toTaurus-Kirch, rather than to public service broadcasters, cost 11.2 billionfrancs.15

Since FIFA has accepted that the modern World Cup, like the OlympicGames, is a global marketing bonanza, commercial stakeholders tend to domi-

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nate decision-making in the organisational hierarchy from FIFA downwards.Since commercial sponsors account for half of the CFO's budget, far more if oneadds in the prestige ticket sales to corporate clients, their ability to pressurise theorganisers is obvious. The weight of commercial interests and their use of theWorld Cup for public relations and customer relations is clear from the ticketingarrangements.

The CFO received much criticism in the six months preceding the start ofthe tournament, especially from foreign Football Associations, under pressurefrom their fans desperate to buy tickets. In compliance with FIFA guidelines,20 per cent of the two-and-a-half million tickets were allocated via FIFAto affiliated national football associations (this compares to 15 per cent in the1994 USA World Cup, where stadia were bigger). While this may seem areasonable percentage, it results for example, when allocated equally to givencompeting FAs, in fewer than 3000 tickets for each side's supporters inEngland's match in Lens. One of the key aims of the CFO and the Frenchfootball authorities was to spread the tickets as widely as possible in France, sothat interest stimulated within France for the World Cup would translate itselfinto high seat occupancy, not just to fill the stadia in June-July 1998, but in thehope that a wider spectator base would be created for subsequent domesticfootball. They saw the World Cup as a way of building a more durable interestin the game in France that would allow a lasting rise in gate receipts andbroadcasting income to clubs. Low spectator numbers has always been astructural weakness of French football (only 14,212 average gate in 1996-1997Division 1 games).16 The CFO felt French fans too were important stakeholdersin view of the enormous public investment of their taxes into the event. Sixtyper cent of the 2.5 million total tickets were sold in France therefore, a largenumber at low prices: half a million tickets cost less than 150 francs, and oneticket in two costs less than 250 francs. The CFO's approach was vindicatedin the sense that immense interest was generated in France: the France 98Pass package (gaining entry to all pre-quarter-final games in a given city) wassold out by the end of May 1997, and individual tickets for the nine mostimportant matches were oversubscribed threefold and a lottery organised toallocate them.17

However, the equity sought by the CFO in distributing the tickets seems tohave broken down somewhat under pressure to satisfy vested interests andsponsors. Le Monde reported that for the nine major matches, 50,000 tickets soldin France were in the form of boxes and prestige seats for corporate hospitality,and that these sales had brought in more than traditional ticket sales.18 Inaddition, 100,000 tickets went to official sponsors and commercial 'partners'.Some of these will come to the general public through public relations compe-titions, but most will go to corporate hospitality. The World Cup has followedthe pattern of major sports events where the traditional faithful spectator is beingousted in favour of corporate interests. There will be two distinct phases: thematches before the Quarter-Finals will be left to the French general public, plussmall contingents of foreign fans, and the later rounds will be watched by

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football's VIPs and the beneficiaries of corporate hospitality, plus relativelysmall numbers of 'real fans' of whatever nationality.

Aware of both regional, national and international interest in games in theirlocal stadium, the ten host towns (Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier,Nantes, Paris, Saint-Denis, Saint-Etienne, Toulouse) are also key stakeholders.French municipalities and their local football club have long been mutuallysupportive. The World Cup offers the opportunity to publicise a city or regionfor purposes of inward investment and tourism, and France 98 is being integratedinto the more ambitious local authorities' strategy of image communication,defining distinctive market positions, creating corporate images to endow thetown with a recognisable personality, and communication through logos, slo-gans, and PR events. Towns spend millions of francs on events as diverse asmusical festivals or the privilege of being a ville d'étape during the Tour deFrance.19

One major town that decided to opt out of the World Cup opportunity wasStrasbourg. Having a First Division club that has cost the town a lot of moneyin subsidies in recent years, its mayor, Catherine Trautmann, was not preparedto invest further in improving the stadium to be one of the host cities, when theyhad put in 150 million francs in 1984 for the European Nations Championship.This refusal became a local political issue, the opposition seeing it as a missedopportunity, since the state is putting one third of the capital into stadiumrenovations.20 Bordeaux was a natural host city, having led the way amongFrench cities in using the modern football business and in making the club asymbol of the city and the region on the national and international stage in the1980s. Mayor Chaban-Delmas claimed the promotional effects for the townswere 25 to 50 times the original investment.21

Montpellier was a less obvious choice. 'Montpellier la surdouée', at thecentre of the smallest host conurbation (248,000) amongst the host cities, isusing the World Cup to fit into its longer-term communications strategy.Football at first sight seems unrelated to an image based on classical musicand high culture: Montpellier boasts the Centre national choréographique duLanguedoc-Roussillon, its own philharmonic orchestra, two opera houses, a popconcert venue, and numerous music festivals. It has, however, managed to builda bridge between France 98 and its longer-term strategy by organising eventssuch as a musical competition where two orchestras 'play against each other' inthe open air in the city centre, while that evening's World Cup match isprojected onto a giant screen behind them. Other events such as a large-scaledance festival accompanied by 112 musicians, underline the cultural message,while more down-market photo-opportunities have been provided for visitingcamera crews by erecting a giant version of the World Cup mascot cockerel,Footix, in the Place de la Comédie, crowing 'Buuuuuuut' every hour on thehour. The local city and regional authorities have invested heavily in footballover the last 20 years which have seen the club rise from the Division d'honneur(Third Division) to European competitions. They were able, before the end of1997, to measure economic effects in terms of jobs, with many local firms

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working on the renovations to the stadium, the smallest of the ten, its capacityneeding to be enlarged by 50 per cent to turn it into a 35,500 all-seater stadium.Many spin-offs are expected in terms of tourism, given the international natureof the event.22

The smallest host town, Lens (35,280 inhabitants) has more parochial ambi-tions. Located in the major conurbation centred on Lille, with a stadium thatwill now hold 41,275 fans after 120 million francs of building work, LensRacing Club will be targeting 30 surrounding communes with a transportablemini-football pitch during the World Cup in an attempt to interest new youngsupporters in the club as the regional sporting standard-bearer.23

Conclusion: 'La France dans la cour des grands'

Sport has traditionally been used as a vehicle for nationalistic values in the veinof Mussolini's use of the prewar World Cups for the greater glory of fascistItaly, or the attempts by Hitler to transform the Berlin Olympic Games intopromotion of the Aryan ideal. More recently the 1978 World Cup was used tolegitimise the new Argentinean military regime internally and externally, and in1982 hosting the World Cup proved that Spain had finally emerged as arespectable member of a post-Franco Europe. However, as Martin Jacques haspointed out, whereas historically, sport has been intimately associated withnation and place, this is changing rapidly. Sport's peculiar mobility has allowedit to become a key agent of globalisation. 'Most cultural forms are limited intheir ability to travel, most obviously by language, but sport has an extraordinaryability to communicate.' He argues that the only true global occasions are theOlympics and the World Cup.24 This certainly helps explain why France 98 isa locus of tensions between national and multinational stakeholders. It has beendifficult for the local organisers to resist commercial stakeholders anxious to usethe event as an international marketing event. The Minister for Youth and Sportand the co-chair of the CFO, Michel Platini, have both used the same term indescribing their hopes for France 98: 'la fête'. Both have expressed a desire tobe inclusive, to avoid elitism, to encourage participation, especially amongyoung people. Is their 'fête de la Jeunesse, et de la citoyenneté, de la solidar-ité',25 a throw-back to the heady days of May 68? This aim, as seen incompromises with corporate interests over tickets, has not survived entirelyintact, but then their room for manoeuvre between FIFA, the big corporationsand the French state interests has been narrow.

The French state has had its own wider agenda from the outset. Staging amajor international event fits a modern tradition of the search for nationalgrandeur through the assertion of French symbolic and cultural capital. Thedifference today may be that the symbolic aspect may have been replaced by adesire to promote the economic and commercial dimension: selling the 'produitFrance'. Overall, however, hosting the World Cup may be seen as a statementthat France has definitively emerged from its inferiority complex to become aworld leader. The symbolism of the official World Cup song is significant: 'jouer

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'DANS LA COUR DES GRANDS1: FRANCE 98 3 4 9

dans la cour des grands'. Whereas France once had an Astérix complex—theexpectation of inevitable defeat for 'les petits Français', while emerging withhonour safe and some satisfaction from small victories achieved through wilyindividualism against overwhelming odds—this has now given way to a greaternational self-confidence.26 This may indeed go some way to explaining why theFootix cockerel mascot for France 98 seems so old-fashioned and unfortunate.International footballing successes for France in the mid-1980s and in the 1990sin European club competitions have confirmed a sense of French football comingof age; the staging of France 98 is one more expression of this new-foundnational self-confidence.

The French football authorities, hoping to promote the future growth of thedomestic game, and the host cities, seeing national and international communica-tions opportunities, have also tried to put their own spin on France 98, andindeed it is perhaps the input of the host towns that may remain in the memoryof visitors. However, whether the French stakeholders are looking to promoteFrench football to a domestic market, to ensure internal security, to promoteFrench hi-tech expertise abroad, to encourage cultural tourism, or generally tosell i e produit France' to an admiring international audience, the success withwhich they are able to do this will depend to some extent on the performanceof the national team. Indeed, for 30, 40 or 50 million ordinary armchair fans, thesuccess of 'les Bleus' will be the only criterion of how well France 98 has gone.However much football is being changed, it still happens on the pitch.

Notes and references1. HARRIS, N., 'Restriction on World Cup tickets "breaks European Law"', Independent (24 January 1998),

p. 24.2. See COLLARD, S., 'Mission impossible: les chantiers du Président', French Cultural Studies, ii, (1992),

pp. 97-132; DAUNCEY, H., 'Choosing and building the Grand Stade', French Politics and Society, 15(4)(1997), pp. 32-40 gives more detailed analysis of the planning of the new stadium.

3. See de CHENAY, C., 'Le Grand Stade attend une décision d'Edouard Balladur', Le Monde (26 avril1995), p. 29.

4. See PIERRETTE, J.-C., 'Fausses factures du BTP en Ile-de-France', Le Monde (5 février 1996), p. 6.5. EDELMANN, F., 'Jean Nouvel demande à M. Balladur d'annuler l'attribution du Grand Stade', Le

Monde (12 janvier 1995), p. 28, and QUATREMER, J., 'Carton rouge pour le Grand Stade', Libération(24 janvier 1997), p. 17.

6. VUORI, I., et al., 'Economie du sport, inventaire économique d'un phénomène de société', Problèmeséconomiques, 2503 (15 janvier 1997), pp. 1-5.

7. BURNS, J. and OWEN, D., 'Football chiefs take aim at the global goal: FA wants to host World Cup in2006 after Euro 96 success', Financial Times (6 July 1996), p. 8.

8. MIEGE, C., Le Sport européen (PUF, 1996), pp. 10-11, and Les Institutions sportives (PUF, 1993), p. 99.9. MIEGE, op. cit., note 8, p. 48.

10. Editorial de Marie-George Buffet (http://www.jeunesse-sports.gouv.fr/francais/mjs1000.htm).11. ECHEGUT, A., 'Mondial 1998: une facture de 9,4 milliards', Les Echos (4 décembre 1997), pp. 54-5;

CORDELIER, J., 'Les milliards de la Coupe', Le Point (3 janvier 1998), pp. 64-5.12. CORDELIER, ibid., pp. 64-5; and officiai World Cup web site (http://www.france98.com).13. HARVERSON, P., 'Comment and analysis: a whole new ball game scores a winner', Financial Times

(4 April 1996), p. 16.14. BURNS, J., 'Contracts debate may undermine Havelange', Financial Times (3 May 1996), p. 5.15. CORDELIER, op. cit., note 11, and official World Cup web site, op. cit., note 12.16. CHAUMIER, D. and ROCHETEAU, D., Le Guide Football 98 (Editions de la Lucarne, 1997), pp. 554-5.

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17. See official World Cup web site and press pack, op. cit., note 12.18. HOPQUIN, B., 'L'envahissante présence des "invités" dans les tribunes du Mondial 1998', Le Monde

(16 janvier 1998), p. 25.19. See HARE, G., 'Communications strategy, cultural tourism and the vitality of the small rural commune.

the case of Fontvieille (Bouches-du-Rhône)', Francophonie, 12 (1995), pp. 28-33; SPERLING, D., LeMarketing territorial. La communication des régions (Milan-Midia, 1991), pp. 20-1.

20. SAINT-MARTIN, E., 'Dix villes sur le pied de guerre', Le Point (3 janvier 1998), pp. 60-2.21. AUGUSTIN, J.-P., 'La percée du football en terre de rugby', Vingtième siècle (avril-juin 1990),

pp. 97-109; WAHL, A., Us Archives du football (Gallimard, 1989), p. 340.22. Officiai World Cup web site, op. cit., note 12; DANIEL, N., 'A Montpellier, la Coupe du Monde au pied

des tours du Grand Rail', L'Humanité (26 juin 1997), p. 22-3; PARKER, G., 'Montpellier ou lamaïeutique mercatique—from identity to reality. The art of wishful thinking', Modern & ContemporaryFrance, NS1 (1993), pp. 385-96.

23. Official World Cup web site, op. cit., note 12.24. JACQUES, M., 'Worshipping the body at the altar of sport', The Observer (13 January 1997), pp. 18-19.25. Ministry web site, op. cit., note 10.26. See DAUNCEY, H. and HARE, G., 'France: French football comes of age', in ARMSTRONG, G., and

GIULIANOTTI, R., Football in the Making: Developments in the World Game (Macmillan, forthcoming).

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