Poli Case Digests

7/31/2019 Poli Case Digests

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ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,petitioners,

vs.JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

March 25, 1919

Facts

Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes

to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that theprostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostituteswere confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, intwo boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to

another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent towork for him were actually prostitutes.

The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of

Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issuedagainst the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanaoagainst their will.

During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect,Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing

Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

Issue

Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men.

Held

We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting theprostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On thecontrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, whocompels any person to change his residence.

Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, asstipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause fordiscrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to

compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have beendeprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collecttheir belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished.

Tuason v. Register of Deeds

FACTS:

Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City by virtue of which they were issued atitle in their names and they took possession of their property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers,issued PD 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the lands covered to be open fordisposition and sale to members of the Malacaang Association Inc.

ISSUE: W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titles

HELD:


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The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he was never vested with judicial

power -- such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law --the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his office as chief executive.

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS NORTE

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created

to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functionsare those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare andthe promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the

administrative agency by the organic law of its existence

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that

Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision ofthe Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the

Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shag not be designated to

any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges

an administrative function, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106)ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic

rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify amember of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in

character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized byJustice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislativeofficial, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm

if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility noless than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecomingindifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of

government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. Aspublic officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice,RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, butonly when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn vs Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882


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Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the DENR

Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or

agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of

minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign

proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration, development,

utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining

operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms.

Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two newspapers of

general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30,

1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan

Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s.

1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO

No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR stop the

implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from receipt to act thereon. The

DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements;

(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative


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Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as

unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issue :

Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.

Ruling :

The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting

an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a

financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a

mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial and technical

assistance agreement;

The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing provisions and cannot

stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement.


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Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement

proposals;

Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial and technical

assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements, or

compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not

be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all

the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Maceda vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner

RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of

service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have

been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that

no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera

alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/maceda-vs-vasquez-gr-no-102781-april-22.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/maceda-vs-vasquez-gr-no-102781-april-22.html


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Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs

constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under

Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious

act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the

investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power ofadministrative supervision over

all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SCadministrative supervision over all courts and court

personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it

is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the

proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may

intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employeearises from their administrative duties, the

Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or

court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Angara vs. elecom

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the

position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara

was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On

Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of

theNational Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the

ElectoralCommission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution,

par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of

members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss

arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC

proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a

writ of prohibition from the SC.


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ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the

several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only

constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the

power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is thesource of

all authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute

and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the

government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

members of the National Assembly.

Aquino vs. Enrile

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a numberof

individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others filed

forhabeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the

arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the state,

when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the

Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet

disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant

to the Presidents order.

Bondoc vs. Pineda

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban

ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However,

Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One

member of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs


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leader) that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw

Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion?

HELD: The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature

particularly a part thereof, HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of

legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out

in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an

obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.

Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be

done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether

the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial

rather than political. The dutyremains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura

was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regardingthe electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative

from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was not supposed to comply with the

proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the

case.

Marcos vs. Manglapus

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to

enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right

of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They

contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do

so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to

do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been

ratified by the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the

Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.


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Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other

countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right

involved in this case at bar is the rightto return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from

although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to

leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the

"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant

guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any

country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order,

public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily

deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the samecontext as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to

return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle ofInternational Law and under our Constitution as part of the

law of the land.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the

Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has

determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the

past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant

petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Casibang v. AquinoGR L-38025 August 20, 1979Makasiar, J.:

Facts: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 localelections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, Dante Casibang who seasonably filed on

November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the

grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoralprecincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures

and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance

of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it isunquestionably a justiciable controversy.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issuedProclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or


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specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to

supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of theRepublic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further

judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50SCRA 30 [1973]).

The petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu

moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over thesame in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally (Section 9 of Article XVII[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI) a political question has intervened in the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question.

Held:

No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever beeninterwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to beindirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political

question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questionswhich under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concernedwith issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First

Instance should proceed.Tatad vs. Sec. of energyFacts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the Downstream Oil IndustryDeregulation Act of 1996. Under the deregulated environment, any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity

ofcrude oil andpetroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and otherdownstream oil facilities and marketsuch crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by

the Department of Energy.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy

(2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law(3) Whether or not Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution(4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power

(5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of tradeand unfaircompetition

Held: As to the first issue, judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of thegovernment. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute

enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution,it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void.

The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. The Court has brightlined its liberal

stance on a petitioners locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to thepeople. In the case, petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Courts forthright

resolution.

It is also contended that Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiringevery law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. The Court did not concur with this contention.

The title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single generalsubject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as theyare not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by

providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. The Court held that Sec. 5 providing for tariff


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differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assail Sec. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil

industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. There are two accepted tests todetermine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard

test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such thatwhen it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there

must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent thedelegation from running riot. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Congress

expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence ofany event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it forany purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion givento the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the

standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices ofcrudeoil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the USdollar is stable.

Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution. Section 19, Art. XIIof the Constitution espouses competition. The desirability ofcompetition is the reason for the prohibition against restraintof trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation ofunmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. 19, Art. XII of the Constitution which

cannot be violated by RA 8180. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league playersin the oil market. As the

dominant players, they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crudeoil and refined petroleum products therefore works to their immense benefit. It erects a high barrier to the entry ofnewplayers. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of

their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer thehuge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The provision on

inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell andCaltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities.Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost.

The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating theentire RA 8180. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another partis valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to the general rule isthat when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements or

compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one partwill vitiate the rest. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. The separability clause notwithstanding, the Court held that

the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The provisions ontariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. Congress could not have

regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisionson tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit faircompetition, encourage monopolistic power and interferewith the free interaction of market forces.Tanada vs. angara

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said

agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on itsexports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and

uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected inthe agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic

sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it givesforeign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of

the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles ofinternational law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation

and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of


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international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international

agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally bindingobligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation ofcommercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its

sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority.As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The

act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this bethe political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as

the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Itsalternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their dulyelected officers, make their free choice.Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Tanada vs. Cuenco

After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the

Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the otherhand was a senatorial candidate who

lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is

provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators

from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from

the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET

would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a memberof the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election

contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is

apolitical question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the

remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before thebarof

public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The termPolitical

Questionconnotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which,

under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary

authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues

dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Defensor Santiago vs. Guingona

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected

President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,

allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those

who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,

belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP

Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the

majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating


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that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized

Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto,

alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority

leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition

(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation ofthe Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of

the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations ofthe petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the

Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation ofthe Constitution or gravely abused

their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of

the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number out of a

total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the

Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all

the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the

minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall

automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead

silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI,

Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who

will be such other officers is merely aderivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said

constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Bagatsing vs. Committee on privatization

Facts Bagatsing is assailing the validity of the contract entered into by the government selling 48% shares in Petron for

violating the rights of members of Congress or impermissibly intruding into the domain of the Legislature. Petitioners


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also claim that the business of oil refining is a public utility and should not be sold to foreigners, in this case a Dutch

company.

Issue Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to sue as members of Congress and as taxpayers

Held They have no legal standing as members of Congress because they failed to show that the contract impaired them as

members of Congress. However, they can still sue as taxpayers because of the ruiling in Kilosbayan v. Guingona that

taxpayers may sue if there is a misappropriation of public funds contrary to law. In this case, the SC still ruled in favor of

PNOC since they found that PETRON is not involved in the buisiness of oil refining and therefore is not a public utility.

Sanidad vs. Comelec

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers

of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his presentpowers. 20 days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring

the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to thenational referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the

same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in thereferendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition tothe convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutionalamendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the

referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.

On Sep 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding

and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofaras they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise,control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose

amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or

legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond

judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to

exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is especially true in caseswhere the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normallyexercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not thelegality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act,

that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the

incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such

act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that

power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, theactuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended,

the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority

assumed was valid or not.

This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to presentthose proposals to the people in sufficient time.

Romulo vs. yniguez


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Petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of the Batasan, filed Resolution 644 calling for the impeachment of Pres.Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. The resolution and complaint were referred by the

Speaker to the Com. On Justice, HR and Good Government which found the complaint not sufficient in form andsubstance. It dismissed all the charges and sent to the archives.

Ramon Mitra moved to recall Res. 644, but Batasan disapproved it.

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to restrain from enforcing Secs. 4-6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of

Procedure in Impeachment and mandamus to compel the Committee to recall from the archives and report out the

resolution together with the verified complaint. They allege that the provisions of the Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional because they amend the

Constitution by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by therequisite 1/5 of all the members of the BP and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment

proceedings by vesting the Committee the power to impeach or not to impeach when such prerogative belongsto the BP as a collegiate body.

Sec. 8: it imposes unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint can proceed totrial before the Batasan by requiring a majority vote of all the members as it imposes a condition not required

by the Constitution.

Respondents:

This is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction

Political questions

Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that

the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the

Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint evenwithout the benefit of said Rules

SC cannot compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.

Can the SC compel the Committee to recall from the archives and order the conduct of trial? NO

When the Batasan denied the motion for recall, it had in effect confirmed the action of the Committee. Since theConstitution expressly provides that "no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all its

members," a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the Committee disapproving theresolution calling for the impeachment of the President and dismissing all the charges contained in the complaint makesmathematically impossible the required at least 2/3 vote of all members of the Batasan to support a judgment ofconviction. Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body

of the resolution and complaint for impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall

from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what authoritythe Committee had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedingsis an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the

power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for bypetitioners. An order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. An interference bythe judicial department of the government with the workings and operations of the committee of the legislativedepartment would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the legislative department itself.

And, again, we are called upon to say, that one branch of the government cannot encroach upon the domain of anotherwithout danger.

Whether the Batasans Rules of Procedure is constitutional? YES

The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its proceedings may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of

procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing for dismissal of a complaint forimpeachment which is not sufficient in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or

probable cause has not been established, or requiring a majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of theresolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with the provision of Sec. 3 of Article XIII of

the 1973 Constitution. More specifically, the provision requiring concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of all members of theBatasan for conviction is not violated by any provision of the Rules which authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority

vote of the Batasan since with such number of votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote of all members necessary forconviction can no longer be obtained. Such being the case, the Batasan can specify in its rules how and when the

impeachment proceedings can be terminated or dismissed for Sec. 3, Article XIII merely provides for how a judgment ofconviction can be sustained but is silent on how a complaint for impeachment can be dismissed when it becomes apparentthat a judgment of conviction by the required number of votes is not possible. Neither is the Constitutional provision tothe effect that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of the members violated by the provision of the

Rules authorizing the Committee to dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it finds not sufficient in form and


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substance (Sec. 4), does not have sufficient grounds for impeachment (Sec. 5), or where probable cause has not been

established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for impeachment initiatedby at least one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or not a complaint for

impeachment initiated by the required number of members of the Batasan warrants being referred to the Batasan for trial.They are not properly part of the "initiation phase" of the impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more

accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such actions are liken to actions taken by this Court in determining whether apetition duly filed should be given due course or should be dismissed outright. That the Rules on Impeachment of the

Interim Batasan in the judgment of petitioners is better is no argument against the validity or constitutionality of the Ruleson Impeachment approved by the Batasan. Said Rules are always within the power of the Batasan to modify, change

or replace any time. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderlyand convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not substantive. They

may be waived or disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no concern. The rulesof public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the form of a 'manual and formally adopted by the body, or whether

consisting of a body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in memory and by tradition are matters of which thejudicial courts, as a general rule, take no cognizance. Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and notsubstantive. The rules of procedure adopted by deliberative bodies have not the force of a public law, but they are merelyin the nature of by-laws, prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. The rules adopted

by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Therules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding on a subsequent legislative body operating within thesame jurisdiction, and, where a body resolves that the rules of a prior body be adopted until a committee reports rules, the

prior rules cease to be in force on the report of the committee.

DISMISSED complaints.

Jaworski v. PagcorG.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004

Facts:

On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument denominated as Grant of Authority and

Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the authority to operate andmaintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and

international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are establishedto ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.

On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by itsChairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document.

Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Interneton a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.

Petitioner Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,

Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE benullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionwhen it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under itslegislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not

have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yetinexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being aninternational network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant toSAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of

P.D. No. 1869.

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gamblingactivities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and authority to

operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within theterritorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could not have been

included within the commonly accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusementplaces as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play

games of chance authorized by law.


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Issues:

(a) Whether respondent Pagcor is authorized under PD No. 1869 to operate gambling activities on the internet?

(b) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction, when it authorized respondent Sage to operate internet gambling on the basis of its right to operate andmaintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other amusement places under Section 10 of PD 1869?

(c) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it granted authority to Sage to operate gambling activities in the internet?

Held:

In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has no legal standing to file theinstant petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite personal andsubstantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCORs grant of authority to SAGE.

Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of thegovernment there must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and

prerogatives as legislator. However in a number of cases, we clarified that where a case involves an issue of utmost

importance, or one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside procedural

technicalities and take cognizance of the petition. Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that mayhave serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.

Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether

exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its legally-mandated franchiseto grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial orquasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerialact. According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed

for failure of petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter the authority tooperate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. The petition is GRANTED. The Grant of

Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE isdeclared NULL and VOID.

Garcia vs. executive secretary

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued Executive Order 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes andcharges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This additionalduty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and otheroil products imported into the

Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating theprevious 5% duty except that crude oil and other oilproductscontinued to be taxed at 9%. Garcia, a representative fromBataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of Art 6 of the Constitution which

provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,

and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur withamendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the Presidentmay not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generatingmeasures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all

other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures,are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) ofArticle VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within

specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the


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Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such

limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties orimposts . . . .

Philippine interisland vs. ca

The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power. When he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized

under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under the original 1973Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage

service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it becamenecessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. That is what the President

did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could heexercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No. 857, Section 20(a) in the PPA

"to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority orby any private organization within a Port District

Araneta vs. dinglasan

Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.

Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceedingwith the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were

consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controlsexports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from

disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriatingfunds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL

EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WARINVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENTTO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY orsimply the Emergency PowersAct. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it hadlikewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that

Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session ofCongress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point ofexpiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect

to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider generallegislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding

dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the NationalAssembly. Even ifwarcontinues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs,otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Rodriguez v.s gella

Rodriguez et al seekto invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum ofP37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the

provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOswere pursuant to Commonwealth act 671. Note that prior toAraneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean Warand his perception that Waris still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in theAraneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective.

The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he fearedcannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent ofCongress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its

power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would beeasier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the
http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/http://www.uberdigests.info/2011/11/antonio-araneta-vs-judge-rafael-dinglasan/


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law. Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only

in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keepthe relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is

coupled with interest.

Randolf David et al vs Gloria Arroyo

Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power

&

Niez Cacho-Olivares vs Exec Sec Ermita

-Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) toassassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppresslawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all

plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public

organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally

which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG andthey seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a

warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail becauseof the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of nationalemergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has nofactual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such

declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in theConstitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an

overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has becomemoot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that

PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still infact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take

cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions ofwhich are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor

Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance ofPP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, theiraudacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and thereproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security

Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented

nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President wasjustified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was notexpected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion

or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in freespeech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP

1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to


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prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the

validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionallyunprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and

constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statuteswhich, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have

been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, theincontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject

to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of

whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a mannerconstituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grantsthe President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are:the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial

Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the Presidentmay call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has beenmet.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) thepresident declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it

arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforceobedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as

provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority

to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of aSenate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergencycan justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying

out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribunewithout any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is notlimited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare thestate of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise

needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the callingout power of the president by the president.

People vs. vera


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Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the

SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation allegingthat the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular

Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed thepetition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under

probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincialboards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is

applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila iscovered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The

said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, thesaid probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation,in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition ofpenalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial

boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which isviolative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so

protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Actshall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a

probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shallbe appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This onlymeans that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation withintheir locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of

their right to probation.

Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC.,

CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIMEAGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP., INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP.,

JZEL COMPANY, INC. , LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIMESERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-

PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING(PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS

EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON,respondent.

Date: April 21, 1995

Ponente: Davide, Jr.,J.Facts:

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino

manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen forand in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, ofthe Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.

Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affectingdeath and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.

Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the

compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and

2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers

Issue/Held: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power. Yes.

Ratio:

The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of

legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern

Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.o The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to

govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).


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o To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence

to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, beexpected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the

latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a givenlegislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to

anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should

be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformitywith the standards prescribed by the law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation)

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previousMemorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitableemployment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.

Osmena vs. orbos

Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the General Fund, designatedas the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases incrude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world

market prices of crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024, and ordered released fromthe National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27, 1987, expanding thegrounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction ofdomestic prices of petroleum products, the amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of

Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for suchpurposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any,

shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIALFUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue

generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled toanother government objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collectedthrough the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special

purpose/objective for which it was created."

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI of the Constitution,viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such limitations andrestrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties orimposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government;

and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the

Documents

Poli Case Digests