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2 Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Rights Law [Vol. 3:1

has to conduct a fair and effective refugee status determination procedure, which is possible only within that state’s territory. The fact that so many peo-ple try to reach the territories of developed countries and claim asylum shouldnot be used by states as a justification for undermining the refugee protection

regime. States have undertaken international obligations regarding refugeesand any qualification or implied limitation of these obligations is to the detri-ment of human rights.

The first part of the paper generally presents states’ obligations concern-ing asylum-seekers. The second part presents views in asylum literature on therelation between non-refoulement and access to state territory. It contains thecore arguments in support of the claim that there cannot be an absolute pro-hibition of refoulement without access to state territory. The third part is de-

voted to three groups of asylum-seekers (asylum-seekers intercepted in thehigh seas, rescued asylum-seekers and stowaway asylum-seekers), which are all

victims of the state practice of blocking access to territory. These three groupsof asylum-seekers have been chosen for the purposes of this paper becausethey constitute highly vulnerable groups.

II. STATES’ OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING ASYLUM-SEEKERS

States are entitled to control immigration, a practice recognized to be within the reserved domain of their sovereignty.5 Immigration control pre-supposes two prerogatives—denying or blocking access to state territory, andensuring the return of those aliens who have succeeded in entering.6 At the

same time, immigration control as an expression of state sovereignty is subjectto the principles and norms of international human rights law. More specifi-cally, the prerogatives of states to control entrance, residence, and deportationof aliens are subject to certain human rights obligations.7 However, immigra-tion control and human rights protection come into conflict when asylum-seekers flee their countries and try to find safe shelter.

Potential countries of asylum are often unwilling to offer protection. Infact, they actually try to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching their territory as well as return those who have managed to enter. When states implementsuch security mechanisms, no distinction between refugees and other immi-

grants is made. Refugees are not illegal immigrants; they are people whosehuman rights have been violated. Their counties of origin are unwilling orunable to offer them protection and, accordingly, they are in need of interna-tional protection.8 However, the procedure for determining immigrants’

5 Ian Brownlie, Principles Of Public International Law, 6th ed., 293 (OxfordUniversity Press, 2003).

6 Matthew J. Gibney and Randall Hansen, Deportation and the Liberal State: the Forcible Return of Asylum Seekers and Unlawful Migrants in Canada, Germany and the

United Kingdom, UNHCR Working Paper, at 1, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/research/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id= 3e59de764 7 Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application no. 13163 /87;

13164 /87; 13165 /87; 13447 /87; 13448 /87, Judgment of 30 October 1991, ¶102; Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application no. 22414 /93, Report of 27 June 1995,¶73; Amuur v. France, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application no. 19776 /92, Judgment of 25 June1996, ¶41.

8 James Hathaway, The Law Of Refugee Status 20 (Butterworth’s, 1991).



2008-2009] The Principle of Non-Refoulement 3

status and for identifying the real refugees is expensive and time-consuming.Consequently, states prefer not to take the responsibility of offering protec-tion.

Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the

right “to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” “Asy-lum” is protection offered by states to aliens who flee persecution and humanrights violations. Accordingly, asylum-seekers are persons whose applicationsfor asylum are under review by the state authorities and who might or mightnot receive protection. When they do not receive asylum or refugee status and

when they have no other legal ground to stay in the country, they must leave. Asylum-seekers are potential refugees, and they receive the status of “refugee”if they prove that they have a well-founded fear “of being persecuted for rea-sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group orpolitical opinion.”9

The most important international human rights instruments, which pro-hibit exposure to refoulement , are the Geneva Convention relating to theStatus of Refugees, the United Nations Convention against Torture andOther Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,10 and theConvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-doms,11 also known as the European Convention on Human Rights. Each im-poses a prohibition on refoulement . Article 33 of the Refugee Conventionstipulates that

No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler ”) a

refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territo-ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on ac-count of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-ticular social group or political opinion.

Article 3 of CAT states that “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler ”), orextradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for be-lieving that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The Euro-pean Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 3 (Prohibition for tor-ture) of the European Convention in such a way as to include a prohibition on

refoulement .12 The principle of non-refoulement applies to asylum-seekers who are still

under the refugee status determination procedure; to individuals who cannotbe returned since there is a risk that they will be subjected to torture or to in-humane or degrading treatment or punishment; and to individuals who have

9 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429(V), 360 U.N.T.S.117 (1950) [hereinafter The Refugee Convention], Art. 1 A.

10 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 39 /46, UN GAOR, 1984, Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/39 /51 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,

213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter the European Convention on Human Rights].12 See Soering v. the United Kingdom, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application No. 14038 /88,

Judgment of 7 July 1989; Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application no.22414 /93, Report of 27 June 1995; Ahmed v Austria, Eur.Ct. H.R., ApplicationNo.25964 /94, Judgment of 7 December 1996.




been recognized as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the RefugeeConvention. Any act of removal is prohibited, which means that the formaldescription of the act—deportation, expulsion, extradition, return—is not ma-terial.13

III. STATES’ OBLIGATION TO GRANT ACCESS TO THEIR TERRI-

TORY

Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the bor-ders of each state” and “Everyone has the right to leave any country, includinghis own, and to return to his country.” Accordingly, asylum-seekers have theright to leave their countries, but they are not entitled to enter other coun-tries. While freedom of movement within the borders of each state is recog-

nized, freedom of movement across international borders is a controversial is-sue.

There is no explicit international norm that obliges states to grant asylumand consequently to accept refugees into their territories. Goodwin Gill findsthat state practice permits only one conclusion: the individual has no right tobe granted asylum.14 He further explains that there is no necessary connectionbetween non-refoulement and admission or asylum; the discretion to grant asy-lum and the obligation to abide by non-refoulement remain divided.15 María-

Teresa Gil Bazo affirms that there is no international recognition of the rightto be granted asylum of universal scope.16 Similarly, the non-refoulement prin-ciple provided for in Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention does not giveindividuals the right to receive asylum in a particular state.17 The prohibitionfor refoulement therefore does not negate the sovereign right of states to regu-late the entrance of aliens in their territory.18 Gill states that non-refoulement isnot so much about admission to a state as it is about not returning refugees to

where their lives or freedom may be endangered.19

13

Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The scope and content of the principleof non-refoulement: Opinion, at 112, available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/.14 Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee In International Law 202 (Clarendon, 1996).15 Ibid .16 María-Teresa Gil Bazo, New issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR Research

paper No.136, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to be Granted Asylumunder EU Law, at 7, available at http://www.unhcr.org/research/: “It’s worth notingthat despite the lack of an international recognition of the right to be granted asylumof universal scope, following the entry into force of the Directive [ 2004 /83 on mini-mum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or statelesspersons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the

content of the protection granted], around 100 of the 146 states parties to the GenevaConvention and/or its Protocol are now bound by an obligation under internationallaw (of regional scope) to grant asylum.”

17 Paul Weis, The Refugee Convention, 1951: The Travaux Preparatoires Ana-lyzed With A Commentary By Dr. Paul Weis 342 (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

18 R. v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport et al., ex parte European Roma Rights Center et al., (2004) UKHL 55 (UK UL, 9 Dec. 2004), ¶19.

19 Guy Goodwin Gill, The Refugee In International Law 132 (Clarendon, 1996).




At the same time, it has been recognized that non-refoulement to a certaindegree limits state sovereignty, because the prohibition in Article 33(1) couldin certain situations amount to a de facto obligation to accept asylum-seekers ina state’s territory if the denial of acceptance “in any manner whatsoever” re-

sults in exposure to risk. James Hathaway finds that acceptance in a state’s ter-ritory could be the only way the consequences from risk exposure can beavoided.20 Alice Edwards has suggested that, read together, Articles 1 and 33 of the Refugee Convention place a duty on States parties to grant, at a mini-mum, access to asylum procedures for the purpose of refugee status determi-nation.21 Further, Edwards points out that access to asylum procedures is animplied right under the 1951 Convention, without which obligations of non-refoulement , including rejection at the frontier, could be infringed.22

Non-refoulement cannot be guaranteed without granting asylum-seekersaccess to state territory. Denial of access to state territory equates to a denial

of fair refugee status determination procedure. If a refugee status determina-tion procedure is not conducted, it becomes impossible to identify those asy-lum-seekers who face risk of persecution if denied protection. Since non-refoulement prevents violations of human rights, which are recognized to holdsuch significant value (like the prohibition of torture) that states should investspecial efforts in order to achieve some degree of certainty that these rightsare not breached. Along these lines of reasoning, conducting refugee statusdetermination procedures is of paramount importance. The procedure has theobjective of determining who is a refugee and who is not a refugee, and there-fore what rights each is entitled to. In order for states to meet their obliga-tions stipulated in the Refugee Convention, including the prohibition of re-

foulement , they have to assess on an individual basis the story of each asylum-seeker.

Since a fair and effective determination procedure includes the right toappeal a negative decision in front of national courts, the procedure can befair and effective only if it is conducted on state territory. The availability of appeal precludes carrying out procedures on states’ borders or immediately before them in international zones.

Another pertinent issue, except the right to appeal, would be whether asy-lum-seekers have access to legal assistance. Without legal help, asylum-seekers are at the mercy of state immigration officials, which is a premise forarbitrariness. Further, although the duty to ascertain and evaluate all relevantfacts is shared between the applicant and the examiner, generally the burdenof proof lies on the individual submitting a claim.23 Demonstrating that theparticular situation of an asylum-seeker falls within the conditions of Article1 A of the Refugee Convention is an arduous endeavor even for a person with

20 James Hathaway, The Rights Of Refugees Under International Law 301 (Cam-

bridge University Press, 2005).21 Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right To Enjoy Asylum, 17 Int’l J.Refugee L. 302 (2005).

22 Alice Edwards, Tampering with Refugee Protection: The Case of Australia, 15 Int’l J.Refugee L. 198 (2003).

23 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status underthe 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,HCR/IP/4 /Eng/REV.1 Reedited, Geneva, January 1992, UNHCR 1979, ¶196.




a legal background. It follows that access to state territory also means access tolegal aid and real chances for asylum-seekers to prove their asylum claims.Equally important is the availability of an interpreter. Preliminary interviewsat state borders and in international zones might not include an interpreter,

which makes it impossible for asylum-seekers to communicate their stories.Consequently, there is a clear connection between the prohibition on re-

foulement and access to state territory. Access to state territory means access tofair and effective procedure for determining if an asylum-seeker needs protec-tion. Therefore, the practices applied by states to block potential access totheir territory are in violation of the prohibition of refoulement. Interceptionof asylum-seekers on the high seas is an example of such a practice. Similarly,asylum-seekers rescued at sea and stowaway asylum-seekers are vulnerablegroups since states do not allow them to enter their territory and to submitapplications for asylum.

IV. INTERCEPTION ON THE HIGH SEAS

The United States’ practice of returning asylum-seekers from Haiti is anotorious example of denying access to state territory. It is also an example of how states can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and, after that, claim thatthey are not responsible for the actions of their officials committed outsidenational borders. In the Sale v. Haitian Centers Council decision,24 the majority of the USA Supreme Court held that United Nations Protocol Relating to theStatus of Refugees25 does not apply to actions taken by the Coast Guard on

the high seas. Accordingly, in the opinion of the majority, the non-refoulement principle embodied in Article 33 (1) from the Refugee Convention is inappli-cable outside USA borders.

The idea that states are not responsible for human rights violations com-mitted by their agents in so-called international zones is unacceptable. By signing international human rights treaties, states have undertaken obligationsto respect the rights of individuals under their jurisdiction. Article 2(1) of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates, “Each StateParty to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indi-

viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in

the present Covenant…” The phrase “within its territory” cannot be inter-preted as allowing states to commit such human rights violations in interna-tional zones, which they cannot commit in their own territory.26 The UnitedNations Human Rights Committee has stated that the phrase “within its terri-

24 Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al. v. Haitian

Center Council , Inc., et al., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Only Judge Blackmun had DissentingOpinion. Judge Blackmun’s main reasons for dissenting were the following: the lan-guage of Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention is unambiguous—refugees should

not be returned; Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention does not contain geographi-cal limitation; it limits only where a refugee may be sent “to,” not where he may besent from.

25 USA is not party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. It isparty to the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the New York Protocol), 606 U.N.T.S. 267.

26 Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, Communica-tion No. R.12 /52, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36 /40) 176 (1981), ¶¶12.1-12.3.




tory and subject to its jurisdiction” refers not to the place, but to the connec-tion between the individual and the state.27 States should respect the rights of all individuals under their effective control, even if they are not in the states’territory.28 The concept of jurisdiction is therefore not limited to national

territory.29 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights hasemphasized that the phrase “within their jurisdiction” includes stateresponsibility for actions of state officials in international zones at airports30 and actions of state authorities irrespective of the place where they have beencommitted.31 The decisive factor is whether the individual is under theeffective control of the state officials.32 The International Court of Justice hasalso noted that the drafters of the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights “ did not intend to allow States to escape from theirobligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory.”33

A narrow interpretation of Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention al-

lows the return of asylum-seekers to persecution with the justification thatthey have not set foot on state territory and accordingly states do not have any obligations regarding them. However, such interpretation is unacceptablesince it is inconsistent with the objectives of the Refugee Convention, which isan international instrument within the international human rights treatiesframework.

V. ASYLUM-SEEKERS RESCUED AT SEA

Intercepted asylum-seekers could turn into people in distress at sea. In

this case, the issue that arises is which states are responsible for the rescuedasylum-seekers. International refugee law and international maritime law areboth relevant when examining the problem. Many questions need answering,such as those that deal with the obligations of the coastal state and of the state

whose ship rescued the asylum-seekers. The duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea is established in

both international treaty and customary law.34 However, the case of rescuedasylum-seekers constitutes a problem for the following reasons—the asylum-

27 Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, Communication

No. 52 /1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 88 (1984), ¶12.2.28 General Comment No. 31(80), Nature of the General Legal Obligations Im-

posed on States Parties to the Covenant: 26/05/2004 CCPR/C/21 /Rev.1 /Add.13 (General Comments), at ¶10.

29 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Eur.Ct. H.R., Application No.15318 /89, Judgment of 23 March 1995, ¶¶62-63.

30 Amuur v. France, Eur.Ct. H.R., Application No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June1996, ¶533.

31 Richard Plender and Nuala Mole, Beyond the Geneva Convention: Construction a

de facto Right to Asylum from International Human Rights Instruments , in Refugee Rights And Realities 86 (Cambridge University Press, 1999).32 Bankovic et al. v. Belgium and 16 other contracting States (Admissibility), Eur.Ct.

H.R., Application No. 52207 /99, 12 December 2001, ¶71.33 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-

tory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 136 (2004), ¶109.34 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM

1261 (1982), Article 98.




seekers do not want to go back to their countries of origin and at the sametime no other state is obliged to accept them in its territory.35 Asylum-seekersin distress on the high seas have to be rescued; however, it is not clear whoshould take responsibility for them after their rescue. There is no provision in

international maritime law to stipulate where the rescued asylum-seeker candisembark from the ship which has rescued them. States are obliged not to re-turn asylum seekers to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedommight be threatened. No state, nevertheless, has the positive obligation to ac-cept them. It is not clear which state is responsible to review their applicationsfor asylum. Without procedure aimed at identifying the refugees, the obser-

vance of non- refoulement cannot be ensured. The incident of the Norwegian ship Tampa and Australia’s unwillingness

to accept asylum-seekers on its territory illustrates how asylum-seekers res-cued at sea fall into a legal limbo.36 The pending questions at the time of the

incident were if Tampa was entitled to enter Australian territorial waters andport and whether Australia had any obligation regarding the rescued individu-als who wanted to submit applications for asylum in Australia.

After rescuing asylum-seekers in distress at sea, Tampa was not allowed toenter Australian territorial waters and port. The position of Australia was thatTampa carried individuals who intended to enter Australia illegally,37 which isa breach of the conditions for admission.38 Consequently, closure of the Aus-tralian harbor is necessary for the prevention of the entrance of illegal immi-grants. Further, international maritime law entitles coastal states to demandthat a ship, which carries illegal immigrants, should leave their territorial wa-ters.39 It could be concluded that current maritime law does not take into con-sideration the problem of asylum-seekers.

However, an issue which should raised is whether the individuals saved by Tampa could be labeled as illegal immigrants. Australia cannot define them asillegal immigrants, since it has not conducted refugee status determinationprocedures. Some of the rescued asylum-seekers could be refugees and, as it

was already clarified, refugees are not illegal immigrants.From the perspective of international refugee law, it has to be mentioned

that no provision explicitly indicates where the obligation for reviewing theasylum application arises.40 However, once an asylum-seeker is under the ju-risdiction of a particular state and claims to be in need of international protec-tion, that state is obliged to fulfill its obligations under the Refugee Conven-tion and to determine the status of the person. In respect to the Tampa case, it

35 Ernst Willheim, MV Tampa: The Australian Response, 15 Int’l J. Refugee L. 166(2003).

36 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Stateof World’s Refugees Human Displacement in the New Millennium (2006), at 41.

37 Willheim, supra note 35.38

Article 25(1) of the Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates: “In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters,the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call issubject.”

39 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 34, at Article 19.40 Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.

229, 232 (1996).




should be emphasized that the ship entered Australian territorial waters, in which Australia has full sovereign rights. The asylum-seekers expressed theirdesire to submit applications for asylum and to seek protection in Australia.

Accordingly, by denying review of their asylum applications, Australia ex-

posed them to potential refoulement .

VI. STOWAWAYS

International human rights law does not contain specific binding rulesconcerning stowaway asylum-seekers. An international convention—the Brus-sels Convention—relating to stowaways was adopted in 1957, but it has not

yet entered into force due to the absence of a sufficient number of ratificationsby states.41 Therefore, its provisions are valid only as recommendations. Arti-cle 1 of the Brussels Convention defines a stowaway “as a person who, at any

port or place in the vicinity thereof, secretes himself in a ship without the con-sent of the shipowner or the Master or any other person in charge of the shipand who is on board after the ship has left that port or place.” If a stowaway isfound on board, the Master may deliver him to the appropriate authority atthe first port in a state party to the convention at which the ship calls after thestowaway is found. The state of first port of disembarkation only temporarily accepts the stowaway. That state may return the stowaway to his country of nationality, to the state where his port of embarkation is considered to be situ-ated, or to the state in which the last port at which the ship called prior to hisbeing found is situated. Finally, the state of first port of disembarkation could

return the stowaway to the state whose flag was flown by the ship in which he was found. The Brussels Convention specifically indicates that the Master of the ship and the appropriate authorities of the port of disembarkation shouldtake into account the reasons which may be put forward by the stowaway fornot being disembarked at or returned to those ports or states mentioned inthe convention.

The Brussels Convention does not provide for an adequate solution to theproblem of stowaway asylum-seekers. The possibility for chain transferringequates to a lack of any responsibility on the part of a state for conducting arefugee status determination procedure. Moreover, among the asylum-seekers

there could be refugees, who have already undergone human rights violationsand the transfer could be very traumatic for them. The process of transfer it-self could even amount to inhumane and degrading treatment.

If the problem is approached from the international maritime law per-spective, it should be pointed out that once a ship enters the port of a coastalstate, that state is then entitled to exercise full immigration control. Althougha ship is considered to be part of the territory of the country whose flag theship flies, once the ship enters the coastal state territorial waters, the stowaway asylum-seekers on the ship are already physically present in the sovereign ter-ritory of the coastal state. Further, Article 24 of the Convention on the Terri-

torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone stipulates that “in a zone of the high seascontiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control nec-

41 The International Convention relating to Stowaways, Brussels, 10 October1957. Nine countries have ratified the convention: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Madagascar, Morocco, Norway, Peru, and Sweden. Ten ratifications are required inorder for the convention to enter into force.





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