Source Du Droit Anglo-Saxon

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SourceduDroitanglosaxon CHEYRithy&SergeBASSET

1

UniversitRoyaledeDroitetdesSciencesconomiques

UniversitLumireLyon2

FilireSpcialedeDroit

20112012

COMMONLAWSourceduDroitAnglosaxon

Enseignant:M.RithyCHEY

Encollaboration

avec

M.

Serge

BASSET


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SOURCE DU DROIT ANGLO-SAXONElmentsdelaBibliographie

Ouvrages,manuels,Raymond Legeais, Les grands systmes de droit contemporains, une approche

comparative, Litec (Manuel) 2008, 494 pages.Michel Fromont, Grandssystmesdedroittrangers, Mmentos Dalloz, 4edition 2005,

197 pages.

Michel L. Wells, Introduction to American Law, University of Georgia Law School, Cours,

indit.

Alain V. Levasseur, Ledroitamricain, DallozConnaissance du droit, 2004, 162 pages.

Rn David, Camille JauffretSpinosi, Lesgrandssystmesdedroitcontemporains, Dalloz

Prcis, 11edition 2002, 553 pages.

Roland Sroussi, Introductionaudroitanglaisetamricain, Dunod 3edition 2003, 200

pages.

Roland Sroussi, Introductionau

droit

compar, Dunod 2edition 2003, 208 pages.

Francis Lefebvre, RoyaumeUni (Juridique, fiscal, social, comptable), Dossiers

Internationaux dition Francis Lefebvre 2003, 535 pages.

Slapper Gary & Kelly David, The English Legal System 20092010, 10th Revised Edition,

Routledge Cavendish, 2009,

Holland James & Webb Julian, Learning Legal Rules, 6th Edition, Oxford University Press,

2006,

James Philip S, Introduction To English Law, 12th Edition, Butterworths, 1989,

Osborns Concise Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, Edited By Mick Woodley, Thomson &

Sweet&Maxwell, 2005,

Harraps Dictionnaire Juridique/Law Dictionary, FranaisAnglais/EnglishFrench,Dalloz, 2004.

Sitesdinternet- Journal Officiel de lUnion Europenne, http://eur

lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do?ihmlang=en

- Journal Officiel des RoyaumesUnis, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/

- Journal Officiel des EtatsUnis, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/legislative.html

- Journal Officiel de lAustralie, http://australia.gov.au/publications/australian

governmentgazettes

- Journal Officiel de Canada, http://canadagazette.gc.ca/- Journal Officiel du Qubec,

http://www3.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/gazetteofficielle.fr.html

- Journal Officiel de la France, http://www.journalofficiel.gouv.fr/

- Journal Officiel de la Chine,

http://english.gov.cn/documents/gazettes/previous/index.htm

- Journal Officiel de la Confdration suisse,

http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/index.html

- Site dun Professeur canadien, Vincent Gautrais, www.gautrais.com


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3

PLAN DU COURSChap 1: What is law and where does it originate?

General overview

Part one: legislation

Part two: the courts

Chap 2: the new U.K. Supreme Court

Chap 3: the Rule of Law (theoretical approach)

Chap 4: legislation and statutory interpretation

Chap 5: the making of legislation

Chap 6: the doctrine of judicial precedent

Chap 7: Stare decisis, ratio decidendi and obiter dictum

What is binding and nonbinding in a court decision?

Chap 8: Equity: a brief history; equity today

Chap 9: the personnel of the law: judges, barristers and solicitors

Chap 10: the effects of European Law on the drafting and interpretation of UK

legislation


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4

THESOURCESOFANGLOSAXONLAW

CHAPTER ONE:WHAT IS LAW AND WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?

GENERALOVERVIEW

Muchhasbeen saidabout thedifferencesbetween the common law,which isamajor sourceof

AngloSaxon

law,

and

continental

law,

that

is

Germano

Roman

law,

which

prevails

in

continental

Europe.

Practice, however, and the evolution of legal systems the world over, contradicts that clich of

systemsthatarepolesapart.Constitutionallyspeaking,BritishmembershipoftheUnion (thenthe

European Community) since Jan 1st, 1973, has eroded the sacrosanct doctrine of Parliamentary

sovereignty that stood supreme since theGloriousRevolution (a.k.a. theBloodlessRevolution)of

168889. The same doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty was later further undermined by the

incorporationof ECHR(theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights)underthefirstBlairgovernment

in

1998

into

English

law.

Also,academicsand legalwriters,likeGarySlapperinthearticlewrittenforTheLondonTimesthat

youwillfind intheappendixtoPartOne,oftenemphasisetheoralityofGreatBritish lawandthe

fact that English law is not codified.As youwill see in Chapters 5 and 6, however, even though

English law isstillcaselaw (that isjudgemade law,a.k.a.unwritten law),thebalance ismoreand

moretiltedtowardswrittenlaw,thatis,thelawmadebyParliament,underthecombinedinfluence

ofEuropeanlawandtheeverspreadingwelfarestate.Theremaynotbecodificationperse,butan

exponentional rise of written law, especially by the use (or abuse?) of delegated legislation by

governmentofficialsanddepartments.

Lastly,Iwould liketosayafewwordsaboutthewordingofthetitletothecourse,thesourcesof

AngloSaxon law.Asyouwillquickly realise, themain, ifnot single focus,willbeonEnglish law,

whichmeansthelawas itappliesandEnglandandWales.This isduetothefactthatEnglish lawis

themotherofallothersystemsusedinAngloSaxoncountries.


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5

PARTONE:INTRODUCTIONANDLEGISLATION

1.WHATISLAW?

Whatis law?This isaquestionthathascausedphilosophersandlegaltheoriststowritevolumesin

tryingtoanswer.

Someoftheiranswerswere,reducedtotheirmostbasicform:

Lawisasystemofruleslaiddownbyanorganisation orapersonvestedwiththepowerand

authorityto

make

law;

Lawiswhatlegislators,judges,andlawyersdoormake;

Lawisatoolofoppressionusedbytherulingclasstopromoteitsowninterests;

Lawisasystemofrulesbasedonfundamentalprinciplesofmorality.

Each of these answers tells us something useful about the nature of law and how it works.

In this chapter, we shall take the question What is law? in two stages. First, we shall briefly

distinguishlawfromotherrules;thenweshallexplainwhatwemeanbyaninstitutionalsource,and

howithelpsustounderstandthelaw.

1.1Legalrulesandsocialrules

Lawisdefinableasasystemofrules.Muchofourdailylifeisguidedanddirectedbylegalrulesfrom

shoppingtoourrelationshipwiththeState.

Ofcourse,anysociety isgovernedbyamassofotherruleswhicharenot laws intheformalsense,

butmerely social conventions. In actual fact, these are alsomeans of controlling social conduct.

Whysome rulesshouldbegiventhe forceof lawandothersnot isanotherofthosephilosophical

questionstowhichwedonothaveafullanswer.Lawisindeednotthesameeverywhere.Takelaws

governingadulteryforexample;inmodernEnglishlaw,apersonwhohasasexualrelationshipwith

anothersspousewillincurnolegalpenalty,evenifheorshemayendupbeingtakentocourtina

divorce case. In Islamic law, theQuranprohibits adulterybymaking ita crime, and subjects the

partiestothepunishmentof floggingorstoning; inancientGreece, togiveahistoricalexample,a

manwhoseducedanothermanswifecouldfaceaclaimforcompensation,sincehehadviolatedthe

propertyrightsofhislovershusband.


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6

Thus, thedifferent lawsonadultery couldbe said toexistasa reflectionofdifferent religiousor

moralstandpointstakenbythe law;perhaps,theyalsoreflectdiverseviewsofhumansexuality,or

thestatusofmenandwomeninasociety.Thisculturaldimensionoflawisimportantindeveloping

ourunderstandingofwhyparticular legal ruleshavedevelopedorwhydifferent legal traditions

have evolved indifferent countries. The culturaldimensionhasbecome increasingly important in

legaleducationoverthepastthirtyyearsorso.

1.2Theinstitutionalsourcesoflaw

Generally, lawscanbe identifiedby the fact that they takea formwhichdistinguishes them from

social conventions. Their form tells us that they are derived from an institutional source that is

sociallyrecognisedashavingthepowertocreatelaw.Onlylawscreatedinthiswaycanbesaidtobe

legallybindingupontheindividual,orevenupontheStateitself.

In English law, there are fourmain institutional sourceswhichwe shall consider:Parliament, the

courts,theEuropeanCommunityandtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights.Totheseprimary

sources shouldbeadded secondary sources,whichare literarysources (legalencyclopaedias, for

instance)forthemostpart.

2.PARLIAMENT

Parliament is significant for three reasons. Firstly, it is from Parliament that the probably most

importantsourceof laworiginatesthat is,statute law. Inthesecondplace,through its legislative

powers,Parliament is able togive lawmakingpowers tootherbodies, such as local councilsand

Government departments. This results in a form of law that is called delegated or secondary

legislation. Thirdly, Parliaments delegatory powers are being increasingly used to create sets of

informalruleswhichoperatewithintheframeworkofformalrulescreatedbystatute.

2.1StatuteLaw

Astatute isadocumentwhichcontains lawsmadebyParliament.Statutesarealso referred toas

ActsofParliament.Eachstatuteusuallydealswithaseparatetopicsuchas,for instance,theTheft

Act1968or theSalesofGoodsAct1979.Statutesarenow found in virtuallyall fieldsof lawand

regulateallsortsofactivities.


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7

Statutesare createddirectlybyParliament, followingprocedures laiddown inboth theHouseof

CommonsandtheHouseofLordsthatwillbestudiedlateroninthiscourseinthechapterdevoted

tothemakingoflegislation.AstatutebecomeslawonlyafterithasbeenintroducedintoParliament

asaBill,beenapprovedbyParliamentandhassatisfiedtheformalityofobtainingtheRoyalAssent.

Once an Act has been passed it cannot be impeached. As Lord Campbell put it in Edinburgh&

DalkeithRailwayvWauchope(1842)8Cl&F710:

NoCourtofJusticecan inquire into themode inwhich itwas introduced intoParliament,nor into

whatwasdoneprevioustoitsintroduction,orwhatpassedinParliamentduringitsprogress.

LordCampbells statement still ringsbroadly true today. There isno singleUnitedKingdom court

with the power equivalent to, for example, the Supreme Court of the USA to declare domestic

legislationunconstitutional and therefore invalid. This absenceof constitutional review reflects a

principle called the Sovereignty of Parliament,whichmeans that Parliament is the supreme law

makerandthatthere isno formof lawthat issuperiortoanActofParliament.Thesupremacyof

ParliamentisimportantforLegalMethod,sinceitcreatesadivisionbetweenlawmakingandjudicial

functionsin

the

State.

As

aresult,

the

English

judge

is

careful

not

to

tread

on

the

legislators

toes.

Thisdoesnotmeanhowever that thereareno circumstances inwhicha court can challenge the

legality or general application of primary legislation. Indeed, there are at least three avenues

wherebythevalidityoflegislationmaybechallengedincourt.

Firstly,evenParliamentmustabidebythe law.Consequently, intheoryat least, ifParliament itself

broke the law, the courts could declare that any resulting legislation was not a valid Act of

Parliament.AgoodandrecentexampleofanActbeingchallenged istheHuntingAct2004,which

bannedfoxhuntingwithdogs.TheoriginalHuntingBillhadbeenstronglyopposed intheHouseof

Lordsand

was

passed

only

by

the

House

of

Commons

invoking

aspecial

procedure,

created

by

the

ParliamentActsof1911and1949,whichallowsBillspassedbytheCommonstobecomelawwithout

theconsentoftheLords.OpponentsoftheHuntingActchallenged its legalitybyarguingakindof

domino effect. TheHunting Act, they claimed,was invalid because itwas deemed to be passed

accordingtoatimelimitestablishedbytheParliamentAct1949.ButtheParliamentAct1949,which

amendedthetime limitcontained intheParliamentAct1911,was,thecriticsargued, itself invalid

becauseitwasonlypassedasaconsequenceofthespecialproceduresintheParliamentAct1911.In

short, inthecriticsview, the1911Actcouldnotbeused toauthorise itsownamendment inthis

way.Althoughtheargumentfailedateverystageofthelegalprocess,itwentallthewayuptothe

HouseofLordsasaCourtof Justice,thehighestcourt intherealmseeR (Jacksonandothers)v

AttorneyGeneral [2005]WLR (D) 129. There, a panel of nine Law Lords finally and unanimously

rejectedthe

pro

hunting

lobbys

claims

on

the

basis

that,

on

aproper

interpretation,

the

1911

Act

didnotprecludetheuseofitsownprocedurestoamenditself,andconsequentlyboththe1949and

2004Actswerevalid.

Secondly,theUnitedKingdomsmembershipoftheEuropeanUnionhasalsohadan impactonthe

relationshipbetweenthecourtsandParliament,totheextentthatthesuperiorcourtsmayoverride


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8

or disapplyanActofParliamentthatconflictswithdirectlyenforceableEuropean lawasweshall

laterseeinthiscourse.

Thirdly, under theHuman RightsAct 1998, the courts also have the power to declare legislation

incompatiblewiththe fundamentalrightscontained intheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights

(ECHR),whichwillbediscussedindetaillatertoo.

ThegrowthoflegislationhasbeenaprominentfeatureoftheEnglishlegalsystemoverthelast100

orsoyears.Itreflectstheextenttowhichgovernmenthasextended itscontroloverouractivities.

ThisisparticularlytruesincetheemergenceoftheWelfareStateinthe1940s.

Asaresult,manyimportantfields,suchasemployment,childcareandsocialsecuritylaw,owetheir

existenceessentiallytostatute.

Thevolume

of

legislation

has

grown

exponentially:

for

instance,

the

number

of

Acts

passed

increased

by an annual 20 percent between 1964 and 1974; or, seen from another angle, the volume of

legislationrosesteadilyfrom745pagespersessioninthe1950sto1,525pagesinthe1980s.

2.2Delegatedlegislation

ActsofParliamentprovidealegitimatemeanswherebyParliamentcanpasson,ordelegate,itslaw

makingpowerstoanotherbodyorperson.

Mostdelegatedlegislationispublishedasstatutoryinstruments;thesearealsosometimesreferred

toasRegulations.Thevolumeofstatutory instruments isconsiderable:almost28,000 instruments

weremadebetween1987and1997.Statutory instrumentsarenotjustquantitatively important.In

practice,wholeareasof law,suchassocialsecurityor immigration,aredependentonRegulations,

which will be of greater daily significance than statute. Delegation always requires the express

authorityofanActofParliament,which,willbereferredtoastheparentAct.TheparentActwillnot

onlygiveauthority to theprocessofdelegation,butalsowillset theparametersofthedelegated

power.

Practically,theabilitytodelegatecarriesgreatadvantages,asdelegated legislationcantakeeffect

more quickly, and deal more easily with technical detail, than statute law; this said, Parliament

exercises little control over delegated legislation, so there is concern that these advantages are

boughtatsomecosttotheConstitution.


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9

2.3Informalrules

Informalrulesaremostlycreatedbyministerialpowersgrantedundertheauthorityofstatute.

They are givenmany aname likeDirections,Guidance,Circulars andCodesofPractice. They are

informalbecausetheycanbecontrastedwiththeformalitiesnecessarytocreateanActorstatutory

instrument,and

because

their

structure

and

operation

are

also

often

less

formalised.

Informal does not mean that those rules are unimportant. Many play a significant part in the

regulationofquiteafewpublicorganisations.Mostofthoserulesregulateofficialdiscretion,which,

accordingtoProfessorGilligan, istheextenttowhichofficialsmakedecisions intheabsenceof

previouslyfixed,relativelyclear,andbindinglegalstandards.

Indeed, in the daily running of business, officials must often resort to their ownjudgement in

decidingwhethera ruleapplies. Informal ruleshelpsaidofficials touse theirdiscretioneffectively

andcanimposerestrictionsuponit.Atthesametime,however,thereisconcernthattheincreasing

useof

such

rules

reduces

the

ability

of

Parliament

and

the

courts

to

maintain

acheck

on

the

activities

ofstatebureaucracies.

Toanevengreaterextentthandelegated legislation, informal rulesareamoderndevelopment in

theEnglishlegalsystem.Theyareoftensaidtofallintothreecategories:

Proceduralrules,bywhichwemeanthatmanypublicorganisationslaydownproceduresfor

outsiderstofollow;forinstance,procedurestoclaimsomesocialsecuritybenefit.

Interpretativeguides,whichare officialstatementsofdepartmentalpolicyexpressionsof

criteriatobefollowed,standardstobeenforcedorconsiderationstobetakenintoaccount,

accordingtoBaldwin&Houghton,andwhichmaybemadeavailabletothepublictoinform

themoftheirrights,etc.

Instructions toofficials, that resemble interpretative guides, are oftenmerely intended to

give guidance to officials, not to citizens, but not always. For example, theAdjudication

OfficersGuideusedbysocialsecurityofficialispublishedandthusseemstofallbetweenour

twocategories.

Informalrulesdonotapplytothepublicatlarge.Somearenotpublished,whileothersareavailable

publicly. In form, such ruleswill also vary considerably.A particularly interesting example of the

typesofinformalrulethatexistwasprovidedbytheSocialFundManual,nowreplacedbytheSocial

FundGuideandtheDecisionMakersGuide.


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10

Themanualcontainedatwotieredsystemof informalruleswhichwereprovidedtoofficersofthe

DepartmentofSocialSecuritytoassistindeterminingapplicationsmadebysocialsecurityclaimants

forgrantsorloansforspecialneeds.ThedistinctionwasmadebetweenDirectionsandGuidance

inthescheme.Theformerhadtobestrictlyappliedbyofficers,whilethelatterwasmeantonlytobe

indicative,leavingtheofficerfreetoexercisediscretioninthecaseconcerned.WhentheSecretaryof

StatepublishedGuidancethatusedthemandatory languageoftheDirections,thecourtfoundhim

tobeacting inexcessofhisstatutorypowers(RvSocialFund InspectorandSecretaryofStatefor

SocialSecurity

ex

parte

Roberts,

the

Times,

Feb.

23

rd

,1990).

To

put

it

simply,

guidance

which

directs

officialstodosomethingisnolongerguidance.

Although legislation iscrucial, itcannotoperate in isolation.Legislationrequires implementation.In

thisprocess,questionsmayberaisedabouttheeffectofaparticularpieceoflegislation.Oftenthese

willinvolvetechnicalquestionsofinterpretation.Thatprocessofinterpretationisusuallyundertaken

bythecourts.

APPENDIX

1. Imsorry,wouldyoumindrepeating

that?GarySlapper,inTheTimes,March13,2007

Withoutadvocacytherecouldbenolegaljustice.Itisessentialthatwhatadvocatessayincourtisclearly

audibleandunderstoodbyallconcerned.Thatiswhyseniorjudgeshaveexpressedapreferencethatthe

fullIslamicveilshouldnotbewornincourt.ItalsoaccountsforwhytheCourtofAppealrecentlyordered

the retrial of an East Timorian man who had been convicted in proceedings that he did not fully

understandasanappropriatetranslatorhadnotbeenusedatthetrial.

FromancientCeltictimes, law inBritainhashadahistoryofforensicorality.Itwastheilliteracyofthat

time, and the AngloSaxon era, that begat the oral legal tradition. Repetition and tautology became

techniques inadvocacybecausetheearcannotbacktracktocheckonaspokenwordastheeyecanon

thepage.Sometimes, though,counsel todaycanbeuncomfortablyprolix.Seeing thejudge lookathis

watchanadvocateonceasked:AmItakingtoolong,Inoticedyourlordshipwaslookingatthetime?,to

whichthereplywas:Iwasnt lookingat the time, Iwas lookingat thedate.Frequentlyhearing long

windedargumentscanprovokejudicialimpatience.In1970inSheffield,MrJusticeHowardsentenceda

boyto14yearsbeforethecourthadbeentoldthefactsofthecase.

TheserenestresponsetoanauralfaultwasthatofaVancouverjudgewhotoldaconvicthecouldspeak

beforebeingsentenced,andasked:Whatwouldyouliketosay?F**kall,wasthecurtreply.What

didhesay? inquired thejudgecuppinghisear.Hesaid f**kall, thecourtclerkanswered.Thats

strange,thejudgedeclared,Imsurehesaidsomething.

EricHoekstra,aDutchphilosopher, isplanningto live foraweek inabarrel inhonourofDiogenesthe

Cynic who, in Ancient Greece, resided for some time in a large earthenwarejar. Hoekstra wants to

demonstratethatmandoesnotneedmuchtobehappy.Regrettably,Diogeneshadajaundicedopinion

ofthelegalprofession.Heoncewenttolookforanhonest lawyer.Howsitgoing?someoneinquired

after a while. Not too bad, he responded, I still have my lantern. He did, though, influence the

outcomeofonemodernAmericancase. In1977, inConnecticut,JusticeParskeyruledthataschoolboy

whohadgiventhefingerfromtherearwindowofabustoastatetrooperwasnotguiltyofmakingan


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12

2. THECONTRASTWITHCIVILLAW

The termCivilLawdescribes those systems thathavedevelopedoutoftheRomanoGerman legal

traditionofcontinentalEurope.Itisalsoknownascontinentallaw.ThisCivilLawtraditionprevails

withintheEuropeanCommunity.Asof2006,onlytwoofthe25memberstates,namelytheRepublic

ofIrelandandtheUnitedKingdom,belongedtotheCommonLawworld.

Thereisaratherdifferentwayofthinkingaboutlawwithineachtradition.InCiviliansystems,there

isahigher

level

of

conceptualisation,

which

reflects

in

atheoretically

complex

institutional

basis.

It

is

sometimes argued that this creates a more scientific or rational legal system than the highly

pragmatictraditionofCommonLaw.Thishasanumberofpracticalimplications:

a) First,itcanbesaidthattheEnglishsystemsdependenceupondescriptivefactualcategories

(theformsofactioncitedpreviously)mayrestrainnewdevelopmentsinEnglishlaw,because

Englishjuristsdonothavetheconceptualarsenaltoincorporatechangeeasily.

b) Inthesecondplace,themodernCiviltradition ismainlybasedonprinciplesofcodifiedlaw.

ThisprocessofcodificationincontinentalEuropeowesalottotheRomans,andespeciallyto

theCorpusIurisCivilis(Latinforthebodyofcivillaw)thathasbeenhandeddowntousby

Emperor Justinian, that ruled from 527 to 565 AD. The assumption governing a codified

systemis

that

it

is

possible

to

create

aset

of

texts

containing

an

authoritative

statement

of

thelaw,habituallyintheformofCivilandCriminalCodes.EventhoughEnglishlawyersalso

talkaboutcodifyinglegislation,theyusetheterminaradicallydifferentway.

In theCommonLaw,acodifyingAct isapieceof legislationwhichbrings togetherall the

existing law on a topic, both statute and caselaw, and turns it into a single entity the

codifyingAct. By contrastwith the continent, codification in England has been used as a

limitedmeansof imposing legislativecoherenceonaparticularlyproblematicareaof law.

English codifications have never effected a complete restatement of the entirety of, for

example,CommercialLaw,inastatutoryform.Yetitispreciselythelatterapproachthathas

beenadoptedbythemajorityofciviliansystems.Toconcludeonthatpoint,fortheEnglish,

codificationhasneverbeenakeyinstrumenttoorganiseandconceptualisetherulesof law

that

make

up

a

legal

system.

c) Thirdly,intheory,codificationreducestheroleoftheCivilLawcourtstosimplyinterpreting

andapplyingthelawoftheCode.EnglishlawyershaveoftenarguedthatCivilianjudgesdid

notact inadual capacityas theCommon Law counterpartsdo; that isasbeingboth the

interpretersoflegislationandtheguardiansofadistinctbodyofcaselaw.Inactualfact,this

is not true, since most European countries have their own systems of precedent and

furthermore thewayCodes aredesigned leavesEuropeanjudges far greaterdiscretion in

interpretationthanEnglishlawyersmightthink.


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13

3. THECOURTSTRUCTURE

ThechartaboveshowsasimplifiedversionoftheEnglishcourtsystem.TheAppellateCommitteeof

theHouseofLordswasthefinalcourtofappealforcivilandcriminalcasesfromEnglandandWales

untilOctober2009,whentheSupremeCourtreplaceditasthehighestcourtintheUnitedKingdom.Source:http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/english.html

ConcerningEnglishcourtsasasourceoflaw,twodistinctionsmustbedrawn:

a) Oneisthedistinctionbetweentrialcourtsandappellatecourts;andb) Theotheristhatbetweencivilcourtsandcriminalcourts.

Thefunctionoftrialcourts istohearcasesatfirst instance,that istosaytomakearulingontheissuesoffactandlawthatariseinthecase.Asforappellatecourts,theirpurposeistoreconsidertheapplication of legal principles to a case that has already been heard by a lower court. Trial and

appellatefunctionsareoftencombinedwithinonecourt.Civilandcriminal lawarequitedifferent in theiraimsandemploydifferent legalprocedures.The

termcivillawasopposedtotheCivilLawexaminedpreviouslyisusedtodescribeallthoseareasoflawthatgoverntherelationshipbetweenlegalpersons,thatistosayindividualsandcorporations,

suchasemploymentorcontract.Criminallaw,bycontrast,describesthosewrongswhichareseriousenough for society to outlaw them as crimes and to impose penalties on the wrongdoers, for

examplefinesorprisonsentences.Generallyspeaking,thereisafairlycleardistinctionbetweenthe

courtsthathavecivillawresponsibilities calledjurisdictionbylawyers andthosethathavecriminallawones.

Beforeconsideringtheroleofeachcourt,mentionshouldbemadeoftheConstitutionalReformAct2005.ThisAct modifies theofficeoftheLordChancellorandmakeschanges to theway inwhich

someof the functionsvested in thatofficeare tobeexercised.TheActalsocreates theSupreme

CourtoftheUnitedKingdomandabolishestheappellatejurisdictionoftheHouseofLords.Itcreates

the JudicialAppointments Commission to select people forjudicial appointments in England and

Wales,andprovidesforjudicialdisciplineinEnglandandWales.TheActmodifiesthejurisdictionof

the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and removes the right of the Lord President of the

Counciltositjudicially.


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14

3.1.THEHOUSEOFLORDS/THENEWU.K.SUPREMECOURT

TheHouseofLordsusedtotopthelegalpyramidofEnglishcourts.Itdealtonlywithappeals,mainly

fromtheCourtofAppeal,andsometimesdirectfromtheHighCourtthereforebypassingtheCourt

ofAppealthankstoaspecialprocedurecalledleapfroggingortheleapfrogprocedure.

Caseswerenormallyheardbyfivejudgesor,exceptionally,byasmanyassevenornine,ifthecases

werefelt

to

raise

issues

of

extreme

importance.

These

judges

were

known

as

Lords

of

Appeal

in

Ordinary,butthecommonpeopleandjournalists calledthemLawLords.

The Lords had finaljurisdictionoverboth civil and criminal appealsandhear relatively few cases

annually, no more than one hundred on average. Two reasons accounted for that state of fact.

Firstly,theHouseofLordsonlyallowedappealsinrespectofcasesthatraisepointsoflawofgeneral

publicimportance.Suchcasesareusuallyfewandfarbetween.Secondly,thecostoftakingacase

uptotheHouseofLordswasastronomical,andthisusedtodeterpeoplefromexercisingtherights

ofappealthattheyenjoy,unlesstheirclaimwasfinanciallyassistedbytheState.

TheofficeofLordChancellorhashistoricallycarriedthestatusofheadofthejudiciary(i.e.Minister

of Justice) and has included the right to sit as ajudge in theHouse of Lords, thoughmost Lord

Chancellors

in

recent

years

have

exercised

that

right

quite

sparingly.

In

line

with

the

mood

for

reform

ofPrimeMinisterBlairandhiswilltomodernisetheinstitutionsofthecountry,LordFalconer,who

wasmadeLordChancellorandSecretaryofStateforConstitutionalAffairsin2003,refusedtositasa

judge.

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 formalised this practice into a constitutional principle, and

transferred thejudicial functionsof theLordChancellor to theLordChief Justicewho,asa result,

became President of the Courts of England and Wales. The Lord Chief Justice however has not

inheritedtherighttositasajudgeintheLords.ThesameActprovidedforthereplacementofafinal

courtofappeal thatwasmoreclearly separated from the legislativearmof thegovernment.The

existingLawLordsweretobecomethefirstmembersoftheSupremeCourtbyvirtueofsection23of

theActand,bysection24,theseniorLawLordwastobecomePresidentoftheSupremeCourt.The

judgeswerenolongertobeknownasLordsofAppealinOrdinary,butweretobestyledJusticesof

theSupremeCourt.

ThesecondchapterinthepresentcourseisdedicatedtotheindepthstudyofthenewU.K.Supreme

Court.

3.2.THECOURTOFAPPEAL

TheCourtofAppealfallsintotwoDivisions,CivilandCriminal.

TheCivilDivisionwillhear appeals from theHighCourt and county courts.Cases areheardby a

minimumoftwo,butnormallythree,judgescalledLordsJusticesofAppeal.Aseniorjudgeknownas

theMaster of the Rolls heads thisDivision. SinceOctober 1st, 2005, the incumbent has been Sir

AnthonyClarkeM.R.

TheCriminalDivisionwillhearappealsagainsteitherconvictionorsentencefromtheCrownCourt.

CriminalcaseswillbeheardbyeithertwoorthreejudgesdrawnfromamongtheLordChiefJustice

(currently LordPhillipsofWorthMatravers), the Lords JusticesofAppeal,and Judgesof theHigh

Court.


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15

3.3.THEHIGHCOURT

TheCourtissubdividedintothreedivisions,eachofwhichhasaseparatejurisdictiontohearcases

atfirstinstance(i.e.trials).Thedivisionsare:

a) TheQueensBench,whichdealswiththemainareasofcommon law,suchascontractand

tort;

b) TheFamily

division,

which

deals

with

matrimonial

cases

and

the

wardship

and

adoption

of

children;and

c) TheChanceryDivision,whichdealswithcertainproperty,corporateandtaxmatters.

This seemsastraightforwardorganization,but it isnotthatsimple.Becausecommercial law itself

andthedemandsofcourtusershavebecomeincreasinglycomplexandspecialized,therehasbeena

growing need for specialization within the two divisions that have significant commercial law

jurisdiction,namelyQueensBenchandChancery.Asa result,anumberofspecialist,commercial,

trial courts have been createdwithin either of those two divisions, with specialistjudges being

assignedspecificallytothosecourts.

Each

Division

has

its

judicial

head.

The

head

of

the

Chancery

Division

is

called

the

Vice

Chancellor

andaPresident leadstheFamilyDivision.Historically,theheadoftheQueensBenchDivisionwas

the Lord Chief Justice, but the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has relieved him of this role by

creatinganewpostofPresident.The firstPresidentoftheQBD,sinceOctober1st,2005,hasbeen

LordJustice(SirIgor)Judge.

Inadditiontothesefirstinstancejurisdictions,eachDivisionhasappellatefunctionsperformedbya

DivisionalCourt,whichwillbepresidedoverbytwoor threejudges.TheDivisionalcourtsof the

ChanceryandFamilyDivisionshavejurisdictionovercertainappeals fromcountyandmagistrates

courts.ThemainfunctionoftheDivisionalCourtoftheQBDhasbeentoexercisewhatiscalledthe

supervisoryjurisdiction of the High Court; that is to say the power to oversee the quality and

legalityofdecisionmakingininferiorcourtsandtribunals.

It alsooccasionally hears appeals bywayof case stated on points of law from themagistrates

courts and Crown Court. In October 2000, the Divisional Court of the QBD was renamed the

AdministrativeCourt.Itnowalsohasitsownnominatedleadjudgewhoisinchargeofoverseeing

itswork.Currently, this isMr. JusticeCollins.At first instance,casesareheardbyusuallya single

Puisne(pronouncedpuny)Judge.

3.4.THECOUNTYCOURT

Countycourts,whichwerecreated inthe19th

century,havegottwotypesofjudges:CircuitJudges

(themore senior)andDistrict Judges.Anappeal from thedecisionofaDistrict Judgewillgo toa

CircuitJudge.AnappealfromthedecisionofaCircuitJudgegoestotheCourtofAppeal.TheHigh

Courtandthecountycourtdealwiththesamesortof legal issues.Thedifference isthattheHighcourtdealsgenerallywiththemorelegallycomplexand/orhighermonetaryvalueclaims.

3.5.THECROWNCOURT

Thiscourtdealsessentiallywithcriminaltrialsandappeals.Mostofitscaseloadinvolvesthetrialat

first instanceofthemoreseriouscriminaloffences,suchashomicides,seriousphysicalandsexual

assaults,andpropertyoffences involving lossordamageofa highvalue.TheCrownCourt is the

onlycourt in theEnglish system inwhichajudge sitswithajury.The functionof thisjudge is to

advisethejuryonthelaw;thejury,however,remainsthesoletribunaloffact,anditisforthejury


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16

alone to decide whether an accused is guilty or innocent as charged. The Crown Court has an

appellatejurisdiction:ithearsappealsfromthemagistratescourtsonissuesoffactorlaw.

3.6.THEMAGISTRATESCOURTS

Magistratescourtsarepurelycourtsof first instance.Theyaremainly inchargeof trying the less

seriouscriminaloffences.Actually,magistrates tryoverninetypercentofallcriminalcases.They

alsohavea civiljurisdictionover liquor licensing, taxarrears,and somematrimonialmatters.The

magistratescourt

is

unique

in

that

the

great

majority

of

cases

are

heard

before

Justices

of

the

Peace

laypersonswith little formalised legal training, though theyareadvisedon the legal issuesbya

legallyqualified Justicesclerk.Legallyqualifiedmagistratesmaysitalonetohearcases;theywere

formerlycalledStipendiaryJudgesbutnowtheyhavethetitleofDistrictJudge(Criminal).

3.7.ADMINISTRATIVETRIBUNALSANDOTHERCOURTS

Inadditiontotheformalcourts,therearemanyadministrativetribunals,mostofwhichwerecreated

after theSecondWorldWar.Theycontrola vast rangeofactivities from the issuingofpassenger

licences toairlines, to theawardof socialsecurityentitlement.Mostof these tribunalshave their

ownrulesofprocedureandareregulatedbyspecificstatutorycontrols.Nonehaseverbeencreated

bytheCommonLawandmosthavelittlecontactwiththetraditionalcourts,thoughrightsofappeal

from

some

important

tribunals

exist,

either

to

the

High

Court

or

to

the

Court

of

Appeal.

Perhaps

the

bestknownaretheEmploymentTribunals,whichusedtobecalledIndustrialTribunalsuntil1998.

Shouldalsobelistedinthatpanoramaofcourtsthreeothercourtswhich,formallyspeaking,arenot

partoftheEnglishcourtsystemthoughtheyareofsignificantimportancetoit.Thesecourtsarethe

CourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,andtheJudicial

CommitteeofthePrivyCouncil.ThelastmentionedwillbestudiedinsomedetailinChapterTwoof

thepresentcourse(thenewU.K.SupremeCourt).


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17

THESOURCESOFANGLOSAXONLAW

CHAPTER TWO:

THE NEW U.K. SUPREME COURT

Introduction

TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedKingdomisthehighestCourtintheUnitedKingdomandactsasa

finalcourtofappealincasesofmajorpublicimportance.

Itwas

established

by

the

Constitutional

Reform

Act

2005

and

started

work

on

1October

2009.

After

itscreation,theSupremeCourtassumedtheworkoftheLordsofAppeal inOrdinary(LawLords)

whowereresponsibleforthejudicialfunctionsoftheHouseofLords,viaits AppellateCommittee.

Asmembers of theHouse of Lords, the previousjudges sat as Law Lords in Parliament. On the

contrary, thenewSupremeCourt is independentofParliamentbecause itsjudges,calledjustices,

moved out of theHouse of Lords, located in the Houses of Parliament in Westminster and into

MiddlesexGuildhall,aHeritagebuildingclosetoParliamentbutseparate from it,thatwasentirely

refurbishedtohostthestayofthenewcourt.

I. AnewCourtfortheUnitedKingdom

A. EstablishmentoftheSupremeCourt

TheideaofanewSupremeCourtoriginatedintheDepartmentofConstitutionalAffairs(DCA)which,

inits

July

2003

Consultation

Paper,

observed

that

the

time

had

come

to

split

the

judicial

functions

of

theJudicialCommitteeoftheHouseofLordsfromthelegislativefunctionsoftheHouseofLords.1

Itwasargued that thepublicdidnotalwaysunderstand that thedecisionsof theHouseofLords

were only taken by its Appellate Committee and not by nonjudicial members as well. A new

1http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/#ch1


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18

SupremeCourtwouldenhance thejudges impartialityand independence, theConsultationPaper

claimed.ThatiswhythenewpresidentoftheSupremeCourt,LordPhillips,acknowledgedthatthere

wouldbeanexplicitseparationofpowersforthefirsttimeeverintheUnitedKingdom.2

TheUnitedKingdomSupremeCourtwasestablishedbytheConstitutionalReformAct2005,which

canbedividedintothreeparts.ThefirstconcernsthereformoftheofficeoftheLordChancellor,the

secondisaboutthenewSupremeCourt,andthethirdregulatestheappointmentofjudges.

ThelongtitleoftheActisAnActtomakeprovisionformodifyingtheofficeofLordChancellor,and

tomakeprovisionrelatingtothefunctionsofthatoffice;toestablishaSupremeCourtoftheUnited

Kingdom,andtoabolishtheappellatejurisdictionoftheHouseofLords;tomakeprovisionaboutthe

jurisdictionoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncilandthejudicialfunctionsofthePresident

oftheCouncil;tomakeotherprovisionaboutthejudiciary,theirappointmentanddiscipline;andfor

connectedpurposes.

TheBillwasoriginally introducedon24February2004andenvisagedcertainchanges,themainof

whichweretheabolitionoftheofficeof"LordHighChancellorofGreatBritain",generallyknownas

theLordChancellor,thesettingupofaSupremeCourtoftheUnitedKingdomandmovingtheLaw

LordsoutoftheHouseofLordstothisnewcourtandmeasuresrelatingtothejudiciary, including

changestothepositionoftheLordChiefJusticeandchangestothePrivyCouncil.

AftersomeamendmentsbytheLords,theActkeptthepostofLordChancellor,even if itsrolewas

reduced and the office holder was no longer automatically Speaker of the House of Lords. The

ChancellorcannowbefromeithertheHouseofLordsortheHouseofCommons.

Thereis

also

the

new

position

of

Secretary

of

State

for

Constitutional

Affairs

scheduled

by

the

Bill

to

replacetheLordChancellorsoffice.In2007theholderofthisCabinetpostwasrenamedSecretary

ofStateforJustice.HealsoholdstheofficeofLordChancellor.Thisofficewasreformedtoremove

theabilityoftheLordChancellortoactasbothagovernmentministerandajudge.Thisdecisionwas

also influenced by the European Convention on Human Rights. Ajudicial officer, who also has

2http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/6251272/NewSupremeCourtopens

withmediabarred.html


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19

legislative or executive powers, cannot be in conformity with the requirements of Article 6

(Paragraph1)whichprovidesfortherighttoafairtrial.BothHousesapprovedtheBillon21March

2005,whichreceivedRoyalAssenton24March.

B. TheorganisationoftheSupremeCourt

The United Kingdom Supreme Court consists of twelve permanent Justices. One of them is the

PresidentoftheUnitedKingdomSupremeCourt,anotheroneisitsDeputyPresident.LikeallBritish

judges,SupremeCourtjusticesareforcedtoretireatage70iffirstappointedtoajudicialofficeafter

31March1995oratage75otherwise.TenLordsofAppealinOrdinary(LawLords)holdingofficeon

1October2009becamethefirstjusticesofthe12memberSupremeCourt.The11thplaceonthe

SupremeCourtwasfilledbyLordClarke(formerlyMasteroftheRolls),whowasthefirstJusticeto

beappointeddirectlytotheSupremeCourt..SirJohnDysonbecamethe12thandfinaljusticeofthe

SupremeCourton13April2010.

TheSeniorLawLordon1October2009,LordPhillips,becametheSupremeCourt'sfirstPresident,

andtheSecondSeniorLawLord,LordHopeofCraighead,becamethefirstDeputyPresident.,On30

September2010,LordSavilleofNewdigatebecamethefirstJusticetoretire,followedbyLordCollins

ofMaspeburyon7May2011,althoughthelatterremainedasactingjusticeuntilJuly2011.InJune

2011,LordRodgerbecamethefirstJusticetodieinoffice,afterashortillness.

1.1.1. Actingjudges

InadditiontothetwelvepermanentJustices,thePresidentmayrequestotherseniorjudges,drawn

fromtwo

groups,

to

sit

as

"acting

judges"

of

the

Supreme

Court.

The firstgroup isthosejudgeswhohold 'officeasasenior territorialjudge':judgesof the

CourtofAppealofEnglandandWales,judgesoftheCourtofAppealofNorthernIrelandand

judgesoftheFirstorSecondDivisionoftheInnerHouseoftheCourtofSessioninScotland.

The second group is known as the 'supplementary panel'. The Presidentmay approve in

writingretiredseniorjudges'membershipofthispaneliftheyareunder75yearsofage.

1.1.2. Appointmentsprocess

TheConstitutionalReformAct2005makesprovisionforanewappointmentsprocessforJusticesof

the Supreme Court. A selection commission will be formed when vacancies arise. This will be

composedof

the

President

and

Deputy

President

of

the

Supreme

Court

and

amember

of

the

Judicial

AppointmentsCommissionofEnglandandWales,theJudicialAppointmentsBoardforScotlandand

theNorthern Ireland JudicialAppointments Commission. InOctober 2007, theMinistry of Justice

announcedthatthisappointmentsprocesswouldbeadoptedonavoluntarybasisforappointments

ofLordsofAppealinOrdinary.NewjudgesappointedtotheSupremeCourtafteritscreationwillnot

necessarily receive peerages, however they are given the courtesy title of Lord and Lady upon

appointment.ThePresidentandDeputyPresidentareappointedtothoserolesratherthanbeingthe

mostseniorbytenureinoffice.

1.1.3. Current Just ices


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Therearecurrently10Justicesandtwovacancies.Asof9August2011,theJustices,inorderof

seniority,areasfollows:

Name Born Almamater Swornin Mandatoryretirement Priorseniorjudicialroles

LordPhillips(President)

21January

1938

(age73)

KingsCollege,

Cambridge

1October

2009

21January

2013

SeniorLordofAppealin

Ordinary(20082009)

LordChief

Justice

of

EnglandandWales

(20052008)

MasteroftheRolls

(20002005)

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(19992000)

LordHope(Deputy

President)

27June

1938

(age73)

StJohn'sCollege,

Cambridge

Universityof

Edinburgh

1October

2009

27June2013

SecondSeniorLordof

AppealinOrdinary(2009)

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(19962009)

LordPresidentofthe

CourtofSession(1989

1996)

LordWalker17March

1938

(age73)

TrinityCollege,

Cambridge

1October

200917March2013

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(20022009)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(19972002)

LadyHale31January

1945

(age66)

GirtonCollege,

Cambridge

1October

2009

31January

2020

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(20042009)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(19992003)

LordBrown9April

1937

(age74)

Worcester

College,Oxford

1October

20099April2012

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(20042009)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(19922004)

LordMance6June

1943

(age68)

University

College,Oxford

1October

20096June2018

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(20052009)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(19992005)

LordKerr22

February

1948

(age63)

Queen's

UniversityBelfast

1October

2009

22February

2023

LordofAppealin

Ordinary(2009)

LordChiefJusticeof

NorthernIreland(2004

2009)

LordClarke13May

1943

(age68)

King'sCollege,

Cambridge

1October

200913May2018

MasteroftheRolls

(20052009)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(19982005)


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21

LordDyson31July

1943

(age68)

WadhamCollege,

Oxford

13April

201031July2018

DeputyHeadofCivil

Justice(20032006)

LordJusticeofAppeal

(20012010)

LordWilson 9May1945(age66)

Worcester

College,Oxford

26May

20119May2020

LordJusticeofAppeal

(20052011)

Onenew

Justice

is

yet

to

be

appointed

to

the

Supreme

Court

and

have

his

courtesy

title

announced:

Name Born Almamater Takingoffice MandatoryRetirement

Priorseniorjudicialroles

JonathanSumptionQC

9December

1948

(age62)

Magdalen

College,

Oxford

Atadatetobeagreed

withthePresidentofthe

SupremeCourt

9December

2018None

Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_Kingdom

Whenvacanciesarise,theQueenappointsasuccessorwhoisatfirstproposedbythePrimeMinister.

ThisproposalismadebytheLordChancellorincollaborationwithaselectioncommissioncomposed

of the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court and a member of the Judicial

Appointments Commission of England andWales, a representative of the Judicial Appointments

BoardforScotlandandonefortheNorthernIrishJudicialAppointmentsCommission.

ThepermanentJusticesareappointedforlifeandmustretireattheageof70.ThePresidentofthe

SupremeCourtisalsoabletosummonotherseniorjudgesinadditiontothe12permanentJustices.

TheysitasactingjudgesoftheSupremeCourtandaredrawnfromtwogroups.

The first group isjudgeswho are senior territorialjudgesof the Court ofAppeal of England and

Wales,theCourtofAppealofNorthernIrelandoroftheFirstorSecondDivisionoftheInnerHouse

ofthe

Court

of

Session

in

Scotland.

Thesecondgroupiscalledthesupplementarypanel.ThePresidentcanchooseretiredseniorjudges

membershipof thispanel if theyareunder75yearsofage.TheSupremeCourtalsoconsistsofa

ChiefExecutiveandaRegistrar.


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22

II. JurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt

A. Cases

TheUnitedKingdom Supreme Court is responsible for the hearingof appeals from courts in the

UnitedKingdoms

three

legal

systems,

i.e.

England

and

Wales,

Scotland

and

Northern

Ireland.

The

SupremeCourt isthehighestcourtforcivilappealsfortheCourtofSession inScotlandbutnotfor

criminallawthatisstillheardinScotland.

ConcerningthepermissiontoappealtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedKingdom,casesthatarefirst

heardattheCourtofSessiondontrequirepermission.AnycasecanproceedtotheSupremeCourtif

twoAdvocatescertifythatanappealissuitable.

InEnglandandWalesandNorth Ireland,theCourtofAppealora Justice fromtheSupremeCourt

itselfhavetogivethe leavetoappeal.This isduetothe factthattheSupremeCourtsfocus ison

casesthatraisepointsoflawofgeneralpublicimportance.

Other cases that are determined by the Supreme Court are socalled devolution issues. They

concernthe

powers

of

the

three

devolved

administrations,

the

Northern

Ireland

Executive

and

Northern IrelandAssembly, the ScottishGovernment and the Scottish Parliament, and theWelsh

AssemblyGovernmentandtheNationalAssemblyforWales.

MostofthesecasesconcernthecompliancewithrightsundertheEuropeanConventiononHuman

Rightswhichhavebeenincorporatedintonationallawsince1998.

B. TheOfficeofFairTradingvAbbeyNationalplc&Others:an overview

Oneofthe firstcasesheardbythenewSupremeCourtwasthe legalbattlebetweentheOfficeof

FairTrading(OFT)andBritainsbankingsector.

TheOfficeofFairTradingisanonministerialgovernmentdepartmentoftheUnitedKingdomwhich

enforcesconsumerprotectionandcompetitionlaw.TheOFTambitionstomakemarketsworkwell

forthecustomersandtoensureactivecompetitionbetweenfairdealingbusinesses.


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OFT v Abbey National and others is about bank charges in theUnited Kingdom. It concerns the

situationwhere a bank accountholder goes intounauthorisedoverdraft.When abank customer

makes a payment request the bank normally makes the payment as requested and then takes

chargeswhichaccumulateaslongastheunauthorisedoverdraftexists.

According to theOFT, the fees that thebanks take from theirclientsviolated theUnfairTerms in

ConsumerContractsRegulations1999,whichimplementstheEuropeanUnionUnfairContractTerms

Directive.TheOFTalsoarguedthatthefeeswereapenaltyforbreachofcontract.

BeforetheHighCourt,thebankscouldsuccessfullyclaimthatthecontractualtermsinthecontracts

with theirclientswerenotpenal.Anyway theHighCourtdecided that the charges fellwithin the

sphereofactivitiesofthelegislationandthattheirfairnesscouldbeassessedbytheOFT.Afterthis

decisionthebanksappealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of theHigh Court and decided that the OFT had the

jurisdictiontoassessthe fairnessofthebanks'unplannedoverdraft fees. Inaddition, theCourtof

Appealdenied leave toappeal to theHouseofLords.After thisdecision thebankspetitioned the

HouseofLords(nowtheSupremeCourt)forpermissiontoappeal.

TheHouseofLordsacceptedandthebanksenteredtheirAppealPetitionon6th

April2009.

The newly established Supreme Court handed down itsjudgment on 25th

November 2009 and

unanimouslyfoundinfavourofthebanks.

TheSupremeCourtarguedthatthechargesofabankareacoretermofthecontractsforbank

accounts

and

that

these

charges

are

part

of

the

banks

remuneration.

Therefore,

the

Supreme

Court

decided thatunder theOFTsauthority toassess the termsof fairnessunder theUnfairTerms in

Consumer ContractsRegulations 1999, the unplannedoverdrafts of a bank account couldnot be

assessed.


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24

TheSupremeCourtarguedthatitspowersweregiventothembythelegislationandthattheycould

donothingeven ifoneconsideredthe termsunfair.According totheSupremeCourt, itwas the

roleofParliamenttoconstruetheEuropeanDirectivemorebroadlytoallowbankclientsortheOFT

tochallengeallegedlyunfaircharges.

That decision reflects the view that the United Kingdoms new highest court has of itself. The

Justicesopinion that theycannotdecideunder thepower vested to thembyParliamentand the

argumentthatlegislativepowerhastodecideoverabroaderenforcementoftheEuropeanDirective

clearlyshowsthattheCourtseesitselfasabodythatisfullyindependentofParliamentandwilling

toseverthebondsbetweenthelegislativeandthejudiciary.

Itdemonstratesthattheconcernofsomepeoplethattherewasnoeffectiveseparationofpowersin

theUnitedKingdom(seeabove)wastakenseriouslyandthatthereisanewwayofmakingdecisions

whichshows

that

the

United

Kingdoms

Supreme

Court

is

no

longer

influenced

by

the

Lords

that

keeptheirpostsintheHouseofLordsandwhoarenonjudicialmembersofParliament.

C. OFTv.AbbeyNational:theTimeslawreport

2. OFT cannot reviewbankschargeson unauthorisedcurrentaccount

overdrafts

SupremeCourt

PublishedNovember26,2009

OfficeofFairTradingvAbbeyNationalplcandOthers

BeforeLordPhillipsofWorthMatravers,President,LordWalkerofGestingthorpe,BaronessHaleofRichmond,

LordManceandLordNeubergerofAbbotsbury

JudgmentNovember25,2009

Charges

levied

by

banks

on

personal

current

account

customers

in

respect

of

unauthorised

overdrafts were part of a package of consideration for the package of banking services

provided and accordingly their fairness was exempt from review by the Office of Fair

Trading.

The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by AbbeyNational plc and other banks from the

dismissalbytheCourtofAppeal(SirAnthonyClarke,MasteroftheRolls,LordJusticeWaller,

VicePresident,and Lord Justice Lloyd) (TheTimesMarch3,2009; [2009]2WLR1286)of

their appeal from Mr Justice Andrew Smith (The Times April 29, 2008; [2008] 2 All ER

(Comm)625)whohaddeclared,onaclaimbytheOFT,thatanassessmentofthefairnessof


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the charges was not prohibited by regulation 6(2)(b) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer

ContractsRegulations(SI1999No2083).

Mr JonathanSumption,QCandMrAndrewMitchell forBarclaysBankplc;MrGeoffreyVos,QCandMiss

SoniaTolaneyforNationwideBuildingSociety;MrRichardBrentforAbbeyNationalplc;MrRichardSalter,QC

andMr JohnOdgers forClydesdaleBankplc;MrRobinDicker,QC forHBOSplc;MrMarkHoskins,QC,Mr

DanielToledano,QCandMrPatrickGoodallforHSBCBankplc;MrBankimThanki,QCandMrJamesDuffyfor

LloydsTSBBankplc;MrLaurenceRabinowitz,QCandMrDavidBlayneyforTheRoyalBankofScotlandGroup

plc;MrJonathanCrow,QC,MrRichardColeman,MissJemimaStratfordandMissSarahLovefortheOfficeof

FairTrading.

LORDWALKER said that the banks accepted that the system of freeifincredit banking prevalent in this

countryinvolvedamassivecrosssubsidy,amountingtoabout30percentofthebankstotalrevenuestream

fromcurrentaccountcustomers,providedbythosecustomerswhoregularlyincurredchargesforunauthorised

overdrafts,about12millionpeople,tothosecustomers,about42million,whoneverorveryrarely incurred

suchcharges.Somewouldregardthatsystemasbeing,insomesenseatleast,obviouslyunfair.Thatdepended

partly on whether one regarded the average customer who incurred unauthorised overdraft charges as

spendthriftandimprovidentorasdisadvantagedandfindingithardtomakebothendsmeet.

TheCourthadbeen told thattherehadbeenmanythousandsof individualclaims in thecountycourt,allor

virtually all of which had been stayed to await the outcome of the present proceedings. The volume of

litigation spoke for itself as to the dissatisfaction felt by many thousands of customers affected by the

challengedcharges.

ButwhetherthesystemwasfairwasnotthequestionfortheCourt.Thatwaswhetherasamatteroflawits

fairnesscouldbechallengedbytheOFTasexcessiveinrelationtotheservicessuppliedtothecustomers.

Thatdependedonthecorrectinterpretation,initsEuropeancontext,andapplicationofregulation6(2)ofthe

1999Regulations, whichprovided:

Insofarasitisinplainintelligiblelanguage,theassessmentoffairnessofatermshallnotrelate(a)tothe

definitionofthemainsubjectmatterofthecontract,or(b)totheadequacyofthepriceorremuneration,as

againstthegoodsorservicessuppliedinexchange.

The

context

required

adequacy

to

be

read

in

the

sense

of

appropriateness:

see

per

Lord

Rodger

of

EarlsferryinDirectorGeneralofFairTradingvFirstNationalBankplc(TheTimesNovember1,2001;[2002]1

AC481,paragraph64).

The1999Regulationshadbeenmade to transpose intonational lawCouncilDirective93/13/EECofApril5,

1993onunfairtermsinconsumercontracts(OJ1993L95/29).Regulation6(2)followedcloselytheEnglishtext

ofarticle4(2)oftheDirective.TheLawLordshadalreadyconsideredarticle4(2)intheFirstNationalBankcase.

Therewasnosignificantdifferencebetweenarticle4(2)andregulation6(2).

ThegeneralthrustofMrSumptionssubmissionswasthatthejudgeandtheCourtofAppealhadadoptedan

overcomplicated approach to an issue that, however important, was ultimately quite a short point of

construction.Article4(2)wasexpressed infairlysimpleandnontechnical language,aswasappropriatefora

Communitymeasurethathadtobeappliedacrossavarietyofnationalsystemsofcontractlaw.Itrepresented

a

compromise

between

consumer

protection

and

freedom

of

contract.

His

Lordship

saw

force

in

Mr

Sumptions

criticisms.

Asupplyofservicesmightbesimple,oritmightbecomposite,aswhenonestayedatahotelofferingawide

varietyofservices.Therewasnoprincipledbasisonwhich the court coulddecide that some serviceswere

moreessential to the contract thanothers.Themain subjectmatterhad tobedescribed ingeneral terms:

hotelservices.Theservicesthatbanksofferedtotheircurrentaccountcustomerswereacomparablepackage

ofservices,whichincludedthecollectionandpaymentofcheques,othermoneytransmissionservices,facilities

forcashdistributionandtheprovisionofstatements.


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Whenoneturnedtotheotherpartofthequidproquoofaconsumercontract,thepriceorremuneration,the

difficultyofdecidingwhichpriceswereessentialwasthesame,andregulation6(2)(b)containednoindication

thatonlyanessentialpriceorremunerationwasrelevant.

Anymonetarypriceor remunerationpayableunder thecontractwouldnaturally fallwithin the languageof

paragraph(b).Justasbankingservicestocurrentaccountcustomerscouldaptlybedescribedasapackage,so

could the consideration thatmoved from the customer to thebank.An importantpartof thatpackage for

customerswhosecurrentaccountswereincreditwastheinterestforgonebythemsincetheywouldreceivea

very low rate;overdraft interest and chargeswere themost importantelement for thosewhowerenot in

credit.

TherelevanttermintheFirstNationalBankcasehadbeenadefaultprovision,andtradersoughtnottobeable

tooutflankconsumersbydrafting themselves intoapositionwhere theycould take advantageofadefault

provision,butinhisLordshipsviewthetermsandchargesinquestioninthepresentcasefellsquarelywithin

regulation6(2)(b).

Astotheapplicationofregulation6(2),properlyconstrued,tothefacts,chargesforunauthorisedoverdrafts

were monetary consideration for the package of banking services supplied to personal current account

customers.Theywereanimportantpartofthebankschargingstructure.Thefactsthattheywerecontingent

andthatthemajorityofcustomersdidnot incurthemwere irrelevant.Thefairnessofthechargeswouldbe

exemptfromreviewinpointofappropriatenesseveniffewercustomerspaidthemandtheyformedasmaller

partofthebanksrevenuestream.

LordPhillipsdeliveredajudgmentagreeingwithLordWalker;LordMancedeliveredaconcurringjudgment;

LadyHale,inashortjudgment,andLordNeubergeragreedwithLordWalkerandLordMance.

Solicitors:Simmons&Simmons;Slaughter&May;AshurstLLP;AddleshawGoddardLLP;Allen&OveryLLP;

FreshfieldsBruckhausDeringerLLP;LovellsLLP;LinklatersLLP;MsWinnieChing.

D.QuestionsandanswersontheU.K.SupremeCourt

UKSupremeCourt:Q&A

ByDominicCasciani,BBCNewshomeaffairs

WhatistheUKSupremeCourt?

It isthenewhighestcourt intheUnitedKingdom,actingasafinalcourtofappeal incasesofmajorpublic

importance.Whatthatmeansinpracticeisthatits12justiceswillbethe"finalarbiters"betweencitizensand

theState,theultimatecheckandbalancethatlawiscorrectly,andfairly,applied.

Isthisanentirelynewconcept?

In thewordsof LordPhillips, the firstpresidentof theSupremeCourt, this isa caseof changing the form

ratherthansubstance.ThecaseworkthatwillbedealtwithbytheSupremeCourtisexactlythesameasthat

whichcamebeforethejusticeswhentheysatasLawLords inParliament.Buttheseseniorjudgeshavenow

left the House of Lords and are therefore independent of Parliament. This separation brings the United

Kingdomintolinewithmanycomparablemodernstates.ItmeanstheSupremeCourtbecomesthefinalpillar

intheconstitution:Parliamentcreateslaws,thegovernmentandpublicbodiesusethoselaws andthecourts

monitortheirapplication.

ArethejusticesstillLords?


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27

No.While theyretain the title thatcamewith theirpeerage, theywillnowbeknownas the Justicesof the

SupremeCourt.ThosewhoretiremaybeabletoreturntotheHouseofLords.

Whatkindsofcaseswilltheyhear?

TheSupremeCourtwillgivethefinalverdictinalltypesofcasesintheUnitedKingdom,otherthancriminal

matters in Scotland. The justices will also offer opinions on major points of law and play a part in the

developmentoflawaroundtheworld.ThejusticeswillhearsomecasesfromtheCommonwealth.Thejustices

willalsoresolveany legaldisputescausedbydevolution toScotland,WalesandNorthern Ireland.Thecourt

willdeal

only

with

cases

that

the

justices

consider

to

be

the

most

important.

Their

rulings

will

be

limited,

as

now,toasmallnumberofcasestheyknowwillhavefarreachingimplications.

Whathasitruledoninthepast?

In 2004, Laws Lords ruled that the government could not hold foreign terrorist suspects without charge

indefinitely amajorblowtogovernmentsecuritypolicy.Thefollowingyear,theLawLordsupheldabanon

huntingwithdogs, legislationthathaddividedParliament.In1993,theLawLordsgavedoctorspermissionto

withdrawlifesupportingmedicationfromTonyBland,afootballsupporterwhohadsufferedirreversiblebrain

damageduringtheHillsboroughdisaster.ThelastcaseheardbytheLawLordswasthatofDebbiePurdy,the

MSpatient,whowonhercallforgreaterlegalclarityonassistedsuicide.

HowdoesthecourtrelatetoEurope?

ThecourthasaroleininterpretinglawpassedinthenameoftheEuropeanUnionand,separately,ensuring

that theBritish courts take intoaccount rulings from theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights. Somepeople

whose casesare rejectedby theSupremeCourtwillbeable toask theEuropeanCourt to intervenewhere

thereneedstobemoreclarityonspecificareasofhumanrights.

Howdothejusticesmaketheirrulings?

Thereisalwaysanoddnumberofjusticessothattherecanbeaclearmajorityonewayortheother.Justices

haveeachtoreachtheirownconclusionsandthenwritetheirlegalopinion.Caseswilltypicallybeheardby

five

justices,

and

the

most

important

cases

will

involve

nine.

HowdothejusticescomparewiththeirUSnamesakes?

The US Supreme Court can strike down a law as unconstitutional but the UK has no codified, written

constitution. IftheBritishjusticessaythata law iswrong,thenthegovernmentknows itmusteventually

bringthematterbeforeMPsforreform.Butthatdoesn'tmeanthedisputedlawistornupbeforeParliament

hashadtimetothink itthrough.Themost importantrecentexampleofthisconstitutional arrangementwas

the Law Lords' 2004 decision on indefinite detention of terrorist suspects without charge. The suspects

remained inprisonwhileParliamentpushedthrough legislationtochangethesystemandallowtheirrelease

andmonitoringinthecommunity.

SoisthereanypracticaldifferencebetweentheLordsandthejustices?

Although theconstitutional differencesaresubtle, thenewjusticeshopetheywillnowplayagreaterpublic

roleinthelifeofthenation.TheircourtsitsinWestminsteroppositetheHousesofParliamentandisopento

thepublic. Ithasacafeandeducationsuite.TheLawLords'judgementswere televised,because theywere

deliveredintheHouseofLords.ButalloftheSupremeCourt'shearingswillbeopentothepublicand,forthe

firsttimeinBritishlegalhistory,televisioncameraswillbepermanentlyincourt.

Howwillthejusticesbeappointed?

TobecomeaSupremeCourtjusticeyoumusthavebeenaseniorjudgeforatleasttwoyearsoraqualified

lawyerforatleast15years.Whenthereisavacancy,thejusticesecretary,alsoknownastheLordChancellor,


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28

willsetupaselectioncommission.Itwillconsultseniorjudgeswhoarenotputtingthemselvesforwardforthe

court, alongwith thejustice secretaryand key figures inScotland,WalesandNorthern Ireland.Thejustice

secretarycanacceptor rejectanomination.Theprimeminister thenmakesa final recommendation to the

Queen,whomakestheappointment.

Doesthatmeantherewillbealotofcourtroomdrama?

TheSupremeCourtjobistoexaminethefinerpartsofthelawanditsapplication.Itisnotthekindofthingthat

lends itself todramaticcourtroomflourishes.Thatdoesn'tmean thecaseswillnotbedramatic in theirown

ways.Their

first

case

in

October

concerns

how

the

government

freezes

the

assets

of

terrorism

suspects.

A

futurecaseinvolvesaformerMI5officerwhowantstopublishhismemoirs.

HowmuchdoestheSupremeCourtcost?

Therehasbeena59mprogrammetorenovatetheMiddlesexGuildhallandturnitintotheSupremeCourt.A

further18mhasbeenspentonnewcourtsforthecriminalcasesmovedfromthebuildingtoanotherlocation.

TheMinistryofJusticesaystheSupremeCourtwillcostabout13.5mayeartorun.

StoryfromBBCNEWS:Published:2009/09/3023:09:57GMT

http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/

/2/hi/uk_news/8283967.stm

E)TheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncil

MentionmustbemadeofthatCourtinconnectionwiththeSupremeCourtsinceit ishousedinthesamebuildingasthe

Supreme Court Court 3 in MiddlesexGuildhall is the normal location for Privy Council hearings and Supreme Court

justicesarecalledontositonthePrivyCouncilaswell.

PrivyCouncil

Established 1833

Jurisdiction CertainmembersoftheCommonwealthofNations

Location MiddlesexGuildhall,London

Authorizedby HMGovernmentviatheJudicialCommitteeAct1833

Website www.jcpc.gov.uk

TheJudicial

Committee

of

the

Privy

Council

(JCPC)

is

one

of

the

highest

courts

in

the

United

Kingdom.

Established

by

the

JudicialCommitteeAct1833tohearappealsformerlyheardbytheKinginCouncil(s.3),itisthehighestcourtofappealfor

several independentCommonwealthcountries,aswellas for theUnitedKingdom'soverseas territories,and theBritish

CrownDependencies. It isoften referred toas thePrivyCouncil,as inmostcasesappealsaremade to"HerMajesty in

Council" (i.e. theBritishmonarchas formallyadvisedbyherPrivyCounsellors),who then refers thecase to the Judicial

Committee for"advice";the"report"oftheJudicialCommittee isalwaysacceptedbytheQueen inCouncilasjudgment.

Thepanelofjudges(typicallyfiveinnumber)hearingaparticularcaseisknownas"theBoard".

InCommonwealth republics retaining the JCPC as their final courtof appeal, appealsaremadedirectly to the Judicial

Committeeitself.InthecaseofBrunei,appealsaremadetotheSultanofBrunei,whothenrefersthecasetotheJudicial

Committeeforadvice.


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29

FormerlytheJudicialCommitteegaveaunanimousreport,butsincethe1960sdissentingopinionshavebeenallowed. In

July2007,theJudicialCommitteeheldthatithadthepowertodepartfromprecedentif itconcludedthatoneofitsown

previousdecisionswasincorrect.

The JudicialCommittee'spermanenthome is inLondon, in theUnitedKingdom.On1October2009, itmoved from the

PrivyCouncilChamber,inDowningStreet,totheformerMiddlesexGuildhallbuilding,whichhadbeenrefurbishedin2007

toprovideahomeforboththeJCPCandthenewlycreatedSupremeCourtoftheUnitedKingdom.

ThejudicialsystemoftheUnitedKingdomisunusualinhavingnosinglehighestnationalcourt;theJudicialCommittee is

thehighestcourtofappealinsomecases,whileinmostothersthehighestcourtofappealistheUKSupremeCourt.

InScotlandthehighestcourtincriminalcasesistheHighCourtofJusticiary;theUKSupremeCourtisthehighestcourtin

civil cases and matters arising from Scottish devolution, the latter previously having been dealt with by the Judicial

Committee.

JudgmentsoftheJudicialCommitteearenotgenerallybindingoncourtswithintheUnitedKingdom,havingonlypersuasive

authority,butarebindingonallcourtswithinanyotherCommonwealthcountryfromwhichanappealisheard.

FromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia


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30

SOURCES OF ANGLO-SAXON LAW :CHAPTER THREETHE RULE OF LAWIntroduction

IntheirPrinciplesoftheEnglishLegalSystem(3rd

edition,1997),GarySlapperandDavidKellyclaim(p.11):

The Rule of Law represents a symbolic ideal against which proponents of widely divergent political persuasionsmeasure or criticise the shortcomings of contemporary State practice.

Theyinsistonthelackofprecisioninthedefinitionoftheconcept,whichhaschangedovertimeandaccording

tothesocietalandpoliticalviewsofthosetacklingthesubject.Theyalsoclaimthat

Itisundeniablethattheformandcontentoflawandlegalprocedurehavechangedsubstantiallyinthecourse

of the20th

century. ()As theState increasingly tookover the regulationofmanyareasofsocialactivity, it

delegated wideranging discretionary powers to various people and bodies in an attempt to ensure the

successfulimplementation ofitspolicies.TheassumptionanddelegationofsuchpoweronthepartoftheState

brought it intopotentialconflictwithpreviousunderstandingof theRuleofLawwhichhadentailedastrictly

limitedambitofStateactivity.(p.11)

Today,itiscommonlyadmittedthattheRuleofLawisthefundamentaldoctrinethatallmenareequalbefore

thelawregardlessofappointmentorofficialstatus.Inherentthemeaningoftheruleoflawisthatthereisno

arbitraryjusticeorexerciseofarbitrarypower.(Reference:www.gilhams.com/dictionary/314.cfm)

DefinitionsofruleoflawontheWeb(Googlesearch):

astateoforderinwhicheventsconformtothelaw

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

thedoctrinethatnoindividualisabovethelawandthateveryonemustanswertoit

en.wiktionary.org/wiki/rule_of_law

Theprinciplethateverymemberofasociety,evenaruler,mustfollowthelaw.

instech.tusd.k12.az.us/Core/glossary/ssglossary.doc

Allgovernment

officials

and

all

private

citizens

must

follow

the

laws

of

the

nation

and

must

be

treated

equallyunderthelaw.Thegovernmentiscreatedbyandforthepeopleandisanswerabletothe

people.

cooscurrycourts.org/glossaryofterms/index.htm

Oneofthecornerstonesofdemocraticsociety,meaningthateveryoneissubjecttothelaw.Itisnot

justtherulethateveryoneiscoveredbytheCriminalCodeandmustbechargedandconvictedif

appropriate....

bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl

anotherphraseforlawandorder;theprinciplesthatrequirethatthepowersofthestatebederived

fromandlimitedeitherbylegislation...

www.manitobacourts.mb.ca/definitions.html


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31

Alegalsysteminwhichrulesareclear,wellunderstood,andfairlyenforced,includingpropertyrights

andenforcementofcontracts.

wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/r.html

Predominanceoflawoverthediscretionaryauthorityofpublicofficials.

www.csa.com/discoveryguides/terror/gloss.php

theextenttowhichagentshaveconfidence inandabidebytherulesofsociety,andinparticularthe

qualityofcontractenforcement,thepolice...

www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/index.cfm

ThereisawidearrayofopinionsconcerningthemeaningoftheRuleoflaw,assaidpreviouslyandascanbe

seenfromthedefinitionsabove.Weshallstudysomeoftheprominentviewsoftheconcept,startingwiththe

classicists,that istosayAVDiceyandFriedrichvonHayek, thenweshallreviewmorecontemporary and/or

progressiveopinionsabout theRuleofLawandweshallroundup thechapterby focusingonMaxWebers

pointofviewonthesubject.

2.1 Theclassicistsviews

2.1.1 AVDicey

AccordingtoAlbertVennDicey(18351922),whowroteTheLawoftheConstitution in1885,theRuleofLaw

wasoneofthekeycharacteristicsthatdistinguishedtheEnglishconstitutionfromitscontinentalcounterparts.

FromDiceys standpoint, theEnglishmanenjoyed theprotectionof theRuleof LawwhileotherEuropeans

werestillsubjecttoarbitrarypower.

AccordingtoDicey,threeingredientswereneededfortheRuleofLawtoexist:

AnabsenceofarbitrarypoweronthepartoftheState.TheextentoftheStatespowerandtheway

in which it exercises such power are limited and controlled by law. Such control is aimed at

preventingtheStatefromacquiringandusingwidediscretionarypowers,becausetheproblemwith

discretion is that it can be exercised in an arbitrary fashion, and that above all is to be feared,

accordingtoDicey.

Equalitybeforethe law.Thefactthatnoperson isabovethe law, irrespectiveofclassorrank.This

was linkedwiththefactthatthoseservingtheState,thecivilservants,aresubjecttothesame law

andlegalproceduresasordinaryprivatecitizens.

Supremacyofordinary law.ThisrelatedtothefactthattheEnglishconstitutionwastheproductof

theordinarylawofthelandandwasbasedontheprovisionofremediesbythecourtsratherthanon

thedeclarationofrightsintheformofawrittenconstitution.

Diceywaswritingfromaparticularpoliticalperspectivethatconsideredthemaintenanceofindividualproperty

and individual freedom a top priority. He was opposed to any increase in State activity in the pursuit of

collectiveinterests.Diceysversionof theRuleofLawveneratedformalequalityattheexpenseofsubstantive

equality.Saiddifferently,hethoughtthatthelawandtheStateshouldbeblindtotherealconcretedifferences


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32

that exist between people, in terms ofwealth or power or connection, and should treat them equally, as

possessorsofabstractrightsandduties.

In Diceys work, the Rule of Law was only one of two fundamental elements of the English system of

government: theotherwasparliamentary sovereignty.Therefore, if thegovernment controls the legislative

process,bycommandingastrongmajority inbothchambers,thesovereigntyofParliament isreducedtothe

undisputedsupremacyofcentralgovernment.Atensionstemsfromthefactthat,whereastheRuleofLawwas

aimedatcontrollingarbitrarypower,Parliamentcould,withinthisconstitutionalstructure,pave theway for

such arbitrarypowerbypassing appropriate legislation.Such a situation is specific to theBritish versionof

liberalgovernment.

2.1.2 FriedrichvonHayek

Hayek followed inDiceys footsteps in considering the crucial component of the Rule of Law as being the

absence

of

arbitrary

power

in

the

hands

of

the

State.

Hayek,

who

was

a

harsh

critic

of

the

interventionist

State,

devotedthewholeofthesixthchapterofTheRoadtoSerfdom(RoutledgeClassics,London&NewYork,2001),

hismasterpiece,tothedetailedexaminationoftheconcept.

According toHayek,thepresenceorabsenceof theRuleofLaw isthemaincriterionbywhichto tella free

countryfromonethatisnot.AcountryenjoyingthebenefitoftheRuleofLawisoneinwhichthegovernment

inallitsactionsisboundbyrulesfixedandannouncedbeforehandruleswhichmakeitpossibletoforesee...

howtheauthoritywilluseitscoercivepowersingivencircumstances,andtoplanonesindividualaffairsonthe

basisofthisknowledge.(pp.756)

Under theRuleofLaw, the individual enjoys the freedom to pursuehispersonalendsanddesireswithout

fearing government interference to frustrate his efforts. In the economic field,wemay find two types of

societies:theone inwhich,withinaglobalandstable framework, individualswilldecideforthemselves, the

otherwhereeconomicactivitywillbeguidedbyacentralauthority.

Inthelattertype,thegovernmentdirectstheuseofthemeansofproductiontoparticularends.Intheformer

one,formalrules...areintendedtobemerelyinstrumentalinthepursuitofpeoplesvariousindividualends.

(p.76)Inthecollectivistsystem,theplanningauthoritycannottieitselfdowninadvancetogeneralandformal

ruleswhichpreventarbitrariness. Itmustprovide for theactualneedsof thepeopleas theyariseand then

choosedeliberately

between

them.

(p.

77)

Ifthegovernmenthastodecidehowmanypigsaretoberaisedorhowmanybusesshouldrun,suchdecisions

are bound to depend on the circumstances of the moment and not deduced from general principles.

Furthermore,suchdecisionmakingentailscomparingthevariousinterestsofvariouspersonsandgroupsand,

eventually,someonewillhavetosaywhoseinterestsprevail.


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33

Therefore, a new distinction of rank will emerge. The distinction between formal law or justice and

substantive rules isvital. It is thesameas thatbetween layingdownaRuleof theRoad,as in theHighway

Code,andorderingpeoplewheretogo.Hayekcontendsthatformalrulesaresuperiortoothersinthesense

thattheydonotinvolveachoicebetweenparticularendsorparticularpeople.(p.78)

Thereare

two

arguments

in

favour

of

formal

rules.

The

former

is

economic.

If

individuals

are

to

make

informed,

rationalchoices,theactionsoftheStatemustbepredictable,mustbedeterminedbyrulesfixedindependently

of the concrete circumstances which can neither be foreseen nor taken into account beforehand. If,

conversely,theStatecontrolledpeoplesactions,itsactionswouldhavetobedecidedonthebasisofthefull

circumstancesofthemomentandwouldthereforebeunpredictable.

(p.79)

Thelatterargument,ofamoralandpoliticalnature,isyetrelevanttothedemonstration.Generalrules,Hayek

argues, must be intended to operate in largely unpredictable circumstances. Therefore, their effect on

particularends

or

particular

people

cannot

be

known

in

advance

and

In

aworld

where

everything

was

preciselyforeseen,thestatecouldhardlydoanythingandremainimpartial.(p.80)

Acounterargumentmightbethattheeconomicplannerneednotandshouldnotbeguidedbyhisindividual

prejudices,butcouldrelyonthegeneralconvictionofwhatisfairandreasonable.However,Hayekclaims,the

moreplanningthereis,themoreitisnecessarytoqualifylegalprovisions...byreferencetowhatisfairor

reasonable i.e. leave the decision of the concrete case ... to the discretion of thejudge or authority in

question.

Onecould

write

ahistory

of

the

decline

of

the

Rule

of

Law...

in

terms

of

the

progressive

introduction

of

these

vagueformulaeintolegislationandjurisdiction,andoftheincreasingarbitrarinessanduncertaintyof,andthe

consequentdisrespectfor,thelawandthejudicature.(p.81)

Inshort,planningnecessarilyinvolvesdeliberatediscriminationbetweenparticularneedsordifferentpeople.

Itmeansineffectareturntotheruleofstatus,areversalofthemovementofprogressivesocietieswhichhas

hithertobeenamovementfromstatustocontract.(p.82)

LiberalismandtheRuleofLaw

Thenotionoflaissezfaire,Hayeksays,hasbeenmisunderstoodasmeaningthattheState

shouldnotactatall,whichisnotthecase.Everystatemustact,butnotalways:


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34

...thestatecontrollingweightsandmeasures...iscertainlyacting,whilethestatepermittingtheuseofviolence,

forexample,bystrikepickets,isinactive.Yet,itisinthefirstcasethatthestateobservesliberalprinciplesand

inthesecondthatitdoesnot.(p.84)

TheRuleofLawwasevolvedduring the liberalage, that is the18th

century,andmaybeoneof itsgreatest

achievements:

Manisfreeifheneedstoobeynopersonbutsolelythelaws.ImmanuelKant(17241804)

(Hayekp.85)

Governmentalactionmaybelegal,butnotnecessarilyinagreementwiththeRuleofLaw:

Itmay well be that Hitler has obtained his unlimitedpowers in a strictly constitutionalmanner and that

whateverhedoesisthereforelegalinthejuridicalsense.ButwhowouldsuggestforthatreasonthattheRule

ofLawstillprevailsinGermany?(p.85)

Themost arbitrary rule can bemade legal if the government is given unlimited powers and in thisway a

democracymaysetupthemostcompletedespotismimaginable.(p.86)TheRuleofLawthusimplieslimitsto

the scope of legislation.(p. 87) The limitations of the powers of legislation imply the recognition of the

inalienable right of the individual, inviolable rights of man. (p.88)


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2.2OthertheoriesoftheRuleofLaw

2.2.1EPThomson

Unlike Dicey andHayek, Thomson is not a conservative, in the traditional political sense. Indeed, he is a

Marxisthistorian,but, likeDiceyandHayek,heseestheRuleof lawasaprotectionagainsttheencroaching

powerofthemodernState.

ThomsonsharesHayeksfearoftheeverexpandingStateandthewaytheWelfareStatehasintervenedinthe

dailylivesofitscitizens.FromThomsonsperspective,however,theproblemstemsnotsomuchfromthefact

thattheStateisunderminingthefreeoperationofthemarketeconomy,butfromthewayinwhichtheState

hasused itscontroloverthe legislativeprocesstounderminecivil liberties inthepursuitofitsownvisionof

thepublicgood.

InWhigsandHunters(1975),thesubjectofwhichisthemanipulationof lawbythelandedclassesinthe18th

century,ThomsonconcludesthattheRuleofLawisnotjustanecessarymeansoflimitingthepotentialabuse

ofpowerbutthat:

TheRuleofLaw, itself,the imposingofeffective inhibitionsuponpowerandthedefenceofthecitizenfrom

powersallintrusiveclaims,seemstomeanunqualifiedhumangood.

SuchaconclusionclearlyshowsthatThomsonconcurswithHayek sviewthattheRuleofLawgoesbeyond

themererequirementthatthelawshouldbemadethroughtheappropriatelegalinstitutions.

2.2.2 JosephRaz

Some legalphilosophershave recognised theneed forState intervention incontemporarysocietyandhave

providedwaysofunderstandingtheRuleofLawasameansofcontrollingdiscretion(i.e.discretionarypower)

withoutattemptingtoeradicateitcompletely.JosephRaz,inanarticleentitledTheRuleofLawanditsVirtue

(1972) intheLawQuarterlyReviewn93,for instance,claimsthatthepursuitofsocialgoalsmayrequirethe

enactmentofparticularaswellasgenerallaws.Hesuggeststhatitwouldbepracticallyimpossibleforlawto

consistonlyofgeneralrules.


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36

RazevencriticisesHayekfordisguisingapoliticalargumentasalegaloneinordertoattackpolicieswhichhe

didnotapproveof.Yet,atthesametime,RazalsoseestheRuleofLawasessentiallyanegativevalue,acting

tominimisethedangerthatcanfollowtheexerciseofdiscretionarypowerinanarbitraryway.Inthatrespect,

byseekingtocontroltheexerciseofdiscretion,hesharescommongroundwithDicey,HayekandThomson.

Raz argues that the basic requirement from which the wider idea of the Rule of Law emerges is the

requirementthat

the

law

must

be

capable

of

guiding

the

individuals

behaviour.

According

to

him,

some

importantprinciplesmaybederivedfromthisgeneralidea:

Lawsshouldbeprospectiveratherthanretroactive.Peoplecannotbeguidedbyorexpectedtoobey

lawswhichhavenotasyetbeenintroduced.Lawsshouldbedraftedinaclearwaytoenablecitizens

tounderstandthemandguidetheiractionsaccordingly.

Lawsshouldnotbechangedtoofrequentlyasthismight leadtoconfusionastowhatwasactually

coveredbythelaw.

Thereshouldbeclearrulesandproceduresinordertomakelaws.

Theindependence ofthejudiciaryhastobeguaranteedtomakesurejudgesarefreetodecidecases

inlinewiththelawandnotinresponsetoanyexternalpressure.

Theprinciplesofnaturaljusticeshouldbeobserved,requiringanopenandfairhearingtobegivento

allpartiestoproceedings.

Thecourtsshouldhavethepowertoreviewthewayinwhichtheotherprinciplesareimplemented

toensuretheyarebeingoperatedasdemandedbytheRuleofLaw.

Thecourtsshouldbeeasilyaccessibleastheyremainattheheartofthe ideaofmakingdiscretion

subjecttolegalcontrol.

Thediscretionofthecrimepreventingagenciesshouldnotbeallowedtopervertthelaw.

AccordingtoRaz,thereistheRuleofLawiftheproceduralrulesoflawmakingarecompliedwithsubjecttoa

numberofsafeguards.Moreover,byseeingthecourtsashavinganessentialparttoplayinhisversionofthe

RuleofLaw,Razmaybeclassifiedasanadvocateofthenotionofjudicialreview.

2.2.3 RobertoUnger

InLawandModernSociety

Documents

Source Du Droit Anglo-Saxon